Election upsets, who’s next?
Assessing socio-economic problems and the populist vote
Bert Colijn, ING Economics Department
Amsterdam, +31 (0)6 30 656 223
20 April 2017
Socio-economic conditions in Italy suggest an election upset more than
in France
In the past year, election upsets seem to have become the
norm. In the US presidential election, the EU-referendum in
the UK, the Ukraine referendum in the Netherlands and the
constitution referendum in Italy, a vote against the
establishment prevailed. In the recent Dutch elections, the
populist Freedom Party gained seats in parliament and
became the second largest party. Factors such as
globalisation, European institutions, and immigration and
integration were key themes in most of the votes.
A common factor among populist voters is that there are
higher percentages of them among the lesser educated,
those with lower income and the elderly, although these
percentages differ across countries.
With elections in France, Germany, Italy and the UK coming
up, many of the same topics in recent elections and
referenda feature prominently in the debate. Especially in
France and Italy, the populist vote commands a substantial
share in opinion polls. In this report, we find that of those
countries, Italy seems to be the most at risk of a populist win
given economic conditions and perceptions, with France
coming second. While there are many other factors at play
that are not related to the economy, this seems to reflect
the current polls quite well.
2
Table of contents
Summary of situation – 3
Perceptions about socio-economic situation – 5
Developments in socio-economic situation – 9
Sentiment about key election themes – 17
Summary and implications - 23
Italy seems most susceptible to an anti-establishment vote given
the socio-economic developments over the past decade
Which election poses the highest risk of a populist win, given
socio-economic conditions?
HIGHER
Italy shows the highest risk of
an election upset influenced
by socio-economic
conditions. Real incomes are
still lower than 10 years ago,
making this a lost decade for
many Italians. The many
Italian SMEs have suffered
from globalisation. Perception
of benefits of participation in
the euro and the EU is low,
creating a breeding ground
for anti-EU parties. Currently,
parties with such a stance
have a majority in Italian
opinion polls.
3
LOWER
In France, the popular
perception of the standard of
living and the economic
future is very low. France is
no outlier in terms of
economic developments for
the more vulnerable groups
since the crisis, though. The
dual labour market is a hot
topic, reducing chances for
the young. More extreme
options have emerged on
both the left and the right
with Mélenchon and Le Pen,
giving the anti-establishment
vote a significant share in
opinion polls.
The snap elections in the UK
will likely result in a victory
for the Conservative Party
and PM May as they are
projected to win additional
seats in parliament. The
economy has recovered
more strongly in the UK than
on the continent and
although many feel left
behind due to low wage
growth, poor employment
protection and low job
security, this is unlikely to
cause an election upset this
time around.
In Germany, economic
growth has been exceptional
compared to the rest of
Europe throughout the crisis
years. Especially in 2009-13,
Germany outperformed
significantly and has since
managed to reduce the
unemployment rate to 3.9%.
Still, underemployment and
low wages seem to be
simmering issues in
Germany. While this is the
case, populists in Germany
are not gaining ground in
opinion polls for the general
election in the fall.
Perceptions about the
socio-economic situation
Lesser educated have seen their standard of living decrease
Only in Germany have people with lower (up to “primary”) levels of education seen their standard of living improve over the past five
years, according to the ING Motivaction Empowerment Report. The gap in perception of standard of living by education category has
been large as the higher (“tertiary”) educated have seen a strong improvement over the same period. France and Italy are the
exceptions here, but there is also still a large gap in the perception of developments in living conditions.
For the next five years, the view barely changes despite improving economic conditions across Europe. The higher educated are
confident about their standard of living improving in coming years, whereas the less educated think their standard of living will
deteriorate further. This is an important gauge of concerns among a large part of the electorate.
Has your standard of living increased in the
past 5 years?
Will your standard of living increase in the
next 5 years?
30
20
20
10
10
0
0
-10
-10
-20
-20
-30
-30
-40
-40
-50
-50
-60
-60
Balance, %
30
France
Germany
Low education
Italy
Middle education
Netherlands
High education
Source: ING Motivaction Empowerment Report, 2016
5
UK
France
Germany
Low education
Italy
Middle education
Netherlands
High education
UK
Older voters are more pessimistic about the future
By age group, we see a similar pattern as for education. Older voters have perceived their standard of living as
having deteriorated everywhere except for in Germany and the UK. While there is a natural bias towards more
progress in the standard of living for the young, this still illustrates the concerns that older voters have. Expectations
for the future among older voters are particularly low in France, Italy and the Netherlands. Without exception,
people in the 55-64 category expect their standard of living to fall in the coming five years.
Will your standard of living increase in the
next 5 years?
Balance, %
Has your standard of living increased in past
5 years?
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
0
-20
-20
-40
-40
-60
-60
-80
-80
France
Germany
18-24
25-34
Italy
35-44
Netherlands
45-54
55-64
Source: ING Motivaction Empowerment Report, 2016
6
UK
France
Germany
18-24
25-34
Italy
35-44
Netherlands
45-54
55-64
UK
Confidence of the young and well-educated is structurally higher
In most countries, people with lower incomes are less confident. This also holds for education, with the less educated having
lower confidence than the higher educated. In all countries, we see that the gap in confidence between higher and less
educated increased during the crisis years. The UK is a remarkable exception as the confidence of the less educated has
increased while that of the higher educated declined ahead of the Brexit vote. There is a clear split in confidence by age
group, with the elderly less confident than the young. In recent months this gap has fallen significantly in most countries.
Gap in confidence between high and low education
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Source: European Commission, ING Economics
7
UK
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
UK
7-16
1-15
10-15
4-14
7-13
1-12
10-12
4-11
7-10
10-09
1-09
4-08
7-07
10-06
1-06
4-05
7-04
10-03
1-03
4-02
7-01
10-00
9-16
11-15
-5
1-15
-5
3-14
0
5-13
0
7-12
5
9-11
5
11-10
10
1-10
10
3-09
15
5-08
15
7-07
20
9-06
20
11-05
25
1-05
25
3-04
30
5-03
30
7-02
35
9-01
35
11-00
40
1-00
40
1-00
Gap in confidence between 18-24s and 65+s
Developments in the
socio-economic situation
Real income growth has been weak for years in most countries
The crisis has had a negative impact on incomes throughout Europe. In Italy, real disposable income growth has been
negative for the past decade. In the UK and Netherlands, real disposable income has not reached pre-crisis levels.
Remarkably, real income growth by education group does not suggest weakest growth for the lesser educated. In fact, this is
only the case in Germany, whereas income growth has strengthened significantly in the UK. In Italy, all groups have seen real
income decline significantly, while in the Netherlands all education groups have suffered from the crisis and have not yet
reached the pre-crisis peak.
Real median disposable household income growth: 2008-2015
15,0%
10,0%
5,0%
0,0%
-5,0%
-10,0%
-15,0%
-20,0%
Germany
France
Low education
Source: Eurostat, ING Economics
9
Italy
Medium education
Netherlands
High education
UK
Equality marginally increased over the crisis years
Inequality is not as bad in Europe as it is in the US, but developments in the Gini coefficient, an often-used indicator of
inequality, show that Italy has seen inequality increase in recent years. In the UK, this has not been the case but inequality is
still at a higher level than in the large continental European countries. In France, inequality has been decreasing since the
peak of the crisis in 2011 and inequality is now lower than in Germany.
Gini coefficient
0,41
0,39
0,37
0,35
0,33
0,31
0,29
0,27
0,25
2005
Source: OECD, ING Economics
10
2006
2007
Germany
2008
France
2009
Italy
2010
2011
Netherlands
2012
UK
2013
US
2014
While older generations have seen income grow faster, wealth has
been impacted negatively in almost all countries
Over 2010 to 2014 the younger generation has seen their wealth decline significantly. Still, except for Germany, older
generations have all seen their assets lose value over the four year period. This can amount to substantial losses though, as
older generations generally have much more to lose than the younger and are closer to retirement or have even retired. This
can cause precarious situations, given the dependence on savings.
Growth of median inflation adjusted net wealth by age of household reference person (2010 - 2014)
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
-100%
Eurozone
Source: ECB, ING Economics
11
Germany
16-34
France
35-44
45-54
55-64
Italy
65-74
75+
Netherlands
Unemployment among lesser educated and elderly still much higher
than pre-crisis
The lesser-educated generally have the higher unemployment rates, but after the crisis have also faced longer periods of
weakness. In France, this is very apparent as unemployment for the lesser educated has continued to rise, while people with
high levels of education barely saw an increase in unemployment.
In the UK and Germany, unemployment rates among the lesser educated are low, but the quality of employment is an
important topic of discussion in both countries. Zero- or one-hour contracts in the UK and ‘mini jobs’ - which pay below the
minimum wage - in Germany frequently pose concern.
Older workers may have lower unemployment rates than the young, but have a harder time getting back to work and, given
the end of attractive early retirement regulations in most European countries, finding a job again is often a necessity.
Unemployment rate, lesser educated
Unemployment rate, age 50-74
20
14
18
12
16
14
10
12
8
10
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
Germany
Source: Eurostat
12
France
Netherlands
UK
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
UK
7-2016
10-2015
1-2015
4-2014
7-2013
10-2012
1-2012
4-2011
7-2010
10-2009
1-2009
4-2008
7-2007
10-2006
1-2006
4-2005
7-2004
1-2003
10-2003
4-2002
7-2001
10-2000
1-2000
5-2016
7-2015
9-2014
11-2013
1-2013
3-2012
5-2011
7-2010
9-2009
1-2008
Italy
11-2008
3-2007
5-2006
7-2005
9-2004
11-2003
1-2003
3-2002
5-2001
7-2000
9-1999
11-1998
0
1-1998
0
Participation has improved, but not for everyone
In France the participation problem is most apparent. As unemployment continues to increase for lesser educated “prime
age” workers (aged between 25 and 54), participation is dropping rapidly. We look at prime age participation here, as
participation is still increasing for older workers. European countries are stimulating people to work longer through increasing
the pension age and other incentives, masking declines among the younger age groups.
Italy also has not seen participation increase and has very low participation in general. This is not necessarily a sign of
economic weakness - female participation is low in Italy, rooted at least partly in culture. Still, the decline in participation for
lesser educated “prime age” workers poses concern.
Participation, age 15-74
Low education participation, age 25-54
75
85
70
80
65
75
60
70
55
65
50
45
60
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Germany
Source: Eurostat
13
France
Italy
Netherlands
UK
2000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
UK
Job security has decreased in most of Europe
An often-mentioned concern for voters is the lack of job security. Not only has the crisis caused people to lose jobs, but
contracts that people work under increasingly lack protection for workers. In many European countries the number of
temporary contracts has increased, making it easier to let people go and consequently making it more difficult to buy a
house. In recent years, especially the Netherlands has seen this number increase substantially. In countries such as the UK,
where regular jobs are not highly protected, this is less of an issue,.
% of employees with a temporary contract
Employment protection of regular contracts
25
3,50
3,00
20
6=strictest
2,50
15
2,00
1,50
1,00
10
0,50
5
0,00
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Germany
Source: Eurostat, OECD
14
France
Italy
Netherlands
UK
2008
2013
Manufacturing as a traditional engine of job growth seems over
Manufacturing jobs have been disappearing for decades as technology and outsourcing have significantly reduced the
demand for workers in traditional industry, particularly for less educated workers. In Europe, the decline has been largest in
traditional manufacturing countries such as Germany and Italy. Still, the percent of all disappearing manufacturing jobs lost
to offshoring is highest in the Netherlands. While the amount of jobs lost is not large, the percent lost to globalisation is
higher in the Netherlands than elsewhere.
% jobs lost to offshoring out of total jobs lost
in manufacturing
Manufacturing shares in total employment
30%
20
25%
18
16
20%
14
12
15%
10
8
10%
6
5%
4
2
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
0%
Germany
France
Source: Eurostat, Eurofound
15
Italy
Netherlands
UK
0
Netherlands
Italy
2008-2009
UK
2010-2014
France
2015-2016
Germany
2003-2016
Sentiment on key election
themes
The image of the EU has taken a hard hit over the past crisis years
Since the crisis, trust in European institutions has decreased, creating scope for anti-euro and anti-EU platforms for populists
to campaign on. The image of the EU has been tarnished almost everywhere, but the situation seems to be of most concern
in Italy. The proportion of people that think Italy has not benefited from EU membership is much higher than in other
countries, at more than 33%. Interestingly, the balance has actually tilted positively, ahead of the EU-referendum in the UK.
% thinks country has not benefited from EU
Image of the EU - positive or negative
50
80
45
40
40
35
20
Percent
Balance, percent
60
0
30
25
20
15
-20
10
-40
5
Source: Eurobarometer
17
France
Italy
Netherlands
UK
France
Italy
Netherlands
UK
3-2016
5-2015
7-2014
9-2013
1-2012
11-2012
3-2011
5-2010
7-2009
9-2008
11-2007
1-2007
3-2006
5-2005
7-2004
9-2003
1-2002
Germany
11-2002
3-2001
5-2000
11-2015
1-2015
3-2014
5-2013
7-2012
9-2011
1-2010
11-2010
3-2009
5-2008
7-2007
9-2006
11-2005
1-2005
3-2004
5-2003
7-2002
9-2001
1-2000
11-2000
Germany
7-1999
0
-60
The image of the euro has divided between countries recently
In recent years Italy has seen support for the euro weaken further, while the number of people that are against the euro has
declined significantly in Germany. In the Netherlands, support for the euro is quite low but has stabilized over recent years.
Trust in the European Central Bank has fallen significantly since its inception, particularly over recent crisis years. In Italy,
distrust peaked in 2011 and has since come down to levels similar to Germany and France. The largest drop in sentiment
took place prior to QE in most countries, surprising given the negative sentiment towards the programme in countries such
as the Netherlands and Germany.
% against the euro
% that does not trust the ECB
40
70
35
60
50
Percent
Percent
30
25
40
30
20
20
15
10
Germany
Source: Eurobarometer
18
France
Italy
Netherlands
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
7-2016
9-2015
11-2014
1-2014
3-2013
5-2012
7-2011
9-2010
11-2009
1-2009
3-2008
5-2007
7-2006
9-2005
11-2004
1-2004
3-2003
5-2002
7-2001
9-2000
11-1999
0
1-1999
7-2016
3-2016
11-2015
7-2015
3-2015
11-2014
7-2014
3-2014
11-2013
7-2013
3-2013
11-2012
7-2012
3-2012
11-2011
7-2011
3-2011
11-2010
7-2010
10
Globalisation is perceived particularly negatively in Italy and France
Globalisation has been an important theme in the American presidential elections. The view that Americans did not benefit
from globalisation is widely shared in certain parts of American society. In Europe, this view is most prevalent in France and
Italy, while in Germany and Netherlands many people think globalisation has been positive for their economies.
Our country’s involvement in the global economy is a …
120
100
%
80
60
40
20
0
Germany
France
Italy
Good thing
Source: Pew Research
19
Bad thing
Netherlands
Don't know
UK
Immigration is a top concern for many across Europe
People rank immigration as one of the most immediate problems their country is facing. The percent of people ranking it as a
top two concern for their country has increased strongly over the past years and seems closely correlated with the number
of people seeking asylum. With the number of asylum applicants having declined since the deal between Turkey and the EU,
the number of people ranking this as a top concern has been falling again but is still at elevated levels. Italy, hosting asylum
seekers mostly from Africa, has continued to see numbers of asylum seekers increase.
50
60000
60
50000
50
40000
40
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
0
0
0
0
10
1000
0
0
2016
10
2015
10000
2014
5
2016
2000
20
2000
2013
20
2012
10
20000
2011
30
30
3000
2010
30000
15
40
4000
2009
20
5000
2008
6000
2009
0
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0
5
6000
35
25
2008
Immigration
concern (right axis)
1000
70
8000
4000
2000
70000
2015
10
40
30
4000
3000
60
2014
15
7000
2013
10000
80
2012
5000
12000
80000
2011
Asylum
6000
applicants
20
45
2010
7000
14000
2009
25
2008
8000
Note: Immigration concern measured by Eurobarometer question: “Is immigration one of the two most important issues facing our
country?”
Source: Eurobarometer, Eurostat
20
Migration has mostly picked up in Germany though
Migration is more a social issue than an economic one. When looking at immigrants - including economic migrants accepted into the country, Germany is clearly the country with the highest level of immigration as a proportion of the total
population. This matches the large percentage of Germans mentioning immigration as one of the two most important issues
facing their country. In France and Italy, the number of immigrants is around just 0.5% of the total population.
Immigrants as % of total population
2,0%
1,8%
1,6%
1,4%
1,2%
1,0%
0,8%
0,6%
0,4%
0,2%
0,0%
2000
Source: Eurostat
21
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Germany (until 1990 former territory of the FRG)
2007
2008
France
2009
Italy
2010
2011
2012
Netherlands
2013
2014
United Kingdom
2015
Summary and implications
Different problems across Europe cause different concerns
Relative assessment of variables between countries
WORSE
BETTER
Current levels
Income inequality
Unemployment of lower educated
Unemployment of older people
Labour force participation of lower educated
% temporary jobs
Labour protection
Medium
Good
Good
Medium
Medium
Good
Medium
Bad
Bad
Good
Medium
Good
High
Bad
Bad
Bad
Medium
Good
Low
Good
Bad
Good
Bad
Good
High
Good
Good
Medium
Good
Bad
Developments 2008-latest
Income inequality growth
Income growth of lower educated
Wealth growth of age group 55+
Unemployment of lower educated
Unemployment of age group 50+
Labour force participation of lower educated
% temporary jobs
Labour protection
Globalisation impact
Medium
Low
High
Good
Good
Medium
Good
Good
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Bad
Bad
Bad
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
Low
Low
Bad
Bad
Good
Medium
Medium
Bad
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Bad
Medium
Bad
Medium
Medium
Low
High
NA
Good
Good
Good
Medium
Bad
Good
Source: ING
23
Italy stands out in terms of poor socio-economic performance, creating a
breeding ground for populism
Better economic situation
with worse development
since 2008
ING’s relative assessment of variables between countries
Germany
Better economic
situation with better
development since
2008
Netherlands
UK
Levels
France
Italy
Worse economic situation
with worse development
since 2008
24
Growth
Worse economic
situation with better
development since
2008
Any support to the recovery in the coming year would be favourable for
political stability in Italy and the Eurozone
Elections in France are around the corner, making it unlikely that conditions and perceptions will change much before the
vote. A victory for Marine Le Pen is not unimaginable as she will likely make it through to the 2 nd round, although it is not our
base case that she will win. The surge of Jean-Luc Mélenchon has brought another Eurosceptic within reach of the 2nd round,
with Mélenchon and Le Pen both going through a possibility.
In Italy, three parties with a strong anti-euro stance currently together score over 50% in the polls. With elections expected in
1Q18 and in May at the latest, there is little time for economic conditions to improve. To reduce unemployment, create wage
growth and improve confidence, it seems necessary to maintain an accommodative fiscal stance over the course of the
coming year. This would favour political stability in Italy and with that in the Eurozone, despite causing Italy to fail to adhere
to the medium-term targets in the Stability and Growth Pact. Given the situation that the Eurozone is currently in, that
seems reasonable.
40
40%
35
35
mrt-17
jan-17
nov-16
sep-16
jul-16
mei-16
jan-16
03-17
mrt-16
LibDem
0%
0
Note: monthly average of polls through April (until April 18), source: ING
25
5%
01-17
03-17
01-17
11-16
09-16
07-16
05-16
03-16
0
01-16
0
First round
10%
Forza Italia
5
UKIP
15%
11-16
5
03-17
5
10
Mélenchon
09-16
10
AfD
01-16
10
20%
Lega Nord
15
01-17
15
11-16
15
Labour
25%
Five star movement
20
Macron
09-16
20
07-16
20
30%
25
25
Conservatives
35%
30
07-16
Social Democrats
25
Fillon
Le Pen
30
Democratic Party
05-16
30
40
05-16
35
45%
03-16
Christian Democrats
45
03-16
40
45
01-16
45
So what happens if a …
Populist victory
Establishment victory
A push towards gaining more domestic control
will likely occur, including a possible Eurozone
exit. The checks and balances in the political
system will be key to the success of this. Less
EU integration seems certain.
Business as usual to prevail with an
establishment victory, although the divide with
the large % of populist voters must be bridged.
Further pushes towards EU integration will have
to be practical and won’t be large.
Markets
Markets have only priced in some of the risk
and will respond negatively if euro break-up risk
increases. Higher spreads, a weaker euro and a
lower risk-free rate should prevail.
The market response will likely be positive, but
smaller than the negative impact of a populist
victory. The risk of a future populist win will
remain, depending on how well the country
performs under establishment leadership.
Economy
The uncertainty of a possible break-up and
possible smaller policy changes will likely
dampen investment further. Any move towards
an exit would take investment further from its
potential and could curb domestic demand.
Policy
Note: for more on the future of the Eurozone and populism, click here
26
With lower political uncertainty, there is an
upside to investment growth. More EU
collaboration could lift growth potential, but
with substantial resistance to further
integration, the question remains how much
can be done.
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Senior Rates Strategist
31 20 563 8955
Juan Carrion
Head of High Yield Research
44 20 7767 8379
Quentin Gilletta de
Saint Joseph
Debt Strategist
31 20 563 8957
Hamza Khan
Head of Commodities Strategy
31 20 563 8958
Brussels
Peter Vanden Houte Chief Economist, Belgium, Eurozone
32 2 547 8009
Warren Patterson
Commodities Strategist
31 20 563 8921
Julien Manceaux
Senior Economist,
France, Belgium, Switzerland
32 2 547 3350
Mark Harmer
Senior Credit Analyst, Financials
31 20 563 8964
Philippe Ledent
Senior Economist, Belgium, Luxembourg
32 2 547 3161
Suvi Platerink Kosonen
Senior Credit Analyst, Banks
31 20 563 8029
Steven Trypsteen
Economist, Ireland, Portugal
32 2 547 3379
Hendrik Wiersma
Senior Credit Analyst, TMT
31 20 563 8961
Geoffrey Minne
Economist, Spain
32 2 547 3386
Job Veenendaal
Credit Analyst, Consumer Products
and Retail
31 20 563 8956
Roelof-Jan van den Akker Head of Technical Analysis
Frankfurt
Carsten Brzeski
Chief Economist, Germany, Austria
49 69 27 222 64455
Inga Burk
Economist, Germany, Austria
49 69 27 222 66131
Milan
Paolo Pizzoli
27
Senior Economist, EMU, Italy, Greece
39 02 55226 2468
31 20 563 8178
Get in touch
Emerging Markets
Moscow
New York
Gustavo Rangel
Chief Economist, LATAM
1 646 424 6464
London
Dorothee Gasser-Châteauvieux Chief Economist, EMEA
Nicholas Smallwood
Senior Emerging Markets
Credit Analyst
44 20 7767 6023
44 20 7767 1045
Chief Economist, Romania
Junior Economist, Romania
40 31 406 8990
40 31 406 8991
Senior Economist, Hungary
36 1 235 8757
Budapest
Péter Virovácz
Chief Economist, Turkey
90 212 329 0751
Manila
Joey Cuyegkeng
28
Senior Economist, Philippines
7 495 771 7994
7 495 755 5480
Prague
Jakub Seidler
Rafal Benecki
Piotr Poplawski
Jakub Rybacki
Karol Pogorzelski
Chief Economist, Czech Republic
420 257 47 4432
632 479 8855
Chief Economist, Poland
Senior Economist, Poland
Economist, Poland
Economist, Poland
48 22 820 4696
48 22 820 4078
48 22 820 4608
48 22 820 4891
Singapore
Tim Condon
Prakash Sakpal
Istanbul
Muhammet Mercan
Chief Economist, Russia and CIS
Senior Credit Analyst, Russia and CIS
Warsaw
Bucharest
Ciprian Dascalu
Silviu Pop
Dmitry Polevoy
Egor Fedorov
Head of Research & Chief Economist, Asia
Economist, Asia
65 6232 6020
65 6232 6181
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Data from Macrobond and Bloomberg, unless otherwise noted.
23%
77%
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