ECC Report <No>
Report on Carrier Identification (CID)
Approved DD Month YYYY
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Body text
(Advice: the Executive Summary should provide a short and concise explanation on the purpose of the
respective ECC Report and should clearly indicate the covered subjects to which it applies. In addition, it
should clearly explain the application of the document.)
The RF environment is becoming ever more crowded with ever increasing competition for bandwidth and
satellite communication is very much a part of that conundrum! Satellites in the geostationary arc are moving
closer together (2°); more people are accessing satellites than ever before and thus interference is very
much a fact of life, however, our industry through innovation, technology and a willingness to cooperate is
fighting back against interference. Carrier ID is a proven technology and another tool to use in reducing
interference.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................. 4
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5
SATELLITE INTERFERENCE AND IMPLICATIONS ...................................................................................... 6
1.1 Background to interference to satellite Access systems and the Related impact ............................. 6
1.2 Statistics .......................................................................................................................................... 17
APPLICABILITY OF CID ON RESOLUTION OF INTERFERENCE TO SATELLITE ................................... 19
1.3 How CID will work? ......................................................................................................................... 19
1.4 DVB formal statement on deriving the DVB-CID… ......................................................................... 21
1.5 Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) Action Plan… ................................................................. 22
1.6 Industry led Resolutions for the implementation of Carrier ID… ..................................................... 24
1.7 Common Carrier ID Database through the SDA… ......................................................................... 25
TYPES OF ACCESS SYSTEMS AND APPLICABILITY OF CID .................................................................. 27
1.8 What types of Access systems which could benefit from introduction of CID ................................ 27
1.9 Are there any Access systems which do not require CID? ............................................................. 27
VSAT SYSTEMS ............................................................................................................................................. 28
1.10 Current Statistics and Findings ....................................................................................................... 28
1.11 Causes of VSAT RFI ....................................................................................................................... 28
1.12 Proposed Solutions ......................................................................................................................... 29
1.13 Further Actions ................................................................................................................................ 29
1.14 Examples of figures and tables (only for drafting purposes) ........................................................... 29
CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 30
ANNEX 1: HEADING ...................................................................................................................................... 31
ANNEX 2: LIST OF REFERENCE .................................................................................................................. 32
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation
ACI
BWA
CEPT
CID
CSM
dB
DVB
ECC
ES or E/S
ETSI
FDOA
GVF
HPA
ID
IRG
ISOG
MSS
NIT
RF
RFI
TDOA
TLE
TWTA
UAV
VSAT
WBU
Explanation
Adjacent Carrier Interference
Broadband Wireless Access
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations
Carrier Identification
Carrier Spectrum Monitoring
Decibel
Direct Video Broadcast
Electronic Communications Committee
Earth Station
European Telecommunications Standards Institute
Frequency Difference of Arrival
Global VSAT Forum
High Powered Amplifier
Identification
Satellite Interference Reduction Group
International Satellite Operations Group
Mobile Satellite Services
Network Information Table (part of a DVB Stream)
Radio Frequency
Radio Frequency Interference
Time Difference of Arrival
Travelling Wave Tube Amplifier
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Very Small Aperture Terminal
World Broadcast Union
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 5
INTRODUCTION
The satellite industry loses millions of dollars per year down to cases of interference and a great deal of
manpower has to be given over to discovering its causes. Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) is caused by
human error, bad installation, lack of training, poor equipment or system design and a lack of adherence to
industry standards and guidelines. Occasionally, interference may be malicious, but this is rare and the main
issues of interference lie largely within the heart of the satellite industry itself. The orbital spacing of satellites
is being reduced and the fill rate is getting higher. It is getting crowded up there, leading to increased
interference. The Satellite Interference Reduction Group (IRG) is aiming to turn this around.
The effects of satellite interference are felt throughout the industry, yet it is we, the industry causing the
problem. Everything from components and subsystem design, right through to the end user affects satellite
interference, so we need to work together for the resolution.
Two technologies currently exist…
1. NIT Carrier ID (NIT-CID) – developed mainly for Digital Satellite News Gathering (DSNG) Encoders
but available in a high proportion of all single thread Encoders. It uses the initial Network Information
Table (open format, not encrypted) available within the DVB stream. Developed in 2006 by Colem
and Link Research (now Vislink) and supported by IRG;
2. DVB Carrier ID (DVB-CID) – a new technology using spread-spectrum techniques to add a separate
and resilient carrier under any Single Channel per Carrier (SCPC) or Multiple Channels per Carrier
(MCPC) transmission method carrying streamed content or pure Data/IP. This is independent of the
DVB or Data Stream the contained content. Developed by Comtech EF-Data and supported through
a specific IRG Working Group, Newtec then joined the development team to be able to work through
the DVB and formalize the open industry specification which has now become an ETSI Standard 1.
Implementation summary to meet the Carrier ID transition date of 1st January, 2015…
1

DVB-CID ETSI Standard completed May 2013

NIT-CID Available

70% of all supplied Modulators are DVB-CID ready now!

80% of all supplied Encoders are NIT-CID ready now!

SDA CID Database in production (ready for testing - June 2014)

Detection Systems for both DVB-CID and NIT-CID available now!

Eutelsat, Intelsat & SES implementing Carrier ID Monitoring Systems now!

WBU-ISOG Resolutions created CID targets! (May 2013)

ASBU Action Plan requires DVB-CID (Oct 2013)

FCC require ALL SNG/Flyaway Broadcast Platforms to be Carrier ID compliant by 1st June 2016
ESTI Specification available via this link…
http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103100_103199/103129/01.01.01_60/ts_103129v010101p.pdf
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 6
SATELLITE INTERFERENCE AND IMPLICATIONS
This section looks at the background to and the fundamental types of, interference, the typical resolutions
and relevance of Carrier ID…
1.1
BACKGROUND TO INTERFERENCE TO SATELLITE ACCESS SYSTEMS AND THE RELATED
IMPACT
Types of interference
There are several causes of interference and, as mentioned above, most of these are caused by the industry
and can be avoided. There are of course some malicious attacks, but they only account for a very small
percentage of the interference cases. By far the most significant cause of interference is human error.
According to Ron Busch, VP Network Operations, Intelsat, as much as 90% can be attributed to human
error.
Below is a quick rundown of the main types of interference.
Satellite radio interference events may be generally categorized into five main groups these are:Human Error - This is usually accidental due to user error (transmitting at the wrong time, wrong frequency or
transmitting through the antenna instead of into a dummy load), equipment malfunction or due to poor cable
shielding causing retransmit of terrestrial signals (see below). Intelsat’s measurements show that 47% of
satellite interference is down to unauthorized carriers, which is often caused by human error.
Masks can be used to detect Unauthorized Carrier occupying spectrum reserved for another user.
Adjacent Satellite Interference - This type of interference is also generally accidental due to operator error or
poor system design or installation practices. This type of interference is becoming more prevalent as 2°
spacing between satellites in the geostationary arc becomes more common, smaller antennas mean larger
beamwidths so pointing the antenna correctly becomes more critical. Typical 3dB beamwidths for approach
+/- 0.75° or greater, it does not take much to miss point the antenna such that it starts to illuminate adjacent
satellite at 2° spacing.
Terrestrial Interference - The use of RF spectrum is increasing and now traditional satellite frequency bands
such as the satellite downlink frequencies of 3.4 to 4.2GHz are being used terrestrially for the last mile
broadband data networks.
Tests carried out by IRG in conjunction with other groups have demonstrated this to be a major issue. These
frequencies are of paramount importance in the tropical regions as they are less prone to attenuation from
weather affects. So the expansion of WiMAX and other BWA systems has limited the use of spectrum for
satellite users.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 7
Many satellite ground stations use Intermediate frequency of either 70MHz or L-Band (950 – 2150MHz).
These IF signals are upconverted to the satellite frequency bands using Block Upconverters (BUC). Often,
such IF frequencies, are used for terrestrial services such as FM broadcast radio, or cell phone networks
(GSM 3G and 4G). Badly planned or maintained ground stations retransmit these terrestrial signals to the
satellite. Certainly the increase in 3G and 4G services has seen a greater number of cell towers, allied with
an increasing number of small low cost satellite terminals has led to increased retransmission of terrestrial
signals.
Deliberate Interference - This type of interference is usually caused by a state or large commercial user that
objects to some content in the transmission that they are intentionally jamming. It is, generally, relatively
easy to locate, but almost impossible to remove without political intervention, and even then this may prove
difficult.
Cross Polarization Interference - Satellites increase the available spectrum by using polarity diversity. The
RF signals are transmitted to the satellite in two polarities at the same frequency. A well aligned antenna
should have greater than 30dB of rejection of the opposite polarity (both transmit and receive) which is more
than enough to ensure interference free communication. According to Intelsat, as much as 33% of
interference is down to cross polarization leakage of signals from one pole into the other.
There are two main causes of cross polarization interference, the obvious one being that the antenna
becomes misaligned. This may be due to several factors, ranging for being pushed around by high winds or
other weather affects, or poor installation in the first place. The other is perhaps not so obvious and comes
down to planning practices, and that is incompatible modulation types (such as FM TV) being transmitted in
the opposite polarization, analogue services are such as FM or analogue video generally at some instance of
time collapse back to being un-modulated or a CW carrier.
The power normally spreads across the bandwidth by the modulation is now concentrated in the CW carrier.
Even with 30dB of cross pole signal rejection, there can still be sufficient power in the cross pole to disrupt
digitally modulated (*PSK) signals.
Modern digital signal analysis can now separate multiple signals occupying the same frequency space and
detect and measure the interference.
Inter-Modulation occurs when two or more RF signals meet and merge, the sums and the differences of their
harmonic frequencies cause inter-modulation products. Most common is third order harmonic for different
products. This form of interference in generally caused as users “creep” up their power for a perceived link
budget advantage, the reality is that as all users resort to power creep it becomes self-defeating as the
satellite TWTA moves towards a non-linear state and inter-modulation in the form of spurious signals and
what appears to be increased noise floor actually reduces link margin. Power creep can also result in ground
equipment becoming compressed and spectral re-growth is seen, which can result in adjacent carrier
interference (ACI) as the carrier now expands beyond its allocated bandwidth.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 8
Detecting and Analyzing Interference is the first step in reducing the effects.
Sun Interference Sun Interference is due to the Satellite, the Sun and the Earth Station antenna being
aligned. Solar heavy noise will be received with the satellite signal due to the satellite, the sun and the E/S
being aligned and it occurs twice a year.
Sun interference is due to the satellite, the Sun and the Earth Station antenna being aligned, image courtesy
of ArabSat
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 9
Scintillation (level variation) Occurs due to turbulent mixing of air mass in the ionosphere, the satellite signal
fluctuates in level (up to 12dB) at affected Earth Stations whilst neighboring Earth Stations may not
experience the same effects. Often occurs between 19:00-23:00 Earth Station local time and affects lower
frequencies, such as C-band, in the main. It is unpredictable, so affected E/S's are recommended to disable
normal auto tracking once noticed and engage in manual tracking using received traffic levels as the basis of
keeping on track.
Scintillation (level variation) occurs due to turbulent mixing of air mass in the ionosphere, image courtesy of
ArabSat
What is causing these cases of interference?
There are a whole range of different causes of interference. A number of years ago we believed the biggest
cause to be deliberate signal jamming, however we now know that is not the case and in fact the deliberate
sabotage of satellite signals is a very small percentage of the problem and that is not our highest priority
currently.
Indeed, we as an industry are the main cause; crowded geostationary satellite arc leading to closer spacing
of satellite is one factor. The biggest reason right now is sub-standard equipment, lack of trained technicians,
poor installations and consequently equipment failure, as well as human error. There is still a lot of
unidentified carriers and insufficient incident coordination.
The Global VSAT Forum (GVF) comments that with VSAT terminal costs dropping well below $1000, the
margin available for installation services is falling. Add to that the fact that installers are no longer necessarily
an experience engineer spending days on site, but instead often a junior technician paid as little as $50 for a
complete VSAT installation. There are a vast number of VSAT terminals being installed, over 100,000 per
year, any of which can cause serious interference. GVF also comments that spot beams make satellites
more sensitive to uplink signals and although this helps reduce VSAT size and cost it makes transponders
more sensitive to interference.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 10
So what is the industry currently doing?
IRG is working together with other industry organizations and major players in the satellite industry to resolve
interference. We have the support from the key satellite operators. Indeed, Intelsat’s has commented: “At
Intelsat, we are very much aware that Radio Frequency Interference continues to be a problem. Indeed, our
metrics continue to show a steady rate of interference events on our fleet.” Intelsat, like others, has its own
Intelsat Interference Management Initiative, which concentrates on training, technology, and processes, both
internally and with the entire satellite community.
There are a number of ways to reduce interference and I would like to think that we will eventually be able to
eradicate it altogether. The only way we can achieve this is by working together. We have already done a lot
of work with satellite operators, broadcasters and equipment manufacturers across the globe, establishing a
number of initiatives and good working practices to tackle this growing problem.
Carrier Identification…
Carrier ID has been the major initiative for IRG thus far in the world of broadcasting. It is an industry-wide
initiative and it is the most effective tool for tracking the source of interference quickly and efficiently. In fact
by working closely with satellite operators, broadcasters, and equipment manufacturers the NIT Carrier ID
was in place in time for the 2012 Olympics.
The purpose of Carrier ID is to tag an RF Carrier with a unique identity, in the form of an alphanumeric string.
This unique identifier is tracked by the Satellite Operator after the carrier is commissioned. So that if that
carrier were to be the cause of interference the unique identifier could be read and the Satellite Operator
contacted to rectify the problem.
There are currently two technologies available for Carrier ID the first makes use of the Network Information
Table (NIT) within DVB streams of satellite digital TV transmissions. A standard DVB stream analyzer can be
used to extract the NIT from the DVB stream. The other method uses a Meta Carrier or sub-carrier
developed by Comtech, and is transmitted at the same frequency as the carrier. The Meta Carrier is
transmitted at low power of around 22dB below the actual carrier so as not to impact the link budget. The
Meta Carrier uses a spectrum spreading technique such that a receiver can correlate and pull the Meta
Carrier out of the noise and read the unique identifier. The industry has come together and suppliers of
communication system monitoring (CSM) equipment now supply systems capable of extracting and
displaying the unique identifier from both systems.
The new Meta Carrier version is now a DVB specification (DVB Document A164) and ETSI [ETSI TS 103
129 v1.1.1 (2013 – 05)] and is the preferred CID model to be used. The FCC has announced that as from
June 1st 2016 all SNG/Flyaway systems must transmit this new Carrier ID.
Another piece of the puzzle for Carrier ID is the equipment manufacturer. A large number of the equipment
manufacturers have integrated NIT Carrier ID capabilities into their encoder and some modulator products.
In addition, the Meta Carrier ID technology is now available in 70% of all modulator and modem systems with
more manufacturers integrating this technology during 2014.
Testing of all methods is also underway. Testing is absolutely crucial for ensuring not only that there are
encoders and modulators on the market able to handle NIT and Meta Carrier ID, but also to ensure
interoperability between equipment. The tests we are currently carrying out means that carrier monitoring
specialists and manufacturers alike can iron out any issues, as well as allowing time to develop the
interfaces and decoding techniques for both NIT and the Meta Carrier ID technology.
A major effort is coming from Satellite Operators. The various announcements and active support from key
operators Eutelsat, Inmarsat, Intelsat and SES has ensured that Carrier ID continues to progress and a new
global CID Database is being built by the Space Data Association (SDA) for release and trials in June 2014.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 11
IRG actively encourage all operators to commit to this program as they have the power to influence to ensure
users can employ Carrier ID within their transmission systems. From this the WBU-ISOG formed resolutions
for the industry to follow…
WBU-ISOG Resolutions…
1) WBU-ISOG supports the requirement that, by no later than January 1, 2015, all new model
modulators and codecs with integrated modulators purchased by end users for video uplinking
contain a Carrier ID (CID) that meets the ETSI TS 103 129 standard issued May 29, 2013.
2) Based on Resolution #1 and with immediate effect, the WBU-ISOG supports the requirement
that all uplinkers of SCPC and MCPC Video and Data, fixed and mobile systems shall include
Carrier ID functionality in the required specifications of all current and future RFP’s (Request for
Proposal) or RFQ’s (Request for Quote) issued to equipment manufacturers regarding the
purchase of modulators and/or codecs with integrated modulators.
3) The WBU-ISOG supports the requirement that all satellite operators, by no later than January 1,
2015 start the transition to use Carrier ID that meets WBU-ISOG NIT or the ETSI standard for all
SNG, DSNG and any other New Uplink transmission services.
4) The WBU-ISOG supports the requirement that all uplinkers by no later than January 1, 2018
shall ensure that Carrier ID is included for all their respective SCPC and MCPC Video and Data
transmissions.
5) The WBU-ISOG supports the requirements that CID NIT shall be phased-out in preference to the
ETSI standard by January 1, 2018.
Carrier ID essentially means that any carrier can be quickly identified, so when interference occurs a Satellite
Operator can identify instantly who is causing the problem.
Carrier ID & the QA Process…
Satellite Operators
Inserted
Carrier ID
...the Key that
unlocks
the Process!
Type Approval
& other QA Data
ID is the Key
Check & Resolve
+ Updates
User/Uplinker/
Broadcaster
STOP Interference Now! (it s a SIN!)
Presented by Martin Coleman - Executive Director sIRG
www.satirg.org
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 12
Detecting and Locating Interference - Geolocation…
For those instances, which still exist when there is no Carrier ID, operators can call upon Geolocation to find
the source of the problem. Companies providing Geolocation tools use specialized monitoring tools to spot
when interference occurs on a satellite. However, this is expensive, required highly trained operators and is
often not a quick route to resolution.
A retransmit of Signal causing Interference
In this case two signals with the same characteristics can be separated and characterized.
These signals can then be Geolocated to identify where the offending carrier is located. This can be further
backed up by more accurate Geolocation using plane based systems and can use UAVs. Before take-off, the
mission is prepared from a laptop. Once in the air, the pilot engages autopilot and records GPS, video and
spectrum power. If communication is possible, the pilot will also receive live data, which is then downloaded
to the laptop after landing and processed.
Image from Integral Systems Europe.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 13
Case Study…
The following interference was detected by a CSM system…
Interfering Carrier detected.
The CSM system was used to measure cross-pol and found no matching carrier, the system continued to
monitor and characterize the interference. The signal was causing ACI interference, has put the transponder
close to a non-linear mode and blocking a fee paying service from accessing the satellite. The carrier was
not employing Carrier ID technology.
Whilst the CSM continued to monitor the signal it was decided the quickest form of action was to use a
Geolocation tool to locate the source of the transmission and then further determine the reason for
interference.
Velocity
Velocity
Position
Secondary
Satellite
Position
Primary
Satellite
TDOA
FDOA
Interference Source
Monitoring Station 2
Monitoring Station 1
Basic Geolocation two satellites technique.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 14
Generally ground based satellite signal Geolocation systems need to monitor the target signal (interferer)
through two satellites. The primary satellite being the satellite that is experiencing interference and the
secondary satellite is close by and has a similar frequency plan.
The signal is monitored through the two satellites and analyzed to produce two lines of position, TDOA a
Time Difference of Arrival, which is generally a north south line, and FDOA, Frequency Difference of Arrival,
which very generally is an east west line. The TDOA is generated based of the different distances to the two
satellites, and FDOA is generated based on the different frequency shift through the two satellites based
upon their relative motion to each other.
Interfering Antenna Found.
Through Geolocation the offending ground station is found relatively easily and after a few phones calls
found that the reason for the interference was simply human error. The problem was quickly rectified and the
carrier was removed from the satellite.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 15
Transmit Spectrum Monitoring…
As discussed, Carrier ID is by far the most effective solution for monitoring and resolving interference quickly
and efficiently, however, this is not yet common practice and those instances where it is not in place
operators are therefore use other methods to combat this costly and challenging problem.
Geolocation is one solution, but most Satellite Operator also encourage all uplinkers that by regularly
monitoring their uplink can be a crucial “tool” for spotting interference.
In general, it has been observed that any undesired signal above the noise threshold but low enough
(typically > 26dBc below the desired carrier level) will affect adjacent users. More crucially, it can be hard to
determine the source by a Satellite Operator even if it is clearly visible on the downlink spectrum.
HPA re-growth, HPA Inter-modulation, retransmission of mobile ground systems and converter harmonics
are part of the undesired signals RFI types. However these could easily be detected in the early stages by
the Uplinker once they have checked their output spectrum. Indeed, L-Band Analyzers, which are the most
commonly available, can monitor these issues if connected to the upconverter input test point.
In addition to Carrier ID the industry would like to see every Earth Station uplink operator apply Transmit
Spectrum Monitoring.
The graphs below, supplied by ArabSat show TX Spectrum Monitoring at Work…
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 16
In Conclusion...
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 17
1.2
STATISTICS
Figure 1: Example of Experience from SES ASTRA
Body text
Figure 2: Types of RFI and Impact on Industry
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 18
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 19
APPLICABILITY OF CID ON RESOLUTION OF INTERFERENCE TO SATELLITE
1.3
HOW CID WILL WORK?
CARRIER ID INTRODUCTION
How DVB-CID works…
An Identifier Is Injected into the Carrier at the Modulator…
The identifier contains mandatory information such as a 64-bit MAC address or a vendor serial number in
combination with optional user configurable data such as GPS coordinates, the carrier name and user
contact details. This information is injected into the carrier by the modulator at the uplink site.
The Carrier ID Is Transported over Satellite below
the Noise Floor…
In order to lower the impact on the throughput over
the satellite, the carrier ID information is spread below
the noise floor of the carrier. The image depicts an
instance of interference between two carriers and the
location of the Carrier ID info.
The ID Is Read from the Carrier by Special
Measurement Receivers
At the satellite operator facilities special
measurement receivers are installed. At any
occurrence of interference these receivers can
read out the contact information from the carrier
and quickly point out the source of interference.
Resolving the interference issue is in most cases
only a phone call away.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 20
Advantages & Disadvantages of each Carrier ID method…
Carrier ID
Method…
NIT Carrier ID…
Advantages
a) Simple to implement & use.
b) Free of charge firmware upgrade
for the majority of single
thread/DSNG Encoders.
c) Covers the main focus of
accidental interference events from
SNGs and Flyaway Terminals.
DVB Carrier ID…
a) Added as part of the Radio
Frequency (RF) signal within
Modulator and independent of
stream and content.
b) Resilient CID, both service &
interferer Carrier IDs can be
detected during the interference
event.
c) Available for any type of SCPC
or MCPC service whether DVB
Stream, NS3 or any Data/IP type.
d) Already 70% availability on all
latest Modulator products
e) Planned three year roll out
starting 1st January 2015 to allow
equipment upgrade & ability to use
the NIT-CID in the interim.
f) High take-up within the industry
as very few modulator providers &
all have either added CID or
completing implementation by end
2014.
Disadvantages
i) Not resilient. The known carrier must
be taken out of service to read the
Carrier ID of the interferer.
ii) Only suitable on DVB streamed
services.
iii) Limited time as DVB-CID to
become the global single SCPC and
MCPC solution.
i) To implement will require a
broadcaster to renew modulators or
single thread or DSNG encoders.
Note: with DVB S2 Extensions and the
Carrier ID rollout plan allows for this
becoming a natural upgrade path over
time.
ii) Relatively few of today’s modulator
systems that are in service will allow
simple firmware upgrade and cost
involved albeit small.
iii) DSNG Encoders on a slower
timetable to rollout but certainly
available from some suppliers by the
end 2014 and by the early part of 2016
it will be commonly available across all
suppliers.
iv) Not suitable on VSAT burst
mode/TDMA or centrally controlled
systems.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 21
1.4
DVB FORMAL STATEMENT ON DERIVING THE DVB-CID…
Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) highly impacts Quality of Service for satellite operators and their
customers. This in particular applies to occasional use satellite transmissions and temporary feeder links,
rather than to full time Direct to Home (DTH) services, often caused by failed equipment or by an improperly
configured system due to human error.
With the objective to develop countermeasures against the so called ‘rogue carriers’, DVB assigned to the
TM-S2 Ad-Hoc Group the task to define a satellite transmission system for Carrier Identification (Carrier ID).
As reported as part of the DVBs Commercial Requirements process, Carrier ID is not expected to be a
perfect solution to solve all RFI, but it will be a key technology in contributing to the rapid identification of RFI
and reducing its negative impact to operators, customers, and the satellite industry as a whole. Furthermore,
the Commercial Requirements state that Carrier ID is not required for transmitters that are fully controlled by
a hub based network management system, since for these the interferer could be identified reliably by
means other than an explicit Carrier ID signal. This is, for example, the case for low-cost VSAT equipment,
for which the inclusion of a Carrier ID signal could be critical.
Carrier ID is meant to enable the operators and users to quickly identify interfering carriers and respond to
RFI, reducing the duration of each event, improve Quality of Service and reduce operating costs. Also in the
longer term, lower the number of RFI events and release bandwidth being used to overcome current and
ongoing RFI events. The availability of a DVB standard for Carrier ID will enable the industry to produce
interoperable equipment and also will ensure an ongoing development and improvement of Carrier ID
technology in a standardized manner.
The activities of the DVB-S2 group started in March 2012, with the conversion of the Commercial
Requirements into technical ones, and the definition of a baseline system which underwent refinements until
the end of 2012. To allow for the Carrier ID to be virtually compatible with all carriers used in satellite today
(to be considered unknown in terms of
waveform and synchronization), and easy to
be included in all satellite modulators, the
baseline solution is based on the
superimposition of a Spread Spectrum Metacarrier (MC) to the main Data Carrier (DC).
Two fixed values are proposed for the CID
chip rate, 112 and 224 Kbit/depending on
the DC symbol rate, in order to simplify
acquisition/detection. To allow for a
negligible degradation of the DC
performance (typically below 0.1 dB), the
MC will have a predefined Power Spectrum
Density level, well beneath the DC level. At
the same time, the adoption of Spread
Spectrum technique, together with the
Differentially Encoded BPSK modulation and
a BCH FEC (Forward Error Correction) protection, allows for a very robust Carrier ID system. It should in fact
be possible, in the majority of practical cases, to identify the interferer without switching-off the wanted
signal, as particularly required by broadcast services.
The message transported by the MC will include, at a minimum, the MAC address of the equipment and the
Carrier ID format version (to allow for future extensions and improvements). Additional information can
optionally be transmitted, configurable and editable by the user, which can contain information such as
Uplinker name, contact phone number, etc., to help in the RFI identification. A common database is expected
to exist, accessible by all satellite operators and possibly other authorized entities, which will contain all of
the Carrier ID codes and the name of the satellite operator whose satellite is carrying each respective carrier.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 22
The packet format allows for a rapid identification of the RFI: the MAC address is repeated every few
seconds, so that it can be possible to identify the RFI in less than 15 seconds during line-up, and less than 1
minute during operation. The commercial requirements indicate respectively 1 minute and 15 minutes: the
available margin can be used by receiver designers for reduced complexity algorithms that implement
automatic detection with respect to massive parallel reception.
1.5
ARAB STATES BROADCASTING UNION (ASBU) ACTION PLAN…
The ASBU Satellite Interference Forum held in Tunis (6-7 October 2013) developed the ASBU Action plan of
which, Carrier ID is a part. The reason for adding this information to this paper is that this action plan shows
the commitment from commercial broadcasters to improve the industry and the way it operates by investing
in the global initiatives being pursued by various industry groups. The plan includes…
1) Awareness
ASBU and operators in this region and other regions to establish a public awareness campaign through
different Mass Media that intentional interference will not prevent the Media message to be delivered, as the
broadcasters affected will move and find other strategies or alternatives (the use of another satellite, other
frequencies or other means of Media).
Broadcasters in the Region should use their access to media to publicize the impact of satellite interference
on broadcasting.
2) Training
ASBU and operators in this and other regions shall endeavor to establish short and medium training plans for
all broadcasters to ensure that best practices in both operation and maintenance of satellite uplinks with the
objective of significantly reducing the number of interference incidents. Training to be delivered using ASBU,
the Global VSAT Forum (GVF) and recognized training plans such as the GVF SNG module developed
jointly with the IRG- End User Initiative (EUI) Working Group as well as other specialized training providers
for satellite Operations and Network Operation Centers (NOC), etc.
3) Earth Station Approvals
ASBU and operators in this region and other regions to request that SNG terminal equipment be tested
and approved for use in coordination with GVF’s Quality Products Framework, which has been endorsed by
both the IRG-EUI and WBU-ISOG in order to reduce interference caused by faulty satellite newsgathering
ground equipment.
4) Carrier ID
ASBU and operators request that all members and users in the Region implement Carrier ID in line with the
WBU-ISOG Resolutions and to record and measure the progress in implementing this initiative. All
Broadcasting Unions and members of this region are to engage with their national regulators with the view to
making Carrier ID a requirement.
5) Regulatory and Political Actions
ASBU, WBU, satellite operators and all concerned parties recognize the actions of the ITU Radio
Regulations Board and the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) in order to tackle the issue of
intentional interference. Their continued support is requested to develop these initiatives. ASBU and WBU
will also consider whether it is appropriate for action to be taken by other competent UN bodies such as the
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and others.
5.1) Broadcasters to build relationships with their regulators and ITU recognized Administrations in relation to
two specific subjects:
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 23
a) The protection of C-Band resource for WRC-15 in close coordination with GVF.
b) Raising awareness of the issue of interference.
5.2) To develop a formal definition of intentional interference; recognizing that the ITU definition of harmful
interference2 does not make such a distinction.
* Action – For ASBU and relevant bodies in the Arab League to work with its members and related
organizations to:
a) Draft definitions for intentional and unintentional interference and for this to be proposed with the
assistance of Regional Administrations and Broadcast Unions to the ITU, for adoption within the
Radio Regulations.
b) Introduce national laws that prohibit and penalize intentional interference.
c) Conduct bilateral coordination among affected countries.
5.3) To work with other Regional Broadcast Unions, the WBU and industry organizations to convince ITU
members to:
a) Develop the proposal for an Intentional Interference Register (IIR).
b) Develop a system of penalties to be applied to those members that practice intentional
interference.
c) Request ITU apply such penalties on members creating intentional interference. All ASBU
member organizations should have a unified approach towards any ITU members subject to
such constraints.
5.4) For ASBU members to participate in industry working groups such As sIRG, WBU TC & WBU-ISOG to
exert more efforts to find technical solutions to the issue of intentional interference.
5.5) For ASBU and its members to participate actively within the ITU and its relevant study groups to secure
and protect the scare satellite resources upon which all broadcasters depend.
5.6) For ASBU and other Regional Unions to recognize that unauthorized use of un-occupied satellite
capacity is an issue and to request broadcasters take action to ensure they do not use material or companies
that exploit such capacity.
5.7) Ahead of ITU and or other international bodies implementing the suggested changes, ASBU will develop
a code of conduct for its members based on the actions proposed in this plan.
“Interference which endangers the functioning of navigation or other safety radio service or that seriously
degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts any radio communication service operation in accordance with
the Radio Regulations”
2
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 24
1.6
INDUSTRY LED RESOLUTIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CARRIER ID…
At the conclusion of the World Broadcast Union – International Satellite Operations Group (WBU-ISOG)
Forum (May 15-16, 2013) held at Fox Networks in Los Angeles, there was agreement to issue the following
global industry resolutions in support of the recently adopted Carrier ID standard issued by ETSI – ETSI TS
103 129 v1.1.1 (2013 – 05). With this positive step forward by the industry to identify satellite transmissions
of video content and as a means to help mitigate satellite interference, WBU-ISOG supports the following
resolutions:
Exclusions and their Definition
a. The requirements for transmission of Carrier ID do not apply to MSS systems which
automatically configure frequency, power level, polarization and transmit inhibit according to
commands issued by a central control mechanism which is in the control of the satellite
operator.
b. The ETSI TS 103 129 v1.1.1 (2013 - 05) standard does not address systems that use TDMA
or other types of burst carriers, and as such, equipment or systems that use TDMA or burst
carriers are excluded at present from these resolutions.
RESOLUTIONS:
i.
WBU-ISOG supports the requirement that, by no later than January 1, 2015, all new
model modulators and codecs with integrated modulators purchased by end users for
video uplinking contain a Carrier ID (CID) that meets the ETSI TS 103 129 standard
issued May 29, 2013.
ii.
Based on Resolution (i) and with immediate effect, the WBU-ISOG supports the
requirement that all Uplinkers of SCPC and MCPC Video and Data, fixed and mobile
systems shall include Carrier ID functionality in the required specifications of all current
and future RFP’s (Request for Proposal) or RFQ’s (Request for Quote) issued to
equipment manufacturers regarding the purchase of modulators and/or codecs with
integrated modulators.
iii.
The WBU-ISOG supports the requirement that all satellite operators, by no later than
January 1, 2015 start the transition to use Carrier ID that meets WBU-ISOG NIT or the
ETSI standard for all SNG, DSNG and any other New Uplink transmission services.
iv.
The WBU-ISOG supports the requirement that all Uplinkers by no later than January 1,
2018 shall ensure that Carrier ID is included for all their respective SCPC and MCPC
Video and Data transmissions.
v.
The WBU-ISOG supports the requirements that CID NIT shall be phased-out in
preference to the ETSI standard by January 1, 2018.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 25
1.7
COMMON CARRIER ID DATABASE THROUGH THE SDA…
The SDA is finalizing the development of a global Carrier ID database for use in the resolution of detected
and identified carriers. This database will be open to all satellite operators, both members and non-members,
to allow the free flow of exchanging IDs to allow the responsible satellite operator to deal directly with the
interfering transmission. The following outlines the “Use Cases” for Carrier ID and how the interaction of this
database shall be implemented. It is expected that over time, many of these procedures will be fully
automated. Initial testing of the database and processes begins in June 2014 for the World Cup, Brazil.
CARRIER ID “USE CASES”…
INTRODUCTION
The ability to add an ID to a satellite carrier is straight forward and fairly easy to implement using either the
NIT method or the DVB CID method. The ability to detect the ID from a satellite carrier is also fairly straight
forward, though a bit more complicated. However, designing, implementing, and using a system that
properly handles the ID, once it is detected, is quite involved. Any Carrier ID Detection System should be
able to accomplish the following:
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





Detect the Carrier ID on more than one polarity and satellite (multiple RF sources)
Ensure the association between uplinkers and IDs is kept private, owned, and controlled by a
satellite access center and satellite operator (the company that authorized the actual transmission)
Determine if an ID is legitimate, with input from a human operator
Reliably publish, in the central database (expected to be housed within an SDC), the association
between IDs and a satellite operator
Provide background detection and publishing of legitimate IDs
Allow manual investigation of operator-specified bandwidth
Assist the satellite operator with determining who to contact when an unauthorized ID is detected
DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of the following use cases, the following terms are defined as follows:




Satellite Uplinker – Any earth station that transmits RF to a satellite
Satellite Access Center – Any organization or individual that authorizes a satellite Uplinker to initiate
transmission to a satellite; satellite operators have their own access centers, but there are also
access centers at teleports and other satellite users that control access to leased satellite bandwidth
Satellite Operator – Any organization that is responsible for the payload of one or more satellites;
this organization has the ability to join the SDA and help resolve RF interference
SDA – Space Data Association, and association of satellite operators that enables the sharing of
data to assist with the flying of satellites and the resolution of RF interference
CARRIER ID USES CASES AND WORKFLOW
The workflow required to make Carrier ID an effective tool in reducing the time required to recover from
accidental interference or to detect unauthorized users requires planning and interaction with multiple
systems. The following provides suggestions for potential workflow from different users’ perspectives and
those users’ operational scenarios.
Note that it takes 20-75 seconds for a Carrier ID to be detected on a carrier. Therefore any Carrier ID
detection system used must be able to handle the necessary delay required to extract the Carrier ID from
carriers.
Document Note: This use case may be of interest to uplinkers in the future, but is not relevant to the
database or initial implementation of Carrier ID.
SATELLITE ACCESS CENTER DETECTS ID
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 26
Since the Satellite Access Center will have a business relationship with the Uplinker they should know how
to contact the individuals operating the uplink and must know that Uplinker’s CID.
Therefore, after a Satellite Access Center grants authorization to an Uplinker and the Uplinker successfully
transmits, the Satellite Access Center will need to provide information to the Satellite Operator for the
following purposes:


So the Satellite Operator will know how to contact the Uplinker at any time, either directly or through
the Satellite Access Center; and
So the Satellite Operator can extract the CID and associate it to the above contact information as
well as populate the central database. The logical place for that association to occur is in the
Satellite Operators’ customer database (or transmission log, or whatever they use to know who is
allowed to transmit on their space segment.)
The Satellite Access Center, therefore, must provide the following information to the satellite operator:



RF Source – Satellite and polarity
Center Frequency
Uplinker contact information, or contact information for the Satellite Access Center, if the Satellite
Access Center is able to contact the Uplinker when requested by the Satellite Operator.
The Satellite Operator will detect the CID at the RF Source and Center Frequency specified; if a CID is found
the Satellite Operator will associate the CID with correct contract information. The Satellite Operator will also
insert a record in the Central Database linking the detected CID, if found, with themselves.
Satellite Operators should also plan to have background monitoring that will cycle through their space
segment and validate the presence of expected CIDs.
SATELLITE OPERATOR MONITORING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Once the Satellite Operator obtains the list of CIDs that are present for conflicting carriers, the Satellite
Operator queries their own customer database to determine if they have a business relationship with each of
the uplinkers or Satellite Access Centers that are associated with the CIDs.
If so, they contact the Uplinker that is causing interference and ask them to stop. If the Satellite Operator
only has contact information for the Satellite Access Center, then the Satellite Operator will need to contact
the Uplinker through the Satellite Access Center.
If a CID is not contained in the Satellite Operator’s database, the satellite operator queries the Central
Database for the CID and the Central Database returns a list of Satellite Operators that should have
business connection to the uplinkers.
The Satellite Operator then contacts the other Satellite Operator(s) and request they contact the interfering
Uplinker associated with the particular CID. That other Satellite Operator then has the responsibility to
request that the interfering Uplinker correct the issue.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 27
TYPES OF ACCESS SYSTEMS AND APPLICABILITY OF CID
Body text
1.8
WHAT TYPES OF ACCESS SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BENEFIT FROM INTRODUCTION OF CID
SCPC/MCPC
1.9
ARE THERE ANY ACCESS SYSTEMS WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE CID?
ISOG Resolutions help define systems that do not apply, i.e. explanation of VSAT, etc…
At the conclusion of the recent WBU-ISOG Forum (May 15-16, 2013) held at Fox Networks in Los Angeles,
there was agreement to issue a resolution in support of the recently adopted Carrier ID standard issued by
ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) – ETSI TS 103 129 v1.1.1 (2013 – 05). With this
positive step forward by the industry to identify satellite transmissions of video content and as a means to
mitigate harmful satellite interference, WBU-ISOG supports the following resolutions:

Exclusions and their Definition
1. The requirements for transmission of Carrier ID do not apply to MSS Systems which automatically
configure frequency, power level, polarization and transmit inhibit according to commands issued by
a central control mechanism which is in the control of the satellite operator.
2. The ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) – ETSI TS 103 129 v1.1.1 (2013 –
05) standard does not address systems that use TDMA or other types of burst carriers, and as such,
equipment or systems that use TDMA or burst carriers are excluded at present from these
resolutions.
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 28
VSAT SYSTEMS
1.10 CURRENT STATISTICS AND FINDINGS
Where is the Data? - Current Statistics and Findings, No of Tickets, Amount of outage
Figure 3: Breakdown of Interference
1.11 CAUSES OF VSAT RFI
Configuration
Installation
Miss-Pointing
Component Selection
Power Management
System design
BUC Control
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 29
1.12 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Training
Component Type Approval
System Carrier Management and Locking – Do not transmit if not locked to the hub
Carrier Power Management – Do not transmit if out of range
Continuously check modems, and override system in case terminals behave unexpectedly
1.13 FURTHER ACTIONS
Body text
1.14 EXAMPLES OF FIGURES AND TABLES (ONLY FOR DRAFTING PURPOSES)
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1. This is a note to a table (style: ECC Table note)
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 30
CONCLUSIONS
Body text
(Advice: a conclusion may review the main points of the ECC Report. A conclusion might elaborate on the
results of the ECC Report and suggest extensions.)
Recent FCC application of CID for June 2015 for all SNG/DSNG systems in the USA…
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 31
ANNEX 1: HEADING
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A1.1 HEADING 2
ECC REPORT <No>- Page 32
ANNEX 2: LIST OF REFERENCE
[1]
[2]
[3]
Reference one
Reference two
Etc.