Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail
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Going Off Script: Effects of Awe on Memory for Script-Typical and –Irrelevant Narrative Detail
Alexander F. Danvers & Michelle N. Shiota
Arizona State University
Date of Revision Submission: December 28, 2016
Corresponding Author:
Michelle N. Shiota
Department of Psychology
Arizona State University
P.O. Box 871104
Tempe, AZ 85287-1104
Tel: (480) 727-8628
Fax: (480) 965-8544
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract
People often filter their experience of new events through knowledge they already have, e.g.,
encoding new events by relying on prototypical event “scripts” at the expense of actual details.
Previous research suggests that positive affect often increases this tendency. Three studies
assessed whether awe—an emotion elicited by perceived vastness, and thought to promote
cognitive accommodation—has the opposite effect, reducing rather than increasing reliance on
event scripts. True/false questions on details of a short story about a romantic dinner were used
to determine whether awe (1) reduces the tendency to impute script-consistent but false details
into memory, and/or (2) promotes memory of unexpected details. Across studies we consistently
found support for the first effect; evidence for the second was less consistent. Effects were
partially mediated by subjective awe, and independent of other aspects of subjective affect.
Results suggest that awe reduces reliance on internal knowledge in processing new events.
Keywords: Awe, Positive Emotion, Cognition, Memory
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There are moments in life where one is struck anew by the vastness, beauty, and
complexity of the surrounding world. Standing at the rim of the Grand Canyon, or sitting on the
roof of a friend’s house looking up at the stars, one seems to shed the perspective and
expectations bounded by mundane, day-to-day experience. At these times, people may feel that
they see the world in a new light, considering deeper questions and opening their minds to what
the universe has to offer. But do moments of awe change the way people process information at
a concrete level? The three studies presented here build on previous research on the effects of
awe on cognitive processing, asking whether awe helps suppress people’s tendency to see what
they expect to see, and whether awe facilitates taking in new information from the environment.
Positive Affect and Cognitive Processing
A rich research tradition demonstrates that emotions influence perception, interpretation,
and memory of information from one’s surroundings, sometimes in subtle ways. While much of
this research has emphasized implications of emotional stress or distress for cognitive
processing, many studies have focused on characterizing differences between positive- and
negative-valence affect. Much research has suggested that positive and negative mood states
each tend to facilitate a particular processing style: global, heuristic-driven, and top-down
processing for positive mood versus local, systematic, detail-oriented, and bottom-up processing
for negative mood (Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2005).
In a happy mood people attend more strongly to global than to local aspects of complex figures
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) and, in a “rose-colored glasses effect,” find consumer products
more appealing (Pham 2007). Positive affect has also been found to increase individuals’
reliance on stereotypes (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Huntsinger, Sinclair, &
Clore, 2009), judgment heuristics (Ruder & Bless, 2003), and number rather than quality of
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persuasive arguments (Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989) in processing
information about new people or making decisions.
Although these cognitive shortcuts are efficient and adaptive in certain situations, helping
people to get the gist of new information quickly, they tend to impair accurate encoding of detail.
For example, studies have found that people in a positive mood are more likely to rely on event
scripts in encoding details of a novel story about a commonplace kind of event (Bless, Schwarz,
Clore, Golisano, & Rabe, 1996). In studies documenting this effect, participants complete an
experimental mood manipulation, then listen to a lengthy story about a kind of event for which
people in the mainstream United States are expected to have a rich mental prototype, such as a
couple going out to a romantic dinner. When later completing true/false questions about whether
certain details were present in the story, participants in a positive mood show a heightened
tendency toward contamination of their memory by the event script—they identify as true details
that you might expect in a romantic dinner, but that were not in fact present in the story (Bless et
al., 1996).
Research documenting these effects typically uses cognitive tasks whose content is
unrelated to the preceding affect induction. For example, Bless and colleagues (1996) induced
positive mood by asking participants to write about a happy time in their lives, or to watch clips
from the films Dead Poets Society or Flashdance—affective stimuli unrelated to the “romantic
dinner” story or to the subsequent memory task. This enhances the internal validity of such
studies, controlling cognitive task details and reducing the likelihood that cognitive effects are
driven solely by properties of the affect-changing stimulus, as distinct from the affect evoked by
that stimulus. This approach also has important implications for theory, demonstrating
“carryover effects” – activation of cognitive processing styles that are maintained beyond
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exposure to emotion-eliciting or mood-changing stimuli. In this way, researchers can document
cognitive effects of short-lived emotions that can linger beyond the emotions themselves, as well
as effects of moods that are thought to be inherently longer-lasting and less stimulus bound (for
more on the distinction between emotion and mood, see Beedie, Terry, & Lane, 2005).
Taken together, the research reviewed above suggests that positive moods commonly
encourage activation of and reliance on internal knowledge structures (heuristics, cognitive
schemas and scripts) relevant to one’s current situation, at the expense of close attention to
details of the actual situation (Fiedler, 2001). Various theories have been proposed regarding the
mechanisms and boundary conditions of this effect. According to affect-as-information (AAI)
theory, for example, affect valence is used to guide the investment of effort in information
processing (Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Positive mood signals that the environment is
safe and predictable, so it is okay to rely on heuristics and internalized knowledge, whereas
negative mood signals a problem requiring more careful attention and systematic processing.
The affect as cognitive feedback (ACF) model, an updating of AAI theory, holds that
instead of preferentially activating a particular processing style, affect valence acts as a metacognitive signal in which positive affect increases confidence and promotes continued use of
one’s current or default style, whereas negative affect prompts a switch to a different style
(Bless, 2001; Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2012; Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2014; Isbell, Lair,
& Rovenpor, 2013). For example, in contrast to theorizing that positive affect always increases
global attentional focus (Isbell, 2004; Isbell, Burns, & Haar, 2005), positive mood has been
found to increase local focus in subsequent tasks, provided that local focus was primed prior to
mood manipulation (Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010). The typical effects of positive mood
highlighted by AAI theory are presumably observed because, in the absence of a reason to
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expend effort on systematic, bottom-up information processing, reliance on heuristics and stored,
internal knowledge is the default cognitive style (Schwarz, 2001).
Hedonic contingency theory (Wegener & Petty, 1994) offers a different account of the
findings above. According to this model, the core impact of positive affect is to increase
motivation to maintain one’s pleasant mood. While this decreases one’s motivation to carefully,
systematically process content that is unpleasant, serious, or counter-attitudinal (common among
studies examining mood effects on processing of persuasive messages), it may increase
systematic attention to inherently pleasant stimuli. This moderating effect was supported by
multiple studies (Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995).
While differing in regard to the theorized mechanism of affect valence effects, the AAI,
ACF, and hedonic contingency models have a few things in common. First, they assume that the
effects of positive affect/mood are consistent – they do not postulate or test differences among
varieties of positive emotion. Assuming that the default cognitive style and informationprocessing task are held constant, therefore, different positive-valence emotions should show
similar effects. Second, all three theories assume that changing one’s default information
processing style is effortful, and thus requires some form of motivation. Third, in each theory,
motivation to change one’s processing style is altered by the subjective experience of positive
affect, which either warns that the current style may be problematic (AAI and ACF), or
sensitizes the individual to affective consequences of attending to non-pleasant information.
Different Positive Emotions, Different Effects?
While most research on emotion and cognition has addressed implications of positive
versus negative valence of subjective affect, aspects of emotion other than valence can influence
cognitive processing as well – a point explicitly acknowledged by ACF theory (Huntsinger,
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Isbell, & Clore, 2014). Another rich body of research documents implications of approach
versus avoidance motivation, even among emotions of the same valence (Harmon-Jones, Gable,
& Price, 2013; Harmon-Jones, Price, & Gable, 2012). For example, high-approach positive
emotions, occurring before a goal is achieved, have been found to promote local attentional focus
and preferential attention to central elements of the visual field, whereas low-approach “postgoal” positive emotions promote broadened global focus and more distributed visual attention
(Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011).
The approach/avoidance dimension of emotion has been found to predict differences in
attentional focus among negative emotions as well (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010b; Gable,
Poole, & Harmon-Jones, 201).
The studies reported in this paper reflect a third approach, emphasizing differences
among specific discrete emotions rather than those along a dimension of affect, such as valence
or motivational direction. In research from this perspective, hypotheses often reflect theoretical
analyses of particular emotions’ adaptive functions, proposing a “problem” defined by a
prototypical eliciting situation in the ancestral environment, and asking what an emotional
“solution” to that problem might look like in terms of physiology, nonverbal expression, action
tendency, and/or cognitive information processing (Ekman, 1992; Levenson, 1999; Tooby &
Cosmides, 2008). Such models tend not to assume that cognitive effects of emotion are fully
mediated by subjective feelings or motivation. Rather, emotions are thought to involve
automatic, even unconscious, activation of particular cognitive mechanisms that are strategically
relevant for accomplishing a current goal. Several lines of research have shown that specific
emotions of the same valence can have different—even opposing—effects on cognition (e.g.,
DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, &
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail
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Kramer, 1994). Much of this work distinguishes among negative emotions, showing for example
that fear and anger have different implications for risk seeking (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), or that
anger and sadness have different effects on stereotyping (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer,
1994), and attribution (Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993).
However, a rapidly growing body of work documents differences among positive
emotions as well (Shiota et al., 2014; Shiota et al., 2017). This research finds that several
positive emotions have distinct effects on outcomes such as autonomic physiology (Shiota,
Neufeld, Yeung, Moser, & Perea, 2011), facial expression (Campos, Shiota, Keltner, Gonzaga,
& Goetz, 2013), vocal expression (Simon-Thomas, Keltner, Sauter, Sinicropi-Yao, & Abramson,
2009), and consumer preference (Griskevicius, Shiota, & Nowlis, 2010). In the domain of
cognitive processing, studies have demonstrated that different positive emotions have distinct
implications for systematic vs. heuristic-based processing of persuasive messages, in patterns
that are not accounted for by either valence or motivational direction (Griskevicius, Shiota, &
Neufeld, 2010). The current research builds upon and expands this knowledge by examining the
cognitive effects of a particular positive emotion—awe.
Awe and Cognitive Accommodation
Awe is an emotion elicited by vast, unfamiliar stimuli such as panoramic views, great
works of architecture and art, and astonishing human accomplishments (Shiota, Keltner, &
Mossman, 2007). Functional theories of awe posit that the “problem” posed by such stimuli is
that they are too big and important to ignore, and may provide valuable information, yet are not
adequately accounted for by one’s stored, internal knowledge (e.g., seeing the view from the
Empire State building for the first time). Even when one has experienced the stimulus or one like
it before, it may strongly evoke salience of the unknown (e.g., looking up into a vast, brilliant
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sunset or the night sky). Such stimuli are thought to challenge the default frame of reference
through which one perceives the world, prompting one to put assumptions and stored knowledge
aside in favor of cognitive accommodation – taking in new information to update understanding
(Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota, Thrash, Danvers, & Dombrowski, 2014).
Although awe can be experienced alongside fear or horror, depending on the exact
stimulus, participants in the United States nearly always describe awe experiences that are highly
pleasant (e.g., Shiota et al., 2007). Moreover, awe inductions used in prior experimental research
have consistently been found to elicit levels of positive affect or “happiness” that are high and
comparable to other positive emotion conditions (e.g., pride, enthusiasm, contentment), with
very low levels of negative emotions, including fear (e.g., Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010;
Piff, Dietze, Feinberg, Stancato, & Keltner, 2015; Shiota et al., 2007). Thus, hypotheses
emphasizing awe’s affective valence would predict it should lead to more heuristic, stored
knowledge-driven processing, assuming this is allowed to remain as the default cognitive style,
and the cognitive task is not itself particularly enjoyable. The functional analysis of awe, on the
other hand, suggests that awe should reduce reliance on heuristics and stored knowledge, and
increase intake of new information, even if this more systematic style is not previously primed.
Consistent with this proposal, prior research has found that dispositional awe-proneness
is associated with high openness to experience and low need for cognitive closure (Shiota,
Keltner, & John, 2006; Shiota, et al., 2007), reflecting awe’s emphasis on seeking new
information and experience, and tolerating uncertainty and ambiguity. Experimentally elicited
awe has been found to increase cautious, systematic processing of persuasive messages, reducing
reliance on cognitive shortcuts such as the “number of arguments” heuristic (Griskevicius,
Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010). Some theorists have speculated that time perception is linked to the
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 10
number of pieces of information being encoded – a necessary consequence of greater attention to
details of stimuli in the environment (Eagleman et al., 2005; Wearden, 2005), and awe
experiences have been found to alter time perception, expanding the sense of available time
(Rudd, Vohs, & Aker, 2012).
The Current Research
The present set of studies builds particularly on a previous finding that, in contrast to
most other positive emotions, awe makes individuals less susceptible to reliance on heuristics in
processing persuasive messages (Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010). Drawing on the
distinction between the central route and the peripheral route in the elaboration likelihood model
of persuasion processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), those studies tested whether individuals in
various positive emotion states were easily persuaded through the peripheral route—using a
“number of arguments” heuristic to judge message quality—or responded more strongly to the
quality of the arguments, indicating systematic central route processing. Across two studies,
individuals in the awe conditions responded strongly to argument quality, whereas individuals
experiencing most other positive emotions were easily convinced by a large number of
arguments regardless of quality.
Griskevicius and colleagues’ (2010) persuasion findings support the theoretical proposal
that awe promotes systematic information processing, but do not disambiguate the mechanism by
which this occurs. On one hand, awe may reduce the activation of stored knowledge to use as a
filter for current experience—i.e., the tendency to rely on shortcuts such as heuristics and
schemas. On the other hand, awe may directly promote the intake and storage of new
information, improving attention to details that are not predicted by one’s expectations. These
two processes are compatible, but distinct. Importantly, both the “heuristic suppression” and the
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 11
“increased attention to detail” effects could account for findings in previous literature, and
Griskevicius and colleagues’ findings do not tease these explanations apart.
The three studies reported here examined the cognitive effects of awe in greater detail
using an experimental paradigm described earlier: a test of memory for details of a story with a
familiar script—a couple going out to a romantic dinner. Based on previous research, we
anticipated that participants in most positive emotion states would tend to filter this story through
their conceptual “event scripts” or prototypical images of such events, as observed in prior
research (Bless et al., 1996). However, we hypothesized that participants in an awe state would
show either or both of two effects in processing the story: (1) reduced reliance on internal
knowledge – in this case, the tendency toward false memory for script-consistent detail (“script
independence”); and (2) enhanced memory for unusual, script-irrelevant details (“intake of
unexpected detail”). Across three studies, we attempted to determine whether awe demonstrated
these effects, and how distinct the awe-related effects were from those of other positive
emotions.
Study 1
In the first study participants watched film clips eliciting awe, a general positive emotion
state, or a neutral state before listening to a five-minute short story about a couple going out for a
romantic dinner. We expected that awe would lead to greater script independence and memory
for script-irrelevant detail than seen in the general positive emotion or neutral control conditions.
Methods
Participants. Two hundred forty (240) participants completed the study in return for
course credit in an Introductory Psychology course at a large Southwestern University. Sample
size was based on a goal of retaining at least 60 participants per cell, providing just over 90%
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 12
power to detect a medium effect size (d = .5), based upon awe-neutral contrasts seen in our prior
research with cognitive dependent variables (e.g., Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010), and
consideration of the effect size that would be reasonable to expect and of theoretical interest. The
final sample was 212, with 16 participants removed for spending less than 100 seconds watching
the emotion elicitation videos, 10 for reporting that they did not listen to the going-out-to-dinner
story, 1 for not reporting gender, and 1 for completing the entire study in under 10 minutes.
Mean age of the final sample was 19.40 years (SD =1.57); 62% of participants were male; 46%
were white, 29% Asian, 13% Hispanic, and the rest reported another ethnicity.
Procedure. Procedures for all studies were reviewed and approved by the Arizona State
University Office of Research Integrity and Assurance. All procedures were completed on Dell
laptop computers with 15” screens and headphones, in individual workspaces in a lab room.
Participants were randomly assigned to watch an approximately four-minute film clip intended to
elicit awe, general positive emotion, or neutral emotion. The Awe film (n = 68) moves in
perspective from the outer edges of the known universe to the level of the Earth, and down to the
subatomic level. The General Positive Emotion film (n = 74) shows Olympic figure skater Sarah
Hughes completing her long-form program and unexpectedly winning a gold medal. The
Neutral film (n = 70) gives instructions on building a cinder-block wall. All film clips included
voice-over audio and pleasant instrumental music.
Participants then listened to a five-minute audio clip of a story describing a couple going
out to a romantic dinner, adapted from Bless and colleagues (1996). After the story participants
completed a brief distractor task: rating preferences for geometric figures. They then answered a
series of true/false questions about whether or not various details were present in the story.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 13
Measures. Forty true/false questions asked about the presence of details in the going out
to dinner story. Details were initially written to be either consistent with a middle-class
American cultural script for a dinner date (e.g. “did the waiter pour the couple wine?), or
unrelated to the script (e.g. “was the waiter wearing glasses?”). Half of the items in each
category were true (the detail was present) and half were false. An independent sample (N = 59)
rated the initial set of 40 items for script typicality; based on these results, analyses focus on the
five most script-typical but false items, and the five most script-irrelevant but true items1. The 40
initial items were included in all studies, increasing the length and difficulty of the memory test.
Following Bless and colleagues (1996), number of correct responses to the five most
script-typical but false items was used to index script independence. An individual relying
heavily on a “going out to dinner” script would be expected to answer these items incorrectly,
imputing script-consistent but absent details into memory for the story. Number of correct
responses to the five best script-irrelevant but true items was used to index intake of unexpected
detail. To answer these questions correctly, an individual would need to attend to and encode
details unlikely to be contained in their “romantic dinner” event script.
In order to establish the specificity of this effect, we also analyzed the effects of emotions
on the five most script-typical true items and the five most script-irrelevant false items. To show
that correct responses on the script-independence index do not represent a general bias towards
answering “false” questions correctly, we should find that awe does not improve accuracy in the
script-irrelevant false items. Similarly, to show that correct responses on the intake of novel
details index do not represent a general bias towards answering “true” questions correctly, we
should find awe does not improve accuracy on script-typical true items.
1
Further information regarding the pilot study is available in the online supplementary materials.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 14
After the true/false items, participants were asked to rate their emotional experience
during the emotion induction film clip as a manipulation check. On a 0 to 8 scale, they rated the
valence (0 = very negative; 8 = very positive) and intensity (0 = no emotion at all; 8 = strongest
emotion ever felt) of their emotional experience, as well as how strongly they had felt each of ten
specific emotions.
Analyses. Analysis of Variance was used to examine main effects of Emotion condition
on performance for each set of memory items (Script Independence, Intake of Unexpected
Detail, script-relevant true, and script-irrelevant false items), as well as pairwise contrasts of the
awe condition with the general positive and neutral controls. Because prior research has
documented gender differences in susceptibility to several emotions (e.g., Brody & Hall, 2008;
Simon & Nath, 2004), and implications of gender for awe are still unknown, we ran analyses
both with and without gender as a potential moderator in all studies reported here; effects of
Emotion were identical in terms of hypothesis-testing outcomes (i.e., significance of effects)
whether or not gender was included, and in no case was the Gender x Emotion interaction
significant. Results of analyses without gender are reported below unless the main effect of
Gender was significant, in which case results of the analyses including Gender as a second factor
are reported.
Results
Manipulation check. Complete descriptive and statistical test information for
manipulation checks in all studies is available in the supplementary materials. Participants in the
Awe condition experienced significantly more awe during the film clip (M = 6.01) than those in
the Neutral condition (M = 3.43; t (209) = 7.34, p < .001), and directionally though not
significantly more awe than in the General Positive condition (M = 5.61; t (209) = 1.17, p =
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 15
.244). Compared to individuals in the Awe and Neutral conditions, those in the General Positive
condition reported feeling greater enthusiasm (vs. awe: t (208) = 6.35, p < .001; vs. neutral: t
(208) = 11.78, p < .001), pride (vs. awe: t (209) = 7.47, p < .001; vs. neutral: t (209) = 9.54, p <
.001), contentment (vs. awe: t (209) = 3.71, p < .001; vs. neutral: t (209) = 7.52, p < .001), and
tenderness/compassion (vs. awe: t (209) = 5.17, p < .001; vs. neutral: t (209) = 7.93, p < .001).
Script independence (script-typical false items). Study 1 results are summarized in
Table 1. The omnibus main effect of Emotion approached significance, F (2, 209) = 2.48, p =
.086, 2 = .023. In planned contrasts testing the main hypotheses, Awe condition participants
scored significantly higher on the Script Independence index than participants in the General
Positive condition, (M difference2 = .53[0.06-1.01], t (209) = 2.22, p = .028, d = 0.37), and the
contrast between the Awe and Neutral conditions was not significant, but was in the predicted
direction (t (209) = 1.32, p = .188, d = 0.22). In an additional pairwise test, the contrast between
the Neutral and General Positive conditions was not significant (t (209) = -.890, p = .375, d = 0.15).
<Insert Table 1 about here>
Intake of unexpected detail (script-irrelevant true items). The omnibus main effect of
Emotion was significant, (F (2, 209) = 4.04, p = .019, 2 = .037). Planned comparisons indicated
that participants in the Awe condition performed significantly better on intake of script-irrelevant
detail than participants in either the General Positive (M difference = .38[0.01-0.75], t (209) =
2.02, p = .045, d = 0.19) or Neutral (M difference = .52[0.15-0.90], t (209) = 2.76, p = .006, d =
2
Throughout this paper the range in brackets indicates the 95% confidence interval of the effect.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 16
0.26) conditions. An additional contrast revealed no significant difference between the Neutral
and General Positive conditions (t (209) = 0.780, p = .436, d = 0.13).
Script-relevant true and script-irrelevant false items. Our analyses found a significant
main effect of gender, therefore we report the results of 3 x 2 (Emotion by Gender) between
subjects ANOVAs on the script relevant true items and the script irrelevant false items. For script
irrelevant false items, there were no significant effects of Emotion or Emotion x Gender
interaction, but there was a main effect of Gender, F (1, 204) = 4.380, p = .038; women
answered more of these questions correctly than men (3.63 vs. 3.30). No planned comparisons
between Emotion conditions were significant. For script relevant true items, there were also no
significant effects of Emotion or Emotion x Gender interaction, but a main effect of Gender, F
(1, 204) = 6.997, p = .009; again, women answered more of these items correctly than men (3.24
vs. 2.77). No planned comparisons between Emotion conditions were significant.
Study 1 Discussion
Results of this study supported both hypothesized cognitive effects of awe. Individuals in
the awe condition answered more script independence items, and more intake of unexpected
detail items, correctly than those in the general positive condition. The difference between the
awe and neutral conditions was also significant for intake of unexpected detail. Importantly,
effects of awe were specific to these two item categories, suggesting they were not driven by a
global increase in accuracy, or general bias toward presuming details were true or false.
One limitation of this study was that the general positive emotion condition did not target
a particular emotion, and participants in that condition reported feeling some awe as well as
several other positive emotions. Study 2 addressed this limitation by comparing awe with three
specific positive emotion conditions.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 17
Study 2
In Study 1 experimentally elicited awe was found to facilitate both independence from
the “romantic dinner” event script and intake of script-irrelevant information when remembering
the details of a novel story. Study 2 built upon this finding by contrasting awe with three
specific positive emotions: enthusiasm (a pre-goal, high-approach positive emotion elicited by
cues of material reward); pride (a social, self-reflective positive emotion following an
accomplishment); and contentment (a post-goal, low-approach and -arousal positive emotion), as
well as a neutral reference state. This design differentiates the effects of awe from those of other
positive emotions more cleanly than was possible in Study 1, and asks whether awe is
comparably distinct from several alternative positive emotions, or if the contrast is limited to one
or more particular positive emotion controls. Study 2 also used a different approach to emotion
induction than Study 1.
Method
Participants. In exchange for course credit, 400 undergraduate students enrolled in
Introductory Psychology participated in this study. This target sample size provides
approximately 90% power to detect emotion condition effects comparable to those seen in Study
1 (Cohen’s d of .35). Of these participants, 39 were removed due to inadequate or inappropriate
completion of the relived experience task (e.g., not writing anything at all, or writing about an
event thematically unrelated to the prompt) or skipping a large number of the memory questions
(over 25% of items), yielding a final sample of 361 participants. Mean age of the final sample
was 19.34 (SD = 3.02); 66% of participants were male; 50% were white, 16% Asian, and 10%
Hispanic, with the remainder reporting another ethnicity.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 18
Procedure and measures. Procedures and measures were identical to those for Study 1,
with two exceptions. First, instead of watching a video for the emotion induction, participants
were asked to describe and vividly relive a time when they experienced a particular emotion.
Prompts, which have been used in previous research (Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010),
described a prototypical emotion eliciting situation for the target emotion: Awe (n = 73), “an
event when you saw a panoramic view for the first time” with the Grand Canyon given as an
example; Enthusiasm (n = 76), “when you knew something good was going to happen to you
soon, and you were looking forward to that event”; Pride (n = 68), “when you accomplished
something important to you”; Contentment (n = 72), “when you had just eaten a delicious meal,
and your body felt full and comfortable”; and Neutral (n = 72), “the last time you did the
laundry.” Participants wrote about and relived the event for two minutes. Second, in this
condition participants listened to the story over a set of speakers, as opposed to via headphones.
Results
Manipulation check. Results of the manipulation check indicated that the Awe
condition elicited significantly more self-reported awe than all other conditions (vs. Enthusiasm:
t (355) = 3.65, p < .001; vs. Pride: t (355) = 5.96, p < .001; vs. Contentment: t (355) = 7.23, p <
.001; vs. Neutral: t (355) = 9.69, p < .001). Individuals in the Enthusiasm condition experienced
the most enthusiasm, but this difference was only statistically significant in comparison to
Contentment (t (355) = 3.60, p < .001) and Neutral (t (355) = 10.18, p < .001). Individuals in all
the positive emotion conditions reported similarly high levels of contentment, and these were all
significantly higher than the Neutral condition (vs. Awe: t (355) = 5.62, p < .001; vs.
Enthusiasm: t (355) = 6.02, p < .001; vs. Pride: t (355) = 8.23, p < .001; vs. Contentment: t (355)
= 5.80, p < .001); the Contentment condition also resulted in more contentment than the Pride
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 19
condition (t (356) = 2.53, p = .012). Due to an experimenter error the term “pride” was not
included in the manipulation check. However, participants in the Pride condition were
significantly higher than those in the neutral condition in positive valence (t (354) = 5.38, p <
.001), enthusiasm (t (355) = 9.32, p < .001), and contentment (t (355) = 8.23, p < .001).
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Script independence. Study 2 results are summarized in Table 2. The omnibus main
effect of Emotion approached significance (F (4, 356) = 2.22, p = .067, 2 = .024). Planned
contrasts comparing Awe to each other condition found significant differences between the Awe
and Neutral conditions (t (356) = 2.68, p = .007, d = 0.45) and the Awe and Enthusiasm
conditions (t (356) = 2.25, p = .021, d = 0.37). The contrasts of Awe with Contentment (t (356) =
1.81, p = .065, d = 0.31) and with Pride (t (356) = 1.09, p = .277, d = 0.18) were not significant,
but were in the predicted direction. Additional pairwise tests did not reveal significant
differences of any other positive emotion condition from Neutral: for Enthusiasm (t (356) =
0.470, p = .639, d = 0.08); for Contentment (t (356) = 0.838, p = .402, d = 0.14); and for Pride (t
(356) = 1.552, p = .122, d = 0.26).
Intake of unexpected detail. The omnibus main effect of emotion condition was not
significant, (F (4, 356) = 0.798, p = .527, 2 = .009), nor did any pairwise contrasts between
Awe and other conditions reach significance (Awe vs. Enthusiasm: t (356) = 0.61, p = .540, d =
0.10; Awe vs. Pride: t (356) = -0.22, p = .827, d = -0.04; Awe vs. Contentment: t (356) = -1.14, p
= .257, d = -0.19; Awe vs. Neutral: t (356) = -0.07, p = .945, d = -0.01). Unexpectedly,
participants in the Awe condition received directionally lower scores on intake of unexpected
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 20
detail than those in the Pride, Contentment, and Neutral conditions. In additional pairwise tests,
no other positive emotion differed significantly from Neutral: for Enthusiasm (t (356) = -0.680, p
= .497, d = 0.11); for Contentment (t (356) = 1.063, p = .288, d = 0.17); and for Pride (t (356) =
0.150, p = .881, d = 0.03).
Script-relevant true and script-irrelevant false items. There was no main effect of
Emotion on script irrelevant false items (F (4, 356) = 0.046, p = .996), and none of the pairwise
comparisons between Emotion conditions were statistically significant. There was also no main
effect of Emotion on script relevant true items (F (4, 356) = 0.164, p = .956), with no significant
pairwise comparisons.
Study 2 Discussion
Study 2 results again showed an effect of awe on script independence that differed from
other positive emotion states—in this case, significantly from enthusiasm, and in the
hypothesized direction relative to contentment and pride. Awe significantly enhanced script
independence in comparison to a neutral control as well. We again found that the effects of awe
on script independence were specific, and did not extend to a general increase in accuracy.
Unlike Study 1, however, Study 2 did not find that awe enhanced intake of unexpected detail; the
effects were in the opposite direction, though they did not reach significance. It is noteworthy
that the enthusiasm, contentment, and pride conditions did not differ significantly from neutral
on either of our cognitive processing measures, and in fact, the direction of their effects on script
independence was opposite to that seen in the studies of positive affect by Bless and colleagues
(1996). We will address this point further in the general discussion.
The difference between the awe and contentment conditions, which approached
significance and was in the hypothesized direction, undermines explanation of the awe effect in
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 21
terms of approach motivation. As noted in the introduction, positive emotions with differing
levels of approach motivation have previously been found to produce distinct cognitive effects
(e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Gable & Harmon-Jones,
2011). Although awe has not been explicitly characterized in terms of motivational direction, it
has little or no appetitive content, and should be relatively low on approach motivation.
Contentment, as operationalized here, is arguably the prototypical, post-goal attainment, lowapproach motivation positive emotion. The fact that awe differed from both contentment and
enthusiasm (a prototypical pre-goal, high-approach motivation emotion), while these latter were
quite similar to each other, suggests that awe’s effects are not easily explained in terms of
motivational direction.
The contrast with contentment also suggests that awe’s cognitive effects are not easily
explained in terms of arousal. Arousal has long been thought to facilitate automatic cognition at
the expense of controlled cognition (Easterbrook, 1959), and heightened arousal has been shown
to increase heuristic processing of persuasive messages in an effect similar to that previously
seen for most positive emotions (Sanbonmatsu & Kardes, 1988). Because most positive
emotions, including enthusiasm, involve increased arousal whereas awe has been linked to
decreased arousal (Shiota et al., 2011), an arousal-based mechanism of these contrasts might be
plausible. The contrast between awe and contentment, another low-arousal positive emotion
(Kriebig, 2010) cannot be explained easily in this manner. This suggests that the facilitation of
script independence, in particular, may be distinctive to awe. Whether this effect extends to
multiple varieties of awe was addressed in Study 3.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 22
Study 3
Results of Study 2 replicated the Study 1 finding that, relative to other positive emotions,
awe promotes greater independence from event scripts in encoding the details of a new fictional
story. Study 2 also documented a significant difference of awe from a neutral control condition
in this regard, which was not statistically significant in Study 1—but was similar in terms of
direction and magnitude of effect. In Study 3 we turned our attention to different variants of awe,
and asked whether these would have similar or differing implications for the processing of
narrative detail. Although prototypical experiences of awe are consistently described in positive
terms, at least in the United States (Shiota et al., 2007), terrifying events such as natural disasters
and extreme weather may elicit awe blended with fear (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Extraordinary
prosocial deeds and achievements performed by other people, which violate our assumptions
about human nature and capabilities, should elicit awe as well as elevation and admiration
(Haidt, 2000; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Study 3 compared these awe-related constructs and “pure”
awe to nurturant love, a new positive emotion control condition.
Nurturant love, an emotional response to youth, smallness, vulnerability, and cuteness
(e.g., kittens and puppies) provides a particularly interesting contrast for awe. On one hand,
nurturant love can be described as a high-approach and high-arousal positive emotion, whereas
awe is lower in both behavioral approach-motivation and sympathetically mediated arousal (e.g.,
Shiota et al., 2011). On the other hand, previous research found that awe and nurturant love share
a tendency to promote careful, systematic cognitive processing of persuasive messages
(Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010), suggesting that it might have effects on script
independence and intake of unexpected detail similar to those of awe. As in Studies 1 and 2, a
neutral reference condition was also included.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 23
Methods
Participants. A total of 327 undergraduate psychology students were recruited to
complete this study online for course credit, with a goal of retaining 300 participants (60 per
cell). This target would provide greater than 90% power to detect an effect of Cohen’s d = .40,
consistent with the range of awe effect sizes observed in Studies 1 and 2. As expected given
typical response patterns for online surveys in this population, many participants had to be
excluded for not providing sufficient data: 47 skipped more than 25% of the memory questions;
20 took over an hour to complete the survey, indicating distraction and likely dissipation of any
emotion effects; one took approximately 10 minutes; and two reported being unable to hear the
romantic dinner story. These exclusions left a final sample of 257. Mean age of the final sample
was 19.68 (SD = 2.94); 53% were male; 61% were white, 11% Asian, and 14% Hispanic.
Procedure and Measures. Procedures and measures in Study 3 followed those of
Studies 1 and 2, except that participants completed the study online. Emotions were elicited by
presenting a series of 12 photographs for 20 seconds each. Awe photos (n = 53) depicted
panoramic nature scenes such as the Grand Canyon and Aurora Borealis. Awe/fear photos (n =
51) depicted dangerous natural phenomena, including tornados and lightning strikes.
Elevation/admiration (n = 50) photos depicted exemplary individuals or actions, such as Martin
Luther King, Jr. giving a speech and firefighters working in the rubble of the World Trade Center
after 9/11. Nurturant love (n = 57) photos depicted baby animals, including an infant polar bear
and a crib full of infant pandas. Neutral photos (n = 46) were of prosaic interior and exterior
scenes, such as a bus stop or child’s bedroom.
Results
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 24
Manipulation check. Results of the manipulation check indicated that individuals in the
Awe condition felt the most awe (vs. Awe/Fear: t (156) = 3.40, p = .001; vs.
Elevation/Admiration: t (156) = 2.52, p = .013; vs. Nurturant Love: t (156) = 2.54, p = .012; vs.
Neutral: t (156) = 4.60, p < .001). Individuals in the Nurturant Love condition felt the most
tenderness/compassion, although individuals in the Elevation/Admiration condition felt similar
levels (vs. Awe: t (156) = -6.08, p < .001; vs. Awe/Fear: t (156) = -5.00, p < .001; vs.
Elevation/Admiration: t (156) = -1.51, p = .134; vs. Neutral: t (156) = 5.48, p < .001).
Individuals in the Awe/Fear condition felt significantly more negative than individuals in all
other conditions (vs. Awe: t (156) = 8.52, p < .001; vs. Elevation/Admiration: t (156) = 5.65, p <
.001; vs. Nurturant Love: t (156) = 11.11, p < .001; vs. Neutral: t (156) = 3.94, p < .001).
Script independence. Study 3 results are summarized in Table 3. There was a
significant omnibus main effect of Emotion condition, F (4, 252) = 2.72, p = .030, 2 = .041.
Planned comparisons revealed that participants in all three awe-related conditions scored
significantly higher on Script Independence than participants in the Nurturant Love condition:
(vs. Awe, M difference = .49[0.06-0.91], t (252) = 2.25, p = .025, d = 0.30; vs. Awe/Fear, M
difference = .59[0.16-1.02], t (252) = 2.72, p = .007, d = 0.36; vs. Elevation/Admiration, M
difference = .54[0.11-0.97], t (252) = 2.46, p = .015, d = 0.33). Participants in all three awe
conditions also scored directionally higher on script independence than those in the Neutral
condition, although none of these contrasts were significant (Awe vs. Neutral: t (252) = 1.31, p =
.193, d = 0.26; Awe/Fear vs. Neutral: t (252) = 1.75, p = .081, d = 0.356, Elevation/Admiration
vs. Neutral: t (252) = 1.51, p = .132, d = 0.308). There were no significant differences among the
awe conditions (Awe vs. Awe/Fear: t (252) = -0.48, p = .635, d = -0.09; Awe vs.
Elevation/Admiration: t (252) = -0.23, p = .818, d = -0.05; Awe/Fear vs. Elevation/Admiration: t
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 25
(252) = 0.24, p = .810, d = 0.048). The Nurturant Love and Neutral conditions did not
significantly differ (t (252) = -0.85, p = .398, d = -0.17).
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Intake of unexpected detail. When analyses were run with gender as a factor, a
significant main effect of gender was observed, F (1, 245) = 4.64, p = .032, 2 = .019; women
scored higher on Intake of Unexpected Detail (i.e., script-irrelevant true items). Thus, analysis
used a two-way ANOVA with both Emotion and Gender as between-subjects factors. Neither the
omnibus main effect of Emotion, F (4, 245) = 1.17, p = .323, 2 = .019, nor the Emotion x
Gender interaction was significant. No contrast between any of the awe family conditions and
either the Nurturant Love or Neutral condition was significant (Awe vs. Nurturant Love: t (252)
= 1.02, p = .308, d = 0.19; Awe/Fear vs. Nurturant Love: t (252) = -0.16, p = .870, d = -0.03;
Elevation/Admiration vs. Nurturant Love: t (252) = -0.97, p = .332, d = -0.19; Awe vs. Neutral:
M difference = .37[-0.07-0.82], t (245) = 1.66, p = .098, d = 0.34; Awe/Fear vs. Neutral: t (252)
= 1.03, p = .302, d = 0.21; Elevation/Admiration vs. Neutral: t (252) = 0.26, p = .795, d = 0.05).
The Nurturant Love and Neutral conditions did not significantly differ (t (252) = 1.22, p = .224,
d = 0.24).
Script-relevant true and script-irrelevant false items. We conducted 5 x 2 (Emotion
by Gender) between subjects ANOVAs on the script relevant true items and the script irrelevant
false items. For the script irrelevant false items, there were no significant effects of Emotion or
the Emotion x Gender interaction, but there was a main effect of Gender, F (1, 256) = 4.437, p =
.036. Women answered more of these questions correctly than men (3.66 vs. 3.40). No planned
comparisons between Emotion conditions were significant. For the script relevant true items,
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 26
there were also no significant effects of Emotion or the Emotion x Gender interaction, but a main
effect of Gender, F (1, 256) = 7.817, p = .006. Women also answered more script relevant true
items correctly than men (3.23 vs. 2.85). No planned comparisons between Emotion conditions
were significant.
Study 3 Discussion
Study 3 contrasted awe with yet another positive emotion—nurturant love—and again
found that awe increased script independent processing of the “romantic dinner” story compared
to that condition. This further extends support for our hypothesis that awe has unique effects on
cognitive processing relative to other positive-valence emotions. This effect generalized from
“pure” awe to two other awe-related states: an awe-fear blend, and a blend of elevation and
admiration. Notably, nurturant love did not increase script independence; scores in this condition
were directionally though not significantly lower than in the neutral condition. As in Study 2,
Study 3 again failed to replicate the effect of awe on intake of unexpected detail seen in Study 1.
Meta-Analysis of Awe Effects, and Mediation By Subjective Awe
Results of the contrasts between the awe and control conditions for each of the key
dependent variables were statistically significant in some studies, but not in others. In order to
get a more precise estimate of effect sizes, we conducted meta-analyses comparing awe (a) to the
neutral controls and (b) to the average of the positive condition controls, separately for script
independence and intake of unexpected detail. Meta-analyses were conducted assuming random
effects, since each study differed in its method of emotion elicitation; this option leads to more
conservative results. When comparing awe to other positive emotions, we combined the
enthusiasm, contentment, and pride conditions into an alternative positive category for Study 2.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 27
We combined the awe, awe/fear, and elevation/admiration conditions into the awe category for
Study 33. All calculations were done using the Metafor package for R (Viechtbauer, 2010).
In order to assess whether effects of awe manipulation were accounted for by the
subjective experience of awe, we also conducted mediation meta-analyses contrasting awe
against all control conditions (neutral and positive emotions) in predicting self-reported awe
across all three studies, and asking whether self-reported awe, in turn, predicted script
independence and intake of unexpected detail. Each mediation analysis also included subjective
affect valence and intensity (these two items had been included in the manipulation check,
alongside feelings of specific emotions, in all studies; see Study 1 measures for additional detail)
as covariates and additional potential mediators, to ensure that effects on the cognitive outcomes
were accounted for by awe above and beyond these dimensions. The awe, awe/fear, and
elevation/admiration conditions from Study 3 were all coded as awe conditions. We tested the
mediated effect using the product of coefficients method, using bootstrapping to estimate
standard errors (MacKinnon, 2008).
Script Independence
For the script independence index, we found significant differences between awe and
general positive (Study 1), enthusiasm (Study 2), and nurturant love (Study 3) conditions; we
also found a significant difference between awe and neutral in Study 2, but not Study 1 or 3. In a
meta-analysis including all three studies, we found that the cumulative effect of awe compared to
neutral control was significant (Mdiff = 0.42, S.E.diff = 0.13, Z = 3.11, p = .002; see Figure 1a).
There was no evidence for heterogeneity across the awe vs. neutral comparisons (Q (2) = 1.22, p
3
Comparing just the awe condition to the nurturant love condition in Study 3 led to the same
substantive results.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 28
= .542). The effect of awe as compared to alternative positive emotions approached significance
(Mdiff = 0.32, S.E.diff = 0.17, Z = 1.84, p = .066; see Figure 1b). There was evidence of significant
heterogeneity of this effect across studies, likely reflecting the fact that awe was compared to
several different positive emotions across studies (Q (2) = 7.53, p = .023).
Probing this possibility further, we conducted a regression analysis on the combined data
sets with self-reported awe, enthusiasm, contentment, love, and tenderness (which were
measured as part of the manipulation check in all studies) entered as simultaneous predictors of
script independence. Self-reported awe showed a significant positive effect on script
independence (B = 0.184 [0.142, 0.226], t (719) = 11.595, p < .001). Self-reported tenderness
also showed a significant positive effect (B = 0.106 [0.058, 0.153], t (719) = 4.386, p < .001).
Self-reported enthusiasm (B = -0.126 [-0.181, -0.072], t (719) = -4.577, p < .001) and
contentment (B = -0.110 [-0.164, -0.056], t (719) = -3.982, p < .001) both showed significant
negative associations with script independence. Self-reported love did not significantly predict
script independence (B = -0.005 [-0.051, 0.042], t (719) = -0.194, p = 0.847).
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
In the mediation analysis (see Figure 1c), awe condition (relative to all controls)
significantly increased self-reported awe (b = 2.03, Z = 10.00, p < .001)4, and self-reported awe
significantly predicted script independence (b = 0.05, Z = 2.71, p < .001), above and beyond
valence and intensity. The test of the mediated effect through awe was significant (a*b = 0.115,
4
Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented in the text. Standardized regression
coefficients are presented on figures.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 29
Z = 2.63, p = .009). Awe condition did not significantly predict either valence or intensity,
although both of these variables predicted script independence (valence: b = .129, Z = 4.10, p <
.001; intensity: b = -.129, Z = -3.63, p < .001), and neither valence nor intensity significantly
mediated the effect of awe condition on script independence. The direct effect of awe condition
was also significant (c’ = 1.71, Z = 14.88, p < .001), suggesting that the awe conditions shaped
script independence through additional mechanisms not captured by subjective emotional
experience. Overall, the model explained 32.7% of the variance in our measure of script
independence.
Intake of Unexpected Detail
For the intake of unexpected detail index, we found a significant difference between awe
and the general positive and neutral conditions in Study 1, and the comparison between awe and
neutral approached significance in Study 3. In meta-analysis, the cumulative effect comparing
awe to neutral control was non-significant (Mdiff = 0.28, S.E.diff = 0.22, Z = 1.26, p = .208), but
with significant heterogeneity across studies (Q (2) = 7.12, p = .029). From the forest plot
(Figure 2a), it appears that the comparison between awe and neutral had a similar effect in
Studies 1 and 3, but a very different effect in Study 2. The cumulative effect comparing awe to
alternative positive emotions was small and non-significant (Mdiff = 0.08, S.E.diff = 0.11, Z = 0.70,
p = .486; Figure 2b), with no significant heterogeneity across studies (Q (2) = 4.18, p = 0.124).
As for script independence, we conducted a regression analysis on the combined data sets
with self-reported awe, enthusiasm, contentment, love, and tenderness entered as simultaneous
predictors of intake of unexpected detail. Self-reported awe showed a significant positive effect
(B = 0.215 [0.171, 0.259], t (719) = 9.576, p < .001), as did self-reported tenderness (B = 0.144
[0.094, 0.194], t (719) = 5.666, p < .001). Self-reported enthusiasm (B = -0.131 [-0.188, -0.074],
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 30
t (719) = -4.489, p < .001) and contentment (B = -0.129 [-0.186, -0.072], t (719) = -4.409, p <
.001) both showed significant negative associations with intake of unexpected detail. Selfreported love did not significantly predict intake of unexpected detail (B < .001 [-0.049, 0.050], t
(719) = 0.037, p = .970).
<Insert Figure 2 about here>
The mediation analysis (Figure 2c) provided stronger support for an effect of awe
manipulation on intake of unexpected detail. In this analysis, awe (vs. all controls) condition
significantly increased self-reported awe (b = 1.98, Z = 9.88, p < .001), which in turn
significantly predicted intake of novel detail (b = 0.08, Z = 3.84, p < .001). The test of the
mediated effect through awe was significant (a*b = 0.157, Z = 3.44, p = .001). This mediated
effect was observed controlling for the implications of valence and intensity, and indeed,
controlling for these dimensional aspects of subjective affect appears to have revealed a
significant effect of awe condition to emerge that was not present in the meta-analyses without
mediation, reported above. Being in an awe vs. control condition was not a significant predictor
of valence (b = -.237, Z = -1.46, p = .143) or intensity (b = -.011, Z = -0.07, p = .943), but
valence and intensity were significant predictors of intake of novel detail (valence: b = .173, Z =
5.87, p < .001; intensity: b = -.123, Z = -3.72, p < .001). The mediated effects through valence
(a*b = -.041, Z = -1.49, p = .162) and intensity (a*b = 0.001, Z = 0.07, p = .945) were not
significant. In addition to the effect mediated by subjective awe, the direct effect of awe
condition on intake of novel detail was significant as well (c’ = 1.73, Z = 15.78, p < .001),
suggesting that the awe conditions influenced this outcome through mechanisms not captured by
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 31
subjective emotional experience. Overall, the model explained 33.6% of the variance in our
measure of intake of unexpected detail.
General Discussion
Functional accounts of awe suggest that this emotion should promote increased cognitive
accommodation, inhibiting people’s default tendency to filter current experience through the lens
of prior knowledge and expectations (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota et al., 2007). Previous
research has found evidence for this effect in the context of persuasive message processing,
finding that participants in an awe state responded more strongly to argument quality than those
in neutral or most other positive emotion states; the latter were easily persuaded by a large
number of arguments regardless of quality (Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010). Awe’s
effects in the persuasion studies could have been accounted for by either or both of two, specific
cognitive processes: suppressing the influence of heuristics and stored knowledge; and/or
systematically encoding and using novel information from the environment. The studies reported
here were designed to extend evidence linking awe to cognitive accommodation, while also
teasing apart these two more subtle aspects of accommodation, and assessing the effect of awe
on each.
In three experiments, each using a different approach to eliciting awe, we found that awe
consistently enhanced script independence. Overreliance on event scripts in processing new
information is one example of filtering through stored knowledge. In these studies, awe reduced
people’s tendency to falsely impute details from the mainstream U.S. “romantic dinner” script
into memory of a specific story, heard for the first time. This effect of awe set it apart from a
variety of other, specific positive emotions including enthusiasm, nurturant love, and a blend of
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 32
positive emotions. Meta-analysis revealed a significant difference of awe from neutral affect in
this regard, with a consistent effect size across studies, as well as a difference in the hypothesized
direction, though more variable, from alternative positive emotions (presumably reflecting the
variety of positive emotion controls). Mediation analysis revealed that, across all studies,
subjective feelings of awe partially mediated the effect of awe manipulation on script
independence. However, a substantial direct effect of awe condition (i.e., not mediated by
subjective feelings) was significant as well.
Evidence for the “intake of detail” effect was more variable across studies. Awe showed
this effect compared to a general positive manipulation in one study, and compared to neutral in
two of the three studies, but not in the other contrasts. In meta-analysis, there was no consistent
finding relating awe condition to intake of unexpected detail as compared to neutral controls
(although there was significant heterogeneity in effect sizes across studies), or other positive
emotions considered as a group. It is possible that differences in the methods used to evoke
target emotions account for the inconsistent findings for this aspect of cognition. Studies 1 and 3,
which showed stronger awe effects, used novel visual stimuli (either films or photos) to elicit
emotion states, whereas Study 2 used a relived emotion task. It may be that exposure to novel
awe stimuli primed greater intake of detail than did the more familiar awe memories.
Alternatively, it may be that the awe-eliciting movie and photos primed greater visualization of
the “romantic dinner” story, which in turn facilitated memory for detail. A significant effect of
awe condition did emerge after controlling for subjective affect valence and intensity in the
overall mediation analysis. This effect was mediated, in part, by self-reported feelings of awe,
though a significant direct effect of awe condition remained as well. Future studies clarifying the
mechanisms and boundary conditions of awe effects on intake of detail will be valuable.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 33
Our results are not consistent with a view of positive emotions as universally increasing
reliance on heuristic processing (Fielder, 2001). In fact, no positive emotion other than awe
differed significantly from neutral in these studies, although effects of general positive emotion
(Study 1) and nurturant love (Study 3) were in the heuristic-facilitating direction predicted by
much prior research. Moreover, in meta-analyses more positive ratings of subjective affect
valence significantly predicted greater script independence and intake of novel detail, suggesting
reduced reliance on heuristics. We recommend some caution in interpreting the affect-valence
effects as they include the various awe conditions, most of which were experienced by
participants as highly pleasant in general as well as awe-inducing in particular; this may account
in part for the unexpected direction of the effect. Affect valence and intensity were included in
the mediation models to assess whether subjective awe, specifically, mediated the cognitive
effects of experimental awe manipulation, above and beyond these dimensional aspects of
subjective affect. Notably, controlling for valence in the mediation analyses also ruled out the
possibility that awe’s cognitive effects differed from those of other positive emotions because it
was experienced as more negative. The lack of a significant pathway from emotion condition
(awe vs. other conditions) to valence indicates that awe did not typically have a negative tinge.
The affect-as-cognitive-feedback (ACF) model’s account of the effects of positive mood
(Isbell, Lair, & Rovenpour, 2013) also does not explain the present findings. The ACF model
suggests that positive mood will encourage individuals to continue using whatever cognitive
processing style is either the automatic default, or previously primed. A great deal of research
indicates that reliance on heuristics and stored knowledge is a default among mainstream North
American participants such as those in the present studies (Schwarz, 2001). In no study reported
above was a systematic cognitive style actively primed prior to emotion manipulation, yet awe
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 34
clearly and consistently reduced participants’ reliance on event scripts. It is possible that simply
being in the experimental session primed more careful attention and systematic processing,
which was then amplified by positive affect. However, this would not explain why some positive
emotion manipulations led to directional reduction in script independence (Studies 1 and 3), nor
why awe manipulation produced cognitive effects over and above those of subjective valence.
The effect of awe on cognitive processing also cannot parsimoniously be explained by
motivational direction (approach/avoidance) or arousal. In Study 2, the effect of awe on script
independence differed from that of contentment—a low-approach, low-arousal emotion—as well
as that of enthusiasm—a high-approach, high-arousal emotion. These two conditions produced
effects that were similar to each other, but distinct from awe. Hedonic contingency theory
(Wegener & Petty, 1994) also fails to account for the differences between awe’s effects and the
effects of other positive emotions, which emerged even when the focus of attention (romantic
dinner story) and resulting implications for subsequent mood were held constant.
Rather, the findings across studies are consistent with theoretical perspectives
emphasizing differences among “discrete” emotions in general, and the cognitive function of
awe in particular (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota et al., 2007). Supplemental meta-analyses
revealed that, across studies, subjective feelings of awe and tenderness significantly predicted
reduced reliance on the event script heuristic (i.e., greater script independence and intake of
novel detail), whereas subjective enthusiasm and contentment predicted greater reliance on event
scripts, and love had no effect. While these patterns are consistent with our expectation that
different positive emotions have differing effects, we caution against assuming that subjective
feelings necessarily drive all observable cognitive outcomes. One important finding to emerge
from the mediation analyses is that the effects of awe condition on cognitive processing were
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 35
only partially mediated through subjective awe. The significant direct effects that remained
indicate that awe increased both script independence and intake of unexpected detail through
cognitive mechanisms that were not consciously accessible, at least in the form of subjective
emotional experience.
People seek and value experiences of awe. They expend considerable time, effort, and
resources traveling to places of great natural beauty, like the Grand Canyon and Niagara Falls;
creating and visiting vast products of human ingenuity, like the Taj Mahal and the Eiffel Tower;
and experiencing works of art that help one see the world through new eyes, like Van Gogh’s
Starry Night and Picasso’s Guernica. For many, these experiences can feel transcendent—as if
one’s worldview is transformed. Yet psychological science has only recently begun to document
how awe affects cognition and behavior in concrete, objective, quantifiable terms.
Results of this program of research suggest that, consistent with theory as well as
phenomenological experience, awe helps individuals open their minds. It does this specifically
by suppressing the usual expectations through which people filter experience of the world, and
enhancing people’s attention to unexpected details. While not large, the awe effects documented
in these studies are consistent with theoretical definitions of this emotion and associated
predictions regarding its impact on cognitive processing. These studies add to a new and rapidly
expanding body of evidence on awe. In just the last decade, strong programs of research have
documented non-verbal expressions of awe (e.g., Campos et al., 2012; Simon-Thomas et al.,
2009), physiological aspects of awe (Shiota et al., 2011), and effects of awe on prosocial
behavior (e.g., Piff, Dietze, Feinberg, Stancato, & Keltner, 2015; Prade & Saroglou, 2016),
language use (Darbor, Lench, Davis, & Hicks, 2015), absorption with a stimulus (van Elk,
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 36
Karinen, Specker, Stamkou, & Baas, 2016), and agency detection (Valdesolo & Graham, 2014),
all of which are distinct from the effects of other positive emotions.
This study was conducted with a population of undergraduate college students, so further
research is needed in order to determine whether it generalizes to populations of different ages,
education levels, and cultural backgrounds. It is also important to note that, relative to real-life
experiences of awe (i.e., those not involving laptop computer screens and relived memories), the
emotions elicited by our awe manipulations were likely on the weak side. We would anticipate
that more intense awe experiences, such as standing at the rim of the Grand Canyon, would lead
to stronger cognitive effects. Future research is needed to compare these effects of awe with
those of other epistemological emotions (those whose primary adaptive functions are thought to
involve learning), such as interest and amusement.
Future studies are also needed to assess specific mechanisms of these effects. For
example, appraisals of smallness (Shiota et al., 2007) or uncertainty (Valdesolo & Graham,
2014) might account for our observed effects of awe stimuli on cognition. With respect to the
exact cognitive process modulated by awe, one possibility is that awe directly inhibits activation
of heuristics and facilitates accommodation (Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010; Keltner &
Haidt, 2003). Another possibility is suggested by attention restoration theory, which posits that
stimuli commanding intense involuntary attention – such as awe stimuli – give effortful attention
control mechanisms a brief respite, allowing them to rebound in a subsequent task (Berman,
Jonides, & Kaplan, 2008). Third, an extension of the ACF model may account for the effects of
awe observed here. Awe may promote rejection of one’s default or current cognitive processing
style – whatever that style may be – in much the same way previously observed for negative
mood. The ACF account allows for specific emotions to have such effects (Huntsinger, Isbell, &
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 37
Clore, 2014). Future research is needed to determine which of these specific processes is
facilitated by awe. Another important future direction for this research will be extending these
basic findings to more applied contexts, such as eyewitness memory, evaluating scientific
evidence, and creative problem solving. Cultivating awe in people’s everyday lives may help
them approach more tasks in an open-minded way.
Beyond advancing knowledge about awe, this research also adds to the growing body of
evidence that that positive emotions can and should be differentiated based on their effects on
cognition. Although most previous literature on cognitive effects has characterized emotion
broadly as either positive or negative, we found here that taking a more fine-grained approach to
positive emotion—one that more fully accounts for its variability—led to theoretical predictions
borne out by empirical tests. All positive emotions are not the same. Theorizing about the
diversity of positive emotions, and using a functional perspective to generate hypotheses, can
help affective scientists better understand how the mind works.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 38
Funding
This work was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation to M.N.S. [grant
number 23375]. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 39
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Authors’ Note
Alexander F. Danvers and Michelle N. Shiota, Department of Psychology, Arizona State
University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Alexander F. Danvers,
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 871104, Tempe, Arizona 85287.
Email: [email protected]
M.N. Shiota developed the study concept, with assistance from A.F. Danvers. A.F.
Danvers performed data collection and analysis for all studies. Both authors contributed
substantially to data interpretation and manuscript preparation. Both authors have approved the
final version of this manuscript for submission.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the members of the ASU SPLAT lab for their help with
this project.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 48
Table 1: Memory for Story Details by Question Category and Emotion, Study 1
Script Independence
Intake of Detail
Awe
M (SD)
2.25a
(1.48)
3.34a
(1.11)
General Positive
M (SD)
1.72b
(1.34)
2.96b
(1.12)
Neutral
M (SD)
1.93ab
(1.48)
2.81b
(1.12)
Note. Differing superscripts indicate differences between conditions of at least the p ≤ .05 level
of significance.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 49
Table 2: Memory for Story Details by Question Category and Emotion, Study 2
Script Independence
Intake of Detail
Awe
M (SD)
2.33a
(1.34)
3.08a
(1.22)
Enthusiasm Contentment
M (SD)
M (SD)
1.80b
1.90ab
(1.53)
(1.30)
a
2.96
3.31a
(1.32)
(1.32)
Pride
M (SD)
2.07ab
(1.36)
3.15a
(1.26)
Neutral
M (SD)
1.71b
(1.37)
3.24a
(1.18)
Note. Differing superscripts indicate differences between conditions of at least the p ≤ .05 level
of significance.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 50
Table 3: Memory for Story Details by Question Category and Emotion, Study 3
Script Independence
Intake of Detail
Awe
Awe/Fear
M (SD)
3.19a
(1.23)
3.75a
(1.00)
M (SD)
3.29a
(1.15)
3.51ab
(1.08)
Elevation/
Admiration
M (SD)
3.24a
(1.02)
3.34ab
(1.17)
Nurturant
Love
M (SD)
2.70b
(1.16)
3.55ab
(0.95)
Neutral
M (SD)
2.89ab
(1.06)
3.29b
(1.24)
Note. Differing superscripts indicate differences between conditions of at least the p ≤ .05 level
of significance.
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 51
Figure 1: Meta-analyses of Awe Effects, Script Independence
A. Forest plot, awe vs. neutral
B. Forest plot, awe vs. alternative positive emotions
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 52
C. Mediation analysis
Note: In forest plots (A & B), “RE Model” = random effects model. For each study, size of the
box representing mean effect size estimate indicates weighting of that study in the meta-analysis.
Numeric values in each row indicate the mean and 95% confidence interval of effect size
estimates in bootstrapping analyses; positive values indicate greater accuracy in awe conditions
as compared to control conditions. In the mediation path diagram (C), values are standardized
coefficients. *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 53
Figure 2: Meta-Analyses of Awe Effects, Intake of Unexpected Detail
A. Forest plot, awe vs. neutral
B. Forest plot, awe vs. alternative positive emotions
Awe and Memory for Narrative Detail 54
C. Mediation analysis
Note: In forest plots (A & B), “RE Model” = random effects model. For each study, size of the
box representing mean effect size estimate indicates weighting of that study in the meta-analysis.
Numeric values in each row indicate the mean and 95% confidence interval of effect size
estimates in bootstrapping analyses; positive values indicate greater accuracy in awe conditions
as compared to control conditions. In the mediation path diagram (C), values are standardized
coefficients. *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001