The Terrestrial Carbon Group How to Include Terrestrial Carbon in the Overall Climate Change Solution Presentation at Forests Day 2 Ralph Ashton, 6 December 2008, Poznan terrestrialcarbon.org Climate Change: The Basics Atmosphere Climate change is caused by the build‐
up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere Greenhouse gases have only two other places to go: 1.  The oceans 2.  The terrestrial system (inc land and vegetation) Up to 25% of the climate change solution (emissions & sequestration) Oceans Terrestrial System * In the developing world The Terrestrial Carbon Group Science, Economics, Public Policy Ralph Ashton Chatib Basri Rizaldi Boer Peter Cosier Ruth DeFries Mohamed El‐Ashry Tim Flannery Thomas Lovejoy Yadvinder Malhi Jacques Marcovitch Warwick McKibbin Daniel Nepstad Carlos Nobre Hugh Possingham Bernhard Schlamadinger † Hadi Soesastro Joseph Stiglitz Bernardo Strassburg With input from hundreds of people over the last year † RIP 2008 Limitations of the International Response to Climate Change 1. Terrestrial Carbon is More than Forests Terrestrial Carbon Mitigation Potential Avoided Deforestation Global (17.9 GtCO2e pa) Forest Sequestration Agriculture Developing Countries (12.5 GtCO2e pa) Charts show mitigation potential at <US$100/tonne CO2 in 2030 based on forest carbon; agricultural sequestration; and avoidance of N2O and CH4 emissions, mainly from livestock (< 0.1 Gt). Developing countries = Non‐OECD / Non‐EIT. Source: Smith et al., 2007 (Figure 8.5: Total technical mitigation potentials (all practices, all GHGs: MtCO2‐eq/yr) for each region by 2030, showing mean estimates); Nabuurs et al, 2007 (Table 9.3: Potential of mitigation measures of global forestry activities. Global model results indicate annual amount sequestered or emissions avoided, above business as usual, in 2030 for carbon prices 100 US$/tCO2 and less); both from Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the 4th assessment report of the IPCCC 2. It’s Messy, but Doesn’t Have to Be JI Compliance markets AFOLU Avoided deforestation Voluntary markets Deforestation LULUCF Peat Afforestation CDM and reforestation Election vs mandatory Sustainable forest management Forest degradation Annex 1 and non‐Annex 1 3. Reducing Rates vs Avoiding Emissions % Year0 Volume Carbon 120 Same Total Carbon Emissions 100 80 60 40 Paying for a Delay 20 0 Year Business as Usual Reduced Rate BAU Total Emissions Reduced Rate Total Emissions 4. Missing the Dynamic Links Population Demand for food, fibre, fuel, carbon, and land Prices for those commod‐
ities Vegetated land in developing nations will be increasingly threatened with conversion to: •  Agricultural and plantation use •  Human settlements and infrastructure Land use decisions Framing a Solution Guiding Principles for Effective Action 1. 
Maximise long‐term terrestrial carbon volumes 2.  Maintain existing terrestrial carbon and create new terrestrial carbon 3.  Include all types of terrestrial carbon (using a phased approach) 4.  Use a mix of complementary approaches (market and non‐market, public and private) 5.  Take action on terrestrial carbon in addition to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from all other sources across the world 6.  Recognise sovereignty over land management 7.  Build appropriate national and international institutions 8.  Avoid perverse outcomes 9.  Adapt to best available information Solution: A Simple Concept •  Create a new economic development option for nations and communities: carbon capture and storage in the terrestrial system •  The technology for this CCS exists today •  Governments and land‐owners can then choose between economic development based on: •  Existing options (oil palm, timber extraction, copra, infrastructure, etc); and •  Selling the service of carbon capture and storage in the terrestrial system Solution: Defining the New Commodity Map a nation’s terrestrial carbon into two categories: •  Not at Risk = “Protected” –  Effectively protected by law –  Protected by biophysical conditions –  Protected by economic constraints over next 50 years (dynamic) •  At Risk = “Tradable” –  Everything else See detail in Terrestrial Carbon Group’s paper Example: Indonesia (forests only) Forest area ≈ 86.2 million ha Carbon density ≈ 140 tonnes per ha Following the TCG proposal (based on Government land classifications): •  Protected Terrestrial Carbon ≈ 32.6 million ha ≈ 16,760 Mt CO2  •  Tradable Terrestrial Carbon ≈ 53.6 million ha ≈ 27,500 Mt CO2  •  Business as usual emissions from deforestation and forest degradation would be about 550 Mt CO2 per year (over 50 years) •  Assuming carbon price of US$20 / tCO2, and that Indonesia halves forest emissions, Indonesia could earn: –  US$5.5 billion per year for the next 50 years for avoided emissions –  Plus the value of newly created terrestrial carbon •  Indonesia could decide not to sell all Tradable Terrestrial Carbon to: –  Pursue other social and / or economic development options –  Avoid price dampening caused by over‐supply Proposed Market Solution: Advantages •  Voluntary to join the system •  Applies to developing nations with different terrestrial carbon circumstances •  Nations determine national‐level implementation •  Does not restrict economic use of land, but opens up a new economic development option – carbon credits •  No need to sell underlying asset (land, forest, carbon) – but sell service of sequestering carbon •  Sets a credible business as usual terrestrial carbon emissions scenario for a nation •  Based on a simple, robust methodology using easily compiled data Proposed Market Solution: Advantages •  Addresses key concerns of additionality, leakage, permanence, and flooding •  Rests on national terrestrial carbon accounting and monitoring, but allows: –  National‐, sub‐national‐, and project‐level activities –  Private sector and civil society participation •  Builds on existing monitoring infrastructure •  Builds on existing methodologies and standards •  Provides certainty to buyers and sellers of credits •  Limits perverse outcomes Proposed Market Solution: National Implementation Requirements • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Establish the infrastructure and expertise to collect (through remote‐sensing using satellites and through on‐the‐ground surveying) and analyse terrestrial carbon data Agree methods to determine how much carbon is stored in a particular type of landscape and what happens to that carbon under different land uses Create and audit national terrestrial carbon inventories Effectively engage those who depend on forests and those who depend on deforestation and forest degradation Undertake a transparent process of clarifying rights to ownership and use of land, vegetation and carbon credits Establish credible and transparent systems and institutions to: measure terrestrial carbon; certify, verify and audit project‐ and national‐level outcomes; monitor changes over space and time; produce national terrestrial carbon accounts; facilitate and oversee the stable, long‐term disbursement of funds; and coordinate with international institutions Draft and enact regulations to establish terrestrial carbon registers, exchanges, dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms, and regulatory oversight What Next? Critical Path to Success A Agree Rules for Early Action B National Scale Demon‐
strations & Early Action C Terrestrial Carbon in Copenhagen Agreement Early Action Implement‐
ation 3 Years Poznan 2009 Copenhagen Post‐2012 A. Building Consensus on Early Action •  2008 –  Analysis of all proposed mechanisms –  Prince’s Rainforests Project Roundtable (princesrainforestsproject.org/news‐and‐articles/project‐activity) –  The Little REDD Book (littlereddbook.org) –  Consensus on core requirements for early action •  Poznan –  UN can agree early action rules without pre‐empting a final decision •  2009 –  Learn and adapt •  Copenhagen –  UN agree final early action rules (2010‐2012) and post‐2012 rules B. Bringing All the Pieces Together to Break “Chicken and Egg” Deadlocks •  National terrestrial carbon inventory •  Clarify ownership rights •  Set rules for projects •  Structural adjustment •  Legislative framework •  Technical capacity and lesson sharing •  Funding •  Coordination •  Standards setting •  Pooled risk management Inter‐
Governmental Institutions Academics •  Technical capacity •  Scientific research •  Methodologies •  Technology transfer •  Start‐up funding and risk guarantees •  Training and staff swaps •  Demand for credits Host Government National‐Scale Demonstration Developed World Governments Civil Society Land‐Owners and Local Communities •  Projects to generate credits •  Community engagement •  Optimising co‐benefits •  Local development decision‐making •  Projects to generate credits Private Sector •  Carbon measurement •  Monitoring systems •  Projects to generate credits •  Finance •  Risk management •  Commodity tracking C. Economic Information to Support Decisions based on National Interest 1. Collaborative Modeling Initiative on REDD Economics: •  Consistent and comparable quantitative information to assist negotiations •  Conservation International, University of East Anglia, Woods Hole Research Center, Environmental Defense Fund, the Terrestrial Carbon Group, and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) •  New! “Open Source Impacts of REDD Incentives Spreadsheet” (OSIRIS): a free, transparent, and accessible open‐source spreadsheet, using standardized data and assumptions •  Initial country‐by‐country results available now •  More results ready for the IARU International Scientific Congress on Climate Change (C’hagen, March 2009) 2. Working with The Nature Conservancy (TNC) on its modeling Bolstering National Capabilities Co‐opted Experts and Systems Experts and Systems from Host Government, Academia and Civil Society Transition over Time The Terrestrial Carbon Group’s paper is now available in 5 languages at terrestrialcarbon.org Bahasa Indonesia English Español Français Português do Brasil Terima kasih!
Thank you!
¡Gracias!
Merci!
Obrigado!
We’re Hiring