Gábor Forgács, Tihamér Margitay, Zsolt Ziegler
Dept. of Philosophy and the History of Science
1111 Budapest, Egry J. st. 1. E 610.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
www.filozofia.bme.hu
Reliabilism
Knowledge, truth, and belief
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What is knowledge?

Knowledge: propositional knowledge (knowing-that), non-propositional
knowledge (knowing-how) (E.g. I can swim, I know how to drive a car with
manual transmission)

Knowledge is a special kind of belief-state
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Propositional knowledge is justified true belief, that is, s knows that p if, and
only if

s believes that p

s is justified in believing that p

p is true
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Justification supplies reasons for the belief that p. (It is a matter of degree.)
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This definition captures pretty much of what we require of knowledge.
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Epistemology
S knows that p, if and only if...
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1. Belief: S believes p.
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2. True: p is true.
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If it is incorrect then - no matter what else is good or useful about it - it is
not knowledge.
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It can feel to the believer as if it is true, but it doesn't matter. If the belief
is mistaken, it would be knowledge, no matter how much it might feel to
the believer like knowledge.
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3. Justification: p is justified.
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p needs to be well supported, being based on evidence or some other
kind of rational justification. The belief, even if it is true, may as well be a
lucky guess.
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Epistemology
Gettier-cases
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Edmund Gettier challenged this
traditional account of knowledge.
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He used counterexamples.
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He described possible situations in
which all of these conditions obtain,
but we wouldn't count it as
knowledge.
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Therefore, knowledge is not
justified true belief.
Epistemology
Gettier's original example
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Smith and Jones have applied for the same job.
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Smith has been told by the company president that Jones will win the job.
Smith has observed that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
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He infers that whoever will get the job has ten coins in their pocket.
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But Smith, who will actually get the job, has ten coins in his pocket.
Nevertheless, neither of those facts was known by Smith.
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Smith has a justified and true belief: „Whoever gets the job has ten
coins in his pocket.” But Smith doesn't have knowledge.
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"Smith" and "Whoever gets the job" are not freely interchangable
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Epistemology
Other examples
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A modified version of Gettier's second example
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Smith believes that one of his colleagues has a Ford. He has good
reasons for believing this: Jones always had a Ford, and Smith has seen
him recently in a Ford.
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But Jones's Ford was stolen yesterday, and he drives a rented car.
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Nonetheless, one of Smith's other colleagues, Brown has a Ford. But
Smith doesn't know these facts.
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He has a justified and true belief („One of my colleagues has a Ford”),
but he doesn't have knowledge.
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Epistemology
Internalist and externalist
theories of justification
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The rise of internalist-externalist debate is due to Gettier's article.
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What are the relevant factors of justification?
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Internalism:
•
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(1) Knowledge requires justification and
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(2) the nature of this justification is completely determined by a subject’s internal
states or reasons.
Externalism: denies at least one of these commitments:
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(1) either knowledge does not require justification or
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(2) the nature of justification is not completely determined by internal factors alone.
Epistemology
Internalism
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Internalism: justification of a proposition is completely determined by
one’s internal states.
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Internal states: one’s bodily states, one’s brain states, one’s mental
states (if these are different than brain states), or one’s reflectively
accessible states.
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Foundationalism and coherentism are internalist theories. The
justification is in my „head”.
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The justifiability of p depends only on my internal states (my beliefs
and non-propositional states, such as experiences).
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A p belief is justified, if the subject has good (sufficient) evidences of p.
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Epistemology
Internalism
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Internal states as either reflectively accessible states or mental states.
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Therefore, according to internalism I need to have an access to the factors which
make my belief justified.
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Crucial point: A person either does or can have a form of access to the basis
for knowledge or justified belief. The subject is (is able to) aware of the
ground, basis of her knowledge or justified belief.
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(And we can ask for justification: how do you know that... )
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Epistemology
Externalism
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Justification depends on additional factors that are external to a
person.
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The facts that determine a belief’s justification include external
facts such as
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whether the belief is caused by the state of affairs that makes the belief
true,
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whether the belief is counterfactually dependent on the states of affairs
that makes it true,
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whether the belief is produced by a reliable belief producing process.
Epistemology
Justification without awareness
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Causal origins of one’s beliefs are not, in general, reflectively accessible.
(causal theory of justificaton)
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Externalists deny that one always can have (reflective) access to the basis for
one's knowledge and justified belief. I don't need to know the basis of my
knowledge or justified belief.
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If my belief is produced by (for example) reliable process, then my belief is
justified, even if I'm not aware the facts which make my belief justified.
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(Example: Testimonial knowledge. I can't remember the „evidences” on which
my belief that 'Napoleon lost at Waterloo'. But I don't need to remember, if my
belief was proced by reliable processes.)
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Epistemology
The structure of Gettier cases
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Each Gettier case contains a belief which is true and well justified
without being knowledge.
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Two important features of Gettier cases:
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1)
Fallibility: The justification is fallible (there can be mistakes). It gives strong
reasons to believe p, but leaves open the possibility of the belief’s being
false. Justification indicates strongly that the belief is true, without proving
conclusively that it is.
2)
Luck: The well (but fallibly) justified belief is true by luck. There are odd
circumstances in the case, which make the existence of that justified and
true belief unexpected.
Epistemology
Possible solutions
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1)
Infallibility:
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There is no fallible justification. In Gettier cases the subject doesn't have a
justified belief, because it is (and can be) mistaken.
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Justified belief = If p belief is justified, then it is impossible for p to be
false.
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Contradiction: justification can lead to false beliefs
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We don't allow that one’s having fallible justification for a belief that p could ever
adequately satisfy JTB’s justification condition.
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In Gettier cases the subjects don't have knowledge, since they don't have a real
(infallible) justification.
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Epistemology
Problem with infallibility
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It is a drastic and mistaken solution.
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In „ordinary” situations we think that we have knowledge, yet we rarely (if
ever) possess infallible justification of a belief.
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If we accept that infallible condition, then we can have knowledge only if
we cannot be mistaken.
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But there are very few things (if any), which are infallible.
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The infallibilist conception of justification leads to sceptical
conclusions: we don't know anything at all.
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Epistemology
Possible solutions
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2)
Eliminating false evidence
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The subject lacks knowledge, because he is relying upon false evidence. He
has luckily derived a true belief, p from a false belief and this is because he
doesn't have knowledge.
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Smith includes in his evidence ('the president told me that..') the false belief that
Jones will get the job. If Smith had lacked that evidence, he would not have
inferred belief p.
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If so, he wouldn't have had a justified and true belief, which failed to be
knowledge.
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JTB must be modified: no belief is knowledge if the person’s justificatory
support for it includes something false.
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Epistemology
Problems with eliminating false evidence
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A Gettier case can be formulated, when there is no false belief at all.
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Suppose: Smith has a belief: „The president of the company told me that
Jones would get the job.”
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Suppose: Smith doesn't infer to: „Jones will get the job.”
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His belief (together with „Jones has ten coins in his pocket”) also supports this
true belief that: „whoever will get the job has ten coins in their pocket”.
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Therefore this solution is not useful.
Probably, there is always some false evidence being relied upon, at least
implicitly.
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If there is some falsity among the beliefs you use, but if you do not wholly remove it
or if you do not isolate it from the other beliefs you are using, then you don't have
knowledge.
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Therefore, we have again the threat of scepticism.
Epistemology
Possible solutions
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Gettier examples demonstrated that, a subject can obtain true beliefs
with very solid grounds and yet the agent could still easily have been
wrong.
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It is only by luck or coincidence that the agent’s source of justification leads
to true belief.
Epistemic luck: The justification leads to true belief by coincidence.
•
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To have a proper theory about knowledge, we have to eliminate the
epistemic luck.
Epistemology
Appropriate causality
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3)
Eliminating inappropriate causality
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What is the connection between the justification, believing in the proposition, the
truth of proposition, and knowledge?
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Goldman's response: Knowledge = true belief which is caused in an
appropriate way.
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In Gettier cases, S doesn't have knowledge, because his true belief is caused in
an „abnormal way”.
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Knowledge is constituted by two factors.
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The true belief AND the way as it was formed by a causal process
constitute knowledge.
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Epistemology
Causal theory of knowledge
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Alvin Goldman's causal theory of
knowledge:
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S knows p, if and only if: the same
fact which makes p true causes S's
belief p.
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The fact that makes p true must be
included in the causal process which
produces the belief p.
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There is an appropriate causal
relation between the belief p and fact
which makes p true.
Epistemology
Gettier examples and causal theory
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In Gettier cases, the subject doesn't have knowledge, because
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the causal connection between the facts which make the belief true, and
his belief is missing.
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Gettier I.: Smith believes that „the person who will get the job has 10
coins in his pocket”, not because the facts which make his belief true:
„Smith (will) get the job.” ; „Smith has 10 coins in his pocket.”
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Why Smith does believe this? Because he believes that Jones will get
the job (because the president told that), and Jones has 10 coins in his
pocket.
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He has evidences for these beliefs, but these facts are not relevant to the
truth of the original belief (the person who will get the job, has 10 coins in
his pocket.)
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Epistemology
Gettier cases and the causal theory
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Modified version of Gettier's second case:
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„One of my collegues has a Ford.”
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This proposition is true, because Brown has a Ford (but Smith doesn't know
this).
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But this fact plays no role in his belief forming process.
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Smith believes this, because he believes that Jones has Ford.
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There is no causal connection between the fact which makes his belief true,
and his belief.
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Epistemology
Perception
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By perception we can acquire knowledge by causal processes.
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If the perceived object (Stoczek building) causes my belief that „It is the
Stoczek building in front of me.”, and my belief is true, then I know that it is the
Stoczek building.
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In memory, there is a causal relation between my present mental state (I can
remember that..) and a past experience.
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I believe that 'I have seen the Stoczek building this morning', because I have
actually seen the Stoczek building.
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Epistemology
Appropriate causal connection?
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Problem: What is an appropriate causal connection?
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We can construct a case that is similar to the original Gettier cases and uses
the notion of causal connection
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Suppose: Smith believes that one of his colleagues owns a Ford,
because Mr. Black has told him that Jones has bought a new Ford.
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And Mr. Black usually doesn't lie. But in this case Mr. Black remembers
wrong, he has seen Brown buying a new Ford.
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In this case: Smith's belief „One of my colleagues has a Ford” has a
certain kind of causal relation with the fact which makes it true (Brown
has Ford), but in this case Smith doesn't have knowledge.
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Epistemology
Reliabilist theory
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Reliabilism: An improved version of causal theory.
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Appropriate causal connection - > reliable cognitive process
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Causal theory: local theory of knowledge. It gives an answer to the
question: whether the specific cause of a true belief is sufficient for
knowledge.
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Reliabilism: general theory of knowledge. Question: whether the general
belief-forming process by which S formed the belief that p would produce
a high ratio of true beliefs.
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Whether a process is reliable in general or not?
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Epistemology
Founding Insight of Reliabilism
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Knowledge attribitions can be underwritten by a believers
reliability, even when the believer is not in a position to offer
reasons for her belief.
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It is not a simple contradiction of the JTB account, rather a
generalization of it.
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Reasoning takes place as one potentially reliable process among
others.
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Epistemology
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So in order to give a proper account of reliablism, we must search for examples,
where S is not in a position to reason with her reliability
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
Examples: industrial chicken sexers and superblindsight.
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Tension: insist that blind but still a reliable reporter of visual perception
‘There is a red square in front of me.’
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One cannot account for a belief if one is not in a position to give reasons for
it.
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‘Why do you believe that p?’
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Beliefs are propositionally contentful – can serve as premises or
conclusions of inferences.
Epistemology
Conceptual blindspot
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The failure to realize the limitation of explanatory powers of reliability know how
is mixed with know that.
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We might teach a parrot or a thermostat to react to a certain state of affairs.
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However we cannot state that they are having beliefs, because their utterances
asserting those beliefs is not a move in the game of giving and asking for
reasons.
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They are not applying a concept.
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Although we started by trying to rule out the criterion of justification, we see that
it inevitably returns in reliablism.
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Epistemology
Red barn argument
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In barn facade county there are 999 fake barns and only one real
barn. Stangin in front of the only real one we utter ‘There is a red
barn.’
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Would our reliable distinguisher of red barns produce knowledge?
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What distinguishes reliable processes from unrealiable ones in
different circumstances is external to the subjects own belief and
to their connection to their causal antecedents.
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Epistemology
Conclusion
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Internalist and Externalist accounts
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Infallibility, Elimination of false evidence, and proper causal connection
Causal theory
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Difference in what gets explanatory status of internal vs. external factors
Gettier cases and possible solutions.
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Problem of appropriate causality
Reliabilist theory
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
Founding insight
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Conceptual blindspot
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Status accounted for beliefs (conceptual content)
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Red Barn example
Epistemology