__________________________________________________________________________________
2010/HLRT/014
APEC’s Achievements and Challenges Today
Purpose: Information
Submitted by: Australian National University
APEC Growth Strategy High-Level Policy
Round Table
Beppu, Japan
7-8 August 2010
APEC's Achievements and Challenges Today
Peter Drysdale
Crawford School of Economics and Government
The Australian National University
Keynote Address APEC Economic Committee Roundtable, Beppu, Oita, Japan,
7 August 2010
APEC's Achievements and Challenges Today
Since the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process was launched in 1989, it has come a
very long way. We have a huge asset in place in APEC; and we can continue to build on that.
APEC was set up on the premise that Japan's development, and the development of the Asia Pacific
region as a whole, would require successful integration into the global economy. The framework of
GATT and its successor, the WTO, and the great post- war international institutions were critical to
success because they provided the confidence in international commerce that allowed Japan to
resume its growth and fulfil its legitimate ambition to catch up with the industrial world. This was also
the basis on which the rest of East Asia could achieve its ambition for economic development.
The success of Asia’s industrialization was fostered under the umbrella of that post war institutional
framework. A central element of trade and economic growth in the region revolved around strength of
trans-Pacific ties, and access to the huge American market. Trans-Pacific ties remain important to
robust growth in East Asia, although in the coming years there will have to be significant re-balancing
of the structure of growth if there is to be sustainable growth of the global economy.
Origins and legacy
Hence, the genesis of APEC was the rise of Japan and the intense economic relations that developed
between Japan and the United States and within East Asia as the Japanese economy grew to
become the second largest and one of the richest economies in the world. Australia and Japan played
a critical role in the establishment of APEC, working closely together in through the 1980s. The first
Ministerial meeting of APEC meeting in Canberra in November 1989 was, in large measure, a joint
product of creative Australian and Japanese economic diplomacy.
APEC signaled the emergence of a new economic and political order in East Asia and the Pacific in
the late 1980s. APEC committed to the priorities of trade and investment liberalization and set out to
promote regional community building. This approach was, in part, a response to the end of the Cold
War. The Cold War regional order was imposed upon Asia, structured around the East–West divide.
The new approach went beyond the traditional concept of balance of power and was ordered around
Asia's economic development interests in an open global economic system.
The enduring characteristic of the Asia Pacific region is that it is a region of continuing economic and
political transformation. Our strategies toward regional cooperation need to be based on
understanding that this change will continue, that it is positive, and that choking it off will damage the
prospects for prosperity and our political, as well as economic, security.
From the beginning, the APEC process and its approach to regional cooperation has been organised
around a strategy of inclusiveness which is born of the interest in continuing economic, political and
social transformation in East Asia. That is where the idea of open regionalism came from. It was
important to regional cooperation in this part of the world that cooperation be open in terms of the
principles whereby economic policy strategy is formulated so that there can be continuing inclusion of
new players in the process and that the process does not exclude new players and new opportunities
for regional growth, trade and development.
Open regionalism
Open regionalism became the cornerstone of the APEC process and it still is, because the process of
political, social, and economic transformation across the region is a continuing process and openness
is important for its successful continuation (Drysdale, 1991; Garnaut and Drysdale, 1993; Garnaut,
1996). Developing arrangements that excluded others would threaten political and economic stability
and security in the region.
That is also why APEC is a process that seeks to reinforce national trade reform agendas, not impose
an agenda for reform from outside or through some supra-national authority as was the case in
Europe. At the beginning, the emphasis was on trade and investment reform and liberalization. The
trade and investment reform agenda had priority in the 1980s when APEC was established and in
APEC's early years, when it was the driving motivation for cooperation among the East Asian and
Pacific economies. The establishment of the Leaders’ Meeting from 1993 saw this agenda elevated to
a new level, and it was embedded in the institution of the Bogor goals in 1994. Effective integration of
the East Asian economies into the global economy was critical to successful industrialization and
achieving the region's ambitions for growth and development.
Beyond trade and investment liberalization, the development of capacities to support growth became
the third pillar of the APEC process. The Bogor goals were important in this strategy. They set out
targets for liberalization by the APEC member economies globally, in a way not previously attempted
in international economic diplomacy, reinforcing a huge round of trade reform and growth in East
Asia.
These goals delivered a clear set of objectives for APEC on trade and investment and a narrative that
sustained APEC's momentum until the end of the last decade. They remain important, but they are
much less so than they were in 1994 because member economies have moved forward with their own
liberalization agendas largely unilaterally, through multilateral negotiation, and to some extent through
regional negotiations. ASEAN, in the latter process, had a strategy of regional negotiation tied to
broader multilateral liberalization. Regional cooperation within ASEAN supported the global objectives
that were set out in the Bogor goals.
The Bogor goals delivered coherence to the APEC process and its trade and economic reform
agenda. Because of its character, of volunteerism, the APEC process brought regional economies
together and, through dialogue, encouraged commitment to these common policy priorities. There
was no formal, legal sign-on to policy strategies that promoted economic openness, so delivering on
them required independent national commitment. The sense of coherence and a common order of
policy priorities were key benefits to all the APEC economies that were involved.
Some say that without the institutionalization and legal supra-national authority to ensure that member
nations follow through on commitments, APEC is nothing but talk. But when you look at the numbers
and measure the effect of these commitments through APEC to trade and economic performance, it
compares more than favourably with NAFTA or the European Union, both of which are legally binding,
exclusive arrangements.
Given its political and economic structure and the transformation of the Asia Pacific region, effective
regional cooperation requires this different style of regional cooperation and institutionalization from
those in Europe or North America.
Do the unique modalities of APEC mean that its effect on member trade and investment cannot be
measured? Not easily, and not without rigorous analysis, but it is important to measure it.
One way to think about the effect of APEC is to ask whether its members achieve more of their trade
potential because they are APEC members. Trade potential can be defined by estimating a frontier
determined by the economic size, economic structure and the proximity of countries and looking at
how their actual trade stacks up against the benchmark frontier. This is conceptually a neat way of
seeing whether there is a beneficial ‘APEC effect’ associated with APEC membership, although it
requires some complex econometric analysis to do measure precisely.
In a recent study my colleague, Shiro Armstrong and I, did just that (Drysdale and Armstrong, 2009;
Armstrong and Drysdale, 2010). It should come as no surprise to this audience, though it may
surprise some, that being a member of APEC is associated with both higher trade volumes not only
among APEC members themselves but between members and non-members. This is an important
result. APEC is also more open to foreign investment than is the world on average. Moreover, we
show that the so called ‘hard’ institutional arrangements in North America (NAFTA), the EU and Latin
America do not have the same globally positive effects. In brief, APEC members’ trade is 32 per cent
higher against its potential than that of EU members and 10 per cent higher than that of NAFTA
members. These are large numbers in terms of the volumes of trade involved. Unlike the other
regional blocs, APEC is outward-looking and does not divert trade between members and nonmembers. That is by design. Given the diversity in the region and the need to integrate into the global
economy, APEC’s open regionalism makes the APEC effect a global not just a regional public good.
The sceptics might suggest that these results, however robust, are a product not of anything that
APEC has done, but of the self-selection of a bunch economies that would be trade and investment
liberalizers, ahead of the pack in any event. Certainly, some of the causation must run that way.
Success by the trailblazers in the region has encouraged imitation of the policies that lay behind that
success. But not the lot. The causation at least is positive and likely runs not one way but both. There
has been a process of policy reinforcement at work through the APEC as anyone who’s been in the
trenches and seen where policies have come from among APEC members over the last twenty years
will attest.
Over that period, the relatively open trade and investment environment in East Asia has helped
underpin growth and integration into the world economy. There are points of political tension, but the
underpinnings of political confidence in an open regional economy have been steadily deepening.
Indeed, what is remarkable, for example, about the biggest economic relationship in the region — that
between Japan and China — is that the growth of common commitment to global institutions like the
WTO has ensured its remarkable growth and stability, despite the baggage of history and political
vicissitudes that might otherwise have inhibited that economic relationship (Armstrong, 2009;
Armstrong and Drysdale, 2010).
East Asia is now a force of stability and dynamism at a turbulent time in the global economy. And it is
important to be absolutely clear that the evidence is that APEC has mattered to securing this
outcome.
What should APEC do now?
Since the mid 1990s, there has been a craving for stronger institutionalization of arrangements in the
region. There was, and still is, active pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements. But the contribution of
these strategies to regional integration and to economic growth and efficiency has been remarkably
modest. Most of the free trade agreements have been bilateral arrangements. The nature of these
arrangements is limited in character.
They encompass only a part of the APEC agenda of reform for complete and effective integration into
the international economy because the process of integration does not stop with the negotiation of
border measures which affect trade and investment. Effective integration requires deep reform of the
institutions and regulatory systems that govern our economies and how they relate to the rest of the
world.
While the Bogor goals are not yet complete, they are a job already well done. One of the elements of
that job well done is, in particular, attributable to APEC. Post Osaka through Manila, APEC presciently
identified the IT sector as a new growth area of considerable importance to the region. Instead of
trying to liberalize IT trade within the region under some limited regional agreement, APEC took the
agenda of liberalizing IT trade to the WTO and garnered support within the WTO for global
liberalization of trade in IT products. This was relatively easy to do at the time because it was a new
area of trade and the barriers to trade in IT products were low. The Information Technology
Agreement (ITA) was a huge success for APEC because a good part of subsequent trade, investment
and industrial growth in East Asia came from that sector, driven by the framework that APEC
encouraged and supported through taking the lead in a global process of negotiation.
One suggestion I have today is that APEC should go back to the basics in areas in which it has a
strong and effective record. Can the WTO still be used as it has been by APEC in the past to
prosecute trade and economic liberalization? There have been problems in concluding the Doha
round, but now is not the time to give up on the WTO or the Round and the WTO.
Instead, APEC should spearhead delivery on the Doha Round and re-inventing the WTO as the
anchor of an open global economic system. Among the issues that are important to APEC in the WTO
are the disciplines (or lack of them) on preferential trade agreements. APEC can lead WTO reform on
this issue. It will not achieve immediate results, but APEC can start the process moving.
Political circumstances later on this year will change, particularly in North America. It may look difficult
to make progress now but there will be opportunities to push forward again on Doha and on the
invigoration of the WTO, after the mid term elections and now that the Obama Administration has
seen successful passage of both its health care and financial sector agendas.
APEC is the natural vehicle for starting it. APEC’s connection to the WTO through its guiding policy
strategy and philosophy remains fundamentally important to a robust APEC agenda.
Re-inventing the WTO as an engine of global growth will require a totally new approach to regional
integration arrangements — one that eschews traditional free trade agreements as a the main way
forward on effective, deeper integration and accepts the centrality of cooperation on structural reform
as the driver of progress towards developing contestable markets in a single or seamless Asia Pacific
regional economy. APEC needs also to relate to other global processes in carrying the trade reform
agenda forward, including the G20. The G20 meeting in Seoul in November just before the APEC
Summit in Yokohama provides a particular opportunity to link APEC's regional agenda to the global
agenda on trade reform.
What are the alternatives? An FTA model or a series of model FTAs, such as the East Asia
arrangements, ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 6 arrangements, an APEC-wide FTAAP arrangement and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), are all ideas that are on the table. There is a great deal of interest in
the TPP developing now.
The TPP is certainly one of a range of instruments that are available that may or may not drive the
APEC agenda. Whether the TPP idea drives the APEC agenda desirably will depend on who
participates, on what terms, and how it is structured. If it were turned into a vehicle to try to redefine
the partnership idea from a free trade area idea into a broad economic partnership which really
involves an agenda of structural reform beyond the borders, it would be of interest to APEC in driving
its agenda. But there is no thinking about the TPP that is likely to lead in that direction any time soon.
The TPP is not going to be effective for APEC if it seeks to deliver immediate results. There is too
much to do — only some of which is regionally negotiable — for TPP to provide a quick fix for the
APEC agenda. We must be careful not to divert energies toward a TPP agenda that delivers very
little. Australia is anxious to negotiate an FTA with Japan. If Japan is to progress in a way that
manages its East Asian interests alongside its trans-Pacific and global interests, it must make hard
choices on agriculture and come to terms with opening up to Australia, America, and others in the
region. Until these hard choices are confronted putting faith in the TPP as a comprehensive Asia
Pacific trade strategy is hardly likely to be productive. It would be leading APEC in the wrong direction
and it would miss the core agenda of APEC and APEC’s core comparative advantage in carrying that
agenda forward.
So what needs to be at the heart of the APEC agenda going forward?
Structural reform and growth
Going back to basics for APEC involves reinforcement of national reform agendas. That requires
creating more opportunity for dialogue among countries at different stages of the process who can
learn from the experience of others in this process. This can be associated with initiatives year-byyear that confirm commitment to trade and investment liberalization, and beyond that, structural
reform supportive of the objectives and ambitions of the region for sustainable development as well as
political and economic security in the region. The priority is for structural reform that makes markets
and institutions function better so that countries can get the most out of economic integration.
A key issue in international economic policy today is the re-balancing of growth in the global
economy. It is an issue that is fundamental to the sustainability of successful regional development in
a global economy that can welcome and accommodate the scale of what is required to lift the next
two billion people in our region out of poverty, as we have done so with three quarters of a billion over
the past thirty or forty years.
Behind the push for re-balancing regional and global growth is the recognition that continuation of
'growth as usual' will no longer deliver on these objectives. The old open trade, open investment
strategy is not enough. Global markets will find it very hard to absorb the pressures of Asia's growth.
The pressure of current account imbalances is one dimension of this. But that is only one dimension,
a symptom of the problem and not the most important dimension that needs to be dealt with in
achieving a better balance in regional and global growth.
The imbalances that have emerged in our economies, at their core, are a product of the whole range
of structural and institutional impediments to efficiently mobilising resources for production and
investment and delivering output so that the benefits of growth are spread widely across our
communities; they are not the product of savings imbalances or exchange rate misalignments but
they do underlie them.
The structural reform agenda is central, therefore, to the shared objective of achieving more
sustainable and balanced growth in our region. Continuing economic growth and deepening
integration of the East Asian and Pacific economy requires reform of domestic institutions and
regulatory systems. These regulatory and institutional reform issues are not susceptible to negotiation
through traditional processes of trade negotiation, either through the WTO or through FTAs.
Multilateral and bilateral agreements do not deal with reform or liberalization of communications
(including ICT), transport, the provision of infrastructure and finance or other areas that are central to
efficient integration into the international economy and achieving more balanced growth. The
structural reform agenda is much broader than the trade reform agenda and delivers much higher
gains than at-the-border trade reforms (Dee, 2009).
Structural reform is now a high priority in Asia and the Pacific and is seen as an area in which Asia
can contribute to the international agenda through the G20 process. It can contribute not only via
broadening the agenda out to a wider group of economies but also by deploying its proven,
consensus-based processes and its use of capacity building to drive implementation of reforms with
real economic impact at the sectoral level.
This is where the APEC agenda now needs to focus, not only in the crucial Economic Committee, but
also as a central issue for Leaders, Finance Ministers and APEC as a whole.
There are many elements in this agenda. APEC needs to establish the priorities and carefully set
milestones to achieve them. Let me make a few suggestions here.
Among the issues that command priority is developing ideas about capital market reform. This will
require intensifying dialogue within East Asia (Drysdale and Armstrong, 2010) and, through APEC,
across the Pacific. Structural reform in capital markets is essential to using national and international
savings more effectively. Asian financial integration depends first and foremost on deepening Asian
financial institutions. Hence, the next phase of Asian financial integration needs to be led through the
market, developing and opening national capital markets, and by the removal of the barriers to
financial institutions integrating within the region. Allowing more financial institutions to serve domestic
markets is a concrete step towards regional integration. Thinking through a structural reform agenda
along these lines can give real impetus to global reform, and will be essential to sustaining the
region's own growth momentum.
There are also the big questions of structural reform related to integrating national and international
markets through improved logistics, communications and connectivity on which the APEC Secretariat
is doing good work. Much of this agenda relates to the challenge of the huge investment required in
regional infrastructure. These requirements are of course pressing in emerging markets, with the ADB
estimating that that the infrastructure needs for the Asian region are expected to be in the order of
US$750 billion per year, nearly US$8 trillion over the coming decade. They are also important in
many developed APEC economies; to replace ageing post war infrastructure, improve quality of life in
our major cities, create lower emission electricity grids and insure against a digital divide.
The question is how can we deliver the huge infrastructural requirement we have in the region to
achieve our potential and our ambitions for development? With public balance sheets strained and
lower risk appetite in capital markets we need to optimise our provision of infrastructure. The work
within the Finance Ministers Process to develop greater commonality in approaches to PPPs is a
good example of what APEC can do. It is practical and can deliver real benefits, including greater
cross-border flows of infrastructure finance and greater competition in project construction.
The question of infrastructure for development is related to many other reform agendas. Well
structured PPPs can provide assets with stable, long term returns. This helps pension funds and
financial institutions manage the time profile of their liabilities and helps to develop capital markets as
the pool of long term assets is expanded and as infrastructure funds are listed on equity markets.
Infrastructure is also of growing importance to the G20 agenda. In their report to Leaders at Toronto
the IMF highlight infrastructure investment as one of the key ingredients to the world lifting its growth
potential after the global financial crisis.
This is where there is business in growth, with opportunities that will promote the diffusion of the
benefits of growth across the region, especially in those parts of our region that are poorer.
Practical ways forward
The bold and continuing goal for APEC is to work towards the establishment of a seamless market, a
single economy to all intents and purposes, in the Asia Pacific region (Elek, 2010).
This goal is comparable with the single market agenda in Europe. However, the European single
market agenda had very specific and institutional boundaries to it. APEC needs to think beyond these
boundaries as is goes beyond the Bogor goals. This is APEC's goal for the longer term, — the
agenda of trying to create a single economy. This is a continuing process, without a defined
chronological end-point, with milestones that can be defined and met along the way. Milestones are
necessary and could be complemented by an annual process at Leaders' Level where economies can
pledge or commit to specific structural reform actions that suit their domestic circumstances.
The Bogor goals have provided long-term coherence to this point. The longer term vision of a single
Asia Pacific economy delivered through structural reform can provide it going forward.
A single economy agenda for long-term sustainable growth is what should drive the core outcomes of
every APEC Leaders’ meeting and Ministers’ meeting from here on. This year, the ideas on balanced
growth that have been developing emerged out of the problems that were exposed during the global
financial crisis. Balanced growth involves not only issues relevant to getting the balance right between
the tradable goods sector and non-tradable goods sector via international accounts, but also of
addressing equity issues and the institutions that support equitable growth and the distributional
dimensions of growth.
Another issue is green growth. This is an idea amenable to the same approach as the IT sector more
than a decade ago. There is a significant opportunity now to open up a new agenda for liberalization
of a range of goods and services which are critical to success in achieving sustainable growth on the
environmental front. What I have in mind here is not a negotiation over these issues within APEC but
an APEC initiative in the WTO that would see trade in green goods and services kept open to support
environmentally sustainable growth.
The FDI regime is also an important priority for APEC. The principles are already in place as APEC
put them there. They are principles that we would want to apply globally. APEC countries
independently, in their own national interest, have signed onto many of these principles in their
approach to foreign investment policy because that was the way to compete successfully for foreign
investment and it delivered effective growth and trade through the process. The FDI regime is of new
importance because we have a range of issues emerging about foreign direct investment in the
region, around the growth of outward FDI from China and elsewhere. APEC members can take the
initiative in addressing these issues before they become a problem.
There will be the APEC Summit in Yokohama and, next year, a Summit in Honolulu, and there is
already interaction between the hosts of these Summits in Japan and the United States. That
interaction should intensify in order to develop the repositioning of APEC’s long-term agenda along
the lines I have outlined here. In the end, the focus needs to be narrowed a little by picking up the
core issues and interests of member economies, rather than throwing too many items into an
overcrowded agenda. We should abandon what I call 'the Christmas tree approach' in which trivial,
little presents (less important agenda issues) are thrown in over more substantial, strategic issues. In
Yokohama APEC can take the first steps to deliver on these big, strategic issues, engaging all its
members and developing a new vision beyond, but incorporating its successful Bogor goals. In
Honolulu there should then be significant deliverables.
I believe the time has come for the instigation of a high level APEC Task Force on structural reform
and its role in progress towards a single Asia Pacific economy, mandated by APEC Leaders to report
back and develop the principles that would guide its development and the practical tests that would be
applied to identifying milestones year-by-year along the way. The Task Force might be charged with
taking an example, like the infrastructure investment challenge of which I spoke before, highlighting
the scale of investment required, setting out innovative strategies for achieving bold regional targets
and explaining how APEC could build milestones into its agenda for taking that strategy forward.
There is also a question of the membership of APEC. India and others are standing on the sidelines.
India is part of the East Asian process and it does not make sense to exclude it from APEC any
longer.
Untidiness in regional architecture also needs be sorted out. The East Asian process and the transPacific Asia Pacific have overlapping agendas but there are still some gaps in the framework of
regional cooperation. A central interest which emerged post East Asian financial crisis was
strengthening financial regional cooperation in East Asia. Elsewhere I have urged the establishment
of an Asian Financial Stability Dialogue (Drysdale and Armstrong, 2010; ADBI, 2007). The AFSD
would relate to finance ministers, and comprise finance ministry representatives, central bankers,
financial market regulators and supervisors. An AFSD could serve as an agent of policy dialogue,
policy development on financial reform and regulation, financial policy management and contribute to
consistency of targets for fiscal and monetary policies for stabilizing long term interest rates and
dealing with the adjustment, or stabilization, of real exchange rates. It would help in developing
mechanisms for the coordination and conduct of early warning system analysis and discussing more
openly national and regional policy interventions and would fill what is presently a big gap in regional
financial cooperation (ADBI, 2009).
There is no question that a development of this kind is consistent with, and complementary to, the
trans-Pacific process that is encouraged through APEC.
There are gaps on the political side that are becoming increasingly important. APEC was always as
much a political initiative as it was an economic one. It will be important to move on several fronts at
once, while keeping a focus on the priorities. APEC will undoubtedly remain the most important
anchor in trans-Pacific cooperation and an appropriate platform by which to fill some of the gaps in
regional political as well as economic cooperation.
APEC will also have a growing role to play in the evolution of global governance structures. While
APEC will not solely or directly service the G20 process, APEC's relationship to the G20 is likely to
become more important to the legitimacy of the process. The G20 members from the Asia Pacific
cannot presume anything on behalf of the broader membership of APEC, but there is a vehicle within
APEC to discuss G20 matters and make sure there is effective dialogue on the Asia Pacific region’s
interests in global governance. That is clearly a process that has already begun.
This is an exciting, challenging, time for APEC. Whatever, its frailties sometimes seem to be, APEC
has a very impressive record of achievement in innovative and effective international economic
diplomacy, and in helping to secure the economic and political foundations for spectacular regional
growth, the scale of which the world has never seem before. Indeed, APEC's unique mode of regional
cooperation appears increasingly robust, as a model for global cooperation through the G20 and in
the face of difficulties and problems that attend other models of economic cooperation that have been
exposed in Europe. And the agenda for the future that I have briefly outlined here offers practical
ways forward, and promise, in managing the momentous changes that are taking place in our region
and our region's new responsibilities in global affairs.
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