Reconceptualizing Change in the Cognitive Construction
of Knowledge
Janice A. Dole and Gale M. Sinatra
Department of Educational Studies
University of Utah
How is knowledg6q u k d and repmenfedin memory? By what pmws do individualscome
to change their &a, anreption$.or knowledge? Although the fintqnedon has been central
to cognitivepsychologiats' nssarch Wdaa formsny years, relatively leas is known about the
ohangeprocess.Wewarnine3n s s a r c h l i l a l U u M t o h s d e a o u r ~ d t h e p m c e a s
of kwwls4pc change. In partleular. we draw on models of conwphd chunge Prom cognitive
psychology, social psycholo$y, and science education. Each model ad& a IWW perspcctiveon
the change proms. B& on the 1ltemturcProm these models of change, we developed a new
model that q m m t r our monceptualization of the change procesrr. We d m d i the model
aod use it to point out new anas of rascareh to be admesJed
P~shologyhas, at its foundation, an abiding interest in
t m b t m d h g the construction of knowledge. How do individuals come to perceive, know, remrnber, and l m ? How
do individuals acquire new knowIedge? How is knowledge
qmmted and organized in memory? How do individuals
come to change their knowledge? TBwe questions have
saved as wncq)hral framewoh fm psychological, as well
as philowphid,thought for centuria (Hunt, 1993).
A major wnaibution of cognitivepsychology has been the
conoqrtaalization of knowledge as memory npnsentations
in the fOllll of d p t s , fmmes, or achemta (Anderson &
Fearson, lW,RumeIhart& Ortony. 19n;Shank&AbeIson,
1977, Spiro, 1980). Schemata am defined as "packets of
intagmted information on various topics" (Hunt, 1993, p.
530). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s. cognitive psychologists wan intmstcd in describingthe name of thesepackets
of iaformation. Spiro (1980)demonstratsd the constructive
agd comp1ex nahm of achemam and highlighted contextual
fmkm-incl&gtasks, texts, and situational contexts-that
influcnccdhow knowledge is orgenid in memory.
Recmtly, q n i t i v e meamharp have come to view knowledge and schemata as multidinsional (Jetton, Rupley. &
Willson, 1995). For example, meamhem havedifferentiated
novics and expsrrpxpsrrp
knowledge strumum~in subject-matter
domains (Chase & Simon, 1973;Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982;
Larkin, McDe.rmot&Simon. & S i o n , 1981;Vass, Greane,
Post. & Pemer, 1983). Rtsearchers have wramined discourse
knowledgc-k.nowledgs about language and how it works
(hlcCutchen, 1986). Another aspect of knowledge that has
been extensively studied is saategic knowledgtihrowkdge
about proceduresfor acoompliihing ago4 or task (Alex&
& Judy, 1988;1.R Andason. 1983a;hwat, 1989).
Until recently, questiohs about the nature of knowledge
and its representation have received far mope thaorctical and
reserach attention than have questions about how iadividuals
acquire knowledge. F'iaget distingubflbd himBOlfasa notablc
exception to his cmatempo&es in that he spcnf his life
sntdying knowledge acquisition. He dcswibed two pmcuim
involved in acquisition. He used the term &mihion for the
addition of mfmation to existing knowledge structureg and
accommodarion for the modification or change of existing
knowledge smtuns (Piaget,1985). Mope recently, theae
views of knowledge scqnisition are well captured by the
pcrspecrive of wgnirive ~onstncctivism(Cow, 1994). Constructivism placGs prime imp~tanceon the individual's active role in the knowledge acquisition process.
Researchers afte~Piaget fine-tuned the o~nstructsof assimilation and ~ccommodation.Schema theorists used the
term accrerionfor the assimilation of new factual informarion
that fits into existing knowledge smctuns (Rumclhaa &
Norman, 1981). Cognitive psychologi&t3dssuibed various
mechanisms of knowledge acquisition, such as addition, deletion, discximihation, and generalization (Chi,1992). that
result ih assimilation or "weak raptruenning" (Vosniadou &
I
Brewer, 1987). For example, students who attend a biology
lecture may readily assimdate new knowledge about plant
reproduction into their existingknowledge base about plants.
By contrast, the change pmcess, or accommodation, has
been a much more thorny issue for researchers interested in
knowledge acquisition. Suppose those same students who
attended the biology lecture on plant reproduction attended
another session on human reproduction. This time, students
may not easily assimilate new information about how human
beings reproduce. Students may have their own ideas about
human reproduction. lhcy may not be willing to hear the
instructor's ideas, or they may listen to them but reject them
(Chinn & Brewer, 1993). If students do make radical shifts in
their thinking, then accommodation would be said to have
taken place.
Vosniadou and Brewer (1987) described the accommodation process as "radical restructuring" or 'khange in knowledge that invofves the creation of new s t r u c m [which] are
constructed either to reinterpret old information or to account
for new information" (p. 52). Chi (1992) refwed to such
knowledge reorganization as "radcal conceptual change."
and lhagard (1992) used the term "'conceptualrevolution" to
describe how one conceptual system can replace another.
Regardless of the tern used, radical changes in one's thinking about any topic are usually difficult to attain.
Lkspite differences among theorists in their description of
the accommodation process, there is one issue on which
change theorists appear to agm.That is, we still do not know
enough about the mechanisms that produce knowledge
change (Siegler, 1996). Smith, di Scssa, andRoschelle (1993)
argued that an adequate theory of learning must not only
describe knowledge, but also provide. richer descriptions of
how knowledge is transformed. Chi (1992) argued that too
little is known about the conditions of knowledge representationsthat may lead to change, such as how learners come
to remgnize that new information does not fit with their
existing conceptions.
Under what conditions is knowledge change likely or
unlikely to occur? What are potential sources of influences in
bringing about change? Is change likely to be temporary or
relatively long lasting? Weak or strong? What can educators
do to facilitate the change p m s ? These questions are of
central interest to educational researchers.
To explore these issues, we turn to models in cognitive
psychology, science education, and social psychology for
new insights into thechangeprocess. First, we examinerecent
work on conceptual change within a cognitive psychological
framework. How concepts come to be represented in memory
and change in children's conceptual knowledge have been
central issues of concern in cognitive psychology since its
inception (for examples of classic works in these areas, see
Mar1979, and Rosch & Mavis. 1978). Current cognitive psychological mearchers investigating change in concept reprosentation have elaborated on early Piagetian and
schema-theoretic notlons of accommodation. These re-
searchers have attempted to more fully descnbe the process
whereby conceptual knowledge comes to be reorganized (see
Carey, 1992: Chi, 1992: Thagard, 1992).
Second, we tum to work in science education. Scienceeducation researchers have been more influenced by the history and philosophy of science and have described how
knowledge acquisition and restructuring in scientific communities is similar to knowledge acquisition and restructuring in
learners (Carey. 1985; Driver & Easley, 1978; Osbome &
Wiarock, 1983; Posner. Strike, Hewson. & Gertzog, 1982).
These mearchers likened the paradigm shifts made by the
scientific uwmunity (Kuhn, 1970) to conceptual changes
made by students as they developed new frameworksthrough
conslrwting their understanding of various scientific phenomena. Despite critiques that the process of knowledge
restruchuing in students differs fundamentally from that of
thescientific community (Pintrich,Marx. & Boyle, 1993). the
Conceptual Change Model (CCM) still provides many useful
insights into the nature of the change process.
We also turn to the field of social psychology. Social
psychologistshave had a long-standing interest in change and
have generated an extensive body of research on how beliefs
and attitudes can be changed. Researchers have studied faotors related to learners, presenters, and specitic contexts that
makeindividualsmoreor less likely to consider andlearn new
information. Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)described the conditions necessary for
change. Together, these pcrspectives and the reaeerch base
provide a framework from which to reconccptualizcourview
of the change process.
We begin by defining key concepts in the cognitive and
social psychological literature as a context for describing
current models of change. Next, we review change models
with particular attention to their similarities and diierences.
Then we present our reconceptualization of the change process. Finally, we present a discussion of unaddnssed rescarcb
issues related to change models within a cognitive constructivist framework
OUTpurpose in generating a new model of change is to
providemearchers interested in the change procegs with new
insights and perspectives fhm three fields of research. Our
model was not developedtoresolvea specificempiricalissue,
but rather to integrate current theory and mearch from different disciplinary domains. We believe such an integration
will point to possible new and fruitful irreas for research for
those interested in learning as change.
COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTIVIST
PERSPECTIVES ON CHANGE
Cognitive psychologists have traditionally focused more attention on descrihingthe structureand function of knowledge
than on change and growth in knowledge (e.g., Anderson &
Pearson, 19% Rumelhart, 1980; Spuo. 1980). However,
Ccgnsthre PByohological Models of Changer
2hologi--.
Learning
The6ri~s'
-J
.
..
. -
,
'Cognltjvp'
Information
.Pi@cessing
~,.
.
Concept
:nrmattnn
GoncEsprrrai
Change Model
Chi (1992). Qtky (1W.Cany & Spelke, 1994). aed
Tha@ (1992) have posited concGptual shifts as rsdical
restroctoring. Sueh changes mprofoundand fundamentalin
that near conccptionsreplace dd. hoeording to this parspe~tive, the new concept is so distiact from the old Brat the
original wncept playe no role in funha rhinking within the
domein 'Ihus,the change is revofutionary and multsin "the
cmer$glce of new pinc'kples.incommensnrablewith the old,
which carve h e world at diffennt joints'' (Carey & SpaIke,
1994, p. 179).
Such h d m e n t a l change in tbe mental mpmmtations of
coaccpts cannot occur through ss&niMion proctssts of addition, deletion, digaimination, and pegalizstion. Rather,
~~aceptualeategoriesmust
kmnfigured througha process
Chi (19!Q)deucribedas eatogorkal remf8nmnt. According
to Chi radical wnwphlal change occurs when concepts are
reassigned to a new category that is fundamentally dif&rent
in kind. For eategolical~ignmentto oocor, a learner mwt
lean a t h e new category's properksand about concepts
that exist within the new categq. This can oanr through
baditional assimilation mechanisms. Than, the leama must
nassign a w m q t to the new category. An example of such
aconceptusl shift would be a physics student wbrecatcgop
izea heat as an process rather than a property of a material
subotancc.
Saagerd (1992) described radical conceptual change as
brunch jumping a me switching. If one considers concepts
to be organizad birrenhically, then a radical c ~ ~ c d p t u a l
change would invoke moving a concept from one !me to
another. Such a change in the hierarchical organizstion of
concepts in memory is analogous to Darwin's repositioning
of humans under the category of animd when p n v i d y
huamswerewasidendtobeadifkmtltindoforeaauQ
Not Wllie science educators imeresfed in change, Chi
(m23and Thagard (1992) drew analogies between the scientific rev01utiions described by Kuhn (1970) and the bowledge ehanpprcro*win learners. That is, in science, information aceumulatesuntil auomalies am d i s c o v d that cannot
standing exist f a some time hefore new concepts am fully
formed.
Smith etal. (1993) a p e d that their position is b a d on a
fundamental tmant of wnstn~tivism:that is, pioa howledge plays a significant roll in learning. According to this
dew,mcepmalrep1"ementis "neitherplausiblcmalways
des'uabIen @. 153). Ratha than wholesalcreplaccmsntofone
concept with anotba,a r s d i u l ~ & n o f l m o w l e d g e ,
existing k n o w l e d & e f ~the basis for new cmceptioas and
rcwalnsimportant in the new undcrstaading.
Siegler (1996) borrowed a metaphor from m1utionary
biology to d d b e incremental change in the coaceptual
developme~~t
ofchi1dren. Rs argued that childrenthink about
a phenomena in a variety of ways, rather thaa having a unitary
understanding. In his dew, change results aschildren choose
adaptively among these various ideas. In other words, a
particular conception becomes the more prevalent w e when
it proves to he more successful over time. Aeeordia$ to
Siegler, t W n g changes continnously as it becomes more
adaptive.
A View of Conceptual Change Flom
Science Education
During the 1980s, science educators adopted a cognitive
constructivist view of knowIedge consistent with cognitive
psychology and Piagexian &my n, explain how children
acquire knowledge about scientific phenomesa (White &
Tishw, 1986). According to this consmtivist persptive,
knowledge is not transmitted from teacher I0 laamex but
constructed by individualsbough the processes of assimilation and acwmmadation. Bemuse the aecomt110dbti0npiocess described change in existing knowI&ge structrrres, scwmmodation was viewed by science edocatots as the centrd
mechanism for conceptual change.
Pmneret al. (1982)developadtheCCMtoexplain(a) why
so many studentsheldon to their existing conceptioris in spite
beacco~~~tsdfOrwithe~gthdw.AnewtheotyrcCeivesof inshuctioa, and (b) what conditions were newssay for
change to takeplace. As bsdeve1oped the CCM, they
accaptanceby sientists if it p v i d e s a more coherent *ladrew fmm the litaatrne on the history and philosophy of
nation of phenomera So m, individuals emunter new
science as well as cognitive theory and research. SEiencc
information, notiw discrepdm bGtween their existing
knowledge and new id-, and re~~ganizc
educators' focus has beea on what they &anbodies of organtheir ktiow1edge
struchm.8 to more coherently ~ccountf a the new informaiznd knowledge-such as Newtonian physics, the csrth aad
tion. 'Ibis wnceptuslization of the change process from coggravity, and scientific explanations of photosynthapis, light,
nitivc psychology is similar to concaptions of knowledge
and heat mest & P
.
,
1985). Tlrcse whereat bodies of
change in the %Id of science education.
knowledge consist of a set of concepts and interrelafad ideas
In contrastto the view of knowledge change as revolutionthat take time and effm to I m and are often inconsistant
with intuitive experiences and evayday beliefs about the
ary, Smith et al. (1993) and Sieglcr (1996) described the
world. Basearch on conc8ptw.l change leaving ha$ b6a
change proms as evolutionary. 'IhePt theorists described
how laowledge is gradually msformed from one state to
conductad on students of many d i i e n t *from
young
another.AEconl'ito this view, concephutl change occurs by
childm to adutts (fora review, see West &%,
1985).
hBasforming and refiniig prior ktiowledge into more and
To undersandmechanisms for change, dence educators,
morS sophisticated forms. Substantial change does not occur
like cognitive psycho1o~tsintensted in change, drew paralquickly, and relatively stable intermediate states of underlels between the accommodation process that individuals
expQienc~and the p m w scientists undergo as they do
nomral science (Anderson & Smith, 1987). Philosophas and
historians of science, such as T o w n (1972) and Kuhn
(1970), arguedthat"scientificrevolutions,""paradiishifts"
(Kuhn, 19701, or 'khauges in m m h pro$rams" (Lakatos,
1970) result from the accommodation proceap made by the
scicntificwnuaunity. Toulmin (19721refcnadto this m m modation process, whether occurring in individuals or in
scieacs, as "cooceptual change."
Posm et al. (1982) desaibed the similarity between the
conceptual cbange preotss in scientific communities and the
mmmodationpmocss in 1carner.s. For example, most young
childnu, like many early Eumpm scientists, believe that the
ceab is flat. Children's ideas come from nomea~ls8e1180ry
expsienecs with a flat horizon. Like the early European
scientists, childrtn eventually enwunter new information
suggesting that the earth is a sphere. At some point, children
rejecttheii beliefthatthe eanb is flat andreplace it with a new
owctptualizsrion ofthe earth as a sphere (Nusshaum, 1985).
Thr;proocss whereby the spherical notion of the eanh comes
to replace children*~flat earth views is called conceptual
change.
Posaa et al. (1982) ident8ed four critical variables in the
conoephlpl change pmcess (see F i 2). First, they argued
that when scientists and studeno' knowledge s b u c t u ~are~
crystallid, coherent, and firmly enmched, they arc highly
resistant to radical change. Of coma, not all conffip&ions are
so resolute. Knowledge of scientific phenomena is o&n
c8enrorcai$tically enmnched in the scientist because it is
based on a coherent bady of knowledge and in the individual
bccause of pasonal experience with scientific phenomena
(the sua appears bo travel across the sb). Radical change of
such entrenched idem nquiregcansidetable cognitiveefforf
and individuals are unlikely to engaae in such effort unless
they believe that a less radical change will notwork. According to theconcephlal change model, individualsmust become
dissatisfied with their existingwnctptions as explanationsfor
data. Gecond, individuals must find that the new c~cy,tions
are intelligibleand make sense.Thatis, they must undmtand
the new CMlCeptionsif they areto adopt them. Third, scientists
and studcnta must perceive the new conceptions to be plaosible oasg Thus,the new conceptions must not only make sense
and be comprehensible, but they must be believable. To be
believahk, the new conceptions must fit into existing and
related ideas. Last, scientists and students must find that the
newwnccptions are ftuithd. or open to'hsw arcasof inquiry''
(p. 214). Thwthe new wnffiptionnmustleadto new insights
and further hypotheses.
Science educators have used conqmal change as the
thwretical framework for explaining a multitude of studies
showing how individuals fail to develop conceptual understandings about numemus scientific phenomena (e.g., Carey,
1985; Chinn &Brewer, 1993; West & Pin@, 1985). Ewther,
themodelharibeenusedt o p t o p i n s l ~ ~ t i o ninterventions
al
that have pmven promising in helping students change their
paconceptions or naive thoodes about scientiftcphenomena.
We will not review these studies, as they have been reviewed
extensively elsewhere (e.g., Guzze.t& Snyder, Glass,& Gamas,1993;Nickerson, 1985, Nussbaum, 1985;West& Pines,
1985).
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOQICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CHANGE
Although cognitive psychologists have only m n t l y begun
to examine the change ptgeesa, pocialpsychologists have had
a long-standing intenst in chan&.. Two construots of traditional inmust to social psychologists arebeliefsandattitudes.
Beliefs are chmterized as the thoughts that people have
about attitude objaog. B e l i are the building blocks of
attitudes (Eagly Bi Cbaiken. 1993)in fhat an d h d e consists
of an interrelated and interwrmected set of beliefs that have
a positive or negative valence for an individual. Thus, a
person's attitude toward gun wnml exists along a positive
to-negative continuum. It consist6 of a related set of beliefs
about guns-who uscs them and for whet purposa,when and
where they can and should be usedwell as beliefs about
gun owners, the National Rifle Association, and a host of
gun-related issuur. It is iatapsting to note that even if individuals have a neutral position about gun control, it would
still be consided an attitude by social psychalogists m l y
& Chaiken, 1993).
&lief8 and attitudsscan be propositional in natum, or they
can be npresaatcd by mental images or a set of experience6
and behaviors. Eor example, when asked about one's beliefs
about guns, an individual may think about an image of a
m i l i t i a - d d man shoothg at a target, a gang member in a
drive-by shooting, or a hunting hip in Montnna. Such
thoughts may be ssmiated with negative or positive evaluations about guns. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) argued that
"these images no doubt carry evaluative meaning, just as
pmpositional beliefs don @. 1W).
To provide a t h d c a l framework to undcraFtand beliefs
better, social psychologists adopted some of the theory and
methodology of cognitive psychology F ~ s k e& Taylor,
1991). In particular, the construct of schwa (J. Andexson,
1983% 1983b; R. C. AnderaDn & Pearson, 1984) was borrowed from cogpitivepsychology to explain how beliefs are
stored and organkd in memory. Social psycholagists concepfualiud beliefs as memory repmentations consisting of
networks of associations or schemata (TssSar & Shaffer,
1990). just as cognitivepsychologists concephlalizcdknowledge. L i e k n o w l schemata,
~
beliefs can be wnccptuali d as simpleor complex. Eor examplc, a less eomplex belief
schema about a presidential candidate may contain beliefs
about the candidate's position on 8 pin%&issue, such as the
role of the federal government A more complex belief
schema about that candidate, however, may entail aricher and
more detailed understanding about who t h e c a n d i i i s , whar
Intelligible?
the candidate's personal and professional background is, how
the candidate voted on important state and federal issues in
the past, and knowledge abwt who is supporting and opposing the &date and why.
This characterization of beliefs roncspnds with a eognitive view of knowledge representation. According to a
schema-thsoaeticpcrspative on knowledge, an activist for a
particular presidential candidate would hnve a rich schema
with many knowledge nodes related to the candidate and
many connections to other related knowledge nodes. A high
school student studying civics, on the other hand, may have
fewer knowledge nodes about the candidate snd fewer con&om to other related concepts.
As far as we can tell, there are few differences in the way
social pycblogists and cognitive psychologists use and
apply the term schcmata It does appear, however, that social
psychologisD include a full range of affective f w t m in their
discussions about schemata. Although Bartlett (1932) and
some LatathsMists may haveoriginallyconceptuaIized schemata in the same way f.e.g., Spuo, 1980). the focus of cognitive pychologist~on the information-pmcessling metaphor
likely nsultedintheeliminationofguchaffectivecomponenta
in tater discussions about schemata (Ftske & Taytor. 1991).
In sum, social psychologists have adopted some of the
theory and methodology of cognitive psychology to explain
how attitudes and beliefs are npresanted in memory. Social
psychelogigtp view belieb similar to the way cognitive psycholagistsview knowledge-as schemata with related, associative networks 'hm srmilarities between mcial and cognitive psychology lead us to contend that social psychology
research may well prove useful to educational reseamhem
haditionally operating within a cognitive framework.
As part of tbcu interest in basic cognitive precessas, one
branch of social psychoEagy4tude formation and
change-has primarily focused on how people acquire their
views, how likely they are to chat15 them, and under what
conditions they do so. Thc social psychology firarmwork for
undenftanding the change process has bacn concepmalizcd
tbrough many different models and hundnds of stdies. Eor
our purposes, we have chosen to look at information-pmc*rsing models of attitude and bskf change, because these models were formed using theory and methods similar to those in
cognitive psychology. The similarity of these models to the
cognitive constructivist orientation make them particularly
useful for our view of knowledge restructuring.
Models of attitude and belief change in social psychology
come out of research on persuapion. 'hm models can be
categorized into two types: combinatorialandpocess models
(see Figure 3). Cambinatorid models consist of highly specifrc quantitative desuiptions of how individuals combine
penicular pieces of idormation to form new beliefs and
change old ones (e.g.. McOuire 1960, Wyer. 1970). These
models place numuioal weights on the componentsof change
that reflect their relative contribution to the change prooess.
Mathematical computations are then calculated using equations that contain the weighted components. Eagb and
Chaiken (1993) argued that cambiatorial models are useful
for desctibiig attitude struchue. Further, they adequately
explain how individuals integrate new information with existing information once they have aocspted it. However,
~ t t i t d eand Belief
1
Change
Process Models
Models
FIGURE 3 Models of altiNdc and belief dsaogo.
comhinatorial modele do not adequately explain how individuals corn to accept new information in the first place, and
therefore, they do not elaboraa fhe cognitive processeg underlying attitude change.
Pmcsas models, on the other hand, have a decidedly cognitive orientation in that they attempt to describe and expIain
cognitive mechanisms for attitude and belief change (Eagly
& Chrilmn, 1993). In contrast to the quantitative orientation
of combinatorid modcls, pmces models ine qualitative desniptiom of ponruasion that show how individualscan come
to aeccpt new information. ?hem rim saved type8 of prooess
models. Dual ploccss models (e.g., Chailrea, 1980; Petty 8
Cacioppo, 1986) represent a synthesis of the findings from
various procurs models. Dual proms models provide a cognitive pmcesing account of how individuals who hold a
particular set of beliefs can change those beliefs based on
exposme to a complex message.
Social psychology researchers have examined the m y
factors involved in how individuals can be persuaded to
chan~cthclr beliefs. A* a flurry of highly controlled l a b
ratory studies from the 19% *ugh the 1960s. intenst in
artitude and belief change diminished becausa '%here war so
if, when, and how [ d i h t
little agreement con-g
variables] affectedattitudechange" petty & Cacioppo. 1986,
p. 125). The lackof sgrcenaGnt stemmed from the diversity of
findings and conflicting accounts of belief change in the
litenhue.
Duting the 1970s and 1980s. social psychologists began
to examine these conhndictory empirical Wigs. Several
models of attitude change were considered, Some omdele
assumed that thoughtful consideration of mcssagc content
was necessary for attitude change (piske & 'layor, 1991).
Other models assumed that individuals did not always need
to engage in thoughtful evaluation for attitude change to
occur.A new m of modole, called dual pmcass modeb, wete
developed to account for both of thew passibilltia. Dual
process models postulated two mutes to attitude change. One
route involved an individual's thoughtful consideration of
issue-mlevant infarmation, and the the route involved an
individual's quick and cursory judgment based on variables
peripheral to the message content. Peny and Cacioppo's
(1986) ELM is one such dual process model (see Figure 4).
Elaboration Likelihood Model
The ELM specifies the processes underlying belief change,
known in the social psychology literature as pcasuasion (see
1 Persuasive Communication
Peripheral Attitude
Shifi
dotivated to Process
'eripheral CUE
Present?
--NaturwA Gognitiv-e Processing;
,,..
cosnifm.'
~~ru&r~'
Change?:,
+..-+,
,. .
~~
Initial
Attitud
..
,
2entral Attitude Change
also the bclnistic-systematic model, Chiken, 1987; Chaiken,
Liberman. 8i Eagly, 1989). The key construct in the model is
that of elaboration. Elaboration is the extent to which individuals think about "issue-relevant arguments contained in a
message" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 128). Elaboration
exists on a continuum from high to low. High elaboration
oecurs when individuals engage in issue-relevant thinldng;
low elaboration oecurs when individuals do not.
The two key factors contributing to high elaboration are
motivation and ability. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) use motivation as an overarching eategory for several constructs. For
am, personally =levant topics, or topics in which individuals
have a stake in the outcome, will promote motivation to
process a message (for a review, see Chaiken & Stangor,
1987). Petsonally relevant topics am intrins'iy important
because they have signif~cancefor individuals' personal lives
(Sherif & Hovland. 1961). For example, Petty, Ostrom, and
Brock (1981) manipulated the personal relevance of a policy
change that would d i i y affffit university students. They
told undergraduafes that the proposed change would take
place in 1year or in 10y m . Students who were told that the
change would take place in 1 year were more likely to be
motivated to pmoess infomation about the policy change. In a
meta-amlysis of "invalvement effects'' ssuch as personal rele
vance, Johnson and Fhgly (1989) showed thai individuaLP who
wen more involved because they c a d about the outcnns of a
debatedissueweremon:pcrslLsdedbystrongargnments.In
genaslsocialpsychologistspositthatpmswallyrelevanttopica
stimulate thought, which, in turn, can lead to high dabomtion.
Petty and Cacioppo (1986) noted two caveats, however,
regardii the influence of personal relevance. First, a topic
may be so intensely tied into individuals' values that they are
not willing to process the message at all (Oreenwald, 1980;
1982). For example, individuals who espouae a creationist
view of the origins of humans may be unwilling to process a
message related to evolutionary theory. The second caveat
involves message repetition. Sometimesindividuals feel that
they have heard a message and its arguments and counterarguments so many time8 that they are unwilling to listcnto and
process the new ideas in the message. For example, smokers
may be unwilling to p m e s new information about added
nicotine in cigarettes because they have heard so many argu-
meats against smoking in the past (for the effect of message
repetition, see Cacioppo & Petty, 1979,1985).
Anothe~oonmct related to individuals? motivation to
pmcsss a mesage is a personality trait that social psychologists dcsaibe as a "need for cognitionw(Cacioppo & Petty,
1982). Social pychologists d&be this individual difference as
to struchlrc relevant situations in meaningful,
integrated ways" or a need to "understand and make reasonablotheeqdential world" (Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe., 1955,
p. 291). Some indiiiduals have a high need for cognition.
whae they enjoy the effortPul engagement of arguments, the.
evaluation of ideas, and the analysis of problems and their
solutiws. These individuals by their very nature are more
likely to engage in high elaboration. 0 t h individuals will.
by their very nature, not be motivated to eagagc in effomul,
thoughtful evaluationand analysisof ideas. Theindividuals
will be mom likely to prwcess the information heuristically,
that is, with low elaboration (Chaiken, 1987).
Finally, high interest in a topic can promote motivation
to process a message. This is not unlike the finding in
educational research that situational intereat (interest stemming from environmental conditions) can promote text
~ ~ m p r e h e r i ~learning,
i~n,
and achievement (Alexander,
Kulikowich, & Schulze, 1994; Shraw, Bmning, &
Svoboda. 1995).
The other key factor contributing to high elaboration is
ability. For a message to be processed. it must be compr*
hensible and not too difficult conceptually. Further, individuals most have sufficient background knowledge to
make sense of the message. Research in this area has shown
that the more comprehensible the message, the more the
recipients of the message can think about what was said.
Then, if the arguments are good, recipients can agree with
the presentex (Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991: Wood &
Eagly, 1981). In contrast, an incomprehensible argument
can elicit fmsuation and negative feelings. These negative
feelings can become associated with the message and the
presenter-in effect discouraging high elaboration (Fiske
&Taylor, 1991).
Research has also shown that message effects interact
with the degree to which the listener has a stake in the
outcome to produce different levels of elaboration. For
examplc, if the message is difficult, the extent to which
someone will try to pmcess the message will depend on
their involvement. Fiske and Tayor (1991) explained how
involvement affects the likelihood that students will prao
ess a difficult statistics lecture with high elaboration. A
student who has alnady given up on the course will likely
daydream and not process the message. A student who will
be a teaching assistant for the course next semester will
make the effort to understand the lecture, despite its difficulty. Students moderately involved are the ones most
likely to be affected by the difficulty of the lecture. The
added diiculty may induce greater processing of the information and thus high elaboration.
Two mutes to persutwion. Tbrougb positing two
routes to psuasio-tral
and peripheral---~~~ial
psychologistsrcsolved the apparently conUadictmy Endings in
the literature on attitude change. Research participants in
social psychological studies changed their beliefs either
though the thoughtful weighing of idess or through attention
to a peripkal cuc. Undez conditions of high elaboration,
individuals engage in thoughtful and effonful prooessing,
which may lead to relatively strong and long-lasting change
in beliefs. Petty and Cacioppo (1980) called this the central
route topersuasion. Howevsr, the model also predicts that a
weakchange may ocau.Under conditionsof low elaboration,
individuals engage in quick and superficial evaluations that
may lead to achangein beliefsthat is w&aodcan,over time,
dissipate. Petty and Cacioppo called this weak change the
peripheral r o to persuoswn
~
~
Thecentral route to persuasion describes a process lesding
to relatively strong and long-lasting change in attitudes or
beliefs, not unlike the process of conceptual change. This
route begins with a message that is intended to persuade
individuals to adopt a parrieular attitude or belief. For example, a health teacher presents information ngsrding the risk
of AIDS to high school seniors. If students am motivated and
able to process the information. then the ELM predicts they
can consider the issues. ?his involves effottfd, thoughtful
prowssingof theinformation studentsfinddevant Thistype
of evaluation and analysis of arguments is anaIogous to "dcsp
processing of informati6n"nsulting in theformation of memory repmentations or lemming (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).
At this point, the quality of the argument is a key factor in
whether or not individuals will be pernuadd to change mGir
minds. If students engage in deep processing of a message on
AIDS, a strong argument will be n d to promote change.
The ELM,like the CCM, suggests that the process leadiing
to relatively strong and pgmanent belidchange is a difficult
one. Individuals may not be motivated toprooessthe message
because they may we be intwe6ted in the topic. Individuals
may not see the paecnal relevance of the issue,or they may
not have a stake in the outcome of the issue.
Even if they am motivated. individuals may not have the
ability to p m c ~ the
s information. Individuals may be distracted; they may not have the backg~~und
knowledge; or the
message may be incomprehensible. Faaher, becaueeprocessing the message takes time, cognitive effort, and energy,
individuals may not be willing to process the information at
all.
One of the unique features of the ELM is that it p i t s
another set of facrors that can lead to the peripheral mute to
persuasion. F a examplo, students listening to a lecture on
AIDS may not be motivated or committed to engage in high
elabaation ofthe issuesand arguments. Portheseindividuals,
thequalityor strength oftheargumentsdoesnotmatter@gly
& Chaiken, 1593). However. these same students may be
persuaded by an attmctive.credible, or trustworthy source; by
a pleasant context (Petty & Cacioppo, 1980); or by a simple
messagethattheyunderstandeasily(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Time students are not persuaded by the strength of the
arguments, butrather by the peripheral cue iwlf. Under these
circumstancas, the resulting beliefs are less strong than centrally pmwsed ones. In time, individuals are l i l y to retm
to their previously held beliefs (Petty & Cacioppo. 1986).
Although the attention to psripheral cues with low elaboration can lead to weak belief change, peripheral cues may
still be useful in promoting change. The ELM predicts that
pexipheral cuts can serve w an impctus toward h i e1abw8tion, which may lead to central change and strong beliefs
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). For example, consider unmotivated shldsnts in a health class who heur a lecture from
someone they admire who is HIV positive. The speaker may
act as a pwiphcral cue that then leads to d a p and thoughtful
promsing of information about HIV safety precautions. The
thoughtfulproeessing of informationcouldthen 1 4 students
toward change in their thinking about taking precautions
against infection.
In sum, the U M predicts change in one of two
ways-through high or low elaboration. A quick. hewistie
evaluation of a message that occurs because of aperipheral
cuc-an attractive, credible, or trustworthy source-can
lead to change. But the change is weak and may not be
long-lasting. The only way skong and relatively long-lasting change can occur, and the hallmark of the model, is
through high elaboration of the issues and arguments involved in a message.
individuals' existingconceptionswerenot assesscdbeforeths
persuasion intervention (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Research in science education (West & Pines. 1985). as
well as in reading research using ashma-dmxetic approach
( A n d e m &Pearson, 1984). and mon recently, in mnsmctiviat theories Of knowledge (cg., Steffe & Gale, 1995) has
shown that understanding students' existing conceptions in
critical to u-ding
the knowledge recollgtnrctionprocess. This research indicates that one's prior knowledge regard'mg an issw is not an ali-or-none wrmuct. b a d ,
individuals diier on how much prior knowledge they have
and also on the quality of that knowledge. Sometimes prior
knowladge can get in the way of processing new information
(Guzzetti et al., 1993; Lipson, 1982). Prior knowledge also
influences indtviduals' intapretation of the same events
(Gaskins. 1996).
Therefore, we note three relevant qualities of a learner's
existing conception that influence the Iikelihood of change:
strength, coherence, and commitment. Strength refers to the
richness of a learner's existing idea, that is, is it well f o d
and detailed or spame and fragmented?Research suggeststhat
the strength of an existing conception is a factor inflwncing
the likelihood of change (Eagly & Chaiksn. 1993). The
stronger the idea. the less likely it is that change will occur.
Coherencenftrs to the conceptual coherenae of the individual's existing knowledge. That is, does the existing conception provide a explanation of the phenomenon, idea, or
event that fits together all the evidence,leaving no loose ends?
Thagard (1992) argued that the likelihwd of change is affected by the conceptual coherenccof theexistingconccption.
A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF
When existingideas lackconceptualcoherence,they are mom
CHANGE: THE COGNITIVE
susceptible to change.
RECONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE
Finally, individualscan be mom or less committed to their
MODEL
existing conception, regatxiless of the idea's skength, coherence, or both. Individuals' commitment to their ideas can
Because of the similarities among tbe theoretical assumptions
come from a variety of sources, such as sensory experience,
ofthe various change models, cognitive pychdogy, science
social group membuship, or cultural background. Sinakaand
education and soeial psycholopical nsesrch can be used to
Dole (1998). in their work examining creationists' views of
reconccptualii change within a cognitive cwskuctivist
evolutionary biology, identified what they called a 'need to
framework. We present hen our reconceptualization of
believe." Individuals in thew study reported fhat they could
change. We call our reconceptualization thecognitin Reconnot accept the idea that humans wae animals because they
skuction of Knowledge Model (CRKhQ.Our model takes
were committed to the conflicting notion that humans beings
into account nsearch within a cognitive psychological perare a special creation. This nscd to believe cuts a c m i d i spective. science education re.se~n:h,and social psychology.
viduals with high and low background knowledge in both
Ollr reconceptualization of the change process begins by
creationism and evolution. Individuals who are very commitexamining the interdon of lcamcr and m c 8 ~ ~ gcharsoe
ted to theii existing ideas ate less likely tochange thoseideas.
t e r i b (see Figure 5). The first laarna characteristic of
Thus, it is imperative that a model of knowledge change
importance in the change prooess is an individual's exisling
examine the skength, coherence, and commitment of an
conception m g d g an idea, topic, event, or phenomenon.
individual's existing conception to assess the likelihood of
Social psychol&ts have often ignored existing concaptions
conceptual change.
or pior knowlsdge in their nseatch on persuasion (P.White.
Another critical. albeit interrelated,characteristicof leampersonalcemmunication. 1996). Sometimesthese~e~eurchms em is whether they are motivated to process the new informas e l d subjects who self-reported that they held particular
tion. Motivation has been identified indiitly in the CCM
stances on issuas, and in M doing, provided some control of
and mon d i i y in Strike and Posner's reconceptualization
prio~knowledgein their T C S ~ ~ T However,
C~.
for the most part,
of theCCM (Skike & Posner, 1992).Posmret al. (1982) used
Learner
r
Conceptiu~~
LAIJLI~~
trength Coherence Commitment
1
!..
-.,.Motivation
- -.
Social
Context?
Need for
Cognitio~
'
MNo
If Yes
I
F
Periphera
Cue
Present?
Engagement Continuum
If LOW
If Hiah
~~~~~
-
1
Plausible?
Relevance?
~
Strong
Conceptu
Change
lo Conceptual
Change
FIGURE 5 cognidversonsrmctiw of knowledge.
the term dimtisfacriDn for describing what motivates individuals to change their ideas. lhey argued that individuals,
wbdhar scientists or students, must experience something
like cognitiveconflict ordisonance (West & Pines, 1985)to
consider change. The conflict or dissatisfaction comes from
seeing anomalies b e t w n their existingconceptions and new
data (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Cognitive conflict can also
arise when individuals hold two views simultanwusly that
conlradict one snother (Heed & S u m , 1985).
In contrast to the CCM, our model posits dissatLt//aftion
asjust one ofmany reasons why individualsmaybemotivated
to prous8 new information. In fact, the CRKM includes four
facets of motivation. of which dissatisfaction is one. Dissatisfaction may be the critical motivating element when scientific ideas conflict with intuitive ideas about how the world
works. Inmitive ideas me formeddirectly from senmy expe
risnccs--like the sun @ng
on the horizon-and are
thcnfon particularly resistant to change.
However, it seems clear from the research in both cognitive
and social psychology that at kast in domains 0 t h than
science, individuals can be motivated to change their minds
without being dissatisfied with the'iexisting id-. For example, they may haveastakein the outcome(Chaiken&Stangor,
1987)or an interest in the topic (Alexander.KuUkowich. &
Jetton. 1994, Hidi, 1990: Schiefele, 1991). They m y be
emotionally involved (Gaskins, 1996) or have high self-efficacy related to the topic or task at hand (Dole, Brown. &
Trathen, 1996: Parajeut 1997). Thus.we consider these el*
ments as possible alternative sourns of motivation to process
new and conflicting information. We use the twn personal
relevance from thc ELM to capthe motivation factor
stemming fnnn thesepersonal factms.
The third fact^ we subeuine under motivation is a host of
social contexts that may persuade an individual to process
information with high engagement. Students may be motivated to process a message because their peers show interest
in the topic. Often, school administrators or teachera invite
guest speakem to give talks to their students to convincethem
not to d d c and drive, not to smoke, or to pmtice safe sex.
Depending on the credibility of this individual, the students'
respect for this individual, or their peers' nactims to the
speaker, the guest could provide a motivating context to
p-s
a message that otherwise studen0 would not want to
hear. Alternatively, students in a group discussion may be
motivated to consider new or conflicting information they
have disregarded in the past because they value theii peers'
viewpoints. In sum, the context in which the message is
considered eonfains a variety of social omtext variables.
Interactions with members of q. community, school, or pem
group may motivate individuals to pmcess information they
would not othwwise consider.
Finally, some individuals, by their very nature, are inherently motivated to process information. These individuals
have a need for cognition (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). lhGy are.
challenged by copsidering many s i b of an issue and enjoy
the cognitive procedng inherent in high elaboration. Motivation mfmchers might characterizt someone with a high
need for cognition as "intrinsically motivated" to engage with
ideas, infamation, or concepts. Pincrlch and Schunk (1996)
dwcribed intrinsicmotivation as willingmgs to "engage in an
activity for its own sake" @. 257). Individuals with a high
nted for cognition are also willing to persist in their consid&on of ideas. This persistence is akin to the motivational
construct of 'Colitim." Como (1993) described volition as "a
dynamic system of psycholo@calwntrol promass thnt protect concentmion and directed sffort in the faca of personal
and/or 6nvironmental distraction" @. 16).
Certainly, we do not consider these four elements to be the
only motivators that may contribute to the change process.
However, baaed on existing nscarch in cognitive and social
psychology and science education, we think then is Bufficient
evidence. to support them as elements that may lead toward
motivation to proocss information.
I n m m t i with
~ the leamerCTs
existing conception and his
or her motivation to process a message an critical features
of the message itself. The message canies with it a set of
variables that are unique to that particular message, such as
the format. organization, and the task implied by the message. 'Ihcse.variables intMact with l6arms' existingconceptions and motivation to make the mwage more or less
comprehensible, plausible, coherent. and rhetorically compelling to each individual.
Following the CCM, we hypothesizethat a messagemust
be ~ m t g r e h i b kand p h i b k to a W c u l a r individual.
For the message to be comprehensible, it must not be too
conceptually difficult for a paiticular individual to grasp.
Fmther, the individual must have sufficient bsck.$round
knowledge to d a t e to the message.
For a message to be eonsidered plausible, an individual
must decide that the message could reasonably be me.
That is, the individual would have to weigh the quality of
the evidence and decide on the probability of its truthfulness. For example, recently in California, 14 members of
the Heaven's Gate cult committed suicide. They believed
that their souls would be saved by aliens in spaceships
flying behind Halley's comet. Although it is not hard to
comprehend the explanation offered by the cult members
for their plan, mom of us would de&de that the explanation
fails to meet the plausibility criterion. Specifically, the
evidence supportingtheir views seems tenuous at best, and
the probability that their explanation pomays a likely sce-
nario seems to be quite small.Unless information is both
understandable (comprehensible) and credible (plausible), an individual will not be motivated to process it.
Individuals must also find the massage to have a csrtain
level ofexplanatoryeohomnce('Riagard, 1992)in accounting
for the phenomena. In other words, it must provide an explanation of the phenomenon that linlrs ideas into a wnoeptual
whole. Last, amessage must be rhbtoricalIy compelling to an
individual. That is, the language usage, tbe sources of information that form the arguman5and thejusti4ications psovided
must be convincing and persuasive to the individual. Some
individuals may be more compelled by an impassioned and
emotional s p h given by a politician on the plight of the
h o m e h , whueas anotbR individual may be more e m pelled by a candidate who V n t s dam on growing housing
costs and statistics on population growth to make his or her
point. Conversely, a message cannot be Morioally compeIling if it is ambiguous, confusing, or disjointed.
We c o n c e existing
~
wl~~eptioas,
motivation, and a
given mosgage to form an inwraeting, dynamic system. A
comprehensible message may be personally meaningful to
one individual and yet meaningless to another. Some individuals who are initially dintac?ated in a topic may become
motivated to attend to a message if thsy find the musage
rhetorically compelling, but athas may not find the nrgument
persuasive. Studentsmay be more willing to work at comprehending a confusing message about a univusity's conversion
from quto semesters if Ihe information is personally
relevant-that is, if the conversion will take place before they
graduate. Thewfom the qualities of a message can only be
considmad as they intexaet with a given individual's existing
conceptions and motivation.
It is interesting to note that the ELM @ins with message effects that in time, may lead to motivation, whereas
the CCM begins with dissatisfaction-a kind of motivation
to process--and then message effects (comprehensibility
and plausibility) come into play. The reverse order of these
components in the ELM and the CCM may bathe result of
differences in the bodies of research the two models try to
explain. The ELM synthesizes experimental research,
which typically begins by introdwing paaicipants to a
message in a laboratory setting. The paaicipaots are there
because they have generally received some sort of compensation for their rime. Thus. they may be motivated by the
experimental conditions. If the message is comprehensible
to the pacticipant, the experimenter can then ass= whether
the individual is motivated to process the information
further. But this order of events may be an artifact of the
experimental situation.
On the other hand, the CCM tries to explain conceptual
change within a classroom context. h a classroom, students are not always rnetivated to process every bit ofnew
information they hear. The CCM 5uggest9 that if students
are not motivated to process new and conflicting information, they are udiiely to attend to the mmsage. Thus, the
process bsgins with motivation for the CCM but with the
messagein the ELM.
In our model, we hypothesize that learner characteristics
and mwsage effectsare not linear at all. Raehor than suggesting that the procass starts at one particularpoint and proceuls
in a step-by-step fashion, we wish to capture $heiterative
~atursofthechangcpncpur.Weima@nethatthenare
chmmmm under which the change proccss can be initiated at the 1or at the message level.
So, @?heintendon betwecn lcamsr and message characterislice occur in a W t i v e manner, then the individual will
lilccly process the information. However, this processing, like
pria knowledge, is not an alla-none phenomenon. We
suggest that the processing ofthe infomation itself lies on a
continuum from knv wgni'tivc engagement to high nrstacogniriyb engagmm. ' h e notion of acontinuumof en@ganent
relates to what persuasion nscmhess call thb continuum of
elaboration. High elaboration aQcu18 when individuals engage in e W , analytical proceasing of information. At the
other end of tlie continuum individuals may engage in more
supsrficial or heuristic pmco6sing of information or low
elaboration.
We use the term engagsmetat to nflffit a cognitive-consttuctivist view of informstion processing, strategy use, and
(for M
i notions of nadzng engagement, m
Guthrie, 1996; Outhrie & Wigfield, 1997). We bypothep'i
thar engagement ean exM on a conflnuum from low to high,
Wvidualsmg@inalow~m~~~tofpmces~may
attend
to new information and actively process that information
through datively simple strategies, such as maintenance
reheanat or mnemonics, p m m m requiting little reflective
or mcfacopitiva thought. This may lead to the assimilation
of ths new infnmaton into existing conceptions without
sisnificant change to those conwptions, 'Zhese new idea
could also be membered but not integated into existing
coaecptio~,leadiig individuals to wrapsnmentalixc the information (Chinn & Erewer, 1993). Compartraental'ization
would result in no change to fhe existing conception. Tbup,
as depicted in Figure 5, low engagement will often result in
no ooRecptual change.
Individuals also may engage in a more moderate level of
engagement. They may mekc meaningful connections with
their existing conceptions through such activities as answering l e h n t i a l questions during reading (Benton, Glwa, &
&'wing, 1983)or drawing pgsoael umnffitionsto the content (Alvemmn& Hayes, 198%M m w , Rcssley,Smith, &
Smib, 1997). lhis moderate amount ofengagement involves
gnatsr ckpth of pmcassing, more elaborate suategy use, and
somcrcflectivethoughtormetac~&nitive
ragulation. Herr.we
tslathcELMonestepfuaha, largely basadon thesubstsntial
bndy of nscarch on metaoognitien ( B a h & Brown, 1984,
Oarnet, 1987).
We posit that engagementat the hillpast end of thecontinuum would involve deep procassing, elaborativeshatc&yuse,
and significant mefawgnltive ntlwtion. We propose that
individuals invalved in the highest form of elaboration would
not only engage in thc cognitive srrateglesof connening and
comparing existing conceptions with new informiaton, but
they would be reflective about what they were thinkkg and
why. Thcy would think deeply about rhe arguments and
c o w ~ trelated
s rt, the message. This is the higtrost
form of mctacbgnitive en$agement. It is only through Bigh
metecognitive engegmant that smng conceptual chsngc is
possible (mFigum 5).
In what context would such high engagemmt occur? Berei w (1990) described a leaning situation that captung what
we mean by mefacognitive engagement He called rhis situation intcntwnal iearncm in inquieg ciasmwoms. In these
clasaooms, students are awareef their ideas and have control
ovar their own h i n g . Such classro~nsbecome swings
where stu&nts knlr: Haw do I I-?
How do I solve prob14How do I chinlt things t6rough critically7 Am I aware
of whaf I believe? What would it faketo convince me otherwise? Studants in such classrooms would I% taught to think
critically, possibly tlmugh instructid mchniqucs such as
disoussion (Alvcmmn & H a m , 1989). critical inquiry, or
questioning the intent of the author in communiosting a
message (Bffik, McKmwn, Hamilton, & Kucan, 1997).
It seems tous tharthecontinunm ofengagement is the most
impntant element of the change prows&In4ividuels' proeessing of a message is not an all-ofinone phenomeaon, even
if they are m o t i v d to pocess the massagp. Instcad,in&
viduals' procasshg lies on a continuum from low cognitive
angagement-active wndderation of i&w-to high mstacognitive e n g a g ~ m c r , ~ p , a n a l y t icriticul
e,
dection and
awareness and regulation of thought proeessas.
Note that even if individuals process a message at a high
matacopitive l e d ofengagement, concepml changeisDtin
not guaranteed,For example. after rcpats of cod fwsion had
been publicizrd, many scienthtsengaged in high daeoration
by weighing the issues and arguments caretully and rhoroughly. In fact, many conduotcd experimentsin anattempt to
replicate the qmted results. But sciLntist8 finally rejedcd
the new infomation about cold fusion, even though they
engaged in high elaboration. Whether high ebboration Isads
to conceptual change depends on s complex intcrsction
among existing wnctpi.ions, motivation, and the incoming
message. (e.g., m u h from the new experiments). W~entists
may have been vexy motivated to considex rhe information,
butthey may havefouadthenewmcssageaboutcddfusjon
to be less cdmmt or less dmtatioally compelling than their
own existing concepdon about fusion. In fact, their existing
conceptions were likely btrenptbned by the'u failures to
replicate the cold fusion cffcct.
Depend'ig on the outcome of the engagement with the
issuts, an individual may w p n d in one of several different
Ways (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). In the cold fusion example,
scientis$ rejected the new infomation and held onto their
existingconceptim. But they wuMhavehad otherreactions.
Por example, if fheir own W i g s pmved inconclusive, they
could have suspended their judgmant until additional information was available. Thus, wncepEual change depends on
the outcomeof theengapnent process as it ~ a c l with
s the
lcama and massage characteristics.
Our t e c m z a t i o d of the
- d. t s thw men if Mividuals an not motivated to change and do not fmd the new
information comprehensible or compelling, change is still
p i b l e . As depicted in Figure 5, a peripheral cue can induee
low c w t i v e engagement, which can, in turn, c a w B supsrftcial change in conceptions. This is anaIog6w to the @pheral m t e to attitude change identified in tha ELM U is
impwtant to keep in mind that engagement that occurs
through pnipheral cues is often low, and thuscbange is l i l y
we& temporary, and smngly susceptible to funher change.
Science education research is replete with studies showing
smdents who pafono well on measures d knowledge &
insbvctien but re* back to tbe'uold emoqtions o v a time
(Uuueai et at., 19PR West Bc Pines. 1985). Tlms, paiphnal
cues that i n d a law engag,ementmayproducetheappearanee
of change or weakconceptuul change (mPigureS), but such
change is likely superficial and trmporary.
However, as rasea~chon the ELM suggs8ts, a peripheral
cue has the potentid to draw an individual into high engagement with the isaua and arguments. For example, if a group
of ranchus who are opposed ro the ninwduction of wolves
into Yellowstone National Park hear new information about
&mto owaol the wolves' predation on livestock from a
fellow rancher, tlrey might be willmg to take a c k look et
the issue. They might be iaters8ted in gaining fruthw information about tfmecontrol effortsand the sucamratcsofsuch
measu~cs.In ether words, the fellow rancher m l d sefve as a
periphmal cue, drawing the ranchers into the type of high
metaeugnitive mgaItcment that could laad to conceptual
*c
The CRKM deserih a complex interaction of existing
lmowledge, motivation, message effects, and engagemenk
l b s , it illpotrateswhy radical conoqmaldutngeasdasrribed
by Chi (1992) is so wrz Chahghg naive or intuitive existing
conosptions o h quires individuals m reassign wnoepts
acms what Chi cancd ontological mtepries. This type of
change is nmksssry in the study of physics, for example, if
studem lrpe ta wmpt w W am often c c w ~ ~ h z i t i scie~t
ve
tific explenasions for phenomena One mason such pdound
changee are exfmndy difficult to achieve, according to the
CRIEM, is that naive or intuitive existing c o ~ ~ ~ p t i are
ons
l i l y strong and coherent Pnrther, individuals may be very
committed to thcse conceptions beeause they &re based on
their everyday expaienm.
What would it fnke to prinIuce radical conceptual change
sccording to the CRKM? It would take an exceptionally
well-formed massage that an individual foand to be very
cohepeaf comprehena'ble. plausible. and rk.torically e m -
pelling. It would also require the individual to b motivated
to interact with the message at the highest end of the engage
ment continuum. It s
eem clear why radical amptual
change in so diffcult for t e d to~pnunote:
~
The coaditiw
necessary for radid change are challenging to pmduce in a
classroom setting.
In sum, our l t ~ ~ ~ l c c p h E a l 'of
i o the
n change p m e s
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CRKM
We have m n t e d a model of the conditims that nead to
mew for h e cogniti* ncanstnrction of knowladgc. Itl db
vebping the model. wednw from theory andmearch in three
areas. In this way, we hope to wmbinc the best feahues of
these perspectives to develop a more general model of conceptual change. Next, we examine each c o m p m t of the
CRlCMas it relam to the &sting h
-r
and suggest arras
for future remarch that need to be itddresised to more. M y
undcrstandthec~eproa%s.
Existing Conceptions
fdentifying existingconceptions about a topic remains a basic
probhnfsr~csearch~r~.
Oneissue that has madethispmMem
particulady complex is thst existing conceptions cons& of
d i f f m t types of Bnowitdge, e.g, topic knowledge. do&
knowledge, and metawgnitive and strategic knowledge (Por
arcview of knowtedge tmninology, sesAlexanda, Shallat,
8t Hare, 1991). The implications of this issue for thosc of us
intmsted in conceptual chgertseatr;h is whether we o d d
identify differem id thc conccpual changeprowsdepandem on the type of knowledge.
Given that them are these d i f f m t types of knowledge,
another issue. comes to the fore: Can thesu different types of
howledge he assessed? Alexander, Jeiton, and Kulikowich
(1993)developed twe types of q W o n s to separately assess
domain and topic knowledge. Questions used to sasess dcmain knowledge consisted of items measuring key concepts
and principles in the domain. Questions used to assess topic
knowledge consistad of detailed knowledge tied specifically
to a given twrt on a topic.
Thsoridcal issue for theCRKl.4, however, is notonly haw
to aeaqs diffemat types of knowledge, but how to asses the
s t l ~ g t hcoherence,
,
and commitment of sn individual's existing conceptions. Clearly, empirieal wearch is needed to
establish whether theseconstructscan he measurrd.However,
much wisting work in knowledge representation and assessment suggests it may be p s i b l c (see Sonassen. Beissuer, 8t
Yacci, 1993). Recall that strength refen to the richness of an
individual'swnceptualkmwledge. whetherit is well formed
and i n ~ n a c c t . or
d sparse and ffagmentsd. Shangth could
bc d d n e d by asking individuals to C O I L S ~ ~ Inetwork
C~
raprcsantatim, such as webs or semantic maps (F'iher,
1990). It may be possible to assess the relative shangth of
individuals' c o n a p ~ a lknowledge by dctcrmining the
number of Laanchas and instawes they produce in generating
thentsps.
SiIarly,conceptual coherence could bc assessed by asking individual# to produce concept maps or causal maps
(Jonaracn a al, 19!B). In rhew network replwsntations,
individualsmost~otonlygenerarenodesandconnections,but
they mwt label the links in termsof therelarionthey repment
(using W l s such as caused by, fjpa ox characterisric $c
neceJsttatcb,c@crs, etc.) Thtnodes and labelimg of the links
could bcjudged asdepicting more or l m explanatory coherence of a phenomenon, idea, or event. Another method that
may p e useiul for assessing cohgGnce is the use of similarity retine (Diekhoff & Dickhoff, 1982). This method
involves asking Wviduals to genuatc a list of o f s nlatsd
to a cancegtandjudge the degreeof simiiaity or dissimilarity
between ~ a o hpair of listad tcmls. 'lbss ratings can be asssssed usingstaristical beehniqucs, such as clweranaiysis or
multidimoosiomal sealing, and individuals' ratings can be
compared to each other's a to an
W i n g individuals' commihuent to their ideas may
pow to be the most challenging. One technique we are
upIoring is asking questions such as T h a t could someone
tell you thst would change your vkwl" and then scoring
rsspons~sbnaed on a N ~ S ~ranging
C
&om highly committed
(reapembits indicate that them is nothing anyone wuld say
that would change their thinking) ro weakly committed (re
spoadents iadicate an opennessto bearing evidence in o w
sition to their view).
Clearly, diffarent t y p of measurea may be needed to
identifyttlGsbngth,wherence,and wmmibcmtofindividuals' existing knowledge. A program of rss~archexamining
possible measures is l i l y to produce new and helpful infor-
mation regarding thecharacterizationof existingcowqtlons.
As well, it may bc that different measures may work be* in
some domains than o w . Identifying the interactions h e
tween measures and domaim may be an important conhibution toward understandinghow to tap the nuances of students'
existing conceptions as they affect the likelihood of concep
tual change.
A critically impormt construct dad to learner charac-
teristics in the CRKM is motivation. Thc conarnct of motivation has a long-standing 'tradition of researchin the field of
psychology, imcludingsocialpaychology.Within educational
psychology as well, rasca~chhas been extpnsive, particularly
as motivation relates to academic achievement and schooi
learning (s.g., ( k n h a ~&~Weiner, 1996, Stipek, 19%).
What does the body of nscaroh on motivation within fhe8e
traditions tell us abwt what might motivate imdividuals to
consider new information about a topic about which they
~yhavcbcliefs7Toc~idnchangingons's
mindmeans
to be wilding to engage in the deep cognitive and metawDpitive processing - s a q
to reexamine issues andmgummts.
For example, one of the authors is cumntly working with
teachers and students in the Southwest. Some students come
to school with negative stereotypes abnd Native Americans
(orAnglos). In faet, some teachers come in& classroom with
the same stereatypes. The stereotypes influence the way
teachers view students and their work. 'Ihsterrotgpes also
influence the way students view each other and the many
topics that come up in social studies, science, and hismy
classes.
What happens when Anglo students read a text (or beat a
lectureor audiorape) describingthe negativeeffectsof settlers
of the American West on the Nativo American culture7 Or.
what happen8 when Anglo teachers rend about (or ate told)
thenegetim impact of Native American sbcnotJlpesmNative
American childnn's learning?Will Anglo satdcntsand teachers considcr tbe measage w k n it contradicts
existing
bftliefs and wncsptim?
Existing social psychology theory and-ch
has shown
that individuals can be motivated by the personal relevance
of an issue or bscause they have a stake in the outcome,Thus,
students and teachers in the Southwest may be m m willing
to consider a messsgc about Native American (or Anglo)
cultlne than about other cultures. In this w e , Native Americancul'hlremayhave more personalrclevanueto some Southwe% students and teachers than, forexample, other cultures
may have. As weU, the ELM p d i c t s that certain peripheral
cw-aclascfriend o r a m t w o h y source,perhaps+&@
serve to facilitate later d q processing and rethinking of
issues related to thew topics.
What additional insights w motivation to change do cmrent cognitive perspectives give us? Motivation wearchers
have developed congtructs mlated to aehiovement and leaning in @n&ral(Dcmbo & Eaton, 1997). We sa the value of
this nstrnch ss helping us envision a general diisition
toward &-regulated h i n g and deep mQacOBnitive processing, Studan& who have self-confidencein their abilities to
laem, who have the ability to self-monitor and self-regulsre
W i learning, and who are intrinsically motivated and have
a mastery gaal orientation would bc in a better position ta
reexamine theiu e & h g beliefs (pmhirh et el., 1993). Such
behaviors would be consistent with Beniter's (1990) inquiring, self-regulating lmers (seealso Paris, Wasik, & Turner,
1991; Zimmannan & Risemberg, 1997) and with social psychologists' msm ofa "need for cognition." Oa rhe other
hand, 8tudef1ts who are motivated by the need to get a gaod
gradh who want to l a ~ good
k to their pcsrs, or who view the
classroam ss a oompetitiVe envircmmant are lass likely to
=gage in the deep processing neccssray to change their
wnoopions ar beli~fs(Guzzeni & Hynd, 1998).
Thus, thecognitive rascarch on motivation identifies chargctaistics zhet pmmte in student%s gcntral disposition to
I-.
However, W g e n d dtspitlon may or may not be
the same as a disposition to re%wminaissues critically aad to
engage in deep metacognitive p~ocessiqg.Thw, the tesearch
has not focused on motivation to roleam or recomider wmcthing that is inconsistent with existing beliefs. It is one thing
togain knowledge and beliefs about some&ing. But itis very
diffaontto~idermdmdi~koritically
new and conflicting ideas for wbieh you slnady haw knowledge and belicfs.
Bacs it mke a d i h t level of motiwatien to be motivated to
msxamina existing ideas than it does to examine something
with which one is unfamiliar? Does this type of motivatioQ
differ only in d m or in kind?
A sccMd foam of cognitive rsscapch on motivation is the
identaicstian of contextud variables that might promote motivation blerun somethingthatconflictswith existing beliefs.
Motivation ressarch has @en edwatm important ideas
a W contextual variabIes that we more or lsss l i l y to
promote motivation to kern. These can be used to u n M
hetIerthecmtextthatcanbecratedtomaximizGthe~ibility that sNrlsnts can reconsider theiu &sting Wtefs. For
exampla, classroom cuntkxts thatpromow u)operarion rather
then eompttition,that use intrinsic rather than extrinsicincentives, that promote mastery rather thaa puformanw goals,
and that provkdtsmdents withmoderatelyd i c u l t tasks tend
to mate Itamem who are more likely to edgage in strategies
that foster self-regulated leasing @embo & Eaton, 1997;
StipeL 1996).
As we examined the cognitive and social psychology
rcsearoh on motivation as it relates tochange, it isdear that
we are looking at dierent types of motivation We nted
knowledge about general motivation to I-,
motivation
to consider a plntioular message on a particular topic,
motivation to change, and motivation to engage in high.
met%eognitiv~~~eotion.
Although we have more research
in some. enss than in others (e.g., motivation to learn vs.
motivatioatoconsidetaparticularme~sage).~eg~netal~
of motivation for reconsideringone's ideas in light of new
and conflicting inf~mationremains a topic for further
research.
Comprehensibilityand Plausibility
Comprohensibiiity has been studied extensively by cognitive
psychologists and social psychologists. It is mtaesting that
both areas have examined written texts (messages) f o r m prchcnsibility. Meyet and Rice (1984) rcvlcwed a body of
early wgnitiw work on text structures and how b y &t
recaU and l m i n g . Mditional mwwh witbin e cognitive
perspu,tive identified numerous ways in which text can be
"inconsidmate" (Atmb~stcr,IS&+).
However, more meamh is needad on the inteaaction of
wmpreheusibility and text difficulty. Tho regearch has fb
cused on comprehensibilityas easing the amount ofeognitive
effort needed to understwd. The pemiontaseerchsu$gests
that sometima easier may not be better. This wMlld be.
consistent with nsaarch by Chall, Conard, a n d l k i s (1991),
who found that high schod students considered some textbooks "too easy!' These students reposed los* interant in
boaks that they found to be too simplistic. Further, Remhger
(1992) found that students who were intuaMsd in a topic
comprehended text bettcr even when the material w s more
difficult for them to read. Thus, motiv8tion may intemct nith
comprehensibility in intemting ways. It would be ltsaful to
know how mis finding relates to conceptual change.
It is inmesting that plausibility has not bsea studied in
detail. But Poslntr and his coUeaguw (Posr~er at 81.. 1982)
recognized that not only must a claim be undgstandable, it
mustmake sen= a d belogical. Thiisconaistentwith astudy
by W e , S i t r a , and Reynolds (1991). who found that an
important determiner of studants' accoptancc of creationism
or evolution is whether the argument8 "made sense." We
believe this holds tme for domains of knowledge otbg than
science. But how do individuals know if something 'bakes
sense"? We think this is an interesbg inea to explorein teamg
of conoepfualchange. U n h an argument "makes malrc9'' it
is unlikely to be coneidwed by individuab-no matter how
motivated they may b.
High Metacognitive Engagement
F l y , we believe the CRKM builds on the strengths of the
pe~sugsionand cognitive research to identify an m g w t
continuum that has not been discussed in previous nsaarch.
Ihc CRKM predicts that students can engage in thinldns
about an issue at many different IevcIs, from very low levels
of engagement. to medium, to high levels of engapwrit
Consistent with the hcon mefmopition, we propose
that the highest level of engagement involves deep thinldng
Butthemodul~~e$ltbata~~cuecaalsld
to high engagement. that will evmtudly W to oonc-cphtal
change. Socia2paycho1ogy research has v ~ d o s b m ; e a y
educafors know intuitively. Outside s
e 6JRWiPlly
those to whom sndants can relate, can oftea have-dm
effeet on stodsras than OGachers caa S i g n i f i c a n t o u c ~ ~ a a
m y gcaarstG SOBM idcrrs about what v
t looks like
in a cbuunxrm. GuaGni and Hynd (1998) pregented claw
aa €riggemto iaduccor promote high copitive
which eventually can lead to change.
room dgneE(as in which skudents varied in thek levels of
Ths CIUCM offem an explanafion for why .sMm@
enmgsent in science acFidw. Thcn, students' levels of
to thajr pvioasly held w
e0
aapaOemeat and nd thcns b e h ' i t h e ievtls wart pDMu19W).It is likely they en
l a t d b y l w w ~ m h n a ~ d i ~ ~ o a l ~ t i vNiederhawer,
e s .
rial at a fairly low cagpitive level, rathsFthan at a@& laucil.
Studias .such as these should add SignidoanUy to om underrtondidg of engagement DevcIopmentsl data may be approl'l~erefore,when memhem evaluate studca$' Wn&g
~bgO,~wd.Itislikalythathighengag~tatthc b u p h oral or Bvritfeu assessments, they nwd to be atwax
first-grde level will look very different from high engagethat change may appear just aftcs instnwion but
mestatthssscoadarylovel.
overtime. W e t h i n k a n i m p m t ~ t ~ ~ E a i i s a u D i s t o
Ttreiamrdetion&weenh&h tneascopitiveengagement
abut lwrning and high met~oogniti~
engagement abwl a
topic needs to be examined more dasely. Webetievethem is
rnac to1- rboutmotivation to 1sampsrticule~topics. This
is eln~entlybcing done a$ the Nationel I\oading Remmh
Csntor (e.g.. Chihie & W i d , 1997), where m h e m
We do no! want to lenve the impredm that we believe
am sxanafniag atudGntat8motivation m read. But we need to
schools are all ebcut comcptual change. llheortainly is not
c o n d u c t ~ m on
~ how
~ ~motivation
~ ~ h to learn inicracts
rhccapc.
Most knowledge is assimilatedby students mugh
~ e ~ w i t h s p e c ~ c ~ .
extending
expan&,
and mfiniig existin$ coaseptions.
A m t h fraitfu1 a m for rcaaarch on wnocpeutl change
Uoreeva,
when
*
t
s
are wnfmntad with a n d
is to exphe et111p@tompntfor leaning about a topic in one
wedonotlnsanto~lythatthe0atymsponscshould
data,
Wvidual bva time. 'IB'i would be productivefor examiabeoonocphlalchange. Quitethc w ~ , e d u c a t o r J h o ~ ~
iag @saxpieition afbbtiofs a8 WOll as oonqtual change.
students have inquiring minds and that they cballengc, niTwo isMlCr are hpmteat hnr.First, we aeed m Learn how
tiwe, apal~na~
&criticaUy evaluatewhattliey cxpekenceas
klicfs am dewloped initially. What level8 of engagement
conflicmingdata
are nod& to form a bslief? R
d in neither d a l nor
So hew impo~tantis conceptual change for sduostors?
cognitive psychoIogy has ddRsgcd this important issue.
Afieccdl,howoftonanstlldcnrPconfronti?dwithtcdlnformation
Sewnd, once a belief is formed, what particular a r p c t i e m
that wnfli* with lhsir prior knowI.dee? fn fsch hofhadults
~ u t to kUef
e
change? Row are i w w and arguments
and children plr wII&Mtcd with anomalous data aa a part of
weighed, mjsctsd,cr cDunteB evcr time9 9 would be intertBeir everyday snpgienccu. We believe
trend will inesting to follow the tlrinliing of individuals who are in the
onasc as technology, computers, and the tbaarrrmtion Age
p.oaess ofcWging their id-. Studies can be done with
edults,butillsy alsOmu~tbedone with tniddkaad s c ~ ~ ~ d a r ) r bwomemoreea~inoursodetg.TbsmopewecorhI wid, the mms l W y we
atadcne.&y y e e ~ s a g o , ~ ~ ~ o n ( ~ 'hadoubt
~ ~ ~ n o t e dmunicats with olbcbs mund UC
will be amfrontedwith DIIOBMIOUS
data.
11~hcrnsM
chaqp Ly gradual extension, articulation and reRe~mofstud~ts'axistintingview,
aducataaohopstha
finement" @. 424). It would be interestingand informative
students will gain laon b i g h t into critical issuea king
to & a finegained analysis of extension, articulation,
society and bc able to view them from multiple panspactivw.
and FeRnement of the chanp proms.
lhig is p i b l e , howeva, only to the extent that studem
bsoome highly engaged with the issnrs awl arguments. A
~uodsrstandingoftkechangepr~will~lped~
create an enuironment in which sNdents can engage with
multiple pqwcdveb.
A f@ contributioa of the CRKM,and one that we think is
d d y imporrant, is the idsntiftFetion of eltwnstive vadeMaa rdrtad to change. Tho CRKM w
t
s that change can
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
oomsabotit duou@hthepsriphsrsl mate. When this hsppsns,
sardeatllam not involxed in high engagementand eIaboratim
We thank Patricia A k a d e r and our wlleaguss in the Debut in quick hatdstic judgmentsthat do not leadto smng and
partment of MEIcationai S W e a for hdpM feedback on
lens.mobaagc.
and p c d n g of the information and reflwtion on one's
progmsion throagh the pmess.
tiowevex, ne&a~the wgnitive nor the social psychology
ha M b c d the tngpgmmt plowis very well.
Csso Pbrdiw of students who en vadously engagad in a topic
~ ~ . r ; l ~ ~ . & d $ s . ~ . i I e ~
(W.
1
M
c
m
.New Yarlr: CnmWBCtJahmby FRa.
.
32.54%.
Nickcma R. S. 11985). Ung
-
AnurlclaZavrrJ$
Education.93.201-239.
Nussbarrm, I.(1985). Tho senh 06 conraic body. h R Drlw, E. OPtslg &
Oabom* R. I.. & w
~ - M
C. (1983).
. l.emhg
~sama
i psccim:A @n
pnaespl. Science Eduuaicqh W, &B-J(W.
Pmju.P. (199T). Sclf&apl bellda in acsdsmic acvings. RNLnv
-~uscvch
a ~3-na.
of
Tbce~stofirsmodcntiqgofkawtbs~ivcimpactofsamxeucs.
J w d a f CunncnrrRap~(pch18,5262.
R d n g r . R. A (1992). ladlvidud ia~uesiand dmlopmcDE lmpliePima
failag,~dPIIICtLS.InI.A.Rs&ga.S.Hldi&ADnpp(Bdr).
Thrmkoflnlenn~kMu'ngamidmlop~(pp.MI-3%).
lMI&k
NJ: L D w r c o c c B r l b a m ~k.c.
Rmm. E.. & Morvis. C. (1978). ChUdrm'a 8odng A ffiin-011
bssrd
ontbshcnatunofnbstrsdimin~~~~~~.laM.S.Sman&RC.
Schicfek, U. (1991). lnknn, lenming, and mMivation. Educational Psychologirt, 24 299-323.
S W R. C.. &Aklsoo. R. (197%. Plons, scriprs, gi~&andundcrsuvldIng.
Hilladale, NI: Lawnmc PrIbaum krraeiates, ine.
Shaif. M.. &Hovlanb C. 1. (1961). SocinIJudgmnr. New Haven, C T Yale
Udvedty M.
Slnnw.G.,BNning,R..&Svtrboda C.(1995). Sovncsofsauntionalinknst.
J w d of Reading Behavior. 27.1-17.
Sicglsr. R. S. (1996). Ennrging minds: Thcpmcus ofchange in children's
fhinLIng. New Yorlr: Oxford University Ress.
Sinaim, G. M., & Dok.1.A. (1998). Knmrkdgc versus bclicfs: An nnipcinl
in rhc srvdy ofevolution Uanwripf in pnparation.
Smi~h,I. P.. di Sessq A. A,, & R 4 e . 1. (1993). Misconceptions
nrrmaivcd: A wosauctivia analynis of knowledge in W t i o n . Thc
InuUigem, and educafion @p. 245-2781. Hiisdlle, N1: LaPrlbaum Assaciatcs, Inc.
Steffe, L. P.. & Gale, I. (1995). Const~ucmilsmin edueaion. Hilladale. N1:
LaWDaCC ~1~
Ascciatg, l a .
Stipk. D.1.(19%). Motivation and instruction. In D. C. Bcrlimr & R. C.
Cslfcc(EdP.), Hrmdbwkof ed~~mwnalpsychology
(pp. 85-1 13). New
YOIIC sirnotla Sehusm.
Strike, K. A. & P m w , 0. 1. (1992). A revisionist tbcay of co~cepusl
shsogc. lo R. A. DvsN and R. 1. HMiltcd~@UPPhilosophy
..).
of
sciancc, c o g n i r i w ~ h o l o g yandcdvcofiond
,
rhcory~dprncnce
(pp.
147-176). New Yo* SIaIc Univsrsily of New York M.
TeBTr, A., & Shaffcr, D. R. (1990). Altitudes snd .flindc change. Ann&
RevinvqfP~hology.41.479-523.
Tbagprd,P. (1992). C o n c e p ~revolutions.
/
Rlaocton, NI: Rinmm Udvemity Rcss.
Toulmis S. (1972). Hwnmrodcr&ng.
PI~IIcM~,NI:
Pthmon Uoivasity mss.
Voaniadou, S.. & B m W. P.( 1 9 8 7 ) . ~ o f l a o w l a d g e r c w u a u r i n g
in development. Review of E d v c n f i o ~ R c s e m h57.5147.
Voss. I. F.,Gpknc, T. R.. Post, T. A,, & Ponner, B. C. (1983). Problem-sohing &iin
llibc said scimocs.In G. H. Bower W),
%-psychology of
knmlng andnwrivolio~A d v m in m s e m h andthcory (VoI. 17,pp.
16S213). New YON:Acsdcmic.
Wesf L. H. 7.. & Pines, A. L. (1985). Cognirivl s m b n and c o ~ a p N n l
chmgc. Oltsndo. PL:Academic.
While. R. T.. & T
isher.R. P. (1986). R u r M h in science education (Vd.
16). Pspcrs from the annual d ~ r of eibc Avsbsliaa
~
~
Sdcne.
PdwtionRuiealch Associaioa. *dslpid+ Sauh Aosaslia: Ausaaliae
Sciwa EducPtion Rcaearch AmccWm.
Wood, W., BEagly, A. H.(1981). Stages in the analysisof persuasive
messages: The mls of causal attributions and message comprehension. Journnl of Personality nnd Social Psychology. 40.
246-259.
Wyer. R. S.. Ir. (1970). Quantitative prrdidiooofbeUefandopinionchangc:
A further test of a subjective probability m d 4 . J w d ofPersonalify
andSocinl Psycholoff. 16.559470.
Zimmrman. B. I.. & Risetuberg. R. (1997). Self-regulatory dimensions of a&mic learning and motivation. la G. D.Wys W.).
Handbook of ucndcmic lenrning (pp. 106-125). San Diego. CA:
Academic.