Transarmament:from o f f e n s iv e t o d e f e n s ' iv e d e f e n s e *
1.
G a l tu n g
3v Johan
F te a 6 ti o n s
to a n a tta ck
e/defensive"is pr ob' lematic,but a' lso
' lookat the who' lepr oblemof
c r u ci a l .In a ne ffo rt to h a ve a fr esh
s e c uri ty, th e fo l l o w i n g fi gur e giving a spectr umof r eactions to
a n a tta ck o n a co u n try maybe useful:
F i g ureI
A sp e ctru mo f reactions to attack
tota I
d estnr ction
n u cl e a r&o th e r
ma sd e stru cti o n
offensi ve
I-
violent
co n ve n tio n a l
milffiary
conventionaI
mTlTtary-
defensi ve
nonVio]ent
GTense ( CM D)
par amTTTtary
Ffense ( PM D)
nonfrTTitary
deTense(NMD)
n o n -mi l i ta ry
ltg
re si stance
T h e sp e ctru mi s o n e -d i me nsional
whjch m eansthat it is sim plistic,
p o s si b l y to o si mp l i sti c - but it m aynever thelessbe useful.
the"t
A t th e b o tto me n d ^ i s no r esistanceat all' in case of an attack;
a t t he to p e n d to ta l d e stnuctionof oneself as well as of
t h e atta cke r. In -b e tw e e n
a r e a' ll other for m s of r eactio4c- the
s p e ctru mi n c1 u d e sa l l " w ave- ' lengths",
so to speak.
-2-
T h e 6 1 si c th e si s o f th j s ar ticle
is sim ply r hat
a.lm osta.il
t h e q l r r e n td e b a te co n ce rn i n gwhich r eactions to m akeuse of is
f o c u s s e do n tw o ma j o r cu ts a l ong this dim ension,betweennuclear
a n d c o n ve n ti o n a 'la rms o n th e one hand, and betweenviolent and
non-violentreactioQ!onthe other. The Iatter is the distinction
a r o u n dw hi ch n o t o n l y p a ci fi sm but also lar ge sections of the
Pe a c em o ve me ni st o rg a n i ze d : the r ejection not only of nuclear
a r m s a n d o th e r w e a p o n o
s f ma ssdestr uction,but a' lso of vioJence
i n g e n e r a ,l me a n i n ga l l ki n d s of conventionalmi' litar y syster m.
Al t h o u g hmo st p e o p l emi g h t a g r ee that ther e is sucha distinction,
o n l y r e l ati ve l y fe w w o u 'l dsh a re the opt' im ismof pac' ifists - whenthey
point to
su ch e xa mp l e sa s gandhianact' ions in india against
t h e Br i t i sh E ml i g e -w i thre g a rd to the efficacy of non- militar y r eactions
e v e r . r w h e r? a 'l o n e '.-H e na ce
s i,s ver y welI known,it is the djstinction
b e t w e e nnu c'l e a ra n d co n ve n ti onalbr eapons
that dom inatesthe political
d e b a t e a n d a cti o n co mp l e te l y, and not oniy in the militar y and
p o f i t i c a ' l e sta b 'l i sh me n ts(i n cl uding the vr ar establishm ents)
, but
a ' l s o i n t he p e a cemo ve me n t.The thesis, then, is that this is
m o s t u n f ortu n a te , th a t i t i n e anscutting the dimensionat points
t h a t c e r t a i n l y a re i mp o rta n t but have the distinct disadvantage
t h a t o n e of th e m i s l o ca te d too high on the scale of destr uction,andthe oi j r er
o n et o o l o w . T h ecu ts to th e l e ft in Figur e I.ar e s' im p1yinsufficient.
H e nce ,th e a rg u me n ta ti onher e is in favor of a thipd cut,
t h a t b e t ne e no ffe n si ve a n d d e fensive r eactions to attac*tn tr ying
t o d e f i n e th i s cu t, w h i ch l i ke the other two by no m eansis a shar p
o n e , i t s ho u l d fi rst o f a l l b e emphasized
that it r efer s to the
o b i e c t i v e ca p a b i l i ty o f th e re action' system s"{ the weaponsbeing
a p a r t o f th a t co n ce p t), n o t to the subjective m otivationsthat
m a yb e a t ta ch e d to th e m. In o ther wor ds, it is not a questionof
w h e t h e ra re a cti o n syste mi s i ntended to be used for an attack;
t h e w h o l e i ssu e i s w h e th e ri t is capable of being usedfor an
a t t a c k . H e n ce ,th e b e st j u d g e as to whethera weapon systemis
d e f e n s t ' v eo r o ffe n si ve i s a p ossible tar get of the system ,theadver sar ynot
,
-3-
t h e s u b je cti ve mi n d b e h i n d i t.
Thoughtsand wor ds comeand go,
a c t i o n s de p e n do n w h a t i s o b jedively possible, given by the cons t r a i n t s o f n a tu ra 'l l a w s o n 1y. The adver sar yis the best judge;
j u s t a s w e , i n o u r se 'l f-d e fe nse,ar e the best judge of the adver sar y.
H e n ce ,I rro u ]d l o ca te the definition of the offensive/defensive
d i s t i n c t i on i n g e o g ra p h i ca lspace: can the weapons- ystem
be €FFectivet y
a b r o a d , or ca n i t o n l y b e u sed at hone?If it can be used abr oad
t h e n i t is o ffe n si ve , p a rti cular ly if that "abr oad" inc' ludescountr ies
w i t h w h ich o n e i s i n co n fl i ct. If it can only be used at homethen
t h e s y s te mi s d e fe n si ve , b e i ng oper ational only whenan attack has
t a k e n p l a ce .
a.
T he
Fange
and
i mp a c t
area
oF
w eapons.
L o ca ti n g th e d e fi n i ti o n in spacemakesit possible to for muI a t e t h e p ro b l e mi n te rms o f two var iab' les: the r ange ( of the weapons
c a r r i e r s ) a n d th e i mp a ct a re a ( of the weaponitself, whetherit
i s a c ' l a ssi ca l i mp a ct w e a p o n,an incendiar y weapon,a high explosive
o r w e a p o n so f ma ssd e stru cti on - chemical/toxic, bio' logical, r adiologic al ,
n u c l e a r or g e o p h ysi ca l ).If w enowdi vide"r ange"into imm obi' le/shor t/
l o n g a n d " i mp a cta re a "i n to 'l o ca' l/limited/extendedthen we ar r ive at
t h e n i n e co mb i n a ti o n si n F j g ur e, r r ,four of themdefensiveaccor d' ing
t o t h e a p p ro a chta ke n a b o ve , five of themoffensive:
F i g u r e r r .0 ffe n si ve vs. d e fe nsive systems
i mp ct
a
rea
a
e x t e n si ve
I i m it e d
I o c al
i n mo b1i e
short
r a nge
1ong
us ea
- 4-
0 f co u rse , i t a i 1 d e p endson wher ethe bor der - ' line between
"s h o r t " a n d ')o n g " o n th e o n e hand,andbetween"' limjted" and,extensive ',
o n t h e o th e r, i s l o ca te d . . An fndicat' ion ls a' lr eadygiven above: th1_
effects of t|te reaction to rr attack should be rilhin one's owncountry$U
0 f c o u r se , th e re ma yb e co u n tr ies so small that alm ost any weapon
s y s t e mw o u l d re a ch o u tsi d e a nd/or have an impact ar ea that would
a l s o i n c l u d e a d ve rsa ryte rri tor y. In gener al this would call for
research into other types of weaponsysterm, for the use of highly
i n r n o b i l esyste msw i th o n l y l o cal im pact along the bor der s ( bor der
f o r t i f i c a ti o n s a re a cl a ssi ca l answerin this connection) , leaving
t h e "s h o rt" /u l i mi te d " co mb i nationto cor e ar eas of the countr y.
Bu t e v e n i f so meo f th i s sh o uld r each into sonr eminor par ts of
a d v e r s a ryte rri to ry th i s d o e s not in any r najorway affect the type
o f r e a s o n i n gw e a re tryi n g to develop her e.
I n o rd e r to d i scu ss th i s mor e fully let us contr ast the extr em es
i n l i g u r e i l l .0 n th e o n e h a n d , in the upper .ight handcor ner ! ar e
v e r y l o n g ra n g e w e a p o rF system
s extensive im pact ar eas: inter with
c o n t i n e n ta l b a l l i sti c mi ssi l e s , long r ange-bor nberand
s submar ines
a l l o f t h e m w i th d u a 'tca p d u ititi; := fr ?"*&pon, of m assdestr uction.
T h e yw o ul d ce rta i n l y b e cl a ssified i) oftensive by anybody.
0 n th e o th e r h a n d , i n the bottom left handcor ner r ould be
s u c h w e a p o n ssyste msa s l a n d , sear or air mir es r ith local impact
o n l y , o r a p i p e l i n e b u ri e d u n der gr oundthat can easily be filled
w i t h a n exp l o si ve , i g n i te d a nd makehundr edsof kiJom etr esunpassa b l e f o r t an ks. A s me n ti o n e d ,for tifications also belong in this
c a t e g o r y' b u t so meo f th e mwou' ldhave guns with an im pact ar ea that
w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e " l o ca l " , b ut "limited". Real long r ange guns
n o u l d b e a l i e n to th e l o g i c of pur ely defensivedefensg,however .
T h e nth e re a re a l l th e i r,betweencategor ies, and they ar e
n u n p r o u s.H o w e ve r,th e y a re n ot that difficult to handle fr om the
p o i n t o f vi e w o f th e p re se n t analysis. Long r ange *eaponssystem s
- 5-
w i t h l o c al i mp a ct w o u l d cl e a r ly be offensive: a Per shingII isstill an off e n s i v e w e a p o nw h e ne q u i p p e *iUftonr
d
"ntiona' lwa/- headr r ith a highly
f\nv
' l o c a l i m p a cti a ve ry l o n g ra nge
gun withlnuclear war - headwouldbe
-A
nat- _fr onei' .+
w
e
a
o
p
n
i
f
Q
f
f
e
nsi
ve
e vp n
,
$l
-s!at,!oned
M o n e i mp o i --te n t i s th e *shor t"/"7 imited" combinationsince that
v o u l d b r in g u s to th e b o rd e r- linebetweenoffensive and defensive.
T het r im m ob L l e tt /rt e x te n s i v e ? r
combi nati on,
F annnrrr:rF a n
both
Er[n s .g - _ e m L rse]esg.
the
nucl -ean
defense_and
For
or shor t
mi ne
ofFense.
' nev F5heo
;iEFaontan
"*=Jfi " ffiui t ET il'[Fi fliii " *Xor\ ? Ff* tua%tl.roTence'
"',
f o r o f f e n si ve p u rp o se s.
jeeps
On ewould be thinking in ter m s of
a n d s ' i m il a r ve -h i cl e so n l a n d , motor tor pedo boats on water , sm all subm a r i n e s , a n d sma 'l l a i rcra ft u s ing r oads as air str ips, possibly with
v e r t i c a l ta ke -o ff a n d l a n d i n g , possibly helicopter s. Ther ewould
b e n o t h i n g a g a i n st th e se me a nsof tr anspor tatjon be' ingver y qu' ick:
t h e p r o b le mi s n o t sp e e d ,b u tr ange. In speedther e is pr otection,
a n d t h e po ssi b i l i ty o f co mi n gquickly to the r escuewher edefense
a g a i n s t ag g re ss'i o ni s n e e d e d .Speedis cer tainly also im por tant in
a g g r e s s io n ,b u t o n l y u se fu 'l whencombjnedwith sufficient r ange
t o r e a c h o u tsi d e o n e 's co u n tr y.
H e n ce ,o n e w o u l d b e th i nking in ter ms of highly m obil: and
s m a l l u n its w i th l i mi te d l a n g e, on land, in the water , in the air .
fo r th e I im ited r ange they would have to
I n o r d e r to co mp e n sa te
b e r r e l l di sp e rse da l l o ve r the nationa' l ter r itor y,but becauseof
t h e ' l i m i te d ra n g e e sse n ti a l l y with local or distr ict ( sub- national)
f u n c t i o n s a l o n e . If th e ra n g e fr om one end of a countr y to another
i s 5 , o . l o ng .q s a l so to q 'e g chp ossjbl.eadver sar yter r itor - v
"' i
obvi oi .rs
a n d Sw e d e n
bei ng
exampl es
one
- Chile
i Nonway
- then
r angesof that' type,letting
s
s h o u l d r en o u n ceo n w e a p o n l systemwittr
t h e n o n - o ffe n si vech a ra cte r o f the systemtake pr ior ity over the
w i s h t o use a l 'l syste msa l l o v er the national ter r itor y - and eeploy s y s tem s
r , l i t h s h o rte r ra n g e , d i sp e r-dllowever , if they ar e to oper ate in
a d i s p e r s e da n d e sse n ti a l l y l ocal r fidr n€fr theya' lso have to be r elatively
T h i s d o e s n o t me anthat they ar e not under nat' ional
a u t o n o mo u s.
c o n m a n d,o n l y th a t th e y a re capableof oper ating even if that comm and
s h o u l d b e se ri o u sl y i mp a i re d thr ough adver sar yattack. And this,
m eans
that
th e
and
int ell i g e n c e
A nd
t hat
F or
ar m am e n ts [4 ]
th e
wholt
-
c o u n tn y
C3I
also
does
system
h as
not
to
-
command,
be
di spersed,
depend
on
communi cati on,
outsi de
l ess
in F ac t,
cont r oJ
centnal i zed.
suppl i ens
5-q.
- 6-
H a vi n gn o w e sta b l i sh e dthat they shou' ldhave shor t r angebut
p o s s ' i b l yb e ve ry q u i ckl y n p b ile, wel' l disper sed, sma]l, local ar d aubr ol tol r l w e
c a n t u r n to th e i mp a ct a re a of the weapons.It should be "lim itedu
f o r t h e ve ry si mp l e re a so n that it is lim ited howmuchone uants to
destroy of one's own territory even if a rnoreextensive impact area
w o u l d b e rmre d e stru cti ve to adver sar yfor ces. This, then, nould
p o i n t i n th e d i re cti o n o f ve r y efficient, pr ecision- guidedweapons
r i t h c o nsi d e ra b l e d e stru cti ve polr erbut lim ited im pact ar ea; an exa m p l eb e i n g " sma rt rrcke ts" . They cer tainly exist today and ar e
g e n e r a l ly se e n a s ve ry e ffe ctive against tanks in the for m of antit a n k w e a p o n s;a g a i n st sh i p s,but per hapsless so against air cr aft
p a r t i c u l a rl y w h e nth e y ma keu se of the old tr ick of inter posing
t h e m s e ' lvebs e tw e e nd e fe n si ve for ces and the sun. However ther
,
e
w o u ' l db e w a yso f d e a i i n g a l so with this pr ob' lem.Let' it only be
a d d e dt h a t su ch fo rce s i n a d dition would have weapons
with a highly
l o c a l ' i r np a ctsu ch a s o rd i n a ry guns, ther eby completingthe four
c e l l s i n th e d e fe n si ve a re a of figur e Ir .
3.
T he
g re y
zone
0 f co u rse th e re i s a g rey zone inbetween.Ther e is the fam ous
c a s e o f th e a n ti -a i rcra ft g u ns that ar e defensivewhenpointing
u p w a r d s,y€ t ca n b e u se d a s highly offensive weapons
whenm ounted
w i t h a d iffe re n t a n g l e fo r ta r gets on the gr ound on a car r ier
( a s h i p , fo r i n sta n ce ),w i th a long r ange. This, however ,is no
a r g u n e n ta t a l l a g a i n st th e distinction r nade.l.Jhathas happened
i n t h a t an d si mi l a r ca se s i s that a newy,eapon
systemhas been
c r e a t e d , fro m so me th i n gi n mo bi' lewithlimited or even local im pact
a r e a t o so n re th i n gl o n g ra n g e with limited impact ar ea. That one maior
p h y s i c a l co mp o n e ni tn b ro w e aponssystemcou' ldbe the same,or the
s a n n w i t h a mi n o r mo d i fi ca ti on, is tr ivial. A countr y that r ants
t o b a s e its se cu ri ty o n d e fe nsive for ms of defensewould simply
not undertake that type of transformation of the *eaponssystens,
y to ma keth e m.soth a t - theycar flr ot be- suspectedof it either .
aF or
r r dt rt hat
p u r-p o s e
be pl fysi cal l y' i mpossi bl e
it
should
to conveFt .
A t t h e sa meti me , h o w e ve r,this ser ves asawar ning not to be naive
i n b e l i evi n g th a t a n y co mp onent
of a |r eaPonsystemis inher ently
d e f e n s i v e o r o ffe n si ve ; i t d ependson the total system. It should
- 7-
n o t , h o v re ve r,d e p e n do n th e motivation. As notivations change
s o m a y th e o b j e cti ve ch a ra cter of the weaponssystem- henceit is
a n e n g i n e e ri n gp ro b l e mto ma kesystemsthat ar e highly r esistant, "r obus t" ,
t o s u c h ch a n g e s,re ta i n i n g th e defensive char acter over a vast r ange
o f t r a n s fo rma ti o no f th e co mponents.
6 o in g b a ck to F i g u re $tl"ther e ar e still a num berof clar ific a t i o r s t o b e ma d e .l b re p a rti cular ly, if we makeuse of all thr ee
c u t s t h a t h a ve b e e n ma d eo n this single dim ension,cutting the diabout eachof the four r egionsm i ghtbe
m e n s i o ni n fo u r re g i o n s, so meconr nents
i n o r d e r to b ri n g o u t th e i ssues.
of m assdestr uction,with m ost
F i rst, th e re a re th e w eapons
o f t h e p u b 'l i c d e b a tea n d a cti on concentr atedon nuc' learar ms. They
a r e c ' l a s si fi e d h e re a s o ffens' ive,and that is not entir ely unp r ^ o b l e ma ti c.T h e re a so n i n gw as indicated above: vr eapons
of m ass
d e s t r u c t i o n a re so d e stru cti ve that nobodyin his r ight m indr cuJd
u s e t h e ma t h o me ,a t mo st a g ainst an adver sar y, and even then only
a g a i n s t a ve ry mu chh a te d a d ver sar y. Oner easonfor this is that
beings
t h e w e a po n sa re n o t o n l y d e str uctive of the homospher(ehuman
a n d t h e i r se ttl e me n ts) b u t a l so of the biospher e, lithospher e and
t h e h y d r o sp h e re- i n o th e r ro rds of the whoJeenvir onnent( the
a t m o s p h e re
to o fo r ttra t,rn a tter , but that effect w' ill be disper sed unle s s ther e
i s "a "r J ' :cl ^e a r w .i l i fi o th e r wor ds, nuclear weapons( and other weapons
o f m a s sd e stru cti o n fo r th a t m atter )ar e simply not cr ed' ib' leas
d e f e n s i vew e a p o n w
s h i ch , o f cour se, is a maior r eason why they
a r e u s u a l l y co n ce i ve do f a n d discussedin connect' ionwith long
r a n g e w e a p o n sca rri e rs 'l i ke those found in the US/MTOtr iad.
n
s,seLF-pr opel l i ng
A c o u n t ry ma yh a ve sh o rt ra n ge car r ier s ( such as 155nrhowitzer
rnounted
o n tru cks o r tra i n s) with dual capffi.ir y ( e.g. for ERI{ ,
"n e u t r o n g re n a d e s')- th e q u estion still r emainsr ihetherthey ar e
c r e d i b l e fo r u se o n o w n te rri tor y. Admittedly the answeris not
a v e r y c ' l e a r-cu t me i n d i ca ti ng that the dim ensionin ' Flgur er is
n o t e n t i r e l y o n e -d i me n si o n al- but the basic thesis still
r em ains:
- 8t h a t w e a p o n so f ma ssd e stru ction ar e essentially offensive weapons
i n t h e se n sema d eu se o f h e re. In fact, they ar e so aggr essivethat
t h e y a r e fo r d e stru cti o n ra ther
than for conquestof enem yter r itor y.
' shont-Fange
- I t ' is
no t
wit hdr awn
s u t' F n i s i n g
th a t
o rr a u n i l a te n a l
basi s
by
nucLear
U S /N A TO.
w eapons
are-bei ng
T he nth e re i s th e se condcategor ywhich is a ver y impor tantone:conv e n t i o n a l , o ffe n si ve w e a p o nsystems.l' lhenthe basic distinction is
m a d eo n ly i n te rms o f n u cl e ar vs. conventionalthen it is easily
forgotten how extrernely offensive conventional weaponscan be. The
Secondl{orld Har xas an examp'leof that, so }rere the Koreanand
a rs .q {? l 'l o rmo st of the other local war s after 1945for thatm atter ,
ln
d o c h i n aw
\ nec enT
wans
s u c h a s fL e b a n b na n d A fg h a n i stan. 0f cour se,a r najor wartoday r ould not be fought
w i t h e x actl yth e sa mea rms, b ut for instance with the missiles,
b o m b e r san d su b ma ri n e sn o wa t the disposal of the super - pewer s,
b u t ' b n l y" w i th co n ve n ti o n a lw ar - heads.Theyar e so destr uctive,
a n d a J s o so o ffe n si ve th a t a lthough r eduction or elim ination of
n u c l e a r armsw o u 'l db e a d va n tageous,r nost
of what has beensaid about
t h e d a n g e ro f w a r sti l 'l re mainsvali4with conventionaloffensive
l , e a p o ns yste msd o i n g th e j o b . And it is pr ec' iselybecausethe thir d
c u t a l o n g th e d i me n si o ni n F i gur e I has not beenr nadethat it becor nes
p o s s i b l e fo r ce rta i n p o li ti ca t ar d ni1itar y estab' lishnr ents
to sr nr ggle
for a
as a "com pensation"
i n c o n v en ti o n a lo ffe n si ve a rr nament.
p o s s i b l e n u cl e a r d i sa rma me nt
- r iding on the fear of nucJearar m s,
par t ic ular ly
in
th e
I ikely
w ar
trtheaten' t
countni es
in
E unope.
T h e nth e re i s th e !h i r{ categor y: conventionalmilitar y
d e f e n s e . It h a s b e e n d e scri b ed in sor nedetail above, so let us
h e r e o n ly l o o k a t o n e mo re p oint. If the units car r ying the bur den
o f c o n v en ti o n a lrn l l i ta ry d e fense( CMD)ar e shor t r angemobi' le,sna',llloc al,
q u i c k , d i sp e rse da, n d a u to n o mous
then they ar e ver y muchlike
g u e r r i l l a fo rce s. T h e o n l y d iffer ence betweenCl' lDand par a- militar y defens e
( PM Dv) ou 'l db e th a t th e l a tte r would tend to be evenmor elocal,mor e
enbedded
in the local humanand natural evnvironment,and operate
l e s s i n th e o p e n ,a l th o u g hth ey r ould pr obably|.ear som kind of
u n i f o r m in co n fo n n i tyri th th e r egulations of the Jawsof xar .
T h e o f t en u se d te rm " mi l i ti a 'a' lso enter s the pictur e her e, inc l u d i n g so meo f i ts p o l i ci n g functions. In this connectionit
s h o u l d b e p o i n te d o u t th a t P l.lDpr obablyhas pr oven, after 1945'
- 9-
t o b e t h e mo st e ffe cti ve fo rm of r eaction to an attack,whether
t h a t a t t a ck ta ke s th e fo rm o f dir ect violence of militar y for ces
o r t h e s tru ctu ra 'l vi o l e n ce o f excessiveexploitation within and/or
b e t w e e nco u n trie s.
4.
Non- m i l i ta n y
deFense
T h e n , th e re i s the four th categor y, non- militar y
defense (Nl'tD).ibst nrodelsof that type of defensewould a'lso
o p e r a t e on th e a ssu mp ti o no f small units, local and autonom ous,
d i s p e r s e d- i n o th e r ro rd s the sanr estr uctur e that has alr eady
b e e n a r g u e dfo r C MDa n d P MD.Onem ight say that ther e ar e two
r e a s o n sun d e r'l yi n gth i s: n e ver to offer the adver sar yany tar gets
y r i t h s u ch a h i g h co n ce n tra ti on of defensepotential that it would
o'ru?"18il.35
I.gtBik'tf;3dof,3r
ShS,iiTFrlt[3ron"J'H#15sh'.'yhow
,uh3'f;liu
r e d i s t an a ti a ck'i n -a l l co rn er s of the countr y. For the cdse of
n o n - m i l i ta ry d e fe n seth i s o b v iously meansnot only ter r itor ial
d e f e n s ei n th e se n seo f re si stance in geogr aphicallywe' ll defined
u n i t s , b u t a 'l so so ci a l d e fe nse in the senseof all or ganizations
a n d a s s oci a ti o n s i n a co u n try finding thejr ownwaysof r esisting
a t t a c k b y n o t p ro d u ci n gg o o dsor ser vices for the adver sar yetc.
c l e a r l y th i s i s d e fe n si ve a s it is only m eaningfulin one' s oltn
' looksat the
society.
T h i s b e co n e se ve n m or eclear whenone
f ollowin ss h o r t l i s t o f t z r un a l1 ::.]_ ' ::::ffft
o r sa n ize d
fo r NM D,
i n t h r e e g ro u p sw i th fo u r str ategies in eachf- "
I . A n t a q o n i st-o ri e n te dd e fe nsestr ategies
A . ' Atta ck sh o u Jdn o t p a y"
1 . S e l f-i n fl i cte d sa b otageon objects of value to adver sar y
2 . N o n co o p e ra ti oann d civil disobedience,"em pld' social str uctur e
B. "I n ca p a ci ta ti o n o f th e antagonist"
3 . C re a ti n g e mP a th Y
(a ) P o si ti ve i n te ra ction befor e attack; helpfulness, assistanc e
with
(b ) C o o p e ra ti o nw i th the Per son;noncooper ation
th e sta tu s - fri endl iness at the per sonallevel
4 . C re a ti n g syrn p a th ythr ough suffer ing infijcted by adver sar y
I I . D e fe n sestra te o i e s a i n re dat gr otseting oneself
5 . E ffi ci e n t co n mu n i cationinside one' sownqr oup
6 . E ffe cti ve l y h 'i d i n g s elected peopleand objects
vu l n e ra b ility of the populationthr oughalter native s tr uc tur e
7 . D e cre a se d
8 . C o n mu n i ca t'i oann d enaction of one' s o;' n values
- 10 -
I I I . D g l e n sestra _ te i e s a i medat deter r ing the antaqonist
pr epar edin peacstim e
9.Org a n i za ti o n o f N l '' lD
1 0. C o n mu n i ca ti oonf p r epar edness
thr ough r naneuver s
1 1. C o n n u n i ca ti o no f cor r m itm ent
to Nt' lD
1 ? . H i g h l e ve l o f sa ti sfaction in one' s owngr oup
0 f c o u r se , i t ma yb e a rg u e dthat t{ M Dspecialists can penetr ate
i n t e r n a ti o n a l fro n ti e rs a n d or ganize the population elsewher e
i n a t t e mp b to o ve rtu rn th e i r r egimes,as can PFID
volunteer s. This
i s t r u e , b u t i n th a t ca se i t is a question of tr ansfer of know- howi
t h e r e a l fi g h ti n g w i l 'l h a ve to be done by the loca1 populationagainst
i t s o w n l e a d e rs. It i s mo re l ike send' inga book acr oss the bor der ,or a te ac her ,
' l e s s l i k e se n d 'i n ga n u cl e a r-t' ippedmissile.
L o o ki n ga t th e to ta l d i m ension,again, the case has nowbeen
m a d et h a t o n th e o n e h a n d th er e ar e offensive r eactions to an
a t t a c k , wi th w e a p o n o
s f ma ssdestr uction ( inc' ludingnuclear weapons)
a n d w i t h co n ve n ti o n a 'lo ffe n sive weapons. 0n the other thene ar e
d e f e n s i ve re a cti o n s'a n dth e y ar e of lhr .ee types: conve- ntional
militar y
d e f e n s e , p a ra mi 'l i ta rvd e fe n seand non- m ilitar v defense.Just Jike
a n o f f e n si ve re a cti o n to d a y i s conceivedof as inc' ludingboth nuclear
a n d c o n ve n ti o n a 'lw e a p o n s(i n Soviet/l{ T0str ategy the nuclear Heapons
ar e
n o t f o r fi rst u se , i n U S /N A TO
str ategy nucJearvr eapons
also,possib l y , f o r f i rst u se ),a d e fe n si ve r eaction cou' ld inc' ludeal' l thr ee
t y p e s , co mb i n i n gC MD ,P MDa n d NMD.The pr oblemof whetherthey
a r e c o mb i n a b l ei s a n 'i mp o rta nt one, just as it is for offensive
s t r a t e g i e s. T h a t p n o b l e m,h o wever ,will be taken up below.
T he b a si c p o i n t to b e d iscussedher e is not so m uchthe
s t n u c t u re o f o ffe n si ve vs. d efensive system slastheir functjon.
T h e k e y d i ffe re n ce i s th a t o ffensive system scan be used for attack.
T h e y a r e p o te n ti a l 'l y a g g re ss ive, and hencepr ovocative. l.lhetherthey
w i ' 1 1b e u se d fo r a tta ck i s another matter , the im por tantpoint
i s t h a t a n y p o ssi b l e a d ve rsar ym ay have r easonsto suspectthat they
c a n b e u se d fo r a tta ck si mply becausewhat is possjb' lemayalso
- 1t
b e c o m ere a l i ty. tl h a t i s i mpossiblemay not, this is the whoJepoint
u n d e r l yi n g a n o b j e cti ve l y defensive postur e.
At this point someconments
aboutthe arsiguities of the
two importantwords"defense"and ''deterrenceu
maybe in order.
Th e w o rd d e fe n seo b vi ously has two meanings:any r eaction
to an attack, in other nords the use of any weaponsystemfrom
a n y p o i n t o n th e d i me n si o nof Figur e I , ( including the bottompoint
w h i c h r n a ya l so b e so meki n d of defense, per hapsin the' longer r un) ;
a n d t h en th e o th e rme a n i n ga limited par t of the spectr umonly,
w h a t h ere so me w h ac'l
t u msi 'l yis r efer r ed to as "defensivedefense".
A n d t h i s sp i l l s o ve r i n to the doub' lenr eaninggiven to the wor d
"d e t e r r e n ce " : d e te rri n -oa n attack thr ough the thr eat of effective
: e y'q eltung)0r
r e t a l i a ti o n (Ge rma nV
, deter r ing attack thr oughthe
p r o m i s eo f e ffe cti ve re si stance ( Ger man: Ver teidiqunq, not including
"V e r g e 'l tu n g " ).Onma
e ysa y that ther e is a br oad use of the ter ms
d e f e n s ei d e te rre n ce
co ve ri n g al' l points on the spectr un,andthe
n a r : ^ o wu se l i mi ti n g i t to the ( pur ely) defensive systemsonly.
I t i s F ro b a b l yn o t p o ss ' ibleto changethe semanticssince
r o r d u sa g e sa re so d e e p l y i nEr ained at this junctur e. But it is
a b s o ' l ute l y i mp e rmi ssi b l ew h enpeople par tic' ipating in the debate
d o n o t c l a ri fy w h a t th e y me an.At any point wher ethe wor ds"defense"
a n d "d ete rre n ce "a re u se d i t shou' ldbe m adec' lear vlhetherthe tems are
l i m i t e d to (p u re l y) d e fe n si ve system s,or also to systemsoper ating
o n t h e te rri to ry o f th e a d ver sany.
0ffe n si ve d e fe n sei s offensive, in both sensesof that ter m:
i t c a n be u se d to sta rt a n offensive in the senseof aogr ession,and
i t i s offe n si ve 'i n th e se n s eof pr ovokingthe other side. it is
n o t t h e ma n p o w e r,
ca p i ta l , resear chand or ganizationalwor k that
g o e s i n to a mi l i ta ry syste min gener ai that pr ovokes;it is the
o f f e n Si ve C cmp o n e notf a l l of thiS. ThuS,dt - i..4m- isleadins to anal y s e
"onl
=:::=
v
- 1?-
in terms of the magnitudeandrate of growth of al'l the factors that
h a v e b e en p u t i n to th e o rg a n ization, oF - better - the destr uctive
c a p a b i l i ty o f th e o rg a n i za ti on ( the "badsnand "disser vices" that
c a n b e r e n d e re d ),
0n'ly the offensive components
s h o u l d be co u n te d . 0 n th e o ther hand, it is quite c' lear fr om what
h a s b e e n sa i d a b o veth a t th e bor der - line is not a ver y shar p one
( a l t h o u gh sh a rp e r, i t i s a rg uedhene,thanm ost peop' lebelieve) h e n c et h e e a sy so l u ti o n i s to count a' l' l m ilitar y asset- r l' d i s r e g a r d i n g th e o ffe n si ve /d efensivedistinction. The distinct' ion
t h a t i s ma d eu se o f, a rmy, n avy,and the air for ce has appr oximately
t h e s a m el e ve l o f i n te l l e ctu al { epth as the cor r espondingd' ivision
f o r t h e an i ma 'lk'i n g d o m:a n i mals on land, in the water and in the
a i r . Z o o'l o g yma d ea g re a t step fonr ar d whenthe dist' inction between
v e r t e b r a te s a n d a ve rte b ra te swas madesystem aticuse of; it is
h i g h t i m e th a t si mi 'l a r d i sti n c tions - acutally ver y old in the field
preom inentin the debate.
o f m i l i t ary sci e n ce- b e co mer uchm or
point s
tFre
me compare
the
w i th
starti ng
statenentF,
maj on
Let
surfaci ng.
been
Swiss
d o c tri n e :
oF F ic ial
Z ent naLs t elle
ant
=ome
to
made
h ave
ti -:e y
R e c e n tl y
F tl n
s t at am e n g 5 [th e
Ge s a m tv e n tei di gung,
only
p o i nt
1973,
mi ssi ng
makes
e
numbsr
normi l i tary
is
oF
im pont -
deFense]:
I t T his
ent a i l s
th e
p ro h i b i ti o n
oF f,i y
t-€rcour-se to i ndi scri mi nete
d uc t
oF H a r a g a d ,n s t
p o p ul ati on
th e
oF ti re
opponent,
GrvE n though
at om ic
age ,
only
th e
th re a t
oF the
destructi on
oF the
oppo.," .I' s
lat ion
s ee m s -to
b e a n e F fe c tive
detennent' r
a3l
tp.
conin t he
popu_
ilS hould
f i.
the
o f the
lenge
u n i ts
army ceaser to exi st
as efFecti vo
\
F or m at i o n E ,
ing
th e re
will
be necourse
i
th e n
to guerri l l a
w ar-Fane
\
1
onder
t o p t^ e v q n t
o p p o n e nt
contnol
ove r
t he
Fnom gai ni ng
compl ete
th e
oc c r - 1pied
fm
te n ri to n y
a n d to pnepare
the
l i bareti on' r
I].
tp.
nM iLit ar y
other
S w it zer statas
for
c o o p e n a ti o n
ri th
ie
i nadmi ssi bl g
statrs
Bt at r
cause
oF i ts
neutne l
es@ ffi E l y
l
S hould
i n a i an,
S w i tz e n l a n d
i nvol ved
then
such
E cooper - at ion
become
crr
c on s i d e re d
be
T he
r eaoer
t 3l
and
chy
to
t4 l
also
__ rhovzq-rgc'-
conEcientious
paralleling
gl-oes
re fe n re d
a p p r.e c i a te
lg8Ep-ofh-E
Fischer,
case:
is
th e
x i th
cost
CeFence;
the
on no peace
oF
the
how not
objaction
by
to
5etten
end pantly
ovanruns
littla
out
opponB nt
is
tha
quotes
the
aggressonrt[p." 9].
gi ven
S w i ss
doubling
militany;
ie
admitted;
the
well
and
with
e heavy
civilian
no prapaFation
end conFlict
Footnotes
doctri ne,
evenything
not
in
research.
one;
198e.
Fi sher,
the
military
Swiss
hierer
aFms expcrrt;
fon
non-militany
S wedish
T he
?r 0ef ens e
c i o c tri n e
be
eLabor ate d
to
def end
in
d o c tn i n e
per c ept ion,
aF-*-
own
that
el way
c o u n try
and
and
of
ones
which
percei ved
becomes
-
A.
defense
deFanse only,
in a vany *ell
as rbuilding
on an impnobal€'
belence
oF powen
vCls for
disanmamant,
buta
wonld
democratic
our
militarizetionw.
minority
which
-
For
he
iF
ar eas
and
t ony
c iv ilian
ti e
to
aI l
th re e
def ens e
v er t eidigung,
bonder
is
f or c es
ui' ri l e
it
at
is
is
er v eny
so
to
to
t v o r.5 e :
c los e
of
ipc h
th e
bonden,
clne's
own
to
A lt er nat iv e
oeFence
es t
is
tP
is
t he
uv h a t
c oncn e te n e s s
e Lebour
h av e
g o v e n n me n t.
euc h
t he
peace
e lt er nat iv es
e l e m e n ts
th e
l{hen
in
m o v e me n t
a re
can
will
least
not
fol l ow i ng
to
to
Form
be made
point s
and
stop
of
th e
enem y
i mpor t ant
w el l
st ocked
occupi ed
in
t er ni-
j uri sdi cti on ;
N orw egi an
maki ng
of
use
agai n
a case
is
gi ven
as
i tsel Fr
Es
seern,
in
ei gh t
protect
guenri l l a
.
i tsel f
to
N o r wegien
of
conver -
p ol i cy
are
is
pnoposal
th e
publ i c
going
to
posi ti ve
countni es
end
debate?
take
onJ.y
i ts
concrete
that
B ni tei n,
in
E urope
rhen
aFB
so
to
occuPying
oF
cour se,
to
comes
seri ousl y
clos-
the
goi ng
prrt
t na- lir i- r
book
obvi ously
they
cni ti ci sm?
same
about
For
t ir e
presenving
the
in
is
psycho-
because
oF
poi nt
H hen,
task
i s,
to
battl efi el d
' t981,
very
the
cl ose
possi bl y
LB ser,
Vor ne-
to
note
mi ght
doctni ne
age-ol d
the
opposed
questi on
mai n
the
pnoposal s
el l
rrJn,
The
be
R aumverteidigun:
popul ati rr
Fi nst
the
one
One
the
the
1gB 3
not
should
the
fnom
be
publ i shed,
discussed,
case
Forces
in
answ entr
te n ri tory?
b o o k s /e x p l o n a ti o n s
c om G r m ajon
in
under
h e re .
oF
comtsr €t
guns
sP ace
or-
C o mmi s s i on,
pnoposed
view
to
the
mobi l e
el sew here.
o c c u p i ed
be
their
forti Fi cati ons
enemy
bonder
on
gces
d e fe n s e
time
contni-
uE to
pFesent,
r4
given
speak
forcing
initiati-
pnogress;
F l a u mvartei di gung:
th e
on a dubious
eoncrete
am eFreid
For
Austri an
the
militany
u s o F o u r t e rn a inl
the
A u stri err
d e F e re e
taking
has
mai ntai n
As
are
rtth e
th e
in
I
and
p n e vent
in
p ro b l e m
logic al
fnom
securi ty
e nemy
e l e me n ts
d e p th ,
in
I egi-
non-
ma k e F u t l
preparati on
1 9 -a O ],
1975,
S pannoc c h i ,
based
mean the
enemy;
suppl y
to
gent r e;
is
for
ecenanio,
anti -ei rcraFt
th e
re s i s ta n c e
r e s o u rc e s [p p .
diecus-
a
subj ective
the
against
1981,
enemy
the
d e p o ts ;
s oc ial
what
€ to p
F o rc e s ;
mo b i l e
onden
in
i m p e de
to
dec ent ra l i z e d
and
In
to
fo n ti fi c a ti o n s ;
pass e s
Tot al-
is
case
e long
not
dAes
No rwa y :
a rti l l a ry
see
lloers in
non-gl-igrment,
in
ro a d s
rar
us
ansen,
oF
should
pertrepti on
w hat
tgBe,,:.
Howevan,
a q. IUorWfor rar^ c dlc n
his b
Fot cief ence
olit'il
bn "F"'*'?"rL.J"*dr
c oas t al
is
enoding
countries
dy nam it ing
to
oF
it
purpose
here
not
as
and
cfearft,
mi ssi ng
argued
prevanting
theony,
eerlHa
'
is
jedomsFBneningBn,
skil
oF E smell
that
that
n o t.
military
t^emain
absol utel y
t-Bcommendati ons
i dea
defensi ve
capabi l i ty,
o b j e cti ve
the
E rs a thneat,
W hat
Fneds-
to
on
excl usi vel y
svenska
och
based
the
p.
Sw e d i s h
w i th
be
a n y b ody
u p p l y s n i n g s n Emn d ,
oF
t im at e
by
such
o n e ts
f bns v at - et s
s ion
not
should
s o mew het* * L--* r" ,
is
it
f on
-
to
goi ng
to
be-
di Ffen ent ly,
that
concFet e
Pa r ti cula r ly
A F heldt ,
important
1983
w i th
-
B nigadegene n a l
und
Eckant
Bemoknatie,
NATO policy
ment.
these
at
I
five
combining
total
deFense
in
by
is
hi s
, cousin,
book
alternetives
buildirg
nos,
3 end
that
that
also
[and
aLternative
and conrplete
cen
disanme-
ray
of
looking
be combined
in
many ways,
include
f.Io-r=tionsdienst,
under
present
the
guernitta]
a more
in
provoke.
not
does
Gnundrechte
strictly
be a moFe clean
blocks
4
to
neutralism,
unil+ppsf
rould
flln
Komit6
1gEe^presents
#ense
po1t45g]
e numben oF
arguing
that
such
deFensive
deFence
could
should
as taumverteidigung
end small,
mobile
be combined,
but does not.argue
the combirration
social
Ile
and
this
with
troncepts
includes
guenriIIa
eoncepts
uvEnet totally
oF debate
BBling'
197A,
Union,
any
which
ie
continue
the
fi ghting
after
oF
whole
warfane
1990
But
it
woul'd
would
would
share
be
had
been
thet
worth
capitulation,
oF the
is
elso
view,
the
international
rrunirt
they get.
and
regulan
the
have
resist-,
peoplerr
has
to
Forces.
detenr great
nthat
the Ffuma-
347)
[p.
type
Soviet
which
Yugoslav
sr-.rpposed to
this
a partisan-Fot^ce
as
mentions
to
people's
army , rtthe
tl-re same pninciple:
that'ra
wonld
a vetFy diFferent
both
point
by
non-nuclean
debating"[P.
any
aII
much dominated
to
resistance
-
of
ondinany
the
no. means resolve
been
mits
its
-
198e makes
oF E t-ational
to
eliminated
Robants'
too
on
nespact
19EB a policy
also
'tinoFfensive
sunrounded
by
states
in
oF
defense
territonial
.
out
thet
special
deFeat
RBling
poi.'ls
by
with
small
of
units
ago such
documents
Et strategy
to
concept
the
some yEar-s
party
open
fighting
based
is
in
the
populationrf
gnessive
rtsuch
necognize
A).
lp..3
19g2,
tfrat
Next
oF continued
1g7?
r.apidly.
evants
panticipate
to
Hollins,
by
the
invasion,
to
eFfectrt
law
point
such
veny
Yggoslavia,
forbidden
The prospect
and
although
Hcwever,
in
strategy
only
aFter
utene organizad
by
the
the
adopted
ernce against
nrian
unm*rtionale
makes
is
defense,
'deFense,
deFense]
nEighbons.
mightier
r€nce
nonmilitary
now moving,
ie
deternencen
f
:
deFense,
the
Sozialdemokratischen
for
disengagement,
civilian
concept
elternatives,
deFense
expl o,^ati ons
German debate,
options
as
options
defensi ve
techni cal
the
in
discussed:
mies
€g by
of
$out
A F h e ldt.
book
deFense,
Whst
n u mber
1981,
are
deFensive
in g lp ld e b a . le
( tser rn"en\
a
eJloLhre,(.
importent
fn
- ltl-
world
parts
that
r,rfrich the
and
this
the
From
of
the
defence,
A statement
be
the
we have
one
Eg-
accomplished
cnitical
whole
deserve
is
could
fon
problems.
nowrrtp,65].
it.
and the
versLrs'rmul.ti"
capecity
world's
debate
Bnmament/disarmament
conFlicts,
177).
in
about securit y
has
,rThe
issues:
creation
vanious
moFe place
oy
with
attempts-to
in
the
no means the
which
it
is
li-
discussion
only
hard
set
issue
to
disaqree.
- ls-
D e fe n s e
and
c o m m on
secuni ty
L et u s n o wh a ve a l o o k at this type of defense,a tr iad consisting
o f c o n ve n tj o n a l ,p a ra m'i l i ta ryand non- militar y defense.Themajor
fa vo r a re o b vi o u s: a defenseof this kind is not pr ovocativc
a r g u m e ntsi n
s i n c e i t ca rD o t b e u se d fo r an attack, henceshouldnot' lead to any
a r m sr a ce . l ,l i th i n th i s typ e o f defensedoctr ine it wouldbe entir ely
p o s s i b l e fo r b o th p a rti e s b o th to havea high level of secur ity and a r el ati v e' l y e q u a l l e ve l o f se cu ri ty. In addition it' is possible
for themto
c o o p e r a te :i t w o u l d b e i n th e intenest of either par ty to makethe
o t h e r p a rty fe e 'l se cu re ,w h i c hwouldmeanthat ther ecould even be
a n e x c h an g e
b e tw e e na d ve rsa riesof techn' iquesofdefensjve
defense
( n o t n e nce ssa ri l yo f th e i r e xact locatiR!* however ) .T h is me a n st h a t
a s e t t i n g i s E 'i ve nfo r co mmon
secur ity,LL'
a n d t h a t i s a l re a d y so me th i ng.
[ . I i th th i s a p p ro a chth e re wouldstill be ar m sand evenar mamentas i 'l
b u t w i t h th e d i sti n ct p o ss'i b ility that a stable plateau can be achieved ,
i n o t h e r w o rd sn o t o n l y co mmon
secur ity but a stable and com m on
s e c u r i t y.0 f co u rse ,'i n w o rl d histor y this m utually cefensive posr ure has
ib ly h e e n a n o r m a l s ta te o f a ffa i rs fo r m ost pair s of neighbor ingcountr jes;
flf
F
*v v !t
Eee
-,-
t h e a c c umu 'l a ti oonf o ffe n si ve ar m s,and offensive ar m sr aces being
a n e x c e p ti o n . B u t i n a d d i ti o n to this a str ong defensivedefense
s h o u l d h a vea h i g h d e te rre n t value, "deter r ence"then taken not in
t h e s e n seo f re ta l i a ti o n , b u t in the senseof being able to stave off
a n a t t a ck. N e ve rth e l e ss,sh o uld the attack cor ner and
that wouldbe
t h e t h i r d l i n e o f a rg u me n t,then the level of destr uction wouldbe
' l o w e rs i n ce th e re w o u l d b e n o incent' ive( exceptfor pur e ter r or ism )
t o u s e n u cl e a r a rmsa n d o th e r weapons
of m assdestr uFlion. Not only
t h e d e f e n sesyste mb u t a l so the social systemitselfLq
w o u ' l db e o rg a n i ze di n su ch a way that no im m ediatetar get wouldpr es e n t i t s el f a s b e i n g w o rth y o f a nuclear attack.
pr o
_16_
,5.
S ome
c ri ti c a l
oF
issues
deFensi ve
defense
T hi s, h o w e ve r,d o e s n o t meanthat the type of defenseadvocated
h e r e i s u n p ro b l e ma ti c.T h e follow' ing is a shor t' list of som ebasic and
c r i t i c a l co n si d e ra ti o n srfo r a debatethat nowshould take place not
but in our societies ' in gener al.
o n l y w i th i n th e p e a cemo ve m ent
F irst, d e fe n si ved e fe n sepr esupposes
a high level of national
to be
s e l f - r e l i a n ce i n d e fe n sema tter s. If weaponsystem sar e not supposed
q u i c k U rl o nra
g n g e rmo b i l e ,th e they
n
cannotbe tr anspor tedfr om one country
t o a n o t h e r i n o rd e r to h e l p that other countr y( r atherthan attacking it)
e i t h e r . U n d e ra d o ctri n e o f defensivedefensem i' litar y alliances based
o n h i g h l e ve l s o f mo b j l i ty a re sever ely cur ta' iled. This, of cour se,
d o e sn o t me a nth a t th e re ca n notbe all kjnds of djplom atic, other wjse
p o ' l i t i c a l 'a n d e co n o mi csu p p or t jn case of an 4ttack. W or ldpubfic opinio n
w o u l d s t 'i l l fu n cti o n , a n d e venm or eso than befor e becausea countr y
w i t h p u r e l y d e fe n si ved e fe n s ecannotpossibly be accusedof havingpr ovo k ed
a n a t t a cke r. T h 'i sma y l o o k l i ke a sever er eductionof defensivecapability,
b u t co u l d a l so b e seen in exactly the oppositem anner Clear
.
ly,
a c o u n t ry w h i ch i s u se d to re' lying on alljes, and par ticular ly on a
s u p e r p o vrear1 1 y,w i 'l l n o t mo bilize all its defenser esour ces.This is
t r u e i n ti me s o f p e a cea n d e v enm or eso in times of war . M ilitar y for ces
i n a c l i en t co u n try i n a n a l l jance, given the idea that"I have to fight
f o r 2 4 ho u rs ti l l h e l p co me sfr om the super powerpossibly
,
evenwith
s u p e r w ea p o nwsij l l ce rta i n l y not exer cise their defensepotential to the
m a x i m u m.
R a th e r, th e stra te g y wouldbe to put up a decentshowbut
t r y i n g t o d o s0 i n su ch a w a y that national and per sonalhonor sar e
p r e s e r ve d ,ye t o n e ma n a g eto
s sur vive till the m ajor bur denof the
b a t t l e i s 'u a ke no ve r b y th e super powerA. po' licy of national selfr e l i a n c e w o u l d ru l e th i s o u t. If one r ea11ym eanswhat one says, that
f r e e d o mi s w o rth a fi g h t,th e n that fight has to be doneby nobodyelse
t h a n o n e se l f. T h e tri a d a d vo catedabove( CM D,PM D,and M ND)is so diver s e,
a n d o n t he o th e r h a n d so d i sper sed thr oughoutthe countr y that ' it
s h o u l d se rve e xa cti y a s a n e twor kcapableof m obll' iz' ingall kinds of
bt r t
als o
s ef v ic e
F onm
Not
p o te n ti a l s .
def ens e
fo n
is
on
alI
most
h e a l th
simply
o n l \/
oF
is
those
t-e a s o n s .
i n c a p a i --l e
of
it
capabl e
w ho
ar-e
oF
di smi ssed
Mi l i tanyi l deFense' ti n
mobi I i zi ng
mobi l i zi ng
the
Fnom
w omen,
mi l i tary
today' s
popul ati on.
oFfensive
- 1+-
a high level of
S e co n d ,a p o l i cy o f d e fensivedefensepr esupposes
l o c a ' l d efe n sese l f-re l i a n ce . If the unjts ar e to be sm all, disper sed,and
;.
l o c a l l y su p p o rte d ,ve ry o fte n also locally based,
'
local capac' ityto keepa f ight
th e n e h a s to b e a h 'i gh
g o i n g e v e n i f th e n a ti o n a l center has beenr ender ed' incapableof doing
s o . Ag ai n th e sa mere a so n i n gapplies: in a h' ighlyhier ar chicalnational
d e f e n s esyste m,i tse 'l f p o ssi bly a r epl ication of high]y hier ar chical
the local units m ight tend to wait for
i n t e r n a ti o n a l d e fe n sesyste ms,
s u p p o r t fro m th e ce n te r a n d thus yield m uchless r esistancethan they
o t h e r w i seco u l d d o . If n o su ch suppor t is for thcomingthey m ight give
u p , c a p i tu l a te . B u t i f e ve rythinghas beenpr epar edin advancethey mig ht
that they have only
n o t o n ' l y co n ti n u e th e stru g g le, but also,know' ing
t h e m s e l ve sto re 'l y u p o n ,d omor ethan other wisecould have beenexpected
o f t h e m. H e n ce ,i t'i s o b vi o u sthat a poficy of defensivedefensepr es u p p o s e sn o t o n l y a h 'i g h e rl evel of national self- r eliance, but also of
l o c a l se 'l f-re l i a n ce . T h i s type of m il itar y doctr ine, hence,is str uctu r " =
a l l y c o mp a ti b l e w i th a so ci al str uctur e m uchm or ebasedon national
a n d l o c al se l f-re l i a n ce i n g ener al, just like the ver tjcal alliance
p a t t e r n w i th h i e ra rch i ca l o rganisationinside a countr y ar e com patiblewi l .h
the
so c'i a l stru ctu re o n e finds, fon instance, in tr ansnational
str uctur e does not com pleteiy.
o r g a n i z a ti o n s.Ob vi o u sl yth e econom ' ic
d e t e r m i n eth e m'i l i ta ry stru ctur e but ther e is a r elation betweenthe
at least
t w o . A co mp l e tech a n g ej n d e fensestr uctur e would pr esuppose
s o m ec h a n g e 'i ne co n o mi c,p o fi tical and social str uctur e in gener al.
I t m a ybe a rg u e dth a t th i s i s to ask for too m uch.It m ayalso be ar gue d
t h a t t h i s typ e o f ch a n g ep ro bablywill haveto take place anyhowas a
r e a c t i o n to th e g e n e ra l w o rl d cr is' is, and that the changeis not that fundam ental
T h i rd , a d e fe n si ved e fenseis vulner ableto an enemywhoattacks
t h e s y s te mw 'i th o ffe n si ve a rm sfr om his owncountr y. As a m atter of fact ,
a l l t h e a d ve rsa ryw o u l d h a ve to do wouldbe to set up a long r ange gun
o n h i s ow nte rri to ry, ca p a b l eof hitting tar gets in a system aticm anne r ,
a n d d e s tro y th e mfro m o n e e n d of the countr y to another . Air "cr aft would
h a v e t o o p e ra te o ve r th e te rritor y; a long r angegun ( or batter y of
_ lt_
m i s s i l e s) n o t. H e n ce ,i t sta nds to r easonthat a defens' ivedefensewould
h a v e t o b e su p p l e me n tebdy.som eelementof inter d' iction capabjlitir . Thes e
a r e c o u n te rfo rcew e a p o nfo
s, r instancea' ir cr aft capableof hitting the
g u n j u s t me n ti o n s6 .A nth
d e n we ar e, of cour se, back to the pr cblem:any
i n t e r d i cti o n ca p a b i l i ty w o u l dalso be an offensive capability, and hence
p o s s i b l y b e p ro vo ca t'i ve C
. o nsequently
it is a questionof havingas little
a s p o s si b l e , ma ki n gth e mve ry counter for ceand not counter value,building
t h e mi n t o th e mi l i ta ry d o ctrine downto the jetter and ver se of the inst r uc ti on
m a n u a l s,a ta l l l e ve l s o f th e militar y or ganisation,asinter diction weap ons
o n l y . H o wmu chi s n e ce ssa ryand howm uchis sufficient wouldbe diffjcult
t o s a y ; m'i l i ta ry e xp e rts cl o se to the peacem ovements
wouldbe the ideal
too m uch,too pr ov oc at'i v e.
p e r s o n sto a d vi se o n th i s. C l ear ly, ver y soon it becomes
F ou rth , a p o l j cy o f d e fensjvedefenseis not offensive against an
o u t s i d e a d ve rsa ry'b u t co u l d b e h' ighly offensive against an inside adver s ar y .
T h e t y p e s o f w e a p o n th
s a t a re descr ibedaboveas being defens' ivear e
d e f e n s i veb e ca u seth e y ca n n ot r each outside natjonal bor der s in any sign i f i c a n t ma n n e r.B u t th e y ca n c er tainly hit inside those bor der s, other w i s e t h ey w o u 'l dn o t h a vea n y c apab' ifity at all. And they wou' ldnot
n e c e s s a rj l yd i sti n g u i sh b e tw eenexter nal and inter nal foes of the r eg' ime.
A s a m atte r o f fa ct, th e y a re exactly the type of weapons
that a r ep r e s s i v e g o ve rn me nmj
t g h t u se against insur gentfor ces,whethertheir
c l a i m s are j u sti fi a b l e o r n o t. Theyar e mor eadequatethan offensjve
w e a p o n s:th e ca se o f th e Ira nian r evolution showedr ather convjncingly
y
for long
h o wh e l pl e S th e S h a hw a sw i th his "moder n"weaponrdesigned
r a n g eo pe ra ti o n sa g a j n st a l e v6e en m asse, of the popu' lation.Clear l y
t h i s i s a n i mp o rta n tp ro b l e m,and a typical exampleof howa policy desi gned
t o s o l v e o n e p ro b l e mma yn o t only not solve anotherone but alsoaggr avate
i t . T h e o n 'l y so 'l u ti o n I ca n i mag' inewouldbe it' o m ake the countr y les s v ul nena b l e , si mp rv b v# l d u ci n g o r even el iminating m ajor contr ad' ictions
w i t h i n t he co u n tr|-U T h a t w o uld per mLt djstr ibuting the contr ol over
in a m or eequ' itablemannerin
t h e s e m e a n so f d e stru ctj o n , the weapons,
ly the gover nm ent.
t h e p o p u l a ti o n , n o t re g a rd 'i ngit as a total m onopo' of
T h i s d o e s n o t n e ce ssa ri l yme an going so far as one doesin Switzer lan d
i n t h e se n seo f p e o p 'l eh a vi n g ar m sat hom a That wouldbe too sim ilar
- ltt
t o t h e US si tu a t'i o n w h e rea c ountr ywidedisper sionof fir r ar ms has
p r c v e d to i n cre a seth e l e ve l of insecur ity consider ably.lr lhat may not w onk
in
ar e
t he
not
US seems
r-s e d
Fon
to
wonk
p n i v a te
in
S w i tzerl and
vi ol -ence
and
l {orrw ay
w hene
mi l i ti a
anm s
ei ther.
F i fth , a d e fe n si ved e fensepolicy pr esupposes
a higher level of
r e a d j n e ssfo r d e fe n sei n th e population. It clear ly supposes
a h' igher
l e v e l o f mo b i l i za ti o n ; se l f-reliance at the national and local levels,
a n d c o n se n su s.B u t th i s d o e s not necessar ilymeanmiljtar ization. I do
populat' ion
n o t t h i nk th a t i t ca n b e sa i d a highly mobi' lizedNor wegian
a g a i n s t n a zi a n d q u 'i sl i rg ru l e wasm jlitar ized becauseit wantedto
d e f e n ditse l f. Mi l i ta ri za ti o n would havemuchm oneto do with excessiv e
M B C I - co mp l e xeos,
offens' ivear m ament
ve r-a rma ment,
and such things.
N o r i s it n e ce ssa ri l yth e ca se that this type of defensepr esupposes
a c o n s t a n t F e i n d b j l d . In ti mes of peacea poficy of non- alignment
and
e v e n n e u tra l i ty w o u l dse rve to build downsuch Feindbjld. In tjmes of
w a r i t w o u l dco mea b o u t a n yhow,only that the non- m ilitar y component
o f d e f e n sew o u l dtry to se e to it that it wouldbe dir ected against
t h e e n e mya s a so l d i e r a n d n ot the enem yas a per son. But what is absol utel y
c l e a r i s th a t a d e fe n si vep o 'l' icy,
becauseit r elies m uchm or eon popular
p a r t i c i pa ti o n ,w o u Jdp re su p p ose
a high level of consensus.That, of cour s e,
h a s t h e ma j o r a d va n ta g eth a t m ob' ilizationof the m ilitar y potentjal
c a n n o th a p p e na g a 'i n stth e p o puiarwi' 11,as whenfor ces ar e usedoffensivl y
t what a populationm ight feel , r e' ly' ing
i n t o t a l d i sre g a rd ,co n te mpof
ing of m i' l' itar y
o n p r o f essi o n a lso l d i e ry a n d a gener a' ldecoupl
wouldbe impos s i bl e.
s o c i e t y fro m ci vi l i a n so ci e ty. Inter national adventr tr ism
pr eS i xth , a d e fe n si ved e fensewith thr ee differ ent com pcnents
do not wor k at cr oss pur poses.This
s u p p o s e sth a t th e th re e co mponents
i s t h e f a mo u sp ro b l e mo f th e M ix betweenm ilitar y and non- militar y types
o f d e f e n se .S u ffi ce i t h e re on' ly to say that the pr oblemm aybe m or e
i m p o r t a n t i n th e o ry th a n i n pr acti6e. In pr actice ther e ar e sever al
p o s s ' i b ili ti e s. T h e re j s th e M ix ' in space: convent' ionaldefensea' long
t h e b o r d e rsa n d i n th i n l y p o pulatedaneas; PM Dand NMDelsewhene.Ther e
i s t h e Mi x i n ti me : co n ve n ti onaldefensefir st, then PM Dand NMDas
f a l l - b a ck p o ssi b 'i il ti e s. T h e re is the tljx in what one nr ight call funct' io nal space:
co n ve n ti o n a ldefensefor geogr aphicand pr ecise tar gets,
-r0 -
PM Da n d N MDfo r mo red i ffu se danddisper sedtar gets such as the popu' lati on
and PMDfor m or eoffens i v e
a s a w h o 'l e ,so ci e ty a s a w h o le, natur e; then CMD
p u r p o s esi n si d e o n e 's o w nte rritor y, NMDfor mor edefensivepur poses.Ther e
i s t h e M i x o f a l l th e se mi xe s - the questionof cour sebeing whetherjt
b e c o m es
mi xe d -u p ?l ,l a rt'i mee xper ienceseemsto indicate that it does not,
t h a t t h e p o p u l a ti o n i s a b l e to enter ta' in djffer ent types of defenseat
t h e s a meti me , a n d th a t th e adver sar yalso m akesa distjnction between
t h e t h r e e , p e rh a p sb e h a vi n gi n the most aggr essiveway against PM D,
l e s s s o a g a i n st C MDa n d mu chless so against NM D.Per haps;it could also
b e t h e o th e r w a y ro u n du n d e r cer tajn cir cumstances. r n any case, the
las k
hoo.
r 1e m -a i n s th a t.n f.-ma k j l E.
to a
no t
a D tre ti z i n o
"' T h at,
i ndi gesti bl e
-ri he country
w ol f,
and hi qhl v
i noffensi ve
,
l i ke
a hedgeto each ot hen.
h o w e ve r,i 5 a d i scussjon- thatwouldl- eadfar beyondthe
s c o p eo f th i 5 a r-ti d e .S u ffi cei t her e only to say that the str ength of
t h i s t y pe o f d e fe n sei s p re cisely' its ver satility,and that the enem y
o f i t w ou l d b e th o se w h o seth inking has become
so one- dim ensjonal
that
t h e y c a n o n l y th i n k i n te rms of one foot of the tr ipod not in ter ms
o f a l l t h n e e . In fa ct, th e a rgumentagainst it is pr obablynot so much
t h a t i t i s i n e ffe cti ve a s a deter r ent and as a defense.The ar gum ent
m i g h t r a th e r b e th e o p p o si te : it is so effect' ive that it could also
b e s u c c essfu l 'l y tu rn e d a g ainst the countr ies' owngover nm ents.
In
o t h e r w ord s,th eo p p o si te o f the ar gumentabovewher ethe emphasjs
was
jnstr
ument
o n c o n v en ti o n a mi
which in the hands
l l i ta ry d e fenseas an
t u l d b e u sed to cr ush a r ebellion. Par am i' litar y
o f t h e go ve rn me nco
d e f e n s ean d n o n -mi l i ta ry d e fense,meaningless
unless they ar e in the
h a n d so f th e p o p u l a t'i o ni tse l f, could also be used to topple a gover nm e n t , O n emi g h t sa y th a t th i s alr eady constitutes a balanceof power ,
t h a t o n e typ e o f d e fe n si ved efensemaybe the answerto the other in
i n t e r n a l p o w e rstn u g g l e s. B u t the muchbetter answer ,of cour se, would
b e t o s a y th a t a co n d i ti o n fo r a pur e' lydefensivefor m of defenseis
t h a t t h e co u n try h a s co meso far in r jddjng itself of basic inter nal
the popu' lation,would
use
c o n t r a d icti o n s th a t n e j th e r a gover nment,nor
f o r c e i n o rd e r to p ro vo keso mebasic discontinuity in the h' istor y of
t h e c o u n try.
-?L 7.
Conc l u s i -o n :
to w a n d s
new
a
consensus?
I n co n cl u si o nl e t u s p ut this aspectof alter native secur ity
p o l i c i e s i n p e rsp e cti ve . E vi dently,' it is filled with contr adict' ions,
r e f l e c t i ng th e fa ct th a t w e l ive in a per ilous wor ld, par tly of our
o w nm a ki n g .S o meo f th e se co ntr adictions can only be softened, possibly
o v e r c o mei,f o th e r a sp e ctso f alter native secur ity po' l' iciesar e also
e n a c t e d,ve ry o fte n re fe rre d to as "political" - in the pr esentbook in
t e r m s o f " n o n -a l i g n me n t"",i n ner str ength" and "outer usefulness",to
b e d e a l t w i th i n th e fo l l o w i ng thr ee sections.
her e is only one point: the focus her e
l , lh a tsh o u l d b e e mp h a sized
el sew here
i s o n t r an sa rma me n t,n o t o n djsar mament.
I have
argued
that disarmamentof offen s iv e f o rc e s is a b s o lu t e ly in d is p e n s a b le , t o
m aJ or
w a rs ,
and
avoid
t h a t t h e ro u t e v ia d is a rma me n t
n e g o t ' i a ti o n sa s p ra cti se d so far is a bl ind al1r y. The policy advocated
h e r e i s a co mb 'i n aotin o f d i sar m ament
and tr ansar mament
, not the
o b v i o u sl y fa l l a ci o u s p o l i cy of tr ying to obtain disar m ament
in offensive
w e a p o n th
s ro u g ha rma me ni tn offens' iveweapons,
but an effor t to obtain
d ' i s a r m ame innt o ffe n si ve w e apons
thr oughtr ansanm ament
to defensive
highl5r
w e a p o n s.S o meo f th e l a tte r a r e undou!:tedly still
violent.
B u t w i th i n th e d efensivedefenseconceptar guedher e ther e
a r e t h r ee d 'i ffe re n t typ e s o f defense:conventional,par a- m ilitar y and
n o n - m iilta ry. 0 ve r ti me th i s m ight deve' lop,if one should tr - y som e
o p t i m i s mi n th e se tro u b l e d year s, towar dsnon- militar y defensewhich
i s m o r eo r l e ss th e w a y i n w hich we handleconflicts in civilized societ'i es ,
w ' i t h s t r ike s, so rn eci vi l d i sobed' ience,
non- violentconfI ict r esolutjon
m e c h a ni sms
not go str aight to
a n d so o n . Ma n yw ouldfeel ' im patient,why
l
n o n - m i l i ta ry d e fe n se ,w h y n o t gener a' and
completedjsar mament
and not
t h i s a p pro a chvi a co n ve n ti o nalm ilitar y defense!Andmy answerwouldbe
a l o n g t w o 'l i n e s: fi rst, b e ca usethe over whelm ing
major ity of the populati on
d o e s n o t b e l i e ve j n n o n -mi fi tar y defense,on' ly a par t of those whoar e cons c i e n t ' i o u so b j e cto rs, o r p a c ifists in som eother way,do.Second,becau s e
l
a g l a n c e a t w o rl d h i sto ry i n gener a' and
Eur opean
histor y in par ticular
s h o u l d c o n vi n cea n yb o d yth a t we live in a danger ous
wor ld. Secur jty does
n o t c o m ea u to ma ti ca l l y, th e re is a needfor som ekind of defense.
And
th e re
O F F ens iv e
d e te rre n c e
c ount r i- es
believe
in
eit hen .
to
c hos s e
m ilit ar y l
a
is
is
in
DeFensive
th e
which
need
b ra n c h
s /h e
i t;
fon
o nl y
a
consensus
cnedi bl e
they
do
d e Fense,
iF
not.
w i th
the
in
the
mi ght
in
5e
deFense
popul ati on
ense
N on-def
human
not
is
ri ght
an
-n= * = " .frd
matte r s.
in
for
para-mi l i tary
mi l i tary,
Ic o n venti onal
b e l i e ves
new
der nocr at ic
bel ieved
every body
on
non-
arti cl e
in
shoul d
be seen
thi s
i n a br oader
pol
i
ci
es.
s e c u ri ty
My book
on that
topic,
the
present
From w hi ch
anti cl e
and
i s taken
ane added,
L i te n ature
i s an eFfort
to develop
Thi s
is
one i s
a p p n o ech.
i mportant
led
to
l est
pnesent
out
oF the
hi ghl y
dan3erous
si tua t ion
onl y.
oF mi l i tany
hardw are
ty p e s
P e tte n
Fon hel pful
and Jan E berg
Gl edi tsch
x
developed
T he id e a s
c ont ex t
o F a l te n n a ti v e
T hene
A r e Al te n n a ti v e s !,
r eF er - r nc es
to
" u r-re n t
a m one co m p n e h e n s i v e
ro a d
believ e
th a t
th e
oF new
is a ques ti o n
I am inde b te d
to N i l s
edit or ial
c o m m e n ts ,
can be
occupati on
duni ng
the
1940-45
i n N o nw ay
The expenience
nonvi ol ent
nesi stance
w as ver y
ci vi l i an,
as Follows:
s um m a ri z e d
oF ci vi l i an
by the
soci ety
Qui sling
n a z i F i c a ti on
ef f ec t iv e
against
occupati on
w as also
the
as
German
a g ai nst
negim e,
i n e F fe c ti v e
but
outsi de
From the
was
l i benati on
Mi l i tany
n e s i s ta n c e .
t he
m ilit a ry
s
u
F
F
i
c
i
e
nt'
nec
e
s
s
a
ry
a
n
d
bot h
t 1]
E0
counse,
€F
a
c ons ider ab l e
N at ions
r
" ']
in
th e
Z ent r als t el
ilT he
t 4]
the
idea
oF deFensive
n o l -e
in
th e
f l -tr
le
debates
See,
1 9 3 Os .
anm y
r v it h
A gain,
t he
Sw i s s
Fon
and
i nstance,
p oi nt
mi ssi on
all
the
and played
Leagcr e
oF
1936.
on
cl ear-
very
is
and
new,
of
poi
t his
prepanati ons
i ts
Zeni ' ral stel l e,
in
-
at
Gni ffi n,
1973,
d e Fensi ve
th e
make
not
is
commi ssi ons
G e s a m tv e F tei di gung,
as a whole
has
a view
to w a rd s
m ade
defencer
et Fe
'. t [ p. ?8]
1973t
tt.::
ne ha v e
to g u a ra n te e
a mi nmal
degrae
oF serF-suffi ci erE y
wit h
r egand
to a n m a m e n ts ,
S uFFi ci ent
t o m aint ain
th e
c o m b a t-e F F e c ti veness
oF our
ar.my i n case
E r gelne ra l
Fon
I SI
re v i e w
panticulanly
cl imate,
the
t 6]
S ee
J ohan
E jler s
T he
B ber g,
198 3 ,
1984,
oF
cult uF e?r .
p.
deF ens iv e
r ith
167,
deFensive
I
O nient al
Yonk,
New
5.4.
,
nucl ear-
the
Fon
eFFects
€ee
deFence
agnee,
but
deFence
less
th i n k i n g
p o i n ts
as
Free
out
how
l ras
shoul d
th e
deFence
like
P ress/
not
oF
the
case
1980'
as
w el l
gri ent,
undenesti mate
the
the
i ncl i neti ons
in
defense,
Macmi l l an,
in
reaker
even
oF
the
if
1983.
I I , C openl -tage n
the
ori gi n
on
*ar
3 November
V ol .
?rnonvi ol ence
i ts
one
aggnassive
-
The
n onder
w ar r f t p, eg]
6al tung,
oF nuclear
New Scientist,
elso
P eqce_E e= eereh,
in
w an,
nmi l i tary
section
Galtung
of
.Es s ,a y s
5.4.
t9l
4.4.
19A3/84;
'l.984, section
Galarng,
oF
eFFects
,-
1984,
,
and
3.4.
t8l
p ant ias
Sagan,
th e
section
Galtung
oF
see
W o rl d s ,
T nue
los ophy
3.4
19 7 f,
(7)
6o)
?.4r
Ga l tu n g ,,
,
of
oF
as
S w i ss.
the
phiin
i mportan ce
€rnd t he
is
4. 4.
section
not
parti es,
thena
'
also
rD
tr elce
our
S UM M A R Y
T he
e rt,i c l e
pos s ibl e
re a c ti o n s
des t r uc ti o n
a fl d
m ilit ar y
a
trF*
1::,
to
ra n g e
most
attack
only
is
betw een
systems
non
'lir;i,5
y'
del ,
,rr..-,' bhol :e
and
.i '
fr
o]vm tenni tr,r
pons
s y s te ms
ob jec t i v e
T hnee
good
on
aI I
ar e
th re e .
is
and
to
w i th
co n c e p t
th e
rest.
n ot
The
p a t-a -mi l
The
c o n c e pt
th e
most
w oul d
that
the
is
o v e ra l l
posture.
e me rg i n g
I i te ra trr
nel ated
then
e
in
and
thi s
l ,ast:cj
tfrat
be
jl
and
a
f i el d
in
t heir
cJeFense
ther' l
by
be
based
object ions
some
i ntendict ion
the
characten
si mi Lan
wea-
co{ r,,/cn t iclnal
rni ni mum
oFFengi ve
ha
or. l )encept ion=
sl roul .d
deFensi ve
to
on
ns{ -rmi .l -i tary
Funther'
bei ng
it
r i,
descri bi ,,
deFense
expl ored
i mportant
is
then
def erse
is
conclusian
developed
rrcti or
r:F
t f r at
i rFFerrr,i v e
decl ari .i ,.i t,,,r
i noffensi ve
i n d i s p e ms a b l e,
th e
are
i tary
on
di sti
sub j ecti ve
on
defense
n o n -p ro v o c a ti v e
us ed'
r apidly
th e
cFensive
deFense,
c apabil i ty
T he
oF
ty p e s
discussed,
be
all
p ro p e n ti e s ,
m j- lit an y
a
ane
l ::
' . i eas(-)l t t r an
\/;
)
i rl l d
.l r{ .,
fri r
''tl
deFi nr,i
ane
one' s
,fF
,,r,r'
'i
betw r,
ard
area
on
used
,
betw een
oFFensi ve
d e stnucti on
be
not
i
cut
i mportant
deFense,
ry e apons
and
I es s en ti a l l y ]
an
but
O e fe n s i v e
lim it e d
the
c o n v e n ti o nal "
deFense,
deF ens e .
l*.
th a t
a rg u e s
r:orrcepts
cr t t er ion
wil- l
in
E es; i .t,r .r r E urorre .
heve
t he
7
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+-Fra
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h-hrr'l-f
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elabor a te d
to
c jef en d
F br s v ar et = ;
s ion
w a rfa n e
B ut
it
I
would
be
s h a re
would
no
th e
been
t oo
much
c o m i n a te d
of
r at i o n a l
t hat
t he y
ItU n i rt
should
be
social-
[ ie
inc ludes
g u e l ^ ri Il a
c onc ept s
wene
of
debat e
is
det en-
creat
ttthat
as
on
the
a
thneat,
excl usi vel y
Flum a-
t he
deFense
W hat
is
oF
to
shoul- d
pu r pose
see
here
mi ssi ng
it
and
cl eartr,
not
as
th at
i dea
deFensi ve
absol utel y
"a
w onl d
in
-
and
el i mi nated
resol -ve
is
Tot a- I discus-
a
subj ect ive
the
percepti on
w hat
is
legi-
w onl d
p oi nt
by
that
one
the
and
pr obf em s,
n ow"t p, 6S]
more
by
is
rtThe
no
in
means
the
cr eat ion
to
attempts
pl ace
has
secur it y
about
i ssues:
vari ous
the
desenve
trmul -ti tt
accom plished
w e have
debate
w hol e
armament/di sanmament
v e r-s us
ag-
i t.
the
deFence,
be
cni ti cal
w orl d' s
From
of
coul d
thi s
For
capaci ty
the
w hi ch
the
al l
par-ts
both
c o n c e p ts
c ould
wit h
a
to
f or ces.
ter-ni toni al
capabi l i ty,
as
c o m b i n ed,
but
and
does
not
def ense,
' deFense,
u n menti onal -e
mo v i n g ,
pol
i c i es,
Fl aumventei di gung
n o n mi l i tar-y
deFense]
to ta l l y
now
19.a? pr-esents
ffense
a l te rn a ti ve
u n d e rd e fe n c e
t his
have
347)
Ip .
or - ce
has
Y ugosfav
to
based
In F o nmati onsdi enst,
def ens iv e
an d
peoplet t
set
I i-
di scussion
the
onl y
issue
1 7 7 ).
S oz ialdem o k ra ti s c h e r
alt er nat iv e s ,
A.
c o n Ffi cts,
i n te rn a ti o n a l
de b a ti n g " Ip .
wont h
r esist -
w hi ch
and
pri nci pl e:
becomes
that
n o n -n u c l e a n
g e t.
Soviet
ttthe
,
by
a parti san-f
as
supposed
the
peopl e' s
army
regul ar-
the
pencei ved
the
d i fFeFent
view,
th a t
ma k e s
to
capi tul ati on,
recommendati ons
m e a ns
a v e r-y
198?
m it s
any
to
oF
i cy
nesi stance
w eaken,
p.
been
F lobent s ,
a
a pol
the
sarne
that
-
out
had
by
would
-
nespect
ordi nary
of
surrounded
n o t'
ones
p o i n ts
gr . es s iv e
i ts
o bj ecti ve
oF
Swedish
which
1942:
1990
w ay
a
and
HoI lins ,
to
be
a n ybody
c o u n try
own
w i th
and
196G
" i noFfen e; - i- ve
states
a.]-so menti ons
the
u p p l y = n i n g s n H mn d ,
per c ept ion,
by
such
d o c tri n e
oF
t im at e
by
in
one's
in
is
s o mew hat
is
s h o u l d ;ro t
be
speci al
smal l
of
inntl
d o c tn i n e
S weC i s h
T he
on
based
is
137?
w i th
Fi ghti ng
Fl bI i ng
stnategy
to
defeat
the
3 4 4 ).
Ip .
in
n e c o gni ze
F o rb i d d e n
oF
] aw
N ext
a
open
events
p a r-ti c i p a t e
to
eF f e c tt'
n, ian
th e
invasion,
any
pnos p e c t
T he
Ys g o sl avi a,
a F te r
quu|J
ur
t' such
that
strategy
only
th e
n e i g h b o rs .
m ight ier
p o i nt
th e
makes
1 2 7 A,
ver-y
ar' gue
al though
in
such
rapi dl y.
party
sma} 1,
oF
numb en
such
that
argui ng
and
H ow ever,
a
unit s
mobile
of
combi nati o n
the
the
some
concept
yeans
documents
also
a go
-
t his
such
t ype
F on
a g e n e ra l
par - t i
neview
c u 1 a r Iy
t he
? .4 ,
c . L i ma te ,
rn
a
und
v e ry
po J - i c y
m ent '
at
t hes e
eg
by
a re
o p ti o n s
def ens e
in
pnoblem
F onc es
while
is
so
ev eny
to
oF
in c h
1983,
los ophy
oF
c u] t ur et r '
of
be
th e
bonden,
one's
own
167,
is
t he
s uc h
c om e
m a j o r-
Z ent r aLs t elf
a re
th e
deFence
e
F tl rr
in
" T his
duc t
=tn
m "'|rui
q
uu
n
pol i cy
ane
t he
th e
publ
going
to
not
p o i nt
eFFect i v e
the
of
w el I
i ts
is
oF
counse,
the
sa m e
as
ther_e
phi_
t he
in
our
i mtror - t ance
and
is
that
t he
no
t r ece
com es
about
B ni tai n,
in
E urope
w hen
ar-e
W hen,
so
to
cr os-
t he
book
obvi ously
goi no
they
put
it
For
to
goi ng
seni ousry
to
be-
di FFenent r y
that
concr - et e
cri ti ci sm?
makes
a
nonmi l i tary
number
oF
the
of
tp.
a3]
im por t -
deFense]:
any recounse
to
i ndi scri mi nate
oF the
opponent,
even
thoqg f i
destruction
detennentrr
t r adit bn
no t
panti es,
poi nt
for
' 1973,
occupying
sw i ss.
posi ti ve
concrete
t he
preser ving
the
iF
the
task
to
to
oni ent,
proposal -
and
,
as
psycho-
because
oF
in
the
even
i sthe
onry
i s,
is
w eaker
debate?
mi ssi ng
oF
in
vor - ne_
t he
battl efi el d
1g,B 1 ,
,
to
cl ose
coctri ne
countni es
take
ways,
a m or e
note
questi on
mai n
pnoposars
ic
m any
opposed
undenesti mate
publ i shed,
t hr eat
an
the
oni gi n
veny
al r
in
possi bl y
" nenvi ol ence
cese
one
looking
Fl aumvent eidigung
as
mi ght
rufi ,
age-ol d
1gg3
th e
p ro h i b i ti o n
of
a g a d -n s t
th e
p opul -ati on
qs Er
ur r l!
--a
s e= r = - Tilb-
be
oF
the
of
in
popurati on
The
not
G e s a m tv e rtei cl i gung
only
one
i ncl _ i nati ons
discussed,
s t at em e n l s l th e
en ta i l s
oF w a n
la tion
in
m o v e me n t
alt ennat iv e q
ant
shoul d
th e
as
Fi rst
i ts
o ne
when
e ]e rn e n ts
the
how
h e re"
oF
i tserf,
Lbser
has
ri ke
p ro p o s e d
g i ven
the
the
out
w ay
disar m a-
guerni rl a]
i tsel f.
to
unden
b o o k = /e x p l o n a ti o n s
peace
or
c o mmi s si on,
g o v e r-n me n t,
hav e
t he
as
co n c re te n e s s
a Laboun
is
but
-
is
what
in
comprete
combi ned
is
ersew here.
d e fe n ce
th i n k i n g
es t
on
p o i n ts
a g o re s s i v e
D e fe n c e
spece
t erni tony?
less
A r t er nat iv e
up
be
i i ncl ude
ansW enrr
bonder
o c c u p i erd
deFence
c nienta l
tp
goes
a g re e ,
w i th
the
can
stri ctl y
pr-ovoke.
not
A ustni an
oiven
deFensive
def ensi v e
does
cl ean
19g3.
pnesenc
the
i sm,
be
on
Ft-l n Gr- undr . ecr r t e
to
and
wan
N ovember
K omi t6
a mor-e
Gal tung,
3
uFri l = pral -
afso
[and
nucl ean
neutr-ar
F taumvstei di gung:
speak
p.
r
par t ies
th e
to
4
oF
a]ternati ves
thet
A ustri an
at
deFense
w o rs e :
@ber g,
of
in
to
close
is
th e
deFense
is
a nd
ttth e
in
w oul -d
bLocks
th e t
1973,
,
d e p th ,
bor den
what
3
debate,
fon
deFense:
b u i rd i n g
as
see
N ew S ci enti st,
di sengagement,
book
w ar-,
eFFects
Genman
opti ons
th e
concept
v ent eidigu n g ,
logic ar
in
nucl ear
the
al so
the
F i ve
nos.
Th' : ^^* ^^^- L
- Lt r ; pann o c c n i
in
oF
Fon
1943/F-4;
civilian
miss
deFense
4,4.
book
deFense,
I
efFects
di scussed:
combining
t ot al
and
19e1,
what
the
S-n-n
q:Ju||,
i m p o n ta n t
deF ens iv e
it
3 .4
qee
Demo k ra ti e ,
NA T o
of
the
oppor,-a,t,s
conin t he
popu-
,
t t T he
has
as a whole
to w a r-d s
a view
an m y
with
m ade
ttr,
i r i +-n .
t v t I I I Lqt
c an
w i th
states
of
i ts
i nvol ved
because
become
c o n s i d e re d
be
mi ssi on
and i ts
onl y
* i thi n
i ts
other
wit h
at ion
uuut
v
land
in p e a c e * ti me
S hould
S w i tz e rfa n d
deFensi ve
fi ghti " g
oF
rr -to q u a n a n te e
a mi nmal we h a v e
S ufFi ci ent
r eg e n d
to a rm a m e n ts .
wit h
c o m i ra t-e F fecti veness
t o m aint a i n
th e
inadmissible
the
aggnessor-' r
a
+Fe
- n: : r e o
c ons ide r-a b l e
Nat ions
in
l- r e n = -e o c
and
o rd e r-
in
s oc ial
r-e s o u r-c e s [p p .
genoe
F is c her ,
cost
gr - os s
Cef enc e;
S v ens k a
and
o v e rr-u n s
l -i ttl e
or
Fneds-
och
as
t? b u i l d i n g
l: alanc e
oF
power
v es
C i s a n ma me n t,
F on
but e
r em ain
to
w o n l -d
th a t
dem oc r at i c
oF
the
enemy
can
not
cousin,
his
by
mi l i tany;
p e a ee
no
anC
on
an
small-
no
-
w el l
non-aI
a
not
of
Nor wegian
of
conver -
Swiss
the
hier ar -
mi l i tary
one;
pnepanati on
e xpont ;
arms
fon
non-m ilit any
neseareh.
Fnom
goes
case
I
ti me
mean
the
no n-
for
based
m i I it any
on
concrete
f orc i nq
am af rai d
l ong
in
agai nst
taki ng
i gnment,
H ow ever,
deos
t enr i-
sdict ion;
w i th
a heavy
argued
out^
w hi ch
j uri
a case
w ar- scenari o,
fon
st ocked
occupi e d
use
w el l -
1982_'
us
mi nor-i ty
is
ci vi l i an
the
preventi ng
,
enem y
i m pont ant
w el l
in
agai n
admi ttedl
i mpnobal e
e ro d i ng
t he
stop
of
Form
maki ng
seen,
and
pr-otect
to
the
From
conFl i ct
a ver-y
to
N or-w egi an
Sk i l j e d omsfbneni ngen,
in
terrai n l
.
not
doubl i ng
th e
be
our
f or-ces
point s
eight
Forti fi cati ons
evenythi ng
j .s
m i l i ta ri z a ti o n t r
c o u n tri e s
is
by
guenr-i 11a
Fon
present
ar-e
th e o n y ,
a
defense
of
us
in
mai ntai n
p a rtl y
only,
deF ens e
of
Leaque
fol l ow i ng
quns
and
As
o b j e c t i on
deFense
m ilit ar - y
p r event
how
ful f
secur-i ty
enemy
out
p o i n ts
pana l l e l i n g
the
played
and
4q?tr
the
mob i Ie
pr' eparati on
th e
has
-a j ncraFt
anti
1 9 -e O].
c o n s c i e n ti o u s
c as e:
c hy
1982
of
defensi ve
pFogness;
enemy ;
the
;
e l - e me n ts
th re e
aI l
;
new ,
al l
expl or-ati ons
make
enemy
suppl y
to
re s i s ta n c e
at
Gni F F i n
about
N or-w ay:
i c a ti o n s
ti e
c iv ilian
not
,
1981,
s;Lop
c i e p o ts :
to
is
U
H ansen,
i mpede
F o rc e s ;
m o b i l -e
|v
techni cal
oF
to
to
Cece n tn a l i z e .C
t or y
and
ro a d s
F o r-t i f
gu|
|J
wit h
in or - den
war t r [ p. 2C]
A fh el dt.
deFence
l e ry
a rti l
|
of
n umber
a
i nqf=nne
!
.
[p.2S ]
Fight exi st
as efFecti ve
to guerri l l a
w ar- Far e
in
compl ete
contr-ol
over - t he
l - i b enet i onrt
t p . 30 ] .
commi ssi ons
and
debate
the
in
Ga l tu n g
oF
F nn
a
to
def,ence
debates
Goe
w i th
Fon
nl= n
d rrn =mi 'l -i n n
anc
th e
Ec k a rt
in
P er Hans en ,
ar - eas
in
-
B nigadege n e n a l
i F
ro l -e
1 9 3 Os .
1983
c oas t a. l-
d efensi ve
i m p o n ta n t
A F l- r eldt ,
hiq
of
th e
P ar t ic ulan l y
'i n
idea
Sw i t.ze r -
st et e
neu t r 'al
cooper - at ion
of sefF-suFFi ci ency
deE ree
suppl i es
be kept
must
oF our
oF
i n case
army
o F the
th e
u n i ts
anmy cease
l a rg e
' r S hould
will
be recourse
f or r ra ti o n q ,
th e n
th e re
in. l
or der
o p p o nent
Fnom gai ni ng
t o p re v e n t
th e
oc c t - 1p i e d te n ri
f on the
to r-y
a n d to pnepane
nF
Fon
as a permanentl y
w ar,
then
such
status
in a
opponent
the
is
- u q u s-
pnepar-ati ons
ane
ow n terr-i tony '. '[ p. 28]
to
case
shoul d
Cubious
init iat ius
thei r
come,
a
€t
to
cont r i-
v iew
will-
f
^-^!
IEd=
no t
L
be
:
II - I
made.