The incentive structure of cooperation between the Europarties and the non-EU parties.
Maria Shagina
University of Lucerne
[email protected]
Draft version, comments are welcomed
Paper prepared for the 23rd World Congress of Political Science, IPSA
July 19-24, 2014, Montréal, Canada
Introduction
The cooperation with European party federations (hereafter “Europarties”) represents one
of the channels for EU rule and norm promotion. Through a wide range of networking
activities, domestic parties undergo exogenous influences in line with EU rules and practices.
Based on the evidence from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, the Europarties
have a substantial impact on political parties by providing ideological and material support
(Pridham 1999, 2010, Haughton et al. 2011). During the process of socialization, the
Europarties “teach” party elites EU rules and norms. They do so through institutionalized
programs of mutual visits, joint seminars, training, and political consulting. As a result,
national party elites acquire political experience in European party model building (Pridham
1999: 16). They, thereby, indirectly incorporate EU practices and principles, adjusting their
party manifestos, organizational structure and political behavior.
Whereas in established democracies, the Europarties have a rather limited impact on
national party systems (Mair 2000), their involvement in new democracies has been more
pronounced (Spirova 2008, Pridham 2010). The affiliation with Europarties is often seen by
domestic parties as an opportunity to be accepted among European party elites. In post-Soviet
countries, cooperation between domestic parties and the Europarties is often perceived as
joining a prestigious club (Dakowska 2002). Whereas for their Western counterparts the
membership in the European party family is an ordinary practice, domestic parties from the
non-EU member states consider it with high appreciation. It is an issue of prestige that partly
triggers the establishment of cooperation. Apart from it, cooperation promises more practical
benefits. The linkages to European party elites are often seen as unofficial channels for
developing contacts with the EU officials and as promotion of European integration agenda.
Moreover, beyond exogenous credentials, the affiliation with Europarties serves as a point of
reference for domestic parties to map themselves on political landscape and underpin their
domestic legitimacy. In ideologically weak political sphere, Western templates of left and
1
right division are not always applicable for post-communist party politics. Hence, the process
of identification of European party family contributes to structuring of domestic party politics.
From this perspective, the affiliation is conducive to standardization of political spectrum
comparable with the Western one. In addition, it helps to identify parties with pro-European
stances. The adherence to the Europarties is considered to be the evidence of party’s genuine
position of the European integration.
As the process of cooperation does not work solemnly unidimensional, it affects not only
domestic parties, but has an impact on the Europarties as well. Obviously, the impact is
constrained by the non-EU member status. It deprives domestic parties of participation and
vote rights and they possess no representation in the party groups in the European Parliament
(EP). Despite these constrains, the Europarties continue to establish contacts with parties
beyond the EU. The incentives are bound to the promotion of norms and values in the
neighbourhood. By establishing links to national party elites, the Europarties are interested in
finding potential partners and like-minded allies. For the Europarties, it means the
maximization of their influence beyond the EU and strengthening of their numerical force. In
its turn, it affects the behavior of the Europarties themselves. Frequently, the largest
Europarties like the EPP and the PES compete in network expansion spreading their contacts
to further unexplored terrain. Furthermore, the practice of cooperation with non-EU parties
leads to readjustment and reassessment of Europarties’ policies in the neighbourhood.
Looking at cooperation with the Europarties, this paper aims to envisage the rationale that
drives this cooperation. Applying the cost-benefit analysis, the paper examines the incentives
from both sides - the Europarties and domestic parties - and seeks to answer the question:
what are the incentives for the Europarties and for domestic parties to cooperate with
each other? The analysis comprises mainstream political parties from Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine and look at their cooperation through joint activities with the Europarties and their
affiliated organizations (e.g. German party foundations). These countries were selected as the
frontrunners of the Eastern Partnership and hence as highly exposed to exogenous EU impact.
High aspirations towards the European integration push domestic parties to voluntary
cooperation what, in its turn, makes the impact more discernible. These countries have
longstanding relations with the EU and have shown their willingness in the rapprochement to
the European values. Moreover, the countries perceive themselves in terms of “back to
Europe” discourse, emphasizing their geographical, historical and cultural proximity towards
Europe. Following the logic of “most-similar-systems” design, one can control country-
2
specific conditions. The analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with party elites and
experts as well as on media coverage.
The paper is structured in following way. Firstly, it introduces the theoretical framework
embracing top-down and bottom-up approaches to Europeanization. The next part describes
the EU party politics and the role of the Europarties in the process of Europeanization.
Thirdly, the paper moves to the mechanism of cooperation and observes the major steps of
affiliation with Europarties. In the fourth part, it elaborates on the main incentives of
Europarties and of domestic parties to cooperate with each other and analyzes its twodimensional impact both on European and domestic arenas. The final part concludes the
major findings and opens discussion of potential perils in the assessment of cooperation
impact.
The State of the Art
The research question lies in interdisciplinary domain and covers both democracy
promotion as well as Europeanization debates. In a broader context, the research question is
deeply embedded into the realm of democracy promotion and particularly, into the field of
international party support (Burnell 2004, 2006; Carothers 1996, 2006, 2010). Political party
assistance remains mostly unexamined among all subfields of international dimension of
democratization. The main findings conclude that so far there has been only limited and
tentative effect on political parties. International aid providers fail to address party’s needs
and meet mistrust and resistance from the top-party leaders (Carothers 2006, Bader 2011).
Yet, party aid showed modest positive effects on electoral campaigning, organizational
development and norms promotion. The paucity of overarching findings can be explained by
the lack of transparent information and difficulties in evaluation of party aid’s efficiency.
On the other hand, the research domain is rooted into the Europeanization of party politics.
Whereas polity and policy dimensions have fully been analyzed, politics dimension, by
contrast, lacks attention and still remains unexplored. The EU direct impact on format and
mechanics of Western party systems has been investigated by Mair (2000). He concluded that
European party system is restricted in its impact on national party systems and has failed to
restructure domestic party competition. The explanation for insignificant impact roots in
underdeveloped character of European party system. European-level elections still remain
second-ordered elections, with blurred and weak party competition among European party
federations that prevents the spillover-effect to national arena (Mair 2000: 27-28). Moreover,
national party systems operate as gatekeepers and define electoral agenda. The final findings
3
suggest that national and European political arenas are strictly divided along the domain of
policy issues. While national politics seems to be the arena for contestation over European
issues, European politics is becoming rather the playground for day-to-day decision-making
(Mair 2000: 45-46).
Whereas Mair’s focus was on party system, Ladrech (2002) theorized the effect of
Europeanization on national political parties. He defined five dimensions of effect programmatic and organization content, patterns of party competition, party-government
relations and relations beyond the national party system (Ladrech 2002). Following his
analytical framework, various studies have examined some of those dimensions. For instance,
Pennings (2008) has analyzed national party manifestos and the degree of Europeanization.
The major findings ascertain that the degree to which parties refer to the European issue
depends on specific factors such as time period, duration of the EU membership, policy sector
as well as party position and internal cohesiveness on the European issues. Parties that joined
the EU earlier have showed higher degree of incorporation of the EU issues. Similarly, parties
favourable to the European integration and homogeneous parties refer more frequently to the
EU issues in their manifestos. The domains of economy, external relations and security issues
are more disposed to the incorporation of the EU issues than other sectors. Those findings
show strategically motivated decision of parties to include the EU issues into manifestos
(Pennings 2008). On organizational level, Poguntke with his colleagues has conducted
comparative analysis across 15 EU member states (Poguntke et al. 2007). The major results
conclude a comprehensive shift of power to parties in government. Information asymmetry
and wider power competencies make MEPs and members of national government more
powerful in decision-making within party structure. As a result, the linkage between party in
the office and party on the ground is getting weaker which subsequently leads to a partial loss
of legitimacy (Poguntke et al. 2007: 20). The analysis of party competition has been
conducted by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008). The scholars investigated the patterns of party
competition on the subject of Euroscepticism. They concluded that party in opposition tends
to be hard skeptical, whereas party in government mitigates its position to soft
Euroscepticism.
Whereas in Western Europe the EU impact on national political parties has been rather
limited (Mair 2000), the influence in CEE countries and beyond seems to be more substantial
(Pridham 1999, Ladrech 2008, Sedelmeier 2011). Cultural and historical rapprochement to
Europe (“return to Europe”) facilitated the penetration of EU impact into domestic arena. In
this respect, the responses towards the EU impact in post-communist countries show more
4
dynamics. Analyzing the scope of impact, a series of studies from post-communist and Balkan
states have identified a range of significant results. Investigating the changes in party politics
after the accession, Haughton et al. (2011) has detected an indirect impact on party
organizations and programmes in CEE countries. Furthermore, the EU has often been
perceived in the region as “a source of agreement”, “a point of reference” and “a measure of
competence” (Haughton et al. 2011). Likewise, Lewis (2008) has observed particular
transformations in government coalitions, party system structure and party organizations.
Despite the difficulties in identifying a robust EU impact on consolidation of party system,
there have been found some changes in coalition format. The mainstream parties tend to
exclude extremist parties from coalition-building process what leads to their subsequent
marginalization. Moreover, the membership in a European party family has facilitated the
relations among sister parties. In terms of organizational changes, the EU has caused only
minor changes like, introduction of gender quotas and adoption of the European labels (Lewis
2008).
In the same vein, party systems in the Balkan states have also changed under the EU
influence. The main findings conclude the difficulties both in separation of Europeanization
and democratization effects and the limitations of EU impact due to institutional constrains
and cultural mismatch. For instance, the lack of transformations in Montenegrin party system
has demonstrated slow Europeanization effect exemplified in the Constitution negotiation
process (Vujovic and Komar 2008). The Slovenian party system has undergone some minor
changes in organizational structure - power shift towards secretaries for international
cooperation and specification of relations between parties and their MEP members in party
statutes (Krasovec and Lajh 2008). Similarly to the Slovenian case, the Serbian party system
has been slightly transformed as the result of EU influence. Some Serbian parties have
adjusted their ideological profiles in line with international linkages, transformed their
organizational structures and started the harmonization of legislation (Orlovic 2008).
One of the pivotal contributions to the last Ladrech’s dimension – the relations beyond
national party system - has been made by Pridham (1999, 2000, 2010). He analyzed the
impact of cooperation with transnational party federations in CEE countries. Under normative
pressure, domestic party ideologies have been subjected to certain adjustments in line with
Western European ideological tendencies. The contact establishment with transnational party
federations has caused not only ideological and structural approximation, but also spilled over
into party system level (Pridham 1999). The cooperation had an impact on standardization of
party system by its adjustment to Western European party systems. Furthermore, the case of
5
Slovakia has proved that transnational linkages can lead to democratic consolidation and
stability of party system. Through transnational links, the Slovak parties stayed under outside
democratic expertise what has contributed to stabilization of party system (Pridham 2010).
In the non-EU member states, the cooperation impact has been investigated either in
globalized context (Bader 2010) or based on a particular case study (Timus 2014). Analyzing
the international party aid support to Georgia and Ukraine, Bader concludes that
transformative effect to recipient parties is very limited and has failed to contribute to
stabilization of party systems (Bader 2010). The failure of successful transformations boils
down to badly designed party assistance programmes and to domestic constraints. Whereas
the “standard method” (Carothers 2006) of party assistance did not address country’s needs,
domestic environment showed its resilience to the reception of assistance (Bader 2010).
Focusing on the cooperation with the EPP, Timus (2014) has investigated the impact on
Ukrainian political parties. The main findings reveal strategic incentives for cooperation
emanating from both the Europarty and domestic parties. On the domestic arena, parties use
the engagement with the Europarties for internal and external legitimacy – commitment to
European norms and values and international recognition. For the Europarties, the cooperation
represents an opportunity of strengthening their positions in the neighbourhood.
The review of previous studies and their findings point out on existing research gaps on
politics dimension within Europeanization studies as well as within the field of European
party federations. Despite the above-mentioned sporadic contributions to the field, there is
still a lack of systematic cross-national analysis of European cooperation impact beyond the
EU. Changing focus from democracy promotion to cooperation with the Europarties, the
papers aims to examine the incentives of this cooperation. To increase the leverage and the
scope of analysis, it does not focus on a single case study, but encompasses all mainstream
Europarties and parties from neighbouring countries. This kind of research design aims to
enhance the leverage for generalization. It allows to examine the causalities not only in crossparty variation, but also among the countries. It helps to establish similarities in the incentive
structure for the Europarties as well as for domestic parties in different national contexts. In
addition, it gives an example of inter-party relations within a European party family crossnationally.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical conceptions of Europeanization have different interpretations. In Radaelli’s
interpretation, the impact of Europeanization can be encompassed as logic of political
6
behavior, thus including the changes in identities and cognitive component of the politics
(Radaelli 2000: 4). Applying the approach of sociological institutionalism, Radaelli includes
in his definition the notion of shared beliefs and norms. Olsen’s definition for the concept
implies sui generis phenomenon, which depicts the process of reactions and transformations
of the dynamics of European and national/non-European system of governance. The process
of Europeanization comprises domestic changes in response to changing opportunities and
challenges (Olsen 2002: 922). In order to capture nature of Europeanization, Olsen proposes
to differentiate among five “faces of Europeanization”, namely “changes in external
boundaries, developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national
systems of governance, exporting forms of political organization and a political unification
project” (Olsen 2002: 923-924). The underlying mechanism of exporting forms of political
organization and governance consists in diffusion process. Exporting European templates, the
outsiders undergo adaptation and transformation process, adjusting exported forms to
domestic political culture, historical experiences and institutional traditions.
Considering the non-EU member status of selected countries, the theoretical framework of
this paper is based on the conception of a “wider Europe”. This conception argues that
Europeanization takes place not only within the European Union, but has the impact on
domestic arena in the neighbouring countries as well. In line with it, Vink and Galzano claim
that “the scope of Europeanization is not conceptually limited to the impact of the EU on its
member states” (Vink and Galzano, 2007: 9). This definition has important implications for
this research. Firstly, it extends the boundaries of Europeanization beyond the EU and beyond
the EU institutions. Hence, diffusion process is not limited to the EU member states. It
spreads further beyond the EU boundaries where the European values are considered in
historical and cultural terms (e.g. “return back to Europe”). It means that the Europeanization
has not necessarily to be limited to the adaptation to EU institutions. The Europarties can be
also seen as promoters of the European standards and values through the extension of their
networks. Secondly, despite the absence of main “carrot” – credible EU membership
perspective, political actors are still subjected the impact of Europeanization. Whereas
conditionality represents only one way of promotion of EU values and norms, socialization is
as an alternative mechanism. According to Checkel, socialization is “the process of inducting
new actors into the norms, rules, and way of behavior of a given community” (Checkel 2005:
804). Considering the cooperation with the Europarties, the logic of action corresponds with
socialization approach and in particular, rationalist approach of international socialization
(Schimmelfennig 2000). Although there is no conditionality in cooperation with the
7
Europarties, it does not exclude the cost-benefit calculation. The socialization by
reinforcement differs from “classical” socialization with regard to actor’s motivation and
outcomes. The incorporation of norms is based on resource ratio instead of genuine norm
convergence: “actors calculate the consequences of norm conformance rather than reflecting
on its appropriateness; they engage in bargaining and rhetorical action rather than consensusoriented arguing; and they adapt their behavior rather than changing their views, interests, or
identities” (Schimmelfennig 2005: 831). During socialization, there are “situations in which
change results from socialization and situations in which it is induced by a calculation of costs
and benefits” (Checkel 2005: 805). Socialization by reinforcement can be caused on the
ground of tangible (material or political) and intangible (social or symbolic) rewards and
punishments. The set of rewards ranges from international recognition, public approval to
acceptance into governmental elites, whereas the set of punishment includes the threat of
exclusion, shaming and shunning (Schimmelfennig 2005: 831-832). In addition, socialization
approach is more suitable here due to Europarties’ loose requirements towards potential
partners. The absence of clear membership criteria to the affiliation with the Europarties
makes the conditionality mechanism implausible. Thirdly, the Europeanization is not
constrained by unidirectional process. It comprises horizontal and vertical dimensions as well
as top-down and bottom-up approaches. A horizontal perspective of Europeanization consists
of equal relations among political actors. Applying this to cooperation with the Europarties,
the latter represents a platform for network between the European parties and their likeminded partners outside the EU. The interaction takes place within European party family and
fosters the convergence of standards and values. From a vertical perspective, top-down
approach focuses on the EU impact on domestic arena and its approximation to the EU
promoted standards and values, whereas bottom-up approach concentrates on the influence of
domestic actors on the European level. Again, referring to cooperation, on the one hand, the
Europarties promote their practices and standards as the result of joint activities, on the other
hand, the impact on domestic parties rebounds to the Europarties themselves. Domestic
contexts put its own emphasize on the Europarties’ behavior and readjust their strategy
towards like-minded partners.
The Europeanization through cooperation with the Europarties combines all abovementioned features. Spreading their networks beyond the EU, the Europarties do not constrain
the promotion of their practices and standards by geographical boundaries. There is no
conditionality mechanism imposed on domestic parties. Therefore, the latter willingly initiates
the cooperation and voluntarily engages themselves in joint activities. Through inter-elite
8
socialization, the EU impact penetrates to domestic arena and triggers changes in domestic
structures. In this sense, European party families can be considered as epistemic communities
which serve as places for socialization and provide expertise knowledge in a voluntary
manner (Haas 1992). Possessing “normative power” (Manners 2002), the Europarties impose
indirect impact on domestic actors. Being a member of certain community, collectively shared
identity, beliefs, values and norms spread through the socialization mechanism and impose
expectation on behavioral pattern (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006:3). The Europarties have
ideological influence over opinion of the others which transfers into changes and
transformations (Manners 2002). The Europarties “persuade their partners to redefine their
identities and interests by engaging in a social learning process” (Dakowska 2002: 288).
Being in a “group with a common style of thinking” (Haas 1992: 3), domestic actors are
socialized in line with European beliefs, values and practices. Last but not least, the affiliation
with the Europarties has its own developments on domestic arena and leads to sometimes
unexpected reaction among like-minded parties. In its turn, these reactions of domestic parties
have an impact of the Europarty’s behavior and strategy towards their “sister parties”.
The Europarties and their Networks beyond the EU
Every “European party family” includes three components: national parties on domestic
arena, party groups in the EP and extra-parliamentary Europarties. The latter is umbrella
organizations comprised from like-minded national parties and thus represents ideological
alliances on sub-national level. Until recently, the status of Europarties in the EU structures
was rather limited. Due to weakened position of the EP and strength of national parties, the
Europarties were constrained in their powers. The European party federations lacked direct
affiliation with their voters, whereas national parties had an overhand in elections and
decision-making process. The strengthening of the Europarties started from the empowerment
of the EP. Beginning with the first “direct elections” in 1979 and a series of treaty
amendments, the EP began to strengthen its position becoming the veto power. Prior to the
elections, the (con)federations of national parties were formed: the Confederations of Socialist
Parties of the European Community (1974), the Federation of European Liberal and
Democratic Parties in the European Community (1976) and The Federation of Christian
Democratic Parties in the European Community (1976) (Hix and Lord 1997: 168). However,
promising role of the federations was deemed by the failure to produce common manifestos.
Their role was reduced to the function of clearing-houses: “providing information and
campaign materials, and organising (poorly attended) conferences” (Hix and Lord 1997: 169).
9
With the Article 138a of the Maastricht Treaty, political parties at the EU level started to gain
more power. They were recognized as an important “factor for integration within the Union.
They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the
citizens of the Union” (Article 138a, Maastricht Treaty). It gave an impetus for the subsequent
development of the Europarties. In 1992, the conferedations of national parties were turned
into the Europarties. In addition, Party Leaders’ Meetings were established as an official
organ within the Europarties for coordination of policies on the EU issues. The revision of the
Party Article (138a, Maastricht Treaty) laid down the grounds for party funding. In the Treaty
of Nice (2000), “Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251
(co-decision-procedure), shall lay down the regulations governing political parties at
European level and in particular the rules regarding the funding”. Whereas the Party Article
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty was rather an “incomplete contract” (Johansson and
Raunio 2005: 522) without any legal grounds for party funding, the amendment in the Treaty
of Nice specified regulations for party spending. This contributed to clear organizational
separation between the party groups and the Europarties. Since 2003, after the Treaty came
into force, the Europarties are eligible for public funding from the EU budget. Additionally,
the amended regulation defined a European political party as a party that have elected
members to the EP, the national parliaments or regional parliaments in at least one-quarter of
the member states or have obtained at least 3% of support in one-quarter of the member states
in the last European Parliament elections (EU Regulation 2003/2004). Party programmes and
activities should go in line with values and principles of the European Union and respect the
fundamental rights and the rule of law. Under this financial scheme, the European party
foundations have been established contributing to further development of policy-seeking
focus (Gagatek and van Hecke 2011). With the Lisbon Treaty, the role of the Europarties is
expected to be strengthened further. Starting from the European elections 2014, for the first
time, the Europarties are allowed to actively participate in the election campaign and to
propose their candidates for the President of the EU Commission. To raise the EU citizens’
awareness in the elections, the Constitutional Affairs Committee decided that the emblems of
European party federations should be present on the ballots by showing the affiliation of
national parties within a certain European family. Despite their incremental empowerment,
the Europarties are still rather party groupings than genuine European political parties. In
contrast to national parties, the Europarties are not vote-seeking or office-seeking parties.
They possess no direct link to electoral process and no direct attachment to voters. In the same
vein, they have no leverage over the formation of the Commission. It is the party groups in the
10
EP that have direct links to the EU institutions. In fact, the Europarties are policy-seeking
coordinating organizations that have something in common with the central party offices of
domestic parties (Hix and Lord 1997: 63).
Due to their supranational position, the Europarties have broader range of functions
compared to their national counterparts. They perform not only trivial duties as
representation, mobilization, recruiting and legitimation but also fulfill such superior
functions as networking and partner selection (Mittag/Steuwer 2010, Zur Hausen 2008).
Considering the last tasks, the Europarties act as agencies for rule convergence, which
promote the EU norms and values across and beyond the European borders. Operating as
network fora, the Europarties enhance the exchange on inter- and intra-party levels. Through
joint activities with European parties, national parties undergo the learning process and are
challenged in an organizational and programmatic way (Pridham 1999, 2010, Zur Hausen
2008). Expressed in terms of “contagious organization” (Duverger 1971), domestic parties
adjust their policy orientations, organizational structure and electoral campaigning according
to the principles of a certain European party family. On the European arena, the Europarties
operate as “transmission belts” (Delwit, Külahci, van der Walle 2004), reducing the
democracy deficit and linking the European citizens and European institutions, while beyond
the EU they also operate as a stimulant of party system democratization and consolidation.
Currently, there are 13 recognized Europarties that operate on the EU level, whereby the
biggest ones are: The European People’s Party (EPP), The Party of European Socialists
(PES), The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, former ELDR), the
European Green Party, Party of the European Left and the Alliance of European
Conservatives and Reformists (AECR). Recently, all these Europarties increased their
representation in Eastern Europe by having affiliation with like-minded parties (see Annex 1).
The strongest representation possesses the EPP which cooperates with the Ukrainian,
Georgian and Moldovan parties (see table 1). On the contrary, the Socialists and the Liberals
have weaker representation. Due to difficulties in finding a credible partner, the PES
cooperates only with the Moldovan Social Democrats, whereas the Liberals have cooperation
with Georgian and Moldovan liberal parties. The European Left has a strong partner in
Moldova, while the European Conservatives cooperates with minor right-wing party in
Georgia. As a cross-party observation, the Ukrainian parties are grouped exclusively within
the EPP, whereas the affiliation of the Moldovan parties is covered throughout the whole
political spectrum. The Georgia case is in the middle, with links to three European party
families.
11
European party cooperation
EPP: the Batkivshchyna party (UA); “Our Ukraine” (until 2013) (UA); People’s Movement
Rukh (UA); UDAR Party (UA); the Liberal Democratic Party (MD); the United National
Movement (GE); the Christian-Democratic People’s Party (until 2012) (MD); The New Rights
Party (applicant) (GE)
PES: the Democratic Party (MD);
ALDE (ELDR): the Liberal Party (MD); the Republican Party (GE); Our Georgia – Free
Democrats (GE)
The European Left: The Party of Communists (MD);
AECR: the Christian-Democratic Movement (GE)
Table 1. Europarties’ affiliation in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (up to 2013)
Apart from the affiliation with the Europarties, domestic parties have an opportunity to link
themselves to their Associations such as Youth and Women Groupings as well. However,
rudimentary organizational structure of domestic parties shows certain inconsistency in
affiliation with the Associations. There are some cases where youth organizations cooperate
on the European level and mother party has no affiliation, and vice versa. With regard to
Women Associations, only Moldovan Liberal Democratic Party women’s branch is the
member of the EPP Women. These observations point out on weak and undeveloped party
structure of Eastern European counterparts.
The Incentive Structure for Cooperation: a two-way process
Whereas domestic parties from CEE countries were given credible EU membership
perspective, countries from the Eastern Partnership do not posses such a “carrot”. Due to this
reason, the incentive structure both for Europarties and domestic parties is different. The
leverage from the EU institutions and subsequently from the Europarties is limited, as
conditionality does not take place in these relations. It is domestic parties who initiate
cooperation despite lacking EU membership perspective. However, as rational agents,
domestic parties do it on the basis of cost-benefit calculation. In the course of cooperation,
there are rewards and punishments - tangible (political) and intangible (social and symbolic)
ones. Domestic parties are aware of the advantage of cooperation that provides them with
better access, better knowledge and better assistance from the EU side 1. They benefit from
cooperation by acquiring domestic legitimacy and international recognition (Pridham 2008:
198). On domestic arena, parties use the affiliation as a benchmarking for trustworthy and
genuinely pro-EU parties. International recognition secures party’s reputation on the ground
and converts trust bolstered by international partners into domestic legitimacy. Having
1
Interview with the EPP representative, September 2013.
12
partners on the EU level, domestic party can show that they belong to a bigger, stronger entity
of credible and reputable parties and appeal to this affiliation domestically as a proof of its
recognition and legitimacy. To be accepted to the European party family means for domestic
parties to be a credible partner. As a representative from the Georgian Republican Party put it,
the affiliation shows our voters and our opponents where we belong to, so that nobody can
doubt our ideology2. In fact, social reward turns into political one: during elections, domestic
parties frequently appeal to the affiliation with their European partners in order to attract more
electoral support (Lewis 2008: 11). For example, in the Moldovan case, the EPP enormously
supported Filat, PLDM party leader, during the 2010 parliamentary campaign. Prior to the
elections, Martens, EPP President, visited Chisinau and was basically campaigning for
PLDM. During the joint press conference he openly supported PLDM’s electoral programme
and team. Also he voiced his conviction that “the country has a clear European vocation”
(EPP Press release 2010). Additionally, domestic parties broadly use the affiliation with the
Europarties in public discourse as an argument for party’s genuine European position.
Emphasizing the linkages with the Europarties, domestic parties often strategically appeal to
them in public statements and electoral campaigns. Admittedly, voters may consider this
appeal as a genuine benchmark for party’s pro-EU stances. On international arena,
cooperation with the Europarties allows broader integration into the EU party elites. Aspiring
to cease from post-communist legacy, they strive to enhance their image and to be
acknowledged by the European party elites. For the Moldovan Democratic Party, the
affiliation with European Socialists was important to separate themselves from the
Communists and show that they represent the only left-wing party in the country3. The issue
of prestige also plays an indispensible role here. The opportunity to be accepted into the ranks
of EU party elites gives domestic parties a proxy for their importance. Publically, they often
appeal to the affiliation as a prestigious opportunity to meet EPP heads of government as
Merkel and Sarkozy in informal environment. During inter-party debates, this prestigious
affiliation is also an important argument for winning a point. Domestic parties refer to joint
activities with Europarties as the evidence of credibility and reliability. Barroso’s visit to
Chisinau in November, 2012 was portrayed as an acceptance into the EU party elites and as
an important sign of successive European integration4. In line with last argument, the
affiliation with the Europarties is perceived as a platform for advancing country’s European
aspirations. By regular meetings and mutual visits, domestic parties get familiar with the
2
Interview with the representative from the Republican Party, April 2014.
Interview with expert, Moldova State University, January 2014.
4
Interview with expert, ADEPT, January 2014.
3
13
European institutions and obtain a subtle opportunity for lobbying EU integration. In
particular, the affiliation with the biggest party families increases the chances for promotion.
Having an observer status in the EPP or the PES, which define the neigbourhood policy,
domestic parties have more opportunities to foster their EU aspirations. The interplay of EU
partisan and EU institutional dimensions gives domestic parties a better opportunity to
effectively propel the European agenda. For the Georgian UNM, the main incentive to join
the EPP was its consistent support for country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. In this sense, for
the UNM, the EPP represented a platform for pushing national interests further 5. Another
incentive of cooperation is the desire to sharpen party’s ideological profile and receive
expertise knowledge on party building. By identification with particular European party
family, domestic parties map themselves within particular political spectrum. In this way, in
post-Soviet countries, parties with weak ideology try to sharpen their profiles. Trainings and
workshops on programmatic profiles contribute to transference of expertise knowledge to
domestic parties. It allows them to approximate their ideological positions and adjust their
organizational structure to models of European party building. For instance, Filat reiterated
that EPP values and ideals are “an infinite source for inspiration and optimism for the future”
(EPP Press Release, 8 December 2011). For PLDM, the main rationale behind the cooperation
was the exchange of knowledge in party building what leads to congruence in values and
organizational structure6. In their opinion, it facilitates the dialogue between party and its
European partners. Last but not least, the affiliation with the Europarties provides domestic
parties with political support for their activities both in government and in opposition. For
instance, the EPP vocally supported the governments of Vlad Filat, Julia Tymoshenko, and
Mikheil Saakashvili, in each case underlining government’s progress on the way to closer
European integration. In Moldova, after the non-confidence vote 2013, the EPP reassured that
“Vlad Filat enjoys the full support and trust of the whole EPP political family” (EPP Press
release, 17 April, 2013). Likewise, when parties shifted to the opposition, the EPP was
gathering enormous support among EU leaders against the imprisonment of Julia
Tymoshenko, Ukrainian ex-prime-minister, and Vano Merabishvili, Georgian ex-Secretary
General of the UNM.
On the other hand, the cooperation with non-EU parties affects the Europarties themselves.
Establishing links with parties from non-EU member states, the Europarties do not obtain
additional seats in the EP and have no access to national policy-making. Likewise, the
5
6
Interview with the UNM representative, April 2014.
Interview with PLDM representatives, January 2014.
14
incentive structure for the Europarties for cooperation differs from the case of Central and
Eastern Europe. For the European party families, the primary objective is predominantly
bound to promotion of norms and values. The Europarties are interested in formation of a
natural network of like-minded parties which does not finish at the EU border. Extending their
networks, the Europarties aim to strengthen party family’s thought and ideological ties
throughout and beyond Europe. In the EPP case, the promotion is not constrained by party
family’s ideological values. The Europarty aims to promote and support the idea of deeper
European integration. Finding potential partners outside the EU, the Europarties make an
investment for the future. Having a like-minded partner on the ground, the Europarties can
expand their influence in post-Soviet space and reduce transaction costs in the neighbouring
countries. However, to identify genuinely like-minded and sustainable parties might be
difficult in party systems prone to volatility. To secure the sustainability, the Europarties have
a natural interest in having stable and viable partners that do not disappear in a short time
period. For example, in the 90s, the EPP could boost their presence by granting observer
member status to viable parties in CEE countries. As a result, 7 out of 8 observers have
become associates by 1999. In this way, the EPP have integrated to their party family likeminded parties who at that time formed the government in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,
Poland and Slovakia (Hanley 2002: 474). Similarly, the Europarties treat current neighbouring
countries with high EU aspiration in line with the same strategic logic. Once country
integrates closer to the EU, the Europarty will already have a stable and viable partner.
Additionally, the competition among the Europarties has triggered the expansion of further
cooperation. Likewise, it is practical and prestigious for the Europarties to have a broad
network not only within the EU, but also beyond it. Spreading their norms and values, the
Europarties can increase their presence in potential EU candidates.
Europarties’ Membership and the Application Procedure
The largest Europarties like EPP and PES share the same approach to the differentiation of
their members and to the procedure of application. In general, they apply geographical
distinction to membership degree. The full membership is grated to parties based in the EU,
parties from candidate countries for accession with the EU, EFTA member states obtain
associated status and, finally, observer membership is granted to parties beyond the EU. In the
EPP case, the observer status is further restricted to members of the Council of Europe,
whereas for the PES it is socialist, social democratic and democratic progressive parties with
close links to the PES. In contrast to the EPP and the PES, ALDE applies different approach
15
to the engagement with their potential partners. For them, there is no differentiation between
parties from the EU and non-EU countries, but rather a differentiation in time. Affiliated
members may apply for full membership after two consecutive financial years, while an
observer status can be held up to three years. As a new development, the Europarties have
started to introduce individual membership in order to make parties more attainable for
individuals and activists. However, it remains common for all categories of membership - the
requirement to accept and respect Europarties’ statutes and internal regulations. In terms of
members’ rights and obligations, the scheme is quite similar in each of the European party
family. Whereas full members are eligible to attend all meetings with the right of expression,
of initiative and of vote, affiliated members are invited to the meetings with the right of
initiative but with no vote rights. The observer members are deprived of the right of initiative
and of vote right. Each category of members should accept financial obligations. A failure to
pay membership fees for two successive years gives a ground for expulsion. Moreover, the
membership can be suspended for more political reasons that just outstanding bills. For the
EPP, it is the case when party is not represented in regional or national or European
Parliament for two consecutive parliamentary years. In the case of PES, ALDE and EL, noncompliance either with the statute or the Standing orders/Internal Regulations or membership
criteria might give a ground for suspension.
In general, the application procedure in different Europarties has similar approach.
Domestic party sends an official application which is reviewed by the Europarty on the
subject of congruence with their norms and values. Next step, the Europarty organizes factfinding mission to the country and assess the situation, afterwards the decision is taken by the
Europarty’s Presidency whether to accept the party. As a detailed example, the application
procedure to the EPP has the following mechanism. As a rule, the initiative to join the
European party family emanates from domestic parties. Firstly, they need to send an official
request to the President. In the 1st reading, the Political Assembly does a legal check on
compliance between applicant’s principles and values and the EPP Statute and Programme.
On this stage, the EPP assesses whether party can be potentially associated with their party
family. The potential of party is measured not only by ideological match. Potential candidates
suppose either to have parliamentary representation or participate in election on different
levels and have a big chance to enter the parliament. If party fulfills these criteria, the
assessment is considered to be continued. The Working Group on Membership (WG3) sends
a fact-finding mission to the country to assess political situation. The WG3 tries to receive
encompassing information on the applicant by setting meetings with party representatives,
16
activists from youth and women branches, local organizations, party foundations, journalists
and experts. The fact-finding mission aims to examine applicant’s party structure and intraparty democracy. Afterwards, based on this assessment, the recommendations are sent to the
Political Assembly for the 2nd reading, who decides whether to approve or reject the party’s
application. There is no deadline for sending the application and there is no fixed timeframe
for the application to be evaluated. As selection criteria are flexible, there are several informal
factors that increase the chances for party to be accepted. First, initial contacts prior to the
application request matter. As the affiliation in the European party family is about building
trust, personal contacts between leadership of the applicant party and the Europarty’s
leadership are very important. In this way, the Europarty can better assess party’s credibility.
For instance, prior to the formal application, UDAR Party representatives had informal
contacts with the EPP President Martens and German EPP members7. In this way, the party
has gained a broad support within the EPP what led to a fast application procedure in less than
a year. Secondly, fact-finding missions do not start work from scratch because the Europarty
relies predominantly on the previous assessment of their partners. For the EPP, the most
credible partner on the ground is the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS). The foundation
acts in line with the EPP values and is the first contact in helping to identify and select
potential partners. Again, trust plays a crucial role here. As politicians in Brussels are not
always aware of developments in countries, they fully rely on the foundation’s
recommendations and suggestions. Usually, KAS advises the EPP on whether it is worthwhile
considering the application further. During fact-finding missions, KAS is the organizer of
round-tables, meeting and conferences between different domestic party representatives,
country’s experts and journalists. They provide the EPP representatives with the first-hand
information not only about party’s formal match, but also about party’s behavior in the
parliament or in political life. In its turn, this information gives the EPP a clearer picture of
how viable this political force is. As the Europarty is interested in dealing with sustainable
political parties, viability is of great importance here. Viability is certainly not bound to some
percentage threshold, but in this way the EPP wants to avoid affiliation with small minor
and/or unfledged parties. Negative experience with unstable political landscape in Central and
Eastern Europe made the Europarties re-think their strategy for selection. Investing in future
partners and building strong relations with them, the Europarties are interested in rather
established parties on political landscape. They are obviously reluctant to cooperate with
unsustainable parties that disappear after one term. Due to this reason, frequently the
7
The interview with the EPP representative, September 2013.
17
Europarties are looking at the election’s results before making any decision on acceptance. An
ability to participate and enter the parliament during two consecutive terms gives a reassuring
sign for the Europarties about party’s sustainability in domestic arena. Thirdly, the applicant
parties should share the Europarties’ principles and values but most importantly they should
have a pro-EU position. The parties should support and promote the idea of deeper European
integration to be considered as a potential partner. Finally, the decision of acceptance might
be influenced by other applicant parties from the same country. After some negative
experience, the Europarty has an interest in informal approval by incorporated observer
members for new applicants. It is believed to help avoiding obstructive behavior between
“sister parties”. These facilitating factors are in total applicable for all mainstream parties.
The Impact on Inter-Party Relations
Cooperation has an impact both on relations between the Europarties and between
domestic parties. The Europarties have a strong interest in endorsing cooperation between
like-minded parties. In their press releases and official statements, the Europarties’ leaders
often plead for cooperation among “sister parties”. This cooperation can have its expression in
formation of electoral block, in single presidential candidate or even in party fusion for
electoral wins (Jansen/van Hecke 2011: 71). In Ukraine, two parties stuck to calls on
consolidation within the Orange camp. People`s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) has supported
the coalition-building with Block of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) during the 2006 political
crisis and expressed its condemnation of Tymoshenko’s arrest. The mutual cooperation
between the EPP “sister parties” was likely to bring benefits for both of them. While Rukh’s
party leader Tarasyuk has been appointed as the co-chairman of parliamentary assembly of
EURONEST (2011), Tymoshenko has benefited from strong support and solidarity among the
EPP. Another example stems from other European party family. “Sister parties” within ALDE
family - the Republican party and Our Georgia-Free – build a part of current governing
Georgian Dream coalition. There were some attempts from ALDE party to endorse a party
merger between two like-minded parties. However, due to admittedly personal factors the
parties remain separated structures. Nevertheless, they support each other within the coalition
in educational and anti-discrimination reforms though8. In its turn, these informal signals from
the Europarties put some limitations on coalition formation and force parties to search their
close ideological allies. For example, during the Moldovan political crisis in 2010, for the
EPP it was unthinkable that its “sister party” PLDM would cooperate with the Communists to
8
The interview with the Republican Party representative, April 2014.
18
save the Alliance for European Integration and would thus remain in power9. As an
acknowledgment, EPP leadership praised PLDM role in coalition building by party’s
constructive and open approach (EPP Press Release, 14 January 2011). The coalition was
beheld by support of the Liberals and the Democrats, affiliated with ALDE and PES
respectively. However, by 2013, the pro-European coalition, led by PLDM leader Filat, was
again in jeopardy. A situational collaboration of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party
with the Communists that questioned Filat’s coalition leadership has met a strong reaction
from the Europarties. They voiced their united position on the preservation of the coalition.
Martens and Watson called on the leaders of the AIE to resume the dialogue as soon as
possible in order to secure Moldova’s European future (EPP and ALDE Press Releases,
March 2013). In this sense, the Europarties shape the coalition building along with ideological
criteria and generally endorse cooperation among pro-EU forces.
However, the Europarties’ recommendations on consolidation might be unsuccessful as
parties follow their own behavioral logic. Instead of cooperation among like-minded parties,
there are cases of blocking the entry for another “sister party” from the same country.
Operating in a competitive environment, “sister parties” may find the affiliation to a certain
Europarty as a ground for rivalry. The first observer parties often act as “gatekeepers”,
impeding newcomers’ efforts joining the European party family (Enyedi and Lewis 2006:
237). Competing in the same electoral sector, it sounds plausible that domestic parties pursue
exceptional relations with the Europarties and fight for a privileged treatment. For instance,
the parties from the Orange coalition were contesting with each other to be named as the most
genuine supporter of the European integration. Based on this experience, the Europarties
usually inquire consent from already accepted observers with respect to potentially new ones.
In the EPP, they would never accept another party without asking their partners10. Thus the
Moldovan Christian Democrats were blocking new applicant PLDM to join the EPP, while
the UNM was reluctant to support the New Rights’ entrance to the EPP. Admittedly, as a
result of failed negotiations towards newcomers, parties decide to withdraw from a European
party family because of other domestic party’s joining. Likewise, the rationale behind is
similar to the previous case. Frequently, domestic parties do not want to share the privilege of
affiliation with other national parties and retreat from cooperation. As a justification, they
often accuse newly accepted parties in their undemocratic credentials and in misfit within the
European party family. In 2012, the Christian-Democratic People`s Party has withdrawn its
9
The interview with the EPP representative, September 2013.
The interview with the EPP representative, September 2013.
10
19
membership from the EPP family as a sign of protest against affluent support to Filat’s PLDM
party. Joining the EPP family in 2005, the Moldovan party has demonstrated in this way its
devotion to the Christian democracy and democratic principles which are the core of the
European party. However, after PLDM has been granted an observer status, the Christian
Democrats accused the EPP in loosening the ideological criteria for newcomers and rebuked
the EPP in support of anti-democratic and corruption regimes. The Christian Democrats
decided to withdraw their membership due to, in their convictions, PLDM’s wrongdoings and
EPP’s ignorance towards it. Finally, political support emanating from a Europarty might have
a negative outcome for the coalition-building. Expressing support for a party leader within the
coalition, who is often the head of government, the Europarties might overemphasize the
support for one party leader and neglect the others. Domestic parties are likely to be very
sensitive towards support for their coalition partners. For example, by supporting
Tymoshenko’s privileged position as the only democratic candidate, EPP unintentionally
contributed to the deterioration of relations with Our Ukraine. Critics towards Yushchenko’s
unwillingness to build a coalition with Tymoshenko has further led to aggravated relations.
Since 2007, the party stood aside from the EPP activities as a sign of protest to the EPP’s
support of Tymoshenko (Kuzio 2008). In 2013, Our Ukraine’s membership was suspended.
Moreover, sometimes domestic parties use their European affiliations for tackling domestic
issues. Domestic struggle between Georgian mainstream parties spilled over to the European
level. The so-called “War of Letter” among the UNM and Georgian Dream showed an
example of inter-party rivalry which utilized the EU framework for accusation and
contestation. In the letter to the Georgian PM on March 6, 23 MEPs, 19 of them from the
EPP, accused Ivanishvili in drifting Georgia away from Europe. They accused new
government in democratic backsliding and usage of hate speeches and calls for violence. As a
reaction, Davit Usupashvili, the Republican party leader with links to ALDE, asked not to set
President Saakashvili and his former regime as a standard as it would be an insult to Europe
(Civil Georgia, 12 March 2013). He urged to refuse from statements based on unsubstantiated
claims. The reaction from Ivanishvili followed later, who accused the letter’s authors of
“living on Saakashvili’s lies”. He called previous regime as façade democracy and enlisted
plenty of wrongdoings by the previous government. Ivanishvili connected “groundless
allegations” with blind support for the UNM as the EPP “sister party” and that “Saakashvili’s
allies in the European Parliament, as it seems, choose confrontational tactics” (Civil Georgia,
14 March 2013). Moreover, he said that such approach “means that the European People’s
Party is not capable of articulating its own political conclusions” (Civil Georgia, 18 March
20
2013) about situation in Georgia. Saakhashvili described Ivanishvili’s response as
inadmissible that will lead to a deadlock (Civil Georgia, 18 March 2013). Interestingly that
after this accident, there has been some informal talks on potential affiliation between
Georgian Dream and the PES. Admittedly, this case has motivated the party to find their
influential supporters on the EU level.
The experience in dealing with non-EU parties puts adjustments on the Europarties’
strategy to the region as well. After the successive waves of enlargement, the ideological
profiles of Europarties ceased to be sharpened. Weak ideology inherent to political parties
from post-communist states decrease the Europarties’ cohesiveness with regard to their
ideological principles (Timus and Lightfoot 2014: 2). Recruiting observer party members
outside the EU, the ideological profile of the Europarties continues to dilute further. As party
programmes are rather redundant for parties in Eastern Europe, it forces the Europarties to
decrease the requirements for affiliation. Frequently, it is very difficult to find purely liberal,
Christian democratic or social democratic parties in countries where traditions of multi-party
democracy have not been rooted yet and where party ideology is substituted by charismatic
party leaders. Due to these reasons, considering cooperation, the Europarties apply rather
democratic requirements. Often, it is not ideological profile that matters, but party’s proEuropean position and its democratic credentials that are the lowest denominator for
acceptance. In the EPP case, it is a compromise between values bound to the rapprochement
to the EU and party’s political weight in the country. The EPP is interested in supporting
parties that have or will have political influence in decision-making rather than Christian
democratic parties with 1% voter’s support11. On the other hand, by lowering the standards,
the Europarties want to avoid the misuse of affiliation. After a couple of negative cases, the
Europarties have changed their policy towards the newcomers. A potential damage to the
image has forced them to be more careful by accepting new and treating older ones. In CEE
countries, the Slovak SMER was suspended from the PES after building a coalition with the
far-right Nationalist Party. It contradicted the PES Statute where the party condemns racism
and xenophobia (Holmes and Lightfoot 2010: 43). In Eastern Europe, Our Ukraine was
expelled from the EPP family because of abstention from all EPP activities and noncompliance with the Europarty’s values. Likewise, the Moldovan Christian-Democratic
People’s Party departed from its initial centre-right position towards ultra-nationalist position
with ad hoc collaborations with the Communists. Marginal support for the party (about 0.5%
in 2010) has questioned EPP’s further political assistance. In both cases, potential misuse of
11
Interview with formal KAS representative, November 2013.
21
the affiliation by almost non-existing party with dubious nationalist shift compelled the EPP
to terminate the assistance and apply the suspension article. Furthermore, the competition
between domestic parties for European support might foster the competition between the
Europarties themselves. Interested in having viable political forces, the Europarties compete
with each other by expressing political support for their like-minded partners. In this sense,
the competition among the Europarties is expressed in having sustainable, and if possible,
governmental party. A particular case of competition between the EPP and the PES was
revealed during the above-mentioned “War of Letters” in Georgia. What started as EPP’s
warning of backsliding on democracy to current Georgian government has turned into a battle
between different Europarties. The provision of enormous support to EPP’s sister party - the
UNM - has triggered a reaction from other Europarties that have allies in Georgia. ALDE
Chairman Watson warned the EPP of being on the slippery slope with Saakhashvili, who is
“playing fast and loose with the rule of law” (ALDE Press release, September 9, 2012). The
EPP’s letter addressed to Ivanishvili’s government was seen as interference into Georgia’s
domestic affairs and as evidence of blindness on Saakahshvili’s wrongdoings. EPP President
Martens, in a response, called on other European political parties to condemn Ivanishvili and
especially on ALDE and their party leader Watson, “who enthusiastically endorsed - even via
paid adverts - Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream” (EuroActiv, December 21, 2012). In this
sense, the Georgian case has showed that the support for “sister parties” can be a contestable
battlefield for the Europarties as well.
Discussion and Limitations
Due to interdisciplinary locus of research domain, there are some caveats that should be
discussed here. The non-EU member status makes its own emphasize to the notion of
Europeanization. The engagement of Europarties with parties beyond the EU shows different
faces of Europeanization. One should be aware of possible overdetermination of the EU
impact, as parties are not likely to react in the same way as their Western counterparts. In the
neighbourhood, the process of Europeanization is concurrently intertwined with the processes
of transition and democratization. Some cases of the EU impact on political parties have
rather democratic effect than a European one. Moreover, one should consider ongoing
democratic consolidation process within country’s context in order to assess the cooperation
impact. The Europarties still promote very much fundamental issues like democratic
standards of party building and freedoms. Secondly, one should be cautious about the impact
in the result of cooperation with the Europarties. To distil a purely European impact on
22
political parties one should check the influences of other actors from the realm of
international party assistance. Together with the Europarties, there are plenty of organizations
that work in the same direction: the US institutions like NDI and IRI, German, Swedish and
Dutch party foundations, ODIHR-OSCE etc. The impact of cooperation is multi-layered as
different actors are involved into democratization and party assistance. Thirdly, the causal
mechanism of application between the European party families and like-minded parties is not
always onefold. On the one hand, it is domestic parties’ own choice to apply to a certain
European party family. As initiative emanates from domestic parties, they identify themselves
with a particular European party family and find like-minded allies within. From this
perspective, the choice is made because domestic parties feel ideological closeness to a
particular party family. On the other hand, the causal relationship might be reverse. While in
Western party systems parties join transnational federations because their ideological profile
matches with the profile of European party family, in Eastern European party systems the
causal mechanism might be different. As parties from post-communist countries lack
ideological profiles, the affiliation to the European party families might be a way of mapping
themselves in political spectrum. Party representatives from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
mentioned that the establishment of transnational links helped them to place themselves on
the left-right spectrum. Prior to the affiliation, they were in the process of identification and of
finding their place in international alliances. Through links to transnational federations,
Eastern European parties attempt to define their ideological stances. It is worth noticing that
this reverse relationship is rather inherent to catch-all parties like Batkivshchyna, UNM and
PLDM. Furthermore, bilateral transnational links could be more influential than the affiliation
with the Europarties. After becoming an observer member within a Europarty, domestic
parties obtain direct links to the European counterparts. Depending on domestic parties’
networking abilities, bilateral cooperation might be more affluent with a certain party from
the European party family. The bilateral links seem to be more conspicuous and might reveal
more about real ideological sympathies (Pridham 2014: 36). For example, within the EPP, the
Ukrainian UDAR has close ties with German CDU and the Georgian UNM is linked with
Swedish Central Party. Unlikely, the EPP affiliated PLDM closely cooperates with the UK
Conservatives which belong to other European party family – AECR. Another caveat in
assessing the cooperation impact concerns a vague distinction between party per se and party
in government. In cases where like-minded parties are in government, it is difficult to
disentangle whether the Europarty addresses “sister party” or government led by this party.
On the flip side, parties in government frequently discuss not only party business, but also
23
promote national interests. For the UNM, the EPP’s position on Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic
aspirations was of crucial importance to foster country’s national interests. In the same vein, it
is difficult to distinguish between the impact of European integration and the influence of
cooperation with Europarties. As the Europarties fully share the EU norm and values, the
promotion of democratic standards and practices might be overlapping with the EU
institutions. It is roughly complementary to the agenda of Europarties they promote (Pridham
2014: 37). Finally, measuring the match between domestic parties and preferred European
party families, one has to consider the ongoing process of ideological dilution on the
European side as well. Due to internal re-structuring developments, the ideological profile of
Europarties has also lost its sharpness. During the process of EU enlargement, the EPP family
became more heterogeneous. Firstly, Christian Democratic parties were accompanied with
groups of conservative and even liberal parties. In the 1990s, the EPP employed the
expansionist strategy and started to include parties with comparable social design and
European objectives. This pragmatic decision has shifted the ideological core from Christian
Democrats to centre-right parties (Delwit 2001: 146). The shift was stipulated by the desire to
increase their presence in the EP. Next ideological evolution of the EPP was bound to the
accession in Central and Eastern Europe. At the end, this strategy has contributed to loose
ideological coherence. In the same vein, in 2004, the pragmatic approach to expansion was
applied by ELDR. The group merged with the European Democratic Party who shared a
federalist view and was subsequently renamed as ALDE. In 2009, by incorporation of
agrarian parties, ALDE widened its ideological profile and thus became the third biggest party
in the EP (Smith 2014: 112).
Conclusions
The paper examines a nascent “face of Europeanization” as cooperation with the European
party federations. The Europarties represent platform for networking where domestic parties
obtain an opportunity to get socialized in line with EU norms and practices. The cooperation
with non-EU political parties reveals a different incentive structure and shows more dynamic
compared to the Western countries. Having no credible EU membership perspective, domestic
parties beyond the EU still willingly cooperate with the Europarties. On the other hand,
through widening their links to the non-EU member states, the Europarties do not obtain
additional partners in the EP. Yet, analysis of cooperation shows that both Europarties and
domestic parties employ rational and sociological arguments to engage with each other.
Neither strategic nor ideational incentives are sufficient to explain the cooperation. For
24
domestic parties, cooperation with European partners bestows international recognition which
they broadly use to underpin their domestic legitimacy. It is very prestigious for non-EU
parties to be incorporated into the European party elites. Often, this cooperation is
instrumentalized as a proxy for party’s ideological profile and pro-European position.
Additionally, through joint activities, parties exchange expertise knowledge in European party
building. For the Europarties, it is an opportunity to promote their norms and values to the
neighbouring countries and find credible and sustainable partners for the future. On the
European level, the mainstream parties are competing with each other for expanding their
networks and their circle of allies.
The cooperation is likely to empower and open up opportunities for some parties, while
marginalizing the others. Analyzing cooperation cross-nationally and across the Europarties,
there are several generalizations to be made. On the country level, in Ukraine only centrist
and centre-right parties have established cooperation with the EPP, while the Moldovan
parties have covered the whole political spectrum, including even the affiliation with the
European Communists. In Georgia, cooperation has been established with three European
party families – EPP, ALDE and AECR. The empirical evidence shows that predominantly
catch-all parties prefer to be affiliated with the EPP or the PES. As a rule, those domestic
parties often form the government as a single party or as a part of coalition. It stipulates
party’s preference for the biggest Europarties as this choice offers better opportunity for the
promotion of European integration. From this perspective, major domestic parties affiliate
themselves rather due to strategic calculation. For minor parties, the choices for affiliation are
more restricted. On the one hand, the biggest Europarties are interested in viable political
forces to insure sustainable promotion of norms and values over time. The EPP and the PES
have a clear interest in affiliation with currently or potentially influential parties. While the
EPP tends to cooperate with newly fledged parties that triggered changes in countries, the
PES cooperation is marked by links to post-authoritarian parties. During the Rose, the Orange
and the Twitter Revolutions, now the EPP “sister parties” - the UNM, Batkivshchyna party
and PLDM - were leading forces respectively. For the PES, all potential parties stem from
former Communist parties. For this reason, frequently cooperation is overshadowed by links
to oligarch-driven parties. As a result, the European Socialists cooperates with the Moldovan
Democratic Party ruled by an oligarch and had some informal dialogue with oligarch-driven
Party of Regions and Georgian Dream. On the other hand, joining the same Europarty,
newcomers should obtain an unofficial approval for acceptance from incorporated members.
Frequently, the relations are preferred to be seen as exceptional what leads to obstructive
25
behavior. In these cases, minor parties are on the safe side cooperating with smaller
Europarties like ALDE or AECR. In this way, parties try to find unoccupied niche on the
European arena to secure their international support and acknowledgement. Although it goes
in line with strategic calculation, ideological match between minor parties and the Europarties
is likely to be more congruent. As minor parties do not aim to encompass broader social
groups but to target a particular one, the congruence of party profiles seems to be the closest.
In particular, it is the case for the Georgian Republican Party with ALDE and the Ukrainian
Rukh with the EPP.
On the party system level, the cooperation triggers some changes with regard to mechanics
and format of national party systems. The establishment of affiliation structures parties in line
with Western party systems. Joining ideologically grouped Europarties, non-EU parties
signals their programmatic preferences. This process of identification contributes to
standardization of political spectrum in traditional, Western left-right terms. As the
Europarties frequently plead to inter-party dialogue among “sister parties” or pro-European
forces, it changes the format of coalitions. De facto parties are restricted in their choices to
form a coalition with authoritarian/extremist/anti-European parties. These calls on inter-party
support aim to consolidate democratic and/or pro-European forces. However, in contrast with
expectations, “sister parties” often act obstructively against each other.
As next step, it is to examine the impact of cooperation on domestic party structure on
programmatic, organizational and behavioral levels. It will contribute to further examination
of the Europarties as EU norm promoters in the neighbourhood. The next analysis should
address some important issues as level of match before joining the Europarties and degree of
transformation after the affiliation.
References
Bader, Max (2010): Against All Odds: Aiding Political Parties in Georgia and Ukraine,
Amsterdam University Press, 2010.
Burnell, Peter (2011): Promoting Democracy Abroad: policy and performance, Transaction
Publishers, New Brunswick.
Carothers, Thomas (2006): Confronting the weakest link: aiding political parties in new
democracies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 2006.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2003): “Going Native” In Europe?: Theorizing Social Interaction in
European Institutions, Comparative Political Studies, 36 (1/2), 2003, p. 209-231.
26
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005): International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction
and Framework, International Organization, 59 (04), p. 801-826.
Dakowska, Dorota (2002): Beyond Conditionality: EU Enlargement, European Party
Federations and the Transnational Activity of German Political Foundations.
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3 (2):271--296.
Dakowska, Dorota (2005): German Political Foundations: transnational party go-betweens in
the process of the EU enlargement, in: Kaiser, Wolfgang; Starie, Peter (eds.): Transnational
European Union, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 150-169.
Day, Stephen (2014): Between “Containment” and “Transnationalization” – Where next for
the Europarties? Acta Politica, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 5-29.
Delwit, Pascal, Külahci, Erol, Van der Walle, Cédric (2004): The Europarties. Organization
and Influence, Centre d’étude de la vie politique of the Free University of Brussels (ULB),
Brussels.
Hanley, David (2002): Christian Democracy and the Paradoxes of Europeanization:
Flexibility, Competition and Collusion, Party Politics, Vol. 8 (4), pp. 463-481.
Haughton, Tim (Ed.) (2010): Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Does EU
Membership Matter?, Routledge.
Holmes, Michael; Lightfoot, Simon (2011): Limited Influence? The Role of the Party of
European Socialists in Shaping Social Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,
Government and Opposition, Vol. 46 (1), pp. 32-55.
Johansson, Karl Magnus; Raunio, Tapio (2005): Regulating Europarties: Cross-Party
Coalitions Capitalizing on Incomplete Contracts, Party Politics, Vol. 11 (5), pp. 515-534.
Ladrech, Robert (2002): Europeanization and Political Parties. Towards a Framework for
Analysis, in: Party Politics Vol.8 (4), 289-403.
Ladrech, Robert (2009): Europeanization and political parties, Living Reviews in European
Governance, 4(1), Available from: http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2009-1.
Lewis, Paul G. (2008): Changes in the party politics of the new EU member states in Central
Europe: patterns of Europeanization and democratization, Journal of Southern Europe and the
Balkans Online, Vol. 10 (2), pp. 151-165.
Lightfoot, Simon (2006): The Consolidation of Europarties? The “Party Regulation” and the
Development of Political Parties in the European Union, Representation, Vol. 42 (4), pp. 303314.
Mair, Peter; Mudde, Cas (1998): The Party Family and Its Study, Annual Review of Political
Science, Volume 1, 1998, pp. 211-229.
Mittag, Jürgen; Steuwer, Janosch (2010): Politische Parteien in der EU, Facultas Verlag- und
Buchhandels AG, Wien 2010.
27
Pridham, Geoffrey (1999): Patterns of Europeanization and transnational party cooperation:
party development in Central and Eastern Europe, Paper for Workshop on European Aspects
of Post-Communist Party Development, ECPR Sessions, University of Mannheim, 26-31
March 1999
Pridham, Geoffrey (2014): Comparative perspectives on transnational party-building in new
democracies: The case of Central and Eastern Europe, Acta Politica, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 30-50.
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2005): Strategic Calculation and International Socialization:
Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and
Eastern Europe, International Organization, Vol. 59 (4): 827-860.
Schimmelfennig, Frank; Sedelmeier, Ulrich (Ed.) (2005): The Europeanization of Central and
Eastern Europe, Cornell University Press, New York.
Smith, Julie (2014): Between ideology and pragmatism: Liberal party politics at the European
level, Acta Politica, Vol 49 (1), pp. 105-121.
Timus, Natalia (2014): Transnational Party Europeanization: EPP and Ukrainian parties, Acta
Politica, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 51-70.
Timus, Natalia; Lightfoot, Simon (2014): Europarties: Between the processes of “deepening”
and “widening”, Acta Politica, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 1-4.
Von dem Berge, Benjamin; Poguntke, Thomas (2012): The influence of Europarties on
Central and Eastern European partner parties: a theoretical and analytical model, European
Political Science Review, November 2012, pp. 1-24.
Zur Hausen, Clemens (2008): Der Beitrag der “Europarteien” zur Demokratisierung der
Europäischen Union, Tectum Verlag, Marburg 2008.
28
Annex 1
Party
People’s Union “Our Ukraine”
(UA)
Batkivshchyna Party (UA)
People’s Movement of Ukraine
Rukh (UA)
UDAR Party (UA)
The United National Movement
(GE)
The New Rights Party (GE)
Georgian Dream (party) (GE)
Affiliation with the Europarty
EPP (2005 - 2013)
Internationals
-
EPP (since 2008)
EPP (since 2005)
IDU Associate Member
-
EPP (since 2013)
EPP (since 2008)
IDU Member
Applicant to EPP (since 2003)
IDU Associate Member
Unofficial dialogue with the PES (since 2013)
The Republican Party (GE)
ALDE (since 2007)
Liberal
International
(Observer Member)
Our Georgia – Free Democrats ALDE (since 2011)
(GE)
The Christian-Democratic
AECR (since 2012)
IDU Member
Movement (GE)
The Party of Communists (MD) EL (since 2007)
The Liberal Party (MD)
ALDE (since 2010)
The Liberal Democratic Party EPP (since 2011)
EDU, IDU Member
PLDM (MD)
The Democratic Party (MD)
PES (since 2010)
Socialist International
The
Christian
Democratic EPP (2005-2012)
People’s Party (MD)
29