PHIL 103: Philosophical Aspects of Cognitive Science
RICE UNIVERSITY, FALL 2015 — COURSE SYLLABUS
Time & Location: Tue & Thu, 10:50am-12:05pm, KWG 100
Instructor:
Alex Morgan
Contact:
[email protected]
Office Hours:
Tue & Thu, 4:30-5:30pm, or by appt.
Office Location:
Humanities 214
COURSE DESCRIPTION
In seeking to understand the nature of the mind, thinkers throughout history have used metaphors
inspired by the technology of their time. Plato likened memory to the process of stamping an image
onto a wax tablet. Freud’s theory of the unconscious evokes steam engines and hydraulic
mechanisms. In our own age, scientists have attempted to understand the mind by comparing it to a
computer. Indeed, the idea that the mind is a kind of biological computer is often said to be one of
the foundational assumptions of the modern science of the mind, cognitive science. But what exactly
does it mean to say that the mind is a computer? What is a computer anyway? Could a computer
ever really have beliefs, emotions, or conscious experiences? If the mind is like computer software,
can we understand it without investigating underlying ‘hardware’ of the brain? Must we understand
the mind as a computer if we are to explain it scientifically? In this course, we will critically engage
with these and related questions by actively reading and discussing relevant literature in philosophy
and cognitive science. The hope is that in doing so, participants will develop their skills of
philosophical analysis, and will come away with an enriched understanding of one of the most
exciting scientific endeavors of our time.
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PREREQUISITES
There are no formal prerequisites for this course. Just bring your curiosity and enthusiasm!
COURSE MATERIALS
The textbook for the course is ‘Mindware’, by Andy Clark. Please make sure to get the 2nd edition,
published by Oxford University Press in 2013, which should be available at the university bookstore.
The textbook will be supplemented by a variety of other readings and audiovisual resources, which
will be made available electronically via the OWL-Space site for the course. Assigned readings for
each week are listed under the schedule at the end of this syllabus.
The OWL-Space site contains a variety of important resources, such as a discussion board, lecture
slides, and an up-to-date schedule of readings, and will function as a central hub for information
about the course. It is thus important that you familiarize yourself with the site as soon as possible,
and ensure that the email account associated with your OWL-Space account is one that you check
regularly.
ADVICE & EXPECTATIONS
Discussion
The best way to learn philosophy is to do philosophy, and a central aspect of doing philosophy is
engaging in reasoned discussion. Discussion is thus a central focus of this course, and a significant
portion of your grade for the course will depend on your active participation in discussions, both in
class and on the OWL-Space discussion board (see the section on grading below for details). I will
assume that when you come to class you will have read the assigned material, and will be prepared
to discuss it — don’t be surprised if I call on you for your thoughts about the material. If you are
uncomfortable about speaking up in class, please keep in mind that you can contribute to discussions
online. However, I do encourage you to push yourself and speak up; getting used to public speaking
will help you in almost all of your future endeavors. I will strive to ensure that the classroom is a
relaxed, friendly environment conducive to free, exploratory discussion, but I will need you to do
your part, too: Please be respectful of others; raise your hand and wait your turn to speak; don’t
monopolize discussions; and (this should go without saying) never be rude or insulting.
Reading
Many of the readings for this course are challenging, but don’t feel that you have to understand
every nuance of every reading. It is more important that you have a basic grasp of the overall point
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of a reading than to understand any particular detail. Accordingly, I suggest that you first quickly
skim each reading with the following questions in mind: What is the main problem or topic under
consideration? What solutions or positions is the author advocating? When you have a clearer sense
of what the reading is all about, read it again more carefully to fill in any gaps in your
understanding. If you’re still puzzled or uncertain about anything, write down your questions and
either bring them to class or raise them on the discussion board.
GRADING
Papers (25% × 2 = 50%)
You will be required to write two short (3-5 page) papers for the course, which will be due on
October 16th and December 4th. Paper topics and instructions will be made available in a
separate handout.
Reading Responses (2% × 10 = 20%)
For ten of the fifteen weeks of the term, you will be required to submit a short response to one of the
assigned readings for that week. This response should be roughly one paragraph to half-a-page in
length, and should address the following questions: What is one of the central claims the author is
making in this text? What are the central reasons the author provides in support of this claim?
What did you find puzzling or questionable about this claim or the reasons given in support of it? To
receive credit for your response, you must submit it at least two hours before the session in which we
will discuss the reading you are responding to. Please submit your response via the ‘Assignments’
section on OWL-Space. Note that you may also receive up to 5% extra credit by writing a response
to a reading from one of the other five weeks (these will be graded at 1% each, and may be
submitted any time before the end of semester).
Take-Home Assignments (10% × 2 = 20%)
There will be two assignments for the course, covering some of the more technical material in the
course. These will require you to complete some simple pen & paper exercises, as well as some selfdirected computer activities using software freely available on the internet. The assignments will be
due on October 2nd and November 6th. I will hold computer laboratories for those who would
like to complete the assignments with my assistance, probably during office hours on September
29th and November 3rd. Further details about the assignments will be provided later in the
semester.
Attendance and Participation (10%)
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As mentioned, you will be graded on your active participation in discussion, both in class and on the
discussion board. Active participation is hard to quantify. It’s not about the quantity of your
contributions to discussion; rambling on in class or posting nonsense to the discussion board will not
gain you any credit. But it’s not exactly about quality either; if participants only spoke up when they
were sure they had something profound to say, neither they nor the rest of the class would benefit
much from discussion. In fact, one of the best ways you can contribute to discussion is to express
your confusion or puzzlement about the ideas we’re discussing. Those ideas are genuinely puzzling.
Basically, discussion in this class is about engaging in a communal activity of trying to clarify,
understand and critically evaluate those ideas. You will be evaluated on the extent to which you
contribute to that activity.
Extra Credit (up to 5%)
Aside from the 5% extra credit for doing extra reading responses, as described above, there may be
various opportunities throughout the semester to gain up to 5% additional extra credit, which I will
announce in class. I also encourage you to come up with your own extra credit ideas. Initiative and
imagination will be rewarded!
Your total % grade will be assigned a letter grade on the basis of the following scale (the number
indicates the upper threshold for the corresponding letter grade; e.g. 90.5% would yield an A):
A+
A
A−
B+
B
B−
C+
C
C−
D+
D
D−
F
100
95
90
86
82
78
74
70
66
62
58
54
50
COURSE POLICIES & PENALTIES
Attendance
Because of the importance of discussion in this class, attendance is mandatory, and roll will be
called. You are allowed two unexcused absences without penalty. Every unexcused absence thereafter
will result in a deduction of 5% from your grade. You will count as absent if you are not present
during roll-call (roughly within 5 minutes of the beginning of class).
Communication & Electronic Devices
Communicating with anyone outside of the classroom during class hours is not allowed, except in the
case of emergencies. Please turn your phones off, or put them on silent, before class begins. Laptops,
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tablets and other electronic devices are to be used for taking notes only. Each violation of these rules
will result in a deduction of 5% from your grade. If you email me about class-related matters, please
make sure to add ‘103’ in the subject-line.
Disabilities
If you have a documented disability that may affect your academic performance, you should make
sure that the documentation is on file with Disability Support Services (Allen Center, Room 111 /
[email protected]) to determine the accommodations you need, and meet with me to discuss your
accommodation needs.
Academic Integrity
I trust you to avoid all forms of dishonest academic conduct in this course, such as plagiarism or
cheating. Academic dishonesty is not only a violation of my trust, it is a serious academic offense,
and will be treated as such. If I suspect that you have engaged in any violations of academic
integrity, I will report you to the Rice Honor Council, which could have serious repercussions both
for your course grade and for your future at Rice. I recognize that what constitutes academic
dishonesty is sometimes a subtle issue, so if you have any uncertainty about whether your actions
might count as a violation of academic integrity, I encourage you to either contact me or consult the
Rice honor system handbook (http://honor.rice.edu/honor-system-handbook/).
SCHEDULE
This schedule is subject to change over the course of the semester, depending on the pace at which
we move through the material and the interests of course participants. Any changes will be
announced via the OWL-Space site. In general, the first reading listed for each session is most
important, and should be read closely; any subsequent readings should be considered supplementary.
I’ll announce exceptions to this rule as we go along.
WEEK 1: THE BIG IDEA: MIND AS MACHINE
Aug. 25
Boden, M. (2006). Mind As Machine: A History of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University
Press (pp.52-61).
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009). Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (pp.13-18).
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Aug. 27
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Introduction).
Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Ch.1).
Fodor, J. (1992). The Big Idea: Can There be a Science of Mind?, Times Literary Supplement,
4567: 5-7.
WEEK 2: WHAT IS MIND? CONTENT, CONSCIOUSNESS & FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
Sep. 1
Crane, T. (2001). Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press (pp.19-26).
Crane, T. (2003). The Mechanical Mind (2ed). London: Routledge (Ch.1).
Sep. 3
Crane, T. (2003). The Mechanical Mind (2ed). London: Routledge (pp.216-220).
Churchland, P. (2013). Matter and Consciousness (3ed). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (pp.87-102).
WEEK 3: METAPHYSICS OF MIND: DUALISM VS. PHYSICALISM
Sep. 8
Churchland, P. (2013). Matter and Consciousness (3ed). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (pp.11-35).
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary Didn’t Know, The Journal of Philosophy, 83(5): 291-295.
Cohen, M. and Newsome, W. (2004). What Electrical Microstimulation Has Revealed about the
Neural Basis of Cognition, Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 14(2): 169-177.
Sep. 10
Churchland, P. (2013). Matter and Consciousness (3ed). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (pp.36-62).
Ryle, G. (1949 [2002]). Descartes’ Myth. In ‘Philosophy of Mind’, ed. D. Chalmers. Oxford:
Oxford University Press (pp.32-38).
Smart, J. (1956 [2002]). Sensations and Brain Processes. In ‘Philosophy of Mind’, ed. D.
Chalmers. Oxford: Oxford University Press (pp.60-67).
WEEK 4: METAPHYSICS OF MIND: FUNCTIONALISM & MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY
Sep. 15
Churchland, P. (2013). Matter and Consciousness (3ed). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (62-72).
Block, N. and Fodor, J. (1972). What Psychological States Are Not, Philosophical Review, 81(2):
159-181.
Sep. 17
Bechtel, W. and Mundale, J. (1999). Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and
Neural States, Philosophy of Science, 66(2): 175-207.
Shapiro, L. (2000). Multiple Realizations, The Journal of Philosophy, 97(12): 635-654.
WEEK 5: INFORMATION AND COMPUTATION: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Sep. 22
Gallistel, C. and King, A. (2010). Memory and the Computational Brain. Oxford: WileyBlackwell (pp.1-10).
Barker-Plummer, D. (2012). Turing Machines, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine/).
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Sep. 24
Sipser, M. (2013). Introduction to the Theory of Computation (3ed). Boston, MA: Thomson
(Selections).
Copeland, B.J. (2002). The Church-Turing Thesis, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/).
WEEK 6: THE ‘COGNITIVE REVOLUTION’ AND COMPUTATIONALISM
Sep. 29
Garnham, A. (2009). Cognitivism. In ‘The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology’,
ed. J. Symonds & P. Calvo. Abingdon: Routledge (pp.99-110).
Miller, G. (1956). The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity
for Processing Information, Psychological Review, 63(2): 81-97.
Oct. 1
Gigerenzer, G. and Goldstein, D. (1996). Mind as Computer: Birth of a Metaphor, Creativity
Research Journal, 9(2): 131-144.
Piccinini, G. (2004). The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at
McCulloch and Pitts's ‘Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity’, Synthese, 141(2):
175-215.
Newell, A. and Simon, H. (1976). Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search,
Communications of the ACM, 19(3): 113-126.
WEEK 7: THE MIND AS SOFTWARE & THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT
Oct. 6
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Ch.1).
Pylyshyn, Z. (1984). Computation and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Ch.2).
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, CA (Ch.1).
Oct. 8
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Ch.2).
Schneider, S. (2009). The Language of Thought. In ‘The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Psychology’, ed. J. Symonds & P. Calvo. Abingdon: Routledge (pp.280-295).
WEEK 8: COULD A MACHINE THINK?
Oct. 13
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MID-TERM RECESS
Turing, A. (1950). Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind, 59(236): 433-460.
French, R. (2000). The Turing Test: The First 50 Years, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(3):
115-122.
McClelland, J. (2009). Is a Machine Realization of Truly Human-like Intelligence Achievable?,
Cognitive Computation, 1: 17-21.
WEEK 9: IS THE MIND A COMPUTER PROGRAM? IS THE BRAIN A COMPUTING MACHINE?
Oct. 20
Searle, J. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3): 417-424.
Parisien, C. and Thagard, P. (2008). Robosemantics: How Stanley the Volkswagen Represents the
World, Minds and Machines, 18(2): 169-178.
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Oct. 22
Searle, J. (1990). Is the Brain a Digital Computer?, Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, 64(3): 21-37.
Egan, F. (2012). Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let’s Not Let the Tail Wag
the Dog, Journal of Cognitive Science, 13(1): 39-49.
WEEK 10: CONNECTIONIST COMPUTATION: A NEW GAME IN TOWN?
Oct. 27
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Ch.4).
Hinton, G. (1992). How Neural Networks Learn from Experience, Scientific American, 267(3):
145-151.
Chalmers, D. (1992). Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room. In ‘The Symbolic and
Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap’, ed. J. Dinsmore. Lawrence Erlbaum (pp. 25-48).
Oct. 29
Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical
Analysis, Cognition, 28: 3-71.
Eliasmith, C. et al. (2012). A Large-Scale Model of the Functioning Brain, Science, 338(6111):
1202-1205.
WEEK 11: COGNITIVE MECHANISMS AND NEURAL COMPUTATION
Nov. 3
Boone, W. and Piccinini, G. (forthcoming). The Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution, Synthese.
Carandini, M. (2012). From Circuits to Behavior: A Bridge Too Far?, Nature Neuroscience, 15(4):
507-509.
Nov. 5
Barrett, D. (2014). Functional Analysis and Mechanistic Explanation, Synthese, 191(12):
2695-2714.
Salazar, R. et al. (2012). Content-Specific Fronto-Parietal Synchronization during Visual Working
Memory, Science, 338(6110): 1097-1100.
WEEK 12: ACTION & EMBODIMENT: DOES COGNITIVE SCIENCE NEED REPRESENTATIONS?
Nov. 10
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Ch.5 & 6).
Brooks, R. (1991). Intelligence without Representation, Artificial Intelligence, 47(1-3): 139-159.
Anderson, M. (2003). Embodied Cognition: A Field Guide, Artificial Intelligence, 149(1): 91-130.
Nov. 12
Clark, A. and Grush, R. (1999). Towards a Cognitive Robotics, Adaptive Behavior, 7(1): 5-16.
McNaughton, B. et al. (2006). Path Integration and the Neural Basis of the ‘Cognitive Map’,
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7(8): 663-678.
WEEK 13: EXTENDING THE MIND? LANGUAGE AS A TOOL FOR THINKING
Nov. 17
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Ch.5 & 6).
Fodor, J. (2009). Where is My Mind?, London Review of Books, 31(3): 13-15.
Nov. 19
Kaye, L. (1995). The Languages of Thought, Philosophy of Science, 62(1): 92-110.
O’Brien, G. and Opie, J. (2002). Radical Connectionism: Thinking with (Not in) Language,
Language and Communication, 22(3): 313-329.
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WEEK 14: THE PREDICTIVE BRAIN
Nov. 24
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Ch.11).
Hohwy, J. (forthcoming). The Self-Evidencing Brain, Noûs.
Botvinick, M. and Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber Hands ‘Feel’ Touch that Eyes See, Nature,
391(6669): 756.
Nov. 26
THANKSGIVING RECESS
WEEK 15: CONSCIOUSNESS & COMPUTATION
Dec. 1
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Appendix II).
Chalmers, D. (1999). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, Scientific American, 273(6): 90-100.
Dec. 3
Clark, A. (2013). Mindware (2ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Ch.10).
Kiverstein, J. (2007). Could a Robot Have a Subjective Point of View?, Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 14(7): 127-139.
Thomson, E. et al. (2013). Perceiving Invisible Light through a Somatosensory Cortical
Prosthesis, Nature Communications, 4(1482): 1-7.
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