UZBEKISTAN'S SELF-RELIANCE 1991-2010 :
PUBLIC POLITICS AND THE IMPACT OF ROLES IN
SHAPING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS
Bernardo da Silva Relva Teles Fazendeiro
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews
2013
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Uzbekistan’s Self-Reliance 1991-2010: Public Politics and
the impact of Roles in shaping Bilateral Relationships
Bernardo da Silva Relva Teles Fazendeiro
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the
University of St. Andrews
2013
Abstract
This thesis applies role theory to understand how Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationships
became either conflicting or cooperative between 1991 and 2010. Roles are key
elements of social interaction as they describe plausible lines of action in a particular
subject-person. They are thus a helpful way of identifying actors and constructing
narratives. Furthermore, if they are seen as metaphors for drama, one may argue that
roles - as opposed to personal identities - encapsulate autonomous action, which, like a
text, ascertains meaning beyond the author’s intent. In other words, by separating
action from intent, one may regard politics in a different light - as interaction
emplotted by roles -, thereby revealing how actions contradict a set of roles and lead to
conflict and crises in public credibility. This manner of emplotting relationships
divulges an alternative story that, rather than focusing on Tashkent’s strategic
balancing and alignment, demonstrates how Uzbekistani leadership gradually
developed an overarching self-reliant role set that shapes its actions. Moreover,
Uzbekistan’s cooperative and conflicting relationships are described less in light of
strategic survival rationale than as the outcome of gradual role compatibilities arising
through time. Therefore, unlike some other accounts, this thesis argues that,
throughout Uzbekistan’s first twenty years of independence, public disputes were
crucial to understanding interaction and also that Tashkent was never actually aligned
with Russia or the United States. To bring forth this argument, the following chapters
expound the assumptions behind some scholarly research and develop the concepts of
self-reliance, roles, action, public sphere, credibility and narrative. The discussion
progresses toward self-reliance and how the concept captures President Karimov’s
roles, which are used to emplot Uzbekistan’s interaction with the United States, Russia,
Germany and Turkey. The first two are relevant for analyzing whether roles reveal more
than the typical accounts based on security balancing. Germany is then included
because its relationship with Tashkent was rarely conflicting in the public sphere,
allowing it to increase bilateral trade and secure a military base in Uzbekistan after the
2005 Andijan Crisis. It was thus a relatively stable connection, unlike Tashkent’s
relationships with Washington and Moscow. Lastly, to control Germany’s middlepower status, the case of Turkey is brought to the fore since Ankara’s willingness to
engage with Tashkent was not enough to foster cooperation.
1
1. Candidate’s declarations:
I, Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80.000
words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that
it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.
I was admitted as a research student in September 2009 and as a candidate for the degree of
PhD in May 2013; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of
St Andrews between 2009 and 2013.
(If you received assistance in writing from anyone other than your supervisor/s):
I, Bernardo Teles Fazendeiro, received assistance in the writing of this thesis in respect of
language, which was provided by Naomi Elizabeth Court, Rev. Dr. Peter Doble and Bridget
Gevaux.
Date 25-03-2013 signature of candidate ………
2. Supervisor’s declaration:
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations
appropriate for the degree of ……… in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is
qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.
Date 25-03-2013 signature of supervisor ………
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In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission
for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for
the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I
also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may
be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be
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as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic
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Add one of the following options:
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2
Acknowledgements
No four year journey in St Andrews can be made alone and so I am very grateful to so
many people for making this thesis possible. First and foremost, I am thankful to my
supervisor, Professor Sally Cummings, for accepting my original research proposal and
for the amazing diligence and advice. Your attention to clarity and the intricacies of
presentation was crucial for me to realize that a thesis, despite the importance of the
thought-process, is written on paper. I am also grateful for the opportunity to organize
with you the workshop on Sovereignty After Empire. Those days of discussion opened
my eyes to the complexities of publishing and the importance of academic debate.
For deepening my interest in Uzbekistan and its wonderful language and culture, I am
greatly indebted to Dr Mohira Suyarkulova, who was an excellent teacher during my
first year in St Andrews. Similarly, I am grateful to Sherzod Mukhamadiev, who in
2010/2011 helped me practice Uzbek and also to Ned Conway for his great practical
advice on research and publishing. I am also deeply indebted to Fundação da Ciência e
Tecnologia for granting me a research scholarship, which allowed me to have four years
of financial security in a time of recession in Portugal.
Additionally, I was fortunate enough to have met several people to discuss some of my
ideas. I want to thank Dr John Heathershaw and Kemel Toktomushev for organizing
the 2012 Exeter Post-Graduate Conference on Central Asia, from which I obtained
valuable feedback, alongside meeting some wonderful people. I am also indebted to
Revd Dr Peter Doble, who took time from his busy schedule to read one of my chapters
and supply me with very relevant feedback. Given that a thesis cannot come about
without discussion, the St Andrews Research Seminars were also essential, and
therefore I am very grateful to Hans Lindenlaub and Francesco Belcastro for organizing
the events.
Indeed, perhaps to convey once more how grateful I am to having had opportunities to
discuss politics and theory, I confess that I was a very happy member of the 2012/13
‘Whey Pat Gang’, more formally known as the International Political Theory reading
group. Thanks John-Harmen Valk, Hans Lindenlaub and Antonio Di Biagio for the
hours discussing political theory, accompanied by refreshing ale. Your insights during
the Research Seminars were also crucial. I also wish to thank Professor Nick Rengger
for being present in many of those discussions, always contributing to a lively and more
insightful discussion.
St Andrews has been the beginning of what I hope to be life-long friendships, which
always inspire any thesis. Thank you Sandro Megrelishvili, Nika Khazaradze, Miras
Medenica, Giorgi Kiladze, Asset Omirzhanov and Dima Bogomolov for three great years
of football. ‘Joga Bonita’ is a legend, even if only in my mind. Also, I am very happy to
have met Miguel dos Santos with whom I engaged in a deep philosophical debate about
the ontological priority of Ronaldo over Messi. Additionally, I will always remember
conversations with Clara Eroukhmanoff on a little bit of everything. Likewise, my
occasional visits to Kilrymont Castle, hosted by those larger than life Salam Akmouci,
Dominik Scotfalda, Yannick Suchert and Valeria Fadda, provided me with countless
and excellent memories. Thank you all for your friendship and support. I also cannot
forget to mention João Farinha, Pedro Chaves, Tiago Pires and Ricardo Capelo for
always being there when need be, because my life after all extends beyond St Andrews.
I reserve this last paragraph for the four most important people of my life: my mother
Maria Teresa Silva Relva, my father Fernando Teles Fazendeiro, my sister Joana Teles
Fazendeiro and of course Naomi Elizabeth Court. I am so grateful, Naomi, for all the
patience in reading these chapters and, more importantly, for three amazing years in
Scotland. I cannot picture how St Andrews would have been with you. As for my family,
I am so lucky to have you always there with me and for your advice, no matter the
distance. Thank you.
3
Table of Contents
Acronyms
7
Preface: Transliteration and Sources
8
Introduction: Uzbekistan’s bilateral relations and their difficult assessment
Opaqueness and the problem of assuming intent
The main thesis
9
9
12
I. Self-Reliance: The Complex External Relations of Uzbekistan’s regime from 1991
t0 2010
15
I.1. The Focus on Uzbekistan’s regime survival and alignment
I.2. Looking at bilateral relationships independently
I.3. Summary of the main challenges and positing ‘Self-Reliance’ as the main predicate
action
I.4. Self-Reliance
I.5. Brief historical sketch of Self-Reliance
Extreme Contestation of Liberalism and Communism: the Fascist Political Economy
Chinese Self-Reliance
Self-Reliance as a new Strategy for Economic Development
16
21
for
27
28
29
30
31
32
II. Role Theory: Framework and Methodology
35
II.1. Focusing on process
Brief introduction: Role Theory in International Relations and Social Science
II.2. Imposing Narratives: ‘Emplotting’ as Explaining and Understanding Action
The dialectic of Explanation and Understanding
Explanation through emplotment in a Narrative
II.3. Roles as Predicate-Processes of Action in the Public Sphere
Roles explaining action
The difference between role and identities
Roles, Public Sphere and Public Credibility
Roles and Role Conflict within the Public Sphere
A Narrative of bilateral relationships: Cooperation vs. Conflict
II.4. Narratives
and
Inferring Roles:
Methodology
for Uzbekistan’s
relationships
Selecting the actors and the events for the narratives
Inferring the roles of actors in the United States, Russia, Germany and Turkey
Inferring Uzbekistan’s roles: circularity and spoken word as the unit of analysis
Rhetoric and intra-role coherence: evaluating self-reliance
Chronological approach
Content analysis: purpose, coding and reliability
III. Inferring roles and role cohesion from 1989 to 2010
35
36
38
39
40
41
41
43
44
46
48
bilateral
49
49
50
50
51
52
53
55
III.1. Repertoires from 1989 to 1993
55
Control of economic development for the sake of stability
56
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis
58
Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality
61
III.2. Repertoires from 1994 to 2001
62
Preservation of security for the sake of economic development and stability
62
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis
66
Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality
69
III.3. Repertoires from 2002 to 2005
70
Preservation of security for the sake of controlling development, ensuring stability and avoiding
Revolution
71
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis
73
Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality
75
III.4. Repertoires from 2006 to 2008
75
Defending the image of the Uzbek people for the sake of stability and development
76
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis
78
4
III.5. Repertoires from 2009 to 2010
80
Defending the image of the Uzbek people for the sake of stability and development
80
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal footing
82
III.6. Role coherence and intra-role conflict from 1989 to 2010
82
Intra-role conflict between role group-types
84
Intra-role conflict inside role group-types
85
Intra-role conflict between defender of Uzbekistani international equality and seeker of genuine
Independence
86
Role coherence through self-reliance
86
IV. The Uzbekistani-Russian Relationship 1991-2010
88
IV.1. The beginning 1989-1993: the ruble, debt, bilateralism and Uzbekistan’s image
Reform and President Karimov’s public position regarding the future of the Soviet Union
The need for bilateralism and the rhetoric of reform
IV.2. Disentanglement to a degree (1994-1999): diverging concerns over Tajikistan
Afghanistan and protecting Uzbekistan’s image
The problem of Moscow’s imperialist rhetoric
Russia and Uzbekistan’s interventionist policies: clashes over Tajikistan and Afghanistan
Increasing economic self-reliance
Unresolved issue-areas: Debts and TAPO
IV.3. Rapprochement 2000-2006: A shift in Russia’s Roles
The shift in Russia’s strategy in 2000: Recognizing Uzbekistan’s importance
Reinforcing Russia’s role: Military Purchases and Investment in Oil and Gas
The effects of the Colour Revolutions: Consolidating Russian-Uzbekistani relations
After Andijan: The peak of Uzbekistani-Russian relations
IV.4. Deterioration 2007-2010: The persistence of unresolved issue-areas
Russia’s encroachment through CSTO and Eurasec
The persistence of unresolved issues: debt, TAPO and negotiating gas and oil prices
89
90
92
and
95
95
97
100
100
102
102
104
105
106
107
108
109
V. The Uzbekistani-American Relationship 1991-2010
113
VI. The Uzbekistani-German Relationship 1991-2010
137
V.1. A Bad Start: Uzbekistani-American relations 1991-1994
114
President Karimov’s bad start
115
V.2. Improving relations 1995-2000: The Importance of Security after disappointing reform
and economic investment
116
Energy vs. Human Rights: President Karimov’s visit to the United States
117
The June 1996 visit and the disappointing economic cooperation that followed
118
Promise in the Silk Road initiative?
120
The growing importance of the ‘island of stability’
121
Despite Uzbekistan’s stability, controversy over Human Rights remained
122
V.3. The Strategic Partnership 2002-2005: A relationship that never was
124
The new momentum after 11 September 2001
124
The Unrealistic Strategic Partnership Declaration
126
Some concessions
128
Limelight, Openness and Growing Criticism
128
The Impact of the Colour Revolutions
129
Insecurity and the Snub by Congress
130
Conflicts within Washington over Uzbekistan
131
V.4. The Andijan Spark: The final deterioration in relations
131
The Andijan Uprising: Western Reponses and the Eviction from K-2
132
V.5. Reigniting relations: the importance of security
134
Interaction after 2007
135
Concessions and the Security Relationship that followed
135
VI.1. Uzbekistani-German Relations 1991-2000: Trade and Migration
A Good Start: Germany shows concern for Germans in the former Soviet Union
Business as the motto of Uzbekistani-German relations in the 1990s
Germany’s new government: business as usual
VI.2. The growing importance of security, 2001-2005
The Beginnings of a Stronger Security Relationship
Germany leaps to the Hindu Kush
VI.3. Testing the Partnership: The 2005 Andijan Crisis
Some German misgivings after the Andijan Crisis
Increasing intra-role conflict in Germany
VI.4. An increasingly frail relationship 2007-2010
138
130
140
142
143
143
144
148
148
149
150
5
Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s new EU strategy
President Karimov’s unwillingness to compromise
Security once more: the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
Growing controversy concerning Germany’s Involvement in Uzbekistan
Epilogue
154
154
155
156
157
VII. The Uzbekistani-Turkish Relationship 1991-2010
159
Conclusion
180
VII.1. A Promising Start: 1991-1993
President Karimov visits Turkey
Turkey and Uzbekistan reinforce their ties: The Century of the Turks
VII.2. The first setback: 1994
Muhammad Solih and pan-Turkic aspirations
Managing reconciliation
VII.3. An increasingly difficult relationship: 1995-1996
Incompatibility over (a)political relationships
Explicit dislike for Turkey’s new government
VII.4. Growing friction: 1997-19981
Signs of a deteriorating relationship: Turkey’s Sincan crisis
Ankara attempts to reassure President Karimov
A small period of increased cooperation
VII.5. The attempt on President Karimov’s life 1999-2000
The bombings and Turkey’s first demonstration of support
Crisis in the relationship
Ankara’s renewed attempt at rapprochement
VII.6. A Relationship that never (re)ignited: 2001-2010
AKP and the first contacts
The Impact of the Andijan Crisis
Turkey’s Ottomanist roles reborn and President Karimov’s disinterest
Role coherence and self-reliance
The impact of roles in bilateral relationships
Suggestions for further inquiry
160
161
162
164
165
166
167
167
168
169
169
170
171
172
172
173
175
176
176
177
178
183
184
188
Appendix I: Sources of President Karimov’s rhetoric
192
Appendix II: Coding Rules for Content Analysis
209
Appendix III: Content analysis on status, motivational orientation and issue-area
211
Appendix IV: Ethical considerations for interviewees
218
References and Bibliography
219
6
Acronyms
AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Welfare Party)
CAU – Central Asian Union
CDU – Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of
Germany)
CENTCOM – Central Command
CENTRASBAT – Central Asian Battalion
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
CPUzSSR – Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR
CRRF - Collective Rapid Reaction Forces
CST – Collective Security Treaty
CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization
DoD – Department of Defense
DoS – Department of State
ECO – Economic Cooperation Organization
EUCOM – European Command
Eurasec – Eurasian Economic Community
FDP – Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IMU – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD – Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE – Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
PfP – Partnership for Peace
SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SSR – Soviet Socialist Republic
TAPO – Tashkentskoe Aviacionnoe Proizvodstvennoe Ob’edinenie (Tashkent Aviation
Production Association)
UN – United Nations
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UTO – United Tajik Opposition
WP – Welfare Party
7
Preface: Notes on Transliteration and Sources
As this is a work written in English covering Uzbekistan’s relationships with other
countries communicating in different languages (Uzbek, Russian, German and
Turkish), an overall standard of transliteration is required to avoid confusion and
inconsistency. Uzbekistan’s government adopted a latinized script in 1995, which
greatly facilitates the task (it is important to be aware, however, that Cyrillic slogans
and books are still commonplace). Following Uzbekistan’s decision, the United States
Board on Geographic Names (BGN) and the British Permanent Committee on
Geographical Names (PCGN) agreed in 2000 for Uzbekistan’s new alphabet to be used
in their official geographical spellings of the country. Hence, in conformity with
standardization procedures, this work presents Uzbekistani names and locations
according to Uzbekistan’s latinized alphabet, with the exception of English
conventional names (e.g. Bukhara, Samarkand, Andijan, Tashkent, Amu Darya). The
same practice is applied to the two other latinized alphabets covered in this thesis,
namely German and Turkish, regardless of certain diacritic letters not existing in
English. The Russian script, on the other hand, is transliterated according to PGCN
conventions, with the exception of English conventional nouns (e.g. Moscow).
Furthermore, the thesis refers to Uzbekistan’s nationals as Uzbekistani rather
than Uzbek, given that Tashkent’s foreign policy has been predicated on territoriality as
opposed to nationality or ethnicity (Fumagalli 2007b). The term Uzbek is only used if it
refers directly to the specific ethnicity or language. Despite the rise of what could be
regarded as nationalism, the geographic territory still remains the official source of
official identity. For example, after the 2010 massacre of Uzbeks in neighbouring
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan’s current leadership barely commented on the events (a
decision that was not well appreciated by some Uzbekistani citizens, as I observed
during my travels at the time). Moreover, even during the 1990s, when President
Karimov took steps to support General Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek in northern
Afghanistan, he conveyed that solidarity was not due to ethnic convergence, but instead
to agreement on policy.
As concerns the referencing procedures, the Harvard system was applied
throughout. The standard, however, was slightly adapted, in light of the vast number of
transcripts and other unauthored sources used in the last past of the thesis.
Consequently, those unauthored references were placed as footnotes in order to make
the main body of text smoother and less confusing to read. Also, anonymous references,
like BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, were almost all obtained from Nexis UK – a
vast online data base. Hence, if not otherwise indicated, the reader should regard those
sources as obtained from Nexis UK.
8
Introduction:
Uzbekistan’s
bilateral
relations
and
their
difficult
assessment
Opaqueness and the problem of assuming intent
Uzbekistan is a challenging case for studying politics and international relations. On
one hand, the overall foreign policy rationale of its regime remains somewhat shrouded
in mystery and, on the other, its unstable relations with a number of countries make it
difficult to understand the reasons, goals and repercussions of its actions. Indeed,
unlike
Turkmenistan’s
own
opaqueness and systematic
‘positive neutrality’,
Uzbekistan’s external relations with Russia and the United States were characterized by
several periods of friction from 1991 to 2010. This perhaps explains why, even today,
discussions on Uzbekistani politics are enveloped in conspiracy theories and
dichotomous perspectives; split, more or less, between those who argue that the regime
simply pockets financial and political gain from the international system (e.g. Lewis
2008) and those who state that it actually implements a consistent, albeit controversial,
policy for its political economy (e.g. Spechler 2008).1 Similarly, in thirteen confidential
interviews conducted between 2010 and 2012, there was no consensus as to the
interests and preferences of Uzbekistan’s government.2 Some even argued that no
actual foreign policy existed.
Given the conundrum behind Tashkent’s intent, many geopolitical analysts
bring order to the political environment by positing that Uzbekistan’s regime seeks to
balance against competing powers (see Chapter I). This way of understanding events
provides a conceptual framework that seemingly captures the so-called shifts in the
country’s relationships. However, it also propounds a distinct set of problems as it
reproduces the image that security and strategic calculation are pivotal to Tashkent’s
interaction – a problem that can be otherwise avoided if no such assumptions
regarding the government’s intrinsic preferences and intent are taken. For that reason,
it is appropriate to make some preliminary observations about the impact of
opaqueness, inferring intent and taking certain preferences as given. This may then
contextualize why balancing might not be the most suitable approach.
Despite opaqueness, scholars have attempted to trace the causes for a number
of Tashkent’s practices. One current and noteworthy attempt is found in Alexander
1
Some might argue that this is the case for any political environment. Any political action is obviously
open to contestation and distinct interpretations. Yet, with Uzbekistan, this level of uncertainty is even
more pervasive and exacerbated. The fact that no actual opposition parties, independent media or open
political debate exist, alongside a highly secretive authoritarian regime and repressive security service,
makes it even more difficult to ascertain the rationale behind almost any decision.
2
Interview sources (2009-2012). See Appendix IV for information regarding sources and procedures.
9
Cooley’s (2012) book, Great Games, Local Rules, which portrays quite convincingly
how global powers are unable to escape from the priorities and rules imposed by
Central Asian Republics.3 Cooley (2012: 27; 48) focuses on a number of cases and his
account demonstrates some of the dubious transactions involving Gulnara Karimova,
the eldest daughter of the President of Uzbekistan. Her business deals are explained by
making full use of telegrams issued by the American Embassy in Tashkent, recently
leaked by Wikileaks. Indeed, resorting to this type of material evinces how difficult it is
to depict Tashkent’s secretive politics and obtain reliable sources. Still, while it seems
clear that extracting profit and seeking security guarantees are part of the narrative,
resorting primarily to patrimonial exchanges and the elite’s need for survival (Cooley
2012: 16; 21-29), makes local politics seem almost analogous to financial transactions,
leading to a uni-dimensional picture of Central Asian society. This becomes even more
problematic because other international elites are not portrayed in the same light. For
instance, in Cooley’s (2012: 139-140) accounts of the Kazakhgate and Giffen affairs, the
scholar demonstrates persuasively how a number of American oil companies and
individuals purveyed hidden payments to Kazakh companies and officials. In
Uzbekistan, too, a number of suspicious cases involving German companies have come
into the international spotlight (see Chapter VI). Should one not then consider all those
foreign actors and powerful businesses as profit-seeking elites too? So, how useful are
profit-seeking preferences, survival and the label ‘elite’ if one is unable to identify
clearly who all those actors are and their specific intentions?4
Naturally, the purpose here is not to argue that corruption in Central Asia is
easily comparable to other regions. The sheer number of incidents in that part of the
world reveals that malfeasance is especially problematic.5 The point though is that
Uzbekistani politicians are not more cunning than their foreign counterparts, and that
accounts based on pursuing profit, manipulating great power interests and balancing
against competitors are limited and sometimes even detrimental to understanding the
region. Local leaders also need to pay heed to the promises they make to their
international partners and domestic constituencies. When accessing those in control is
difficult, narratives based on the intention to survive and profit-seeking, for example,
3
David Lewis (2008) also provides a lengthy depiction of Uzbekistan’s authoritarian politics and its
controversial economic policies. Cooley (2012), however, looks more into the geopolitical context,
thereby putting forth some of the issues that this thesis aims to counter. For a more detailed discussion on
authors who focus on Uzbekistani foreign policy, see Chapter I.
4
Of course some research on Central Asia has focused on characterizing the elite level politics and their
rise to power. For instance, Sally Cummings (2005: 38-58), using a wide collection of interviews,
characterizes Kazakhstan’s elite and demonstrates how a specific group of individuals rose to prominence
and consolidated power.
5
Practically all interviewees from 2009 to 2012 agreed that corruption was a problem in Uzbekistan. See
Appendix IV for information regarding sources.
10
may often serve to reproduce the idea of Central Asia being a hub of conspiracies,
rather than just any other place of political interaction, where power, profit, ideas,
emotions and violence all come to the fore. It is important to be aware, though, that
Cooley (2012) makes a very strong case about one side of Central Asian politics and
Chapter I explores how some other scholars took a strict number of preferences
regarding survival and rationality.
Let us return now to the issue of balancing. Explaining how Uzbekistan’s
relationships shift by presupposing that Tashkent intends to play one against the other,
may misleadingly lead one toward theories of alignment and realignment.6 Like Cooley
(2012), the narrative becomes slightly one-sided and mechanical and other less
conflicting relationships tend to be ignored since they are not straightforward cases of
tactical calculation and relative gains. For that reason, analyses have tended to focus
almost exclusively on Tashkent’s interaction with the great powers, particularly on the
difficult relationships with Moscow and Washington (see Chapter I). Due to the focus
on balancing, those two relations are regarded as closely interconnected. So, the
possibility of each relationship having an independent dynamic is downplayed
considerably. Furthermore, as objects of study, balancing and especially the idea of
realignment, may make Tashkent seem like a place of relatively inconsistent or even
unpredictable foreign policy.
These issues raise the question of whether it is fair to use concepts such as
balancing and alignment for depicting Uzbekistan’s interaction – points which are
revisited in Chapter I and in the Conclusion. However, despite the difficulties, it is still
possible to explain how Uzbekistan’s relationships varied across time – an explanation
which may, however, not be typically causal in the Humean sense.7 Despite the
restriction, though, there are in fact a number of factors that allow for inquiry to take
place. The President of Uzbekistan, Islom Karimov, expressed his views throughout his
rule and these statements were, by definition, not private but set in the open.
Therefore, one need not enter the mind of the interlocutor nor infer intrinsic
preferences and beliefs to ascertain intent, i.e. the intrinsic purpose of action. Beliefs,
evidently, do make up the attitude of an agent, which shape intent (Ajzen & Fishbein
1980: 47-63), and so some scholars have called for determining the agent’s preferences
or belief systems (e.g. Goldstein & Keohane 1993: 13-17; Shapiro & Bonham 1973). Still,
6
Robert Cox (1981: 132) would argue that a concept like balancing, derived from the assumptions of
political realism, induces a mode of thinking that ‘also performs a proselytising function as the advocate
of this form of rationality.’ Hence it may mislead analysis toward always depicting action in that manner.
7
Causal explanations require exogenous preferences to explain action (Goldstein & Keohane 1993:5),
which are not entirely available in Uzbekistan. Since it has not been possible to obtain biographical
information of Uzbekistani policy makers and their decision-making procedures, the political process
might be the best way of studying bilateral relationships. See Wendt’s (1992) study on the differences
between causal explaining and process.
11
delving into the mind of the other is a complex endeavour because beliefs, while
existent, cannot be observed directly (Rokeach 1976: 2). Specific preferences and
intrinsic beliefs do of course matter and one cannot ignore that many actions are not
congruent with rhetoric and thus aimed at manipulation,8 but positing strict exogenous
preferences downplays how they might change over time. As Alexander Wendt (1992:
407) explicated: ‘the forms of identity and interest that constitute such dilemmas (…)
are themselves ongoing effects of, not exogenous to, the interaction; identities are
produced in and through “situated activity”.’
So looking into a process of public interaction might be one way of studying
international politics and Chapter II develops these core assumptions. Alan Finlayson
(2007: 549; 552) recognized that politics is a place where traditions, arguments and
rival narratives clash and are constantly subject to dispute. Regardless of the private
intentions behind different agendas, statements as well as non-verbal actions affect
social interaction and open up new possibilities. They influence international
interaction, since ‘all politics is shaped through the webs of meaning that are
developed, both intentionally and otherwise, through time and chance’ (Rengger 2002:
353). Indeed, even if the ‘tsar breaks his word he does so with yet more words’
(Heathershaw 2009: 10); so action, in the public sphere, is never inconsequential, as all
politicians have to deal with public credibility. For these reasons, rhetoric, public roles
and their repercussions can themselves be objects of inquiry, irrespective of the actual
intent.
The main thesis
Overall, the goal herein is not to dispute that there is a geopolitical context for each of
President Karimov’s external relationships, nor that rapprochement with Russia or the
United States existed in certain periods, rather dismiss alignment interpretations and
show how Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationships result from political interaction evolving
through time. More specifically, the aim is to demonstrate that Uzbekistani leadership
insists publicly on self-reliance - a type of political autonomy that is not simply reduced
to the exogenous rationale of playing one against the other. (In)stability in bilateral
relationships derives from periods of particular (in)compatibility in roles. These result
from (in)coherency in public interaction and not from a particular calculating or
tactical mindset. Once adopting this hypothesis, Tashkent is no longer taken to be
aligning itself with any particular state for either financial gain or security, thereby
8
Intentions cannot obviously be ignored if the goal is to determine accountability, explain frustration,
deception and resentment.
12
mitigating the problem of inferring preferences for such an opaque regime. Periods of
cooperation, instead, depend on how a process of public interaction evolved through
time; shaped, in part, by Tashkent’s commitment to self-reliance. So, the way in which
Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationships progress depends on two alternative hypotheses:
- Uzbekistani leadership developed roles in the public sphere pertaining to political
self-reliance, which shape and give meaning to its actions;
- Bilateral relationships can be explained as a political process, in which the roles of
Uzbekistani leadership and those with whom it interacts shape action in the public
sphere, thus leading to conflict and cooperation.
This thesis is organized around those two pillars. Chapter I starts by reviewing
the literature on Uzbekistani foreign policy and the focus on geopolitical balancing;
explicating then what is meant by self-reliance as a typology of strict autonomy and
political independence. Afterwards, Chapter II delves into the framework of the thesis,
elucidating all the key concepts in detail, namely the notions of role, narrative, action,
public sphere and public credibility. Chapter III builds on the former two chapters and
looks into rhetoric to infer the self-reliant roles propounded by Uzbekistani leadership
from 1989 to 2010. It evaluates whether the role set was relatively consistent and also
the contexts that led to its public prominence. Lastly, Chapters IV through VII propose
four distinct narratives for each of Tashkent’s relationships with the governments of the
United States, Russia, Germany and Turkey. It is worth clarifying why the thesis
focuses on those four cases. The first two deal with Tashkent’s bilateral interaction with
the ‘great powers’, namely Russia and the United States, which are the usual targets of
scholarly accounts (see Chapter I for how Uzbekistan’s relations have been described).
Hence, these two narratives shed another light onto those relations, less focused on
geopolitical calculation than on highlighting their specific dynamics and public
interaction. On the other hand, a section focused on Germany - an important middle
power - shows that some consistent cooperation with Tashkent is possible and that not
all of relationships in the international public sphere need be conflicting. It is thus an
important control-case, seeing as Germany was one of Uzbekistan’s main import
partners in the 1990s,9 and the only foreign actor to maintain a military base in the
country after the Andijan crisis of 2005. This account will hopefully demonstrate that
cooperation depends on compatibility in roles arising through time. Lastly, Tashkent’s
9
See Uzbekistan’s main trade partners in ‘Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2011’ Asian
Development Bank, available via http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/KI/2011/pdf/AFG.pdf, accessed
July 2012.
13
relationship with Turkey’s government somewhat controls the middle power influence
of Germany, thereby showing that conflicting interaction can arise with any other
country and not just with the ‘great powers’. This, then, is a way of observing how
conflict comes about. If the narrative conforms to the core hypotheses, Tashkent’s
conflicting relationship with Ankara, like with Washington and Moscow, was more a
product of growing role incompatibility than of preconceived rational calculation or
strategic balancing.
Lastly, the conclusion discusses whether focusing on public interaction reveals
anything different and so revisits the question of whether balancing is just as useful for
explaining Uzbekistani relations. In any case, a cautionary note is required, seeing as
this thesis does not seek to become a definitive explanation of all events. On the
contrary, this work takes as its main premise that the intrinsic preferences of the
regime are highly secluded and so focuses only on public politics and interaction.
14
I. Self-Reliance: The Complex External Relations of Uzbekistan’s regime
from 1991 t0 2010
Uzbekistan has the largest population of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics and
is one of the only double landlocked countries in the world.10 Stable leadership since
independence in 1991, in addition to its size and location, means that Tashkent has a
substantial role to play in Central Asia. It is therefore important to characterize how
some scholars portray Uzbekistan’s complex external relations and its tussles with the
‘great powers’, namely Russia and the United States, and how self-reliance may be an
appropriate way of depicting its international engagement.
A number of works on Central Asian politics refer either to the systemic
importance of Uzbekistan or to the influence of its domestic environment on foreign
policy (e.g. Cooley 2012; Allison 2008, 2004; Allison 2001; Blank 2005; Deyermond
2009; Lewis 2008; Kazemi 2003). These two distinct points of view disclose different
characteristics: the geopolitical level reveals how local securitization is part of a wider
regional context (Buzan and Waever 2003: 44) and a domestic focus, like studying
Uzbekistani leadership (e.g. Kazemi 2003), locates the origins of Tashkent’s foreign
policy decision-making.
Looking into the regional or domestic level, though, is not the goal herein.
Instead, the lens is focused at the bilateral state level in order to downplay a bit of the
systemic context and show how each relationship has its own independent dynamic.
This may come at the cost of greater methodological complexity (Singer 1969: 27-28)
but, as Waltz (1990) would argue, explaining foreign policy is not analogous to studying
systemic politics.
The purpose of this Chapter is to look into works concentrating solely on
Uzbekistani foreign policy and international relations, namely
those of Fumagalli
(2007a), Aneschi (2010), Akbarzadeh (2005), Spechler and Spechler (2010, 2009),
Melvin (2000), Bohr (1998) and Hale (1994). These contributions are then split into
those that focus on Uzbekistan’s regime survival and alignment (I.1) and others that
look at bilateral relationships independently (I.2) - a division that purposefully brings
into light some of the points made in the Introduction. Each work will be analyzed
separately, since many contain different assumptions that need to be contextualized
appropriately. It is also worth noting that some criticisms may appear pedantic in that
they concentrate on wordings/definitions; yet, subtle distinctions do influence how
10
Double land-locked means that goods and people have to cross two political borders before reaching
the sea. Liechtenstein is the other double land-locked country in the world.
15
each relationship is depicted and therewith play a role in reproducing the idea of
inconsistency in Uzbekistani policy making that this thesis aims to counter.
I.1. The Focus on Uzbekistan’s regime survival and alignment
Matteo Fumagalli’s (2007a) article ‘Alignments and Realignments in Central Asia’ is a
suitable way of opening the discussion since it is an excellent parsimonious application
of a balancing paradigm. The scholar applies Steven David’s (1991) omnibalancing
theory to ‘understand the rationale of Uzbekistan's rapprochement with Russia, look at
the implications thereof, and locate this discussion within the theoretical debates on
international realignments’ (Fumagalli 2007a: 254). The article makes a number of
important inferences regarding the relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan: the
existence of a deteriorating political relationship during the 1990s followed by revived
interest in the energy sector; President Putin as the main instigator of rapprochement,
leading to an improving relationship after 2000; President Karimov’s goals of
maintaining autonomy in the international arena; and scepticism toward Russian
encroachment (Fumagalli 2007a: 255-256; 261-262).
The inferences listed above suggest the existence of an unstable bilateral
relationship between the Russian and Uzbekistani governments that does not depend
necessarily on surrounding context or even Washington’s interests. However, the
author then portrays Tashkent’s rapprochement with Moscow as a result of increased
‘normative competition’ with the United States (Ibid: 254; 264), even though he
recognizes that the relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan had been improving
after 2000, following President Putin’s new approach of good-will toward Central Asia
(Ibid: 261-262).
Evidently, the relationship between Moscow and Tashkent cannot ignore
surrounding factors, such as the Colour Revolutions, as the author pointedly explicates
(Ibid: 257). Still, balancing as an analytical tool derives from a number of underlying
assumptions regarding the preferences of Uzbekistan’s leadership. As concerns
intrinsic motivation, the article argues for the need to understand Uzbekistani foreign
policy-making (Ibid: 254). Yet, instead of concentrating on internal politics (a
complicated endeavour given Tashkent’s obsession with secrecy), the author proposes a
number of exogenous preferences by inferring ‘underlying continuity in the driving
forces behind Uzbekistan’s international alignments, namely, regime survival’ (Ibid:
261), and Tashkent playing ‘various powers against each other in order to retain
political autonomy’ (Ibid: 256).
16
Notwithstanding their apparent validity, the assumptions are far from being
satisfactory. For example, if regime survival was indeed the main goal of President
Karimov’s government, why then would it have to play one against the other? Could it
not simply retreat from the public sphere, as did Turkmenistan throughout the late
1990s? In fact, one could argue that all leaders of Central Asian Republics aim at
survival, except that this does not show why their international relationships differed.
So, the model applied by Fumagalli (2007a) already takes as its core premise that
strategic balancing is the more rational strategy, thereby begging the question of
(re)alignment. In other words, focusing on balancing implies that Tashkent was at
some point aligned with either Washington or Moscow.
According to Steven David’s (1991: 234) model, alignment ‘occurs when a state
brings its policies into close cooperation with another state in order to achieve security
goals.’ The definition is broad yet straightforward in calling for ‘close cooperation’. So,
at a first glance, applying David’s (1991) model offers a seemingly convincing picture of
Tashkent’s actions from 2000 to 2006. However, it cannot be extended to the 1990s,
since evidence suggests that the relationship with both powers was equally unstable at
the time.11 In any case, if it was just after 2001 that Uzbekistan’s government aligned
with Washington, one has to take into account the empirical evidence. Negotiations for
Tashkent leasing K-2 to Washington were difficult (see Chapter V) and the 2002
‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’, signed between both parties, is hardly proof of
alignment. The document was more a list of reforms than a ‘strategic’ security
document: only a number of bilateral consultations were proposed and no American
security commitments were guaranteed (only a reference to ‘grave concern’ was
indicated, in the case Uzbekistan were attacked, as well some clauses for providing
military equipment, which Washington had already started supplying since 2000).12
Actually, Tashkent signing international agreements is not evidence of alignment.
Already, in 1994 and 1998, Moscow and Tashkent signed agreements on joint strategic
and economic cooperation, yet no close cooperation came about. Indeed, Fumagalli
(2007a: 244) actually described this as the period Tashkent ‘decisively undertook a
progressive distancing from Russia.’ Fumagalli (2007a: 264) also recognized that
Uzbekistani leadership was reluctant in conceding to Russia even after it joined the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2006. In fact, there is no evidence
that the two countries ever closely cooperated within CSTO. So, bearing in mind these
11
Matteo Fumagalli (2007a) admits that the relationship with Moscow was not strong in the 1990s.
Moreover, the relationship with Washington only began improving significantly after 1998, once the
American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were attacked by Al Qaida.
12
See ‘Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Between the United States
of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan’ March 2002, available via,
http://www.fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/2002/US-UzbekPartnership.htm, accessed: September 2010.
17
events, how is it then possible to conclude that alignment was a feature of Uzbekistani
interaction?
In sum, (re)alignment is not equivalent to rapprochement, i.e. improving
relations. Instead, autonomy seems to have been the underlying motif and Fumagalli
(2007: 256) was aware that President Karimov hoped for ‘retaining political autonomy
and stability in order to avoid entrapment’. The relationship between Tashkent and
Moscow certainly improved after 2000, but this is not a sine qua non condition for
realignment or strategic balancing against Washington. There is, therefore, much more
than security to the relationship between Russia and Uzbekistan, as Fumagalli (2007a:
261) also recognized.
Luca Aneschi’s (2010) analysis of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s foreign
policies has a number of similarities. Like Fumagalli (2007a), the author offers very
insightful explanations of the interconnection between domestic concerns and foreign
policy-making and demonstrates how both regimes took special steps to ensure total
control of foreign policy (Aneschi 2010: 145). As such, the article portrays convincingly
how building foreign relations is a significant prestige and nation-building tool:
‘Turkmen and Uzbek nation builders selected analogous strategies in their
propagandistic exploitation of foreign policy and, at the same time, adopted parallel
discourses in support of such propaganda’ (Ibid: 146). In the case of Uzbekistan, the
scholar shows how the regime’s top-down hierarchy instrumentalized Amir Timur
(Tamerlane) as one of the originators of Uzbekistani foreign policy and how President
Karimov frequently portrayed himself as an innovator in the field (Ibid: 147). The
article offers thus an important perspective on how foreign policy was a source prestige,
particularly as a ‘drive for internal legitimacy’ (Ibid: 146).
Nevertheless, one of the main problems lies in the way it connects foreign policy
decisions to the long-term goals of the regime. The scholar recognizes that in
Uzbekistan, like in Turkmenistan, ‘leaderships considered both excessive dependence
on external power and international isolation as detrimental to their political survival’
(Ibid: 144). The difficulty lies precisely in this last point, i.e. in equating their
worldviews with ‘regime survival’ - very much like Fumagalli’s discussion (2007a).
Aneschi (2010: 146) argues explicitly that ‘regime maintenance and regime survival
became therefore central to Turkmen and Uzbek foreign policy making and wielded
equal influence on declaratory and operational foreign policy, which the regimes
constantly manipulated to consolidate their internal power.’ Thereupon, he argues that
‘both regimes made frequent reference to vaguely framed declaratory statements to
justify elastic operational foreign policies, in which (…) sudden shifts and constant
realignments featured regularly’ (Ibid: 148). Naturally a question comes to mind: what
18
kind of political establishment does also not manipulate for the sake of
manoeuvrability? Michael Denison (2009: 429) too contested this point in his review of
Aneschi’s (2009) book on Turkmen foreign policy: ‘given that diplomacy is, more often
than not, a dirty game of compromise and backroom deals, this dissonance could be
applied to virtually any state.’
Besides over-extending the argument of manipulative foreign policy, Aneschi
(2010), much like in the case of Fumagalli (2007a), deduces regime survival to be the
key decision-making factor. To show then how foreign policy was instrumentalized for
that purpose, Aneschi (2010: 149-153) discusses Uzbekistan’s relationships with two
major powers, namely the United States and Russia.13 This choice spawns from the
author’s aim of focusing on the ‘complex linkage connecting regime survival and
sudden shifts in the relationship between Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Great
Powers’ (Ibid: 144).14 The latter statement, however, is not fully accurate because, as
Fumagalli (2007a) recognized, Tashkent’s rapprochement with Moscow was not
sudden, but gradual. As such, when the article argues that ‘in the early Putin era, Uzbek
foreign policy continued to pursue disengagement from Russia’ (Ibid: 150), this
deduction is not precise, especially because Aneschi (2010: 155) justifies it with the fact
that a Strategic Partnership was signed between Washington and Tashkent. As
aforementioned, for Uzbekistan’s regime, signing an agreement is not evidence of
alignment. Indeed, the inference is even more perplexing in Aneschi’s (2010) case
because he argues that Tashkent’s declarations do not often match operational policy
(see above). Moreover, the argument assumes implicitly that Tashkent cannot be
improving relations with both powers at the same time.
While Aneschi (2010) recognizes that an improved relationship with
Washington was certainly important to the prestige of the regime, he ignores that
Tashkent was focused on control and that increased public spotlight was not entirely
compatible with internal stability. Hence, the relationship with Washington was never
without friction, unlike the succinct picture portrayed in the article. John Heathershaw
(2007: 137), for example, argues that the ‘partnership’ with the United States was
‘always an illusion in that it was built on wishful representations of each other and what
the partnership did and did not entail. While at first these contrasts lead to a formal
vagueness and a constructive ambiguity, this ambiguity became unsustainable as the
playing out of events made the differences more acute and brought them into conflict.’
Shahram Akbarzadeh’s (2005) book, Uzbekistan and the United States:
Authoritarianism, Islamism and Washington’s Security Agenda, offers an excellent
13
The first problem comes from the choice of focusing just on these two states. Suffice to say, great
powers cannot be ignored, but what about other relevant actors such as Germany, Turkey or even China?
14
Italics added.
19
compilation of some of the main issue-areas affecting Uzbekistani foreign policy.
Akbarzadeh’s (2005) work does more than the title suggests as he also pays great
attention to Tashkent’s relationship with Moscow. The overall thesis of the book is that
President Karimov’s regime sought mainly to fight against Islamism and strengthen
itself against Moscow, but that these goals ‘did not always coincide and seldom allowed
Uzbekistan to follow a consistent foreign policy (…) and that the United States offered
the best chance of pursuing goals in tandem’ (Akbarzadeh 2005: 3). In order to develop
the argument, the book is divided into seven chapters, in which only the fourth and
fifth focus specifically on Uzbekistani-American relations. The Chapters are rich in
information and depict quite consistently Uzbekistani overtures toward Washington
and the latter’s initial reluctance to engage with Tashkent (Ibid: 61-75). The story also
shows the effects of policy debates by demonstrating how some of Washington’s
internal discussions affected the Russian press (Ibid: 78-81).
While the work is incredibly coherent, it is still important to question
Akbarzadeh’s (2005) thesis, i.e. Tashkent’s focus on curbing Islam and Russian
influence, and how this resulted in inconsistency. For one, the scholar argues that ‘the
Uzbek regime’s relations with Islam followed a complex and contradictory course’
(Ibid: 24). It is important to bear in mind that inconsistency in foreign policy was not
defined in Akbarzadeh’s (2005) book. So, if the scholar means that Tashkent entering
and exiting international organizations is a sign of inconsistent behaviour, then what
could be said about American and Russian foreign policies during the same period?
Moscow distanced itself from the region and only regained interest gradually in the late
1990s. Washington also paid little attention to Central Asia and only later became
interested in the region’s natural resources and security situation. The author
recognizes this, so how can Tashkent’s policies be regarded as inconsistent if its own
counterparts were also changing their perspectives of the region? Either all were
inconsistent or no such consistency can be surmised without first acknowledging
whether Tashkent’s intention changed. The book actually argues quite persuasively that
Uzbekistani leadership hoped to lure the United States to the region and therefore
supported all of Washington’s positions in the United Nations (Ibid: 57-61). Is this then
not a sign of consistency?
Another problem lies in the depiction of Tashkent wanting to distance itself
from Moscow, which makes subsequent analysis ad hoc. For instance, when describing
Uzbekistan’s accession to the Collective Security Treaty (CST), which could contradict
that premise, Akbarzadeh (2005: 46) justifies the decision as a sort of last resort: ‘at the
time, Tashkent felt it necessary to join the only power available in order to protect
itself.’ It is unclear, however, from what Tashkent needed to protect itself. He states
20
that it was a response to Tajikistan’s Civil War, but this might be overstretching the
case. The CST was endorsed in Tashkent in May 1992 before conflict in Tajikistan
became rampant. Instead, the decision to join the CST was part of ongoing negotiations
pertaining to the future of the ruble zone and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (see Chapters III and IV).15
The analytical predicament persists throughout the book: ‘in 1999 Uzbekistan
was still looking for allies to combat Islamic insurgency as well as counter Russia’s
encroachment into Central Asia’ (Ibid: 48). The United States is thus portrayed as the
counterpart to Russia and Akbarzadeh (2005: 61) deliberates among other examples
that ‘Uzbekistan’s pro-NATO orientation was made public in 1994, when it joined the
outer periphery of NATO by signing up for NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP)
programme.’ However, all other Central Asian states joined PfP (even Turkmenistan),
and Uzbekistani forces, like those of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, also participated in
the CENTRASBAT military exercises that were partially coordinated by the Pentagon.
As such, within the Central Asian context, Uzbekistan joining PfP is not surprising.
Regarding
accession
to
the
Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova
organization
(GUAM), Akbarzadeh (2005: 48) argues that it was designed to counteract Russia.
However, it is important to take into account that joining GUAM is also consistent with
economic policy. At the time, GUAM was regarded as the best means of implementing
the Silk Road initiative, which proposed new trade routes for the region.
So, instead of suggesting that Uzbekistani foreign policy was driven by two
somewhat contradictory exogenous goals - fighting Islamism and disentangling from
Russia -, it is better to frame it in a more general way, based on preserving general
autonomy, as mentioned briefly by Aneschi (2010) and Fumagalli (2007a). In sum, it is
not entirely accurate to portray Tashkent’s involvement in Tajikistan as driven by
concerns over Islamism, especially because Akbarzadeh (2005: 7-23; 50) concedes that
internal control and prestige were also important to President Karimov’s
authoritarianism.
I.2. Looking at bilateral relationships independently
Martin Spechler and Dina Spechler’s (2009) article ‘Uzbekistan among the Great
Powers’ is one of the most thorough accounts of Uzbekistani foreign relations. Rather
than adopting a balancing paradigm, their work describes the relations between
Tashkent and the ‘great powers’ (Russia and the United States) by focusing on each of
15
Whilst President Karimov did indeed voice his demand for non-interventionism, he also prioritized
being part of a loose confederation supported by Moscow. It is perhaps herein that lays the contradiction
and not in distancing Uzbekistan from Russia. See Chapter IV.
21
their particular internal dynamics. To begin at the end of their article, the two scholars
surmise that ‘considering its objectives - assuring independent development and
regime stability - Uzbekistan’s foreign policy must be considered a success’ (Spechler &
Spechler 2009: 371). Unlike the other works above, their understanding of Uzbekistani
relations downplays regime survival and, like Gleason’s (2003; 2001: 177-179) work on
Central Asian economies, focuses on the ideological conceptions of President Karimov’s
regime. Accordingly, Spechler and Spechler (2009: 353) argue that as ‘one of the larger
successor states of the former Soviet Union, the Republic of Uzbekistan has been
especially concerned in its foreign relations to retain the new country’s independence political, economic, and military.’ Additionally, the article highlights that ‘outside
observers have little way of determining how Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is made’ (Ibid:
351).16
Spechler and Spechler (2009: 354) then posit ‘three main periods of the
country’s external orientation: (1) from 1991 to 1999, characterized by delinking from
Russia and a search for alternatives, (2) 1999-2003/5, a time of reliance on NATO and
the USA, and (3) 2003/5-2008, years in which there has been a return to closer
economic and political cooperation with the Russian Federation, as well as with the
People’s Republic of China’. The two scholars explain that the ‘break with the USA
resulted from accumulated dissatisfaction on the Uzbek side, together with a change in
American needs and priorities, as well as Russian reengagement. It was not a sudden
change’ (Ibid: 368). This inference seems analogous to the other works above.
However, the differences are actually substantial. The two authors focus on a
combination of factors - namely gradual disappointment, Russian engagement and
American dissatisfaction - to explain why relations with Washington deteriorated. It
thus underlines (in)compatibility between both sides and not just Tashkent’s supposed
exogenous wish to balance or survive.
Even though Spechler and Spechler’s (2009) portrayal offers a more
comprehensive take on nearly twenty years of Uzbekistani foreign policy, a number of
points remain unclear. For one, given that the article focuses on the two great powers,
more evidence is necessary. For instance, no account is provided of American
involvement before 1999 and, if there was none (which is not the case), no justification
is proposed. Moreover, Spechler and Spechler (2009: 364) are too succinct in their
analysis of the Russian-Uzbekistani relationship in the early 1990s, arguing that ‘in
short, Uzbekistan saw little benefit, and some threat, from its long-time association
16
The article then describes some geographical characteristics of the country, its economic capabilities,
military power and some of its main policy conceptions, such as territoriality. The latter is one of
Uzbekistan’s main policies for the region; a pillar that is amply described in Fumagalli’s (2007b)
excellent article on Uzbekistani multi-ethnic politics.
22
with Russia and cautiously withdrew.’ The story though is more complex and little if
nothing is mentioned of the problem of Soviet debt, the ruble (issues which Hale (1994)
highlights) and the disagreements between President Karimov and Moscow’s
reformists and nationalists.
It is also unclear why the article posits that ‘Uzbekistan has switched its primary
foreign orientation several times since 1991, though always reserving its freedom of
maneuver’ (Ibid: 353). Actually, the narratives presented by the two authors show that
Tashkent’s relationships with Washington and Moscow had their highs and lows.
However, if they both argue that ‘freedom to manoeuvre’ and ‘independence’ are the
underlying goals of President Karimov’s foreign policy, how then could Uzbekistani
orientation have altered? Perhaps engaging with literature on foreign policy change
would have offered insight. According to Charles Hermann (1990: 5-6), an
international orientation change is the most ‘extreme foreign policy change,’ which
consists of an actor shifting its ‘international role and activities.’ So, while Spechler and
Spechler (2009) do propound convincingly that Tashkent’s relationships with
Washington and Moscow were far from being static, adjustments are not necessarily a
case of orientation change. Following their line of argument, if Tashkent’s aim was
seeking independence, the end did not change but only the means. Assuming, though,
that orientation did alter, on which basis then could the authors conclude that
Uzbekistani foreign policy was successful?
In addition to the problem of orientation, by also summarizing that policy tilted
from one to another, the authors imply that it was mostly Tashkent’s decision to
improve relations. This, however, is not entirely consistent with the story that was
presented. As indicated above, the discussion in the article evinces that relationships
changed not just because of President Karimov’s decision-making, but also due to how
the great powers positioned themselves in the region. In fact, the article argues that
President Putin’s decision to engage more with Central Asia after 2000 was a key
reason (Ibid: 367).
Martin Spechler & Dina Spechler’s (2010) other article extends some of their
first conclusions. Its title, ‘Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan: Sources, Objectives and
Outcomes’, suggests a more general discussion on Uzbekistani foreign policy, as
compared to its 2009 counterpart. The article, however, fails to deliver a
comprehensive analysis on foreign policy, offering a very brief account of Uzbekistani
relations with other crucial actors. An important state like Turkey is entirely neglected.
Germany too is not mentioned (with the exception of a succinct allusion to a speech
23
made by President Karimov).17 Evidently, Uzbekistani-German and Uzbekistani-Korean
relations are not as eventful as the apparent competition between Washington and
Moscow, but neglecting them leaves the story entirely incomplete.
Moving to Annette Bohr’s (1998) monograph on Uzbekistani politics and
foreign policy, the complexities of the first years of President Karimov’s regime are
brilliantly detailed. Bohr (1998: 43) argues that Uzbekistan’s foreign policy ‘has focused
on strengthening national independence, attracting direct investment and building
political and economic ties with partners in both the West and East.’ This is perhaps
one of the best summaries of President Karimov’s aims. Unlike other works (see above),
no mention is made of Tashkent deliberately playing one against the other and
purposively aiming to deter Moscow. In fact, the author concludes that ‘while aware
that a good relationship with Russia is crucial for stability, Uzbekistan’s leadership is
conscious of the dangers that deeper integration poses to its freedom of action’ (Bohr
1998: 68).
Bohr (1998: 44-65) explains some of Tashkent’s main relationships, namely
with the CIS, ECO, Central Asian Republics, Russia and some non-CIS members. This
focus on bilateralism seems appropriate since President Karimov tended to neglect
multilateralism from the start (see Chapter IV). Bohr (1998: 61) then offers an account
of the problems affecting cooperation: ‘in recent years [the mid 1990s] Uzbekistan has
been reorienting its economy toward the industrialized West, in the process relegating
its traditional partner [Russia] to a secondary role.’ This account again seems to suggest
that the purpose was not to relinquish Moscow; rather the relationship deteriorated
because Russia was not the only partner Tashkent sought to embrace. Moreover, the
text then develops the point that the relationship was not stable because Moscow too
remained distant (Ibid: 61-2). Uzbekistan’s government is also compared to Ukraine’s
and described as ‘the southern pole of resistance to Russian efforts to exert undue
influence on CIS member states. Indeed, President Karimov’s disillusionment with the
CIS appears to have grown with each attempt by Russia to entrench its position as the
organization’s hegemon’ (Ibid: 44). So, a key factor in explaining the relationship is not
necessarily the goal to separate from Moscow. Relations, instead, deteriorated because
of Moscow’s status as primus inter pares.
As for other interactions, the narratives are shorter, but demonstrate how
Uzbekistan’s regime was not wholeheartedly convinced of the approaches adopted by
17
This is surprising, given that Berlin is the only foreign actor that has a military base in Uzbekistan.
Also, the article focuses significantly on the economic dimension and, on that regard, Germany was one
of Uzbekistan’s main import partners (by far the largest from Europe) throughout the period. For the same
reason, more insight should have been provided on South Korea – a state with a large stake in
Uzbekistan’s economy - beyond some small factual examples provided in the text and in two footnotes
(see Spechler & Spechler 2010: 162; 165; 166).
24
both Turkey and Iran (Ibid: 61-65). Little though is mentioned of actors that invested
significantly in Uzbekistan.18 Regarding the United States, Bohr (1998: 65; 63)
deliberates that ‘Uzbekistani-US relations, however, have not always been cordial’ yet
that it was Washington being ‘uneasy with Russia’s preponderant influence in the
former Soviet south, in 1995, that altered its assessment of Uzbekistan.’ What is
insightful about this analysis is that it downplays Uzbekistani interests and,
alternatively, highlights Washington’s changing perception of the Central Asian
Republic. In other words, Bohr (1998: 63-65) suggests that the dynamic is gradual and
not simply a predetermined result of Tashkent’s wish to engage with Washington as a
response to Russia. Disappointment, quarrels and different worldviews gradually
shaped each of the relationships and not a deliberate strategy taken from the start.
Perhaps the only negative issue with Bohr’s (1998) account is that while it
suggests that there is a political dynamic, it does not show how these issues manifested
themselves publicly and affected action. At any rate, it is unjust to criticize Bohr (1998),
and also Melvin (2000) (see below), for not focusing on these processes, given that
their works are largely monographs, attempting to trace Uzbekistani foreign policy, and
therefore less concerned with showing how events were shaped by public interaction.
Like Bohr’s (1998) work, Neil Melvin’s (2000) discussion of Uzbekistani
relations with the outside world is also a comprehensive analysis. Melvin (2000: 89118) focuses on the changing mindset of President Karimov and recognizes the
difficulty of fully understanding Uzbekistani foreign policy: ‘since independence, a
complex set of interrelated factors has affected Uzbekistani external policy. Frequently
these factors appear contradictory and cause problems for developing foreign policy’
(Melvin 2000: 90).19 The book then sketches Uzbekistani relations with a diverse set of
important actors and organizations, namely Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Turkey,
Iran, Pakistan, India, the United States, the CIS, the Economic Cooperation
Organization (ECO) and the Central Asian Union (CAU).
Thereafter, the author foreshadows Spechler and Spechler’s (2010, 2009)
inference (see above): ‘external relations can be viewed as the most successful sphere of
policy developed by President Karimov since independence. Uzbekistan has been able
to develop its main aim of building links to western industrial countries, particularly
the United States, while still maintaining a wide variety of relations necessary to
manage critical regional issues’ (Ibid: 114).
In his subsequent account of Uzbekistani policies toward Russia, the United
States and Turkey, the author looks at each bilateral relationship separately. As
18
Annette Bohr (1998: 63) identifies them as South Korea, Japan, Germany, France, Britain and
Indonesia.
19
Italics added.
25
concerns Russia, Melvin (2000: 100) begins by arguing that ‘as the former colonial
power in Central Asia, the Russian Federation’s relationship to Uzbekistan has often
been difficult (…) a central aim of Uzbek policy has been to reduce the role of the
Russian Federation in Central Asia.’ He shows, in addition, that this goal was not clearcut and ‘that Uzbekistan initially adopted a cautiously positive relationship to Russia
and Russian inspired institutions such as the CIS’ (Ibid: 100). He more or less shows
that the relationship deteriorated as both sides became engaged in a number of
disputes over the Duma’s reformist and nationalist policies, the civil war in Tajikistan
and international equality (Ibid: 101).
As for interaction with Turkey, Melvin (2000: 104-5) propounds that the
relationship did not fully blossom after a promising start, mainly due to President
Karimov’s reluctance in indulging with Ankara’s ‘big brother’ type of schemes and the
growing influence of Turkish Islamism (Ibid: 104-5). Lastly, a very succinct account of
Tashkent’s relationship with Washington is offered, whereby the author demonstrates
that friction over President Karimov’s authoritarianism prevented mutual cooperation.
Melvin (2000: 108-9) then suggests that the latter’s growing reliability paid off since
Washington become less reluctant to engage with Tashkent.
Lastly, Melvin (2000: 114) argues in one conclusion that ‘Uzbekistan’s ties have
been characterized by frequent reorientations reflecting the contradictory interests that
have informed Uzbekistani foreign policy’. This is misleading for the same reasons
discussed for the authors above. As concerns contradictory interests, this is possible,
but Melvin (2000) gives little insight into what they might be beyond the wish to
hamper Moscow’s influence in Tajikistan. With regard to ‘frequent reorientations’, it is
unclear what the author means, since the only change in orientation that was indicated
in his work was Tashkent’s growing disillusionment with the CIS and Russia’s role
within it. As for relations with Turkey and ECO members, Melvin’s (2000: 105-107;
113-114) account does not show a shift, rather hesitant relationships that never
consolidated.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning Henry Hale’s (1994) early work on Uzbekistan’s
foreign policy orientation. Hale (1994) defines orientation as ‘the degree to which a
particular state is willing to constrain its own decision-making autonomy through its
association with another state or group of states as indicated by political and economic
pacts and other mutual economic ties that some other states actively promote with
other states’ (Hale 1994: 139). Hale (1994: 136) then identifies three forces guiding
Uzbekistani orientation, namely its proximity to Russia, and both Islamic and Turkic
values. The scholar also recognizes the importance of rhetoric and the insistence of
leadership in defending its own interests (Ibid: 143). Since Uzbekistan had only
26
recently become independent, its foreign policy was still consolidating itself, but Hale
(1994) manages to illustrate how difficult it is to describe Tashkent’s relationships with
Turkey, Iran, Russia and the United States. Based on the lack of American interest for
the region and Tashkent’s scepticism toward Iranian politics and Turkey’s economic
power, he concludes that Uzbekistan’s regime would either be tied with Russia or
become a neutral actor in the region (Ibid: 164).
I.3. Summary of the main challenges and positing ‘Self-Reliance’ as the
main predicate for action
All the above authors offer different insights into several features of Uzbekistani foreign
policy. A number of challenges were also indicated that are perhaps appropriate to
recall and summarize:
- Focusing solely on the United States and Russia is misleading since it pushes inquiry
toward the idea of inconsistency and (re)alignment, thus ignoring other important
relationships that may contest that generalization;
- Adopting a balancing paradigm means that a whole process of interaction tends to be
ignored;
- It is important to look into each bilateral relationship from the beginning and
consider how the manner in which it evolved resulted from a specific publicly contested
process of interaction that evolved though time;
- Assuming strict exogenous regime preferences brings upon a number of problems in
explaining the nature of relationships and how they evolved, especially because they
cannot be extended to all periods;
- Exogenous preferences that determine intent also lead analysis toward a portrayal of
shifting orientations and inconsistency, rather than seeing such changes as a coherent
way of asserting self-reliance;
- If self-reliance is regarded as the main predicate for action, it is easier to acknowledge
that Tashkent has never actually aligned itself, i.e. it did not cooperate closely with any
other state.
Before delving into the conceptual framework (Chapter II), it is appropriate to
clarify what is meant by the core notion of self-reliance. As indicated above, most
authors either tacitly or explicitly agree that Tashkent endorses a vision of political
independence that has real effects in its external relations - norms that are, in fact,
amply advertised by President Karimov’s regime. 20
20
Besides President Karimov’s frequent public statements concerning foreign policy and international
politics, many of his worldviews were articulated in a number of books. For English accounts, see
27
I.4. Self-Reliance
To understand the concept of self-reliance, it would be suitable to begin with
Wolfgango Piccoli’s (1999: 7) excellent summary of Paul Schroeder’s (1976) work on
alliance formations. The latter argues that states do not necessarily align with another
power and that they can instead interact by ‘declaring neutrality, whether formal or
informal; approaching other states on one or both sides to improve relations, but short
of alliance; trying to withdraw into isolation; and conciliating or compromising with the
threatening state without capitulating and joining that power in order to keep options
open and gain time’ (Piccoli 1999). Uzbekistan’s external engagement epitomizes the
latter inference and many would agree that there is a need to capture Tashkent’s stance
in the international arena with some kind of typology. For instance, Martin Spechler
(2008: 31) argues that Uzbekistan’s regime projects an ‘independent’ stance on regional
affairs, but simultaneously rejects ‘isolationism’. Similarly, Gregory Gleason (2001: 177)
posits that Tashkent follows a ‘structuralist’ approach that rejects neo-liberal economic
policies and emphasizes ‘neo-mercantilism.’ Stuart Horsman (1999: 45) portrays
Tashkent as having an ‘autonomous and pragmatist’ outlook. Lastly, Elena Mogilevski
(2004: 1) refers to Uzbekistan’s government fulfilling a ‘self-determining’ foreign
policy. Curiously, some of the concepts can actually be mutually exclusive, depending
on the theoretical lens that is taken. For instance, if Uzbekistan’s regime is considered
neo-mercantilist, some could argue that it is ideological instead of pragmatic.21
For reasons that are made clearer below, self-reliance is the most suitable
concept for categorizing Uzbekistan’s foreign policy predication. Indeed, Gleason
(2003: 119) had once indicated that Tashkent endorsed self-reliance as an economic
policy. The scholar does not offer a precise definition, although he suggests that it is an
alternative to liberalism, focused on self-sufficiency and gradual reform (Gleason 2003:
119).
Perhaps it is useful to look at another interpretation. Self-reliance is the title of
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous essay on individuality. The renowned 19th Century
Transcendentalist philosopher argued for men to be declared non-conformists: ‘the
Karimov (1992, 1997, 2008). Andrew March (2002, 2003) also offers excellent analysis of President
Karimov’s works.
21
Given that being pragmatic is normally connected with practice rather than theory, using it to compare
or even characterize policies is not the best option, insofar as what may be considered practical for some
can be cumbersome for others. For instance, protecting an economy might be more logical or practical for
a mercantilist, yet highly cumbersome for a liberal. Therefore, for comparison purposes, classifying
worldviews as either ideological or pragmatic is highly deceptive and compromised by the bias of the
observer.
28
great man is he who in the midst of the crowd, keeps with perfect sweetness in the
independence of solitude’ (Emerson 1930: 36). Remaining permanently dissatisfied
with current state of affairs is thus regarded as virtuous, since ‘discontent is the want of
self-reliance’ (Ibid: 52). Emerson, though, did not mean to promote seclusion. His
purpose was solely to highlight the dangers of ‘foolish consistency’ and praise
scepticism toward society’s beliefs and trends. Hence, some of Emerson’s assertions on
self-reliance may be extrapolated onto international politics. Self-reliant states are
essentially sceptical non-conformists, reluctantly committing themselves to the
prevalent ideological, institutional, political and economical system:
Self-reliance is a role based on mistrust of foreign penetration and deep
scepticism toward the values, institutional arrangements and ideologies of
the international public sphere. The role tends to make a regime look
inward and depend on its own ideas and capabilities to assure economic
performance, preserve authenticity and guarantee manoeuvrability.
However, while never committing fully to any ideological paradigm or
international organization, the regime does not wholly reject trading or
working with international institutions, so long as it does not affect its
level of autonomy.
The self-reliance typology derives essentially from the English language,
focusing on independence and mitigating dependency, and is therefore a useful way of
conceiving Tashkent’s stance in the international public sphere. Stating that it is an
anglo-saxon term is meant to help generalization, i.e. establish that certain regimes can
be described as self-reliant if they follow those criteria, regardless of whether they have
actually used an equivalent term in their language or whether their ideologies or public
statements can be translated into English as self-reliant.
Lastly, it is important to be aware that self-reliance is not a new typology in
scholarly literature. Kal Holsti’s (1982: 4) book on foreign policy-restructuring already
used the concept of self-reliance - defined as behaviour centred on keeping external
economic transactions low; avoiding dependence and commitments which involve
dependence or support from other states. Later, Holsti (1995: 87) also described selfreliance as a ‘variation of isolationism’, whereby states diminish threats through
autonomous deterrence. Curiously, Holsti (1982: 4) also differentiates self-reliance
from non-alignment, seeing as he considers the latter to be characterized by greater
foreign penetration. To better contextualize how the typology might capture a number
of similar behaviours in international politics, the following section briefly sketches
some potential historical self-reliant states and the origins of their ideas.
I.5. Brief historical sketch of Self-Reliance
29
Marxism and Liberalism, in spite of their differences, tend to propose political and
economic systems that favour universal human progress, independent of any a priori
constructed social, political or economic traditions (Freeden 1996: 418; 433-434). Karl
Marx, for example, besides feeling ‘happiness through rebellion’ wanted to bring
‘enlightenment to humanity’ (Priestland 2009: 25). In contrast, approaches located
between Liberalism and Marxism can be labelled as ‘structuralist’ (Spero & Hart 1997:
152-155). Such simplifications are very narrow but, for the sake of comparison, it is best
to think of a ‘structuralist’ paradigm as a loose grouping of ideas that openly contest
classical Liberalism and orthodox Marxism. This is controversial, especially because
structuralism can also be classified as socialist or ‘neo-marxian’.22 Yet, if one bears in
mind the broad limitations of such a comparison, self-reliance may be located within
the broad structuralist spectrum, opposed to universal progress and mainstream
political theories.
Extreme Contestation of Liberalism and Communism: the Fascist Political Economy
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the consolidation of the Soviet Union’s power
institutionalized the ideological alternative to Liberalism within the international
system. Yet, after the turmoil of World War I and the establishment of Communism in
the Soviet Union, Fascism soon rejected the those two systems:
When attempting to evaluate classical fascist economic doctrines, it is
important to understand classical fascists’ aversions to traditional
concepts of political economy, due to an in built ideological bias against
materialist arguments and an associated hostility towards structuraleconomist interpretations of events in history. Marxism and socialism are
inherently materialistic, embracing the need to have a highly developed
understanding and appreciation of the economic side of human existence
(…) Liberal beliefs also derive from forms of political economy – a term
which emerged in liberal thought in order to explain the ‘natural’ rise of
market based individualism (Baker 2006: 209).
Fascist economies geared themselves for war and emphasized the superiority of
rural life, i.e. ‘a return to the land and its peasant values’, along with an extreme
nationalistic overtone in the defence of the nation’s own special abilities (Baker 2006:
232-235). In short, fascism hoped to ‘transcend both capitalism and socialism’ (Ibid:
239). Yet fascist political economy, while similar, does not combine all the prerequisites
of self-reliance. The latter entails the pursuit of economic development – authentic to
22
As explained in the remainder of the chapter, many of these very general structuralist approaches were
adopted in countries whose governments also considered themselves to be Communist.
30
each country’s overall values and characteristics. Also, self-reliance is not necessarily
revisionist, whereas fascism openly endorses aggressiveness and militarism (Ibid: 227;
Benjamin 1936).
Chinese Self-Reliance
With the end of World War II and the gradual dissolution of the colonial empires of
many western European states, self-reliance became a political and economical slogan
in the developing world. The first place to espouse a clearer take on the idea was China.
Mao Tse-Tung voiced ‘in the late 1950s and early 1960s (…) increasingly assertive
nationalism as a response not only to the boycott of China by imperialists, but to Soviet
great power chauvinism’ (Schram 1991: 67). Mao, facing antagonism from the Soviet
Union as well as the disastrous economical consequences of his 1950s ‘Great Leap
Forward’, gradually proposed an alternative. So, in 1962, he announced what was to be
considered the Chinese road to socialism:
In the field of heavy industry especially, we copied almost everything from
the Soviet Union, and we had very little creativity of our own. At that time
it was absolutely necessary to act thus, but at the same time it was also a
weakness - a lack of creativity and lack of ability to stand on our own feet.
Naturally this could not be our long-term strategy. From 1958 we decided
to make self-reliance our major policy, and striving for foreign aid a
secondary aim (Schram 1991: 59).23
Marx and Lenin had both argued that the only way to develop Communism in
the Far East would be through ‘Europeanization’, i.e. the adoption of western style
institutions and economical practices (Schram 1974: 29). However, by 1965, Mao
declared that Marxism ‘no longer constitutes a universal and immutable fundamental
theory, but merely one more contribution from the West which must be digested and
critically made to serve China’ (Ibid: 36). Alongside anti-imperialistic rhetoric, Mao
developed a new ideology that, whilst still Communist, was no longer orthodox Marxist
and certainly not liberal. Chinese Zi li geng sheng, which was translated into English as
self-reliance, literally means to ‘produce even more with one own’s strength’ (Yahuda
1983: 53). The approach was deeply nationalist and underlined Mao’s scepticism
toward Moscow and Washington.
Regarding national security, Beijing endorsed a flexibility axiom, known as
quan bian, based on the traditional Chinese adherence to realpolitik. Communist
China would not settle with a fixed set of rules to engage with its neighbours and would
23
Italics added.
31
simply adopt the strategy that fit its concerns at each particular moment in time
(Johnston 1996: 239). In sum, Maoist self-reliance entails ‘an independent outlook,
self-conscious creativity and above all the determination to avoid dependence’ by
means of ‘retention of the capacity for self-initiative and independent decision-making’
(Yahuda: 52-53).
Self-Reliance as a new Strategy for Economic Development
The Cold War and new global trends, such as self-reliance, would greatly influence
intellectuals and post-colonial leaders in Africa and Asia (Macginty & Williams 2009:
10). China had its novel approach as did India when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
proposed Non-Alignment. Even within the Communist camp, Josip Tito too had
pushed for removing Belgrade’s dependency on Moscow.
Throughout the 1960s, the developing world demanded a New International
Economic Order (NIEO). As a response, the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously declared the development decade (Akinsaya & Davies 1984: 209), since
many non-industrialized states felt that the prevailing economic order was no longer
able to cope with global challenges. For that reason, reforms to GATT were demanded,
as were measures to terminate asymmetrical interdependence (O’Neill 1980: 32).
For a great majority of Third World indigenous thinkers, Africa and Latin
America were under neo-colonialist domination (Slvan 1983: 26), thus leading to the
inauguration of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
in 1964 (Akinsaya 1984: 210). One of the outcomes of UNCTAD’s Algiers summit in
1973 was the adoption of ‘collective self-reliance’ (Gosovic & Ruggie 1976: 313), which
then became an official UN development strategy in 1975;24 targeting the problem of
dependency (Biersteker 1980: 230).
By 1980 the term became popular and was the title of Johan Galtung’s new
general economic approach. In his edited volume, Self-Reliance, a Strategy for
Development, Galtung (1980: 12) proclaimed self-reliance to be incompatible with
Marxism and Liberalism. Moreover, the paradigm called for ‘authenticity’ and contextspecific strategies for development (Mutombo 1980: 111). As such, self-reliance was
considered compatible with the rising nationalism of many post-colonial states, by
rejecting strict adherence to Western style approaches, although Galtung (1980: 23-27)
24
See Helen O’Neill’s (1989: 35-35) transcription of the strategy: ‘cooperation (in trade and in industrial
and infrastructural planning) between the developing countries themselves needs to be strengthened so
that, through a policy of “collective self-reliance”, the “peripheral” countries can reduce their excessive
dependence on countries of the “centre”’.
32
was careful in underlining that self-reliance did not imply isolationism, self-sufficiency
nor autarky.
Besides theoretical extrapolations, self-reliance was adopted by several newly
independent states throughout the 1960s and 70s. For example, President Julius Nyere
of Tanzania declared in 1967 that his country would pursue its own version of socialism
(Bismarck & Cranford 1979: 3-14). Such, practices became commonplace in Africa, as
Kenya too engaged with a similar concept designated as Harimbi (Mbithi &
Rasmusson 1977: 15)
Besides post-colonial countries, some Communist states deviated from
Moscow’s ideological grip and sought to implement their own specific methods for
governance and growth. In 1969, Nicolae Ceausescu delivered a marathon speech in
which he propounded a new socialist path based on Romanian national qualities
(Priestland 2009: 407]. Similarly, President Enver Hoxha of Albania developed greater
ties with Maoist China and officially adopted self-reliance as the regime’s slogan
(mbeshtetja ne forcat e veta) (Backer 1982: 355). Tirana defined self-reliance as an
inward policy that, while not rejecting international trade and ‘sincere’ socialist foreign
aid, was aimed at guiding all levels of economy toward greater savings, limited waste,
research and development (Turku 2009: 88). Burma too, after the 1962 military coup,
adopted a policy known as the Burmese Way to Socialism (Aung-Thwin et al 1992).
North Korea is another interesting example, mainly because of how it disdained
foreign influence and emphasized military expansionism. These norms became part of
Kim Il-Sung’s Juche Idea, which he espoused in 1967 at the People’s Supreme
Assembly:
The Government of the Republic will implement with all consistency the
line of independence, self-sustenance, and self-defense to consolidate the
political independence of the country (chaju), build up more solidly the
foundations of an independent national economy capable of insuring the
complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation (charip)
(Lee 2003: 106).
Kim Il-Sung, mistrusting what he considered great power meddling,
maintained that he was against flunkeyism, i.e. a kind servile to the bigger powers.25
The Juche idea, according to Kim Il-Sung, was the only way North Korea could pursue
both national independence and socialism (Lee 2003: 106). The new political doctrine
insisted on security, fear of aggression and the need for preparing against armed
conflict (Turku 2009: 71-77) and was thus both strongly nationalistic and militaristic,
with some overtones of fascist political economy.
25
See Exposition of the Juche Idea (1983).
33
Self-reliance, in spite of its different manifestations, is one manner of capturing
how Uzbekistan’s regime gradually positioned itself in international politics. It is
important to be aware though that not all of the actors mentioned above would
acknowledge being described by a single typology. Clearly, North Korea’s Juche idea is
not wholly analogous with Tanzania’s self-proclaimed self-reliance. Evidently, selfreliance might be translated differently into each language and assume quite distinct
connotations. However, for the study herein, it is worth emphasizing again that selfreliance is simply a term in English language that captures key public manifestations
favouring
defence
autonomy,
mercantilism,
strong
economic
and
financial
protectionism, unilateralism, economic development and international equality (see
definition above). It is therefore one way of generalizing and comparing similar
practices in international politics and, more importantly, understanding how President
Karimov gradually positioned himself in the international public sphere.
34
II. Role Theory: Framework and Methodology
II.1. Focusing on process
Roles are one way of conceptualizing the politics of the public sphere independent of
intent. Such an assumption, however, is not to downplay the importance of intent, since
the latter is important for understanding instrumental reasoning or cases of
manipulation and deception (intent means essentially the purpose of action – see
Introduction). Indeed, ‘if speakers said what they meant, then there would be little
room for speech act theory and discourse analysis’ (Stubbs 1983: 147). So, social science
and humanities delve greatly into the question of intent so as to assess intrinsic
preferences and volition.26
While acknowledging the importance of inferring preferences, the following
discussion will steer away from fully decoding reasons for political action by simply
taking literally what actors say and do. For reasons that are explained below, the core
thesis is that cooperation or conflict arises in the public sphere as the roles of different
actors clash and become either compatible or contradictory through time.
The hypothesis might suggest that this is a study of (mis)perception seeing as it
is based on ideational convergence between distinct actors. Still, studies of perception
are intricately connected to intent, since misperception arises when the rationale for
the other’s action is incorrectly deduced.27 Roles and their real implications, on the
other hand, discount inner motivations and derive from interaction in the public
sphere. They are unavoidable and what binds them to political relationships is that
once something is advocated in public, that claim has to legitimated throughout
interaction; otherwise the actor gradually loses public credibility.28
26
In short, different approaches take a variety of core assumptions regarding the intent of actors which,
alongside reasons for action, is usually the building block of many theories. Max Weber (1947: 88-112),
for instance, starts the Theory of Social and Economic Organization with ‘definitions of sociology and
social action’ where he discusses the problems of interpreting meaningful action that can be ‘overt or
purely inward.’ Standard economic textbooks are more categorical in their premises, assuming that
human agents are utility maximizers subject to certain budgetary constraints. Other authors, like
Alexander Wendt (1992: 395) would avoid such categorical assumptions and assume that individuals act
on the basis of meanings they have toward those objects. Moreover, Paul Ricoeur (1981: 43; 213-214) too
begins his discussion of identity by defining hermeneutics as a ‘theory of operation of understanding’ the
nature of intention, action and their meanings.
27
For instance, Mary Buckley and Sally Cummings (2001: 3), in their work on perception, argue that ‘the
conceptual lens, paradigms or frameworks through which political actors view reality in turn affects their
understandings of the behaviour of others and their reactions to it.’ Hence, a study of perception looks at
volition and attempts to understand how the other sees the world. It is therefore slightly inward focused
and tries to portray the intrinsic conceptions that one might have toward an object.
28
As Michael Brecher et al. (1969: 89) argued, even in the case of dissimulation, decision-makers are
likely to be prisoners of their own articulated images since systematic deception leads to credibility
problems.
35
In order to develop these assumptions, the Chapter will begin by developing the
idea of narratives and thereafter address the specific methodology for inferring roles.
The concept of narrative is framed in section II.2, followed by an explanation of how
roles give meaning to action (section II.3). In that section roles will also be
differentiated from the widely used concept of personal identity in order to connect the
former with the public sphere. This will then allow for separating role from intent and
introduce public credibility and its impact in the international public sphere. The last
section indicates how roles and narratives are operationalized (II.4).
It is worth mentioning that many of the concepts proposed hitherto are not the
product of a singular theory. They in fact incorporate a number of contributions from
sociology and international relations. Such an attempt may strike as haphazard,
although it should be regarded as a pluralistic endeavour opposed to ‘rationalism’, i.e.
reducing social behaviour to the interplay of exogenously determined preferences. 29
Accordingly, the framework is based on the contributions of hermeneutical philosophy,
symbolic interactionism and constructivism - namely the works of McCall and
Simmons (1966), White (1984), Wendt (1999; 1992), Ricoeur (1992; 1981), Ku (2000),
Harnisch (2012; 2011a,b); all of whom focus on issues of identity and processes of
social interaction, rather than on mechanistic models of reaction to external stimuli.
Despite the similarities in a number of works it is important to be aware that
these contributions are not perfect substitutes. Symbolic interactionism – a theoretical
framework spawned from sociology – is not analogous to Ricoeur’s hermeneutical
philosophy. The latter focuses on issues beyond the sociological such as textual
interpretation. For that reason, a brief digression into the current state of role theory is
appropriate. This hiatus may then clarify the ontological/epistemological differences
between a number of scholars and shed light on how this thesis is situated in the
current academic debate.
Brief introduction: Role Theory in International Relations and Social Science
Role theory came to life as a theatrical analogy (Biddle 1986: 68) because, essentially,
all actors in a play perform roles. This literary metaphor implies that the theory focuses
on ‘patterned and characteristic social behaviours, parts or identities that are assumed
by social participants, and scripts or expectations for behaviour that are understood by
all and adhered to by the performer’ (Ibid). Realizing its potential, Kal Holsti (1970)
29
See Wendt (1992: 391-394) for a brilliant discussion on the differences between ‘rationalist’ and
‘constructivist/reflectivist’ schools of thought.
36
was the first scholar to apply role theory in international politics. In his 1970 seminal
paper ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, Holsti argued that:
Historians, officials, and theorists of international relations often
characterize foreign policy behaviour by terms which suggest patterned
or recurring decisions and actions by governments. Typical
classifications would include “non-aligned”, “bloc leaders”, “balancers”
and “satellites.” When we classify a state as “non-aligned” we imply that
in a variety of international contexts and situations, its diplomaticmilitary actions and decisions will be consistent with the “rules”
subsumed under the general category or class of states called “nonaligned”’ (Holsti 1970: 233).
Building on Holsti’s (1970) opening argument, Stephen Walker (1987a: 2)
posited that understanding foreign policy through role theory is useful because the
latter describes, organizes and explains behaviour. This line of argument derives from
the tacit assumption that foreign policy is driven by ideas and shaped by particular
expectations (Bengtsson & Elgstrom 2012: 94; Le Prestre 1997a: 4).
A more systematic point in favour of studying roles is that they shape national
interests, thus revealing
national orientations (e.g. Krotz & Sperling 2011: 214;
LePrestre 1997a: 5; Chafetz et al. 1996: 733; Hermann 1987: 125; Wish 1980; Holsti
1970). Another frequently cited benefit is that role theory allows for bridging the gap
between agency and structure, given that roles are, on one hand, ideational constructs
provided by a particular structure, and, on the other hand, enacted by agents (Breuning
2011: 16). Thereafter, some have even suggested that roles may be applied to all levels
of analysis - from actor specific foreign policy to more general international relations
(e.g. Walker 1987a,b; Holsti 1970).
While it is important to be aware of the promise of role theory for international
relations, its history predates Holsti (1970), as it was developed in the 1950s, 60s and
70s by a number of psychologists and sociologists.30 Much the same as in international
relations, role theory did not culminate in one theory, but in a blend of assumptions
and approaches (Harnisch 2011a: 7-8; Nabers 2011: 75; Thies 2009: 4).
While, in any case, classifying complex works is never wholly accurate, one may
still infer the general assumptions that differentiate a number of scholarly
contributions. Accordingly, Dirk Nabers (2011: 4) proposed four general approaches for
applying role theory: symbolic interactionism, organizational theory, structuralism and
functionalism. Traditional role theorists of international relations were mostly
influenced by the latter two, in that they assumed roles to be script based formulae that
30
For a detailed account of the main scholarly contributions of Role Theory to Social Psychology, see
Bruce Biddle (1986).
37
cause action (e.g. Holsti 1970; Wish 1980; Walker 1987c; Shih 1988; Chafetz et al 1996;
LePrestre 1997a). For that reason, those scholars were either directly or indirectly
influenced by the works of classical functionalist sociologists, like Talcott Parsons,
Robert Merton and Neil Gross, who described behaviour as result of either positive or
negative reinforcement (McCall & Simmons 1966: 6-7). Additionally, a structuralistfunctionalist account tends to focus on ego roles such as relatively stable preferences
and beliefs that are taken to be triggers of foreign policy (e.g. Wish 1980, Holsti 1970).
Our concern herein, however, is to avoid the functionalist-structuralist type of
analysis and focus mainly on the contributions of symbolic interactionism, whereby
action is less diagrammatic and more spontaneous.31 This approach is based on the
assumption that ‘mechanistic conformity to a role script is observed only in unusual
circumstances, as in tightly structured organizations in which roles in this sense are
formally defined (…) [Alternatively] individuals involved must somehow improvise
their roles within very broad limits’ (McCall & Simmons 1966: 7). If roles are conceived
in such a strict deterministic manner, it would not be possible to show how meanings
change and gradually became contested through time.
Recent scholarship has gradually adhered to the importance of socialization and
so avoided some of the structural accounts that were prevalent in role theory’s
inception (e.g. Harnisch 2012; Nabers 2011; Thies 2012, 2001).32 This thesis thus
proposes that roles provide a kind of conceptual model that gives meaning to action,
but nothing more (the concept of meaning to action will be better developed below).
Roles cannot wholly predict what will be one’s response to external stimuli; they only
contextualize the level of conflict and cooperation evinced in interaction.
II.2. Imposing Narratives: ‘Emplotting’ as Explaining and Understanding
Action
Narrative serves to ‘transform a list of historical events that would otherwise be only a
chronicle into a story narrative. In order to effect this transformation, the events,
agents, and agencies represented in the chronicle must be encoded as “story-elements,”
that is to say, characterized as the kinds of events, agents, and agencies’ (White 1984:
20). Consequently a narrative, which is imposed on a particular set of occurrences, is
not simply ‘a product of a theory nor as the basis for a method, but rather as a form of
31
For an excellent introduction to symbolic interactionism and its connection to Role Theory, see
Sheldon Stryker’s (1980) book.
32
This criticism has tended to be voiced by European scholars (Thies & Breuning 2012), thereby
revealing an Atlantic divide on ontology and epistemology.
38
discourse which may or may not be used for the representation of historical events’
(Ibid: 2).
That said, narratives have multiple purposes in inquiry. On one hand, they may
be the object of inquiry, whereby they are subject to interpretation. On the other hand,
they are also a means of organizing a particular set of occurrences. This chapter is
concerned mainly with the latter use, in that it proposes to impose a story on various
interlinked incidents. The verb impose, though, has to be read with caution, because
the goal is not to recreate one ‘true’ story, but simply sketch an alternative take on a
process of bilateral interaction.
The manner of imposing a narrative is not random and unstructured. Narratives
depend on emplotment, which provides meaning to a particular set of events and, more
importantly, is a particular type of explanation (White 1984: 20-21). According to
Ricoeur (1992: 143), emplotting ‘reverts the effects of contingency, in the sense of what
could have happened differently or which might not have happened at all, by
incorporating it in some way into the effect of necessity or probability exerted by the
configuring act.’ Prior to developing the concept of role, however, it is important to
clarify how emplotment is a specific type of explanation.
The dialectic of Explanation and Understanding
Present day social science is fixated on Max Weber’s apparently irreconcilable
dichotomy of explaining (Erklaren) and understanding (Verstehen) (e.g. Hollis &
Smith 1990). This consolidated distinction has, nonetheless, been subject to varying
degrees of contestation. Patrick Jackson (2010: 18-23), for example, basing himself on
Max Weber, argued that both are in fact not mutually exclusive. His claim presupposes
that science depends on the goal and not just the method; and so understanding and
explanation are equally ‘scientific’. Paul Ricoeur (1981; 1976) offers another
interpretation, by positing that explanation and understanding are dialectic, i.e.
mutually dependent.
The dialectical interpretation stems from Ricoeur’s (1981) ideas regarding
interpretation (hermeneutics) and the human sciences as themselves hermeneutical.
His analysis is too complex to summarize fully herein, yet it is important to be aware of
its key points. According to Ricoeur, explanation is not just causal in the Humean
sense, i.e. ‘a regular sequence of antecedents and consequences with no inner logical
connection between them’ (Ricoeur 1981: 218); rather explanation unfolds a number of
propositions and meanings, whereas understanding occurs if the whole is built into one
synthesizing act (Ricoeur 1981; 1976: 72). Ricoeur (1981: 217) clarifies this point by
39
comparing his thesis to Levi-Strauss’s (1955) structural explanation of the myth. He
argues that Levi-Strauss’s explanatory study already presupposes an understanding of
what is to be a myth, and that his explanation is actually both insufficient and even
insipid if left by itself, given that it is only in the act of understanding that the whole is
comprehended (Ricoeur 1981: 211).
The dialectical conceptualization reveals that while understanding and
explaining are both useful concepts, insisting on their distinction stems from a
particular way of conducting science based on Humean causal explanation. Cause,
according to Ricoeur (1981: 214), may also be construed as ‘an expression, or a phrase,
which allows us to consider the action as this or that.’ Ricoeur (1981, 1976) therefore is
not just criticizing one strict way explaining but also proposing an alternative.
Other authors discussed below would probably agree with Ricoeur’s argument.
For instance, Alexander Wendt (1999: 165) and both George McCall and Jerry
Simmons (1966: 47-48) argue that not all effects are causal in the typical ‘scientific
sense’, rather constitutive or interactive. In light of this, McCall and Simmons (1966:
47-48) stipulate that social (inter)action cannot be conceived as a product of
independent objects. Instead, interaction is the combination of equally dependent
objects, none of which can be fully isolated to explain the effect. As a result, in some
circumstances, it might be best to avoid explaining social action in the strict linear
sense posited by Hume.
Explanation through emplotment in a Narrative
In theory, a classic explanation of causes based on antecedent independent conditions
is rather straightforward to operationalize. Independent and dependent variables are
set, and causal explanations are tested to rule out mere correlation. Given the
predominance of that tradition, Ricoeur’s conceptualization seems counter-intuitive,
but imposing a narrative requires precisely an interweaving between explanation and
understanding.
Understanding is disclosed once a set of events is conceived as a whole, much
like when one is immersed in reading, inasmuch as each sentence is construed as part
of a larger picture. A particular choice of emplotment imposes a choice of story-type,
which endows events with meaning (White 1984: 20), whereby the latter refers to a
contingent relationship between objects in a narrative (Epstein 2008: 7). This
alternative manner of sequencing action should not be regarded as completely
idiosyncratic, since, much like scientific explanation, emplotment may also be
validated, even though one is tempted to dismiss such a methodology as guesswork.
40
Hence, the ‘truthfulness’ of a narrative lies in emplotment subscribing to a
correspondence criterion:
Not only must the singular existential statements that comprise the
“chronicle” of the historical account “correspond” to the events of which
they are predications, the narrative as a whole must “correspond” to the
general configuration of the sequence of events of which it is an account.
Which is to say that the sequence of “facts” as they are emplotted in order
to make a “story” out of what would otherwise be only a “chronicle,” must
correspond to the general configuration of the “events” of which the “facts”
are propositional indicators (White 1984: 17-28).
Recognizing that constructing narratives is subject to validation is similar to
Jackson’s (2010: 18-23) alternative view of science - that validating a work should be
based on the overall assumptions and coherency of the argument, rather than on how it
abides by a universal methodology.
II.3. Roles as Predicate-Processes of Action in the Public Sphere
Roles explaining action
Ricoeur (1992: 144), quoting Claude Bremond, defined role as ‘the attribution of some
possible, actual, or completed predicate-process to a subject-person.’ McCall and
Simmons (1966: 66) also propose a similar conception: ‘a plausible line of action
characteristic and expressive of the particular personality that happens to occupy the
given position and represents that person’s mode of coming to grips with the general
expectations held toward someone in his position.’ These two conceptions of role
assume that it predicates or shapes action, but not that it necessarily causes it in the
Humean sense (see above). So roles can act as a form of emplotment, since they provide
meaning to the narrative, shaping and delimiting the scope of action:
In this attribution we see the narrative solution to the problem of
ascribing action to an agent (…) The reference in the very definition of
“role” (...) situates the role within action dynamics (…) On the basis of
this definition of elementary sequence, it becomes possible to draw up a
full repertoire of roles, by taking into account a series of enrichments
bearing on both the subject-person and the predicate-process (Ricoeur
1992: 144).
Perhaps it is important to emphasize that roles are not material entities in
themselves and do not exist beyond the context of interaction. In the light of the
definitions, roles should simply be regarded as heuristic tools that subsume a number
41
of characteristics pertaining to both the subject-person and the action. This, however,
does not make them irrelevant, as will be made clearer below, because they provide
meaning to action in a narrative, and contribute to ascertaining the actor’s public
credibility.
That said, in this thesis action is broadly defined as what the actor does.
Consequently, it is not restricted to just physical behaviour. John Austin’s speech act
theory demonstrated how the act of speaking is also action, since certain verbs do more
than just the locutionary (the act of saying) (Kaplan 2003: 30). Undeniably, besides
kicking, hugging and running, ‘in speaking the actor does things; it achieves certain
concrete practical results. However, it also positions itself in relation to the other
speaking actors, it marks itself in a particular way’ (Epstein 2008: 13).
According to Ricoeur (1981: 203-206), action is also like a text since it is (1)
fixated; (2) autonomized; (3) relevant; and (4) an open work. For reasons of space it is
not possible to develop fully Ricoeur’s perspective on action and so it is best to focus on
the first two core concepts (1 and 2). Action being fixated implies that it leaves its
‘marks on time’, which means that ‘action itself, action as meaningful, may become an
object of science, without losing its character of meaningfulness, through a kind of
objectification similar to the fixation which occurs in writing’ (Ricoeur 1981: 203).
Thereupon, Ricoeur (1981: 206) argues that action leaving its mark is the
‘autonomization of action’ similar to text: ‘in the same way that a text is detached from
its author, an action is detached from its agent and develops consequences of its own.’
He then develops the claim by highlighting the differences between simple action
segments and complex actions, the latter of which leave segments ‘so remote from the
initial simple segments, which can be said to express the intention of the doer, that the
ascription of these actions or action-segments constitutes a problem as difficult to solve
as the authorship in some cases of literary criticism’ (Ricoeur 1981: 206). What this
means, essentially, is that unlike a simple dialogue, where one can gradually ascertain
the original meaning of the speaker, action may become a written text that ‘is out there’,
thus not subject to the original intent. In fact, unless one is able to dialogue with the
intervening actors, intent becomes a matter of ‘guessing’.33
Of course, interaction does not become meaningless and random. When action
is emplotted by roles within a narrative, the meanings of action become restricted and
so roles explain by ‘predicating’ a relatively stable ‘line of action.’ In other words, they
constrain the possible reasons for action being as such, thereby delimiting the possible
origins of intent. The following example may clarify some of these points. After
33
According to Ricoeur (1981), guessing need not be random and unstructured. As mentioned above,
processes of guessing need to be validated, meaning that some inferences are obviously better than others
in explaining action.
42
witnessing an individual assisting an elderly woman cross the street, one could report
the event in a narrative as ‘the Good Samaritan helped the old lady cross the street.’ The
Good Samaritan is the role ascribed to both the action and to the actor who helped the
old lady; or according to Ricoeur and Bremond, Good Samaritan established meaning
by providing a complete predicate-process to a subject-person. Role therefore also
subsumes the characteristics pertaining to that action itself. The role hints at the
latter’s intention but does not reveal it, i.e. one is still unaware of why the individual is
a Good Samaritan or why he or she helped the old lady in the first place. That choice
depends on the nature of the lady herself, the particular setting and how the individual
conceptualized the situation in that particular moment in time. If one was aware of all
the circumstances and knew the Good Samaritan intimately, both privately and
publicly, one could probably surmise the intent.
The difference between role and identities
A crucial characteristic of the foregoing example is that ascribing a role seems like
fixing an identity upon an individual. Identification is, in fact, a key process in any type
of interaction since one has to classify things in order to act (McCall and Simmons
1966: 64-65).34 By identifying a predicate-process, a role is in itself an identity.
However, it is not the identity commonly used in many works of social psychology and
sociology. In other words, it is not a personal identity, derived from identifying one ‘in
terms of categories referring to unique individuals’ (McCall and Simmons 1966: 64-65).
This is an important distinction, because roles allocate meaning to action and do not
necessarily result from ego conceptions or selfhood.35
Many scholars connect selfhood to identification and by extension to the term
identity. McCall and Simmons’ (1966), for example, propose the concept of ‘roleidentity’; defined as ‘the character and the role that an individual devises for himself as
an occupant of a particular position’ (McCall & Simmons 1966: 67).36 Consequently,
‘role-identity’ encompasses ‘his imaginative view of himself as he likes to think of
34
Identification is meant as ‘to be able to make apparent to others, amid a range of particular things of the
same type (…)’ (Ricoeur 1992: 27).
35
Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy alongside symbolic interactionism may clarify what is meant by
this distinction. Central to symbolic interactionism is the work of George Mead who developed the
notions of ‘Self’, ‘Me’ and ‘I’ (Harnisch 2012, 2011b: 39; McCall & Simmons 1966: 53-57). ‘Self’
happens as an actor learns to take the role of the other and examines his or herself from the other
perspective (Harnisch 2011b: 39). Mead’s analysis does not exactly parallel Ricoeur’s (1992) but there
are commonalities (Ezzy 1998: 246). Ricoeur (1992) proposes somewhat similar conceptions of selfhood
(ipse) and sameness (idem). The latter is ‘a relation of relations’ that allows for one to identify a character
as being the same’ (Ricoeur 1992: 116-118). The former (ipse), conversely, is related to one’s own
subjective dimension and so inward focused.
36
Italics added.
43
himself being and acting as an occupant of that position’ (Ibid). Hence, role-identity is
in fact similar to other ego identities applied by prominent role theorists, seeing as it
includes one’s own self-conception.37
However, roles, according to the definitions above, are not identities in a
personal or inward sense. This explains why Peter Burke and Judy Tully (1977: 883)
proposed dividing McCall and Simmons’ (1996) concept ‘role-identity’ into two:
identity as ‘the internal component of role/ identity’ and role as ‘the external
component.’
Evidently, one cannot ignore that roles do have an impact in personal identities
and vice-versa, whereby personal identities provide the actor with a framework for
interpretation of the social position that roles supply an actor with; and, on the other
hand, actors create plans and perform activities according to the boundaries of their
roles, which then reinforce their identity (Nabers 2011: 82-83). However, because this
thesis is not looking into self-perception it is important to distinguish between the two
widely used concepts.
Roles, Public Sphere and Public Credibility
The question that arises naturally, then, is why is a role important for emplotting a
narrative and studying politics? The reason is that action, like text, develops meaning
beyond the original intent of the actor (see above), eventually being subsumed under a
number of roles. Hence, an actor might either wittingly or unwittingly develop a set of
composite roles that may or may not coincide with one’s personal identity or selfhood.
Unlike beliefs or intrinsic preferences which cannot be observed directly (see
Introduction), roles provide meaning to public action – action that is out there - no
matter the intent. For that reason, even though roles are a sort of heuristic, they are not
negligible because the public sphere has real impact.
The public is a ‘nominal construction about boundary and membership’ (Ku
2000: 225). Agnes Ku (2000: 226) conceptualizes the public sphere as something that
37
For instance, some scholars define ‘role conceptions’ as a covert expectation that is intrinsic and
constitutive of an actor or an attitude (Biddle 1979: 154). Holsti (1970: 230-241, 244-245) applies
‘national role conception’ to international politics, which encompasses norms and definitions of ego, such
as values, orientations, interests and goals. Wendt (1999) was aware of the terminological complexities,
between identities and roles, and so developed a stricter taxonomy: (1) ‘type identity’, which refers to a
label placed on people or groups who share common characteristics and is based on intrinsic properties;
(2) ‘role identity’ which also ‘depends on other and is derived from occupying a position in a social
structure; (3) ‘collective identity’, which ‘takes relation between self and other to its logical conclusion,
identification’, combining role identity with type identity (Ibid). Crucial to Wendt’s (1999)
conceptualization is therefore ‘identification’ which is intricately connected to selfhood. Hence, Wendt’s
(1999) process of identification is a sort of holistic undertaking that subsumes both ‘type’ and ‘role
identities’, thereby leading to the recognition of self.
44
‘underlines the existence of a realm of political life where citizens of a particular
community come openly to define and contest the cultural and moral meanings of
politics, public life, and citizenship.’ Hence, it should be regarded as ‘communicative
institution belonging generally to the public domain of citizenship, or more
particularly, to civil society’ (Ibid: 227).
It is important to recall that the modern concept of public sphere dates back to
Jürgen Habermas’s (1989) seminal book Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere. This work traces the rise and fall of the public sphere as an institution of
rational-critical dialogue. Perhaps one problem in his influential thesis is that while it
portrays the various dichotomies existing in ‘the state/public versus market/private
distinction and the public versus mass distinction (…) [it] undertheorizes the
conceptual pair of publicness (openness) versus secrecy’ (Ku 2000: 216-217).
38
Since
Habermas’s analysis delves only briefly into that pivotal distinction of this work, Ku’s
(2000) understanding of the public sphere is an excellent way of conceiving roles as
part of a non-private domain where meanings are visible and open to contestation.
Regrettably, her conception is heavily centred on the domestic state level and especially
on those states where citizenship warrants for open political debate. Indeed, not all
states match this criterion.
Nevertheless, the concept of public sphere is still useful if extended to global
politics. According to Manuel Castells (2008: 78, 80), the international public sphere is
a sort of space ‘not subject to any particular sovereign power but, instead, is shaped by
the variable geometry of relationships between states and global non state actors.
Consequently, the public sphere shapes the actions of traditional states in the
international arena (Ibid: 80). Although the public sphere is greatly shaped by the
media (Ibid: 79, 89-90; Ku 2000: 227, 231), it is a heurist concept that acts as a
‘cultural/informational repository of ideas and projects that feed public debate’
(Castells 2008: 79).
The concept of civil society in a global environment consists of the specific civil
actors in a particular country (1); international non-governmental organizations (2);
social movements that shape globalization by seeking to promote, for example,
international justice (3); and, lastly, ‘the emergence of spontaneous, ad hoc
mobilizations using horizontal, autonomous networks of communication’ (Ibid: 85-86).
Consequently, the public sphere has effects that are very much real in international
politics, since public debates reveal or galvanize crises pertaining to the efficiency of the
38
For a detailed description of some of the main criticisms of Habermas’s work on the public sphere, see
Nick Crossley and John Roberts’s (2004: 10-17) excellent edited introduction to the topic.
45
distribution of goods, legitimacy, identity and equity (Ibid: 82-83). Therefore, even
those who are not ‘globalized’ face scrutiny from the public sphere (Ibid: 81).
By expanding the concept of the public sphere to the international, it is possible
to propound how politicians are restricted by their own roles.39 Ku’s (2000: 236) idea
of public credibility - defined as an ‘evaluative claim by the public of citizens, of moral
status and moral authority about particular actors, institutions, or the whole
government on the basis of their public presentations and performances’- is the key
reason why politicians cannot fully escape the consequences of their own autonomized
actions. Public credibility may, therefore, be extended to role theory. As already
discussed, no matter the intent, action is evaluated according to past actions subsumed
under a number of roles, which in turn are observed and discussed by a public, both
domestic and international.
Roles and Role Conflict within the Public Sphere
By connecting roles to public credibility, it is now possible to develop a few interesting
propositions of role theory. On a first note, it is important to be aware that each role
has a counterrole (Stryker 1980: 58). For instance, in the case of the Good Samaritan,
its meaning derives partially from the existence of a semantic opposite. 40
Individuals are capable of several complex actions and therewith have multiple
roles which constitute an aggregate role set (Thies 2001; 2009: 5), which then requires
a degree of role cohesiveness. In other words, two or more roles have to be more or less
coherent with each other; otherwise the character becomes strained (Backman 1970:
314). Indeed, cohesiveness, or a lack thereof, means that roles are consistently
contested within a particular context, leading to other counter or complementary roles
(Harnish 2011a: 8; Cantir & Kaarbo 2012). Naturally, contestation reveals the most
interesting corollary of role theory, which is conflict, i.e. contradictory meanings
between different roles.
Role conflict is classified under two distinct types: intra-role conflict and interrole conflict. The former pertains to role divergence within a particular role set and the
latter to incongruence between the roles of two different characters (based on Harnisch
39
It is perhaps important to mention that this chapter purposively endorses ‘public credibility’ rather than
‘legitimacy’, which I believe is a broader concept including tradition, charisma, emotional empathy,
rational discussion and legality. For more on the origins of legitimacy, see Weber (1947: 133-133).
40
The idea of all roles being what they are not is an interesting way of capturing the complexities of
meaning. Given that roles are linked to performance, signifying action with one role may imply that other
domains are marginalized. Roles are therefore one way of conceiving Judith Butler’s (1993: 187-222)
identification of the real: a role can be one, but not the other, which may lead to marginalization.
46
2011a: 8; Barnett 1993). With regard to the inner role set, its stability is based on
avoiding the following situations:
-
Role ambiguity - when the specificity of a role is low;
-
Role malintegration - when multiple roles do not interlock;
-
Role discontinuity - when different sequential contexts require disjointed roles;
-
Role overload - when too many role expectations exist.
Yet, while delving into intra-role conflict is important for evaluating internal
coherency, the more interesting case for interaction is inter-role conflict. Returning
therefore to the example of the Good Samaritan might be appropriate. Imagine that a
politician publicly promised to implement legislation for assisting the elderly cross the
street. In this case, Good Samaritan would seem again to be an appropriate way of
identifying both the actor and his promise. Thereafter, the audience in the public
sphere would observe whether subsequent action is congruent with the role of Good
Samaritan. Of course, role theory does not deliberate which specific action will be taken
after the promise since it is not concerned with volition and personal identity. It merely
points out that there is now an open space for contestation and thus further action. If
the promise was never kept, and the actor keeps reaffirming Good Samaritan-like
promises, conflict becomes more probable. However, even if the vow is broken, the
story continues, for one has to justify oneself with even more words (Heathershaw
2009: 10). This is likely to be captured by the public sphere leading to further
contestation and negative public credibility, to which the actor has to pay heed. Another
case of role conflict may simply originate from bilateral interaction. If a Good
Samaritan faces an Evil-doer, meanings are publicly malintegrated and so for inter-role
conflict to subside between the two actors, both have to locate less disparaging roles;
thereby leading to a continuous process of adjustment in interaction.
The example reveals that coping with public credibility is essentially a process of
‘legitimation’ (McCall & Simmons 1966: 95),41 whereby the actor is gradually forced to
cope with situations of conflict. McCall and Simmons (1966: 95-99) and Sebastian
Harnisch (2012: 56) thus propose a number of ways of dealing with a rise in inter-role
conflict:42
41
It is important to mention that McCall and Simmons’s (1996) mechanisms for legitimation are much
broader. According to McCall and Simmons (1996: 95), crises in legitimation are ‘to be found in the everpresent discrepancy between the role-identity itself and the role-support earned from various audiences by
a particular role-performance.’As mentioned earlier, this chapter is not concerned with the issue of either
‘role-identity’ or ‘selfhood’ and therefore the coping responses that were selected avoid introspection.
Nevertheless, actors still legitimate their statements because these actions are out in the public sphere and
affect public credibility, regardless of their own imagination.
42
These responses are similar to Harnisch’s (2012: 56) proposals for gradual change in action through
‘role learning’. However, much like McCall and Simmons’s (1966) theory, they are responses closely
related to one’s own imagined identity. Still, Harnisch’s (2012: 56) alternative is also worthy of being
47
-
Selectively tailor the audience’s response to one’s action, whereby the norms
of ‘propriety and polite discourse (…) dictate that we “nicify” the responses
to the person’;
-
Withdraw from the interaction;
-
Enact another role within a role set;
-
Resort to scapegoating and thus blame someone else for rising role conflict;
-
Resort to disavowal of a performance by claiming, for example, that the
former statement was not wholly serious and simply an instance of humour;
-
Condemn the audience that does not support the action.
A Narrative of bilateral relationships: Cooperation vs. Conflict
Given the importance of inter-role conflict and cohesion, the concept opens up the
possibility of cooperation in a way similar to how Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane
(1985) defined it. Both argued that cooperation is not harmony or ‘complete identity of
interests’, but the result of actors adjusting ‘behaviour to the actual anticipated
preferences of others’ (Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 226). Likewise, given that roles
subsume actions autonomized in the public sphere, cooperation becomes visible if
actions do not question the roles of the other; avoiding thus the problem of public
credibility. In other words, cooperation comes about when actors adjust their actions in
the public sphere according to the roles of the other; allowing for increased
compatibility.
Even though Axelrod and Keohane (1985) mentioned preferences, their
conceptualization is still appropriate when modified to role theory. For that reason,
narratives emplotted by roles may recreate how cooperation or conflict occurs gradually
through time.
II.4. Narratives and Inferring Roles: Methodology for Uzbekistan’s
bilateral relationships
As indicated in the Introduction and Chapter I, this dissertation:
mentioned. The scholar proposes the following lines of action: the first is ‘Ego vs. Alter’, which means a
shift between the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ segments of a role. This is essentially a dramatic change when the actor is
facing a potentially new situation and the ‘I’ segment of the role tends to reject previous social obligations
and ‘constructs itself as prior or above the obligations of society to an alter-oriented orientation.’ A
second shift, labelled ‘Significant vs. Generalized’, can occur when the actor decides to interact with
other significant or generalized others, being essentially a variation of the scope of experience (Harnisch
2012: 56). Finally, ‘Strong vs. Weak Internalization’ alternations refer to situations when the actor may
move from a heavily internalized or committed role to a less committed one (Ibid: 56).
48
- proposes four narratives for describing Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationships with
Russia, the United States, Germany and Turkey, and for depicting how conflict,
cooperation and rapprochement came to be;
- pertains to evaluating whether President Karimov propounded self-reliant roles in the
international public sphere.
In view of these two goals, the remaining sections of this Chapter set out this
thesis’s methodology for both constructing narratives and inferring roles.
Selecting the actors and the events for the narratives
The aim is to impose narratives of relationships based on the way events were
articulated in the international public sphere. For that reason, open parliamentarian
meetings, senate hearings, opinion articles, transcripts of television appearances,
interviews, summits, speeches and legislation are all used to recreate events. More
importantly, the lists of all articles used for inferring President Karimov’s role set are all
indicated in Appendix I.
What determines the presence of actors in the narrative is whether their actions,
such as speeches, gesticulations or legislation were given headway by the global media
and thus obtained visibility in the international public sphere; all of which can be
obtained by the news reports and accounts of international organizations.
Consequently, for the United States, Russia, Germany and Turkey, any individual or
organization is likely to be a character within the narrative, so long as they have some
sway in the international public sphere. For obvious reasons, it is more likely for the
foreign ministers, heads of state and government to have larger roles in each narrative.
As concerns Uzbekistan, President Islom Karimov’s own public roles will be a
central element of most narratives – an assumption that is not farfetched for two
reasons: Mr Karimov has been in power since 1989 and has thus been Uzbekistan’s
constant representative; he also plays a decisive role in Uzbekistan’s centralized politics
and foreign policy (Kazemi 2003: 208; Luong 2004; Spechler & Spechler 2010: 159).
Nevertheless, other actors in Tashkent’s political establishment may also be portrayed,
so long as they are in the spotlight of the international public sphere. Their actions,
though, are all emplotted according to President Karimov’s role set. This may be a
strong assumption, but it is important to be aware that Uzbekistani officials rarely, if
ever, contradict their President’s public assertions.43
.
Inferring the roles of actors in the United States, Russia, Germany and Turkey
43
Interview source (2009-2012). See Appendix IV for information regarding sources.
49
As concerns Washington, Moscow, Berlin and Ankara’s foreign policies, there are
ample secondary sources available for determining their specific role sets (see
introduction for why those particular actors were selected). So, inferring roles for these
actors is less complex than for Uzbekistan. Subsequently, in order to contextualize the
stories, each narrative is preceded by a brief introduction on the key roles of those
countries. These, then, shall be used to emplot their actions toward Uzbekistani
leadership.
Inferring Uzbekistan’s roles: circularity and spoken word as the unit of analysis
Inferring roles for Tashkent can be a conundrum, simply because it is a twenty year old
independent Republic that only very recently started interacting in the international
public sphere.44 As the foregoing analysis demonstrated, the relationship between roles
and action is reciprocal. Roles are derived from action, but the former provides
meaning to the latter. Therefore, a simple way of both inferring and applying roles
would be to observe President Karimov’s speech acts, infer his roles and then emplot
the narrative diachronically. This is the actual approach that is adopted, even though
some might categorize it as circular (Muller 2011: 57; Le Prestre 1997a: 12).
Circularity, in any case, need not be a problem and is actually welcomed. Much
like the reading of a text, roles and actions within a narrative are part of a general
hermeneutical circle: ‘the reconstruction of a text as whole necessarily has a circular
character, in the sense that the presupposition of a certain kind of whole is implied in
the recognition of the parts. And reciprocally, it is in construing the details that we
construe the whole’ (Ricoeur 1981: 211). So, roles are indeed inferred from actions,
which reciprocally predicate actions within the whole narrative. Harnisch (2012: 5862), for example, applies role theory to three case studies but does not specify how the
roles were obtained. Consequently, action and roles are more or less conflated
throughout his depiction, whereby roles name action and vice-versa. This, however, is
perfectly acceptable herein since the aim is not to make sense of Humean causality or
ontological priority; the goal is simply to deliver meaning to a whole process of
interaction (Ricoeur’s understanding – see above).
That said, the object of analysis is solely President Karimov’s spoken word
(speeches, interviews and remarks at conferences), since it is both directed toward a
public sphere, and the way in which actors justify and position themselves in relation to
44
Scholarship on Uzbekistani foreign policy exists, even though, this thesis disagrees with a number of
assumptions regarding the study of Uzbekistan’s international relations (see Chapter I).
50
others (see discussion above). So even if legislation or other actions are useful for
determining roles, they would still have been justified and deliberated by spoken word.
It is also important to mention that unlike some scholars who focus just on foreign
policy statements (e.g. Holsti 1970, Wish 1980, LePrestre et al. 1997), this inquiry
assumes that, despite the differences existing between domestic and international
politics, leadership has to avoid role contestation within both spheres. So, any type of
statement may be important for role inference.
Rhetoric and intra-role coherence: evaluating self-reliance
To infer roles, it is necessary to delve into how the themes of statements are combined
and interrelated. In fact ‘it is only as bundles that these relations can be put to use and
combined so as to produce a meaning’ (Levi-Strauss 1955: 431). The paragraphs in each
speech are the unit of analysis, all of which are labelled by a theme or topic, based on
how it compares to the speech as a whole. In those cases in which scripts are not
divided into paragraphs, the speech is split into units according to its main themes.
Ascertaining themes allows for finding categories of ideas in President
Karimov’s speeches and overall rhetoric. Thereafter, to grasp the meaning of the
paragraphs and their importance to the speech as a whole, instances of ‘strategic action’
are sought for. ‘Strategic action’ is essentially action ‘oriented toward a goal but not
necessarily planned to detail or strictly instrumentalist’ (Wodak et al. 2009: 32).
.According
-
to Ruth Wodak et al. (2009: 33), there are six cases of ‘strategic action’:
Constructive strategies, in which leadership promotes a certain kind of national
identity;
-
Strategies of justification in which leadership legitimates its past actions for a
common national perception that has been tainted;
-
Strategies of transformation, which transform aspects of identity into another
conceptualized form;
-
Dismantling or destructive strategies, which seek to disentangle an existing
construct;
-
Strategies of sameness, which create a temporal or spatial homogeneity;
-
Strategies of difference (dissimilation), seeking to create temporal or spatial
heterogeneity.
Based on these strategies, it is possible to observe how Uzbekistani leadership
set forth its epistemology and ontogeny in the public sphere, i.e. the rules for
ascertaining truth and declaring the objects about which it is possible and meaningful
to speak (Sapsford 2006: 262). This allows for constructing broad ‘repertoires’ based
51
on the themes that appear to be consistent throughout President Karimov’s speeches
(Ibid: 267), from which roles are inferred. Once roles are classified, the overall
coherence of the role set is evaluated according to role ambiguity, malintegration,
discontinuity and overload so as to locate the potential for intra-role conflict.
The speeches, transcripts and statements made by President Karimov from 1989
to 2010 were obtained from the Nexis database and are all indicated in Appendix I. It
is important to bear in mind that the statements are all translations into English, which
is a suitable way of standardizing them into distinct repertoires. In fact, it is only by
assuming first that translating themes is possible that one can then conceive of public
interaction between actors speaking different languages. So, it is worth recalling that
the purpose herein is not to focus on specific meanings or linguistic cohesion - the
formal links between clauses and sentences (Nunan 1993: 21) –, rather to look into how
themes delivered publicly can be grouped into roles, and then to evaluate whether they
follow the general premises of self-reliance as an English language typology. Evidently,
public manifestations are not private political discussions, where special expressions,
metaphors and inside jokes tend to be more predominant. Consequently, their
translation, while not revealing the complexity behind different meanings, makes
repertoires available from which roles can be inferred for an English-speaking
readership.
Chronological approach
A chronological approach divided into five periods is adopted to analyze President
Karimov’s spoken word: 1989-1993, 1994-2001, 2002-2005, 2006-2008 and 20092010. The reason for breaking down the analysis into different periods is twofold: on
one hand, it facilitates the task of analyzing large amounts of material; on the other
hand, it allows for evaluating the possibility of radical changes in rhetoric, which might
corroborate whether alignment and/or orientation shifts actually occurred as some
scholars proposed (see literature review of chapter 1).
The first period contains statements made by Islom Karimov prior to
Uzbekistan’s independence. He became Secretary of the Uzbekistan’s Communist Party
in 1989 - the highest political position in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (UzSSR).
Therefore, references to that period in time are useful to indicate how he positioned
himself in the public sphere. That period ends in 1993, which is the year Uzbekistani
authorities were forced to issue their own currency and formally disentangle
themselves from Russia (Hale 1994). Therefore, the time span of 1989 to 1993 seems to
52
be a suitable time period for capturing the public meaning of President Karimov’s first
acts.
Spechler and Spechler (2009: 354) then consider the 1991 to 1999 and the 1999
to 2003/2005 time periods as the occasions Tashkent delinked from Moscow and
relied on Washington. Alternatively, this thesis proposes a slightly different time span:
the first extending from 1993 to 2001 and the second from 2002 to 2005. The latter
corresponds to the so called rise and fall of Washington’s influence over Tashkent,
starting from establishment of the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) base in 2002 and ending in
demobilization after the Andijan crisis of 2005. According to some authors, after
American ascendance, Uzbekistani leadership sought to re-link itself with Russia until
2008 (see literature review in Chapter 1). After this brief pro-Russian period, President
Karimov authorized NATO’s Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to cross through
Uzbekistan in 2008 and so rapprochement with Washington soon became more visible.
These time intervals correspond, more or less, to the periods in which Uzbekistani
leadership altered its supposed alignments.
Content analysis: purpose, coding and reliability
Content analysis might also reveal some interesting points and is subjective, much like
discourse analysis, since it relies on a series of presuppositions regarding the choice of
categories and coding (LePrestre 1997: 12). Notwithstanding the limitations, content
analysis, based on the frequency count of written works, speeches and interviews of
leadership, is a suitable approach for obtaining information (Brecher et al 1969: 89).
More specifically, it offers an alternative take on the exogenous content of leadership’s
speeches and how they evolved over time (LePrestre 1997: 11). Hence, content analysis
can signal situations of changes in roles, which are crucial for emplotting the narrative.
It is just used for description and not for unravelling meanings (Kesby 2009: 11).
A systematic methodology for classifying roles was presented by Naomi Wish
(1980) based on Michael Brecher’s et al. (1969) complex foreign policy analysis
framework. According to Wish (1980) role conception may be divided into thee key
variables: Status, Motivational Orientation and Substantive Issue-areas. Status refers
to the capabilities leadership attributes greater absolute advantage. Motivational
Orientation reveals the general attitude toward political and international affairs.
Substantial Issue-area indicates which themes were discussed. The categories which
constitute each of these variables are indicated below on table 1 and it is important to
mention that substantial issue-areas are not mutually exclusive. For example, it is
53
perfectly possible for President Karimov to articulate in each paragraph issues
connected to both economics and security.
Table 1: Role Conception
-Status
a) Capabilities
b) Position toward Others
To which endowments does leadership attach greater absolute
advantage, such as human resources, natural resources or economical
system, military and local culture.
How does leadership perceive its relative position toward other
entities, i.e. is it a lesser partner, an equal one, or a superior one.
- Motivational Orientation
c) Wish to Expand
Leadership wishes or not to expand into the international arena.
d) Competitive/Cooperative motivations
If leadership wishes to expand into the international arena
competitively or cooperatively.
The amount of change leadership wishes to see in the domestic and
international arenas.
e) The amount of change proposed
- Substantive Issue-areas
f) Economic
g) Security
h) Other
i), j) Political
k), l) Universal Values
m) Unilateral Oriented
n) Multilateral or Integration Oriented
Discussion on economic resources, growth, development, reform and
macroeconomic data.
Discussion of military issues or national security threats
Discussion of issues not related to economics or security, such as
culture, history, environment, justice and education
i) Promotion or j) inhibition of political or ideological principles
related to democracy, constitutions, authoritarianism, elections, rule
of law, governmental officials, parties and the role of the state
k) Promotion or l) inhibition of issues related to racial harmony,
universal justice and human rights
Issues related to international politics emphasizing own interests,
zero-sum games, nationalism and pursuit of own goals.
Issues related to international politics emphasizing the need for
multi-lateral approaches, bi-lateral cooperation and deeper
engagement.
Source: Wish (1980: 538-540)
The paragraphs of each speech are the unit of analysis and detailed information
on both the coding procedures for each of the role conception variables is available in
the Appendix II. Lastly, content analysis should guarantee reliability, i.e. yield the same
results from identical phenomena regardless of the circumstances of application
(Krippendorff 1980: 129-130). In order to allow for minimum reliability, an inquiry
should be reproducible, that is allow for the investigatory processes to be repeated
using different coders (Ibid: 131-132). Owing to time and budgetary limitations, it is not
possible to duplicate procedures by applying different coders, but the results of content
the analysis are all indicated in Appendix III.
54
III. Inferring roles and role cohesion from 1989 to 2010
Following the methodology of Chapter II, bundles of thematic relationships were
inferred by focusing on the instances of strategic action employed by President
Karimov from 1989 to 2010. This type of rhetorical analysis revealed three different
group-types of repertoires related to technocracy, cultural authenticity and prestige,
from which fifteen consistent roles were then located (the findings are summarized in
table 2 of section III.6 of this Chapter).
The inferences have a number of interesting implications, showing that a
relatively coherent public rhetoric was employed by President Karimov from the start.
This suggests then that the public orientation did not shift (on definitions of orientation
see Chapter I). In fact, self-reliance seems to be a suitable way of capturing President
Karimov’s overall role set from 1989 to 2010, given his persistent call for defending
international equality and seeking genuine independence.
On the other hand, the discussion below does show that strategic actions were
fluid. The rhetoric emanating from Uzbekistan’s leader was dynamic and actually far
from following a univocal trend. President Karimov gradually shifted his emphasis,
particularly around the period of the Andijan crisis, decreasing technocratic rhetoric
and concentrating on authenticity.45 For this reason, any narrative on Uzbekistani
relations cannot ignore the effects of both the Andijan crisis and the Colour revolutions
on Mr Karimov’s rhetoric, particularly on how these occurrences revealed a degree of
growing intra-role conflict within the relatively stable role set. This means then that the
relative consistency of the two central roles (seeker of genuine independence and
defender of equality) is not a sign of a wholly stable political rhetoric. While President
Karimov was able to face difficult situations without seeming entirely inconsistent, he
still had to adapt to a number of discontinuities that gradually revealed role
malintegration (see Chapter II for the main concepts of role theory).
To show how the roles subsume the key strategic actions of President Karimov,
sections one (III.1) through five (III.5) describe the repertoires found for each period of
analysis. Lastly, section six (IV.6) deliberates on the pivotal roles, their overall
coherence, cases of intra-role conflict and how self-reliance seems to capture the
essence of President Karimov’s role set.
III.1. Repertoires from 1989 to 1993
45
Nick Megoran (2008: 26) provides a detailed description of how Uzbekistan’s leader underlined
national sources to development as opposed to universal scientific laws, particularly after the 2005
Andijan crisis. His work, and Sarah Kendizor’s (2007) article on local poetry, are excellent descriptions
of Uzbekistani discourses and the impact of the Andijan crisis on domestic politics.
55
Three general repertoires were inferred for the 1989-1993 period: (1) control of
economic development for the sake of stability; (2) genuine independence and pursuit
of international relations on an equal basis; (3) defending the image and culture of the
Uzbeks. These three interconnected themes allow for inferring ten roles:
-
Expert on economic issues;
-
Protector of stability;
-
Protector of Uzbekistan’s great image;
-
Defender of Uzbekistan’s international equality;
-
Seeker of genuine independence;
-
Technocratic leader;
-
Developer of Uzbekistan’s economic future;
-
Undisputed authority;
-
Definer of Uzbek authenticity;
-
Voice for a de-ideologized transition.
Control of economic development for the sake of stability
Economics was by far the most referenced issue-area during the period (see Appendix
III for a frequency count). More importantly, though, it was built as an incontestable
concern, to the point that the public discussion of any other subject-area was rendered
futile. In fact, no other statement during Uzbekistan’s rise to independence summarizes
the preponderance of economics as well as President Karimov’s slogan ‘the priority of
economics over politics must be assured.’46
Andrew March (2003) argues that President Karimov sought to establish a ‘prepolitical consensus’ to ensure legitimacy. In other words he imposed an ontogeny
whereby gradual economic development was constructed to be both incontestable and
unavoidable.47 Scholarship has also emphasized Mr Karimov’s job in Gosplan as a
factor in shaping his predominantly economical worldview (Lewis 2008; Bohr 1998;
Carlisle 1995a,b). His background and experience in the area certainly led him to
become Minister of Finance of the Uzbek SSR in 1986. His term in office was short
46
See for example ‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1993.
47
March (2003: 317) refers to President Karimov’s book dedicated to economic reform (Uzbekistan—
‘sobstvennaya model’ perekhoda na rynochnyye otnosheniya; Uzbekistan - its own model of transition to
market relations), citing five principles for development: (1) economics has priority over politics; (2) the
state is the main reformer; (3) all reform must occur under the rule of law; (4) the state underlines the
importance of strong social protection; (5) the transformation to a market economy must be thought out
and gradual.
56
lived, however, given that in that same year, the notorious ‘Cotton’ or ‘Uzbek Affair’
reached a new height. Mr Rafiq Nishonov was made the new Secretary General of the
Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR (CPUzSSR) with the task of tackling corruption
(Carlisle 1995b: 195; Critchlow 1990). Islom Karimov, being connected to the previous
establishment, was relocated to the governorship of the Qashqardaryo region,48 which
turned out to be another short-lived tenure.
After the violent conflicts in the Ferghana Valley between Uzbeks and
Meshketian Turks, Moscow apparently mitigated its confrontational attitude and
decided to replace Mr Nishonov quickly. Islom Karimov was chosen, becoming General
Secretary of the Communist party of the Uzbek SSR on June 23 1989. Naturally, his
nomination to the most powerful position in the Soviet Republic showed that Moscow
was concerned with how rapid reform was negatively affecting the region. It was thus a
sign that perhaps the pace of change had to decrease in order to assuage local
powerbrokers.49
Once in office, Secretary General Karimov conveyed a number of self-lauding
slogans to the public, praising his own credentials as an experienced economist. When
discussing the country’s agricultural problems, he evinced his own skills and insight
with clear-cut remarks: ‘for me as an economist this [agricultural reform] is clear.’50
Moreover, he strategically differentiated himself from rival reformist appeals by
emphasizing that politicians should be aware of economics: ‘I personally find it hard to
deal with politicians who fail to consider the economic consequences of each step they
take.’51
Indeed, while he consolidated his leadership, he applied economicist rhetoric to
almost all situations in the surrounding political landscape. For instance, nearly two
years after the violent crisis in the Ferghana Valley, the now President Karimov
highlighted that the root cause had been social-economical instability,52 thereby fitting
nicely with the analogies and slogans he was using at the time: ‘each person is now
viewing the situation [the political crisis] through a prism of wellbeing [sic]. Uzbeks
48
It is important to note that Rafiq Nishonov had already been implicated in a controversial conspiracy to
remove Sharof Rashidov from power in 1969 - the former patron of Islom Karimov’s political network
and the Secretary General of the Communist party of the Uzbek SSR, from 1959 to 1983 (Allworth 1990:
304-305; Vaisman 1995: 115-116).
49
Many Uzbekistani politicians and businessmen had their status and financial livelihood menaced by
Secretary Gorbachev’s reformist policies (Vaisman 1995: 196). Mr Karimov was a member of those elites
and so his appointment signals a retreat from the transformative policies taken during the Perestroika
period.
50
‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1991.
51
‘Uzbek President tells “Pravda” he is looking for cooperation, not aid’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 7 August 1993.
52
‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ op. cit.
57
have a saying: a hungry man hears music with his stomach.’53 This bit of popular
wisdom was a response to the economic crisis in the region. Glasnost and Perestroika
brought grave economic concerns to many former Soviet citizens, undermining the
future of Soviet cohesion. Hence, Mr Karimov centred his focus on the immediate
economic grievances and its effects on stability: ‘who will be swept away first and
foremost when the population’s indignation at spiraling [sic] prices comes to a head,
when the present shortage of food products grows even more acute?’ As he became
President of independent Uzbekistan in December 1991, he adamantly differentiated
himself from the ‘shock therapy’ policies of Yegor Gaidar, accusing him of perverting
stability and of instigating problems, instead of solving them (see Chapter IV). 54
President Karimov did also call for economic development and thus change, but
only through careful supervision and control. In one instance he stated that ‘firmness,
an authoritarian approach, if you wish, in realization of the chartered policy is needed
in the transition period.’55 Obviously, this appeal is nothing other than a rejection of
economic freedoms. What is also revealing about the example is that President
Karimov apparently had no qualms in admitting publicly that Uzbekistan was
endorsing authoritarianism, claiming that political oppositions are useless unless
constructive: ‘an [constructive] opposition will defend not personal interests, but
convictions, [and not] a policy and decisions which correspond to the interests of this
or that party.’56 Even regarding the press, President Karimov had no inhibitions in
showing his immense scepticism toward their liberties and biased opinions: ‘like it or
not, there are no absolutely independent newspapers. No one will change my mind in
this regard.’57
In sum, during a backdrop of general reform in the Soviet Union, President
Karimov built his career challenging the rising reformist trends. So, based on his
strategies of construction and differentiation, it is possible to subsume this general
repertoire under five roles: expert on economic issues; protector of stability;
technocratic leader; developer of Uzbekistan’s economic future; undisputed authority;
and voice for a de-ideological transition.
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis
53
‘Speaking of borders means breaking up Central Asia’ Official Kremlin News Broadcast, 15 May 1992.
Italics added.
54
For President Karimov’s views on Yegor Gaidar and Russia’s shock therapy, see: ‘Speaking of Borders
Means Breaking up Central Asia’, op. cit.
55
‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies…’ op. cit.
56
‘Interview with Uzbek President’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 June 1991.
57
Ibid.
58
In September 1992, President Karimov celebrated the one year anniversary of
independence with a huge festival, where he proclaimed the beginning of Uzbekistan’s
greatness: ‘one year of independence is only the beginning of a great path. Our life
itself, the passing events, are confirming the correctness of the path taken by us, the
tasks we have placed ahead of us [sic]. We are building the foundations and pillars of an
independent Uzbek state.’58 There is nothing particularly strange about a politician
promoting the future of his state. What is interesting about the latter statement is that
Uzbekistan was already independent at the time. So why mention the ‘pillars of an
independent Uzbek state’ and not just the ‘pillars of an Uzbek state’? This apparent
tautology is not random and by the end of the speech it makes perfect sense: ‘the aim of
our policy consists in a genuinely independent Uzbekistan.’59
What
is
then
the
difference
between
independence
and
genuine
independence?60 As is made clear in a number of statements by President Karimov,
genuine independence seems to be more than just formally recognized independence. It
calls, instead, for disentanglement from dependence: ‘we [the Uzbek people] must in
our own territory and in external political and economic relations be self-reliant and
tackle all issues solely in the interests of our people.’61 Furthermore, he stated in 1993
that ‘as a representative of Uzbekistan I want to say that we have no nostalgia [for the
Soviet Union]. We will not return to the past. For us the only way is forward- only
forward.’62 This last point is somewhat ironic because, before and immediately after
independence, President Karimov had been in favour of continuing with a Soviet
Union-like system (a point that is more evident in Chapter IV). Nevertheless, once
becoming independent, Mr Karimov was less constrained in lambasting against the
region’s Soviet past. Uzbekistan’s President remonstrated against the fact that Moscow
had implemented a limited model of development for Uzbekistan, based almost
58
‘Karimov addresses the Republic on Independence Day’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3
September 1992.
59
Ibid.
60
Even though the intricate meanings within the Uzbek language are not the concern herein (see Chapter
II), Uzbek lexicology offers an explanation, given that there are two words commonly used for
independence: Mustaqillik and Istiqlol. According to a popular dictionary available in contemporary
Uzbekistan: ‘it is possible to attain full independence after having carried out the whole meaning of
Istiqlol. The meaning of independence (Mustaqillik) comes from the word Istiqlol and its whole essence
is associated with achieving that status (…) It is possible for many states to have obtained independence
(istiqlol) and not been able to release themselves from economic dependence’ (Author’s own translation)
(Muminov 2010: 148-149). Upon paraphrasing the definition, what distinguishes Mustaqillik from Istiqlol
is the degree of economic dependence. In other words, states may be ‘formally’ independent, in that they
have achieved nominal freedom for their own citizens, but not yet ‘genuinely’ independent (Mustaqillik),
seeing as they may still depend on others. In sum, if Uzbekistan is to achieve Mustaqillik it has to liberate
itself from the shackles of economic dependency.
61
This reference to self-reliance is one of the few instances that a reference made by President Karimov
was translated into English as self-reliant. See ‘Congress of CP’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13
December 1990. Italics added.
62
‘Uzbek President Tells “Pravda”…’op. cit.
59
exclusively on agriculture and cotton exploitation. Still, he was careful in not delinking
the country from the Soviet Union and Russia, even though he didn’t hesitate in
underlining his wish for a particular type of independence: ‘Uzbekistan links its future
to a union federation, but this federation must be such that we must see our own
interest and see those matters we delegate to the union will definitely be tackled.’63 As
the future of the Soviet Union was being negotiated, Uzbekistan’s leader demonstrated
that he was hoping for a reformed and less centralized Soviet federation and so
consistently underlined Leninist principles of self-determination - a trend that, at the
time, was otherwise commonplace in the Soviet Union.64
Uzbekistani leadership also insisted on not being regarded as a lesser partner –
a notion that soon became associated with the idea of international equality and
disentanglement. Equality in the international public sphere was related to realpolitik
and President Karimov’s public views regarding relative gains.65 In one interview he
stated that: ‘if you look at it through the prism of imperial thinking, we are happy that it
[Russia] is growing weaker. The principle which we uphold is full independence and
sovereignty of each state.’ President Karimov, notwithstanding, assures his audience
that he does not fully endorse weakening Russia, so long as the relationship is equal: ‘I
am against weakening relations [with Russia]. We are bound to stay with Russia in
many complex situations which we expect to encounter on the road to independence
(…) these relations must be equal in all respects.’ However, in other circumstances,
President Karimov made it clear that he was everything but naïve regarding the socalled ‘imperial way of thinking’ of his potential rivals: ‘no matter how much this treaty
[the CIS Military Treaty] of the four republics is disguised, it is nothing other than an
attempt of the stronger, potentially strong republics to dictate their conditions to
others.’66 It would thus seem that the only way to solve the selfish urges of more
powerful states would be to guarantee that all remain on equal footing.
The issue of defending equality and seeking genuine independence is connected
to non-interference and maintaining the status quo in Central Asia. This became
especially clear when conflict escalated in Tajikistan: ‘my view on this [on maintaining
borders intact] is unequivocal. Uzbeks live there [in Tajikistan]. We will be with them,
63
‘Congress of CP...’ op. cit.
Returning to Lenin’s teachings was widely popular at the time in the Soviet Union and was one of Mr
Gorbachev’s main political slogans. President Karimov apparently absorbed this discourse and referred
occasionally to Leninist self-determination. See for example ‘Speech by Karimov’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 7 July 1990.
65
For an excellent discussion on the differences between absolute and relative gains and their connections
liberalism and realism, see David Baldwin (1993: 4-8).
66
‘President Karimov interviewed’ op. cit.
64
60
body and soul, we will protect them, but Uzbeks now reside within Tajikistan and are
citizens of Tajikistan. They must obey its laws and Constitution.’67
It is also worth mentioning that President Karimov did give special prominence
to obtaining international investment and reaching out to other partners. Evidently,
these types of appeals did not match well with his other public demonstrations
concerning dependency and equality, but he praised, for example, the fact that in the
1920s and 1930s many young people from Uzbekistan went to Germany to study. 68 Yet,
despite evincing some good-will, he also placed strict conditions on international
engagement: ‘I would have wanted the interest shown in the republic to have been
global so that contacts are solid and de-ideologized.’69 The reference to ‘de-ideologized’
should be read carefully and was in fact another key slogan. As Mr Karimov’s appeals
for technocratic authoritarianism became more predominant, he went as far to argue
that politics or issues not directly related to economic growth were merely ideological,
portraying himself, either consciously or unconsciously, as a de-ideologized figure.
Consequently, the importance given to equal and non-dependent economic relations
allows for inferring three roles: defender of Uzbekistan’s equality; seeker of genuine
independence; and de-ideologized voice for transition.
Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality
The notion of equality is also tied with defending the international image of Uzbekistan.
During the period, President Karimov remonstrated against a number of portrayals
made by foreign journalists, especially those from Russia, whom he accused of
defaming Uzbeks. For example, he proclaimed in 1989 that ‘whoever they may be, to
whichever nation they may belong, [they] must and will be subjected to severe
punishment so that no one will ever again think of casting a shadow over the good
name of the Uzbek People, of whom genuine internationalism, good will, goodness of
heart and hospitality are characteristic traits.’70
Mr Karimov also highlighted that the Uzbeks had been historically exploited
and that their warm hospitality had been distorted by external forces.71 In some cases,
he was quick to underline how the Soviet Union had contributed to repressing Uzbek
culture, given that ‘everything was banned: ‘religion was persecuted, mosques closed
67
‘Speaking of Borders Means Breaking up Central Asia...’ op. cit.
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
‘Second Day’s Debate on Gorbachev’s Report’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 September
1989.
71
Uzbek people being hospitable is an idea that was supported by Soviet ideology and is thus not entirely
novel. For a very interesting discussion on the ways Uzbekistani elites were perceived both domestically
and within the larger Soviet Union, see Allworth (1990).
68
61
down, everything that was national, deeply national, was suppressed.’72 As an
alternative, he argued in 1991 that the Uzbeks had a new chance for building a great
future: ‘currently in the republic the national arts and crafts are being actively
recreated, in one word, overcoming the aftermath of decades and the artificially
cultivated theory that we had entered socialism bypassing capitalism [sic].’73
Furthermore, he lauded openly Uzbekistan’s so-called ancestors. In 1992 he
opened the anniversary of independence speech with a strong allusion to Uzbekistan’s
contribution to culture: ‘the current festival will reflect the great achievements of our
forefathers such as Imam Bukhari, [word indistinct] Termezi, Akhmet Yasavi, Amir
Temur, Alisher Navoi and many other dozens of our forefathers.’74 So, it would seem
then that the emphasis given to cultural authenticity during the period can be
subsumed under two roles: protector of Uzbekistan’s great image; and definer of
Uzbek authenticity.
III.2. Repertoires from 1994 to 2001
President Karimov’s repertoires for the previous period called for control of economic
development for the sake of stability. However, from 1994 to 2001, conflicts in Central
Asia induced a slight change to the theme. As Tashkent’s experience with independence
progressed, the concept of Control was better defined and a broader notion related to
preserving security was adopted publicly. However, the content remained more or less
the same, as shown below.
Three general themes persevered: (1) preservation of security for the sake of
controlling development and stability; (2) genuine independence and pursuit of
international relations on an equal basis; (3) defending the image of the Uzbek people
and inculcating authentic spirituality. The way in which President Karimov continued
justifying these repertoires means that no significant alterations were found in the roles
discussed above. Instead, four additional roles were inferred:
-
Voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia;
-
Mercantilist entrepreneur;
-
Bridge to joining other markets;
-
Fomenter of defence autonomy in Central Asia.
Preservation of security for the sake of economic development and stability
72
‘Interview with Uzbek President’ op. cit.
‘President of Uzbekistan Interviewed’op. cit.
74
‘Karimov Addresses the Republic…’ op. cit.
73
62
President Karimov expanded the concept of economic stability by juxtaposing it to
border security. By publicly emphasizing control and security, President Karimov was
able to construct and justify the need for safety. In August 1999, he stated during a
Parliamentary Session that ‘our principal strategic goal remains unchanged, the same.
It is to build a free and democratic state based on a market economy and to lay firm
foundations for a civil society. Simply speaking, it is to achieve the high living standards
and quality of the developed countries without blindly copying their model of
development and experience.’75 This aim did not differ from the conclusions already
surmised, but in other situations President Karimov conditioned freedom to a human
need for peace: ‘What do human beings want? They want freedom. What do human
beings want? They want to see happy lives for their children. They want their beliefs to
come true. It is a natural thing, no matter what their nationality. That is why I should
say that it has become like a disease to understand and perceive that peace has become
an ordinary thing or rule of our everyday lives, as if peace has fallen from the sky, from
the moon without difficulties.’76 The statesman has to ensure that the country’s borders
are impervious to any kind of attack: ‘since today we want to build a free, stable and
prosperous life, the most vital guarantee is to ensure the security of our country and
inviolability of our borders.’77 Border security is related to perceived foreign threats,
whilst controlling stability is a means of triggering economic growth,78 and so debating
or even doubting the expert analysis of Uzbekistan’s leader is sidelined, as his rhetoric
carves a pre-political consensus that cannot be disputed.79 Accordingly, he continued
propounding the following supposedly incontestable priorities: ‘the first is security. The
second is humanitarian issues [sic], that is the issues concerning a human being, and
creating humane conditions [sic]. The third issue is economy. The fourth issue is
ecological matters.’80 By now, President Karimov begins to somewhat contradict
himself, since he had previously mentioned the priority of economics over politics (see
discussion above).
75
‘Uzbek President’s Speech at Parliamentary Session’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 August
1999.
76
‘Uzbek President Speaks on Bomb Attacks’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 February 1999.
77
‘President Karimov Says Security and Unity Prime Tasks of State’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 3 September 1998.
78
See examples of the importance of state control in the following transcripts: ‘President visits Eastern
region’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 August 2001. There, Mr Karimov argues that the state by
selling cotton is able to reinvest in industry; ‘President Karimov criticizes economic sector’s
performance’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 January 2001, is one of many instances in which
President Karimov explained the situation of Uzbekistan’s economy.
79
The term ‘pre-political’ consensus is borrowed from March (2002, 2003), who showed persuasively
that President Karimov adopted an authoritarian approach that made many issues, such as economic
gradualism, seem indisputable.
80
‘Uzbek head criticized OSCE for focusing on human rights’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17
November 1999.
63
Preserving security is compatible with very gradual reform and so in 1994 he
persisted with the usual slogan: ‘in Uzbekistan we operate in accordance with the
popular saying: “Don’t destroy your old home before you have built a new one.” In
other words we have taken the constructive path rather than destroying what we had
created.’81 Furthermore, the task of maintaining security is argued to be a sort of
technocratic undertaking, i.e. de-ideologized and thus not contestable: ‘let nobody seek
any sort of politics here. There is the only one policy here: security, security and again
the security and tranquillity of those people who live in our land (…) That is why
everyone is bound to create all necessary conditions to ensure that our borders are
inviolable.’82 As previously analyzed, ideologies are ‘strategically destroyed’ as
economics is set to be superior to politics.83 Additionally, he reinforced his supposedly
unbiased credentials by declaring that even when the communist Uzbek SSR existed he
was not ideological: ‘incidentally, I myself did not attend party school.’84
Many of these rhetorical repertoires are a public response to the turbulent
1990s context, particularly to the crises in the Caucasus and, more importantly, to the
civil wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. As concerns the Caucasus, President Karimov
showed how stability was put into question when ideology permeated politics: ‘in 19891990 there was a danger in Uzbekistan that incompetent people would come to power
on the crest of the democratic wave, as happened in the Caucasus.’85 President Karimov
was referring to the former Presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia, Abülfez Elçibey and
Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The former was a poet and the latter a philosopher and so both
were considered unsuitable for the type of technical management needed in a
statesman.
Security also became the pervasive topic once the war in Tajikistan escalated, as
President Karimov linked the violence in Dushanbe to undesirable instability: ‘go and
see the situation in Tajikistan, show on the TV how people live there, shooting in the
streets, killing people in the entrances of buildings, innocent people are being killed (…)
we have become indifferent to some extent. So bad and evil things are happening
around us, one can see instability everywhere.’86
81
‘Karimov Interview with Russian Paper’ BBC Summary of World of Broadcasts, 1 June 1994.
‘Central Asian Summit: Uzbek head details Afghan threat’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21
April 2000.
83
For a reference by President Karimov to how economics is superior to politics, see ‘Uzbek President
satisfied with results of Moscow visit’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 March 1994.
84
‘Karimov interview with Russian Paper’op. cit.
85
Ibid.
86
After practically five years of conflict, peace in Tajikistan was negotiated in Moscow, in April 1997,
when President Emomalili Rahmon agreed to have thirty percent of the government’s ministries allocated
to the opposition (Horsman 1999: 39-40). For the citation, see ‘Uzbek President Speaks on Bomb
Attacks’ op. cit.
82
64
Beyond acute political quarrels and military interventions,87 President Karimov
showed an intense dislike for Mirzo Ziyo, the Tajik Minister of Emergency Situations,
who had been a member of United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Mr Ziyo was connected to
Juma Namangoniy and Tohir Yo’ldosh - the leaders of the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), who had fled from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan before eventually
moving to Afghanistan (Akbarzadeh 2005: 41; Jonson 2006: 113).88
The IMU’s perceived threat was systematically underlined by President
Karimov. He portrayed the organization as extremist; responsible for the December
1997 killing of security officials; and for orchestrating the February 1999 terrorist
attacks in Tashkent. While those responsible for the latter hostilities remain in
dispute,89 the IMU did lead two incursions onto Uzbekistan’s border in the summers of
1999 and 2000. For that reason, Chechnya and Afghanistan were gradually portrayed
by CIS leadership as harbours of terrorism and a menace to the world at large. As a
matter of fact, the prominent discourses of Islamic terror - so prevalent in the United
States and Europe after the 11 September attacks - were already, in the 1990s, a key
feature of President Karimov’s rhetoric: ‘they are not the representatives of a certain
country or a party or movement. These are criminals who have committed various
crimes in their countries and are at present hiding from punishment. They speak
various languages - Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, Afghan and even foreign languages. Their
aims are terrorism, taking hostages, violence, encroachment upon the constitutional
system of states.’90 Many of these terrorists were described as jealous of Russia and
Uzbekistan’s stable regimes91 and also products of the situation in Afghanistan: ‘we
have genuine information that these centres are based in Afghanistan. Today we have
grounds to state that there are similar centres in Pakistan, and we know their
whereabouts.’92
In spite of President Karimov’s public concerns over the conflicts in Afghanistan
and Tajikistan, they were not the only targets of his rhetorical attacks, since Russia too
was constructed as untrustworthy. For example, President Karimov mentioned that
87
See, for example, Charles Fairbanks et al. (2001) and Stuart Horsman (1999) for accounts of
Tajikistan’s Civil War and Uzbekistani involvement.
88
President Karimov may have had a personal grievance against the IMU, since in 1992 he was forced to
go to Namangan in order to settle an uprising led by Juma Namangoniy and Tohir Yo’ldosh (the two
leaders of the IMU), who both had called for Uzbekistan to become an Islamic Republic. President
Karimov was at the time intimidated and humiliated during his attempt to assuage the local populace. For
a more detailed account of these events, read Adeeb Khalid’s (2007) excellent book.
89
See Polat & Butkevich’s (2000) detailed account of the various conspiracies surrounding the 1999
attempt on President Karimov’s life.
90
‘Uzbek Defence Minister Says Army on High Alert in View of the Kyrgyz Situation’ BBC Summary of
World News, 8 September 1999.
91
On jealousy, see ‘President Karimov says 30 suspects arrested following Tashkent Bombings’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 March 1999.
92
‘Central Asian Presidents’ Press Conference’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 March 1998.
65
altercations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were instigated by Russian secret
services93 and that Moscow had selfish goals for Central Asia: ‘we must openly
acknowledge Russia's presence in the Central Asian region and also Russian interests in
the Central Asian region, and not to play any games here. Yes, Russia had its interests,
has and will have them in this region.’94 Overall, this friction between Tashkent and
Moscow is explained in greater detail in Chapter IV.
Returning again to border security, President Karimov continued arguing for
stability and connecting it to national independence: ‘if I am an independent state, if I
have declared before my own people that we are independent, if we are masters of our
fate and if our future is in our hands, then why should our borders be protected by
foreign forces? What will the forces protecting the borders demand?’95 Undoubtedly,
protecting borders without recourse to external assistance tied nicely with the concept
of genuine independence. For that reason, Mr Karimov continued propounding the
roles described above, although he was more adamant about defence autonomy for the
whole region. All in all, this public concern can be reduced to the role of fomenter of
defence autonomy in Central Asia.
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis
President Karimov continued calling for respect of sovereignty, equality and
independence from supra-national organizations. More than once he argued that: ‘I
would like to reaffirm that Uzbekistan does not interfere in other states’ internal affairs,
that it is for the development of international cooperation, that it wants to build
partnership with other countries on an equal footing [sic] and that it is for settling all
sorts of conflicts or disputes only through peaceful political and lawful means.’96
An issue-area that increasingly became connected to the topic of sovereignty
was President Karimov’s rejection of any military blocs such as NATO or the Collective
Security Treaty’s Rapid Response program: ‘Uzbekistan does not join and will not join
93
‘Karimov says Russian intelligence provoking Uzbek-Tajik friction’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 30 November 1998.
94
‘Uzbek leader says Russia had, has, will have interests in Central Asia’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 22 June 2000.
95
‘Uzbek President gives interview on relations with other Central Asian states’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 31 October 1998.
96
President Karimov’s observation is not exactly true and this issue will be discussed again in the
Conclusion. Indeed, Tashkent, alongside Moscow, was active in endorsing the Kulabi and Leninibadi
factions in the Tajik civil war. President Karimov explicitly supported the popular front led by Mr
Kenjayev (a Leninbadi) in its fight against the UTO (Jonson 2006; Akiner 2001: 21). Nevertheless, in the
case of countries outside Central Asia, President Karimov tended to argue against interference. For
example, he was sceptical of pan-Turkic solidarity toward Uighurs and described the war in Chechnya as
an internal Russian affair. See for example ‘Uzbek leader warns helping Uighurs could upset relations
with China’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 June 1998.
66
any military and political blocs. This is against the common goals and tasks that are
effectively enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. We do not want
old times returned again.’97 He further endorsed non-militarism as he voiced the need
to avoid expansionism and aggression: ‘it should be noted that the defence doctrine
outlined by the republican leadership is purely defensive in nature and displays the
peaceful policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan.’98
It is clear that many of these interpretations of sovereignty and non-militarism
correlate with seeking genuine independence and defending equality, given that Mr
Karimov continued emphasizing the importance of being treated equally by whomever
he engaged with. For example, during a CIS summit he stated that ‘relations between
the CIS countries should be built on the basis of equality and these relations should be
mutually profitable (… ) this means that one big country should not rule over other
countries.’99 The last part of this statement seems clearly aimed at Moscow. In other
circumstances, however, President Karimov was careful in not disdaining Eurasia’s
largest country by admitting that Russia was a partner, so long as equality was
preserved: ‘our bilateral treaty with Russia has been and remains effective. We have
been friends and will maintain friendship henceforth. But I wish Russia to see
Uzbekistan as an equal partner.’100
As a contrast to Russia, President Karimov did show some enthusiasm for
integration with Central Asian Republics,
101
by appealing briefly in the mid-1990s to
Turkestan being ‘Our Common Home’.102 Still, this very vague ambition of a ‘Turkestan’
somewhat contradicted his more unilateral stance. Equality was in fact the consistent
slogan emanating from President Karimov’s rhetoric and ‘Turkestan’ was barely if ever
publicly mentioned by the turn of the century. Indeed, besides condemning the CIS, he
also showed scepticism toward the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO):
‘another thing which does not suit us and which we have always protested against is
that trade and economic issues have become secondary issues and the organization
ECO is mainly being used for political ends (...) The countries which feel themselves
97
‘President visits Eastern region’ op. cit.
‘Military doctrine is one of defense’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 February 2000.
99
‘Uzbek president gives interview on relations…’ op. cit.
100
‘CIS relations depend on Yeltsin’s successor, says Uzbek Leader’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 9 March 1999.
101
‘Presidents call Tajikistan’s joining Central Asian Economic Union’ Interfax, 30 March 1998.
102
President Karimov’s call for unity amongst the people of Central Asia was later developed in his 1997
book. Therein ‘Turkestan is Our Common Home’ is argued to be ‘a humane and constructive process
because it is aimed at achieving interethnic accord in the region. Undoubtedly, this policy fully serves the
strategic state and national interests of all Central Asia’ (Karimov 1997: 46). However, by the late 1990s,
Turkestan and its quixotic harmony no longer appeared in President Karimov’s rhetoric.
98
67
big, above all, countries like Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, are trying to exert their
influence as much as possible on other member countries.’103
Integration therefore was not a key public concern, even though President
Karimov conceded that the CIS was necessary for the sake of economics: ‘not a single
state in the Commonwealth of Independent States will be able to achieve genuine
independence on its own, without economic cooperation.’104 Even regarding economics,
though, he consigned strict conditions to such relations, reminiscent of classic
mercantilism: ‘I said this about a thousand times, and I would like to repeat it again: a
country has a future, is able to achieve progress and positive results and get stronger
only if it earns more money in foreign currency than it spends buying things, that is, if
exports exceed imports.’105
Not all though were sceptical retorts, as President Karimov did actually show
interest in increasing economic links with the West, especially with the United States: ‘I
would like to make an official statement to the effect that Uzbekistan is interested in
seeing our relations with the United States strengthened and grow. We are also
interested in seeing American business, and American capital, take its rightful place in
the Uzbekistani market.’106 This clear-cut appraisal was in part related to the wish to
obtain technology and thus become a ‘civilized country’: ‘I want to (…) take advantage
of this opportunity to let you all know that [we intend to] (…) orient ourselves to
modern technology.’107 However, it is important to be aware that he did restrict
expanding contacts with the West. Trade was not to be totally open and by the late
1990s he deemed imports to be detrimental to the economy: ‘we, above all, should fill
our market with domestically produced goods, instead of importing them. It is
necessary to produce what we do not have and, if there are opportunities inside the
country, we should produce the goods which we are importing now.’108
Lastly, it is relevant to mention President Karimov’s public concerns over
transportation links. The topic is not entirely associated with equality; yet it slightly
contradicted his otherwise autarkic outbursts. In 1999, Mr Karimov confessed publicly
103
‘Uzbek head stressed need to tackle Afghan issue, Access to Iranian Port’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, June 9 2000.
104
‘Karimov interview on CIS integration’ TASS, 14 April 1994.
105
‘Uzbek President Sums up 1998 Economic results’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 February
1999.
106
‘Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov and OPIC President Ruth Harkin Discuss…’NBC, 24 June 1996.
107
Ibid.
108
It is also important to recall that Tashkent at the time was still facing the effects of the 1995 slump in
commodity prices that had gravely affected the country’s balance of payments. For the quotation, see:
‘Uzbek leader against playing role of raw materials supplier’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17
October 1999.
68
to his Ukrainian counterpart that he very much envied Ukraine’s access to the sea 109
and therefore showed some concern for linking his country to organizations like GUAM
(this topic will be better discussed in Chapter V): ‘GUAM is an organization of states
around the Black Sea. From the point of view of communications and routes we are
eager to reach that region and the world market in general. Our joining GUAM will help
us greatly in achieving that our goal.’110
Overall, President Karimov continued calling for a cautious type of engagement,
focused mainly on relative gains and economic mercantilism. To a degree, he was also
enthusiastic about building links with other countries in order to fulfil his ambitious
‘civilized’ programme for domestic development, thereby propounding three more
roles: voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia; mercantilist entrepreneur; and bridge
to joining other markets.
Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality
The repertoire of defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic
spirituality became more prominent in the late 1990s, as President Karimov held
himself responsible for safeguarding the traditions of Uzbekistan and its image abroad:
‘I think much about preserving the dignity of the Uzbek people, the Uzbek nation and
keeping that dignity high, never bowing to anyone and carrying out an independent
policy is my major duty as a leader, I think [sic].’111 This call for prestige seems to have
been partially aimed against Russian assertiveness, especially its pan-slavic
manifestations: ‘all these games around a so-called union of Belarus, Russia and
Yugoslavia: everyone, even the uninitiated, has no difficulty in understanding that Mr
Slobodan Milosevic is playing his own game.’112
It seems obvious though that the appeals to fomenting culture and spirituality
conflate somewhat with his core premise of technocracy, i.e. of not blending politics
with economics. However, he tackled this apparent contradiction by arguing that
‘ideology’ of authenticity is apolitical by necessity: ‘as known, we rejected the false
communist ideas which contradicted our national features and centuries-old traditions
and customs. But, undoubtedly, one cannot allow a vacuum in the world of ideology;
otherwise ideas absolutely alien to us and our aspirations will try to occupy that empty
109
‘Uzbek President Interviewed on Visit to Ukraine Aboard Aircraft’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 10 October 1999.
110
‘Uzbek President Repeats Line on NATO, Kosovo’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 April
1999.
111
‘“We have to think about NATO Membership”’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 29 April 999.
112
‘Uzbek head warns of Russian embroilment in the Balkans’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15
April 1999.
69
ideological space.’113 He expanded this idea of an ideological vacuum by arguing that ‘if
there is ideology, there is a goal and there is a motivation. And then we can unite people
(…) That is why this issue is the most pressing one. It is spring here now. Tomorrow
summer will set in the Batken events of last year.’114 Batken was the location of the IMU
incursions of August 1999 and so it was within the context of increased border
insecurity that President Karimov asserted the need for greater national spirituality. In
sum, the persistence of spirituality and its reinforced articulation gave a stronger
emphasis to Mr Karimov’s roles of protector of Uzbekistan’s great image and definer
of Uzbek authenticity.
III.3. Repertoires from 2002 to 2005
The aftermath of 11 September 2001 was a complex time period for Tashkent. The
security challenges of the 1990s were certainly difficult to manage but, after 2001,
Uzbekistan’s government was increasingly scrutinized by the international public
sphere. President Karimov became widely recognized as one of the symbols of the war
on terror and therewith a ‘target’ of the Bush Administration’s increased enthusiasm
for democratization, especially after the Colour revolutions. However, of all possible
challenges, nothing was as shattering to Mr Karimov’s public credibility as the Crisis of
13 May 2005.115 After an organized prison-break and popular protests in the Ferghana
Valley city of Andijan, Uzbekistani security forces surrounded the local square and
violently confronted the populace, resulting in the death of 187 people, according to
government sources (Human Rights Watch adds a few ‘hundreds’ to that tragic
number).
Unlike the 1990s, when he set the foundations of his role set, President Karimov
was now increasingly on the defensive, especially with Washington. Yet, in spite of the
changes in the international public sphere, Uzbekistani leadership maintained its core
rhetorical repertoires, adapting them only slightly to the time: (1) preservation of
security for the sake of controlling development and stability and avoiding
revolution; (2) genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an
113
‘Uzbek head answers newspaper questions on national ideology, religion, policy’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 8 June 2000.
114
‘President Karimov calls for “well-defined national ideology”’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6
April 2000.
115
Depictions of the Andijan uprising are available in some sources.. For different perspectives, see Shirin
Akiner (2005) and Galima Bukharbaeva’s (2005) accounts as well as the following reports: ‘Uzbekistan:
The Andijon Uprising’ Crisis Group, 25 May 2005, available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/uzbekistan/B038-uzbekistan-the-andijonuprising.aspx, accessed April 2010; and ‘Preliminary findings on the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13
May 2005’ OSCE, 20 June 2005, available via http://www.osce.org/odihr/15653, accessed April 2010.
70
equal basis; (3) defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic
spirituality. This means then that the roles did not change; merely that discontinuity
instigated a gradual shift in rhetoric: from provider of stability to protector of
Uzbekistan’s image and definer of authenticity.
Preservation of security for the sake of controlling development, ensuring stability
and avoiding revolution
President Karimov increased his democratic rhetoric throughout the period, although
he described reform as an end rather than a process. This meant that he did not
actually forsake authoritarian technocracy and thus concede to immediate and total
change. However, Mr Karimov frequently mentioned adopting a ‘western’ type of
political system: ‘we are trying to use the experience of Western countries [sic]. We are
drawing closer to their standards.’116 Pro-democratic stances, though, have to be read
with caution. While political matters related to reform were discussed more in this
period than in others, they were still far from being the main subject matter.
Democracy was simply depicted as a goal for the future: ‘the priority in domestic policy
is the liberalization of all spheres of life, which has great significance.’117 So, albeit
democratic rhetoric, President Karimov persisted with gradualism and invoked the
usual adagio of caution and control: ‘I’m concerned about the people’s problems. We
used to have two slogans, if you remember: First, don't pull down your old home before
building a new one. Do you remember this? Second, reform is not for the sake of it, but
for people.’118 In short, stability and the ability to control the pace of events119 remained
the key pillars of his rhetoric, and so the ‘Colour Revolutions’ became especially
threatening.
In October 2003, Azerbaijan faced widespread protests over fraudulent
presidential elections (D’Anieiri 2006: 339; Way 2008: 29). Soon after, deception and
repression failed in Georgia, and large demonstrations in November 2003 led to the
collapse of President Shevardnadze’s regime. Then, almost a year later, discontent over
forged presidential elections led to the Orange Revolution, culminating in the election
of pro-western candidate Viktor Yushchenko. It is important to bear in mind that
Western backed NGOs, along with Russian interference, played a key role in those
116
‘Uzbek President explains move to reduce his authority’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24
April 2003.
117
‘Uzbek leader lashes out at rights bodies over criticism of neighbourhood system’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 7 December 2003.
118
‘Uzbek leader promises to tighten borders against illegal exports’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
20 September 2004.
119
‘Uzbek leader lashes out at rights bodies over criticism…’ op. cit.
71
outcomes, particularly in Ukraine (Kuzio 2005: 429-494; Tudoroiu 2007: 329).
Kyrgyzstan was the last in this apparent wave of governmental changes, as regional
elite dissatisfaction along with pressure from informal networks contributed to
President Askar Akaev’s ousting in February 2005 (Cummings & Ryabkov 2008: 249).
These challenges to stability were taken seriously by President Karimov, who in
2004 had no qualms in describing the potential dangers spawning from revolution:
We know that at all times revolutions are usually based on violence and
bloodshed, and they are used as weapons to destroy everything created by
the ancestors mercilessly. Dogmatism, no matter in what form it shows
itself, be it religious dogmatism or communist dogmatism, they ignore
everything, act against their own principles, and carry out their activities
proceeding from a Bolshevik principle which says ‘You are either with us
or against us’. We are confident that it is impossible to export democracy
and different models of open societies. It is also impossible to import or
push through a universal project of state construction from outside.120
By underlining the threats associated with political change, President Karimov
revamped his credibility as an apolitical leader and provider of stability. Like before, he
did not avoid the issue of authoritarianism and also defined pro-democratic discourses
as another type of extremism: ‘Uzbekistan has always been against all forms of
radicalism. We in Uzbekistan have always been against it. Even now, we are
irreconcilable fighters against fundamentalism, which has many forms. We are against
religious fundamentalism, we are against Communist fundamentalism and, if you like,
we are against democratic fundamentalism. We are for an evolutionary path of
development.’121
With the times becoming clearly averse to Uzbekistan’s regime, President
Karimov did not conceal that he deserved his own token share of merit in a post-11
September world. Uzbekistan’s leader professed that his regime had consistently
warned the world about the problems sprouting from Afghanistan and the dangers of
Islamic extremism: ‘it was only then after the New York tragedies that people started to
realize and say: Oops, but Karimov's words proved to be right.’122
Obviously the apparent elimination of the Taliban threat between 2002 and
2005 – along with the death of Juma Namangoniy, in December 2001 - could have
raised doubts about security remaining a pivotal concern. However, President Karimov
rarely demonstrated optimism, especially after Uzbekistan was subjected to two
120
‘New Uzbek Parliament part of Democratic Nation-Building’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29
January 2005.
121
‘Uzbek leader stresses common interests with Japanese’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 August
2002. Italics added.
122
‘Uzbek President’s news conference on 26 August’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 August
2004.
72
terrorist attacks in March and July 2004. In the first incident, a series of planned
attacks took place in Tashkent, but doubts remain about whom was responsible for the
incidents. Tashkent, though, took the initiative and publicly blamed them on Islamic
militants, namely the Hizb ut-Tahrir and another unknown Islamic group called
Jamiyat (Islamov 2004). Thereafter, as fifteen individuals connected to those incidents
were being trialled; the second event took place in June, when two bombers attacked
the Israeli and American Embassies and killed Uzbekistani policemen.123 These
incidents were again portrayed as the results of extremism, although uncertainty
remains about the origin and aims of the culprits.
The attacks empowered President Karimov’s public concerns and he, once more,
lambasted against the dangers of extremism: ‘there are forces with evil intentions
among neighbouring and distant countries. These forces are jealous of our peace,
peaceful life and the hard work of building a new society, and they cast evil eyes on us
in such a dangerous situation. They are not afraid of committing subversive and evil
acts. The existence of such forces requires us to maintain our vigilance and boost our
independence.’124 He thus continued showing his public disdain for instability.
Naturally after the Andijan Crisis, this authenticity rhetoric reached its peak and Mr
Karimov did not hesitate in blaming the media and foreign encroachment for the
insurgency.125
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis
Despite the complicated times, Uzbekistani leadership continued supporting
engagement with the outside world: ‘we are not arrogant. As president I am ready to
warmly welcome any investor, a person who is capable of doing something, a
businessman. I personally do not need it. You should understand that President
Karimov does not need it personally. However, it is necessary for the country, our
homeland, our people, our future, our children, to make our country prosperous and to
make our future better than our present.’126 Alongside this public show of support for
trade and foreign direct investment, he confessed his disappointment toward the
123
‘Suicide bombers hit Uzbek Capital, leaving at least five dead’ Eurasianet.org, 30 July 2001, available
at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav073004.shtml, accessed June 2010.
124
‘Uzbek leader’s independence speech urges vigilance’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1
September 2005.
125
For President Karimov’s accusations, see ‘Uzbek defendant says foreign media supported Andijon
plot’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 September 2005.
126
‘Uzbek leader slams agricultural sector, says 40,000 jobs to go’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
14 February 2004.
73
geographic isolation of Uzbekistan and also Tashkent’s inability to develop alternative
transportation routes.127
Still, he seems always to have remained cautious about his country’s
international engagement, by not refraining from defending equality: ‘“we are not
second to anyone in the world” keeps appearing on the TV screen every day (…) We will
not be second to anyone. We were not second in the times of Amir Temur Tamerlane,
medieval conqueror and now the times of Amir Temur have come.’128 In fact, no other
event conveyed his public concern for genuine independence and equality than the
international crisis brought by Andijan: ‘they want to establish an international
commission for an investigation and come to Uzbekistan in order to investigate
whether it was an act of terror (…) Uzbekistan is a sovereign state; it has its own gates
and door steps, also let us say it has its constitutional system, elected government and
elected president. It is a whole state and how could a commission from outside
come?’129
On economic policy, President Karimov’s mercantilist appeals collided with
some concessions he had made about reform, particularly concerning the
implementation of currency convertibility that had been ratified under the ‘Declaration
on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework between the USA and
Republic of Uzbekistan’.130 He therefore conceded that he was sceptical of the interests
of Western companies and international organizations: ‘if business trends were more
favourable and Uzbekistan had these billions, primarily due to its own resources, and
commercial opportunities were somehow more appropriate we would not need any
credits in order to ensure the convertibility of our national currency. Since even today
no one pledges to give us billions. They simply talk.’131 So, President Karimov praised
those who were not necessarily following Western models like China: ‘China has
achieved a higher level in the field of computerization (…) this is the goal of China. It is
not possible to live by growing and selling cotton. Do you know when I got fed up with a
phrase “Hey look, it is fine with us?”’132
127
On isolation, see ‘Uzbek leader urges greater ties with Malaysia’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
3 October 2005.
128
‘Uzbek leader lashes out at imports for sake of future generation’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
19 February 2003.
129
‘Uzbek leader says no international probe into the Andijan crisis’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
25 May 2005.
130
A degree of monetary reform was achieved in 2003, in spite of a number of tariffs being imposed
between 2003 and 2004. See ‘Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan’ March 2002, available at,
http://www.fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/2002/US-UzbekPartnership.htm, accessed September 2010.
131
‘Uzbek president promises convertibility…’ op. cit.
132
‘Uzbek leader slams agricultural sector…’ op. cit.
74
Defending the image of the Uzbek people and inculcating authentic spirituality
President Karimov gradually centred his rhetoric on authentic Uzbek culture and
mentality. By the end of 2005, he was particularly adamant in differentiating his
country from an intrusive west: ‘English intelligence officer said in his time that the
East is the East and the West is the West. I will not go into details but he said
something to the effect that the West and the East would never come together. It was
said back in the 19th century.’133 He seems to have justified these distinctions by the
fact that he was not treated equally (see discussion above): ‘for how long will we be a
backward country? I would like to repeat, as president, as leader I have set a goal before
me. We have never been second to anyone and we will not be second to anyone.’134 He
even criticized the OSCE for being badly adapted to Uzbekistan’s unique cultural
circumstances: ‘I must say one more thing. Uzbekistan is in Asia and let everyone
remember this. We are members of not only the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, but we are members of Islamic states’ organizations as well (…)
We are also Muslims and 85 per cent of our population is Hanafite Muslim (…) you are
forgetting, for example, take Ukraine, it is in Europe, or Georgia, it is also in Europe.
Where is Uzbekistan? Look at the map. Is Uzbekistan, the city of Tashkent, not the gate
of the East?’135
All in all, it would seem that between 2002 and 2005, President Karimov altered
some of his cautious welcoming of the West by evincing disenchantment and greater
apprehension. Based on Uzbekistan’s supposed exceptionality, he justified the use of
condescending rhetoric toward the West, especially during the Colour revolutions: ‘I
doubt that a repetition of the Ukrainian or Georgian scenario would be possible in
Uzbekistan (...) The citizens themselves would not want this, and that is much more
important.’136
III.4. Repertoires from 2006 to 2008
From 2006 to 2008, security and stability continued to be one of the key elements of
President Karimov’s rhetorical repertoires. The period also saw a transformation of the
manner in which those concepts were articulated, as President Karimov switched his
rhetoric from technocratic stability to cultural authenticity. In other words, he
133
‘New Uzbek Parliament of Democratic…’ op. cit.
‘Uzbek leader says God saved Uzbekistan during recent terror attacks’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 7 April 2004.
135
‘Uzbek leader says no international probe into the Andijan crisis’ op. cit.
136
‘Uzbek president issues robust defence of elections’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27
December 2004.
134
75
recreated his role of guardian of Uzbek authenticity by securitizing it; a transformation
that was not entirely novel, inasmuch as it was the continuation of a trend that had
become more prominent in late 2003 and that reached a peak after the Andijan crisis.
Nevertheless, the shift was short-lived. While world financial markets collapsed in
2008, President Karimov began refocusing on economic stability, much like he had
done throughout his whole tenure in office. He even published a book in 2008,
propagating his economic recipes and how Uzbekistan had managed to avoid the
world-wide recession. Another topic that became more prominent was Central Asia’s
ecosystem, particularly the issue of water. As described below, President Karimov
underlined that hydrological resources could neither be side-lined nor forgotten in
regional politics.
Overall, the repertoires themselves did not change substantially. Instead two
themes focusing more on cultural authenticity became prominent: (1) defending the
image of the Uzbek people for the sake of stability and development; (2) genuine
independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis.
Defending the image of the Uzbek people for the sake of stability and development
Throughout much of this period President Karimov sidelined some of his usual
technocratic or apolitical slogans and focused more on Uzbek ‘spirituality’: ‘if we wish
to achieve our great goals, above all, we should focus on spirituality. Spirituality and
again spirituality [sic]. And from this point of view, we should be vigilant and
watchful.’137 This public appeal was now presented as a securitized precondition to all
other objectives, such as preserving stability and allowing for economic development.
However, President Karimov was careful in underlining that he himself had not
changed: ‘I have remained the same as I was in 1991. And I think that all of you
understand well that those who voted for me took into consideration exactly this [fact],
that is, the path which we have started will never end.’138
The stronger focus on Uzbek ‘spirituality’ throughout the period raises doubts
about the consistency of his rhetoric. For instance, unlike in the immediate postindependence period, in which President Karimov coined instability as the result of
social-economic crises (see previous discussions), by 2007 he described it as the
product of dangerous ideologies: ‘first of all, we should fight underlying causes for and
the foundation on which terrorism stands. And I am sure that the terrorist ideology is
sometimes produced on an assembly line. In this case, Hezb-e Tahrir [sic] is an
137
‘Uzbek leader warns of foreign influence at his Cabinet speech’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31
August 2007.
138
‘President delivers inauguration speech’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,16 January 2008.
76
ideological basis for international terrorism.’ The argument of course is not entirely
new, since in the 1990s he had already called for developing Uzbek authenticity (see
previous discussion). The difference though resides in the rhetorical emphasis:
We attach special significance to this [education] in Uzbekistan (…) be
aware of your roots, know your history, nation and be proud of your
history and belonging to this nation. All this education is not only for us to
occupy a worthy place in the international community in the 21st century
(…) but also in order to wean young people off the ground where they
[religious movements] can infect young people with terrorism, fanaticism
and other ‘-ism’s [sic] which are equally unacceptable for us.139
To clarify the connection between Uzbekistan’s authentic culture and security,
President Karimov discussed systematically how he felt the former sprout from external
threats: ‘we are living in a very complicated world. Somebody wants to defeat us. If they
want to defeat us, how will they do this? First of all, they will destroy the economy. Last
year you saw the [Andijon] events (…) An information war against us started in the
world, humiliating us and saying that there are problems here and there. This was
aimed at tarnishing our reputation.’140 Obviously, the importance of reputation is very
much related to Mr Karimov’s basic role of protecting Uzbekistan’s prestige. Therefore,
he argues for citizens to be aware of ‘foreign centres, [that are] taking the advantage of
ideological vacuum in society.’141
Indeed, the late 2004 trend of differentiating Uzbekistan from the West
continued: ‘your values are not acceptable to us because 85 percent of the Uzbek
population is Muslim.’142 Moreover, Uzbekistan’s so-called ancestors were given public
prominence, particularly Amir Timur, whom he idealized as an ideal statesman.143 The
West, in contrast, was portrayed as a false beacon of democracy, since the tolerance it
propagated was apparently fake: ‘they should not only look at the countries, which are
stepping onto the new path of democracy, with evil eyes, but, if they really consider
themselves as democrats, they should help and support us, if you like.’144
By 2008, though, technocracy seems to have regained its former prominence in
President Karimov’s rhetoric. Uzbekistan’s leader focused again on the issue fomenting
economic growth and establishing a democratic society, such as in December 2008,
139
‘Kyrgyz president urges closer ties with Uzbekistan, end to “isolation”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7
March 2008.
140
‘Uzbek leader outlines tasks for 2006’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 February 2006.
141
‘Uzbek leader warns of foreign influence…’ op. cit.
142
‘Uzbek president accuses West of waging “information war” against ex-Soviet Nation’ Associated
Press Worldstream, 20 March 2006.
143
See President Karimov’s references to Amir Timur in ‘Uzbek leader’s speech to eastern Fargona
region’s officials’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 October 2006.
144
‘Uzbek leader urges European countries not to teach democracy’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8
December2006.
77
when he praised the resilience of Uzbekistan’s economy and the model applied since
the beginning: ‘during the process of transition from the administrative-command
system to the market system of management, we chose an evolutionary approach and
the path of carrying out reforms step by step, being guided by a vital concept that one
should not destroy the old house until he builds a new one.’145
Naturally it is impossible to ignore the context behind President Karimov’s
assertions. On one hand, the recession brought by the sub-prime crisis spread across
financial markets and affected the world economy, particularly the West and, on the
other hand, Uzbekistan’s relationship with the United States improved. In January
2008, Admiral William Fallon of US Central Command visited Tashkent to discuss a
new supply route for NATO troops.146 Mr Karimov then visited Bucharest in April 2008
to participate in a NATO summit,147 and, soon after, the EU removed part of its
sanctions.148 Consequently, President Karimov’s rhetoric is linked to the changes in the
international public sphere – an issue that is better addressed in the narratives of the
following Chapters.
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal basis
The emphasis on authenticity throughout most of the period did not, however, change
President Karimov’s repertoires on international relations. He continued to argue for
participating in external affairs:
we consider as another important factor to live in harmony with the world
community while implementing all our good hopes and aspirations, as well as
vital plans; to further develop friendship and mutually beneficial relations with
all our near and far neighbours; and to gain deserved prestige and trust in the
international arena. We will not spare our efforts to expand all-round practical
relations with our foreign partners who have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us
and expressed trust in our nation’s potential and future. In this regard, we
consider as our priority task to develop relations that meet mutual interests, to
serve for maintaining peace and stability in our region and the world as a
whole.149
145
‘Uzbek leader says economy protected from financial crisis’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 December
2008.
146
‘Another Step Toward Rapproachment’Eurasianet.org, 23 January 2008, available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012308b.shtml, accessed June 2010.
147
‘Uzbek President Calls for Resumption of Peace Talks’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 April
2008.
148
‘EU eases Uzbek sanctions despite reporter’s jailing’ BBC Monitoring World Media, 15 October 2008.
149
‘Uzbek leader independence speech lists foreign policy priorities’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1
September 2008.
78
In spite of the good-will, topics related to self-sufficiency and defence autonomy
continued being iterated: ‘who is respected in the world? The world respects people,
nation or a state which trusts in its own strength, capacities and power and which is
able to demonstrate them. It respects people or nation which is prepared to protect and
feed itself, to build its future and to pursue its comprehensive independent policy
without being inferior and bending its head to anyone.’150
Mitigating dependency was made explicit in President Karimov’s appeals for
attaining energy self-sufficiency,151 and increasing Uzbekistan’s gold reserves.152 With
the economic crisis expanding in 2008, Mr Karimov legitimated his mercantilist and
protectionist policies by underlining that Uzbekistan had avoided recession: ‘we should
note that it is not difficult to see and observe that many countries' not well-thought-out
[sic] policy towards external debt has made their economies weak, dependent on
external factors, and unprotected from dangerous situations.’153
Besides international political economy, President Karimov boosted his nonmilitaristic status by making frequent allusions to violence escalating in Afghanistan:
‘the dynamics of the development of the situation in Afghanistan show, with
increasingly more obviousness [sic], that by using armed forces and military means as
well as increasing militarization alone, it is impossible to resolve the problem of
Afghanistan.’154 Subsequently, in April 2008, at the NATO Bucharest Summit,
President Karimov argued for an alternative. He put forth his previous 1990s
suggestion of having each of Afghanistan’s neighbours -alongside Russia, the United
States and now NATO - tackle insecurity: ‘taking into consideration the contemporary
realities, it would be necessary to transform the contact group which operated until
2001 from 6+2 into 6+3 bearing in mind the compulsory participation of the NATO
representation in this negotiation process.’155
Lastly, it is perhaps relevant to mention President Karimov’s greater public
concern with environmental issues. Although this is not specifically connected to
international equality, it had rhetorical repercussions in regional politics. As Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan became more assertive in their wish to develop hydroelectricity
(Weinthal 2006: 11), Mr Karimov voiced his strong scepticism toward Dushanbe’s plans
150
‘Uzbek leader says all work to focus on raising life standards’ op. cit.
On autarky, see ‘Uzbek leader warns of foreign influence at his Cabinet speech’ op. cit.
152
On gold reserves, see President Karimov’s declarations in ‘Uzbek leader says Afghan situation has
“extremely” negative impact on security’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 October 2008.
153
‘Uzbek leader says economy protected from financial crisis’ op. cit.
154
‘Uzbek leader voices concern over Afghan security’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 August 2008.
155
‘President attends Partnership for Peace NATO summit’ Uzreport.com, 4 April 2008.
151
79
for constructing the Roghun Dam.156 He demanded that they should first obtain
international approval157 and underlined the negative consequences of environmental
degradation in the Aral Sea.158 So, the relevance given to environmental issues and the
way in which Uzbekistan sought to guarantee an eco-friendly Central Asia shaped the
role of protector of Central Asia’s environment.159
III.5. Repertoires from 2009 to 2010
The smaller sample of statements for this period means that it is harder to make an
overall sketch of President Karimov’s rhetoric. The complex blend of technocracy and
Uzbek authenticity was still evident, thereby making it difficult to isolate the main
roles. Mr Karimov was still having difficulties in ascertaining public credibility, leading
inevitably to a conundrum: were Uzbekistan’s economic achievements capable of being
generalized under a so-called ‘civilized’ status among the world’s powers, or was
Uzbekistan’s model of development designed to shelter its culture and prevent it from
being compared to others? The question remained unanswered and so the friction
within this complicated repertoire persisted in the years to come.
Defending the image of the Uzbek people for the sake of stability and development
The difficulty of understanding the predominant rhetorical theme throughout this short
period derives in part from Uzbekistan’s improved relationship with the United States
and how this clashed with the appeals for cultural differentiation. At the time, President
Karimov praised Washington and its influence: ‘we learnt from the experience of the
USA, when we set up the Senate, gave its name and elected 100 people to its
membership (...). I think we must study and familiarize ourselves with these issues and
apply them in our country.’160 Lauding the United States evinces how Uzbekistani
leadership revamped the topic of political reform. For instance, in November 2010,
156
Once Moscow abandoned a hydroelectricity project in Tajikistan, President Rahmon announced in
July 2007 that Tajikistan would build the plant by its own means. See ‘Backgrounder: Tajikistan cancels
giant Russian dam project’ BBC Monitoring Research, 11 September 2007.
157
‘Uzbek leader calls for coordinating water projects in Central Asia’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23
April 2008.
158
‘President addresses participants of international conference on Aral’ Uzreport.com, 13 March 2008.
159
The environment was given further importance when the O’zbekiston ekologik hаrаkаti (Ecological
Movement of Uzbekistan) was created in 2008 and allocated fifteen seats in Parliament (Tynan 2009).
However, this was not the first time that green politics were relevant. Already in President Karimov’s
1992 book, the disastrous Soviet legacy to the Aral Sea was described. Still, between 1992 and 2007, the
issue had barely been mentioned in the public sphere.
160
‘Uzbek leader says stability in region depends on Afghanistan’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28
January 2010.
80
President Karimov delivered a 12,000 word speech to Parliament, detailing new
constitutional reforms: ‘it is necessary to draft and adopt the legislative acts that after
the example of the developed democratic countries stipulate establishment of legal
mechanisms (...) The delegation of relevant authorities to the bodies of justice (…) shall
permit to create an effective mechanism of checks and balances in the system of lawenforcement and supervisory bodies of the country, which ensures observance of law
and rule of law in the course of their work [sic].’161 In the latter statement, no other
reference to the American political system is clearer than the allusion to its checks and
balances. Even in 2009, during parliamentary elections, President Karimov praised the
democratic robustness of Uzbekistan’s system.162
It would seem that President Karimov’s greater involvement with the United
States triggered a gradual change in rhetoric (see above). However, the steady
transformation was not novel in the argument, merely in the emphasis, insofar as the
state remained the main supervisor of change.
As the economic crisis gained momentum, President Karimov explained that
Uzbekistan had escaped recession because of the model of gradual transition it had
implemented since independence: ‘life experience has proved on more than one
occasion that no-one and nothing can replace the regulation of economic and financial
relations, the use of state's role in choosing priorities to find a way out of crisis
situations, the role of the state that presents the interests of the majority of the
population, and the conduct of strong social policy and long-term national strategy
[sic].’
163
Moreover, President Karimov continued rejecting any sort of shock therapy
and alluded to the growing success of China’s cautious approach: ‘why am I comparing
the Chinese and Uzbek models? Because they are similar in many ways.’164
On the other hand, President Karimov also claimed that he was propounding
Uzbekistan’s exceptionality and spirituality: ‘naturally, we all respond to this question
that on the focus of our aspirations there lays a dream to bring up our children
physically and spiritually healthy, being inferior in nothing and to no one, see their
happiness and prosperous future. Indeed, isn’t it the core essence of our life?’ 165 He
continued, therefore, describing a number of threats to Uzbekistan’s way of life:
‘various attacks are ever gaining strength aimed against national identity, centuries-old
values of our people, and mercenary aspirations are being manifested to secure the
161
‘Address by President Karimov at the joint session of Legislative Chamber and Senate’ UzReport.com,
15 November 2010.
162
‘Uzbekistan marks constitution day, President addresses the nation’ Uzreport.com, 8 December 2009.
163
‘One should not fetish market relations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 May 2009.
164
‘Leader says living standards rising in Uzbekistan…’ op. cit.
165
‘Uzbekistan marks constitution day, President addresses the nation’ Uzreport.com, 8 December 2009.
81
minds and souls of our youth, and certainly, all these impel us to greater vigilance.’166
As will be discussed below, reconciling cultural authenticity with technocracy is difficult
- if not impossible, thereby leading to intra-role conflict.
Genuine independence and pursuit of international relations on an equal footing
President Karimov’s notions of defending equality, as in all the other periods, were not
subject to any degree of change: ‘the reason for this is the fact that we have never been
inferior to anyone in anything, and undoubtedly, shall be second to none in securing
our cherished goal to build a free, independent and prosperous life, inshallah.’ 167
Equality correlated with a mercantilist outlook, focused on genuine independence (non
dependence), obtaining technology and exporting manufactured goods.168
Other pervasive themes were non-interventionism and non-militarism. As
concerns the former, the ‘Kyrgyz Revolution’ of 2010 led to a response from President
Karimov, who declared that he would not interfere in his neighbour’s affairs,169 even as
the violence targeted Uzbek minorities in Kyrgyzstan’s south. Nevertheless, he made a
surprising appeal at the UN Millennium Goals Summit for the Kyrgyz events to be
subject to international inquiry;170 in effect contradicting his claim for respecting
Uzbekistani sovereignty during the Andijan Crisis.
Lastly, non-militarism, became especially connected to Afghanistan and
Russian policy for Central Asia (the latter topic is developed in Chapter IV), in that
President Karimov continued declaring Uzbekistan’s neutrality in Afghan conflicts171
and for the application of his multilateral 6+3 initiative.172 Indeed, amid the discussion
on NATO withdrawal, President Karimov demonstrated some apprehension regarding
the region’s future.173
III.6. Role coherence and intra-role conflict from 1989 to 2010
166
Ibid.
Ibid.
168
‘Leader says living standards rising in Uzbekistan despite global crisis’ op. cit.; and ‘Global crisis
negatively affects Uzbek exports’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 February.
169
‘Uzbek leader says no revenge to be allowed for Kyrgyz violence’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19
June 2010.
170
‘Address by H.E. Mr. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, at the Plenary Session’
29 September 2010, available at: http://www.gov.uz/en/press/politics/6612, accessed: September 2010.
171
‘Uzbek leader says remained neutral during Afghan conflict’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19
December 2010.
172
‘Uzbek leader focuses on Afghan security during Russian counterpart’s visit’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 29 January 2009.
173
‘Uzbek leader says remained neutral…’ op. cit.
167
82
The above analysis reveals that President Karimov publicly set for himself fifteen roles,
all of which classified under three distinct group-types: technocracy; cultural
authenticity; and prestige (see table 2 below).
The key role that appears in all group-types is defender of Uzbekistan’s
international equality (see table 2). It has a technocratic connotation by virtue of its
economic focus, in that it calls for interaction based on relative gains. It is also
associated with Uzbekistan’s authentic culture, historical past and, by extension, its
prestige, as made evident in the call the slogan ‘Uzbekistan is second to no one’.
Accordingly, no way of life has greater value and no historical narrative can be grander
than Uzbekistan’s own experience.
Seeker of genuine independence is not as all-encompassing as defender of
international equality, but it has a number of repercussions on the technocratic and
prestige group-types. On one hand, as the name suggests, it is explicitly associated with
mitigating economic dependence and achieving defence autonomy. On the other hand,
it purports to augmenting Uzbekistan’s world status, given that being ‘respected’ or
being among the ‘civilized states’ is only possible for those who defend their own
borders, export manufactured goods and decrease their level of imports. So, the fact
that seeker of genuine independence and defender of international equality overlap
means that they have a number of ripple effects in President Karimov’s role set. Before
discussing in greater detail how these two pivotal roles are interconnected and whether
they are coherent with each other, it is worth pointing out a few of the conflicts existing
between and within the three group-types.
83
Table 2: Role Set Coherence174
Technocratic
Cultural Authenticity
Prestige
Expert on economic issues
Protector of stability
Defender of international equality
Defender of international equality
Seeker of genuine independence
Defender of international equality
Seeker of genuine independence
Technocratic leader
Developer of Uzbekistan’s economic future
Undisputed authority
Voice for a de—ideologized transition
Mercantilist entrepreneur
Bridge to joining other markets
Voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia
Definer of Uzbek authenticity
Protector of Uzbekistan’s great image
Fomenter of defence autonomy in Central Asia
Protector of Central Asia’s environment
Intra-role conflict between role group-types
Whilst technocratic-based roles pertain to the idea of achieving higher economic
development, culturally authentic roles subsume the ideas of spirituality that were
many times invoked to differentiate Uzbekistan from pernicious ideologies and even
from the West (see above). In order to look at the degree of intra-role conflict between
group-types, it would be best to revisit the dilemma President Karimov was facing after
the Andijan crisis: were Uzbekistan’s economic achievements capable of being
generalized to a so-called ‘civilized’ status among the world’s powers, or was
Uzbekistan’s model of development designed to shelter its culture, preventing it from
being compared to others?
This dilemma pertains to the problem of role malintegration (see Chapter II),
whereby technocratic themes hardly match counter-authenticity roles. In other words,
174
While the classification is mostly self-explanatory, it is important to clarify why some roles were
placed under certain group-types. Describing Voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia as technocratic has
much to do with how President Karimov equates technocracy with non-political issues. When he
propounded topics concerned with non-militarism, they were usually connected to avoiding greater
militarization, which he argued deflected attention from economics and internal stability. On the other
hand, Fomenter of defence autonomy and Protector of Central Asia’s environment are categorized as part
of the prestige group-type because President Karimov barely structured a programme on those subjectareas. For instance, while defining authenticity implied the deliberate appeal for ‘Uzbekness’, such as
promoting family and local traditions, fomenting defence autonomy was a vague appeal with no actual
practical implementation. Likewise for Protector of Central Asia’s Environment, as no concrete action
plan was delivered. Hence, the roles of Fomenter of defence autonomy and Protector of Central Asia’s
environment are largely slogans attached to President Karimov’s prestige as Uzbekistan’s head of state,
rather than signifiers of an actual technocratic or authentic programme.
84
either President Karimov proclaimed himself to be a supposedly unbiased, apolitical
leader (a man to do business with) or a cultural purifier. This role conflict evidently
causes confusion regarding the source of Uzbekistan’s prestige, meaning would it be its
economic prowess or its cultural authenticity?
It is worth cautioning that portraying technocratic and cultural roles as
contradictory is perhaps overstating the case, inasmuch as it may simply be a case of
role competition, wherein different roles compete in time and space, but are not
necessarily mutually exclusive (Backman 1970: 315). In fact, James Rosenau (1987: 5772) argued that leaders who define various role scenarios are able to deal promptly with
a variety of complex situations. Similarly, Cameron Thies (2009, 2001) proposed that
leaders can endure critical situations if they define multiple roles for themselves.
Therefore, the variety of roles expounded by President Karimov allowed for him to deal
with role discontinuities (different sequential contexts which require disjointed roles –
see Chapter II).
No other discontinuity was as prominent as the Andijan crisis, where his roles of
provider of stability, protector of Uzbekistan’s image and undisputed authority were
all under intense scrutiny. In this case, both McCall and Simmons (1966: 95-99) and
Harnisch’s (2012: 56) discussions on role conflict offer insight (see Chapter II). They
would agree that President Karimov coped with the rising difficulties by gradually
changing the level of commitment from technocracy to authenticity. Moreover, the
effects on public credibility and role conflict contributed to President Karimov altering
his scope of interaction, as he became less reluctant to improve his relationships with
China and Russia (the latter is better demonstrated in Chapter IV).
Despite the ‘complementarity’ existing between cultural authenticity and
technocracy, they are still inherently contradictory. Clearly, in the early 1990s, he had
defined himself mainly as a technocrat, but then, from 2002, his more defensive stance
resulted in Uzbekistan’s exceptional status and prestige becoming more prominent,
which certainly allowed him to cope with credibility problems, but at the cost of
revealing intra-role incoherency. So, role malintegration became more explicit,
irrespective of the ability to cope with new challenges.
Intra-role conflict inside role group-types
The differences between groups are not as stark as table 2 suggests and, in fact, a
degree of conflict can also be found within technocratic roles. This conflict derives from
the general role ambiguity of seeker of genuine independence since, in one case, it
constitutes the role of mercantilist entrepreneur and, in the other, it calls for obtaining
85
technology from abroad. President Karimov was quite vehement that Uzbekistan would
not be able to develop if it remained outside international markets (see discussion
above). Consequently, the contradiction is somewhat evident, as it is difficult to
reconcile mercantilism with the appeals for bridging other markets.
Intra-role conflict between defender of Uzbekistani international equality and seeker
of genuine independence
Defending equality and seeking genuine independence are more or less mutually
dependent roles (see discussion above),175 since apparently it is through genuine
independence that Uzbekistan reaches equality, and it is also by professing that it is
‘second to no one’ that it becomes genuinely independent.
In spite of the assumed coherence between these two persistent roles, however,
there is a degree of malintegration between the rhetoric of international equality and
genuine independence. The argument itself is counterintuitive: defender of equality
suggests an end; and seeker of genuine independence a process. In practice, demanding
the simultaneous fulfilment of an end and a process is rather unfeasible. Either
Uzbekistan is moving toward genuine independence, and so it is not yet equal among
other ‘civilized’ states, or it is in fact an equal and therefore requires no further
incremental progress. This problem inevitably contributed to public credibility
problems, especially after the Andijan crisis. And yet, as shown above, the two loosely
defined roles did allow President Karimov to adapt to discontinuities over time by
alternating his commitment to different group-types.
Role coherence through self-reliance
In spite of President Karimov’s role set seeming largely conflicting, it is consistent with
the overall conception of self-reliance. Indeed, when delving into the intricacies of each
role, many are mal-integrated, as is the case with his core roles of defending
Uzbekistan’s equality and seeking genuine independence. Still, the scepticism toward
the international environment, the avoidance of dependency, the emphasis on
economic development and the concern with authenticity, all reveal a public
175
Both roles are more or less analogous with the ‘Independence Idea’ (Mustaqillik Mafkurasi), which
was explicitly endorsed by President Karimov’s regime in the mid-1990s (Muminov 2010: 148-149).
However, given how his thesis is concerned with classifying general public themes rather than
understanding their distinct local origin, the fact that President Karimov never publicly declared that he
was following an ideology meant that Mustaqillik is not central to the discussion herein. This is not to say
that Mustaqillik and Tashkent’s Ideological Centre are irrelevant. The meaning of the word and its
repercussions are certainly important to understanding the origins of political discourse in Uzbekistan.
For more on Mustaqillik, see I. Muminov (2010) and Andrew March (2003, 2002).
86
commitment to autonomy and a strong reluctance to engage fully with the international
public sphere. Although the justifications varied across time, President Karimov’s roles
were relatively constant. Defending international equality and seeking genuine
independence never ceased to be invoked, and while the two may be questionable
political programmes, Uzbekistan’s president did not deviate substantially from his
original positions. Perhaps even more interesting to observe is that throughout his
nearly twenty years in office, he paid considerable attention to his credibility in the
international public sphere, by constantly legitimating his roles (for legitimating acts in
role theory, see Chapter II).
87
IV. The Uzbekistani-Russian Relationship 1991-2010
The near twenty-year relationship between Uzbekistan and Russia was characterized by
distinct moments of cooperation and conflict. As concerns Moscow, various ideas on
foreign policy were visible in a variety of statements and internal debates (Allison
2004: 283), which allows for a number of roles to be inferred. Yet, even during
President Putin’s era - as a number of more stable and longer-term goals were endorsed
- it was unclear whether Moscow developed ‘a regional strategy for Central Asia that
would integrate Russian security, political, energy and economic interests’ (Ibid). So,
the relationship was fluid, open-ended and fundamentally political in that meanings
and discontinuities all played an important part.
Despite a degree of ambiguity and intra-role conflict regarding foreign policy,
Moscow did display distinct phases of external engagement that are more or less
capable of being categorized: uncertainty in the early 1990s, when Russia divorced
itself partially from the Soviet Union and looked more toward the West; the rise of the
so-called Primakov doctrine in 1996, which sought to reignite interest for the ‘near
abroad’, i.e. Eastern Europe and Central Asia; the Putin age after 2000, characterized
by steadier leadership and clearer security and economic goals (Laruelle 2009: 29-32).
For these reasons, Jean-François Thibault and Jacques Levésque (1997: 20-22) argue
that Moscow’s roles are determined by three distinct and often conflicting roles, namely
the Western outlook of the Kozyrev era, Eurasianism, and Neo-Communism. Their
inference agrees more or less with Stephen White’s (2000: 230) depiction of Russia’s
foreign policy debate in the 1990s - between those who supported foreign minister
Kozyrev’s honeymoon period with Washington and others who were sceptical toward
engaging with the West. It also captures the economic recovery after 2000, in which
Moscow pursued a number of economic projects, particularly in the energy market
(Newnham 2011: 137; Baghat 2007: 163; Tompson 2004: 117). Increasing prosperity
coincided with the beginning of President Putin’s term in office. Moscow then
consolidated a number of new concepts on foreign policy, namely: ‘Europeanism’;
‘securitisation’ of both international terrorism and Chechen separatism; preserving
‘autonomy’; ‘normalizing relations with partners’; and constraining other ‘great powers’
(Sakwa 2004: 275-279). Evidently, it is worth insisting that all these pursuits were not
always coincidental and, as Allison (2004: 283) pointedly observed, they hardly
resulted in a univocal strategy. For instance, rapprochement with the ‘near abroad’
could sometimes be at odds with Moscow’s own goals for monopolizing energy supplies
in Eurasia (see below).
88
Naturally, some of those roles affected Russia’s relationship with Uzbekistan.
The two states were actually never able to settle a variety of disputes throughout their
twenty-year relationship. President Karimov’s self-reliant role set - focused on seeking
genuine independence, protecting stability, defending equality and Uzbekistan’s
image – was never fully compatible with Moscow’s paternalism regarding Central Asia,
its security pursuits and even its occasional neglect of the region.
Overall, the central emplotting feature of the following narrative is President
Karimov’s persistent appeal for being an equal among equals which, alongside his role
of defending Uzbekistan’s image, barely ever fomented an environment conducive to
consistent cooperation. As shown below, President Karimov began positioning his
political career as a supporter of a relatively reformed Soviet Union, one in which
equality among each Republic and stability was respected. Moscow, however,
distanced itself initially from these appeals, which eventually contributed to reinforcing
President Karimov’s self-reliant roles. The friction, then, became more acute as
Moscow debated a number of roles, some of which had imperialistic connotations,
especially during the wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.176 Still, not all was inter-role
conflict, seeing as compatibility was also observable during the early Putin era, when
Moscow adjusted to the region and boosted President Karimov’s prestige and
technocratic roles. Eventually, this led to gradual rapprochement, although, after 2006,
Moscow’s public ambitions in becoming an energy hub and security provider for the
region collided with President Karimov’s calls for seeking genuine independence. Role
conflict thus became a predominant feature of the relationship after 2008, given that a
number of unresolved issue-areas brought about discontinuity. The relationship was
thus characterized by mutual inter-dependencies, in that events in Russia reinforced
and constructed part of President Karimov’s public repertoires, which, in turn, affected
Moscow’s policies for the region.
IV.1. The beginning 1989-1993:
the ruble, debt, bilateralism
and
Uzbekistan’s image
In the summer of 1993, President Karimov gave an interview in which he reflected
upon the end of the Soviet Union. He confessed that a confederation of sovereign states
would have been the natural result if events had not got out of control: ‘everything had
come down to a confederation being formed on the base of the union [sic]. But by the
evolutionary path, without upheavals, in a civilized fashion [sic]. The Emergency
176
See, for example, Roy Allison (2004: 280) for a brief depiction of Mr Chubais’s fascination for a
Russian-based liberal empire.
89
Committee [i.e. the August coup leaders] broke up everything and urged on destructive
processes.’177 He also took the opportunity to pay a small homage to the former
Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR, Sharof Rashidov, whom
he portrayed as an unfair target of the reformist fashions of the time.178
These comments reveal the extent to which President Karimov had committed
himself to stability and Mikhail Gorbachev’s renewed Soviet Union.179 Additionally, one
cannot ignore how the statement evinces a sort of public grievance against both
Moscow’s reformists and how Uzbekistan had been depicted during the notorious
‘Cotton Affair’.180 The interview thus sketches well the way in which Mr Karimov’s
career skyrocketed during the end of the Soviet Union (see Chapter III). Both the
circumstances of his appointment and his public qualms against Perestroika created
the ideal setting for a career based on opposing accelerated change and defending
Uzbekistan’s image and international equality.
Reform and President Karimov’s public position regarding the future of the Soviet
Union
Before independence, President Karimov positioned his rhetoric in favour of curtailing
Moscow’s influence in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs without, however, questioning the
Soviet Union’s economic stability. He therefore gradually invoked the slogan of
equality among the Union’s states,181 but did not endorse changes that could have
ended in economic upheaval.
At the time of Perestroika and Glasnost, one of Mr Gorbachev’s more pressing
concerns was to reform the USSR’s 1977 constitution (White 1991: 139).182 This issue
became relevant as the Baltic countries struggled for independence and especially after
the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian SSR declared sovereignty over the
whole of the Soviet Union on 12 June 1990. Tashkent reciprocated a few days later, on
20 June, by proclaiming both its own sovereignty183 and appealing for a decentralized
177
‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 12 June 1993.
178
Ibid.
179
For more on the issue of sovereignty and the renewed Soviet Union, see Mohira Suyarkulova (2011:
131-132), who argues that the governments in Central Asian favoured most of Mr Gorbachev’s plans, but
that they were not in favour of relinquishing sovereignty.
180
See James Critchlow (1991) for an excellent account of the Cotton Affair and the main issues affecting
the relationship between Moscow and Tashkent in the 1980s.
181
On President Karimov’s interpretation of equality within a renewed Federation, see the following
interview: ‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1991.
182
This was a highly contested issue at the time, especially after Mr Yeltsin declared Russia’s sovereignty
over the whole of the Soviet Union in June 1990. In any case, Lithuania had already declared
independence the year before, soon followed by the remaining Baltic states.
183
‘Congress of CP of Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 December 1990.
90
union.184 President Karimov, nevertheless, remained prudent in public, arguing that he
was against breaking all formal ties with Moscow. Hence, he declared that Uzbekistan
was not pursuing defence sovereignty and complete independence.185 Also, unlike the
trends spurning from the Caucasus (except for the Azerbaijan SSR) and the Baltic
countries, he endorsed the referendum on a new political treaty, the results of which
revealed that 93.7% of the Uzbek SSR’s voter turnout was in favour of Mr Gorbachev’s
plans.186
In August 1991, as events were apparently leading to a reformed union treaty,
Mr Gorbachev went on holiday. However, Moscow’s leading conservative faction then
seized the opportunity and organized a coup. Uzbekistan’s leader was, at the time,
visiting India (Suyarkulova 2011: 144; Carlisle 1995b: 196); but, as the coup’s failure
became apparent, he returned to Tashkent and, along with his Kyrgyz counterpart,
declared independence on 31 August 1991.
This claim to independence, while seeming to be a sudden shift, was in fact a
coherent position, given the demise of the coup. President Karimov persisted with
invoking the protection of stability and technocratic leadership (see Chapter III). So,
the call for independence publicly differentiated Tashkent from the conservative
backlash, but did not question his public commitment to Soviet Unity, so long as his
country’s sovereignty was respected (see Chapter III). Subsequently, he backed Mr
Gorbachev after the coup and his renewed attempt to create a Union Treaty of
Sovereign States (Suyarkulova 2011: 144).
Nonetheless, the political game faced discontinuity after President Boris
Yeltsin’s success in curtailing the coup (White 2000: 32). Russia’s President, probably
convinced that USSR was no longer feasible, supported independent Ukraine and
refused to sign the new Union Treaty on 24 November. Soon after, he met with the
Presidents of Ukraine and Belarus and designed a separate treaty agreement on 8
December, effectively creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This
turn of events was condemned by President Karimov. Indeed, President Yeltsin
proposed a rapid and nationalist change, which confronted Mr Karimov’s roles of
protector of stability and de-ideologized leader. As a result, he declared that the
184
‘Second day’s debate on Gorbachev’s report’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 September
1989.
185
‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ op. cit.
186
In spite of the strong support for the Soviet Union and the narrative that subsequently came about that
Central Asian Republics hoped to maintain the Soviet status quo, it is important to recall a number of
President Karimov’s statements favouring sovereignty (see discussion in Chapter III and IV). Also, the
fact that the question in the referendum itself called for a ‘sovereign’ republic or one with ‘equal rights’,
meant that Tashkent was especially committing itself to a reformed union (Suyarkulova 2011: 141-142),
where equality was kept, as well as economic stability. So, the status quo was more nuanced than just an
attempt at continuity.
91
creation of the CIS was a ‘hot-headed decision’ led by the three ‘Slavic’ Republics and
which, as a result, could have contributed to ‘balkanizing’ the Soviet Union.187 Retorts
aside, the Soviet Union was effectively delegitimized after the creation of the CIS.
The need for bilateralism and the rhetoric of reform
With the end of the Soviet Union, President Karimov remained somewhat consistent
with his previous roles, by simply switching his rhetoric on the Union to the CIS space.
He campaigned for protecting stability and keeping the ruble zone.188 These public
commitments, however, brought about a degree of intra-role conflict. Given that he
persistently declared the need for defending Uzbekistan’s equality, it is difficult to
reconcile economic integration between two different and unequal partners.
Subsequently, the relations between Russia and Uzbekistan suffered, partially due to
Tashkent’s contradicting roles, but also because of Moscow’s public unwillingness to
commit to Eurasian schemes (Laruelle 2009: 30; Thibault & Levésque 1997: 20-22)
Evidence of President Karimov’s calls for defending equality was made clear in
his endorsement of bilateralism. In October 1991, both Presidents Yeltsin and Karimov
ratified a barter agreement - the first bilateral treaty between the two newly
independent Republics.189 The two heads of state then met again in 1992 to prepare the
legal basis of their relations, formalized under the ‘Friendship Agreement’ of 30 May.190
In practice, the agreement downplayed the importance of the CIS as a binding
multilateral framework. At the time, President Karimov admitted that ‘[the CIS] is a
necessity and a mechanism acceptable for all independent states which helps to
preserve the civilized relations and contacts between the CIS states and to go to longterm bilateral relations [sic].’ According to President Karimov’s own words, the CIS was
downplayed as a sort of goodwill summit for promoting bilateral cooperation, rather
than a strong multilateral body. Consequently, bilateralism would soon become his
public modus operandi, seeing as it was perhaps the best way of defending equality
without having it becoming diluted in a large organization led by Moscow.
187
‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ op. cit.
According to Michael Kaser (1997: 28-31), the pro-ruble policy may have been motivated by a wish to
continue receiving the large subsidies of the Soviet era and even the free-ride on Russia’s monetary
expansion. Related also to the question of currency was the need of coordinating the Soviet Union’s debt
in the early 1990s. In fact, it was not just with currency that President Karimov was concerned, but also
the problem of debt. In late 1991, Mr Karimov opposed signing an agreement with the Paris Club, which
planned the partition of the Soviet Union’s claims and debts. This problem was quickly solved, though,
when Tashkent agreed that Moscow would service its external debt in exchange for a transfer of claims
(Nadmitov: 7).
189
Tashkent settled to supply cotton to Russia’s textile industry in exchange for machinery.
190
‘Karimov’s visit to Moscow; Friendship Treaty signed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June
1992.
188
92
However, defending equality was hardly compatible with preserving an
economic union, i.e. protecting the stability of economic arrangements. As negotiations
over the future gained momentum, reformists in Moscow opposed the type of economic
linkages existing with the former Soviet Union. Personalities with growing influence in
Moscow like Yegor Gaidar, Boris Fedorov, Anatoliy Chubais and Aleksandr Shokhin
were all against maintaining the ruble zone (Dabrowski 1995: 25). Their concerns were,
in part, political as most felt Russia’s future lay in the West and not among its ‘lagging’
southern neighbours. Yet, besides their different visions, the reformists’ roles also
sanctioned a sudden transition to a market economy, a measure to which President
Karimov was vehemently opposed. Basing himself on his credentials as both a
stabilizer and technocratic expert, President Karimov campaigned for maintaining
economic stability and not shaking the foundations of the system. He publicly opposed
Yegor Gaidar, the father of Russia’s ‘shock therapy’, accusing him of leading Russia into
disarray and of dragging Soviet States into impoverishment.191
Eurasianists in Russia were at the time the minority and so the ruble zone
gathered little public support. However, President Karimov appealed to this small
segment of Russian society as well as to his own domestic constituency: ‘there is much
more to it [the ruble zone] than that. I would like to explain one simple thing, that is, to
me exit from the rouble zone is not simply losing whatever economic links that we
currently maintain with Russia (…) Among the people living in Uzbekistan are two
million Russian-speakers. These are people who see Russia as their true homeland, and
it only takes us to bring in our own currency for them to feel, quite simply, that they are
being cut off from their homeland.’192
The future of the economic union was in a state of flux, but events would soon
appear to be on President Karimov’s side after signing the ‘Agreement on a Uniform
Monetary System and Unified Money, Credit, and Currency Policy in the States Using
the Ruble as a Legal Medium of Exchange’ on 9 October 1992. President Yeltsin was
paying heed to the calls of Eurasianists, and so the ruble would remain the legal means
of exchange in the CIS. President Karimov showed also his public commitment to the
new arrangement by lambasting against Kyrgyzstan when it decided to leave the
monetary union in early 1993.193
However, shortly after the agreement, President Yeltsin showed increasing
uncertainty. Reformists in Moscow changed the ruble zone’s policy in July 1993 and the
191
‘“Speaking of Borders means breaking up Central Asia” Islam Karimov Speaks in an Interview with
Foreign Journalists’ Official Kremlin News Broadcasts, 15 May 1992.
192
‘President Karimov on Independence Day; speaks on Russia’s regional role’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 17 September 1993.
193
‘Press Conference by CIS leaders on results of Moscow Meeting (President Hotel)’Official Kremlin
News Broadcast, 14 May 1993.
93
Russian Central bank unilaterally announced that notes printed before 1993 would no
longer be legal tender, meaning they were ascribed as debts to be paid by Central Asian
states (Hale 1994).
The decision seems to have had a strong public impact in Tashkent. Even as late
as 2001, President Karimov reflected upon its repercussions and how it had threatened
stability: ‘Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev [the President of Kazakhstan] and I were
among those who were categorically against being pushed out of the rouble zone. If you
remember, this happened in 1991-1993 when Russia introduced its new currency, they
used to send their old banknotes and we did not know how to deal with them [sic]. You
know even removing them from circulation is not a simple process, all these huge piles
of currency and notes which have poisonous consequences [sic]. They gradually
introduced their new currency and sent their old currency to us and we distributed
them as salaries then they registered them as our debt. We objected and asked what
they thought they were doing.’194
In the end, it was simply not possible to merge President Karimov’s call for
economic stability with defending equality - ambiguities that were then reflected in
subsequent negotiations. Moscow demanded the IMF model, whilst its counterparts
desired a one country one vote system (Dabrowski 1995: 20-21). President Yeltsin,
though, seems to have been somewhat sensitive to the situation in Central Asia and
backtracked again by proposing the creation of a Monetary and Economic Union in
August 1993. President Karimov then adjusted his actions by authorizing national
economic policy to be coordinated alongside Moscow.195 However, he then refused
transferring 40 tonnes of gold to Russia (Hale 1994: 149) and so no agreement was
reached. Losing almost all macroeconomic sovereignty was perhaps too much given
how much he had rested his public credibility on defending equality and seeking a
degree of genuine independence.
The discontinuity, though, did bring new opportunities. Forsaking the ruble
zone meant that President Karimov would no longer have to compromise on being the
domestic undisputed authority and could thus become less constrained in propounding
self-reliance.
194
‘No deadline set for US troops to leave Uzbekistan, president says – More’ BBC Monitoring Central
Asia, 29 December 2001.
195
‘Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan to keep ruble with Russia’ Agence France Presse, 7 August
1993.
94
IV.2. Disentanglement to a degree (1994-1999): diverging concerns over
Tajikistan and Afghanistan and protecting Uzbekistan’s image
After the end of the ruble zone, Moscow and Tashkent strengthened their relations by
signing several bilateral accords: the 1994 Strategic Agreement, a Trade Accord in 1998
and other legal treatises dealing with the 1992-1993 credits to Uzbekistan. Although a
degree of bilateral cooperation existed, the number of treaties signed did not reflect any
special level of public trust existing between the two parties. Indeed, by 1999 the
relations of the two countries hardly deserved an optimistic appraisal.
President Karimov, once abandoning the ruble zone, publicly endorsed more
self-reliance. The electoral successes of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s party in 1993 and then
of the Communist party in December 1995 brought about a degree of public grievance
from Tashkent, given their nationalist rhetoric.196 Both parties conflicted overtly with
President Karimov’s technocratic-centred roles, based on protecting stability and deideologized politics and reinforced his role of defender of Uzbekistan’s great image.
Still, it would be the civil wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan that unravelled a strong
level of public distrust between the two countries, as President Karimov accused
Moscow of conspiring against Uzbekistan’s international equality.
The problem of Moscow’s imperialist rhetoric
Despite rivalries and friction, Presidents Karimov and Yeltsin were not publicly willing
to break relations throughout the whole period. Uzbekistan’s leader actually appealed
to Moscow. He called for the Russian government to become a more reliable partner
and galvanize bilateral trade, which was entirely compatible with his role of bridge to
other markets and voice for de-ideologized transition.197 Indeed, Mr Yeltsin, whose
foreign policy had now gradually adhered to the concept of engaging with Central Asia
(Laruelle 2009: 31; Allison 2004: 281), travelled to Tashkent in October 1998. The
official visit and President Yeltsin’s proposal for a ten-year trade accord were portrayed
by the press as an attempt to diminish tension.
198
Even though these efforts did not lead to rapprochement (see below), it is
interesting to observe that President Karimov enjoyed lauding Mr Yeltsin’s personal
qualities. For instance, after signing the 1998 trade accord, Uzbekistan’s President
196
For more on Russian nationalism, see Marlene Laruelle (2009).
‘Russia risks losing Uzbek market, Karimov warns’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 May
1994.
198
As a matter of fact, in March 1994, a few months after being forced to print new currency; President
Karimov visited Moscow and signed a bilateral strategic agreement. It was not particularly innovative,
merely a commitment to not mutually targeting each other.
197
95
praised the Russian head of state for always being opposed to ‘chauvinism’ and
grandiose ‘imperialism’.199 Moreover, he mentioned that he had personal respect for the
Russian President, deriving from the latter’s moderation.200 This was a resounding
show of support for Mr Yeltsin who, curiously, at the time, arrived in what seemed to be
an intoxicated state at Tashkent airport. Reporters revealed that Mr Karimov was even
forced to prevent Russia’s President from falling on the ground.201
The show of respect was probably induced by President Yeltsin’s reluctance to
fully endorse Russia’s growing nationalism,202 which was compatible with Mr
Karimov’s role of defender of Uzbekistan’s image. It is important to mention that, in
the 1990s, President Karimov was visibly sceptical of his Russian counterpart, who had,
during his presidential election, portrayed Russia’s southern neighbours as backward
(Laruelle 2009: 30). Such declarations along with uncomplimentary journalistic
reports were frequently denounced by Mr Karimov.203 Evidently, Mr Yeltsin’s dynamic
style opposed Mr Karimov’s technocratic approach to politics; yet as both the
Communist and Liberal democratic parties gained influence in Moscow, Uzbekistan’s
leader became a stronger supporter of the Russian President, which allowed for
boosting his roles of protector of stability and undisputed authority. After Mr
Zhirinovskiy’s electoral success in December 1993, President Karimov stated that
‘chauvinistic sentiments are on the rise in Russia now. We should not like them to
become predominant because they pose a certain threat to Uzbekistan.’204
Furthermore, when Gennady Zyuganov, the secretary of the Communist party, called
Mr Yeltsin a drunken, President Karimov intervened on behalf of Russia’s President: ‘if
Zyuganov calls his president an alcoholic, then what kind of order will there be in the
state, just tell me that. He is your president, who was elected, as you like to boast, in a
democratic way.’205
Furthermore, Russia’s growing nationalistic pride was portrayed as a threat to
Uzbekistan’s genuine independence and international equality. For instance, Tashkent
199
‘Uzbek President Hails Yeltsin’s Visit’ Interfax Russia News, 12 October 1998.
Ibid.
201
‘Yeltsin “unsteady on his feet” on arrival in Uzbekistan’ Agence Presse France, 11 October 1998
202
For more on Russian nationalism, see Laruelle’s (2009) excellent book. On the politics of Russia’s
Duma, see White (2000).
203
See for example ‘Fourth Congress of People’s deputies of the USSR Statement’ Official News
Broadcasts, 19 December 1990 and ‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of
strong-arm tactics’ op. cit.
204
Mr Karimov’s intense dislike for Russia’s new parties was made clear when he stated that he would
not visit Russia if he were invited by Mr Zyuganov, the leader of Russia’s communist party. President
Karimov further polarized the situation by bluntly stating that the ‘Russia of President Boris Yeltsin
appeals to me but not the Russia of Zyuganov’. See ‘Kazakh, Uzbek and Turkmen leaders on relations
with Russia’ TASS, 29 January 1994.
205
‘Uzbek head in airport interview before leaving for Kazakh Summit – full version’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 20 February 1999.
200
96
criticized Foreign Minister Nikolay Kozyrev’s suggestion of using force to protect ethnic
Russians abroad and the Duma’s decision to consider the Belovezhskaya Puscha
agreements illegal.206 So, as the debate over Russian nationalism and imperialism
persisted, President Yeltsin responded to the politicization of chauvinism by publicly
dismissing the imperial aims of Russia in December 1997 and appealing for
Uzbekistan’s cooperation.207 Still, as shown below, these adjustments and small
instances of role compatibility between the two leaders were not enough to ameliorate a
number of other tense bilateral issue-areas that came under the public spotlight.
Russia and Uzbekistan’s interventionist policies: clashes over Tajikistan and
Afghanistan
At the surface level, everything would suggest that Moscow and Tashkent shared
similar concerns over stability. According to President Karimov, the conflicts in
Chechnya were linked to Tajikistan and Afghanistan and the growth of Islamic
fundamentalism: ‘after the events in Dagestan and in Russia in general, it has become
obvious that there are common centres, which are powerful, have strong financial
resources, and are extremely well organized (...) I am firmly convinced that the savage
appearance of international terrorism is today taking cover behind religious concepts,
sacred to many people.’208 Consequently, both Moscow and Tashkent were sometimes
able to demonstrate public unity as the crises escalated,209 but full role compatibility
was hindered by other parallel events, which increased bilateral friction.
Initially, with factional confrontations in Dushanbe escalating, Moscow and
Tashkent became active in promoting the Kulabi and Leninibadi groups to power.
President Karimov supported the popular front led by Sanjar Kenjayev (a Tajikistani
national from the Leninibadi region) in fighting against the United Tajik Opposition
(UTO) (Akiner 2001: 21; Jonson 2006). The war gained visibility in the international
public sphere as twenty-four Russian border troops were killed in Tajikistan in July
1993, eventually inducing President Yeltsin to become more involved in the conflict and
declare that Tajikistan’s border would be regarded as Russia’s border too (Neumann &
Solodovnik 1996: 92). This was far from being compatible with President Karimov’s
206
‘Other reports; Yeltsin receives telegrams from CIS leaders condemning State Duma decision’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 March 1996.
207
‘Yeltsin voices concern at Uzbek stance on CIS’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 January
208
‘Uzbek President Vows to Defend Territory “with all available means”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
20 October 1999.
209
For example, after the Tashkent bombings of February 1999, Mr Yeltsin was quick to telephone Mr
Karimov and offer his sympathies. On the other hand, when Russia’s actions in Chechnya were
increasingly condemned in the West, President Karimov highlighted American hypocrisy toward the
Andrei Babitskiy affair - a Russian journalist who was imprisoned by Russian military forces.
97
public positions, seeing as he called for seeking genuine independence and defending
equality for both Uzbekistan and its neighbours. In fact, just a few months earlier, he
had stated to be personally against Central Asian countries requiring external
assistance to defend themselves: ‘let me just stress that Tajikistan should not expect
somebody else to come and defend it. Every people must defend themselves and every
state if it is a sovereign and independent state.’210 President Karimov argued for
demilitarizing the region and thus objected to Russian border troops remaining on the
ground (see Chapter III).
Once violence in Tajikistan mitigated in 1994, Uzbekistani and Russian
authorities managed to exclude the UTO from Tajikistan’s late November elections. The
outcome, however, was not favourable to Tashkent given that the leninibadi candidate
they supported lost, and Emomalii Rahmon, a kulabi, won (Neumann & Solodovnik
1996: 94). Power sharing was still a contested issue and a compromise was settled in
Moscow in April 1997, whereby President Rahmon agreed to allocate thirty per cent of
his government to members of the UTO. Despite the successful negotiation, Tashkent
refused to be one of the guarantors of the agreement, even though it did not publicly
divulge the reasons for the decision.211 As an initial response to this settlement,
Tashkent removed its own peacekeeping force from Tajikistan in November 1998 and
clarified its position by demanding Russia to do the same: ‘we used to have our
battalion in Tajikistan. Currently a reconciliation process is underway in Tajikistan. All
the members of the Tajik opposition in Afghanistan have returned. So now they should
come to an agreement, conduct elections and restore peace. Why, now, should our
battalion stay there?’212 As President Karimov’s appeals were ignored, and as a
subsequent military intervention resulted in failure,213 he accused Russian intelligence
of fomenting hostilities between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.214
210
‘Press Conference by CIS heads of State’ Official Kremlin News Broadcast, 22 January 1993.
The more probable reason is that President Karimov was not pleased with the fact that the leninbadis
had been kept out of the negotiations. Additionally, Uzbekistani authorities were concerned with Mirzo
Ziyo’s nomination. The latter was a former member of UTO and closely connected to Juma Namangoniy
and Tohir Yo’ldosh, the leaders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (Horsman 1999: 41). See
also Akbarzadeh (2005: 41) and Jonson (2006: 113) for more on the IMU.
212
‘Refile Uzbek head: “We have to think about NATO membership”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1
May 1999.
213
Tashkent did not confirm its involvement, but everything suggests that it connived with Tajik Colonel
Khudoberdiyev’s incursion into Tajikistan in 1998. The latter was able to temporarily seize Khujand in
the North of Tajikistan, but then was forced to flee as President Rahmon retaliated (Fairbanks et al. 2001:
49).
214
Relations between Presidents Rahmon and Karimov were becoming increasingly confrontational, with
the former accusing Uzbekistan’s government of orchestrating an assassination attempt, increasing
instability and protecting Colonel Khudoberdiyev (Horsman 1999: 39-40). In contrast, President Karimov
ignored any kind of public diplomacy and responded harshly to his counterpart’s accusations: ‘Imomali
Rahmonov was saying absurd things. His words were hard but he was uttering them without thinking
211
98
Role incompatibility also became more visible once the civil war in Afghanistan
escalated. Reports at the time showed both sides clashing over whom to support.
Initially, Tashkent assisted General Rashid Dostum, who controlled the Junbesh-i
Milli-yi Islami (National Islamic Movement) in Afghanistan’s north (Rubin 2002: 275276).215Alternatively, President Yeltsin supported his Afghan counterpart, Burhanuddin
Rabbani. This lack of convergence eventually came out in 1994, when the Russian press
speculated about Tashkent’s decision to hinder Russian supplies from reaching Mr
Rabbani’s frail government in Kabul.216
It would seem that, by the end of 1998, President Karimov was publicly sceptical
of Russia’s roles for the region. As President Rahmon consolidated power, Uzbekistani
leadership saw its own factions lose influence and, according to some elements in the
Russian press, this was the reason for Tashkent not renewing the Collective Security
Treaty (CST) in 1999.217 Nevertheless, President Karimov made it publicly clear that his
position concerning CST resulted from Moscow not coming to Uzbekistan’s aid once
the Taliban were able to control Afghanistan’s north: ‘we were witnesses of those times
when twice the Taleban [sic], the most militant so far, to put it mildly, section of the
groups fighting in Afghanistan, captured the north of Afghanistan and were virtually on
the bridge, the railway bridge linking, via the Amudarya River, the territories of
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Who came to help us? (…) We asked simply for missiles
for the volley fire installations so as to cut the bridge off in case those in the north went
out on the bridge in a state of euphoria. We were told that tomorrow a special train
would set off. I am telling from the source, I was told by Mr Viktor Chernomyrdin who
spoke to me on the telephone on the Sunday. And we kept on waiting.’218 Clearly, the
way President Karimov depicted all those events reinforced his roles of seeker of
Uzbekistan’s genuine independence and defender of equality.
Increasing economic self-reliance
As the promise of the ruble zone faded (see above), President Karimov gradually
embraced economic self-reliance, based essentially on his appeals for a type of
deeply. His words were fabricated and full of slander.’ See ‘Karimov says Russian intelligence provoking
Uzbek-Tajik friction’ op. cit.
215
Even though Junbesh was able to gather considerable assistance from Russia and Turkey, Tashkent
was Dostum’s greatest benefactor, supplying him with arms, ammunition, spare parts, armoured
personnel carriers, wheat, fuel and electricity, and also allowing him to cross into Uzbekistan and use
Termez’s airport (Giustozzi 2009: 136).
216
‘Russian fuel supplies to Rabbani opposed by Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 18
July 1994.
217
‘Discontent at CIS security treaty linked to relations with Tajikistan’ Izvestia, 4 February 1999.
218
‘(Refile) Uzbek head tells Press in Kazakh Capital about Tashkent Blasts’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 21 February 1999.
99
mercantilist entrepreneurship and seeking genuine independence. After 1994, and
especially during the Tajikistani peace negotiations, Uzbekistani officials rarely signed
CIS agreements on border management, military training and economic cooperation.
This was particularly evident as a customs union was discussed for the CIS.
In April 1994, Russia and Belarus took the first steps towards an economic
union, which was then implemented in 1995 and soon joined by Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Tashkent, though, refrained from participating (Lawson &
Erickson 1999). Instead, President Karimov actually became one of the economic
union’s main critics, arguing that forced integration would hinder Uzbekistan’s ability
to diversify exporting partners.219
Economic rhetoric aside, President Karimov also claimed that a customs union
would undermine Uzbekistan’s international equality.220 Indeed, it would seem that
Uzbekistan’s President was wary of Russia’s actions within the CIS and questioned
whether Moscow was sincerely determined in pursuing economic integration. Several
incidents at the time would seem to confirm his public position, seeing as Russian
businesses dumped goods into Belarusian markets and Moscow’s economic power
forced Kazakhstan to tackle debilitating terms-of-trade (Ibid). Subsequently, President
Karimov remained consistent with his role of seeker of genuine independence and
lambasted against the creation of a Customs Union in March 1999. He suggested,
instead, that all CIS member-states should seek to implement a free trade zone.221
Unresolved issue-areas: Debts and TAPO
Besides disparaging concerns over regional influence, nationalism and trade, a number
of important issues remained unresolved throughout the 1990s, which effectively
contributed to bilateral friction. Indeed, most of these topics challenged President
Karimov’s own roles of defending equality, seeking genuine independence and
pursuing mercantilism. One such problem was the financial debt Uzbekistan
accumulated in the early 1990s, when the ruble zone was being negotiated. The subject
was solved initially in March 1997, when Uzbekistani negotiators agreed to have their
debt restructured and pay a total of 500.6 million dollars (Islamov 2001: 12). Yet, the
promise all but waned once Uzbekistan’s parliament declared the agreement illegal in
219
‘Uzbek president criticizes formation of CIS unions’ Interfax News Agency, 22 October 1997.
Ibid.
221
‘Uzbek President Criticizes latest Customs Union Summit’ Interfax News Agency, 2 March 1999. In
spite of this seeming a political ploy, appealing for a free trade zone was not entirely duplicitous. From an
economic point of view, a free trade area, unlike a customs union, does not require tariff homogenization
and so would not harm President Karimov’s claim for alternative trade routes.
220
100
1998, basing their decision on the fact that it had been unilaterally ascribed by
Russia.222
However, the bilateral subject area that gained greatest preponderance in the
international public sphere was the debate over the future status of the Tashkent
Aviation
Production
Association
(TAPO
–
Tashkentskoe
Aviacionnoe
Proizvodstvennoe Ob’edinenie). TAPO was one of the Soviet Union’s largest aircraft
assembly lines and the greatest producer of (Ilyushin) II-76MF airplanes. The factory
had originally been founded in Moscow in 1932, but moved to Uzbekistan in 1941 to
avoid being destroyed in World War II. It eventually became an important symbol of
Central Asia’s industrial potential and thus very much connected to the region’s
modern economic history and, more importantly, to the roles of seeking genuine
independence and developer of Uzbekistan’s future invoked by President Karimov, who
had himself been a manager at the factory before entering political life. Arslan
Ruzmetov, the former director general of Uzbekistan Airways, confirmed in a number
of interviews that President Karimov was personally very interested in aviation, which
evidently increased the public visibility of the sector.223 As a matter of fact, Uzbekistan’s
leader was swift in creating the country’s first airline company in 1992 and called for
significant investments in new planes (mostly Boeings).
Tashkent publicly committed itself to keeping the large facility operational,
which could only be done with Moscow’s acquiescence, as almost all components
originated from Russia. Apparently, a significant breakthrough was reached, at which
point Tashkent was able to remain one of the main production units of Ilyushin-type
airplanes.224 The agreement came out of Moscow’s decision to create the Ilyushin
Production Complex in January 1997 in order to absorb all makers of Il-type aircraft.225
After 1998, the group included TAPO but, according to the press, Tashkent demanded
300 million dollars to place the factory under Russian control. Moscow was reluctant,
yet Uzbekistan’s government was not willing to surrender the plant without a financial
settlement;226 thereby continuing with its defence of equality and pursuit of genuine
independence. In any case, the negotiations stagnated temporarily in 1998 due to
economic crisis. The issue remained unsettled for the time being and would resurface
periodically in following years (see below).
222
For a compilation of Uzbekistani laws and parliamentarian declarations, visit Uzbekistan’s online
archive: http://www.lex.uz/.
223
‘Uzbekistan Airways Rebuilds Its Central Asian Hub’ Aviation Week and Space Technology, April
1998.
224
‘Uzbekistan, Russia to set up interstate aircraft-building company’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, May
1997.
225
For more on TAPO negotiations, see ‘Transfer of Il-76 manufacture from Uzbekistan to Russia
“political issue”’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 September 2003.
226
Ibid.
101
IV.3. Rapprochement 2000-2006: A shift in Russia’s Roles
After a number of visible quarrels in the late 1990s, Moscow gradually changed its
attitude toward the ‘near abroad’. President Putin endorsed Eurasianism (Sakwa 2004:
269) and publicly subscribed to strengthening his country’s links with Central Asia. The
lack of political success in the region, particularly with regards to Uzbekistan, probably
induced a small adjustment in roles, as Moscow sought rapprochement with its CIS
counterpart. President Putin thus signalled his public wish to normalize a number of
commercial relationships, particularly in the arms and energy sectors.227 Additionally,
during the infamous Colour Revolutions, as political instability increased in some
former Soviet countries, President Putin backed the governments of in-fellow CIS
partners. All these events built greater role compatibility in the bilateral relationship,
leading to rapprochement.
The shift in Russia’s strategy in 2000: Recognizing Uzbekistan’s importance
President Yeltsin resigned from his office on 31 December 1999, making Vladimir Putin
the acting President of the Russian Federation. Curiously, he had travelled to
Uzbekistan just a few days before - his first ever foreign trip abroad as acting Prime
Minister.228 The destination was not a random choice and was actually the first step in a
growing trend. In fact, Uzbekistan was again his first stopover as President in May
2000. Mr Putin thus conveyed publicly his commitment toward Mr Karimov and the
rest of Central Asia. Naturally, having Russia’s second President travelling to
Uzbekistan first among all others played up to Mr Karimov’s prestige-based roles and
during the visit he admitted that the two countries had clashing interests, although
Tashkent was in need of Moscow being a reliable partner.229
227
See Richard Sakwa (2004) and William Tompson (2004) for detailed discussions on the economic
policy of President Putin’s new administration.
228
The meeting was probably another attempt at boosting relations between the two countries after the
more or less turbulent period of 1998, whereby both agreed to conduct joint military exercises in the
future. For instance, in April 2000, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all participated in the
military exercise ‘Southern Shield of Commonwealth 2000’. Uzbekistani forces also joined the exercises
but only within their own borders, thereby distancing themselves from militarized coalitions in Central
Asia. See ‘CIS ‘Anti-Terrorist’ Exercise in Tajikistan’ Jamestown Foundation, 14 April 2000, available
at
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=24399&tx_ttnews%5Bback
Pid%5D=207, accessed May 2012.
229
‘Russian, Uzbek heads hold news conference in Tashkent’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22
May 2000.
102
Despite the show of gratitude, it would seem that rapprochement still had a long
way to go, especially after the problematic 1990s period. Even as the situation in
Afghanistan deteriorated, President Karimov dispelled any notion that he was changing
policy and begging Russia for help: ‘please tell Russia, there is no need to defend us.
Should people come to our country and die on Uzbekistan's borders? There is no need
to shed blood on our behalf. Uzbeks are capable of responding blow for blow
themselves. Having said that, we need equipment and armaments in order to defend
ourselves.’230
It is important to bear in mind that, in the summer of 1999, Tashkent was
threatened by the IMU’s incursions into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Also, in the
following summer, the IMU was again able to mobilize into former Soviet Central Asia,
causing widespread fear in Uzbekistan.231 Mr Karimov was subsequently unable to
attend a CIS summit in Yalta but, according to the Russian press, received a
sympathetic call from Mr Putin.232
So, by the end of 2000, the difficult security situation in Central Asia, coupled
with President Putin’s efforts to fight terrorism at home and abroad, led to greater role
compatibility. Tashkent’s military forces cooperated with CIS’s Southern military
exercises in September 2000,233 and Moscow also opened a business centre in
Uzbekistan. Still, some incidents made clear that rapprochement remained a sinuous
path. In October 2000, President Karimov criticized the creation of the Eurasian
Economic Community (Eurasec), consisting of Russia, Belarus and other Central Asian
states. Like his previous critiques, he pointed out that the new organization was an
illusionary scheme and called, instead, for implementing a free trade zone.234 Moreover,
President Karimov remained consistent in his appeals for seeking genuine
independence by remonstrating against Moscow’s decision to reinstate the Soviet
Union’s anthem in December 2000, claiming that the hymn symbolized a totalitarian
system.235
230
‘President warns air force could strike Afghan bases if necessary’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
30 May 2000.
231
Interview source (2009-2012). See Appendix IV for information regarding sources.
232
‘Uzbek leader says Russia had, has, will have interests in Central Asia’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia
Unit, 22 June 2000.
233
Even though they participated, they were not fully integrated with the Russian, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and
Tajik forces.
234
‘Uzbek head criticizes idea of Eurasian Economic Community’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 13
October2000.
235
‘Uzbek President blasts plan to reinstate Stalinist Anthem’ Agence Presse France, 14 December 2000.
103
Reinforcing Russia’s role: Military Purchases and Investment in Oil and Gas
President Putin’s public commitment to consolidating Russia’s connection to Central
Asia was made evident by the number of agreements on energy and arms supplies he
put forth. In January 2002, he even called for a ‘Eurasian alliance of gas producers’, of
which Uzbekistan was supposed to be part (Allison 2004: 289). This focus on economic
partnerships was more in line with President Karimov’s technocratic roles and calls for
de-ideologized and technocratic relations, based on business, trade and security. Also,
in March 2001, a Russian delegation led by Col-General Leonid Ivashov met with
Uzbekistan’s Defence Minister, Qodir G’ulomov, – an encounter which led to more
Russian arms supplies and a quota increase for Uzbekistani officers in Russia’s military
academies. President Karimov apparently replied with a quid pro quo by stating that he
had rejected the US Defense Secretary’s offer of permanent advisers among
Uzbekistan’s troops.236 Such statements naturally corresponded to a Great Game type
of rhetoric, which inevitably became more preponderant as Washington engaged
actively with the region after 2001 (see Chapter V).
In May 2001, President Karimov made an official visit to Moscow at President
Putin’s bequest. According to the press, the two discussed security cooperation and
boosting trade.237 When returning back to Uzbekistan, President Karimov highlighted
that he was satisfied with the progress in bilateral relations, although he cautioned
again that he was not looking for any kind of favours from Russia’s government, since
these usually came at a price.238
In addition to greater security cooperation, President Karimov seems to have
also welcomed Moscow’s interest in Uzbekistan’s energy sector, which was entirely
compatible with developing the country’s economy. A new enterprise was established
in July 2001, when Lukoil and Itera, two Russian oil companies, signed an agreement
with Uzbekneftgaz.239 Afterwards, in December 2002, Alexey Miller, Chairman of
Gazprom, signed a strategic agreement with Tashkent, entailing the long-term
purchase of gas. This was a new hallmark in the relationship and so, in August 2003,
President Putin travelled once more to Uzbekistan, where he formalized the agreement
236
‘Russian paper describes military cooperation talks in Uzbekistan’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2
March 2001.
237
‘Uzbekistan, Russia agrees to set up military cooperation groups – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
6 May 2001.
238
Ibid.
239
‘Lukoil, Itera, Uzbekneftgaz deal for joint development’ Russian Company News, August 2 2001.
104
in Samarkand. At the meeting, Russia’s president gave special emphasis to his country’s
new commitments towards Uzbekistan’s defence and energy sectors.240
The effects of the Colour Revolutions: Consolidating Russian-Uzbekistani relations
As rapprochement was gaining momentum, the relationship received yet another boost
when, in the Novembers of 2003 and 2004, revolutions took place in Georgia and
Ukraine (Kuzio 2005: 429-494; Tudoroiu 2007: 329). Uzbekistani authorities were
quick to respond to the democratizing trends by placing a variety of legal restrictions on
local and international NGOs (Ilkhamov 2005a: 298-301). For that reason, President
Putin’s adjustment toward technocracy and Eurasianism was resulting in increased
role compatibility with Tashkent, particularly as the international context focused on
political reform. However, it is important to be aware that even though both were
visibly sceptical about the reformist backlash instigated by the Colour Revolutions, Mr
Karimov did not consider Moscow an innocent bystander in Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution.241 Nevertheless, soon after the Georgian revolution and the subsequent
ousting of President Shevardnadze, the discontinuity was conducive to protecting
stability. In April 2004, a Uzbekistani-Russian Business Council was set up in Moscow
and then, in May, the Russian Defence Minister proclaimed that the two countries were
preparing joint military exercises for 2005 (Nuritov 2004) - an announcement that
preceded a new bilateral Strategic Partnership agreement, signed in June 2004.242 The
treaty strengthened the positive moment in the two countries’ relations and reinforced
Moscow’s importance in Uzbekistan’s security sector. Article 8 of the agreement even
prepared for the eventuality of Russian forces using military facilities in Uzbekistan’s
territory (although the article safeguarded that, if that was to happen, it would have to
be settled in a separate accord).243 A few weeks later, President Karimov praised the
new phase in Uzbekistani-Russian relations and underlined the importance of his own
personal relationship with President Putin.244 The security agreement could also not
have had better timing for protecting stability given that in both March and July 2004
Tashkent suffered two terrorist attacks (Islamov 2004).245
240
‘Putin optimistic on Russian Gazprom deal in Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6
August 2003.
241
‘Uzbek leader's interview in parliament intermission - fuller version’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 3 December 2004.
242
‘Ibid.
243
‘Russia, Uzbekistan set to boost military, economic cooperation’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
19 June 2004.
244
‘Uzbek leader hails ties with Russia’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 August 2004.
245
It is important to note that it is doubtful whether the reasons for the two attacks were as simple as what
was portrayed by Uzbekistani authorities. For alternative interpretations, see, for example, ‘US, Israel
105
After Andijan: The peak of Uzbekistani-Russian relations
On 13 May 2005, Uzbekistan’s troops fired on protestors in the Ferghana Valley city of
Andijan. A day later, the leader of the Russian Communist party argued that the United
States was in some way behind the Andijan uprising.246 Eventually, Washington
reprimanded Uzbekistan for the violent outcome (see Chapters V and VI for a more
detailed description of the events).247 President Putin, in contrast, was quick to support
his Uzbekistani counterpart. In June 2005, Mr Karimov met with the Russian President
in Moscow. The latter publicly stated that he agreed with Tashkent’s version of the
events, pointing out that the crisis had been organized from outside the country.248
Also, the two leaders continued with business as usual, thereby reinforcing President
Karimov’s role of protector of stability. In September, for the first time in the history of
their relationship, the two countries executed bilateral military exercises in
Uzbekistan’s southern region of Jizzax, as had been planned in the previous year.
Moreover, the two sides increased their economic linkages when Russian state-owned
Lukoil obtained a stake in Uzbekistan’s side of the Aral Sea.249
In November 2005, President Karimov travelled once more to Moscow (the
second time in that year), where he and President Putin publicly pledged to fulfil the
2004 Strategic Partnership agreement.250 The bilateral relationship was then at its peak
and President Karimov eschewed his public scepticism of Eurasec and joined the
organization in January 2006. He then declared that some of the country’s laws would
have to change to accommodate the integration projects of that organization.251 Soon
after, in June 2006, Uzbekistan also became a member of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), another Moscow-sponsored project for collective military action.
In spite of the momentum and political adjustments toward cooperation, the
Secretary General of the CSTO, Nikolay Bordyuzha, was slightly more cautious about
regional integration. He warned before accession that Tashkent’s membership was not
Russia helped set up bloody events in eastern Uzbekistan, says report’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 29June 2005.
246
‘Russian communist leader sees US ‘fingerprints’ in Uzbek unrest’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 14 May 2005.
247
‘EU urges Uzbek authorities to rein in military clampdown on population’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 17 May 2005.
248
‘Russia's Putin hopes for stabilisation in Uzbekistan’ Agence Presse France, 28 June 2005.
249
‘Russian, Chinese energy giants set up consortium to develop Uzbek gas fields’ AP Worldstream, 8
September 2005.
250
‘1.8 Subjects’ Kommersant, 15 November 2005.
251
‘Uzbekistan sets limits for cooperation with Russia’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 March
2006.
106
being considered;252 perhaps hinting at how difficult it would be to negotiate a powersharing agreement with Central Asia’s persistent defender of equality, seeker of
genuine independence and voice for non-militarism.253 Obviously, it is important to
recall that this peak of public goodwill had an uneasy foundation, seeing as a number of
bilateral issues remained unresolved. Indeed, just a few years before, Russia’s Deputy
Finance Minister warned that Uzbekistan’s debt to Moscow harmed economic relations
between the two countries.254 Moreover, as it collided with his role of non-militaristic
voice for Central Asia, Mr Karimov had in 2002 publicly disapproved of Russian forces
using the Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan.255
IV.4. Deterioration 2007-2010: The persistence of unresolved issue-areas
By 2008, friction between Tashkent and Moscow in the international public sphere was
out in the open. Indeed, such was the degree of public discord that Prime Minister
Putin travelled personally to Uzbekistan, in what the Russian press described as an
attempt to halt the growing tension between the two states.256 The trip managed to
reopen some channels of communication, although it was not enough to prevent
Tashkent from announcing its withdrawal from Eurasec a month later.
The triggers for the discontinuity were essentially the clashes over debt
payments, gas and oil pricing, the future of TAPO and the degree of Russian
assertiveness in the region. Given the complexity of the problems, this last part of the
narrative will portray each of those issues separately, even though one should be aware
that they were all inter-linked and affected President Karimov’s roles as a defender of
equality, seeker of genuine independence, mercantilist entrepreneur, non-militaristic
voice and undisputed authority (see above).
Still, it is impossible to ignore that, as role conflict between Moscow and
Tashkent augmented, Tashkent’s relationship with the West improved. The Central
Asian Republic was actually being contemplated as a major transit country for NATO
252
‘Uzbekistan’s accession to CSTO not considered now – secretary general’ BBS Summary of World
Broadcasts, 20 May 2006.
253
‘Uzbekistan sets limits for cooperation with Russia’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 March
2006.
254
‘Uzbek debts to Russia impede bilateral economic ties’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 May
2003.
255
‘Uzbek President Says no to foreign military rivalry in Central Asia’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 12 December 2002.
256
‘Putin signs energy agreements in Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 September
2008.
107
supplies to Afghanistan (see Chapter V),257 and the EU also removed some of its
sanctions in October 2008. While this turn of events certainly affected Central Asian
geopolitics, one must be aware of the fact that the growing level of friction with Russia
originated from a particular dynamic, intrinsic to that bilateral relationship, rather than
from the changing external context. The conclusion of this thesis will, however,
readdress this point as it discusses role theory and strategic interaction. For now, it is
important to observe that, around 2008, role conflict resurfaced as Moscow underlined
its Eurasian roles and was more determined to strengthen its position in the region.258
Russia’s encroachment through CSTO and Eurasec
Unease between Tashkent and Moscow in 2008 grew partly in response to a number of
disagreements over the internal workings of both Eurasec and the CSTO. Looking
closely at how President Karimov publicly called for seeking genuine independence,
defending equality and non-militarism, problems could have been foreshadowed
immediately after Uzbekistan joined the new military organization. At the time,
President Karimov quickly suggested merging Eurasec with CSTO, thereby questioning
the independent aims of both Moscow led organizations.259
Moscow also moved to enhance its roles for the region, advocating in 2008 for
the creation of a joint CSTO force. President Karimov, though, remained a staunch
supporter of his country’s genuine independence and non-militarism and thus opposed
the initiative. Moreover, he rejected implementing a Collective Rapid Reaction Forces
(CRRF) and publicly conveyed his displeasure by not attending the Yerevan CSTO
summit in April 2009 (Akhmadov 2009b). Overall, Tashkent’s position was that
collective forces should not be permanent, that their actions should be based on
consensus, and that provisions for non-interventionism would have to be ensured if
Uzbekistan was to contemplate joining CRRF (Tolipov 2009).
Tashkent remained within CSTO for the time being, although it was apparently
less reluctant to leave Eurasec - perhaps because of the growing friction within the
latter. The decision seems to have been partially instigated by the Eurasec October
2007 summit, where Russia and all other member states sided with Tajikistan in favour
of redistributing water resources in Central Asia. President Karimov, who was
257
‘US-Uzbekistan relations: Another Step toward rapprochement’ Eurasianet.org, 22 January 2008,
available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012308b.shtml, accessed October
2011.
258
See Gawdat Baghat (2007) and Rafael Kantiyoti’s (2008) works for an account of how Moscow
pursued its geopolitical interests in Central Asia more actively after 2006.
259
‘Uzbek leader moots merger of CIS security body, Eurasian economic bloc’ BBC Monitoring Central
Asia Unit, 16 August 2006.
108
attending, was also subjected to a wave of criticism from Tajikistani officials, all of
whom remonstrated against Uzbekistan’s restrictive Visa regime (Saidov 2008). This
seems to have been the last straw (Ibid).260 Indeed, such blatant attacks conflicted with
President Karimov’s undisputed authority.
Consequently, with the relations within Eurasec at a low point, Uzbekistani
authorities announced their withdrawal from the organization in late 2008, slightly
after the EU removed its sanctions. Once more, the timing of the decision suggests a
certain quid pro quo that fits nicely with the strategic rationale of playing one against
the other (see Introduction and Chapter I). This issue will be readdressed in the
Conclusion, but, as demonstrated below, the difficult relations within Eurasec and
CSTO were only one dimension of Russian-Uzbekistani relations and not entirely of
Moscow’s making, rather the reflection of growing power disputes in Central Asia.261
Furthermore, the decision to quit Eurasec also has to be read in the light of growing
bilateral friction.
The persistence of unresolved issues: debt, TAPO and negotiating gas and oil prices
From 2008, several problematic bilateral issues were under the public spotlight.
Uzbekistan’s debt to Russia was certainly one of them. Indeed, President Medvedev
visited his Central Asian partner in 2010 and, according to the Russian press,
personally brought up the issue of debt repayments with his Uzbekistani counterpart.
Tashkent, though, refused clearing its old credits, but the nature of the talks remained
secluded (Panfilova 2010). Moreover, Tashkent’s policy of hindering convertibility to
protect local industries (Rosenberg & Zeeuw 2001: 160) made it difficult for some
Russian enterprises to transfer profits to their mother companies, making negotiations
between the two increasingly hard.262
As concerns the aviation sector, problems arose mainly due to President
Karimov’s strict adherence to the roles of mercantilist entrepreneur and seeker of
genuine independence. Apparently, Tashkent was publicly reluctant to see TAPO’s
260
The main issue behind the rising tension was Tajikistan’s attempt to revive the construction of the
Roghun Dam. President Rahmon announced, in July 2007, that Tajikistan would build the plant by its
own means; then, at a SCO summit in Bishkek in August of that year, he declared that the new dam
would not cause a decrease in water supply to upstream countries. This last point is contested by President
Karimov, who declared that the dam could seriously harm water deliveries to its agricultural sector,
compromising its cotton fields. To exert further pressure, Uzbekistani authorities implemented, in 2008,
occasional blockades on goods travelling by rail to Tajikistan (Karim 2008).
261
Controversy over water distribution between Uzbekistan’s upstream neighbours, namely Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan, was one issue-area that grew dramatically in importance during the period (see previous
Chapter III).
262
See, for example, the following article: ‘Kazakh paper: Uzbek leader scolds Russian media as ties
remain tense’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 25 April 2010.
109
industrial relevance deteriorate. For example, a few years before, in late 1999, President
Karimov took Mr Putin on a tour of TAPO; perhaps in order to show its importance to
Uzbekistan’s industrial sector.263 As such, the plant became a kind of symbol, given how
much President Karimov appealed for economic self-reliance and the need for
industry.264
Following the stagnant negotiations of the 1990s, TAPO gained new life in 2001
when a contract for six II-78 aircraft was signed with India.265 According to the Russian
press, though, this did not solve the problem, as Tashkent was unwilling to
acknowledge Russian royalties (Lantratov 2003). The problem regarding the financial
reward led Moscow to retort, as it supported transferring Ilyushin production to the
Voronezh Aircraft Manufacturing Association in Russia. According to the press, this
imminent relocation was discussed between Presidents Karimov and Putin in 2003. 266
No progress was made, although the press persistently hinted that Ilyushin aircraft
production would eventually be transferred to Voronezh (Mukhin 2004).
The situation eventually became more politicized after 2005, when Russia
negotiated a 1.5 billion dollar contract to supply aircraft to China. TAPO was included
in the production consortium, even though it was slow in abiding to production
deadlines.267 Consequently, Moscow demanded publicly that either production would
have to take place in Russia or TAPO would need to join Russia’s United Aircraft
Company (UAC).268 Negotiations continued until November 2006, during the peak of
Russian-Uzbekistani relations. The press revealed that both sides signed a protocol,
wherein Tashkent agreed to include TAPO within UAC in exchange for receiving shares
in the holding company (Ivanov 2008). Once more, though, the agreement was not
implemented, reaching a stalemate in February 2008. According to the press, President
Karimov disagreed with UAC’s limited design for TAPO (Mukhin 2009) and so it would
seem that an equal Uzbekistan and its mercantilist roles were only compatible with
TAPO having greater strategic importance.
Besides TAPO and the issue of debt, the period running from 2007 to 2008 was
also complicated as far as bilateral oil and gas negotiations were concerned. Moscow’s
2006 gas dispute with Kiev brought a degree of discontinuity to the energy market and
263
‘Russian premier visits Uzbek aircraft factory, Russian Theatre’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 11
December 1999.
264
For more on Uzbekistani economic self-reliance, see Gleason (2003). On how President Karimov
publicly manifested his economic policy for the country, see Chapter III.
265
‘Soviet-era plant back in action thanks to contract for Indian planes’ Associated Press Worldstream, 17
December 2001.
266
‘Transfer of Il-76 manufacture from Uzbekistan to Russia “political issue”’ op. cit.
267
‘Farewell to Tashkent; Russia is preparing to relocate production of IL-76 from Uzbekistan to Russia’
WPS Observer, 21 August 2006.
268
Ibid.
110
so the Russian government sought to circumvent the EU’s attempts to bypass its gas
supplies (see Chapter VI). It is important to bear in mind that President Karimov had
already agreed in July 2007 to be part of a natural gas transit and supply scheme from
Turkmenistan to China.269 Given the circumstances, Russia’s influence in the Central
Asian energy sector was not as preponderant as it had been in the 1990s and President
Putin moved quickly to secure gas supplies from Central Asia (Kandiyoti 2008: 85-86).
His dealings were paying off since, by December 2007, Moscow signed a number of
agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Ibid: 88).
Nevertheless, Moscow sought quite openly to obtain cheaper gas from Central
Asia in order to then export its own gas to Europe at much higher prices (Ibid).
President Karimov like his neighbours was true to equality and demanded European
prices for gas exports. According to the Russian press, he visited Moscow in February
2008 (his first visit since his re-election in 2007) in order to settle a new pricing
mechanism.270
During the negotiations that followed, Moscow temporarily embargoed
Uzbekistani cotton on 12 May 2008, which was justified as necessary to prevent the
spread of crop disease.271 The reasons for the decision remain unclear, yet the timing
certainly suggests coercion. Tashkent then reciprocated by having the name of one of
its central avenues changed from Pushkin to Independence (Mustaqillik).272 Moreover,
Uzbekistani authorities also allowed Petronas, a Malaysian oil company, to explore
fields that at one point had been allocated to Lukoil.273 Russia’s new President, Dmitry
Medvedev, responded by ignoring Uzbekistan in his first visit to Central Asia.
It would seem that negotiations were at an impasse and the relationship
deteriorating. To solve the conundrum, Mr Putin, who was now Russia’s PrimeMinister, personally travelled to Uzbekistan, where he appealed for a settlement.274 The
public gesture apparently had some pay-offs, as President Medvedev later decided to
visit Uzbekistan and also voiced his personal scepticism toward Tajikistan’s Roghun
project.275 Moscow thus slightly adjusted its roles and showed greater compatibility
with President Karimov’s more recent public concerns over protecting Central Asia’s
269
‘Tashkent Backs Turkmen-Chinese gas pipeline project’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 July
2007.
270
‘Russian, Uzbek cooperation accords signed’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 6 February 2008.
271
‘Tashkent continues to drift away from Russia, but not necessarily toward the West’ Eurasianet.org,
15 July 2008, available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav071508f.shtml,
accessed November 2011.
272
‘Tashkent is up to its old geopolitical tricks’ Times of Central Asia, 30 May 2008.
273
Ibid.
274
‘Putin Signs Energy Agreements in Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 September
2008.
275
Even though Moscow had stopped the dam’s construction in 2007, until then it had not taken a clear
position on the issue.
111
environment. Accordingly, Uzbekistan’s leader praised Moscow’s new position:
‘Uzbekistan counts on Russia's well-thought-out and considered position on issues
relating the implementation of hydro power projects in the Central Asian region (…)
This issue is vital for me, and not only for me, but also for the whole population of
Uzbekistan, especially, if we take into consideration a disaster and tragedy - the
shrinking of the Aral Sea - that we have been experiencing for several years.’276
Overall, 2008 showed that President Karimov never quite relinquished his
public position on Uzbekistan’s self-reliance. The fact that the relationship peaked after
2005 was not a sign that things had changed. While President Putin had gradually
adjusted the way in which Moscow interacted with Central Asian counterparts, Russia’s
government did not fully abandon some of its other traditional roles for the region,
which led to less cooperation after 2008.
President Karimov, too, did not compromise his public positions and continued
being a staunch advocate of Uzbekistan’s international equality and genuine
independence, especially vis à vis Russia. So the relationship remained a mixture of
conflict and cooperation throughout the twenty years. Role compatibility was certainly
visible between 2000 and 2006 and, afterwards, both agreed to have TAPO become a
repair centre for Russian helicopters in 2007,277 as well as having Tashkent receive
surface-to-air missiles.278 Moreover, in December 2009, Gazprom signed another
contract with Uztransgaz for importing natural gas,279 thereby continuing with bilateral
energy cooperation. All these instances, among others mentioned above, suggest that,
when the two managed to downplay competitive rhetoric and focus mainly on
technocratic roles, cooperation ensued. Nonetheless, with both rarely adjusting their
core roles - specifically Moscow pursuing unilateral Eurasian interests against
Tashkent’s demand for equality -, it is difficult to foresee a future of closer cooperation.
276
‘Uzbek leader focuses on Afghan security during Russian counterpart's visit’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 24 January 2009.
277
‘Russia, Uzbekistan sign agreement on combat helicopters JV’ Ria Novosti, 7 March 2007.
278
‘Uzbekistan, Russia set priorities in military cooperation’ Russia & CIS Newswire, 30 October 2007.
279
Gazprom had already signed a contract with Uztransgaz in 2005. See ‘Gazprom, Uzbekistan agree on
2010 gas transit and supply terms’ Russia & CIS Business & Financial Daily, 11 December 2009.
112
V. The Uzbekistani-American Relationship 1991-2010
The Uzbekistani-American bilateral relationship is hinged on deep role incompatibility.
Throughout the years, out of all of the roles in President Karimov’s set, protecting
stability and developing Uzbekistan’s economic future were practically the only ones
that converged with Washington. Even in periods of more observable cooperation in
the international public sphere, such as after 11 September 2001, their partnership
remained an illusion, as Heathershaw (2007) described (see Chapter II). Role
discontinuities were also prevalent when a number of shifting contexts led to divergent
roles resurfacing over time – much like Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia. In short,
the narrative is emplotted by several inter-role conflicts, all of which provoked a
number of public credibility problems for the two actors.
One reason for the occasional altercations was the fact that Washington’s
agenda for the region was never wholly coherent, in part due to intra-role conflict
between its own foreign policy makers. American foreign policy is both complex and
highly political, whereby the President, Congress, the Department of State (DoS) and
the Department of Defense (DoD) endorse a number of frequently competing priorities
(Rosati & Scott 2011: 5).
Other than Washington’s lack of role coherency, Central Asia was also a
relatively novel area for many of its officials and analysts (Hill 2002). In fact, the
independence of the Central Asian Republics came as a surprise (Rumer 2007: 18),
causing uncertainty about which strategy to endorse and leading to an ambiguous
foreign policy (Akbarzadeh 2005: 61). Nevertheless, Washington participated in
Central Asian politics from the outset and Uzbekistan slowly managed to cooperate
with the world’s super power as the two sides recognized the importance of protecting
stability – a role that was very much endorsed by American leadership after the first
Golf War (Le Prestre 1997b: 72).
The story begins with Washington seeking to carry out Secretary of State James
Baker’s principles of self-determination, respect for democracy, Human Rights and
international law under the 1992 Freedom Support Act (Rumer 2007: 20-22). The roles
of spreading democracy and market principles became a key aspect of American foreign
policy for the region and were never fully disregarded, albeit their preponderance
waning at particular moments in time.
Washington’s reformist programme led to bilateral role conflict. President
Karimov’s roles of technocratic expert and undisputed authority hardly matched the
American pro-democratic agenda, thereby affecting Washington’s willingness to
approach Tashkent in the early 1990s. Washington ignored Uzbekistan and, instead,
113
praised its neighbours, all of which was a significant stab at President Karimov’s public
credibility, particularly his role of defender of Uzbekistan’s great image. Tashkent
though did not budge from seeking greater recognition as well as American investment
for boosting technocratic roles. Eventually, as Washington considered new economic
projects for the region (Blank 2001: 127), channels of communication began opening,
irrespective of President Karimov’s blatant authoritarianism.
However, it was not in the field of economics that cooperation surfaced. When
security in the region reverberated into the international public sphere in the mid1990s, the credibility of President Karimov’s regime in protecting stability allowed for
role compatibility and a degree of rapprochement. By 2008, this became the only role
with which both sides converged, given that the United States became even more
committed to ending the Afghan conflict (Blank 2007: 1; Akbarzadeh 2005: 75; Hill
2002). However, providing stability was frequently at odds with Washington’s other
roles insofar as it contradicted its reformist and democratic credibility. Gradually, this
would lead to greater intra-role conflict between the DoS and the DoD, which then had
repercussions in the bilateral relationship. For that reason, the 2002 partnership was
characterized by permanent inter-role conflict, leading to a partial change in President
Karimov’s rhetoric, as he began focusing more on differentiating Uzbekistan from the
West (see Chapter 3).
V.1. A Bad Start: Uzbekistani-American relations 1991-1994
In March 1992, Washington was quick to open an Embassy in Tashkent, soon after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Another potential boost for bilateral relations came when
American businesses, such as Newmont Mining Corporation, hastened to tap
Uzbekistan’s mineral wealth.280 Indeed, economic cooperation was theoretically a way
in which the two sides could strengthen their relationship, leading to the creation of
American-Uzbek chamber of commerce in 1993.
Politically though Washington remained distant from Uzbekistan. Stanley
Escudero was the first official of the DoS to travel to Uzbekistan in 1993 and reports at
the time mention little on the prospects of greater cooperation. Instead, Mr Escudero
280
Newmont established a joint venture with the Uzbekistani government for exploring the Muruntau
mining complex in February 1992. For more on the joint-venture, which was nationalized by Tashkent
between 2006 and 2007, see: ‘Zarafshan-Newmont, Uzbekistan’ Mining-technnology.com, available at
http://www.mining-technology.com/projects/zarafshan/, accessed February 2011.
114
focused on the surrounding context and on assisting the region with humanitarian aid
as the war in Tajikistan escalated.281
It would seem, then, that the first instances of Washington’s engagement with
Tashkent barely corresponded to the grand roles proclaimed by President Karimov
after independence (see Chapter III), namely the slogans of developer for the country’s
future, defender of international equality and protector of a great image. The United
States, as the world’s most powerful economy, would do much to boost President
Karimov’s credibility, insofar as it fitted nicely with his other role of bridging
Uzbekistan to other markets. Indeed, Uzbekistan’s President showed his support for
Washington in a variety of situations. For example, in June 1993 he supported an
American raid in Iraq282 and, later in November 1993, he also proposed creating a
Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, thereby aligning his policy with the
American non-nuclear proliferation programme (Allison 2001: 224).283 Tashkent,
though, despite the efforts, was effectively rebuffed by Washington while some of its
neighbours were praised. President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan was received by the White
House in May 1993 and then, in December, Vice-President Al Gore travelled to the
region where he met with President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan.
President Karimov’s bad start
Washington’s apparent little interest for Tashkent was triggered in part by President
Karimov’s roles of undisputed authority, voice for de-ideologizing politics and
protecting stability. In other words, Mr Karimov’s regime effectively endorsed
authoritarianism in the early 1990s as it repressed opposition.284 Indeed, no other case
led to greater inter-role conflict than the May 1992 beating of Abdurahim Po’lat, the
leader of the opposition party Birlik. The incident had repercussions in Washington,
given that at the time, an American delegation led by Senator Larry Pressler was
visiting Uzbekistan to assess the implementation of the Freedom Support Act. On
returning to the United States, he recounted what he saw to Congress and described the
281
On Mr Escudero’s visit, see a small report in ‘General and Western Relations; US mission allocates
humanitarian aid for Tajikistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 January 1993.
282
See a proclamation of support given by Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign affairs at ‘Uzbek Foreign
Ministry describes US raid on Iraq as a “practical step”’ Interfax news agency, 29 June1993.
283
Besides explicit vocal support, Tashkent’s business contacts with the United States increased as it
ordered twenty trucks from Caterpillar Inc. See ‘Caterpillar strikes two deals in former Soviet Union’
United Press International, 22 November 1993.
284
From 1991 to 1992, President Karimov curbed the rise of Uzbekistani opposition as well as potential
adversaries (Melvin 2000: 31-32; Fierman 1997: 375-387). Subsequently, the leaders of Erk and Birlik
were repressed and the Vice President’s post removed.
115
injuries inflicted on one of Uzbekistan’s main opposition leaders.285 He explained that
he had managed to enter the hospital and talk to Mr Po’lat. The Senator then relayed
that Uzbekistani authorities were unwilling to take heed of his criticism and that the
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs dismissed his questions, by invoking that it was an
internal affair.286 The incident certainly led to friction and Senator Pressler
recommended rejecting all of President Karimov’s requests for being received at the
White House: ‘the United States should not invite notorious charlatans like President
Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan to visit the United States to meet and greet President
Bush (...) I commend the Bush Administration for withdrawing for an indefinite period
the invitation for Mr Karimov to visit this country. Thugs masquerading as democrats
also should not qualify for aid.’ 287
As Bill Clinton was elected President little changed in the short-term. His VicePresident went on tour of Central Asia and blatantly ignored Uzbekistan. Furthermore,
during the Secretary of State’s confirmation hearing, in January 1993, Senator Pressler
pressed him to continue rejecting close ties with Uzbekistan’s President.288 Evidently,
the Po’lat beating had not been forgotten and the event symbolized how Washington’s
democratic
roles
were
not
compatible
with
President
Karimov’s
blatant
authoritarianism. His role of undisputed authority continued damaging a potential
relationship with the United States, even more so when, in January 1994, the
Washington Times reported that Uzbekistan’s government had forbid the renowned
Central Asian scholar, William Fierman, to enter the country (Morrison 1994).
V.2. Improving relations 1995-2000: The Importance of Security after
disappointing reform and economic investment
Much to Tashkent’s good fortune, American oil and gas companies invested more in
Central Asia in the mid-1990s. The Clinton Administration thus gradually took a special
interest in the region’s pivotal location and the potential that it had for bypassing
Russia and Iran (Blank 2001: 130-131). The discontinuity would work in President
Karimov’s favour, especially because he gave some signs of political reform (even
though he did not relinquish his undisputed authority). Eventually, Washington
promoted a number of economic investments in Central Asia which, regrettably for
285
See the account of Senator Pressler’s visit in ‘A visit to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, and Latvia, to examine United States
Assistance Policy in the Former Soviet Union’ The Library of Congress, 12 August 1992, available at:
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r102:791:./temp/~r102ffOcAg::, accessed December 2012.
286
Ibid.
287
Ibid
288
Read the full hearing in: ‘Hearing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee’ Federal News Service, 13
January 1993.
116
Uzbekistan, never fully materialized. Alternatively, as the war in Afghanistan escalated,
it would be President Karimov’s stability that allowed for increased inter-role
compatibility.
Energy vs. Human Rights: President Karimov’s visit to the United States
After 1994, President Karimov’s regime made a few adjustments, such as freeing
political prisoners and meeting with a few opposition members.289 These gestures - as
well as Uzbekistan joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 - coupled with
speculation over Central Asia becoming a major energy hub, had some effects in the
bilateral relationship, particularly after Enron Oil & Gas proposed a joint venture with
Tashkent in February 1995.290 A change was on the horizon and American Secretary of
Defense, William Perry, visited Uzbekistan in the spring of 1995.
According to the press, President Karimov’s meeting with Mr Perry focused
mainly on regional security and Uzbekistan’s PfP participation.291 Curiously, Secretary
Perry praised Uzbekistan for being an ‘island of stability’ - a great boost to President
Karimov’s public credibility. Uzbekistan’s leader then thanked Secretary Perry, even
though he lamented that Washington had a ‘distorted picture of Uzbekistan.’292 He
expanded on this last point by conceding that he was hoping for a stronger bilateral
relationship, mainly as a way of leveraging against Russia’s imperialism: ‘first, there are
the imperialist ambitions rearing up in Russia - I mean the chauvinist attitudes which
are intensifying day by day in Russia.’293 Secondly, he underlined the necessity of
obtaining American assistance for facing the threats emanating from extremism,
namely from Afghanistan and Tajikistan.294 Thirdly, he discussed that American
investment and commitment was crucial for his country if it were to implement
political and economic reforms.295 In light of this last concession, it is important to note
289
In 1995, President Karimov met with former leaders of the opposition (Fierman 1997: 391), gave
accreditation to the BBC, Radio Liberty and Voice of America and also released political activists from
incarceration (Melvin 2000: 35). Then, in 1996, Uzbekistan’s leader hosted a OSCE seminar on Human
Rights, created a national Ombudsman, allowed for Human Rights Watch representation and established a
Centre for National Human Rights (Melvin 2000: 37-39). None of these measures, however, affected
President Karimov’s undisputed authority, as shown below. As for reforming the economy, the situation
saw little development and Tashkent actually implemented a multi-level exchange rate system, which was
against the IMF’s original plan (Blackmon 2005: 391).
290
For more on the joint venture, see ‘Enron Oil & Gas International Inc. signs agreements to pursue joint
venture development/marketing of Uzbekistan reserves’ Business Wire, February 3 1995.
291
See for example the following report: ‘US defence secretary praises Uzbekistan as “island of
stability”’ Interfax news agency, 6 April 1995.
292
Ibid.
293
‘President Karimov seeks US help against Russian and Islamic threats’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 11 April 1995.
294
Ibid.
295
Ibid.
117
that when questioned about Human Rights, President Karimov argued that the
situation had changed, but that his agenda was economics (i.e. technocratic roles) and
not politics: ‘the questions you are asking about restrictions on rights and persecution yes, they did take place. But that is all in the past. We are convinced that political
reforms must be founded on economic reforms, so we admit that political reforms are
lagging behind economic reforms in Uzbekistan and we can understand the United
States' critical attitude to the political reforms taking place here.’296 So, Mr Karimov
remained somewhat consistent with other declarations invoking the need for
technocracy (see Chapter III). He also added that Uzbekistani mentality was not yet
suitable to a market economy.297
Upon returning to Washington, Secretary Perry publicly positioned himself in
favour of more engagement with Uzbekistan. During a conference at the National
Defense University College, he noted that, even though Human Rights are important,
Uzbekistan’s stability could not be ignored: ‘it is one of the few countries in the former
Soviet Union that is relatively strong economically. Indeed, it is one of the most - has
one of the most active joint business programs with American companies of any of the
countries in the region. From a security point of view, it's important because it stands
as a countervailing force to regional instability, particularly to forces of extremism that
are being exported from Iran.’298
It would seem that President Karimov succeeded in convincing some members
of the United States security apparatus. So, for the short term, the stage was set for
rapprochement which, according to the Russian media, allowed President Karimov to
request an official visit to Washington during his trip to the United Nations in October
1995 (Musin 1996). The reply given, apparently, was that Washington would sanction
the visit, if Tashkent pardoned around eighty political prisoners. Uzbekistan’s leader
quickly obliged and so the visit was scheduled for the next summer (Ibid).
The June 1996 visit and the disappointing economic cooperation that followed
The June 1996 visit boosted President Karimov’s international equality and his
country’s image abroad. Indeed, protocol and ceremony are relevant for Mr Karimov’s
public credibility, as he later himself confessed during a NATO summit in 1999:
‘Uzbekistan and the USA, that is I as the Uzbek president and Mr Bill Clinton, sat next
296
‘Human rights breaches belong to past - Uzbek leader’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 April
1995.
297
Ibid.
298
‘Remarks by Secretary of Defense William Perry’ Federal News Service, 15 April 1995.
118
to each other [sic]. Of course, it would not be surprising if many countries envied this.
But this is not a matter of equality but of partnership.’299
The visit to Washington also helped strengthen President Karimov’s role of
committed developer of Uzbekistan’s future. He travelled briefly to Colorado, meeting
with representatives of American companies, and was also invited to give a
presentation for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Evidently, the
event acted as another boost in prestige - even more so because President Karimov was
accustomed to delivering lengthy speeches on macroeconomic performance.300 He,
therefore, gave a lengthy account on economic endowments and the potential for a
profitable partnership:
I would like to make an official statement to the effect that Uzbekistan is
interested in seeing our relations with the United States strengthened and
grow. We are also interested in seeing American business, and American
capital, take its rightful place in the Uzbekistani market (… ) I want to just,
you know, make use of this example and take advantage of this opportunity
to let you all know that Uzbekistan intends to develop strategic long-term
relations in this area. We want to orient ourselves to modern technology.301
Following the presentation, President Karimov signed a series of economic
agreements, strengthening Tashkent’s ties with Enron, as the company planned to
invest 1.3 billion dollars in Uzbekistan’s gas fields over the next years.302 OPIC also
signalled its support for the project by pledging 400 million dollars of financing.303 On
a final note, President Karimov approved a deal with TEXACO inc., which planned to
market oil products in Uzbekistan’s internal market.304
All the business opportunities would seem to hint at a new phase in
Uzbekistani-American relations. Indeed, in the following year, President Clinton’s wife
visited Uzbekistan and was received by both President Karimov and his own wife,
Tatyana Karimov. Mrs Clinton answered questions at Tashkent’s University of World
Economy and Diplomacy and presented her newly-published book, whose Uzbek
299
‘Refile Uzbek head: “We have to think about NATO Membership” – Full Version’ BBC Monitoring
Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 May 1999.
300
As a supposed expert on economic matters, many of President Karimov’s addresses to parliament
provide lengthy compilations of economic data. Sometimes, the details are so extensive that they seem
more like a speech given by a President of a Central Bank than a Head of State.
301
‘Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov and OPIC President Ruth Harkin Discuss a Joint U.S.Uzbekistan Energy Venture’ NBC, 24 June 1996.
302
‘News: Uzbekistan/Development: Enron in dollars 1.3bn gas plan’ FT Energy Newsletters International Gas Report, 26 April 1996.
303
‘U.S. supports Uzbekistan gas project’ United Press International, 24 June 1996.
304
‘Uzbekistan enters venture with Texaco’ United Press International, 27 June 1996.
119
edition, according to the press, would be prefaced by Tatyana Karimov herself.305
Likewise, in November 1997, Prime Minister O’tkir Sultanov hosted a dinner at
Uzbekistan’s Embassy in Washington where he received a number of executives and
potential American investors (Boustany 1997). Yet, despite the positive momentum,
many of the economic initiatives were never fully implemented. In fact, only the
TEXACO joint venture materialized. By 1998, Enron quit its position in Uzbekistan
because of difficulties in operating and obstacles placed by Russia (Paige 1998).
Furthermore, a UNOCAL project designed in November 1996 to supply gas to Pakistan
was scrapped because of the problematic security situation in Afghanistan.306
Promise in the Silk Road initiative?
Whilst economic projects failed, President Karimov embraced the Silk Road initiative
proposed by Republican Senator Sam Brownback, who advocated alternative export
routes for Central Asia in an effort to curtail Russian and Iranian influence. He once
even argued that this would be the only way to ensure the independence of many
former Soviet states.307 Such a goal played well with President Karimov’s roles of bridge
to joining other markets and seeker of genuine independence. It thus seems clear that
the Silk Road initiatives, as well as President Karimov’s own comments regarding
Russia’s imperialist tendencies (see above), reveal how power politics was playing an
important part in Central Asia. All the parties involved (see Chapter IV for some
references to Russia’s great power politics) were increasing the level of competition.
Still, from a purely bilateral dimension, the Silk Road initiative conformed to President
Karimov’s appeals to breach Uzbekistan’s geographical isolation (the possible
geopolitical and strategic rationale is readdressed in the conclusion).
Senator Brownback visited Uzbekistan in April 1998308 and President Karimov
became a signatory of the Ankara Pipeline Declaration – aiming at installing a major
pipeline along the Caucasus. He thus embraced the Silk Road initiative and then joined
GUAM during a NATO summit in 1999.309
305
See one report of Mrs Clinton’s visit in ‘ Mrs Clinton arrives in Tashkent, opens women's hospital’
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 November 1997.
306
‘See information on the UNOCAL project in ‘DoD News Briefing, Rear Admiral Craig Quigley’ U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. 6 April 2000, available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1165, accessed August 2012.
307
On Senator Brownback’s statements, see the following article: ‘Developing a “Silk Road” Strategy;
Sen. Brownback Follows a Seldom Tread Path on Mideast Affairs’ The Washington Post, 10 June 1997.
308
‘US Senator Meets Uzbek President’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 April 1998.
309
GUAM consisted of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Its name then changed to GUUAM
when Uzbekistan became a member.
120
GUAM was created with the purpose of fostering cooperation with NATO and
establishing alternative transport routes for bypassing Russia and Iran (Kuzio 2000:
99). President Karimov, therefore, clarified his public position, by classifying GUAM as
a promising trade opportunity: ‘Senator Sam Brownback, who wants to gather together
some six or seven countries linked to the Silk Road and find out our attitude to that law
(…) What is the aim of that organization? GUAM is an organization of states around the
Black Sea. From the point of view of communications and routes we are eager to reach
that region and the world market in general. Our joining GUAM will help us greatly in
achieving that our goal.’310 Joining the organization, though, barely had any impact in
the international public sphere and Uzbekistan suspended its membership from the
organization in 2002, perhaps because no new economic opportunities came about.
The growing importance of the ‘island of stability’
By December 1995, Uzbekistani forces alongside Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s began
addressing multi-lateral security and, a few months later, created the Central Asian
Battalion (CENTRASBAT). The measure was supported by Washington, as
CENTRASBAT participated in several American-sponsored security exercises in the
late 1990s.311
On the security front, therefore, Tashkent was gradually regarded as a reliable
‘protector of stability’ by the DoD, especially after the Taliban threat became more
visible.
The Clinton Administration favoured President Karimov’s proposal for
brokering a settlement for the Afghan conflict in late 1998 (Akbarzadeh 2005: 45),
effectively bolstering President Karimov’s role as voice for a non-militaristic Central
Asia. His approach became known as the 6+2, consisting of the United States and
Russia in addition to Afghanistan’s six regional neighbours (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and China), all of whom were supposed to meet
periodically and find solutions for Afghanistan’s civil war.
Still, the main spark for greater bilateral engagement came in August 1998,
when American Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed by Al Qaida. A few
months later, in February 1999, Tashkent was also subjected to an attack and so
310
‘Uzbek President Repeats Line on Nato, Kosovo – Full Version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 April
1999.
311
Tashkent’s participation in American sponsored security schemes facilitated the creation of the Central
Asian battalion (CENTRASBAT) in December 1995, consisting of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan. The first CENTRASBAT military exercise was organized in Fort Bragg in 1997 (Marat
2010: 105-107). The last CENTRASBAST exercise to be organized was in 2000, but both Uzbekistani
and Kyrgyz forces did not attend it because of the IMU’s incursions during that summer.
121
compatibility over protecting stability was on the rise as President Clinton sent a letter
of support to his Uzbekistani counterpart.312
Thereafter, Uzbekistani military forces were compelled to face IMU mobilization
in 1999313 and Washington began assisting Central Asia strengthen its borders. The
strategic significance of the region was increasing and the DoD took even further action
by deciding to group the Central Asian security complex within the wider Middle East,
thereby transferring responsibilities from European Command (EUCOM) to Central
Command (CENTCOM) (Blank 2001: 138).
Roles converged further in 2000, after a second IMU operation near
Uzbekistan’s border, where a number of American mountain climbers were taken
hostage. Washington responded swiftly and officially designated the IMU a terrorist
organization.314 Tashkent too continued reinforcing its role of protector of stability in
the region and, in that same year, took steps to apprehend Iranian cargo vehicles
carrying radioactive material.315
Despite Uzbekistan’s stability, controversy over Human Rights remained
With Uzbekistan’s increased visibility, President Karimov’s roles would face greater
scrutiny in the public sphere. Growing reliability in protecting of stability was not
enough to detract Washington from its pro-democracy roles, even more so as intra-role
conflict increased. This growing problem was well reflected in a speech made by Strobe
Talbott, in 1997, the Deputy Secretary of State. The statement was appropriately named
‘Farewell to Flashman’ – an allusion to a fictional Great Game character – and argued
in favour of pushing for reform, security and profitable economic relations in Central
Asia, without, however, upsetting Russia or ignoring human rights (Rumer 2007: 2930). These goals, as worthy as they may seem, somewhat contradicted the overall
realpolitik of Senator Brownback’s Silk Road strategy, approved by Congress in 1999,
and designed to offset Russia (see above). Washington’s intra-role conflict was thus on
312
For the news report detailing President Clinton’s letter, see: ‘U.S., French leaders send letters of
condolence to Uzbekistan’ Interfax Russian News, 18 February 1999.
313
Uzbekistan received a number of American jeeps to help secure its borders in February 1999. Further
transport supplies and night-vision hardware were later delivered. See ‘Uzbek-US agreement on military
cooperation for year 2000 signed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 December 1999 and
‘Uzbekistan intends to intensify Military Cooperation with America’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
2 February 2000.
314
The IMU was designated a terrorist group in 2000 and again in 2002: ‘Redesignation of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan as a Foreign Terrorist Organization’ Department of State, September 25 2002,
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20070816051117/http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/13708.htm, accessed
September 2010.
315
See the comments made by Secretary of State Albright commending Uzbekistan’s actions in the
security field: ‘Albright praises vigilant Uzbek customs’ United Press International, 19 April 2000.
122
the rise and diverging positions were also enounced by some experts of the region, such
as Martha Brill Olcott and Zbigniew Brzezinski.316
Although pressure for reform persisted, President Karimov did not compromise
publicly on his undisputed authority and seeking genuine independence. Instead, he
showed increasing wariness toward American lecturing, particularly after his first
meeting with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: ‘I did not like what she said and
had to state my own view (…) I asked her a question: I asked her who best knew the
state of affairs in the USA. In astonishment, she said that they Americans did. Who, I
asked, best knows the state of affairs in Uzbekistan? Of course, we ourselves do.’317 In
another incident in 2000, he also criticized the DoS for worrying more about
journalists who covered the Chechen conflict than the lives of the Russians and
Chechens. 318
Whereas Tashkent reached compatibility with Washington on its security policy,
role conflict increased with the DoS over democracy promotion and economic reform,
which became more visible during the Secretary of State’s trip to Uzbekistan in April
2000. The visit very much bolstered President Karimov’s prestige and credibility as a
protector of stability, given that Secretary Albright recognized the efficacy of
Uzbekistan’s border policy.319 Still, political reform was also discussed out in the open,
resulting in a number of public disagreements. In a news conference hosted jointly by
the Secretary of State and the Uzbekistani Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdulaziz
Komilov, Ms Albright stated that President Karimov ‘took on board the issues that I
raised, he disagreed with me and I disagree with him and we will continue to make our
case and we will continue to follow events here very carefully.’320 The Minister retorted
that ‘we can participate and have a dialogue. At the same time to some extent this also
causes doubts among us and we, I'll be very frank with you, cannot accept it.’321 The
discussion persisted as Secretary Albright underlined her point: ‘I expressed (…) that it
was necessary for the government of Uzbekistan to distinguish very carefully between
peaceful devout believers and those who advocate terrorism or violent political
316
For transcripts of their recommendations to the Senate, see ‘Senate Foreign Relations Committee
international economic policy, export and trade promotion subcommittee hearing regarding Caspian Sea
oil’ Federal News Service, 18 July 1998.
317
‘Refile Uzbek Head: “We have to think about NATO Membership” – Full Version’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 1 May 1999.
318
‘Uzbek leader criticizes US for ‘game’ over Radio Liberty reporter: full version’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 11 February 2000.
319
See some of Secretary Albright’s praise in the following news report: ‘Albright praises vigilant Uzbek
customs’ United Press International, 19 April 2000.
320
‘Albright presses unconvinced Uzbek leader on human rights’ Agence France Presse – English, 18
April 2000.
321
Ibid.
123
change.’322 Mr Komilov then replied that ‘Uzbekistan was more than 80 percent Islamic
and that the government knows how to tell good Muslims from bad.’323
Other similar statements made by American personnel demonstrated
incompatibility,
thus
affecting
President
Karimov’s
credibility
in
defending
Uzbekistan’s image. For instance, one member of Secretary Albright’s delegation
publicly stated that ‘we hope they [the Uzbekistani government] get the message: treat
Muslims as they do the Jews.’324 The official was referring to Tashkent’s tolerance for
Bukharan Jews as opposed to Muslims. American pressure, therefore, wasn’t withered
by President Karimov’s brief rhetorical concessions a few months before the visit, in
which he confessed the wish to one day have Uzbekistan become a democracy.325
V.3. The Strategic Partnership 2002-2005: A relationship that never was
After 11 September 2001, Uzbekistan was under the spotlight of the war on terror.
President Karimov’s public credibility as a protector of stability was greatly boosted
and his misgivings toward terrorism were now part of the discourse of the international
public sphere (see Chapter III). Moreover, being visible meant that President Karimov
could, in theory, enhance his country’s prestige and the roles of developer and
technocratic expert. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that greater engagement
with Washington meant that Uzbekistan’s internal affairs would be under greater
scrutiny. Still, Tashkent seems to have embraced the relationship’s new dimension,
albeit in its typical discrete and reclusive manner.
The new momentum after 11 September 2001
President Karimov quickly voiced support for Washington’s fight against the Taliban
and326, according to the press, spoke on 19 September with President George Bush on
the phone.327 For some of Washington’s officials, greater cooperation with the Central
Asian Republics came as a surprise, even if engagement with that part of the world was
322
Ibid
Ibid
324
‘Albright visits Uzbek hospital, calls for religious tolerance’ Agence France Presse – English, 18
2000.
325
President Karimov had argued that. ‘I sincerely dream about a working system of checks and balances
like in advanced and civilized countries both in the East and the West where people can work within the
system.’ See ‘Uzbek president says democratic mechanisms not working yet’ BBC Monitoring Central
Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 January 2000.
326
See a statement by President Karimov offering support in ‘Uzbekistan ready to discuss cooperation
with US’ Agence France Presse – English, 17 September 2001.
327
On Uzbekistan’s initial engagement with the United States after 11 September, see ‘Karimov, Bush
discuss Uzbek-US interaction in various areas’ TASS , 19 September 2001.
323
124
far from being novel.328
As negotiations proceeded for the provision of a new military base, a number of
obstacles came to the forefront. Being a secretive protector of stability, President
Karimov divulged little information to the media, which led to correspondence
problems with American officials. For instance, despite Washington’s confirmation that
military forces arrived in Uzbekistan,329 Mr Karimov denied the report, although he
later acknowledged that he would allow Washington to use some facilities.330
Another problem surfaced due to President Karimov’s role of non-militarism.
Uzbekistan’s President insisted that the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) base (also known as
Camp Stronghold Freedom) was only to be used for ‘humanitarian purposes’ (Cooley
2009: 118). Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, visited Uzbekistan in the beginning
of October to broker an agreement, but ended up conceding that the base was just for
humanitarian operations.331 The outcome of negotiations was apparently unsatisfactory
and so CENTCOM General Tommy Franks visited Uzbekistan a few weeks later to
request the deployment of troops for attacking the Taliban. However, Tashkent’s
position did not shift and Mr Rumseld returned to Uzbekistan’s capital for another
attempt.332 In the end, the efforts came to no avail and K-2’s status remained for
humanitarian purposes.
Further American frustration came out regarding Tashkent’s reluctance to open
the southern border with Afghanistan.333 This time, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell,
personally visited Uzbekistan in December to broker an agreement. The meeting
between both was inconclusive. Reports claimed that Uzbekistan’s leader bargained for
security guarantees and financial commitment, whereas Secretary Powell remained
328
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfwitz confessed in June 2003 that ‘if I had ever gone to the
Congress in June of 2001 and said we needed money to base forces in Karshi-Kanabad, the first thing is
we’d all have to get our maps out and discover that that’s in Uzbekistan and having discovered that they’d
say what on earth do you want forces there for?’ Also, In light of the new era on foreign policy, the
Senate Foreign Relations panel created a subcommittee on South Caucasus and Central Asia in October
2001. For Paul Wolfwitz’s quotation, see ‘Deputy Secretary Wolfwitz Town Hall with U.S. Troops in
Korea’ U.S. Department of Defense, 1 June 2003, available at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2708, accessed September 2012.
329
On Washington’s initial military involvement, see ‘US military aircraft land in Uzbekistan: Uzbek
source’ Agence France Presse – English, 22 September 2001.
330
See President Karimov’s first denial in ‘Uzbekistan Refutes Arrival of US Military Transport Aircraft’
RIA Novosti, 24 September 2001. Those were not the only reported problems. For example, according to
the Washington Post, after the US officials corroborated the arrival of the 10th Mountain Division in midOctober, an Uzbekistani foreign ministry spokesman insisted that only a few hundred American troops
were in the country (Ricks & Glasser 2001).
331
‘US, Uzbekistan confirm deal on anti-terror military cooperation’ Agence France Presse – English, 12
October 2001.
332
‘US defense chief in tour of Afghanistan's neighbours’ Agence France Presse – English, 3 November
2001 and ‘US Senators to negotiate with Uzbek leaders in Uzbekistan’ Ria Novosti, 20 November 2001.
333
On negotiations for opening the border, see the following report: ‘Rocky start for U.S., Uzbek
relations’ United Press International, 20 December 2001.
125
reluctant to concede much.334 In the end, the bridge opened, but this new stage in the
relationship revealed how role compatibility was far from being a fact. Washington
publicly acknowledged President Karimov as a regional provider of stability and had
practical military goals to achieve.
However, American pro-democratic roles also
meant that it could not fully relinquish its public misgivings over Uzbekistan’s
government. For example, just a few weeks before visiting Uzbekistan, Secretary Powell
was asked by a Senator how he would deal with a regime that ‘crushes its own
people.’335 This statement demonstrated intra-role conflict, once more, and, at the time,
Senator Sam Brownback retorted by changing the subject-matter and arguing that the
regime had actually been a reliable partner.336 These polarized perspectives would
eventually permeate the American press. Indeed, during Secretary Rumsfeld’s first visit
to Uzbekistan, Mr Karimov was required to respond to journalists. Standing next to the
Defense Secretary, he was questioned about the political environment in his country, to
which he replied that freedom was not rampant and cautioned those present that the
United States had taken two hundred years to become a full democracy.337
Such statements reflecting President Karimov’s role of undisputed authority
strained the bilateral relationship. Consequently, the Bush administration was
somewhat at odds with how to position itself: either fully support the regime or remain
critical of its questionable political practices. In practice, the message conveyed in the
public sphere was mixed, as evinced in a number of early statements. For instance, the
DoS showed concern with Uzbekistan’s 2002 referendum on extending the Presidential
term from five to seven years, but also thanked Tashkent for its support. Moreover,
Richard Boucher of the DoS publicly warned that the nationwide poll might not fulfil
international standards (Lee 2002), and then the Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs briefed the press on Uzbekistan’s lagging reforms, while also
recognizing Tashkent’s contribution to the war in Afghanistan.338
The Unrealistic Strategic Partnership Declaration
A new hallmark for Uzbekistani-American relations occurred in March 2002 when the
334
For more speculation on the negotiations between President Karimov and Secretary Colin Powell, see
‘Uzbek president says 1,500 US troops in Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse – English, 6 December
2001.
335
‘Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subject, chaired by Senator Joe Biden’ Federal
News Service, 25 October 2001.
336
‘Ibid.
337
On President Karimov’s comments, see ‘Uzbek leader reports on 5 October talks with US defence
secretary – TV’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 October 2001.
338
For a transcript of her briefing, see ‘Special State Department Briefing’ Federal News Service, 11
February 2002.
126
two parties signed a ‘Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation
Framework.’ President Karimov obtained commitment from the world’s predominant
superpower and a significant boost to Uzbekistan’s image. He then paid a quick visit to
Washington DC where he signed the agreement, recognizing the event as something
‘numerous countries want to establish’.339
The declaration in itself encompassed five general Articles, wherein the first,
third and fifth specified Washington’s conditions for political and economic reforms,
such as implementing convertibility. Nonetheless, the main principle of cooperation
entailed ‘respect for international law, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity
and non-interference in each others’ internal affairs.’ Typically, respect for sovereignty
is stipulated in international agreements but, given the scope of reform envisioned in
the declaration, that guarantee effectively relaxed Tashkent’s obligation to satisfy
Washington’s external pressure. In fact, the document did not have any binding
clauses, inasmuch as it did not specify regulatory mechanisms or deadlines on how or
when Tashkent was to pursue reform. This meant, in short, that President Karimov
obtained prestige from a formal partnership and could, at the same time, condone
goals that may have affected the credibility of his roles: ‘we have signed a declaration on
strategic partnership with the USA and on the fundamentals of relations between
Uzbekistan and the USA. The document was drawn up by both sides, although, in
practice, most of it was proposed by us. It has many components (...) Nothing is
dictated: if we are doing something, we are doing it because it is in the interests of our
present generation and the one that is coming.’340
As concerns Washington, the declaration meant that its pro-democratic roles
were taken into account, without having to offer binding security guarantees.
Washington’s obligations were only detailed in Article Two, which recognized that the
United States would consider ‘with grave concern any external threat to the security
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan.’
In spite of the rise in prestige, by signing the treaty President Karimov opened
himself toward a crisis of public credibility. That perhaps explains why the Partnership
Declaration was kept confidential and revealed only a few months later by the DoS.341
Nevertheless, President Karimov remained a reliable partner on issues that did not
contradict his roles. He gave his public support for the Bush Administrations’ struggle
339
‘Uzbek president to sign six documents in U.S.’ New Bulletin, 11 March 2002.
‘Uzbek leader stresses common interests with Japanese’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 August
2002.
341
According to Lewis (2008:17) the exact reasons for why the document was only revealed to the public
in July remain unknown.
340
127
against terror,342 and its war against Saddam Hussein.343 Concessions on reform,
though, still lagged and so President Karimov remained consistent with his roles of
technocratic and undisputed authority. In fact, just a few months after signing the
declaration, he proclaimed that he was not up for ‘democratic fundamentalism’:
‘Uzbekistan has always been against all forms of radicalism (…) We are against religious
fundamentalism, we are against Communist fundamentalism and, if you like, we are
against
democratic
fundamentalism.
We
are
for
an
evolutionary
path
of
development.’344
Some concessions
It is important to be aware that, while no major reforms were taken, some modest
changes were implemented. As a supposed technocratic expert and de-ideologized
leader, focusing on convertibility was not a significant disadvantage to his public
credibility. As such, he agreed to sign a letter of intent with the IMF in January 2002
(Rumer 2002: 18-20) and, in October 2003, announced full convertibility (Blackmon
2003: 391). On political reform, no major institutional changes occurred. Yet, President
Karimov did allow for the legalization of several human rights organizations
throughout 2002 and abolished Uzbekistan’s main censorship body (Ilkhamov 2005a:
299; Lewis 2008: 19).345 He also announced the opening of an Institute of Studies of
Civil Society as part of his own Presidential apparatus (Kandiyoti 2007: 40-44).346
Limelight, Openness and Growing Criticism
Despite greater openness, President Karimov still had to face the consequences of his
roles and of the criticism he had been receiving since the early 1990s. Amid reports
about the use of torture, Mr Karimov was pressured to allow UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture, Theo Van Boven, visit the country. Uzbekistani officials acceded in December
342
On support for the global war on terror, see ‘Uzbek president comments on Afghan issue – text’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 October 2002.
343
On President Karimov’s comments regarding the war in Iraq, see ‘Uzbekistan ready to support US on
Iraq: Karimov.’ Agence France Presse – English, 6 March 2003.
344
‘Uzbek leader stresses common interests with Japanese’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 August
2002.
345
He did not prevent the opposition party Erk - whose leaders had been persecuted and forced to seek
exile during the 1990s - to have its first political conference in Tashkent in June 2003 (Akbarzadeh 2005:
90). President Karimov also published a law ‘on public funds’, which effectively legalized a number of
NGOs (Ilkhamov 2005: 298).
346
As restrictions loosened, Voice of America (VOA) launched its first reports in Uzbek to a number of
affiliates in December 2003. See ‘USA/Uzbekistan: VOA debuts Uzbek-language television reports’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 December 2003.
128
2002, yet Mr Van Boven’s report strongly condemned the regime.347 Uzbekistan’s
government would also have to face more disparaging accounts made by NGOs, which
described the use of child labour in cotton fields and other persistent human rights
violations.348
As reports condemned the regime, President Karimov’s public credibility as an
undisputed leader and an economic developer was put into question. One such case
took place in May 2003, during a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) conference in Tashkent. President Karimov took part in the meeting, which
was filmed live by Uzbekistan’s television broadcaster. This decision proved to be a
mistake because he was subjected to rampant criticism.349 His frustration was actually
quite observable when he took his headphones off midway through the conference
(Lewis 2008: 35).
Another damaging humiliation to his public credibility occurred in the
beginning of 2003. The United States Congress attached a clause for all funds being
transferred to Uzbekistan, aiming to halt American financial assistance if the Secretary
of State did not declare officially that Tashkent was making progress on reform (Daly et
al. 2005: 84). Even more problematic though was that Congress decided to give
Kazakhstan a waiver (Ibid: 24, 84), thereby disparaging Uzbekistan’s image and
leading President Karimov to confess, in late 2003, dissatisfaction with the level of
external criticism.350
The Impact of the Colour Revolutions
Soon after Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, President Karimov warned about the
potential for instability: ‘first, all the events which are taking place in every country,
including Georgia, are the internal affair of a country and the internal affairs of the
people living in that country. I consider any outside interference, any attempt to
exercise control over these processes or impact on it to be inefficient.’351
In December 2003, the Cabinet of Ministers quickly reacted and adopted
resolution no. 543 calling for all international organizations to re-register (Ilkhamov
347
See the full report in ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Theo van Boven,
submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 2002/38’ available at:
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/29d0f1eaf87cf3eac1256ce9005a0170/$FILE/G0310766.
pdf, accessed August 2012.
348
See for example ‘Uzbek Children in South used as slave labour for cotton harvest - opposition’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 September 2002.
349
See the following report ‘EBRD Conference Opens Under Cloud over Human-Rights Scandal’ World
Markets Analysis, 5 May 2003.
350
‘Uzbek leader lashes out at rights bodies over criticism of neighbourhood system’ BBC Sumary of
World Broadcasts, 7 December 2003.
351
‘Uzbek president urges Georgians to abide by constitution’ BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, 24
November 2003.
129
2005a: 300).352 A few months later, more measures were taken as President Karimov
demanded the closure of OSI’s office in Tashkent (Ibid: 313), by stating that it had
violated the law.353 This incident did not pass unnoticed and the DoS threatened that
not renewing OSI registration would affect American assistance to Uzbekistan.354
Tashkent, therefore, made a concession in May, as it acceded to a DoS request to open
an international inquiry into the death of an Uzbekistani inmate.355 It was later found
that the prisoner had died by hanging and that there were no signs of actual torture
being applied. Ironically, though, in that same month, British Ambassador to
Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, publicly criticized the Human Rights record of Uzbekistan’s
government, accusing it of systematically using torture.356
Insecurity and the Snub by Congress
While President Karimov revamped his undisputed authority, Mr Powell took action in
July 2004 by declaring that he would no longer certify that Uzbekistan was carrying out
reforms. The penalization could not have occurred at a more difficult time in the two
countries’ relations, since both had been negotiating K-2’s terms of payment (Daly et al.
2005: 23-25). Indeed, John Daly’s et al. (2005) detailed account later revealed the
degree to which Tashkent had been pushing for financial commitment. In light of the
war on terror, President Karimov’s position was not entirely unreasonable (see Table 3
below). Uzbekistan was hosting an American military base juxtaposed to Afghanistan,
but received less aid per capita than its two Central Asian neighbours.357 Also, when
compared to other authoritarian partners of the United States, especially Egypt,
Uzbekistan obtained a lot less aid.358 Hence, in terms of Uzbekistan’s image and
international equality, the discrepancy negatively affected President Karimov’s
credibility.
352
Other restrictions on NGOs and political liberties were imposed throughout 2004. See Alisher
Ilkhamov’s (2005) excellent article for more on the subject.
353
‘Excerpts from Uzbek president's speech in parliament on 29 April’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 30 April 2004.
354
OSI was not the only NGO to be targeted and Uzbekistani officials accused other organizations of
fomenting discontent. See: ‘US says Uzbekistan aid threatened by closure of Soros Office’ Agence
France Presse – English, 24 April 2004.
355
‘US asks for probe into case of death by torture in Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse – English, 22
May 2004.
356
See a number of critiques in ‘European elections observers: Uzbek election fell far short of democratic
standards’ The Associated Press, 27 December 2005 and ‘Uzbekistan, Parliamentary Elections, 26
December 2004; Final Report’ OSCE, March 2005, available at
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/41950, accessed September 2012.
357
Kyrgyzstan hosted the Manas airbase but shared no border with Afghanistan. On the other hand,
Kazakhstan was relatively far from Afghanistan and has never hosted an American military base.
358
Martha Olcott (2007), during a hearing at the House of Representatives in 2007, made the same point
that Tashkent’s concerns were being not taken seriously.
130
Table 3: United States Aid in Thousands of Dollars359
2001
2002
2003
2004
Uzbekistan 30,599 160,405 52,937
38,442
Kazakhstan 51,189
57,867
51,296
41,867
Kyrgyzstan 36,353
84,652
46,316
7,291
Egypt
199,2053 130,5106 220,6131 186,7652
Pakistan
132,852 105,0128 502,144 400,441
Total United States Aid
(2001- 2005) per capita
Total
282,383
202,219
174,612
7,370942
2,085565
9.95
11.54
31.77
88.08
0.09
Conflicts within Washington over Uzbekistan
With Tashkent facing increased pressure, Washington’s intra-role also conflict
escalated, in that many influential individuals didn’t agree with Uzbekistan being
penalized. Air Force General Richard Myers commented that Congress was being shortsighted in cutting aid to a pivotal partner.360 Some other American academics and
analysts also argued that many of the portrayals of the regime were biased and that it
had actually been a reliable collaborator - opinions which were expressed in a seminar
hosted in Washington in October 2004.361 Without a doubt, President Karimov’s
compliance to the issue of protecting regional stability was not wholly forgotten - a
role which was again reinforced in September 2004, when Tashkent abided to the
Global Threat Initiative, becoming the first CIS country to return unused nuclear fuel to
Russia. President Bush, according to the press, expressed his gratitude with an official
letter to President Karimov.362 The relationship, however, was already mired by the
exacerbated role conflict.
V.4. The Andijan Spark: The final deterioration in relations
Role incompatibilities triggered a gradual change in President Karimov’s rhetoric,
which began focusing more on defending Uzbekistan’s image and cultural
authenticity. By the end of 2004, Uzbekistan’s President became more incisive in
differentiating his country’s supposed eastern culture from the West (see Chapter III).
359
Data obtained from ‘Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations’, available at:
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/, accessed August 2012.
360
‘U.S. Opposed Calls at NATO for Probe of Uzbek Killings; Officials Feared Losing Air Base Access’
Washington Post, 14 June 2005.
361
‘US Experts Hail Uzbekistan Policy on Foreign Religious Freedom’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 20 October 2004. See also Frederick Starr’s support for Uzbekistan’s efforts: ‘US academic
offers support for Uzbek terror policy’ BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, 25 April 2004.
362
‘US hails Uzbekistan's return of highly enriched uranium to Russia’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 22 September 2004.
131
While the Orange Revolution took place in Ukraine, he consistently underlined the
dangers of stability and of importing different models of government: ‘we know that at
all times revolutions are usually based on violence and bloodshed, and they are used as
weapons to destroy everything created by the ancestors mercilessly (…) We are
confident that it is impossible to export democracy and different models of open
societies. It is also impossible to import or push through a universal project of state
construction from outside’363
Although President Karimov had expressed similar themes during the 1990s, his
undisputed authority was gradually basing itself more on cultural authenticity than
technocracy (see Chapter III). As such, he argued in January 2005 that events like
those in Ukraine and Georgia would not take place in his country: ‘I doubt that a
repetition of the Ukrainian or Georgian scenario would be possible in Uzbekistan. The
reason is not that I, as the head of state, would oppose this prospect. The citizens
themselves would not want this, and that is much more important.’364 A few months
later, however, organized insurgents in Andijan would prove President Karimov wrong.
The Andijan Uprising: Western Reponses and the Eviction from K-2
Depictions of the 13 May 2005 events are available from many sources, but given
Uzbekistan’s habit of secrecy it is difficult to obtain consistent accounts (see Chapter
III). A few days after the incident, on 16 May, a Department of State spokesman
condemned the indiscriminate use of force.365 Afterwards, the new Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice, expressed her own concern and called on Uzbekistani authorities to
focus more on Human Rights.366 Other Western international responses were, however,
less restrained. Soon after the uprising, British foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, called for
an immediate international inquiry.367
Amid demands for an international investigation and the increased public
spotlight, President Karimov reinforced his roles of defender of equality and seeker of
genuine independence, by insisting that his country was sovereign and perfectly
capable of carrying out its own internal investigation.368 With criticism coming from
363
‘New Uzbek Parliament Part of Democratic Nation-Building – President’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 29 January 2005.
364
‘Uzbek president issues robust defence of elections’ BBC Summary of World Broadcast, 27 December
2004.
365
‘Uzbek leader accepts U.S. statements on Andizhan events’ Interfax News Agency, 17 May 2005.
366
‘Secretary Rice Defends U.S. Approach to Uzbekistan on Human Rights’ US Fed News, 18 May 2005.
367
Also, in May 19, the United States Senate Helsinki commission chaired by Senator Brownback
convened to discuss the situation in Uzbekistan. See ‘EU urges Uzbek authorities to rein in military
clampdown on population’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 May 2005.
368
‘Uzbek leader says no international probe into Andijon crisis – Fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 25
May 2005.
132
other international organizations, such as the OSCE, Mr Karimov galvanized his
authenticity rhetoric, implying that such institutions were unable to evaluate Eastern
states:
Uzbekistan is in Asia and let everyone remember this. We are members of
not only the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, but we
are members of Islamic states' organizations as well (...) This is why, on the
one hand you are exerting pressure from Europe, and you are forgetting, for
example, take Ukraine, it is in Europe, or Georgia, it is also in Europe.
Where is Uzbekistan [sic]? Look at the map. Is Uzbekistan, the city of
Tashkent, not the gate of the East? (…) We are proud of being from the
East.369
As the events continued to be debated in the international public sphere, many
western officials required a better explanation into what had happened.370
Subsequently, three American senators (one of which was former Presidential
Candidate John McCain) followed up on the role of defending Human Rights, by flying
to Tashkent and demanding a meeting with President Karimov. Their efforts, though,
were of no avail since Uzbekistan’s head of state completely ignored the delegation. 371
Moreover, Uzbekistan’s government took the additional step of rejecting a VISA to the
aid of the High Representative of the European Union.372
The DoD, in particular, was publicly concerned with how events were spiralling
out of control and how this could affect its relationship with Tashkent. This concern
was made public when news came out that Mr Rumsfeld blocked a NATO declaration
condemning Uzbekistan’s government.373
The relationship was now at an all-time low and, in June 2005, Tashkent
forbade American night-time flights to K-2.
374
Then, at the end of July, after the
situation reached a stalemate, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded the
eviction of United States military forces,375 a decision that was then approved by
Uzbekistan’s Senate in August.376
369
Ibid..
In order to clamp down the pressure, Uzbekistani authorities gave some concessions and allowed
foreign diplomats and scholars to visit Andijan, albeit under tight supervision (Akiner 2005).
371
See a report on the visit and President Karimov’s response in ‘Three US senators visit Uzbekistan,
push for international probe’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 May 2005.
372
See ‘EU/Uzbekistan: European Union angered by Refusal of Visa for Solana Aide’ EU European
Report, 11 June 2005.
373
See ‘U.S. Opposed Calls at NATO for Probe of Uzbek Killings; Officials Feared Losing Air Base
Access’ Washington Post, 14 June 2005.
374
‘Uzbekistan restricts US military's use of air base’ Agence France Presse – English, 15 June 2005.
375
‘Uzbekistan demands withdrawal of US mil base’ TASS, 30 July 2005.
376
‘Uzbek lawmakers ratify US military eviction, seek compensation’ Agence France Presse – English
26 August 2005.
370
133
As a last token of goodwill, Mr Rumsfeld publicly acknowledged Uzbekistan’s
stability and reliability, by agreeing to reimburse Tashkent with 23 million dollars,
despite a congressional attempt to block the transaction (Daly et al. 2005: 37).377 This
last gesture, while not preventing American troops from being evicted, expounded a
degree of inter-role compatibility. In light of the fact that role convergence practically
only existed between the DoD and Tashkent, this action may have left some channels of
communication open. However, in the meanwhile, President Karimov came down hard
on all the groups with connections to Washington’s political and democratic agendas. 378
So, in a last ditch effort to downplay the level of friction,379 a DoS representative visited
Uzbekistan in August 2006, but obtained little success.
Although at the time
Uzbekistan’s leader confessed that the visit was an opportunity for improving relations,
the two parties admitted that only on protecting stability was rapprochement and
cooperation possible.380
V.5. Reigniting relations: the importance of security
After Mr Boucher’s visit in August 2006, public high-level contacts between
Washington and Tashkent ceased for nearly a year and a half. Meanwhile, the DoS
altered part of its organizational system and transferred Central Asian affairs to the
South and Central Asian section, effectively removing the region from the Europe and
Eurasian affairs division (Heathershaw 2007: 135). Curiously, the timing of the
decision suggests that the DoS might have been influenced by President Karimov’s
claims that Uzbekistan was Eastern and not European.
377
Later, in a September visit led by the Assistant Secretary of State, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense and National Security Council senior staff, compensation to Tashkent was publicly confirmed,
regardless of the eviction. ‘U.S. Officials to Talk With Uzbek Leader’ The Washington Post, 24
September 2005.
378
Counterpart International, the American Bar Association, the Eurasia Foundation and the Eurasian Law
Initiative, were all forbidden from working in Uzbekistan. Then, in October 2005, the BBC was also
forced to close its office in Tashkent.
379
After 2005, the EU responded to the political situation by placing an arms embargo and restricting the
access of Uzbekistani government members to Europe. In Washington, Senator John McCain delivered a
hard line speech at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in 2006, condemning President Karimov. The
Senate Helsinki Commission also convened in July 2006 to discuss the situation, inviting prominent
Uzbekistani opposition members, such as the leaders of Erk, Birlik and the Sunshine Coalition to offer
their points of view. Overall, Uzbekistan’s leadership was strongly condemned in the European and
American public spheres.
380
See an account of the tense meeting in ‘US, Uzbek Views on human rights, Andijon differ – official’
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 August 2006.
134
Interaction after 2007
With conflict in Afghanistan increasing, protecting stability in the region became again
a prominent role (Blank 2011). Indeed, the discontinuity may have ignited an
adjustment, in December 2007, when President Karimov asserted that discord with
Washington was something of the past: ‘there are still those who assert that today some
discord still continues between Uzbekistan and the United States of America, on the
one hand, and the European states, on the other. It is not difficult to understand that
they would want such discord to exist from which they would draw a particular
interest.’381 CENTCOM Admiral, William Fallon, then visited Tashkent, on January
2008, to discuss opening a new supply route to Afghanistan via Uzbekistan.382 The
meeting seems to have ended on a positive note since a NATO official announced in
March that Tashkent had allowed supplies to cross Uzbekistani territory.383
Subsequently, a new stage in the two countries’ relations was signalled after President
Karimov went to a NATO summit in Bucharest on April 2008.384 The EU reciprocated
by also mitigating its official condemnation and removing sanctions targeting
Uzbekistani officials (for more on the EU’s position, see Chapter VI).385
President Karimov downplayed his authenticity-based roles and focused more
on technocracy (see Chapter III). In other words, the discontinuity brought by discrete
American rapprochement and the global economic crisis in 2008 allowed for a return
to his technocratic rhetoric, leading to inter-role compatibility, and less authenticitybased remonstrations against the West.
Concessions and the Security Relationship that followed
Rapprochement though was not immediate, given how the relationship had
deteriorated heavily after 2005. Still, protecting stability was clearly the issue with
which both sides converged,386 and so President Karimov made a rhetorical adjustment
381
‘Uzbek President's address dedicated to 15th anniversary of Constitution’ UzReport.com, 11 December
2007.
382
‘US-Uzbekistan Relations: Another Step Toward Rapproachment’ Eurasianet.org, 23 January 2008.
383
‘NATO says US, other members to use air base to resupply Afghanistan’ The Associated Press, 5
March 2008.
384
‘Uzbek President Calls for Resumption of Peace Talks’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 April
2008.
385
‘EU eases Uzbek sanctions despite reporter’s jailing’ BBC Monitoring World Media, 15 October 2008.
386
President Karimov called for the implementation of a renewed 6+3 summit during the 2008 NATO
summit in Bucharest (calling for NATO to also become a participant). ‘Uzbek leader says Afghan
situation has ‘extremely’ negative impact on security’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 October 2008.
135
with a call for reform. On January 2008, the death penalty was officially abolished and
a civil rights activist was released from prison.387
Nevertheless, the subject-area dominating the public sphere was the situation in
Afghanistan, particularly as it became one of the major campaign slogans of American
Presidential candidate Barak Obama. In 2009, the new CENTCOM commander,
General David Petraeus, visited Uzbekistan twice, where he signed a security
cooperation agreement with President Karimov.388 Washington continued lobbying for
a Northern Distribution Network (NDN) as a major supply route to Afghanistan,
without referring much to the Human Rights situation.389 Apparently, it was now the
DoD that was taking the initiative in the region, at least in the public sphere.
So, the stage was set for a level of rapprochement and security cooperation,
which was evinced by the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s visit to Uzbekistan in
December 2010. Like in previous circumstances, President Karimov seems to have preempted the high-level visit with a long address to parliament proposing constitutional
reform.390 Yet, given past rhetorical allusions to democracy, it is difficult to foresee Mr
Karimov fully endorsing a close political connection. Indeed, what the twenty-year
relationship showed is that only in protecting stability was there a degree of inter-role
compatibility between the two governments.
387
See some of the concessions in the following account: ‘Uzbekistan: Prominent rights activist
Saidjahon Zainabitdinov amnestied and released’ Ferghana.ru, 5 February 2008.
388
See ‘Uzbekistan, US sign agreement on military cooperation’ TASS, 21 August 2009.
389
In that same year, the European Union removed its arms embargo, irrespective of the Human Rights
situation remaining dubious. However, President Karimov did continue to make some concessions and
gave amnesty to Sanjar Umarov, the leader of opposition movement, Sunshine Coalition, who had been
imprisoned since 2005. Still, less tolerance was shown to some potential political adversaries, all of
whom were imprisoned in May 2010 for having supposed connections to religious institutions. See
‘Uzbekistan: Opposition figure’s release signal of warming Uzbek-US Ties?’ Eurasianet.org, 20
November 2009; and ‘Uzbekistan: Journalist Khairullo Khamidov is sentenced to six years of prison’
Ferghana.ru, 28 May 2010.
390
In a long speech, President Karimov called for the Prime Minister instead of the President to become
head of government. Furthermore, he suggested that Speaker of the Senate was to become the second
head of state, in case the President became incapable of fulfilling his duties. These measures brought
some debate in the public sphere about the nature of President Karimov’s intentions. Some argued that it
was a concession designed to please the West, while others viewed it as a means of balancing rival
factions. For the full speech, see ‘Address by President Karimov at the joint session of Legislative
Chamber and Senate.’ UzReport.com, November 15 2010. For an interpretation, read Sikorskaya’s (2010)
take on President Karimov’s goals.
136
VI. The Uzbekistani-German Relationship 1991-2010
Tashkent’s relationship with Berlin was relatively free from disturbance. Indeed, while
quarrelling seems to have been the overarching feature of Uzbekistani relations with
the United States and Russia, both Tashkent and Berlin were able to foster a degree of
public cooperation from 1991 to 2010.
Discretion is the element that best describes the relationship, without this
meaning that it was uneventful. Instead, both consistently engaged with each other
from the outset and rarely made public outbursts that could damage their political
connection. Germany was Uzbekistan’s third major import partner (behind Russia and
South Korea) throughout most of the 1990s391 and also the only state that managed to
keep its military personnel in Uzbekistan after the 2005 Andijan crisis. Still, the
apparent lack of public conflict was not without controversy. In 2007, for example, an
Uzbekistani dissident criticized Berlin’s apparent pragmatism: ‘once I went to the
German embassy to ask about funding for a project. But the official said - if you were
applying for a cultural project, like learning to play the dayra [a sort of drum], it would
be fine, but you are asking for a human rights project.’392
Berlin focused on stability and showed a relatively strong commitment towards
engaging with Uzbekistan’s economy. Moreover, the fact that Germany’s governments
were advancing toward ‘normality’ (see below) resulted in relatively secluded
interaction, inasmuch as President Karimov’s undisputed authority was rarely
questioned. As shown below, these instances of discrete engagement are reminiscent of
Chancellor Willy Brandt’s slogan of ‘change through rapprochement’ – ‘wandel durch
annäherung’ (Kempe 2007), which only served to boost President Karimov’s
technocratic roles, such as fomenting stability. Role compatibility rather than conflict
thus became the main feature of the relationship, even if after 2007 some friction
became more systematic in the public spotlight.
As concerns Germany’s roles, Paul Létorneau and Marie-Elisabeth Rakel (1997)
observed that Berlin after the end of the Cold War dealt mainly with whether it could
become a ‘normal power’. In this regard, Dirk Peters (2001) illustrates the complexity
of normality by showing that Berlin needed to balance assertiveness with the status of
‘civilian power’, i.e. constraining the use of force and promoting freedom. This
dichotomy between assertion and being a civilian power, coupled by rhetoric of
391
Germany became Uzbekistan’s fourth major trade partner after being surpassed by China in the 21st
century. See ‘Uzbekistan’ Asian Development Bank: Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2011,
available at: http://www.adb.org/publications/key-indicators-asia-and-pacific-2010, accessed, November
2011.
392
‘EU ministers to shy away from praising Uzbekistan’ EUobserver.com, 18 April 2007.
137
constraint meant that prudence became one of the hallmarks of Germany’s foreign
policy. Similarly, Gunther Hellman (2001: 296; 297; 304) argued that Germany’s
government was striving for a degree of international prestige, although avoiding the
label of great power. Max Otte and Jürgen Greve (2000: 10) also underlined the level of
discretion in German foreign policy throughout the 1990s, insofar as it acted as a ‘lowkey leader and legitimate broker in the post-post war Europe’. Hence, while Berlin
managed reunification, and as normality became more accepted, rhetoric changed
gradually. Indeed, many other scholars demonstrated convincingly how Germany’s
military policy adapted to the new challenges and responsibilities of the international
public sphere (Hyde-Price 2001; Noetzel 2011, 2008; Snyder 2011).
Berlin’s involvement in Central Asia reflects well its changing foreign policy and
the manners in which it balanced the assertiveness of its own interests with civilian
roles. Consequently, inter-role conflict was not a significant feature of the relationship,
even though it was on the rise after 2007, when Berlin was forced to justify its
relationship with Tashkent to a variety of significant political actors, namely the
Bundestag, the press and the European parliament.
VI.1. Uzbekistani-German Relations 1991-2000: Trade and Migration
As discussed in Chapter III, President Karimov’s technocratic roles were very much
open to receiving external investment. Consequently, Germany’s economic success and
its technological endowments were all attuned to President Karimov’s appeals for
development and seeking Uzbekistan’s genuine independence. In an interview to a
Russian newspaper, in 1993, he specifically outlined Germany as one country he had
studied and whose model of state-run economic growth he admired: ‘Germany and
other countries, whose experience we are studying, then, of course, the state will not
intervene in economic processes, which will run everywhere on the basis of the
principle of supply and demand. But even in these countries a significant place is
occupied by the public sector.’393
For its part, Berlin evinced that it was concerned with migration. Indeed, during
the 1990s, Germany received around 1.64 million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union (Dietz 2000: 653). As such, calling for stability seemed the more
likely approach, even more so when Berlin took an active policy in supporting its
companies abroad. This public agenda was thus entirely compatible with President
Karimov’s roles of protecting stability and developing Uzbekistan.
393
‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 12 June 1993.
138
A Good Start: Germany shows concern for Germans in the former Soviet Union
Reinhard Krumm (2007: 9-10) argued that Berlin’s initial policy for Central Asia
envisaged stability at the forefront, as Germany quickly gave international recognition
to the five Central Asian Republics (Ibid: 9-10). Apparently, it was Berlin’s concern to
convince counterparts that it lacked any kind of geopolitical ambitions (Ibid). A
Russian 1995 article, however, counter-argued and claimed that Germany was hoping
to become a leading power, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (Pushkov 1995).
Speculation aside, German officials were at the time debating the future of their
foreign policy (Peters 2001). In the short run, Berlin’s concerns were apparently
predicated by the scale of immigration, given that the admission of ethnic Germans was
guaranteed by the 1949 German Constitution and also the Federal Expellee and
Refugee Law of 1953 (Dietz 2000: 636). Uzbekistan had an important stake in that
policy for nearly 40,000 ethnic Germans inhabited the Republic – a consequence of
Stalin’s 1941 deportation policies (Krumm 2007).394
Uzbekistan’s President had committed himself to technocratic roles and
especially de-ideologized politics. This meant that nationalistic agendas were mostly
outside his rhetoric, although he did propound himself as a definer of Uzbek
authenticity. Accordingly, he directed his public agenda toward protecting stability
and developing the economy (see Chapter III) which were compatible with Berlin’s
concerns.
The apparent goodwill of both sides thus opened the way for President
Karimov’s first state visit to Germany in April 1993. The reliability with which the two
states increasingly saw each other was symbolized by Tashkent returning an evangelical
church to the German community in Uzbekistan, which was duly noted by President
Richard Von Weizsaecker.395 Besides prestige and stability, the first visit also
reinforced President Karimov’s technocratic roles. Before travelling to Germany, Mr
Karimov told the renowned magazine Der Spiegel ‘that we Uzbeks are sitting on
gold’.396 He met, therefore, with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and representatives of various
394
Kazakhstan, though, was the more relevant target of Germany’s migration policy, given that nearly
100,000 ethnic Germans inhabited the country.
395
‘German-Uzbek relations have good prospects: Weizsaecker’ TASS, April 28 1993.
396
‘Lichte Zukunft’ Der Spiegel, 26 April 1993, available at http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d13680695.html, accessed September 2012..
139
German businesses,397 who all paid heed to President Karimov’s appeals and prepared a
law for ‘Reciprocal Protection of Investments’.398
The press then reported that President Karimov was receptive to a lorry
production project.399 Eventually, a joint venture between Daimler Mercedes and the
state-run USSELCHOSMASCH - one of Uzbekistan’s largest industrial enterprises,
employing about 36,000 workers - quickly became operational.400 Investment in the
field of technology fitted perfectly with President Karimov’s public roles as a
mercantilist entrepreneur and seeker of genuine independence. However, much like
some American projects in the 1990s (see Chapter V), the initiative failed after
producing only a hundred lorries. Apparently, errors in forecasting the costs of
transportation prevented the project from being fully implemented.401
Business as the motto of Uzbekistani-German relations in the 1990s
In spite of the failure of the lorry production facility, technology and investment were
especially important to President Karimov’s public credibility. Accordingly, in the
beginning of 2000, Uzbekistan’s leader appealed for more Western investment in the
country, specifically in the field of technology: ‘when we speak about the most modern
technologies, they are in the most developed countries, like Japan, Germany, America
and France (…) If we want to achieve this we must establish very close relations with
the most developed countries, because, without attracting investments and foreign
capital, I cannot see any prospect of developing our economy.’402 Germany seems to
have acted upon these calls. In effect, from the mid-1990s to 2010, Uzbekistan received
approximately 265 million euros in development funds from Germany (more than
Kazakhstan in the same period) (Bruck et al. 2011: 798).
After President Karimov’s first visit to Germany, Chancellor Kohl declared
support for Central Asian countries, particularly those who followed a ‘Turkish
model’,403 i.e. focusing on secular development such as Uzbekistan. Then, in July,
President Karimov received a delegation of economic experts from the Bundestag (the
German Federal Parliament), whom he thanked for being one of his country’s ‘most
397
‘President of Uzbekistan arrives in Germany on a visit’ TASS, 27 April 1993.
‘Gesentzentwurf der Bundesregierung’ Deutscher Bundestag, 12 May 1995, available at:
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/13/076/1307614.pdf , accessed August 2012.
399
See the report in ‘Mercedes plans to assemble lorries in Uzbekistan’ Monthly Report on
EuropeNewsletter, 19 May 1994.
400
Ibid.
401
‘Automobile industry in Uzbekistan’ Central Asia & Caucasus Business Report, 24 February 2004.
402
‘Uzbek president speaks to journalists in parliamentary session break’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia
Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 January 2000.
403
‘Kohl reiterates German commitment on cooperation in Central Asia’ Agence France Presse - English,
21 May 1993.
398
140
significant partners (…) that were making a concrete and significant contribution’.404 By
that time, Alcatel and Siemens were already showing a strong interest in Uzbekistan’s
communications and electronics sectors.405 In fact, the increased interest in German
businesses for the region was reflected in the creation of a German industries centre in
Tashkent in December 1994.406
Berlin’s support for Germany’s business ventures in Central Asia persisted, as
President Chaim Herzog made an official visit to Uzbekistan in April 1995. Having the
head of state of Europe’s most powerful economy travelling to Tashkent clearly
reinforced President Karimov’s equality, prestige and technocratic roles (it is
important to bear in mind that President Karimov had not yet been received by the
United States President – see Chapter V).
During the visit, President Herzog was accompanied by a group of
approximately thirty businessmen, as is custom in many state visits. He further
highlighted the need of increasing economic cooperation ‘to meet the interests of the
two countries and peoples.’407 Many of these promises did not just remain on paper
and, as a result, the Goethe Institute (the leading German cultural and language centre)
opened an office in Uzbekistan in 1998. Moreover, other German-sponsored
organizations expanded to Central Asia, such as the German Technical Cooperation
(GTZ), the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the German Adult Education
Association (DVV), the German Development Service (DED), the Konrad-AdenauerStiftung (KAS) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) (Krumm 2007: 10).
Soon after Mr Herzog’s visit, it was President Karimov’s turn to visit Germany in
November 1995 (his second in two years). Germany’s President was apparently aware
of Mr Karimov’s calls for defending equality and Uzbekistan’s great image, and so took
him on an exhibition entitled ‘Uzbekistan-the Heritage of the Great Silk Road.’ These
occasions were ideal platforms for augmenting Mr Karimov’s credibility, who talked
with leading representatives of Germany’s industrial sector.408
President Herzog also mentioned that Germany should invest more in
Uzbekistan in order to decrease Central Asia’s high level of migration.409 This seems,
then, to have been an important priority for Chancellor Kohl’s government, as
immigration from the East intensified. Likewise, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Klaus
404
‘Central Asian Republics’; Uzbek president receives Bundestag delegation of economic experts’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 July 1993.
405
‘Alcatel-Alsthom east German Unit to install Uzbek telephone system’ AFX News, 5 May 1993.
406
‘Other republics; German trade centre to be built in Tashkent’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23
December 1994.
407
‘Germany interested in cooperation with Uzbekistan’ TASS, 4 April 1995.
408
‘Uzbek President arrives in Germany on official visit’ TASS, 14 November 1995.
409
‘Germany to give aid to ethnic Germans in Uzbekistan’ TASS, 16 November 1995.
141
Kinkel, voiced a similar concern when visiting Uzbekistan just a few months later.410
Other than business, economic development and migration, Tashkent was also
receptive to developing stronger security ties with Germany. The two states thus agreed
in October of 1995 to start a military training programme in German facilities.411 It is
important to be aware that Germany’s interest in the former Soviet Union was also
reflected in the European Union’s policy, allowing for President Karimov to bolster his
role of bridge to other markets. Hence, he signed the EU’s partnership cooperation
agreement in June 1996.412
The various public encounters evinced role compatibility, resulting in bilateral
cooperation during most of Chancellor Kohl’s tenure in office. Indeed, such was the
level of convergence that Tashkent agreed to broadcast some of Deutsche Welle’s radio
and television programmes in May 1997.413
Germany’s new government: business as usual
In October 1998, Gerhard Schroeder, the chairman of Germany’s Social Democrat Party
(SPD), was elected Chancellor, thus putting an end to Mr Kohl’s sixteen-year Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) government. Mr Schroeder was forced to make a coalition
with the Green Party, led by Joschka Fischer, who became Germany’s Foreign Minister.
However, the leftist credentials of the new government and, in particular, those of the
Eco-friendly Green Party, did not lead to a shift in Germany’s relationship with
authoritarian Uzbekistan; quite the opposite, as Chancellor Schroeder appealed for
Germany’s assertiveness in the international public sphere and pushed for greater ‘selfconfidence’ (Otte & Greve 2000: 198).
Lack of discontinuity meant that trade and President Karimov’s technocratic
roles were not put into question. A delegation led by Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister
visited Germany in September 1999 and signed an Anti-Double Taxation accord.414 The
two sides also discussed further economic cooperation as well as the importance of
security, namely fighting illegal drug trafficking and crime.415 Up to the turn of the
410
‘German foreign minister to visit Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan’ Agence France Presse – English, 29 May
1996.
411
‘Antwort des Bundesregierung: auf die Kleine Anfrage’ Deutscher Bundestag, 6 June 2006, available
via http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/017/1601759.pdf, accessed August 2012.
412
‘Signing of the partnership and cooperation agreement between the European communities and the
Republic of Uzbekistan’ RAPID, 21 June 1996.
413
‘Deutsche Welle TV to be broadcast in Tashkent’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 May 1997.
414
‘Entwurf eines Gesetzes’ Deutsches Bundestag, 29 May 2000, available at
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/034/1403465.pdf, accessed August 2012.
415
‘Uzbekistan- Germany sign anti-double taxation accord’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 September
1999.
142
century, President Karimov continued receiving important German delegations, such as
the head of the Bundestag in May 2000.416 Uzbekistan’s leader responded positively to
the growing level of interaction. For example, in a speech at the United Nations (UN),
in September 2000, he appealed for Germany (as well as Japan) to become a member
of the UN Security Council.417
VI.2. The growing importance of security, 2001-2005
The beginning of the 21st century brought added complexity to the relationship. Unlike
Tashkent’s bilateral relations with Washington, focused on protecting stability, security
matters were not a significant feature of Uzbekistani-German relations (in spite of the
1995 bilateral security agreement - see above). Still, the problematic situation in
Afghanistan and its repercussions for the region became unavoidable, which eventually
contributed to a growing security relationship.
Nevertheless, increased visibility in the public sphere meant that Germany
would have to pay heed to its civilian roles. Hence, appeals for reform became
somewhat more noticeable in the public sphere, although most rhetoric focused on
praising Uzbekistan’s stability.
The Beginnings of a Stronger Security Relationship
In April 2001, security became a visible issue-area during President Karimov’s third
visit to Germany. Uzbekistan’s leader met with his German counterpart, with whom he
discussed terrorism and international security.418 Afterwards, two agreements were
signed, aiming to improve transportation links and fighting against drug trafficking and
organized crime.419
Curiously, German officials were also less reluctant to discuss reform, perhaps
due to the financial difficulties faced by some German businessmen in Uzbekistan.
Chancellor Schroeder made reference to this problem and personally appealed for
President Karimov to loosen the currency constraints - a controversial issue in that
year, given that the IMF decided to not replace its representative in Uzbekistan after
the end of his term. Nevertheless, Financial Times Deutschland reported that most of
416
‘President Karimov, foreign minister receive German Bundestag head’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 24 May 2000.
417
‘Uzbek president calls for reform of United Nations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 September 2000.
418
‘Uzbekistan, Germany sign agreements on cooperation’ Interfax, 5 April 2001.
419
Ibid.
143
these talks were private and so President Karimov’s technocratic expertise was not
heavily scrutinized in the public sphere.420
A month after President Karimov’s visit, it was Foreign Minister Fischer’s turn
to visit Uzbekistan. As in the April meeting, security was the main subject-area.421 This
was thus congruent with President Karimov’s role of protector of stability, which Berlin
helped strengthen when it agreed to supply military hardware to Uzbekistan (SchoellerSchletter 2005).
Other than security, though, Mr Fischer paid heed to Germany’s civilian role
and confronted Tashkent on the issue of democratic reform - a year after Madeleine
Albright’s controversial visit to Uzbekistan (see Chapter V). During a press conference,
Mr Fischer stated that ‘we discussed the questions of democratic reforms and an
independent press and consider these are key questions in obtaining stability.’ 422
Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister admitted that Uzbekistan ‘had not obtained the level of
freedom of press as developed by democratic countries’, but cautioned journalists that
Uzbekistan was moving forward. Mr Fisher then praised Uzbekistan for its stability:
‘we have an interest in peace and stability in this region. For this reason I have come
here on a visit because we think that should there be peace and stability, Uzbekistan
will play a central role in the region.’423
Germany leaps to the Hindu Kush
A day after 11 September, NATO invoked article five of its founding treaty, and so the
tragic incidents were considered an attack on all allies. Chancellor Schroeder took
Germany’s public commitment to NATO seriously. He and gave full backing to the
United States and then, in November, decided to supply troops for peace-keeping in
Afghanistan.424 Berlin’s assertiveness and growing responsibilities in the international
public sphere gradually became connected to Afghanistan. Germany’s government
420
‘Präsident Islam Karimow auf Deutschland-Besuch’ Financial Times Deutschland, 5 April 2001.
‘Uzbek head, foreign minister meet German foreign minister, discuss security’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 23 May2001.
422
‘German FM urges democratic reform in Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse – English, 23 May 2001.
423
It is perhaps important to observe that, in spite of the problematic security situation enveloping the
region and the difficulties of working inside Uzbekistan, some German companies continued to see
promise in the most populous Central Asian state. In August 2001, Krupp Materials Handling GmbH
began rehabilitating the Angren coal mine in Uzbekistan and then, in September, Siemens signed an IT
agreement with Uzbekistan’s government. For more on Mr Schroeder’s comments, see ‘Uzbek head,
foreign minister meet German foreign minister, discuss security’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 23 May
2001. On the business transactions, see ‘Usbekistan modernisiert Kohleförderung’ Länder und Märkte, 17
August 2001; and ‘Uzbekistan signs IT accord with Siemens’ BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 3
September 2001.
424
‘Germany offers troops for war; A step toward nation's widest military action since WWII’ The
Herald-Sun, 7 November 2001.
421
144
committed itself to post-conflict resolution in the region, particularly after hosting the
Bonn conference in December 2001 – an event that quickly became a hallmark in the
transition phase of Afghan politics and even praised by President Karimov.425
Assisting Afghanistan was perfectly compatible with Germany’s aspiring foreign
policy, in that it allowed Berlin to augment both assertiveness and prestige without
fully comprising its civilian roles.426 This was then reflected in Berlin’s strong intra-role
cohesion, as all parties in the Bundestag – the SPD, CDU, FDP and Green Party – with
the exception of the smaller Left party (Linkespartei), voted for the Bundeswehr’s (the
Federal Defense force) participation within ISAF. For that reason, Uzbekistan became
one of the main transit countries for the German defence army.
At the end of January 2002, Germany’s Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping,
visited Uzbekistan to lease a military base in Termez. Unlike those with the United
States, the meetings between German and Uzbekistani officials seem to have gone
smoothly (see Chapter V); this was perhaps because Berlin’s original design for Termez
was always logistical, rather than offensive, thereby not contradicting President
Karimov’s voice for a non-militaristic Central Asia. A Der Spiegel article also argued
that the German financial offer for Termez was quite generous.427 As such, President
Karimov quickly announced that the airport was being used by German forces for
humanitarian purposes.428
Uzbekistan’s President was under the spotlight of the international public
sphere and various German high-level officials applauded the country’s stability and its
role in post-war Afghanistan. Once more, unlike relations with the United States, Berlin
did not comment on Uzbekistan’s internal political issues.429 By acting through
discretion, President Karimov’s roles were not subject to credibility problems. Equality
was maintained and stability reinforced. It is also curious to observe that Germany and
NATO’s courting of President Karimov led to disappointment in Kazakhstan. According
to Der Spiegel, Astana rejected German military over-flights, perhaps because it did not
see its regional prestige taken into account.430 Given the public importance given to
protocol (see his statement about sitting next to President Clinton in Chapter IV), this
controversy certainly boosted President Karimov’s role of defender of Uzbekistan’s
image.
425
‘Uzbek president hails Bonn documents on Afghanistan’ TASS, 6 December 2001.
Not all those inside Germany were convinced of Chancellor Schroeder’s vision for Afghanistan. For
instance, according to a November 2001 article in Die Welt, Afghanistan was a perfect opportunity for
Germany’s government to divert attention from some pressing domestic issues (Schwilk 2001).
427
‘Lukratives Geschäft’ Der Spiegel, 21 January 2002.
428
‘Termez aerodrome in Uzbekistan to be used by German troops’ RIA Novosti, 27 January 2002.
429
Evidently, silence does not imply that there were no private discussions. However, in the public
sphere, there were no signs hindering cooperation between the two states.
430
‘Lukratives Geschäft’ op. cit.
426
145
In February 2002, Mr Scharping met again with President Karimov in order to
discuss the operational costs of Germany’s new base.431 At the time, President Karimov
offered high praise to his German partners: ‘we consider Germany our reliable partner.
Or bilateral cooperation is based on a firm, long-term legal foundation (…) Germany is
actively taking part in economic investment, providing modern technologies to large
projects and thus promoting the country's economic development.’ What is interesting
about the latter statement is that it barely focused on security, which was by far the
preponderant issue-area of the post-11 September public sphere. Instead, President
Karimov publicly acknowledged the relationship’s economic contributions and its
stability. Mr Scharping also gave an equally strong panegyric by praising his own
country’s investment in the region (Zhukov 2002) and Uzbekistan’s hospitality: ‘my
Uzbek counterpart Qodir Ghulomov [sic] and I visited many places of interest in
Uzbekistan, and I acquatinted myself with local traditions. I like Uzbek people's warm
hospitality. As far as cooperation between the two countries is concerned, I am satisfied
with its current state. I am sure that socioeconomic and military-technical relations
between the two countries will further improve.’432
The new security dimension in the countries’ relations had thus an auspicious
beginning and President Karimov’s prestige was on the rise, especially when Chancellor
Schroeder travelled to the country in May 2002. It was the first visit by a German
Chancellor and the two parties focused on specific military, security and economic
issues. Notwithstanding the military dimension, Chancellor Schroeder did concede that
such issues as ‘civil society, the interdependence of state security on the one hand and
an individual's rights on the other (…) [would be] continued in future.’433
Enhanced security cooperation was clearly at the forefront and the credibility of
Germany’s government in the international public sphere became gradually more
connected to the situation in Afghanistan. In fact, in December 2002, Germany’s
newest Defence Minister, Peter Struck, made a controversial remark when he argued
that the ‘Federal Republic of Germany is also defended in the Hindu Kish.’434 The
statement reflects how much Germany’s defensive security policy had changed since
the early 1990s, when, at the time, its armed forces were not authorized to participate
in foreign military operations. Germany’s new roles led it to supervising ISAF
431
‘Germany has signed an agreement with Uzbekistan to rent the airport in Termez’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcastst, 2 March 2002.
432
‘German defence minister says satisfied with Uzbek-German cooperation’ BBC Monitoring Central
Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 February 2002.
433
See ‘Schroeder hails Uzbekistan’s role in terrorism fight’ Agence France Presse – English, 10 May
2002 and ‘Schröder lobt usbekische Hilfe für Bundeswehrkontingent; Kanzler setzt sich in Taschkent für
Pressefreiheit ein’ Die Welt, 11 May 2002.
434
‘Pressekonferenz mit Minister Struck zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr’ Bundesministerium der
Verteidigung, 5 December 2002, available via http://www.bmvg.de/ , accessed September 2012.
146
operations in February 2003. Protecting stability thus remained a public priority and,
in 2003, Germany’s government continued to praise Uzbekistan for its role in providing
security to the region.435 The two parties thus converged on the problem of drug
trafficking in Central Asia,436 and the Hizb ut-Tahrir. The latter was frequently posed as
a threat by President Karimov, who then lauded Berlin for barring the organization
from public activity in 2003437 (just a few months before President Karimov blamed it
for orchestrating the attacks against the American and Israeli embassies).438
It is also important to note that, besides protecting stability, other roles were
pushed to the spotlight, even if less ostentatiously. Tashkent continued receiving
German investors, such as in July 2002.439 Moreover, Mr Karimov did make some
visible, even if minor, concessions on political reform. In October 2002, German and
Uzbekistani journalists met in Bukhara to discuss media freedom;440 and later, in
August 2003, Tashkent allowed a foreign journalists association, led by a Deutsche
Welle correspondent, to be registered.441
Therefore, unlike the bilateral relationship with the United States, President
Karimov seems to have had a reliable and stable partner. Furthermore, the relations
extended beyond security, thereby reinforcing almost all of Mr Karimov’s role grouptypes, namely technocracy, prestige and even its cultural authenticity (see Chapter III
for more on role group-types). This level of role compatibility fostered strong
cooperation, which became clearly observable in the year the United States Congress
blocked aid to Uzbekistan. At the time, Chancellor Schroeder’s showed unswerving
support for Tashkent: ‘Islom Karimov is a leading politician who proved the drug trade
was a source of income for international terrorism. We'll continue to support
435
‘Schroeder thanks Uzbekistan for assistance in peacekeeping in Afghanistan’ Interfax, 13 August
2003.
436
‘Afghanistan, six neighbouring states sign antidrug agreement in Germany’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 1 April 2004.
437
‘Uzbek president's news conference on 26 August- full text’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27
August 2004.
438
For President Karimov’s condemnation of the Hizb-ut Tahrir, see ‘Uzbek president blames blasts on
Hizb ut-Tahrir followers’ Agence France Presse– English, 31 July 2004.
439
‘Uzbekistan and Germany discuss development of economic cooperation’
RIA Novosti, 6 July 2002.
440
‘Uzbek and German journalists discuss media freedom’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25
October 2002.
441
See references to the journalist association in ‘Uzbekistan registers foreign journalists' association’
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 August 2003. However, it is important to be aware that
restrictions on the press still remained severe. See, for instance, a reference to these problems in:
‘Deutsche Welle office robbed after blunt query to Uzbek leader - web site’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 24 December 24 2003.
147
Uzbekistan's policies in the future, and will do everything we can to strengthen
cooperation.’442
VI.3. Testing the Partnership: The 2005 Andijan Crisis
By the end of 2003, President Karimov had gradually shifted his rhetoric from
technocracy toward increased authenticity (see Chapters III and V), which could have
potentially contributed toward role conflict with Germany. However, after the Andijan
crisis in May 2005, discontinuity meant that Berlin’s roles conflicted, seeing as
Chancellor Schroeder had to clarify how he would deal with his Central Asian partner.
In the end, Berlin would continue to cooperate with President Karimov, even after its
late 2005 elections. The growing importance of Afghanistan in its foreign and defence
roles (Germany would soon be responsible for peacekeeping in Afghanistan’s north), as
well as the fact that there was no substantial level of intra-role conflict in the Bundestag
(unlike with the United States), meant that the relationship was not under intense
public scrutiny.
Some German misgivings after the Andijan Crisis
Before May 2005, President Karimov’s public relationship with Germany’s government
remained business as usual. Just a few months before the crisis, the Chairman of the
State Customs Committee of Uzbekistan visited Germany. Further cooperation was
discussed and a German official mentioned that ‘our cooperation in countering
terrorism is acquiring special significance. Uzbekistan is an important partner of ours
in Central Asia. I recall with great pleasure my meeting with Uzbek President Islom
Karimov, a man of energy and stamina.’443 Later, in April, Germany’s Defence Minister
visited Uzbekistan, where he made preparations for enhancing the security
relationship.444
The massacre in the Ferghana city of Andijan brought about some friction, as
President Karimov faced increased public criticism from the West. Indeed, many
deputies in the Bundestag voiced their disapproval of the relationship. On May 17, the
foreign policy spokesman of Germany’s Green Party publicly condemned the violence
in Andijan, thereby pressuring his party colleague, Foreign Minister Fischer, to take a
442
‘Germany's Schroeder hails Uzbek antiterror role’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 October
2004.
443
‘Uzbek customs head visits Germany to boost ties’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 18 February 2005.
444
‘Uzbek, German defence ministers in talks to boost cooperation’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 27
April 2005.
148
strong stance.445 Furthermore, Deutsche Welle reports covered the consequences of
human suffering, to which President Karimov had already replied that ‘I have no
complaints to German media outlets. I may disagree with their reports and statements,
but I don't have complaints to them.’446 As pressure increased, Foreign Minister Fischer
waited for feedback from his ambassador, who was at the time visiting Andijan
(Weiland 2005). The trip apparently did not clarify the scale of events and so Mr
Fischer called for an inquiry: ‘in order to reach a peaceful solution to this tense
situation, it is essential that there is a prompt, independent and transparent
investigation of the reports of a high death toll in Andijon and the circumstances of the
degeneration into violence.’447
Ambiguity and potential role conflict in Germany’s government subsided and
Berlin did not pronounce itself about the events. However, some of the Bundestag’s
deputies voiced their concern over German involvement, which was compounded by
occasional media reports detailing the level of military and financial cooperation
between Tashkent and Berlin (Schoeller-Schletter 2005). Uzbekistan was becoming a
controversial part of the public’s knowledge, although the two main German parties
(SPD and CDU) did not contest Berlin’s role in Afghanistan and its connection to
Tashkent (Ibid).
Discretion in acting was Berlin’s approach to the discontinuity, as Washington
increased its level of criticism. The silence, however, was noticed by former British
Ambassador Craig Murray (Murray 2005), who would in the following years become
one of the strongest critics of Germany’s relationship with Uzbekistan. Still, in August
2005, a spokesman of the German Ministry of Defence argued that the relationship was
too valuable and that Americans being expelled was not a reason for its troops to leave
the country.448
The political situation, though, was problematic and President Karimov
reinforced his role of undisputed authority by coming down hard on foreign NGOs and
the media (see Chapter V). Moreover, President Karimov escalated his rhetoric on
differentiation by accusing the foreign media, including Deutsche Welle, of intervening
445
‘Kuhn fordert internationale Untersuchung’ Der Spiegel, 17 May 2005, available at
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/aufstand-in-usbekistan-kuhn-fordert-internationale-untersuchung-a356299.html, accessed 19 September 2012.
446
‘Uzbek president says Andijon media coverage lacked facts’ BBC Monitoring World Media, 18 May
2005.
447
‘German FM calls for investigation into Uzbek violence’ Agence France Presse – English, 19 May
2005.
448
‘Bundeswehr bleibt auch nach Abzug der USA’ Der Spiegel, 8 August 2005, available at
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/usbekistan-bundeswehr-bleibt-auch-nach-abzug-der-usa-a367795.html, accessed September 2012.
149
in the country.449 Curiously, President Karimov also hinted at some German
responsibility for the Andijan crisis when he stated, in October, that many of the
assailants were carrying both American and German weapons (Mirovalev 2005). Still,
the crisis, juxtaposed to President Karimov’s strong reactions, did not result in an
immediate German reaction. Instead, it was the EU as a whole, led by the United
Kingdom, that took a stance. The European Union’s roles were clearly being put into
question by the situation in Uzbekistan, and so Brussels reciprocated in October450 by
placing an arms embargo and restricting travelling access to some of Tashkent’s
officials.
President Karimov’s role of defender of Uzbekistan’s image was, therefore,
being seriously contested. Berlin, however, took the controversial step of allowing
former Uzbekistani Interior Minister to travel to Germany, in spite of EU sanctions.
The decision was justified on the basis of the Minister’s health problems,451 which
eventually sparked intra-role conflict. A number of German parliamentarians in the
opposition voiced their disapproval and called for a criminal investigation into Mr
Almatov’s involvement in Andijan. However, in March 2006, the Attorney General
clarified that no such investigation would take place.452 Furthermore, the government
in Berlin continued acting in a ‘business as usual’ manner, thereby strengthening
President Karimov’s technocratic roles. As the future of the Termez base was being
discussed, an advisor to Daimler-Chrysler and Chairman of the Committee on Eastern
European Economic Relations visited Uzbekistan and received a warm welcome from
Mr Karimov.453 By late November, after prolonged private negotiations, Tashkent
decided that it would allow Berlin to continue using the Termez airbase.
The decision conformed to Berlin’s new defence and foreign policy roles
(Zepelin & Kreimeier 2005). As for President Karimov, allowing the Bundeswehr to
stay was congruent with protecting stability and his roles of developer and bridge to
other markets. Given Berlin’s financial commitments and the respect shown to
Tashkent, there was still sufficient role compatibility. Berlin showed through its
discretion that it did was not undermining President Karimov’s undisputed authority.
449
‘Uzbek prosecutor accuses foreign media of continuing “information war”’ BBC Monitoring Central
Asia, 15 September 2005.
450
‘Menschenrechtler begrüßen EU-Sanktionen’ Der Spiegel, 4 October 2005, available at:
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/usbekistan-menschenrechtler-begruessen-eu-sanktionen-a378030.html, accessed September 2012.
451
‘BANNED UZBEK MINISTER GETS GERMAN VISA WITH RUSSIAN, CHINESE HELP’
Ferghana.ru news agency, 17 November 2005.
452
‘Kleine Anfrage’ Deutscher Bundestag, 18 May 2005, available at
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/015/1601579.pdf, accessed August 2012.
453
‘Uzbek leader receives head of German business committee’ UzReport.com, 22 November 2005.
150
Increasing intra-role conflict in Germany
By the end of November, Germany’s new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, had taken office.
As a new cabinet was formed, the Parliamentary State Secretary personally visited
Uzbekistan in December and thanked President Karimov for allowing the Bundeswehr
to remain in Termez.
Not all in the Bundestag were pleased with the outcome. Some deputies argued
that Human Rights were explicitly not for sale.454 Intra-role conflict, though, was not
widespread and was mainly instigated by Germany’s smaller parties, namely the FDP,
the Left and Green Parties. Indeed, after the 2005 elections, the SPD and CDU now
formed a grand coalition and both remained in favour of augmenting Berlin’s more
assertive roles in the international public sphere.
President Karimov, however, remained a challenge as he continued
propounding authenticity-based roles, focused on differentiation (see Chapter IV), and
increased the level of restrictions on foreign journalists, including on a Deutsche Welle
correspondent.455 Such actions, whilst increasing the cohesiveness of Mr Karimov’s less
technocratic stance, brought credibility problems for Berlin as its relationship came
into the public spotlight.
News from German reports throughout the period also characterized the violent
nature of President Karimov’s regime, using loaded expressions such as ‘drinker of
blood from Tashkent’ (Neef 2006).456 Accordingly, members of parliament pressured
Germany’s Foreign and Defence ministries to reveal more information concerning their
relationship with Tashkent,457 to which the government responded in June.458 Also, a
parliamentary group visited the country in October 2006 and concluded that the
human rights situation in Uzbekistan was still not optimistic (Bensmann 2006).
454
‘Antrag; Menschenrechte in Usbekistan einfordern’ Deutscher Bundestag, 14 December 2005,
available at :http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/002/1600225.pdf, accessed September 2012.
455
‘Sendeverbot in Usbekistan’ Der Spiegel, 17 March 2006, available at:
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/deutsche-welle-sendeverbot-in-usbekistan-a-406567.html,
accessed September 2012.
456
Besides Neef (2006) see, for instance, the following article in Der Spiegel: ‘Sharp diplomatic note to
Germans’ Der Spiegel, 29 January 2006.
457
‘Antwort Auf die Kleine Anfrage der’ Deutscher Bundestag, 3 April 2006, available at:
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/011/1601117.pdf; accessed September 2012.
‘Antrag: Menschenrechte in Usbekistan einfordern’ Deutscher Bundestag, 28 June 2006, available at:
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/019/1601975.pdf, accessed September 2012.
458
The report detailed that, between 2002 and 2005, the Termez air base was used on average for over
300 annual flights. Moreover, the same report clarified that, since 2002, sixty-three Uzbekistani military
officers had been trained in Germany and that Berlin was requested to do considerable infrastructure
development around Termez to have its basing rights extended. See the full report in ‘Antwort des
Bundesregierung:’ Deutscher Bundestag, 6 June 2006, available at
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/017/1601759.pdf, accessed September 2012.
151
Meanwhile, role conflict also took place within the EU, prompted in part by
former British Ambassador Craig Murray’s testimony to the European Parliament. He
made grave accusations, alleging that Germany’s intelligence services had obtained
information from Uzbekistan gathered by use of torture (Büchner 2006). The European
Parliament demanded a clarification, to which the German government responded with
a closed door committee at the Bundestag - a decision that did not please some of
Germany’s own deputies.459
While intra-role conflict grew, the height of contestation was not yet significant,
given that the two largest parties, the CDU and SPD, remained committed to
peacekeeping and also supported stable economic connections with the Central Asian
Republics. Accordingly, in May 2006, the advisor to Daimler-Chrysler visited
Uzbekistan again, followed in July by Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung (Muscta
2007). Indeed, in September 2006, Uzbekistan’s President saw his prestige augmented
as his new book was published in Bremen; and, when outgoing Ambassador HansJoachim Kiderlen recognized Karimov’s personal expertise: ‘after the delivery
presentation of credentials, he [President Karimov] struck me by his precise and
profound knowledge about the situation in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], his
vision of prospects for bilateral relations.’
Perhaps the most relevant event for the bilateral relationship was the visit of
Germany’s Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in November, who confessed a
desire to pressure for removing EU sanctions.460 This position evidently boosted
President Karimov’s undisputed leadership, even more so because Germany was about
to become the acting President of EU. Mr Karimov noted that Berlin was important for
Uzbekistan and that ‘here the experience and prestige of Uzbekistan are essential.’ 461
For his part, Mr Steinmeier replied that he would take into consideration Tashkent’s
decision to give the Red Cross access to political prisoners and his hope that the EU and
Uzbekistan would develop a stronger relationship in upcoming years.462 Curiously, after
the Foreign Minister’s visit, Tashkent released an independent journalist from
imprisonment.463 In site of Berlin’s public wish to soften EU sanctions, they were still
renewed in November. Still, the Minister of State, Gernot Erler, argued that more than
oil and gas was at stake in Central Asia, and that it was necessary for the EU to push for
459
‘Berlin will nur vertraulich informieren; Stellungnahme zur “Usbekistan-Connection” vor dem
Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremium angekündigt’ Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 April 2006.
460
‘Uzbekistan surprised by EU move to extend sanction’ Eurasianet.org, 13 November 2006, available
at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111406.shtml, accessed September 2012.
461
‘Uzbek leader optimistic about ties with Germany’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, November 1 2006.
462
‘Steinmeier: Chance für Neuaufnahme der Kooperation mit Usbekistan’ Agence France Presse –
German, 1 November 2006.
463
‘Uzbekistan releases independent journalist’ Agence France Presse – English, 8 November 2006.
152
equality with countries in the region - a hint that was perhaps directed at President
Karimov.464
VI.4. An increasingly frail relationship 2007-2010
A December 2008 article in the renowned German newspaper Die Zeit coined Foreign
Minister Steinmeier’s policy in Central Asia as ‘Change through Rapprochement’
(Wandel durch Annäherung) (Bittner et al. 2008). Comparing it purposefully with
Willy Brandt’s famous Ostpolitik, meant that Berlin was both seeking to engage with
the East and calling for change. It, therefore, balanced its typical civilian roles with a
new, more assertive, stance. This approach though was not entirely compatible with
President Karimov’s roles, since, at its core, it envisaged change, which could
potentially affect stability. Still, it also meant that Mr Karimov’s undisputed authority
and public concerns over defending equality and genuine independence were not
explicitly targeted.
Slogans aside, the policy, far from instigating serious discontinuity, was rather
an extension of Germany’s already typical approach to Central Asia. Perhaps the only
alteration was that now there was a publicly recognized strategy, which effectively
meant increased visibility for the region, particularly as Mr Steinmeier lobbied for a
new EU strategy in 2007. This momentum was, in part, the result of Chancellor
Merkel’s increasing scepticism toward Moscow – an outlook that had already been duly
noted by Russian press (Tsuvernik & Strokan 2006). The doubts eventually became
more prominent after the 2006 gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine which, in turn,
prompted the EU to enhance its energy cooperation with Central Asia (Hoffman 2010:
87; Kempe 2007; Krumm 2007; Hall 2007).
Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s new EU strategy
In January 2007, as Germany assumed EU leadership, Mr Steinmeier introduced the
concepts of his new EU strategy for Central Asia, arguing that ‘we should simply check
to see if we can help with stability in that region (…). It’s a kind of gap in our European
consciousness. As far as our common European past is concerned I can't see any stage
where people were strongly interested in this region’ (Rettman 2007b). Since stability
was at the forefront, role compatibility with Uzbekistan was galvanized. The EU’s new
concept, therefore, concerned itself less with Human Rights than with the strategic
importance of Central Asia (Rettman 2007a).
464
‘“Es geht um Abwehr von Gefahren”’ Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 December 2006.
153
Uzbekistani Foreign Minister, Vladmir Norov, showed some public willingness
to accede to the strategy by clarifying that Uzbekistan did not need to justify itself for a
stronger relationship with the EU465 and, by July 2007, the New Partnership was
adopted by the European Council. Still, what seems to have been a quick process was
actually a complicated endeavour.
President Karimov’s unwillingness to compromise
It is important to be aware that Tashkent, as one of the targets of the EU’s upcoming
strategy, was still facing sanctions. The embargo and travelling restrictions were serious
blows to President Karimov’s public credibility as a defender of Uzbekistan’s image and
equality. Consequently, for cooperation to augment, inter-role conflict with EU would
have to be mitigated. Berlin, too, would also have to grapple with its own increasing
intra-role conflict regarding Uzbekistan.
Berlin demonstrated goodwill as it allowed Uzbekistani authorities to travel to
Germany, despite the EU’s sanctions.466 Thereafter, a German parliamentary delegation
went to Tashkent to discuss reform.467 Controversy, though, soon became evident as
negotiations advanced. Uzbekistan’s Prosecution Office opened a case against a
Deutsche Welle reporter, who was accused of tax evasion.468 The timing of the case is
suspicious given that it coincided with Mr Norov’s trip to Astana, where he would
discuss the EU’s new strategy. According to a variety of press reports, Uzbekistan’s
Foreign Minister disagreed with the way negotiations were going and how
international equality was being put into question, stating that ‘we will justify
[ourselves] to nobody’ and condemning the ‘student-teacher relationship’ that the EU
was apparently seeking to implement.469
The situation reached a temporary stalemate, but Tashkent then dropped its
accusations against the Deutsche Welle correspondent,470 and the EU removed the
travelling sanctions in October (Ibid). Whether these events are connected is still open
to discussion, yet they evince the quagmire over conflicting roles, namely Tashkent’s
465
‘Germany says EU must create new energy ties with Central Asia’ AFX International Focus, 28 March
2007.
466
‘Usbekische Gäste besuchen Berlin; Regierungsdelegation will jetzt über Strafrechtsreformen
sprechen. Zu Hause sitzen Menschenrechtler hinter Gittern taz’ die tageszeitung, 15 January 2007.
467
‘Presidential initiatives presented in Germany’ UzReport.com, 24 January 2007.
468
‘Deutsche Welle's Uzbek journalist accused of tax evasion’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit
Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 25 March 2007.
469
For more on Mr Norov’s declarations, see the following article: ‘Usbekistan weist EU zurecht;
Missklänge über Menschenrechtsfragen bei Konferenz in Astana’ Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 March
2007. According to EU negotiators, Tashkent then played delaying tactics by postponing successive
meetings, in an apparent ploy to avoid the presence of Human Rights lobbies (Hoffman 2010: 99).
470
‘Uzbeks drop case against Deutsche Welle reporters’ Agence France Presse – English, 11 June 2007.
154
prestige and equality versus Berlin and the EU’s civilian responsibilities of pushing for
political reform. Removing the sanctions solved part of the problem, but
simultaneously increased Germany’s intra-role conflict, given that its Foreign Minister
was now considered to be disinterested in Human Rights issues.471
Security once more: the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
After the EU’s initial concessions, a number of events in Germany would spark greater
intra-role conflict. On September 2007, an attack planned by alleged members of the
so-called Sauerland cell of Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), was foiled by a joint CIAGerman operation. Three people were apprehended - two of German and one of
Turkish nationality (Whitlock 2007) – all of whom orchestrated an attack on American
military facilities in Germany. Thereafter, the Bundestag demanded a better
explanation as to the nature of the terrorist group and some parliamentarians even
questioned whether the IJU actually existed.472
Then, another equally damaging incident took place in March 2008 when an
American military base in Afghanistan was attacked by a terrorist of German
citizenship (Gebauer & Musharbash 2008), followed then by another incident provoked
by a German radical, Erich Breininger, who condemned Berlin’s actions in
Afghanistan.473 These events were indirectly connected to Uzbekistan, even more so
when, at the time, its head of intelligence, Rustam Inoyatov, visited Germany for
reasons that remain unknown, thus sparking debate as to the nature of the private
cooperation between the two states.474 So, intra-role conflict increased in Germany as it
discussed whether it should retreat from its new, more assertive, roles in the region.
While reform in Central Asia was discussed in parliament, mixed cues were also
conveyed when Uzbekistani Defence officials continued meeting with their German
471
Such issues became more prominent, especially when Mr Steinmeier refused to receive the Dalai
Lama who, in contrast, was granted a meeting by Chancellor Merkel in 2008. See the following news
reports discussing the Human Rights policy of the grand coalition: ‘Problematisch diplomatisch’
Financial Times Deutschland, 12 December 2007; and ‘Steinmeier’s bad example’ The New York Times,
14 May 2008, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/opinion/14ihtedgermany.1.12879647.html, accessed September 2012.
472
For the doubts about the IJU, see the following transcript from the Bundestag: ‘Islamische Dschihad
Union’ Bundestag, 10 January 2008, available at:
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/077/1607722.pdf, accessed September 2012. It is important to be
aware that some research later revealed that the IJU was formed in 2002 and was a more radical offshoot
of the IMU (e.g. Logvinov 2010: 76), with perhaps stronger connections to Al Qaida (Kaiser et al. 2008).
473
‘Uzbekistan: Germany Apparently Seeks Tashkent's Help to Combat Islamic Terrorist Cell’
Eurasianet.org, 28 October 2008, available at
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav102908.shtml, accessed August 2012.
474
‘Germany criticized for holding talks with Uzbek secret service chief’ Die Welt, 31 October 2008.
155
counterparts throughout 2008.475 Foreign Minister Steinmeier could not completely
avoid Uzbekistan and his own assertive EU strategy, which was then reflected in the
speech he gave to the Bundestag, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. He argued that his prudent, yet controversial, policy had
actually been successful in advancing with reform in Uzbekistan: ‘let me turn to
Uzbekistan (...) Of course, there is still so much to do there in the sphere of human
rights. But some positive steps have been taken. I called personally for the abolition of
the death penalty in Uzbekistan (...) We have created benchmarks. For example, we
successfully campaigned for the ICRC to be at long last allowed access to Uzbek prisons
again. I ask for greater understanding for the EU's policy on Central Asia.’476
Growing controversy concerning Germany’s Involvement in Uzbekistan
While the nature of Berlin’s long-term relationship with Tashkent became more visible,
Germany’s intra-role conflict propagated to Uzbekistan, as President Karimov had to
pay heed to public criticism. Growing inter-role conflict, though, only appeared
gradually, as economic roles were still relevant. These were, therefore, wholly
congruent with Mr Karimov’s technocratic roles since access to loans remained open,477
in addition to the increase in German investment.478
By 2009, Chancellor Angela Merkel was re-elected and the grand coalition
between the CDU and SPD ceased to be. The CDU then formed a new coalition with the
smaller FDP, making Guido Westerwelle Germany’s new foreign minister. The
government would thus face some increased criticism, especially when a news report
conveyed that Germany’s government had cooperated with Uzbekistan’s military
during the period of EU sanctions.479
Such reports only reinforced the negative spotlight as well as Germany’s
apparent disregard for Human Rights and civilian roles. Another report in May of 2010
remonstrated against a decision taken by the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) - a
CDU-affiliated foundation – to celebrate Germany’s cooperation with Uzbekistan on 13
May (the anniversary of the Andijan crisis) without making a single reference to the
475
‘Uzbek, German defence officials discuss cooperation’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 September 2008.
476
‘Speech by foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier’ States News Service, 5 December 2008.
477
‘Uzbek agricultural construction bank draws Сommerzbank's loan’ Trend Daily Economic News, 9
December 2009.
478
German businesses made a number of investments on automobile production, as well as fertilizer
plants in Uzbekistan at the time. See, for example, the following reports: ‘Daimler Buses receives
contract from Uzbekistan’ Auto Business News, 6 July 2009;‘German, Uzbek joint venture producing
tractors’ The Times of Central Asia, 16 April 2010; ‘Uzbek fertilizer producers aim at foreign markets’
UzReport.com, 24 May 2010.
479
‘Deutschland schulte usbekische Soldate’ ddp Basisdienst, 24 March 2010.
156
tragic events of 2005.480 Still, none of these brought about significant intra-role
conflict. The SPD was now in the opposition, but the new coalition persisted with
protecting stability. Therefore, when President Karimov met with Mr Westerwelle in
July 2010, both focused on defence, an issue that was considered very relevant after
conflict erupted in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan’s President highlighted the
importance of bilateral relations but paid heed to Germany’s intra-role conflict by
conceding to the need of pursuing reform: ‘[German-Uzbekistani relations] concerns
both political and democratic reforms, as well as economic and humanitarian spheres. I
would like to say that Uzbekistan puts certain trust in German institutions concerning
cooperation to resolve such important issues as progress of society's democratization
and economic liberalization and so on.’481
In spite of the business as usual attitude, it became increasingly evident that
President Karimov would have to face Berlin’s increased suspicion, especially after
Zeromax - a large, Swiss-based conglomerate with business links to Uzbekistan declared bankruptcy in November 2010. According to an advisor to Germany’s Federal
Ministry of Economics and Technology, this meant that Uzbekistan was 130 million
euros in debt to German businesses.482 Once more, the relationship was visible for the
worst possible reasons and Germany’s Federal Commissioner on Human Rights
publicly criticized Uzbekistan for using Child Labour in cotton fields.483
Epilogue
The end of 2010 finished with uncertainty and relations becoming increasingly tense.
Indeed, President Karimov’s visit to Brussels in January 2011 did not result in any
visible economic concessions that could bolster Tashkent’s technocratic roles. Instead,
it was heavily criticized by the press, affecting Mr Karimov’s role of defender of
Uzbekistan’s great image. The German press chastised Uzbekistan’s leader, and the
renowned newspaper Die Zeit mockingly labelled him as ‘Unser Diktator’ (Our
dictator) (Bota 2011). Consequently, by 2010, President Karimov’s uncompromising
roles were under greater scrutiny, as both Berlin and Tashkent had to reconcile
disparaging positions concerning stability, civilizing roles and commercial contacts.
What seems clear is that Berlin was conflicted between its usual discrete assertion and
its other responsibilities. Unlike Washington, though, Berlin never evinced strong
480
‘Deutscher Schmusekurs mit Karimow’ die tageszeitung, 12 May 2012.
‘Uzbek president upbeat on cooperation with Germany’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 15 July 2010.
482
‘Uzbekistan owes Germany 130M EURO after Zeromax Building Spree’ The Times of Central Asia, 5
November 2010.
483
‘German Rights Official criticizes Tashkents reliance on child labor’ The Times of Central Asia, 12
November 2010.
481
157
intra-role conflict within its own cabinet, since contestation originated mainly from the
Bundestag’s smaller opposition parties (two of which were the FDP and the Green
Party). Moreover, Germany also assumed a stronger economic role than the United
States, which meant that, despite incompatibility between reform and stability, it still
managed to converge with President Karimov’s more technocratic roles.
158
VII. The Uzbekistani-Turkish Relationship 1991-2010
Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbours were not the only ones entering an
unprecedented era after the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the gradual dissolution of Yugoslavia, Turkey’s governments faced new challenges
(Aydin 2004: 1; Kut 2001: 5; Fuller 1993: 37). This shift in geopolitics, along with
several internal transformations, convinced Barry Rubin (2001: 1) that Ankara had
changed ‘its foreign policy and self-image more than any other post-communist country
in the post-Cold War era.’
As both Turkey and Uzbekistan opened themselves to the international public
sphere, everything would suggest the beginning of a fruitful and cooperative
relationship. Besides a similar language, common culture and ancestry, Ankara’s
Kemalist roles focused on secularism and Turkish nationalism, all of which was
potentially congruent with President Karimov’s technocratic roles.484 Indeed, the
resemblance seemed so straightforward that, in 1994, NATO delegated Turkey the task
of promoting the alliance’s aims in Central Asia (Winrow 2001: 216).
However, Turkish-Uzbekistani relations were actually beset by continuous
inter-role conflict. After the 1980 coup, Turkey progressively liberalized its political
environment (Zurcher 2004: 289-292), which inevitably led to growing debate over the
foundations of its foreign policy. According to Mucahit Bilici (2006: 3), the root
ideologies of modern Turkish politics originated in the Tanzimat period (a time of
reform in the 19th century Ottoman Empire) and are all more or less classified under
secularism, Islamism and Ottomanism. The first led Turkey to engage with the West,
the second toward the Middle East, whereas the latter results from a growing
fascination for the history of its former empire, the Caucasus and Central Asia (Fuller
1993: 47). Consequently, Ottomanism may occasionally evince some pan-Turkic
elements. Those very general roles frequently overlap, however, as was exemplified by
the rise of the AKP (see below). Moreover, the fluctuating reinterpretations were far
from being consensual within domestic politics, as many Turkish citizens did not agree,
for example, with President Turgut Özal’s optimistic engagement with Central Asia
(Ibid: 73).
Naturally, Ankara’s contacts and curiosity fostered some role compatibility with
Tashkent. For one, Turkey’s government quickly recognized President Karimov’s
regime, which bolstered Uzbekistan’s international image. Ankara’s Ottomanist role
also envisaged a number of economic projects linking East to West that very much
484
In addition to converging strategic conceptions, economic contacts between the two states grew and,
by 2010, Turkey was Uzbekistan’s third largest export market.
159
converged with President Karimov’s role of bridging markets. Yet, behind these
manifestations was a strong level of inter-role conflict, which many times suggested
that Ankara desired leadership, thereby contradicting President Karimov’s role of
defending international equality.
Moreover, Ankara faced a strong level of intra-role conflict after the mid-1990s
which, compounded by the fact that it was not as economically powerful as Berlin and
Washington, contributed to bilateral role conflict. In other words, domestic
controversies in Ankara collided with President Karimov’s appeals for protecting
stability and de-ideologized transition. Moreover, lack of economic influence was
hardly compatible with his other technocratic roles, namely developing Uzbekistan,
seeing as Turkey could not guarantee the level of investment it promised (Winrow
2001: 204; Fuller 1993).
Distrust also became increasingly observable in the public sphere, which was
made clear by Tashkent’s growing repression of the Fetullah Gülen movement
(Krespin-Sharon 2009; Park 2007). Conspiracies over the Gülen movement led to
inter-role conflict, which also reverberated into Turkey’s own domestic politics. In fact,
to this day, the aims of the Fetullah Gülen movement are far from consensual in
Turkish politics, especially after the more traditional Welfare and Justice and
Development parties rose to power.
In addition to incompatibilities over economic development and the rise of
political Islam, Turkey’s Western orientation could not match the public demands of
President Karimov. Ankara had to balance its credibility in the public sphere, as
Tashkent appealed for Ankara to fully reinforce President Karimov’s undisputed
authority. Ankara many times hesitated, seeing as it did not want to affect its
important relationships with the European Union and Washington.
VII.1. A Promising Start: 1991-1993
After 1991, everything would suggest that Turkey and Uzbekistan would both become
major partners, particularly because the Turkish President, Turgut Özal, was publicly
committed to reaching out to Central Asia, even during Moscow’s rule. Before the wave
of independence in 1991, he received Azerbaijan’s President in 1990 and also, in early
1991, made a stopover in both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan whilst visiting the Soviet
Union (Aydin 2004: 2-3). This interest for the region probably explains why, by
October, Azerbaijan’s Prime Minister stated that if Ankara did not recognize his state,
no other country would (Kovaci 1991).
Similarly, with President Karimov’s declaration of independence, followed in
December by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkish support boosted the
160
international equality and prestige of President Karimov. Accordingly, he soon
travelled to Turkey at the bequest of his counterpart, where he obtained full
recognition. Henceforth, the bilateral contacts multiplied, but subtle rhetorical nuances
conveyed that roles were actually far from being compatible.
President Karimov visits Turkey
On 17 December 1991, President Karimov travelled to Turkey.485 At the time, President
Özal requested President Karimov to ‘relay our [Turkey’s] warmest wishes to the
brotherly Uzbek people. We will always be together with our Uzbek brothers (…) [I] am
sure the people of Turkey and Uzbekistan as well as the people of Turkestan as a whole
will become respected members of the world community by the year 2000’ (Litvinenko
1991). Turkey’s President, whose Motherland Party (Anavatan partisi, ANAP) had come
in second in the November parliamentary elections, was inevitably staking much of his
public credibility on Central Asia.
After becoming acquainted with the Turkish capital, President Karimov visited
President Özal’s official residence and signed a variety of comprehensive agreements on
culture, education and economic cooperation, of which the most important was a
protocol proposing diplomatic recognition.486 Curiously, President Karimov iterated
that Uzbekistan was a sovereign and independent state ‘that determines its own
domestic and foreign policies’;487 meaning that only after publicly demarcating his
country’s genuine independence and equality, did he proceed to sign the documents.488
President Karimov then praised Turkey’s approach in the international public sphere:
‘in light of the current difficult situation, when the USSR has fallen apart [sic],
Uzbekistan is compelled to choose an effective course of development. The economic
model, used by Turkey, is applicable to our republic, too (…) the more so, since our
peoples are linked by traditional ties of friendship.’489
Turkey’s secular and western-oriented focus did not contradict President
Karimov’s technocratic roles, namely his undisputed authority, focus on development
and attempt to bridge to other markets. Therefore, Ankara saw its prestige and
preponderance in the region increase. Indeed, the press highlighted that Turkey was
485
‘Turkey to recognize all breakaway Soviet republics’ Agence France Presse – English, 17 December
1991.
486
‘Turkey cooperation agreements signed with Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21
December 1991.
487
Ibid.
488
Ibid.
489
‘Interview with Uzbek President’ TASS, 20 December 1991.
161
considered the ideal partner by Washington to engage with the Central Asian
Republics.490
Turkey and Uzbekistan reinforce their ties: The Century of the Turks
Having gradually consolidated his country’s independence, President Karimov went to
Davos, in February 1992, where he attended the World Economic Forum. He met on
location with his Turkic counterparts in what was labelled as the first ‘Turkish Summit’
by some elements of the press.491 Curiously, the word used was Turkish as opposed to
Turkic, thereby admitting Turkey’s leading role.
Uzbekistan’s leader, despite his role of defender of equality, admitted during
the summit that he, as well as his Central Asian neighbours, was grateful to his ‘elder
brother’ for bringing their people closer.492 This praise was not in vain, because
Turkey’s government soon reciprocated by boosting economic relations, which fitted
nicely with President Karimov’s calls for technocratic relations. Turkey’s Foreign
Minister, Hikmet Çetin, indicated in Davos that increased Turkish aid would be
provided by the Exim Bank.493 In fact, Turkey’s government was willing to set up
credits worth 900 million dollars to galvanize trade. This, however, contributed to
intra-role conflict, insofar as many Turkish nationals debated whether such huge sums
should be delivered abroad rather than applied internally (Fuller 1993: 47). Later,
though, Ankara would prove unable to provide all the loans it had promised (Winrow
2001: 204), which would hinder its ability to reinforce President Karimov’s
technocratic roles.
The relationship appeared to be consolidating as technocratic congruence
between both parties became evident in the international public sphere. Consequently,
President Karimov soon underlined the importance of cooperating with, as well as
following, Turkey’s economic model: ‘Turkish way of development is more acceptable
to us, first as all as a secular, civilized way of social development.’494
Tashkent’s growing connection with Ankara reaffirmed President Karimov’s
supposedly apolitical and de-ideologized stance to politics, particularly when some
speculated whether the Central Asian countries would follow the Iranian model (e.g.
Cordahi 1992). President Karimov, however, also made a number of explicit cautionary
490
See the following reports by Kovaci (1991) and Lobe (1991).
For a reference to the ‘Turkish summit’, see the following article: ‘Turkish Leader Met Central Asian
Chief in Davos’ TASS, 3 February 1992.
492
Ibid.
493
Ibid.
494
‘“Speaking of borders means breaking up Central Asia” Islam Karimov Speaks in an Interview with
Foreign Journalists’ Official Kremlin News Broadcast, 15 May 1992.
491
162
remarks, highlighting that there was first Uzbekistan’s own model and only then
Turkey’s: ‘I am impressed by the fact that Turkey while simultaneously observing,
preserving and developing its own national traditions (….) at the same time
understands that bowing to these traditions is not an aim in itself (…) Therefore when I
speak about Turkish model I mean it as a reference point. But Uzbekistan had its own
path.’495 Clearly, Turkey was a partner, but one that had to be equal and not superior to
Uzbekistan. Moreover, President Karimov’s credibility was increasingly based on his
roles of seeker of genuine independence (see Chapter III), which meant that
Uzbekistan’s economy was to be unique.
In July 1992, President Karimov visited Bursa to attend more meetings of the
World Economic Forum. He was received by some of the city’s high level officials
which, once more, enhanced his role of defender of Uzbekistan’s image. Mr Karimov
confessed that Turkey carried a special place and that he was impressed by its culture
and level of economic development.496 He then also took advantage of the change to
bolster Ankara’s own roles by praising its political heritage: ‘we have also chosen the
path of great Ataturk, and we will not renounce it.’497
Those comments probably reinforced Ankara’s enthusiasm, as President Özal
then called for more linkages between Turkey and Central Asia when organizing in
November the first summit of ‘Turkic-Speaking’ countries. More importantly, he staked
a high level of his own public credibility in the opening speech, as he laid down an
ambitious agenda, comprising cultural, political and economic integration; future joint
regulation; the implementation of a development bank; and the breaking down of walls
separating the two regions.498 He then concluded with even more optimism by stating
that ‘if we can exploit this historic opportunity in the best possible way, if we do not
make any mistakes, the 21st century will be the century of the Turks.’ 499
The speech reveals perhaps one of the first clear instances of role
incompatibility between Presidents Özal and Karimov. The latter had predicated his
roles on a type of bland technocracy that effectively appealed for de-ideologized
relationships (see Chapter III). This meant, therefore, that cultural affinities and
schemes beyond the economical were not coherent with his overall public message.
President Özal was thus actually contradicting President Karimov’s gradual appeals for
genuine independence, in that he called for a time when borders no longer existed. It is
495
‘Karimov Turkey is a point of Reference – Ties with Russia Immutable’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 3 September 1992.
496
‘Uzbekistan President Visits Bursa; Praises Turkey as a model to be followed’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 2 July 1992.
497
Ibid.
498
‘Özal Welcomes Fellow Presidents “21st Century will be the Century of the Turks”’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 2 November 1992.
499
Ibid.
163
also important to be aware that Uzbekistan’s leader had, at the time, hinged a lot of his
public credibility on protecting economic stability through a monetary union with
Russia (see Chapters III and IV).
It should then not have come as a surprise the rather unenthusiastic appraisal
given by President Karimov, as he barely mentioned political and cultural integration
and focused just on the economic dimension.500 Evidently, the statement did little to
reinforce Turkey’s Ottomanist role, although Mr Karimov conceded that ‘the Uzbek
people had never forgotten the economic and spiritual aided extended by Turkey’. 501
The relationship, nonetheless, progressed and both parties continued augmenting their
prestige. After President Karimov’s trips to Turkey, it was Mr Özal’s turn to visit
Uzbekistan in April 1993, the first stop in his journey to the region. Once in Uzbekistan,
Turkey’s President argued that: ‘we shall always be with our Uzbek brothers at all times
(…) [and that] relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan, a powerful Central Asian
state, are successfully developing to the mutual benefit of the two nations.’ 502
Recognizing the power of Uzbekistan bolstered President Karimov’s role of defender of
equality and a protector of Uzbekistan’s image. Uzbekistan’s leader thus thanked
Turkey’s President for the visit to his ‘ancestral homeland’.503 Thereafter, during a state
dinner, President Özal highlighted that ‘Uzbekistan is also experiencing the difficulties
involved in moving to democracy and a market economy following the collapse of
communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (…) these difficulties can be
overcome by unity, patience and a lot of work, adding that Turkey is offering its
experience in making this transition period easier for Uzbekistan.’504 The latter
statement hints at paternalism and could also be regarded as a rather blatant denial of
equality. Nevertheless, President Karimov admitted that their bilateral relations were
‘eternal’ and then focused mainly on the need for greater economic investment.505
VII.2. The first setback: 1994
Other than Russia, Turkey was perhaps the state at the time with the strongest ties to
Central Asia and, therefore, a likely candidate for receiving Uzbekistani political
refugees. This would lead to problems in the bilateral relationship seeing as it
questioned President Karimov’s undisputed authority. As far as Ankara was also
500
‘Report on News Conference by Kazakh and Uzbek Presidents’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2
November 1992.
501
Ibid.
502
Italics added, ‘Turkish President appraises Future ties with Uzbekistan’ TASS, 5 April 1993.
503
Ibid.
504
‘Turkish President in Uzbekistan: Condemns Armenian “Incursion” into Azerbajijan’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 7 April 1993.
505
Ibid.
164
concerned, the situation was not easy to resolve, for its western orientation meant that
it could not avoid the rights of asylum seekers.
Muhammad Solih and pan-Turkic aspirations
The leader of Uzbekistan’s Erk (freedom) party, Salay Madaminov - known usually by
his pseudonym Muhammad Solih - was detained under house arrest on April 1993
(Cordahi 1993). He managed to escape soon after, though, and cross over into Turkey.
Once in Istanbul, Mr Solih finished an important work entitled ‘Toward Happier Days’,
which was eventually smuggled into Uzbekistan (Deibler 1996: 33).
Once a major opposition spokesman was abroad, the bilateral relationship was
put to the test. In the early months of 1994, President Karimov attended a breakfast
hosted by Turkey in Davos to discuss a potential oil pipeline project.506 A press report
then deliberated that Uzbekistan’s President had requested Turkey’s newly elected
President, Süleyman Demirel, to extradite Mr Solih (Tütüncü 2002: 20), although the
content of the conversation was not revealed.
After the talk, it seems that no action was taken by Turkey and so the setting
was conducive to inter-role conflict. President Karimov too quick action and recalled
his Ambassador in February 1994. 507 For Ankara the situation was complex given that
Mr Solih represented more than just an asylum seeker. Erk (and also Birlik) was
sympathetic to the ‘Turkestan People’s Movement’ of Uzbekistan (Fierman 1997: 381)
and other pan-Turkic ideals. Subsequently, there was a degree of role compatibility
between Ankara and Mr Solih as both had hedged their public credibility on converging
Ottomanist roles. In fact, Solih’s work did not go unnoticed in Turkey and was
translated by Șuayip Karakaş, a professor of Turkish and Turkic languages, at
Erzurum’s Atatürk University.
Public awareness was on the rise and President Karimov took more action by
banning the distribution of the newspaper Zaman and restricting the Gülen
movement’s activities in Uzbekistan (the nature of the Fetullah Gülen’s movement and
its message will be made clearer below).508 Thereafter, elements of the Turkish media
made their first public condemnation of President Karimov (Tütüncü 2002: 21).
Moreover, repression increased. In the summer of 1994, reports indicated that leading
506
‘Demirel and Cetin discuss oil pipeline project with Central Asia leaders’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 1 February 1994.
507
For references to growing inter-role conflict at the time, see ‘Uzbekistan President Arrives for an
Official Visit’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 June 1994.
508
Bill Park (2007: 54) acknowledges that the intention behind the decisions remains unclear (whether to
prevent Turkey from harbouring Uzbekistani opposition, or to curb Gülen’s movement’s activities in
Uzbekistan). Regardless of the motivation, though, the acts demonstrate a strong public grievance against
the group’s activities.
165
Erk activists were kidnapped from Almaty.509 Indeed, many of those individuals were
actually apprehended and brought to Tashkent for what became known as the Erk
party trial (Melvin 2000: 36).
Managing reconciliation
In May 1994, Turkey’s foreign minister visited Tashkent and declared that trade
between the two countries had not risen sufficiently.510 The focus on economics (at least
publicly) corresponded to President Karimov’s technocratic roles. Ankara also
acknowledged the importance of energy in the region and the need for arranging
alternative trade routes to bypass Iran and Russia (Mater 1994), all of which were
compatible with President Karimov’s role of bridging to other markets.
After the crisis, rapprochement seemed on its way. President Karimov visited
Turkey in June, and the visit was dominated by technocratic issues such as trade,
rather than on political and cultural integration. At the meeting, Prime Minister Tansu
Çiller underlined Turkey’s interests in Uzbekistan and that ‘these relations are carried
out based on the principles of equality, non-interference in domestic affairs, and
mutual interest, love and respect.’511 Later, however, during a state dinner, President
Demirel confessed that he wished to increase the cultural connection between the two
countries, but President Karimov barely responded to this appeal and, instead, focused
on economic issues and investment opportunities.512
The encounters allowed Uzbekistan’s leader to extol his technocratic claims
after the 1994 bilateral crisis and mitigate the Ottomanist and pan-Turkic roles that
had been on the rise after 1991.513 Turkey’s government seems to have conceded to
President Karimov’s undisputed authority by requesting Mr Solih to abandon the
country in the fall of 1994. Subsequently, President Karimov participated in the second
Turkic States summit in October 1994. The event was then marked by a slight
adjustment in Turkish rhetoric, which renounced discourses of cultural affinity and
focused mainly on enhancing economic cooperation.514
509
See ‘“Disappearance”’ Amnesty International, 8 July 1993, available at:
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR62/019/1994/es/dd7a8481-ebfd-11dd-9b3b8bf635492364/eur620191994en.html, accessed November 2012.
510
‘Turkish foreign minister holds talks with Turkmen and Uzbek leaders’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 3 May 1994.
511
‘Uzbek president on official visit to Turkey’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 June 1994.
512
Ibid.
513
Ibid.
514
‘“turkic states’” summit; President Demirel addresses summit participants’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 20 October 1994.
166
VII.3. An increasingly difficult relationship: 1995-1996
In the mid-1990s, President Karimov’s rhetoric gradually concentrated on protecting
stability and securing Uzbekistan’s genuine independence (partially as a response to
the civil wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan- see Chapter III). Change, though, was
more visible in Turkey. Following the success in municipal elections of March 1994, the
pro-Islamic Welfare Party (WP) received 21.1% of the national vote in December 1995
and formed a coalition government with Ms Çiller’s True Path Party (TPP). Hakan
Yavuz (1997: 63), for example, highlighted that this event marked a significant ‘turningpoint in the history of the Turkish Republic’ seeing that, in June 1996, it had for the
first time a Prime Minister whose ideological platform was guided by Turkey’s Islamic
heritage.
The shift in Turkey’s politics impacted the bilateral relationship. If President
Karimov had already shown discord regarding Turkey’s Ottomanist roles, Islamic
rhetoric in Ankara was an even greater compromise to his role of de-ideologized leader,
particularly because Central Asia faced the spread of a potentially extreme
interpretation of Islam (see Chapter III for more on the IMU).
Incompatibility over (a)political relationships
Before the rise of the WP, President Karimov’s relationship with Turkey was also not at
a high point. In April 1995, Uzbekistan’s paper Narodnoye Slovo reported the story of
an individual accused at the Erk trial, who he confessed he had sent a number of fellow
comrades to Turkey.515 Ankara, therefore, was increasingly portrayed as a harbour of
political opposition, thereby affecting President Karimov’s credibility as Uzbekistan’s
undisputed authority.
After the trial and some bilateral rapprochement in 1995, a degree of stability
returned to the relationship, due to an adjustment in the public approaches taken by
the Turkish government. For example, in July 1995, Turkish Prime Minister Çiller
visited Uzbekistan and signed a memorandum for enhancing economic cooperation. Ms
Çiller, who was Turkey’s first female prime minister, argued that ‘our main goal is to
develop our relations with the brotherly countries in every field on the basis of mutual
goodwill and benefits and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.’516
Prime Minister Çiller’s rhetoric was thus fully compatible with President
Karimov’s role of developer of Uzbekistan. Yet, rapprochement was still not underway.
515
516
‘Uzbek paper criticizes Erk opposition figures’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 April 1995.
‘Turkey boosts ties with Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse – English, 10 July 1995.
167
In August 1995, during the third Turkic summit, news reports highlighted that
President Karimov threatened to not participate in upcoming Turkic conferences if they
did not to avoid politicized issues. He was thus referring to some comments made by
President Demirel, who had alluded to the Turkish-Cypriot predicament.517 As a
response, Uzbekistan’s President was quoted defending that ‘economic cooperation
should be developed in the Framework of Central Asian nations’518 - a further stab to
Ankara’s Ottomanist roles.
Explicit dislike for Turkey’s new government
Ankara’s own domestic situation was also not conducive to enhancing role
compatibility. When Necmettin Erbakan of the WP became Prime Minister, President
Karimov remonstrated against the path toward which Turkish politics was heading: ‘we
[Uzbekistan’s government] have established extremely good relations with President
Demirel, with Madam Çiller, and there are many other people. I'm not going to name
all of them I do not know Mr Ebercan [sic]. I am not acquainted with him (…) But I
must tell you that I have negative attitude to the ideology of this party. And I believe
that today Turkey is in a kind of transitional period.’519 The statement was reproduced
in the Turkish press, although President Karimov cautioned that Ankara’s secularism
and connection to the West could not be shaken: ‘it is impossible to turn Turkey away
from the path of cooperation with the United States and Europe’ (Akinci 1996).
The rise of the WP and its traditionalist message also induced role conflict
within Turkey, resulting in mixed cues for Uzbekistani leadership. Indeed, just a few
hours before leaving for another Turkic summit in Tashkent, President Demirel met
with Mr Erbakan to mitigate the rising friction between the two parties.520 These
antagonisms grew, in part, due to Mr Erbakan’s new approach. Indeed, Turkey’s new
Prime Minister confessed that he hoped to create an economic community of Islamic
states and then made Iran his first official visit (Winrow 2001: 202; Liel 2001). A few
months later his newly formed government took the unprecedented step to support a
517
‘Turkic summit, shunning political integration, backs trade links’ Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 28 August
1995.
518
‘Karimov unsure about effectiveness of Turkic economic cooperation’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 29 August 1995.
519
‘Remarks by Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan regarding his country’s investment potential’
Federal News Service, 26 June 1996.
520
‘Erbakan breaks the ice with Demirel, asserts new image’ Turkish Daily News, 21 October 1996,
available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erbakan-breaks-the-ice-with-demirel-asserts-newimage.aspx?pageID=438&n=erbakan-breaks-the-ice-with-demirel-asserts-new-image-1996-10-21,
accessed October 2012.
168
Libyan resolution to the UN, which had been explicitly rejected by Uzbekistan’s
government and also the United States and Israel.521
VII.4. Growing friction: 1997-1998
The rise of political Islam instigated role incompatibility. The ‘transition’ phase of
Turkish politics, as Uzbekistan’s leader had coined it, meant that Turkey’s path was
uncertain and thus hardly congruent with President Karimov’s roles of protecting
stability and fomenting technocracy. Ankara’s internal debate over its future in the
region reverberated into Central Asia and eventually looped back into Turkey as
President Karimov strongly condemned a number of incidents.
Signs of a deteriorating relationship: Turkey’s Sincan crisis
In January 1997, President Karimov’s government decreed a law forbidding parties
based on religion and ethnicity (Melvin 2000: 34). Turkish politics, in contrast, were
facing an increase of religious rhetoric in the public sphere. The ideas proclaimed by
Prime Minister Erbakan augmented the friction between him and the strongly secular
National Security Council, which meant that the lack of internal stability and
technocratic rhetoric barely converged with President Karimov’s roles (Gozaydin
2009). However, Turkey’s intra-role conflict quickly escalated, leading to a ‘Kemalist
restoration’ in February 1997. Turkish armed forces stormed the city of Sincan, where a
conference hosted by the local mayor was attended by both Prime Minister Erbakan
and the Iranian Ambassador (Zurcher 2004: 300). Mr Erbakan had, at the time,
delivered a speech with some Islamic innuendos and thus faced the full pressure of
Turkey’s secular armed forces. He was cornered and eventually resigned from his office
in June. As further reprisal, the WP was also banned in the following year.
Tashkent responded to these incidents by recalling around 2000 students from
Turkey in August 1997. President Karimov explained that his decision resulted from the
path Turkish politics was heading toward: ‘it is incomprehensible why Turkey,
established by (Kemal) Ataturk, has allowed clerics to come to power. We considered
your secular country to be a model. You have shocked us [sic].’522
521
‘Turkey supports Libyan UN resolution’ Turkish Daily News, 30 November 1996, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
522
‘Students recalled from Turkey over fears of Islamic influence’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
27 August 1997.
169
Ankara attempts to reassure President Karimov
Ankara’s intra-role conflict was colliding with some of President Karimov’s major roles
and leading to bilateral role conflict. However, after the Sincan coup, Ankara’s
government responded by boosting its Kemalist roles. Following a 1997 summit,
Presidents Karimov and Demirel discussed economic relations. Turkey’s head of state
defended that the relationship was intimate and facing a significant increase in trade.
Evidently, another adjustment toward technocratic rhetoric fostered role compatibility
and the Turkish Defence Minister travelled to Uzbekistan in January 1998.523
The greatest attempt at galvanizing the relationship, however, was made in the
following April during Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz’s visit to Uzbekistan. Before
travelling to Tashkent, Turkey’s Prime Minister underlined that ‘currently our political
relations (…) are perfect. But at the same time, I believe that we should spend greater
efforts to improve the economic and commercial ties between our nations.’524 Ankara
was, therefore, expounding the type of technocratic roles that had been on the rise
before Prime Minister Erbakan’s elections. Hence, the two sides were able to meet and
sign several agreements.525 Accordingly, during a long press conference, President
Karimov acknowledged the efforts that were being made and so paid homage to
Turkey’s secularism: ‘I am a follower of Ataturk. If Ataturk's legacy encounters any
threat in Turkey, we will feel the same danger in Uzbekistan. We endorse the Turkish
government's attitude towards fundamentalism. Turkey's policies have always been a
guide for Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian states.’526
Prime Minister Yilmaz responded to Mr Karimov’s homage by highlighting that
the relationship had improved considerably after Mr Erbakan’s resignation: ‘Turkey
took an array of measures to prevent the resurrection of fundamentalism. Our
government is determined to continue the anti-fundamentalist struggle within the
principles of democracy and respect for people's religious freedom.’527
A small period of increased cooperation
The gradual public convergence between the two governments would then be put to a
test in June at another Turkic summit meeting. President Demirel declared that the
523
‘Uzbekistan Defence Minister makes high level visits in Ankara’ Turkish Daily News, 6 January 1998
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ , accessed September 2012.
524
‘PM Yilmaz seeks to boost ties with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan’ Turkish Daily News, 13 April 1998,
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
525
‘Uzbek-Turkish Cooperation Documents Signed’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 April 1998.
526
‘Turkey, Uzbekistan boost ties with four bilateral agreements’ Turkish Daily News, 14 April 1998,
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
527
Ibid.
170
fifth summit would reinforce Turkic solidarity and make the next century a ‘turkic
century’.528 Moreover, he confessed that these meetings would eventually allow for
implementing a new silk road.529 Still, President Karimov continued publicly conveying
some doubts about the advantages of the summits which continued evincing a number
of pan-Turkic roles. He once more iterated that he was against them being used for
political agendas and underlined that nationalistic sympathies had to be downplayed,
especially for China’s Uyghur community. Alternatively, he proposed that the goal was
to seek ‘improving economic relations’.530 Incidentally, these declarations were not
welcomed by all in Ankara, as the deputy leader of Turkey’s Great Unity Party
lambasted
against
Ankara
not
defending
the
world’s
marginalized
Turkic
communities.531
Yet, compared to the tense period of the mid 1990s, cooperation seemed to be
on the horizon as a number of Turkish investments in Uzbekistan were soon underlined
by the press.532 Moreover, Turkey assumed an important stake in constructing the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in the following months (connecting Turkey, Azerbaijan and
Georgia). The consortium was signed in Ankara, with the presence and support of
President Karimov, given that it corresponded to his role of bridge to other markets
(for more on the Ankara pipeline scheme and its American support, see Chapter V). It
would seem that Turkey’s regional prestige was at its peak and so the State Minister,
Ahat Andican, stressed the importance of implementing a multidimensional policy
focused on business and transport in the Caucasus and Central Asia.533 By the end of
1998, everything would suggest less friction and increased role compatibility.
528
‘Turkic leaders meet in new Kazakh Capital’ Turkish Daily News, 10 June 1998, available at
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkic-leaders-meet-in-new-kazakhcapital.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkic-leaders-meet-in-new-kazakh-capital-1998-06-10, accessed
September 2012.
529
‘Turkey’s trade with Turkic Countries Exceeds $2 BLN in 1997’ Interfax, 9 June 1998.
530
‘Uzbek leader warns helping Uighurs could upset relations with China’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 12 June 1998.
531
Ibid.
532
‘Uzbekistan, Turkey to produce buses and trucks’ Turkish Daily News, 12 June 1998, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012; and ‘Arcelik to produce refrigerators in
Uzbekistan’ Turkish Daily News, 3 September 1998, available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/,
accessed October 2012.
533
‘State Minister Andican stresses multidimensional economic policy’ Turkish Daily News, 19
November 1998, available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
171
VII.5. The attempt on President Karimov’s life 1999-2000
The attacks of 16 February 1999 are the singular most important events in Uzbekistan’s
recent history after the Andijan Crisis.534 Six bombs exploded in Tashkent, ‘killing
sixteen people and injuring more than one hundred. The attack, which targeted key
government buildings, called the stability of the nation into question for the first time’
(Polat & Butkevich 2000: 541). The event affected President Karimov’s public
credibility, specifically his capacity to instil stability and remain an undisputed
authority.
The severity of the attack was then followed by an equally powerful response by
the government in Tashkent. Repression increased substantially and President
Karimov soon demanded the full support of his closest international partners. The
event thus had repercussions for the bilateral relationship, given Ankara’s ambiguous
support for Muhammad Solih.
The bombings and Turkey’s first demonstration of support
After the bombings, President Karimov depicted the events at a press conference,
where he described those killed, the explosions, the gunfights and the perpetrators.535
Then, in March, the press underlined that one of the potential instigators had been
apprehended in Turkey.536 Ankara was therefore put on the spot, even more so in midMarch, when President Demirel travelled to Uzbekistan. Originally, the trip was
designed to galvanize trade and supervise some of Turkey’s investments in
Samarkand.537 However, with the attacks questioning the credibility of President
Karimov’s undisputed authority and the regime’s stability, the relevant issue-areas
rapidly changed.
Before the arrival of Turkey’s head of state, President Karimov confessed to the
press that he had urged Interpol to extradite Mr Solih from Turkey, whom he accused
of meeting Tohir Yo’ldosh (one of the leaders of the IMU). Uzbekistan’s President
argued that Mr Solih ‘has sunk to the point of dealing with fanatics with whose support
534
The event is still to the present day shown on Uzbekistani TV as a reminder of its significance. Also, a
quick visit to the Museum of the History of Uzbekistan in Tashkent reveals a whole section dedicated to
the terrorist attacks.
535
‘Uzbekistan’s President Survives Assassination Attempt’ Hurriyet, 17 February 1999, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed August 2012.
536
‘Suspect involved in plot against Uzbek President Captured in Turkey’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4
March 1999.
537
‘Turkish, Uzbek presidents to discuss Islamic fundamentalism’ Hurriyet, 16 March 1999, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012.
172
he intends to become president and to make Yuldash his military minister [sic].’ 538
Reports at the time also suggested that Mr Solih had instructed some men to travel
with him to Turkey for bodyguard training, which, coupled with the fact that he was an
acquaintance of Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, the former President of Chechnya, increased
speculation regarding whether he had actually been involved in the February attacks
(Polat & Butkevich 2000: 548).
At the press conference that followed, President Karimov voiced strong public
support for Turkey, calling his counterpart an ‘elder brother’ whose support he was
thankful for in an ‘unstable and changeable world.’ He then went on to describe the
assailants, accusing both Mr Yo’ldosh and Mr Solih.539 Curiously, a BBC reporter then
asked the Turkish President if Mr Solih was still on Turkish soil, to which President
Demirel responded affirmatively.540 Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s leader cautioned that
his country was still compiling a case against Muhammad Solih and that it was difficult
for Ankara to extradite an individual specialized in illegal travel. He argued additionally
that Uzbekistan’s government had not yet appealed to Turkish authorities, but that ‘on
the contrary, I would like to thank the Turkish president, Mr Demirel, for his
condolences he expressed to our government and people and for his readiness to render
a help to fight a common enemy, a common evil - which is currently an evil for the
whole world – terrorism.’541 It would seem that President Karimov refused to put his
counterpart on the spot, even though he hinted that he was expecting full cooperation.
Crisis in the relationship
In spite of
Turkey’s
symbolic
show of
support and President Karimov’s
acknowledgement, the actions that followed evinced role conflict rather than
compatibility. This became more apparent when Tashkent closed twenty Turkish
schools in the country, most of them connected to the Gülen movement. It is important
to bear in mind that Ankara, too, had played a part in discrediting the Gülen
movement’s activities, given that, after Prime Minister Erbakan’s resignation, Mr Gülen
was targeted for trial by Turkey’s secular establishment, which forced him to seek exile
in the United States (Krespin-Sharon 2009: 52).542 So, given Turkey’s own intra-role
538
‘Uzbekistan urges Interpol to hep track down terrorists’ Interfax Russian News, 15 March 1999.
‘Uzbek and Turkish Presidents Give Press Conference: Full Version’ BBC Monitoring Central Asia,
18 March 1999.
540
Ibid.
541
Ibid.
542
In fact, Mr Gülen was indicted for a crime in absentia by the Turkish judiciary in 2000.
539
173
conflict, between rigid secularism and renewed political Islam, it is not a surprise that
the movement’s schools were targeted specifically by President Karimov.543
Due to the complicated context, the Turkish press surmised that Tashkent’s
actions were provoked by Ankara’s delay in extraditing the two suspects. Indeed, the
hold-up seems to have been instigated by the fact that they had appealed to the
European Court of Human Rights.544 Kiev, in contrast, showed complete solidarity and
quickly extradited three Uzbekistani citizens, along with the brother of Mr Solih, to
Uzbekistan in the middle of March. Furthermore, it quickly became public knowledge
that Mr Solih left Turkey in April and was allowed to stay in Norway.545
For Ankara, the rise in the intra-role conflict reflected that it would have to
compromise between pro-western and pan-Turkic roles, especially because the
extradition would be subject to a court hearing in the European Court of Human
Rights.546 The situation also reverberated in the Turkish press as many diplomats,
academics and politicians expressed their opinions on how to solve the predicament.547
President Karimov, however, continued strengthening his role of undisputed
authority. Having now staked his credibility in opposing Turkish, or even Islamic
encroachment, he refused to attend the April 2000 Turkic summit in Baku,548
prompting reflection within Turkey. The media especially contemplated whether
Turkey had in fact ‘Missed the bus in Central Asia?’ (Cevik 2000), and if a new
approach was needed.549
543
It is also relevant to acknowledge that, aside from the rumours circulating around the movement, Mr
Gülen was opposed to the ‘iranization of society’ and endorsed a more complex message than what was
portrayed by Turkey’s secular establishment (Park 2007: 9). Mr Gülen had actually been in favour of the
1980 secular coup in Turkey, as well as for the resignation of the WP’s chairman in 1997. However,
debate regarding the nature of the movement is still pervasive in both public and academic circles. See,
for example, Rachel Krespin-Sharon’s (2009) particularly negative depiction of the movement and Greg
Barton’s (2009) different interpretation. Even in 2011, speculation came out as to whether Gülen’s
actions in Central Asia were supported by American intelligence services. See ‘Gülen, the CIA's favourite
Imam; United States/CENTRAL ASIA’ Intelligence Online, 6 January 2011.
544
‘Uzbek court sentences six dissidents to death’ Turkish Daily News, 29 June 1996, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
545
For more on Mr Solih’s departure, see ‘Salikh asks for political asylum in Czech Republic - Lawyer’
in Coşkunarslan, H. (ed) (2006: 49), The Opponent (Istanbul, Komen Publications).
546
Turkey eventually extradited Uzbek political activists, which then led to a long judicial case in the
European court, lasting until 2004. For more on this story, see the article: ‘European court rehears Uzbek
deportation case’ Turkish Daily News, 18 March 2004, available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/,
accessed September 2012.
547
‘Uzbeks' mistrust of Turkey creates diplomatic tension’ Turkish Daily News, 17 June 1999, available
via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
548
‘President pleased with summit’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 10 April 2000.
549
See the reports of Ilter (2000) and Bagci (2000). Also Prime Minister Ecevit was reported to have met
with Uzbekistan’s ambassador in June 1999, where he confessed that Tashkent’s mistrust was baseless.
See the following reports: ‘PM Ecevit: Uzbek mistrust baseless’ Turkish Daily News, 22 June 1999,
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
174
The situation, therefore, did not improve and controversy enveloped throughout
the year. In effect, the wave of political repression in Uzbekistan continued550 and
another scandal erupted when some of those implicated in the February bombings
confessed in June that former Prime Minister Erbakan had provided them with
assistance.551 Ankara did, however, in the end, cooperate with Tashkent and extradited
the suspects to Uzbekistan.
Ankara’s renewed attempt at rapprochement
As controversy around the 1999 attacks continued, Ankara – and, in particular, the
newly-elected President, Ahmet Sezer, - sought rapprochement. The establishment,
therefore, did not relinquish its public pan-Turkic sympathies and Ottomanist
aspirations (perhaps in order to counteract the rise of controversial of political Islam).
Accordingly, news reports in September detailed that Turkey’s Foreign Minister and
also President Sezer met with President Karimov in the United Nations.552 Uzbekistan’s
leadership confirmed the meetings during a TV report a few days later by stating that
he was now satisfied that Turkey had decided to ‘help to Uzbekistan to guarantee its
independence, security, Uzbek people's peace and stability, and I think that this will
happen for sure.’553
President Karimov thus hinted that Turkey would perhaps need to do more to
support his roles of protector of stability and undisputed authority. Subsequently,
Ankara’s Minister of Interior visited Tashkent in late September 2000 and stated that
Uzbekistani forces were going to be trained in Turkey in order to ensure Uzbekistan’s
stability.554 Then, a few weeks later, it was the turn of Turkey’s Foreign Minister to visit
Uzbekistan, soon followed by Mr Sezer. It would seem that solidarity was being
highlighted in the public sphere, insofar as President Karimov’s prestige roles were all
bolstered after the controversial attacks. 555 If Ankara had hesitated in the spring of
1999, its press now underlined that the relationship was entering a new phase, which
550
See for example: ‘Uzbeks purge Muslims from academia’ Turkish Daily News, 22 October 1999.
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
551
‘Uzbek dissidents claim Erbakan helped them’ Turkish Daily News, 7 July 1999, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012.
552
See ‘Cem to meet Turkic-speaking countries' foreign ministers in New York’ Turkish Daily News, 8
September 2000, available via hhttp://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012; and
‘President Sezer to Visit Uzbekistan in October’ Turkish Daily News, 16 September 2000, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012.
553
Ibid.
554
‘Uzbek forces to be trained in Turkey’ Turkish Daily News, 19 September 2000, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
555
On Ankara’s support, see for instance ‘Full support from Turkey to Uzbekistan in fight against
terrorism’ Turkish Daily News, 3 October 2000, available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/,
accessed September 2012.
175
was focused more on assuring mutual security.556 Still, it is important to note that
President Karimov refused to participate in the April 2001 Turkic Summit in Ankara.557
Tashkent was perhaps no longer endorsing these conferences, where Turkey’s leading
status was frequently emphasized. Bilateral contacts, though, did decrease in the shortrun as a number of bilateral military agreements were signed throughout 2002.558
Much like with Berlin and Washington (see Chapters V and VI), discretion was the new
approach, increasing speculation on the consequences of the new way of engaging with
Central Asia (e.g. Meixler 2001).
VII.6. A Relationship that never (re)ignited: 2001-2010
In spite of a strong show of support in 2000, the number of high-level public visits
between Uzbekistani and Turkish authorities decreased substantially after 2002. It
would seem that President Karimov no longer compromised on equality by playing up
to Turkey’s leadership aspirations and Ottomanist roles. On the other hand, Ankara’s
political environment changed with the rise of the Justice and Welfare Party (AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). The AKP was, at its core, a modern Islamist party that
pursued acceptance in the West, which contrasted somewhat with its more idealistic
WP predecessor. As such, by subsiding Ottomanist aspirations, and also being more
open to Turkey’s Islamic and traditional heritage, Ankara barely converged with the
strong secular and technocratic roles of President Karimov. Additionally, Turkish
politics faced a rise in intra-role conflict that hardly fostered an image of stability in the
public sphere. For instance, Turkey’s armed forces continued acting as secular
guardians when they executed an ‘e-coup’ in April 2007, by threatening to take
measures against the AKP through their online website (Taspinar 2007: 114).
AKP and the first contacts
In November 2002, AKP won the parliamentarian elections and formed a new
government. Recep Erdoğan became Prime Minister and completed his rise to power,
even though he remained highly controversial. Indeed, he originally had a judicial case
opened against him due to some nuanced Islamic remarks he made when Mr Erbakan’s
WP was banned (Zurcher 2004: 300-204).
556
‘A New Chapter in Turco-Uzbek Relations’ Hurriyet, 8 October 2000, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012.
557
‘Turkey and Uzbekistan to discuss trade’ Turkish Daily News, 17 April 2001, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012.
558
‘Kivrikoglu visits Uzbekistan; signs deal for military assistance’ Turkish Daily News, 19 March 2002.
176
On a bilateral level, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister travelled to Ankara in
October 2003, where he met with Mr Erdoğan. The economical dimension of the trip
was highlighted as the two parties travelled with a large entourage of businessmen.559
Ankara’s approach still remained discrete and focused on stability which, therefore, did
not contradict President Karimov’s role set. Indeed, before Mr Erdoğan’s visit to
Uzbekistan, he donated a number of military vehicles to Uzbekistan’s army.560 On
arrival, the Turkish Prime Minister also evinced a degree of continuity by declaring that
‘we appreciate the solidarity that Uzbekistan displays with the international community
in the fight against terrorism. In light of this, we deem cooperation in military and
security fields to be very important and we are determined to develop cooperation in
these fields.’561 It is important to be aware that, at that time, Tashkent was under the
spotlight of the global fight against terror. So, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement
further reinforced Mr Karimov’s prestige.
The Impact of the Andijan Crisis
The encounters in 2003 did not, however, materialize into any sort of increased
cooperation between Tashkent and Ankara. The latter progressively turned itself
toward Europe and downplayed Ottomanist roles. Still, the Turkish foreign ministry
did publicly support its ‘brotherly’ counterpart, such as in March 2004, after Tashkent
was forced to deal with terrorist attacks.562
Later, the Andijan crisis of May 2005 sparked internal debate in Turkey, much
like the 1999 crisis. Following those tragic events, President Abdullah Gül of Turkey
conveyed a mixed message; condemning, on the one hand, the use of force by
protestors and, on the other, calling for greater moderation: ‘we think that the security
forces of the Uzbekistan government, reacting with common sense and demonstrating
moderation towards demonstrators and the civilian population, will avoid further
bloodshed in the region.’563 Ankara, therefore, cautiously placed itself in the middle
ground; distancing itself from some of the West’s incisive condemnation, yet hardly
providing the level of support shown by Moscow and Beijing.
559
‘Uzbek foreign minister in Ankara to discuss ties’ Hurriyet, 28 October 2003, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ , accessed September 2012.
560
‘TSK donates military vehicles to Uzbek Army’ Cihan News Agency, 3 December 2003, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ , accessed September 2012.
561
‘Turkey, Uzbekistan to boost security, trade cooperation’ Turkish Daily News, 20 December 2003,
available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed September 2012.
562
‘Turkey denounces Uzbek attacks’ Turkish Daily News, 31 March 2004, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012.
563
‘Britain slams rights abuse, Turkey and OSCE urge restraint in Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse –
English, 15 May 2005.
177
It is important to be aware that Turkey could not fully avoid being connected to
the Andijan events, even if very tenuously. It seems that the Andijan crisis was
instigated by a relatively unknown conservative organization, Akrimaya, whose
members, at time, were unfairly arrested by the local governor. Reports also stated that
the Akrimaya network was inspired by Said Nurci, a Turkish Islamic thinker, who had
also influenced the Fetullah Gülen movement.564
Meanwhile, intra-role conflict was sparked in Turkey as parliamentarians
contested President Gül’s statement about the Andijan crisis. Curiously, some AKP
deputies were unsatisfied with the silence that their President had adopted after his
statement and appealed for stronger condemnation.565 The opposition, though, was also
not consensual, as some proposed supporting President Karimov’s government.566
Consequently, in the months that followed, the press and various renowned Turkish
officials debated whether or not Turkey was still losing its ground in Central Asia.567
The debate in the public sphere led to discontinuity, in that it instigated Prime
Minister Erdoğan to organize a new Turkic Summit in Antalya in 2006. However, once
more, President Karimov refused to attend. Besides role incompatibilities between the
AKP and Mr Karimov, it also seems clear that Tashkent remained concerned with
protecting stability as it was probably unconvinced of the political climate in Turkey.
This would then clarify why, in 2007, a number of Uzbekistani citizens were prevented
from attending a seminar in Turkey.568
Turkey’s Ottomanist roles reborn and President Karimov’s disinterest
Following his inability to lure Uzbekistani leadership to the 2006 summit, President
Gül declared, in late 2007, that he was aiming to revive Turkey’s relationship with the
countries in the region.569 Bilaterally, however, both sides demonstrated compatibility
on technocratic issues, as a number of business and aid agreements were developed
between 2008 and 2010.570 So, like with Moscow in the 1990s (see Chapter IV), it
564
See for example Alisher Ilkhamov’s (2005b) piece on the Akrimaya.
‘Turkish ruling party MPs criticize government's silence on Uzbekistan’ BBC Monitoring Europe Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 May 2005.
566
Ibid.
567
See for example the following references: ‘Turkey loses track in Central Asia’ Turkish Daily News, 22
May 2005, available via http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012; Arslan (2005).
568
‘Uzbek activists prevented from attending seminar in Turkey’ The Times of Central Asia, 30 January
2007.
569
‘Gül to revive relations with Central Asia’ Turkish Daily News, 19 November 2007, available via
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/, accessed October 2012.
570
See the following cases documented in the press: ‘Turkey's SIS to invest $141 mln in modernization of
Uzbek textile mill’ Russia & CIS Business and Financial Newswire, 17 April 2008; ‘Turkish Health
Minister to Visit Uzbekistan’ Anadolu Agency, 2 December 2009; ‘Türk isadamlari yarin Taskent'te
565
178
would appear that Tashkent would not endorse multilateral schemes that diluted its
political equality.
Moreover, Tashkent continued protecting stability and showed little tolerance
toward several religious or quasi-religious organizations of Turkish origin. For
instance, in February 2009, Uzbekistan’s court jailed eight individuals considered to be
part of a Turkish Nurchilar or Nurcular movement (inspired by the renowned Turkish
scholar, Said Nurci).571 Thereafter, in March 2010, Uzbekistani security forces again
arrested another forty suspects accused of having ties to a Nurchilar society.572
Given public speculation over AKP’s sympathies with Said Nurci, and even the
Fethullah Gülen movement,573 Turkey’s ruling party continued to be indirectly
implicated in events. Their public agenda very much contrasted with President
Karimov’s roles, which could perhaps explain the political distance arising between
Uzbekistan and Turkey. For example, in August 2010, President Gül appealed for
President Karimov to participate in that year’s Turkic summit,574 which Tashkent again
refused to attend.
In sum, after the role incompatibilities of the 1990s, the relationship never
recovered. Indeed, it is hard to argue that the relationship ever had any particular
moment of strong cooperation. There were of course a few instances of mild role
compatibility, particularly regarding stability and technocracy. Yet, Ankara lacked the
economic power of Berlin and Washington to fully bolster President Karimov’s roles of
developer and mercantilist entrepreneur. These issues led to lack of role congruence,
and eventually little cooperation, as society in Turkey debated the future of Islam and
Ottomanism, which persistently contradicted Tashkent’s appeal for equality and deideologized relations.
toplaniyor’ Cihan News Agency, 14 December 2010; ‘Özbek-Türk Isadamlari Taskent'te bulustu’ Cihan
News Agency, 11 March 2009.
571
‘Uzbek court jails members of Turkish Islamic sect’ UzReport.com, 19 February 2009.
572
‘Uzbekistan: 40 suspected members of banned religious group arrested’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
15 March 2010.
573
See Rachel Krespin-Sharon’s (2009)article for a long narrative linking the AKP to a number of
conspiracy theories around the Fetullah Gülen movement and other organizations inspired by Said Nurci.
574
‘Cumhurbaskani Gül'den Kerimov'a davet’ Cihan News Agency, 30 August 2010.
179
Conclusion
Role theory is one way of depicting interaction in the public sphere and emplotting how
actors cope with challenges to public credibility. Roles are more than just interesting
typologies and allow for identifying, shaping and suggesting probable action in addition
to depicting how several issues beyond national security affect international
relationships.
From 1989 to 2010, the notion of self-reliance persistently captures President
Karimov’s role set, which was centred on seeking genuine independence and defending
Uzbekistan’s international equality. Annette Bohr (1998: 43) had already perceptively
indicated that President Karimov was concerned with assuring national independence
(see Chapter I). Similarly, self-reliance shows that Tashkent’s roles were relatively
consistent, in spite of the friction existing in some important relationships. Indeed,
arguing for self-reliance implies that it is difficult to conceive of alignment - closely
cooperating with a country on security goals (David 1990: 234) – in the ways described
by Fumagalli (2007a) and Aneschi (2010) (see Chapter I).
David’s (1990) characterization of alignment is broad, and so Robert Axelrod
and Robert Keohane’s (1985: 226) classic definition is necessary to understand what is
meant by cooperation: the adjustment of behaviour according to the roles of the other
(see Chapter II). Having understood the two concepts, it is clear by definition that
alignment is more restrictive than cooperation, depending essentially on security and
close interaction. Consequently, all the narratives show that it is hard to deduce
unequivocally whether Uzbekistan’s relationships had a strong security dimension and,
more importantly, if they were ever close. Whereas periods of cooperation were
certainly observed, they could hardly be described as cases of alignment.
As concerns security, President Karimov’s relationships were predicated by
many relevant issue-areas, such as prestige and economic development. At least in the
public sphere, President Karimov manifested that he was hoping to obtain American
foreign investment as well as recognition as an equal partner (see Chapter V). So,
cooperation was certainly possible, but it was not driven by one-dimensional security
goals. Yet, if alignment is understood more as ‘close cooperation’, it is clear that there
was never any great proximity between Tashkent and any single power. President
Karimov increased reformist rhetoric and implemented some liberalizing measures
after signing the 2002 Partnership with the United States, but simultaneously rejected
anything that questioned or weakened his own authority. Similarly, after joining the
CSTO, Uzbekistan’s leader immediately called for combining the organization with
Eurasec (see Chapter IV), thereby contesting multilateralism and Russian influence in
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the same way he had done in the 1990s. Even with Berlin, where inter-role conflict was
less pervasive, compatibility existed only in a few roles, such as developing
Uzbekistan’s economic future and protecting stability, which meant that the two sides
were unable to cooperate fully once Germany sought greater influence in Central Asia
in 2007. From the outset, President Karimov’s roles were hardly conducive to fostering
close relationships of any sort, regardless of some adjustments in action between
Tashkent and other governments.
The narratives also show that public interaction had strong impact on bilateral
relationships, thereby challenging some balancing models and Great Game narratives
(e.g. Aneschi 2010; Smith 2009; Tomé 2007; Fumagalli 2007a; Akbarzadeh 2005;
Berman 2004; Menon 2003; Rashid 2002: 150-182). In other words, predicating
interaction as geopolitical, tactical and rational, rather than as a highly adaptive and
publicly contested process, prompted by unpredictable incidents, ignores important
aspects of Uzbekistan’s relationships. Recalling Matteo Fumagalli’s (2007a) use of
omnibalancing; the scholar assumed strict preferences based on survival that
compelled regimes to balance against both internal and external threats (see Chapter I).
Each narrative herein, in contrast, demonstrates that instead of constantly weighing the
pros and cons, political actors adapted themselves to the situations at hand in order to
keep credibility. As such, there is a lot more to Walter Benjamin’s (1940) ‘here-andnow’ (jetztzeit) than to a linear trend, meaning that relationships evolved according to
how roles cohered at particular moments in time rather than through clear-cut strategic
calculation. As laid out in Chapter IV, for example, Uzbekistan’s relationship with
Russia improved from 2000 to 2007 not because of a deliberate tactic to counterweigh
Washington, but due mainly to Mr Putin’s new approach, which was compatible with
Mr Karimov’s roles. So, even though both concepts – balancing and role compatibility –
depict similar outcomes, their repercussions for understanding the region are highly
dissimilar. Whereas balancing suggests a sort of mechanistic reaction based on
exogenous interests, bilateral roles imply that cooperation and conflict evolve according
to contingencies of a particular public relationship, not necessarily dependent on the
intrinsic interests of both parties.
It is important to emphasize, nevertheless, that the aim is not to make roles
seem all-explanatory. Naturally, given the assumptions made, private issues are left
open to interpretation, such as ideas and the intrinsic motivations that shape intent.
Arguing that roles persisted does not imply that the actions taken were not actually
manipulative, i.e. seeking to obtain something other than what was being publicly
conveyed. For that reason, one cannot ignore that explanations based on
strategic/tactical behaviour reveal other important elements of Uzbekistan’s
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international relations. Public roles leave some questions open given that all the
narratives from Chapters IV to VII disclose at least one moment in time when a
government strategically targeted another’s influence. Even Germany, for example,
counteracted Russia’s growing energy supremacy by putting forward the 2007
European strategy. These instances probably also reveal the circumstances in which the
actual intentions were not congruent with roles. This means that relative gains,
strategic interaction and therewith geopolitics cannot be ignored, as Cooley (2012,
2009) clearly showed. For example, the timings for when Uzbekistan left Eurasec,
coinciding more or less with the removal of EU sanctions, are not fully explained
herein. It is also difficult to ignore that GUAM had a security dimension designed to
offset Russia and so it is likely that President Karimov’s decision to join the
organization was not solely derived from his public role of bridge to other markets, as
indicated in Chapter V. Likewise, Roy Allison (2004: 287-288) argued that one of the
reasons for Moscow’s engagement with Central Asian Republics was to constrain
Uzbekistani influence, which tacitly matches Donald Carlisle’s (1995b: 76-77) thesis
that Tashkent aspired to become a regional leader. This would suggest that the
differences between Moscow and Tashkent over Tajikistan in the 1990s were perhaps
more concerned with leadership issues in Central Asia rather than just the public calls
for defending equality and voicing non-militarism (see Chapter IV).
Yet, in spite of the problem of volition, Uzbekistan’s leader still had to face
credibility problems as friction increased in the public sphere. Regardless of backstage
negotiations or secluded motives, public incompatibility between Russia and
Uzbekistan during the Civil War in Tajikistan galvanized conflict. As the stakes
escalated, the way President Karimov publicly accused Russia of compromising
Uzbekistan’s equality (see Chapter IV) made any sort of public or private compromise
difficult if credibility was not to be hampered. In sum, one cannot ignore how
interaction takes place in the public sphere and its importance to the political process;
otherwise actors would not deliver speeches, appear in press conferences or conduct
interviews. An ideal account, like a thorough biography, would include the public as
well as the private dimension, whereby one could understand the context in which
individuals were compelled to act in a particular way. Roles reveal part of that story,
given that they disclose which issue-areas become prominent and how actors construct
their agenda through past and present interaction, which is perhaps better than
assuming strict preferences for such an opaque regime. The remainder of the
conclusion thus revisits some of the main findings using the language of role theory and
sketches ideas for future research (for the framework of role theory see Chapter II).
182
Role coherence and self-reliance
A relatively stable role set does not mean that public credibility remained unblemished.
President Karimov adopted slightly contradictory roles both during the collapse of the
ruble zone and after the Andijan crisis, which effectively compelled him to legitimate
his actions in the public sphere.
Chapter III revealed that President Karimov invoked a self-reliant role set based
mainly on defending Uzbekistan’s equality and seeking genuine independence. His
other roles can be classified under the relatively flexible group-types of technocracy,
authenticity and prestige, which allowed President Karimov to adapt to discontinuities
over time by gradually reemphasizing his priorities - as suggested by James Rosenau
(1987: 57-72) and Cameron Thies (2009; 2001). Indeed, the paradigms of Sebastian
Harnisch (2012: 56) and George McCall and Jerry Simmons (1966: 95-99) (see Chapter
II) can be adapted to Uzbekistan, as President Karimov coped with credibility problems
by legitimating his actions through changing his commitment from technocracy to
authenticity.
Gradual shifts, however, which were clearly noticeable after 2005, also helped
reveal incoherencies and ambiguities within certain roles. For example, when
defending Uzbekistan’s equality and seeking genuine independence, it is important to
recall that the former is an end and the latter a process. So it is rather unfeasible to call
for their simultaneous fulfilment. In fact, the root for this problem derives from the
ambiguity of defending equality and how it can be appropriated by all three grouptypes.
In President Karimov’s case, the concept of equality includes notions of respect
for sovereignty, cultural authenticity and economic development. However, as
President Karimov progressively switched his commitment from technocracy to
authenticity from 2003, questions are immediately raised: were Uzbekistan’s economic
achievements capable of being generalized to a so-called ‘civilized’ status among the
world’s powers, or was Uzbekistan’s model of development designed to shelter its
culture, preventing it from being compared to others? In other words, would equality
be based on respect for authenticity or on economic technocracy? The question
remained unanswered. Evidently, the conflict also affected the relevance of genuine
independence, i.e. the capacity to become militarily and economically powerful enough
not to depend on others. If authenticity was on the rise, reaching genuine independence
was no longer as important as it had been in the 1990s.
So, the degree of ‘complementarity’ between cultural authenticity and
technocracy allowed for adapting to role discontinuities, but their contradictory nature
183
also enhanced the ambiguity behind specific roles, especially when defending
Uzbekistan’s equality. Obviously it is difficult to argue that any sort of role set can be
perfectly coherent and impervious to inconsistency. President Karimov’s public
message from the start was both flexible and cohesive enough to last for such a long
period. As the times changed, though, it was clear that a degree of change was required
if relationships were not to be affected. Indeed, at the date this thesis is being
concluded, President Karimov is aged seventy-five. Someday Tashkent will have new
leadership, which will inevitably have to reconstruct or reproduce the roles propounded
during President Karimov’s tenure in office. When that happens, the conflict between
Uzbekistani authenticity and pragmatic technocracy will have to be better addressed,
otherwise it will remain unclear. However, imagining that these core issues are
gradually modified, Uzbekistan’s government will most likely cease to be considered
self-reliant. It may either progress toward isolationism, perhaps by bolstering its
authenticity vis à vis the rest of the world, or gradually tilt toward technocracy and
thereby allow for a degree of economic opening.
The impact of roles in bilateral relationships
One of the main reasons for breaking down this thesis into distinct bilateral relations
was to downplay the logic of geopolitics and relative gains (see Introduction and
Chapter I) and demonstrate that each relationship had a story of its own that did not
depend necessarily on what was ensuing with other actors. Overall, the following
summaries of Chapters IV through VII apply role theory’s rich terminology to
summarize the outcomes of each relationship (see Chapter II on role theory).
As concerns Tashkent and Moscow, the narrative’s diachronic dimension
evinces how President Karimov’s roles were constructed and reinforced by interacting
with Moscow. The account also shows reciprocity, in that Uzbekistan’s responses
played a part in influencing Russian leadership. Their relationship began in a
particularly complicated setting, as Mr Gorbachev balanced between keeping the Soviet
Union intact and introducing reform, to which President Karimov responded with
caution. So, in the early 1990s, Uzbekistan’s leader gradually differentiated himself
from pro-democratic rhetoric and to become an undisputed authority, an equal among
others, a technocrat, an expert on economics, a seeker of stability and a defender of
Uzbekistan’s image. Nevertheless, when the Soviet system collapsed, President
Karimov began facing intra-role conflict, in that seeking to be an equal to Russia was
hardly compatible with preserving the economic foundation of the Soviet Union. As this
conflict led to friction between Tashkent and Moscow’s reformers, President Karimov
184
separated formally from Russia after the end of the ruble zone, in 1993, which
reinforced his roles of seeker of genuine independence and defender of Uzbekistani
equality. On the other hand, the Civil Wars in Tajikistan and Afghanistan increased
President Yeltsin’s will to serve as an intermediary for regional Mr Karimov claimed
that equality was being denied. Consequently, roles were hardly compatible and
friction increased, especially as a number of bilateral issue-areas remained unresolved
during the 1990s – such as debts and the future of the TAPO plant -, all of which was
portrayed in the public sphere as connected to Tashkent seeking genuine independence
and defending equality.
President Putin’s election in 2000 led to a discontinuity. McCall and
Simmons’s (1966: 95-99) legitimating acts fit nicely with the events that followed:
Moscow’s growing lack of success in engaging with Uzbekistan led it to adjust its
responses by ‘nicifying’ its actions. President Putin propounded Eurasian ideas, thereby
paying heed to President Karimov’s appeals. Visiting Uzbekistan first among all others
bolstered Tashkent’s prestige group-types, and then a focus on technocracy and deideologized issues was compatible with President Karimov’s own roles, leading to more
cooperation in the international public sphere from 2000 to 2007.
Still, disparities in roles remained as discontinuities made inter-role conflict
resurface. After the Andijan crisis, defending Uzbekistan’s equality continued to be a
permanent block in the relationship between the two countries, since President
Karimov stuck to his word and so refused to allow Russia to reinforce its presence in
the region. By 2010, it was difficult not to make parallels with the 1990s. Moscow
publicly demonstrated that it was acting to preserve its own status in Central Asia,
which was diametrically opposed to President Karimov’s claims for undisputed
authority, prestige and equality.
Elsewhere, the story of President Karimov’s relations with Washington is
emplotted by deep role malintegration. Unlike Uzbekistan’s relationship with Russia,
where instability derived from conflict over equality and seeking genuine
independence; with the United States, most roles - excluding protecting stability - were
barely compatible in the public sphere. The United States, nevertheless, had a number
of roles that were appealing to President Karimov’s role set. Being the world’s military
and economic superpower meant that it could help reinforce a number of President
Karimov’s roles, namely boost Uzbekistan’s great image, serve to bridge other markets
and develop the country’s economic future. Moreover, as the situation in Central Asia
became increasingly unstable, Washington could have been an important regional
security partner and assisted President Karimov fulfil his role of protector of stability.
Still, Washington’s reformist stance meant that it distanced itself from Uzbekistan until
185
the mid 1990s, which harmed President Karimov’s image and undisputed authority;
even more so when other Central Asian Republics were praised.
Eventually, though, Central Asia became more prominent in the public sphere
as its economic potential and insecurity became more visible. Washington progressively
adjusted its roles and began focusing on geopolitical stability in the region, allowing for
greater cooperation with Tashkent. Even so, this eventually led to intra-role
competition between the DoD and the DoS, seeing as the latter’s credibility was based
on pursuing reform in Central Asia.
After the Colour Revolutions, role conflict became unmanageable, even after the
11 September attacks and the partnership agreement of 2002. The revolutions
increased Uzbekistan’s visibility greatly and so affected President Karimov’s credibility
as an undisputed authority and economic expert. On the other hand, interacting with a
strongly authoritarian state also harmed Washington’s own credibility as a purveyor of
democracy and political reform. The role conflict gradually intensified after 2003 and
erupted after the 2005 Andijan crisis, leading to temporary withdrawal from
interaction in order to resolve this collapse in public credibility. Another legitimating
mechanism was made evident when the DoS switched its role for the region, as Central
Asia was included in the South Asian department and removed from European Affairs.
President Karimov, on the other hand, faced a grave challenge to his credibility and so
pressed to condemn his audience (namely the West) for not supporting his actions, and
refocused on other roles, such as a defender of Uzbekistan’s image and definer of
authenticity.
As the situation in Afghanistan re-entered the international public sphere in
2008, Washington adjusted by mitigating its reformist roles and tacitly endorsing
protecting stability as its main public goal for Uzbekistan. This revamped compatibility
with Tashkent and President Karimov made some rhetorical concessions on reform,
without, however, upsetting the core group-types, i.e. authenticity and technocracy. So,
by 2010 the two states focused almost exclusively on a security dimension, thereby
avoiding public friction.
As concerns Germany and Uzbekistan, the story is less volatile than Tashkent’s
interaction with Moscow, Washington and Ankara. In short, cooperation was visible in
the public sphere between these two actors because of role compatibility. President
Karimov claimed technocratic roles, such as developing the economy, that were in turn
acceded by Berlin as a number of German companies entered Uzbekistan’s market.
Moreover, German governments rarely if ever publicly contested President Karimov’s
undisputed authority and his claims for stability, mainly due to their concerns over the
well-being of local German communities. Indeed, discretion was a key element in
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Berlin’s approach, letting it assert itself in the region while simultaneously
implementing its traditional civilian roles, namely peacekeeping and development.
Nevertheless, once Germany assumed security provision roles in the north of
Afghanistan, and as it sought to implement a new EU partnership in 2007, Uzbekistan’s
visibility grew. Intra-role conflict was therefore on the rise as Germany’s press and
opposition parties questioned the credibility of its civilian roles, particularly the lack of
importance given to Human Rights. Nevertheless, unlike with Washington, both the
SPD and CDU controlled the majority in the Bundestag and built their credibility on
returning Germany to normality and reasserting its interests abroad. Consequently,
Berlin’s intra-role conflict was never as ostentatious as in the United States, which
resulted in fewer credibility problems. Germany could legitimate its interaction in a
manner very similar to President Putin, by adjusting their rhetoric in a manner that
‘nicified’ President Karimov’s roles.
Lastly, the Turkish-Uzbekistani relationship reveals that roles can clash with
any state and not just with the so-called ‘great powers.’ The story has a deceptive start,
since everything would suggest that Turkey’s secular (Kemalist) roles would result in a
cooperative
relationship
with
Uzbekistan.
However,
behind
these
public
manifestations, some rhetorical nuances hinted that there was in fact little
compatibility, particularly with President Karimov’s own predicates, such as defending
equality and de-ideologized relationships. Ankara’s initial patronizing stance could be
seen as a way of ascertaining leadership in Central Asia, thereby conflicting with
Tashkent’s equality. Moreover, Ankara’s ideas of cultural integration were hardly deideologized, contradicting President Karimov’s preference for technocratic relations.
This then became even more problematic once Turkey hosted important members of
Uzbekistan’s opposition in the end of 1993. However, the relationship managed not to
deteriorate fully since Turkey also insisted on acclaiming President Karimov’s prestige
and bridging Eurasian markets.
Gradually, role conflict became a permanent feature in the relationship. Once
the domestic and regional situations changed in both countries, different priorities
came to the fore. Turkey’s intra-role friction - between secularism and Islamism became less concealed, and was hardly compatible with President Karimov’s persistent
appeals for technocracy and protecting stability. Therefore, Turkey’s own alternating
domestic landscape soon led to permanent inter-role conflict between the two states,
given that political Islam, no matter its moderation, – as an ideological counter-weight
to President Karimov’s roles – explicitly contradicted Tashkent’s public stance.
Uzbekistani leadership responded to these changes by recalling students from Turkey
and shutting Turkish schools, which in turn also fostered increased debate within
187
Turkey. Ankara’s secular establishment did however show that it sought reconciliation,
particularly as it tried to instigate its Ottomanist roles. However, Turkey did not have
the financial means to boost President Karimov’s role of developer, which, in addition
to its pan-Turkic ideas, contradicted Tashkent’s persistent appeal for technocracy,
protecting stability and defending equality.
Suggestions for further inquiry
Chapter IV shows that both the end of the Soviet Union and the ruble zone reinforced
President Karimov’s appeals for seeking genuine independence and defending
equality; a process that reveals how roles became prominent, but not how they
originate. It seems that the end of the Soviet Union had a lasting impact on shaping
President Karimov’s rise to power, and so it would be interesting to revisit and expand
James Critchlow’s (1990) research on how Uzbekistani elites were affected by the
Cotton Scandal of the 1980s. This would better contextualize the overall foreign policy
behaviour of Tashkent, given that continuity seems to be an important theme within
Uzbekistani society (Adams 2010: 7). Glasnost and Perestroika potentially had more
impact in Uzbekistan than in other Central Asian Republics; perhaps explaining why
President Karimov built his entire career on resisting change. Uzbekistani leadership,
while often praising Russia, also has little qualms in lambasting against the injustices of
the Soviet Era. These mixed emotions can offer important clues about the existing level
of grievance with - and also admiration for - Russia and the Soviet past, which might
clarify why equality was so important from the beginning and why change was so
disdained. Critchlow (1990) seems to suggest that the age of reform in the Soviet Union
had a strong impact on Uzbekistan’s elites, many of whom may have felt they were
being made scapegoats and portrayed unjustly. In fact, the concern with bolstering
prestige and defending an image persisted since independence, even more so because
some negative stereotypes regarding Uzbeks did not change and perhaps even
deteriorated. Indeed, David Remnick (1994: 186-187) in his renowned bestseller of the
fall of the ‘Soviet Empire’ barely described any Uzbek people, with the exception of one
or two individuals, whom he portrays as mafiosos. Whether or not it is fair to describe
Uzbekistan’s politics in this way is beside the point. It does seem clear though that its
leadership has been adamant in protecting the image of the country. Hence, a more
comprehensive work on the impact of the last days of the Soviet Union would most
likely reveal how Uzbekistan’s experience may have differed from others, as well as its
lasting impact on continuity and resisting change.
188
Besides the impact of the Soviet period, it would also be important to
understand where President Karimov’s role set came from and how it was formed.
Regarding the history of ideas, it would be important to complement public roles with
the very general ‘Independence Idea’ (Mustaqillik Mafkurasi), which was progressively
endorsed by President Karimov’s regime in the mid 1990s (Muminov 2010: 148-149).
Given that this thesis is more concerned with classifying public themes rather than
understanding their distinct local meanings, Mustaqillik was not central to the
discussion herein because President Karimov never publicly declared that he was
following a strict ideology. However, future analysis could probably verify how much
President Karimov’s rhetoric is influenced by that vague conception or whether in fact
it is the other way round. It is mostly likely a mutually dependent relationship, and so it
would be important to widen the spectrum from public rhetoric to the broader
conception of discourse so as to identify who are the cultural and intellectual elites and
how they have responded to the events happening around the world. Indeed, how much
were President Karimov’s ideas shaped by Uzbekistani intellectuals and technocrats?
Edward Allworth (1990) and Anita Sengupta (2003) offer detailed accounts of how
Uzbekistan and its historiography were gradually constructed by local elites during the
Soviet Era. In spite of the secrecy of the regime, seeking to answer these questions
might offer a better idea of Uzbekistani foreign policy making and how these ideas
shaped Uzbekistan’s controversial political ideas. It would also allow for understanding
some political trends for the future, once President Karimov leaves office. Is internal
debate prevalent or is Uzbekistan’s President simply representing a dominant
worldview? Given the level of cabinet reshuffling after the Andijan Crisis, it seems clear
that not all is consensual.575
A better understanding of Tashkent’s political ideas would also diminish some
existing problems with depictions of Uzbekistan’s politics, of which this thesis is also
guilty. As argued by Laura Adams (2010), Nick Megoran (2008) and Sarah Kendizor
(2007), the top-down hierarchy constantly applied to the country does not show how
wider discourse influences Uzbekistan’s politics. It is thus essential to comprehend how
informal politics takes place and how both the system and its ideas affect foreign policy
decisions. In this regard, a variety of works describe how regional rivalries, patrimonial
competition and family connections affect local politics (e.g. Tunçer-Kilavuz 2009;
Ilkhamov 2007; Collins 2006; Luong 2002, 1995). To a certain degree, these specific
characteristics do not differ from those of any other political environment, yet the fact
that Uzbekistan’s political establishment is so opaque makes it even more important to
understand who the principal pawn-brokers are and also the basis of their legitimacy.
575
Interview source (2009-2012). See Appendix IV for information regarding sources.
189
Given my own brief experiences in the country, it is difficult to talk about almost any
political event. So, such a research goal would involve years of building trust, but
further contributions to Uzbekistani politics still need to find ways of penetrating the
complex system of informal politics and reveal its secluded and more private dimension
to show how a number of decisions are made.
190
Appendix I: Sources of President Karimov’s rhetoric
‘Second Day’s Debate on Gorbachev’s Report’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25
September 1989.
‘Other Speeches on Morning of First Day’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 February
1990.
‘Speech of the President of the Uzbek SSR’ Russian Press Digest, 25 March 1990
‘Speech by Karimov’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 July 1990.
‘Congress of CP of Uzbekistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 December 1990.
‘Fourth Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR Statement by Deputy of the USSR, President
of the Uzbek Republic Islam Karimov’ Official Kremlin News Broadcast, 19 December 1990.
‘Excerpters from Interview with Islam Karimov, President of Uzbek SSR’Official Kremlin
International News Broadcast, 24 January 1991.
‘Interview with President of Uzbekistan on USSR Referendum’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 11 March 1991.
‘President of Uzbekistan Interviewed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1991.
‘Interview with Uzbek President’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 June 1991.
‘Uzbek President Reads out statement on recent events’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23
August 1991.
‘Uzbek President Addresses party in week following coup’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
18 September 18 1991.
‘Representatives of eight republics sign treaty press conference’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 21 October 1991.
‘Karimov “No Sense” in signing proposes Union Treaty’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21
November 1991.
‘“Speaking of breaking borders means breaking up Central Asia”: Islam Karimov speaks in an
interview foreign journalists’ Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 15 May 1992.
‘Uzbekistan cannot imagine a future without Russia’ Official Kremlin International News
Broadcast, 2 June 1992.
‘President Karimov gives press conference on eve of independence anniversary’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 29 September 1992
‘Karimov addresses the republic on independence day’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3
September 1992.
‘Uzbek President fears second Karabakh in Tajikistan, appeals to UN’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 9 September 1992.
‘Uzbekistan; President in favour of staying in rouble zone’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
9 December 1992
‘New Constitution enshrines democratic values and respect of human rights’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 22 December 1992.
191
‘President Criticizes CIS interparliamentary assembly but says CIS necessary’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 5 January 1993.
‘CIS heads of state answer questions at Press Conference’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
19 April 1993.
‘Uzbekistan’s President Speaks on the Economy and hints at possible reshuffle’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 2 March 1993.
‘Press Conference by CIS Leaders on Results of Moscow Meeting’ Official Kremlin International
News Broadcast, 14 May 1993.
‘Uzbekistan; Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1993.
‘Uzbek President Tells “Pravda” he is looking for cooperation, not aid’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 7 August 1993.
‘President Karimov on Independence Day; speaks on Russia’s regional role’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 15 December 1993.
‘Briefing at Uzbek Embassy in Moscow’ TASS, 22 October 1993.
‘Uzbek Gold is Best Guarantee for Investment-President’ TASS, 29 October 1993.
‘President Karimov criticizes the work of Tashkent's city Soviet’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 15 December 1993.
‘Uzbek President Calls for De-Ideologising economy’ TASS, 25 January 1994.
‘Kazakh, Uzbek and Turkmen leaders on relations with Russia’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 29 January 1994.
‘Uzbek President satisfied with results of Moscow visit’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3
March 1994.
‘Karimov interview on CIS integration’ TASS, 14 April 1994.
‘President Karimov urges Russia to promote greater economic cooperation in CIS’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 February 1994.
‘Uzbek President Karimov satisfied with results of Moscow visit’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 8 March 1994.
‘Karimov warns of dangers of fundamentalism at CSCE meeting’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 12 March 1994.
‘Karimov interview on CIS integration’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 April 1994.
‘President Karimov rejects idea of Eurasian union as “populism”’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 3 May 1994.
‘Uzbek president announces introduction of new currency from 1st July’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 11 May 1994.
‘Uzbekistan leader supports UNSC seat for Japan’ Japan Economic Newswire, 17 May 1994.
‘Russia risks losing Uzbek market, Karimov warns’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 May
1994.
192
‘Karimov Interview with Russian Paper’ BBC Summary of World of Broadcasts, 1 June 1994.
‘Uzbekistan calls South Korea to help settle Tajik Conflict’ TASS, 5 June 1994.
‘Uzbek-Kazakh-Kyrgyz summit held in Alma-Ata’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 July
1994.
‘Karimov says Uzbekistan to be self-sufficient in oil and grain’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 28 September 1994.
‘President Karimov addresses parliament’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 September
1994.
‘Uzbek president's visit to Kiev: closer cooperation called for’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 14 November 1994.
‘President Karimov says no alternative to CIS, dismisses idea of Eurasian union’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 8 December 1994.
‘Europe must pay more attention to Central Asia, says Karimov’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 10 December 1994.
‘Uzbek leader denounces Chechen war’ United Press International, 11 January 1995.
‘Uzbek president in talks with OSCE chief’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 January
1995.
‘Uzbek president stresses importance of new markets’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13
January 1995.
‘Uzbek leader says dependency obstructing reform’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21
January 1995.
‘Uzbek president warns Tajikistan of threat of civil war’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15
February 1995.
‘Uzbek statement stresses supremacy of law following Yeltsin remarks’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 10 March 1995.
‘Kazakh and Uzbek leaders review Aral Sea conference’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10
March 1995.
‘Uzbek president holds talks with Tajik opposition leaders’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
6 April 1995.
‘Uzbek president seeks creation of “common Turkestan”’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8
May 1995.
‘Uzbekistan capable of stopping any aggressor - defence minister’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 9 May 1995.
‘Uzbek leader wants no borders between Kazakhs and Uzbeks’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 24 May 1995.
‘Uzbek leader says Tajik rulers holding on to power “at any price”’’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 27 May 1995.
‘President Karimov and Russian premier give joint news conference’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 31 July 1995.
193
‘Karimov unsure about effectiveness of Turkic economic cooperation’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 20 August 1995.
‘President praises Uzbekistan's achievements on eve of independence anniversary’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 2 September 1995.
‘Uzbek president's opening speech to Central Asian security seminar’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 19 September 1995.
‘Tajik and Uzbek presidents call for UN peace steps in Afghanistan’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 26 October 1995.
‘Uzbek president gives interview on relations with other Central Asian states’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 31 October 1995.
‘Pakistani premier and Uzbek president discuss Afghan conflict’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 20 November 1995.
‘President rejects notion of supranational bodies in CIS’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
24 March 1996.
‘Uzbekistan warns against using ECO summit as political platform’ Agence France Presse English, May 1996.
‘Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov and OPIC President Ruth Harkin discuss a joint U.S.Uzbekistan Energy Venture’ NBC, 24 June 1996.
‘Remarks by Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan regarding his country’s investment
potential’ Federal News Service, 26 June 1996.
‘President outlines type of opposition he will accept’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3
September 1996.
‘Uzbek president emphasizes need to stop Taleban at Salang Pass’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 7 October 1996.
‘Leader urges world to cotton on to Uzbekistan's potential’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
11 October 1996.
‘President Karimov slams regional authorities over corruption’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 29 October 1996.
‘President Karimov seeks security guarantees from OSCE membership’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 5 December 1996.
‘President Karimov warns Tajik sides to observe peace accords’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 31 December 1996.
‘President Karimov addresses parliament, opposes military bloc to counter NATO’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 December 1996.
‘President Karimov denies problems over currency conversion’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 3 January 1997.
‘Uzbek president opposes Russia's integration with Belarus’ Associated Press Worldstream, 16
January 1997.
‘Karimov Quizzed over state of Uzbek Democracy’ CTK National News Wire, 16 January 1997.
‘President Karimov hails 1996 feats, urges new view of wealth and property’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 10 February 1997.
194
‘Uzbek president criticizes poor administration of Fergana Region’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 18 February 1997.
‘Uzbek president answers BBC reporter's questions on Afghanistan’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 20 September 1997.
‘Uzbek president criticizes formation of CIS unions’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24
October 1997.
‘President Karimov criticizes officials for poor cotton harvest’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 24 October 1997.
‘Uzbek President says his country is with Russia forever’ TASS, 11 November 1997.
‘President Karimov gives interview on presidential elections, corruption’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 12 November 1997.
‘President warns of threat of an Islamic Tajikistan’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6
January 1998.
‘Uzbek president speaks on CIS, regional issues at Ashkhabad meeting’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 6 January 1998.
‘Uzbek president speaks on CIS, regional issues at Ashkhabad meeting’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 13 January 1998.
‘Uzbek head on Aims of Ukraine Visit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 February 1998.
‘Presidents Karimova and Clinton confirm commitment to raising cooperation’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 3 March 1998.
‘Uzbek President’s Address on Spring Holiday’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 March 1998.
‘Central Asian Presidents’ Press Conference’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 March
1998.
‘Presidents call Tajikistan’s Joining Central Asian Economic Union’ Interfax, 30 March 30 1998.
‘President: Economic Rules must apply throughout CIS’ Interfax Russian News, 17 April 1998.
‘Uzbek head addresses parliament on CIS Summit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 April 1998.
‘Uzbek president pleas for EU help against Afghan drug trade’ Agence France Presse –English,
May 1998.
‘CIS: Uzbek leader says ready to shoot islamists himself’ AAP NEWSFEED, 3 May 1998.
‘Uzbek President reiterates concern over spread of “Wahhabism”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
6 May 1998.
‘Uzbekistan should save hard currency for technology – president’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 7 May 1998.
‘Uzbek head: No return to old system’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 May 1998.
‘Uzbek head wants to solve problem of seaport access’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 May
1998.
‘Uzbek leaders warns helping Uighurs could upset relations with China’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 9 June 1998.
195
‘President Karimov says security and unity prime tasks of state’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 3 September 1998.
‘Uzbek President gives interview on relations with other Central Asian states’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 31 October 1998.
‘Uzbek President: Struggle for power under way in Tajikistan’ Interfax Russian News, 30
November 1998.
‘President Karimov demands internal change to face external economic challenges’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 December 1998.
‘Karimov says Russian intelligence provoking Uzbek-Tajik friction’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 30 November 1998.
‘President Karimov: 1998 was a “difficult” year’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 January
1999.
‘Uzbek President voices concern about CIS restructuring’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26
January 1999.
‘Russia has no clear policy on Central Asia’ TASS, 11 February 1999.
‘Uzbek President Sums up 1998 Economic results’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16
February 1999.
‘Uzbek President Speaks on Bomb Attacks’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 February
1999.
‘CIS relations depend on Yeltsin’s successor, says Uzbek Leader’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 9 March 1999.
‘President Karimov says 30 suspects arrested following Tashkent Bombings’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 23 March 1999.
‘President Karimov calls for “well-defined” national ideology’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 6 April 2000.
‘Uzbek President rejects criticism of controls on Kazakh Border’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 14 April 1999.
‘Uzbek President’s speech at parliamentary session’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15
April 1999.
‘Uzbek head warns of russian embroilment in the Balkans’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
15 April 1999.
‘Uzbek President repeats line on NATO, Kosovo’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 April
1999.
‘Uzbek head: “We have to think about NATO Membership’’’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 29 April 1999.
‘Uzbek President’s Speech at Parliamentary session’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19
August 1999.
‘Uzbek President – “No secret” Uzbeks fighting in Dagestan’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 19 August 1999.
196
‘Uzbek President Congratulates Nation on Independence day – Text’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 1 September 1999.
‘Uzbek President is willing to give his life for the country’s children’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 3 September 1999.
‘Uzbek defence minister says army on high alert in view of the Kyrgyz Situation’ BBC Summary
of World News, 8 September 1999.
‘Uzbek president appreciates China's Central Asia policy, anti-separatism’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 11 September 1999.
‘Uzbek defence minister denies presence of Uzbek forces in Kyrgyzstan’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 14 September 1999.
‘Uzbek President Pledges support for Kyrgyzstan in fighting Militants’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 24 September 1999.
‘Uzbek President challenges “Forces with Evil Intentions”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2
October 1999.
‘Uzbek President Optimistic about New car and telecoms deals in South Korea’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 4 October 1999.
‘Uzbek President Interviewed on visit to Ukraine Aboard Aircraft – Full Version’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 10 October 1999.
‘Uzbek President says positions with Ukraine Coincide “on virtually all issues”’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 11 October 1999.
‘Uzbek President Interviewed on Visit to Ukraine aboard aircraft’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
12 October 12 1999.
‘Uzbek leader against playing role of raw materials supplier’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 17 October 1999.
‘Uzbek President Views to defend territory “with all available means”’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 20 October 1999.
‘Uzbek president's interview on his visit to China - FULL VERSION’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 12 November 1999.
‘Uzbek head criticises OSCE for focusing on human rights’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18
November 1999.
‘Uzbek head criticized OSCE for focusing on human rights’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
17 November 1999.
‘President Karimov comments on elections on eve of Constitution Day’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 9 December 1999.
‘Uzbek president backs Russia's steps in Chechnya FULL VERSION’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 11 December 1999.
‘Uzbek president says democratic mechanisms not working yet’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9
January 2000.
‘Uzbek president calls for new system of appointing senior officials’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 16 January 2000.
197
‘Uzbek president addresses parliament: parts 1-4 complete’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23
January 2000.
‘Uzbek president speaks to journalists in parliamentary sessionbreak’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 24 January 2000.
‘Uzbek president's views on conversion problems and privatization issues’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 1 February 2000.
‘Uzbek leader criticizes US for "game" over Radio Liberty reporter: full version’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 11 February 2000.
‘Uzbek addresses parliamentary session - full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 February
2000.
‘Military doctrine is one of defence’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 February 2000.
‘Uzbek head calls for agricultural reforms in southern Region’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24
February 2000.
‘President Karimov calls for "well-defined" national ideology’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 11 April 2000.
‘Central Asian Summit: Uzbek head details Afghan threat’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
21 April 2000.
‘Central Asian security summit ends in Uzbek capital full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
21 April 2000.
‘Uzbek head calls for more ties with India, trade via Iran’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 May
2000.
‘Karimov asks for Putin's protection against terrorism in Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse English, 19 May 2000.
‘Russian, Uzbek presidents for expanding military cooperation to ensure security’ BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, 20 May 2000.
‘Uzbek president tells parliament of plans for new army’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 May
2000.
‘President warns air force could strike Afghan bases if necessary’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 30 May 2000.
‘Uzbek head answers newspaper questions on national ideology, religion, policy’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 8 June 2000.
‘Uzbek head answers newspaper questions on national ideology, religion, policy’ BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, 9 June 2000.
‘Uzbek head stressed need to tackle Afghan issue, Access to Iranian Port’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 9 June 2000.
‘Uzbek head claims certain ECO states focusing more on political issues OOT2’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 9 June 2000.
‘Uzbek heads stresses need to tackle Afghan issue, access to Iranian port’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 10 June 2000.
‘Uzbek president's visit to Tajikistan - Full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 June 2000.
198
‘Uzbek leader says Russia had, has, will have interests in Central Asia’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 22 June 2000.
‘Uzbek president at Shanghai Five summit urges joint security efforts’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 6 July 2000.
‘Uzbek president: job creation “a matter of life or death” - full version’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 22 July 2000.
‘Bishkek Central Asian security summit 20th August: full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
21 August 2000.
‘Uzbek leader on unrest in south and northeast of capital’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23
August 2000.
‘Avoiding losses in clashes “main objective”, Uzbek president says - full version’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 31 August 2000.
‘Uzbek president calls for reform of United Nations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 September
2000.
‘Uzbek president leaves for Turkmenistan, interviewed at airport’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
21 September 2000.
‘Uzbek president calls for “pragmatic approach” towards Afghanistan’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 27 September 2000.
‘Uzbekistan and Ukraine agree on payments, Uzbek president says’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 12 October 2000.
‘Uzbek leader against playing role of raw materials supplier’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17
October 2000.
‘Karimov slams abuses among officials, businessmen on Constitution Day’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 9 December 2000.
‘Uzbek president blasts Russian plan to reinstate Stalinist anthem’ Agence France Presse English, 14 December 2000.
‘Uzbek head to call referendum on changing parliamentary system’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 14 December 2000.
‘Karimov rubbishes draft law’s definition of terrorism’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19
December 2000.
‘President Karimov criticizes economic sector’s performance’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 1 January 2001.
‘President Karimov hails independence, urges vigilance in New Year message’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 3 January 2001.
‘President Karimov urges Central Asian states to pursue rigorous security policy’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 9 January 2001.
‘President Karimov criticizes economic sector's performance’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 16 January 2001.
‘Global crisis negatively affects Uzbek exports – leader’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14
February 2009.
199
‘Uzbek head calls for people to engage in public affairs’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18
February 2001.
‘Uzbek leader against politicizing Central Asian water issues’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26
February 2009.
‘Uzbek leader against "third" parties involvement in water talks’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
28 April 2009.
‘Uzbek President urges public to remember Uzbek contribution to V-Day’ UzReport.com, 11 May
2009.
‘Uzbek President: Uzbekistan has no intention to join military-political unions’ RIA Novosti, 11
May 2001.
‘One should not make fetish of market relations - Uzbek leader’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22
May 2009
‘President slams Soviet Past, calls for structural reforms’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
17 July 2001.
‘President visits Eastern region – Full Version’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 August
2001.
‘Uzbek head visits eastern region – full version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 August 2001.
‘Uzbek leader calls for judicial and legal reform – fuller version’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 29
August 2001.
‘Uzbek president admits police use “illegal methods”’ Agence France Presse - English, 29
August 2001.
‘Uzbekistan made no pledge to give US its bases for strikes’ TASS, 19 September 2001.
‘Uzbekistan ready to offer use of airspace if “security guaranteed”, head – full’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 27 September 2001.
‘Uzbek leader says anti-terrorism campaign not over, hails US efforts’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 28 December 2001.
‘Central Asian leaders hail peaceful coexistence, forge common positions’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 28 September 2001.
Zhukov, T. ‘Uzbekistan's president says government will reopen bridge leading to Afghanistan’
Associated Press, 6 December 2001.
‘Uzbeks can face 2002 with pride after difficult year – leader’s New Year Message’ BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, 31 December 2001.
‘Uzbek president gives high marks to military-technical cooperation with Germany’ News
Bulletin, 11 February 2002.
‘Uzbek president to sign six documents’ U.S. News Bulletin, 11 March 2002.
‘Uzbek head promises increases in people’s wages in 2002’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
March 21 2002.
‘Uzbek government has much to do to improve human rights situation’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, April 2002.
‘Uzbekistan praises US assistance’ TASS, 5 April 2002.
200
‘Uzbek president criticizes leaders in Aral Sea area for poor performance’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 3 May 2002.
‘Uzbek president berates central region for high crime figures - fuller version’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 1 June 2002.
‘Uzbek leader stresses common interests with Japanese’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2
August2002.
‘Uzbekistan establishes strategic partnership east and west – leader’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 3 August 2002.
Bukharbayeva, B. ‘Uzbek president urges radical democratic change, military reform’ Associated
Press, 29 August 2002.
‘Uzbek leader calls for vigilance, says world recognizes role in fighting terrorism’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 31 August 2002.
‘Uzbek president comments on Afghan issue – text’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5
October 2002.
‘Uzbek president speaks of Russian passivity on eve of CIS Moldovan summit’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 6 October 2002.
‘Uzbek president blasts UN for lack of support on security issues’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 19 October 2002.
‘Karimov describes international terrorism as “21st century plague”’ TASS, 21 November 2002.
‘Uzbek TV reports on president's visit to central region’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30
November 2002.
‘President attacks Uzbeks for lavish ceremonies’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6
December 2002.
‘Uzbek President says no foreign military rivalry in Central Asia’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 12 December 2002.
‘Uzbek president outlines new parliament’s powers’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13
December 2002.
‘Uzbek, Ukrainian leaders discuss cooperation - Uzbek TV’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
19 December 2002.
‘Uzbekistan keeps threat of terrorism from the door - leader's New Year message’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 December 2002.
‘(CORR) Uzbek leader leader lashes out at imports for sake of future generation’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 19 February 2003.
‘Uzbekistan supports USA's stance on Iraq, Uzbek president says - fuller version’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 7 March 2003.
‘Uzbek leader urges “vigilant approach” to terrorism in his Nowruz address’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 21 March 2003.
‘Uzbekistan, Romania for redoubling efforts to fight terrorism’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 22 April 2003.
201
‘Uzbek President explains move to reduce his authority’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24
April 2003.
‘Uzbek president promises decent living conditions to people’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19
July 2003.
‘Uzbekistan, Russia to begin direct cotton trade’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 August
2003.
‘Uzbek president promises convertibility by the end of the year’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 31 August2003.
‘Uzbek president against politicization of Eurasian transport corridor project’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 10 October 2003.
‘Karimov says good relations with U.S. crucial’ News Bulletin, 11 November 2003.
Uzbek president urges Georgians to abide by constitution’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
24 November 2003.
‘Uzbek leader lashes out at rights bodies over criticism of neighbourhood system’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 7 December 2003.
‘Uzbek president's interview on 11 December’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 December
2003.
‘Uzbek president says outgoing year “not an easy one”’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 31
December 2003.
‘Uzbek president reviews 2003 economic achievements’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8
February 2004.
‘Uzbek leader slams agricultural sector, says 40,000 jobs to go’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 14 February 2004.
‘Uzbek leader hails operation on Pakistani-Afghan border as success – excerpts’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 25 March 2004.
‘Uzbekistan should align with great powers’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 2004.
‘Uzbek leader says God saved Uzbekistan during recent terror attacks’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 7 April 2004.
‘Terrorists outpacing antiterror coalition, Uzbek leader tells Putin – excerpts’ BBC Sumary of
World Broadcasts, 18 April 2004.
‘Excerpts from Uzbek president's 29 April news conference’ BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts,
30 April 2004.
‘Uzbek president says Soros foundation broke the law’ BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts, 1 May
2004.
‘Uzbek leader warns Central Asian summit of strategic uncertainty in region’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 30 May 2004.
‘Uzbek leader hails Shanghai body's “iron will” in promoting security, prosperity’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 18 June 2004.
‘Uzbek president pleads to nation to resist extremist Islamic influences, says one group behind
all suicide attacks’ Associated Press Worldstream, 31 July 2004.
202
‘Uzbek President’s news conference on 26 August’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27
August 2004.
‘Uzbek leader urges clerics to work against radical groups’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
1 September 2004.
‘Uzbek leader urges vigilance in Independence Day Speech’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 1 September 2004.
‘Uzbek leader promises to tighter borders against illegal exports’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 20 September 2004.
‘Uzbek president issues robust defence of elections’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27
December 2004.
‘Uzbek president recalls blasts in New Year message’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 31
December 2004.
‘Uzbek President gives wide-ranging interview to Russian paper’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 20 January 2005.
‘New Uzbek Parliament part of Democratic Nation-Building – President’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 29 January 2005.
‘Uzbekistan keen on more South Korean investment – leader’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10
May 2005.
‘Uzbek leader gives news conference on Andijon events - full version’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 14 May 2005.
‘Uzbek leader accepts U.S. statements on Andizhan events’ News Bulletin, 17 May 2005.
‘Uzbek leader says no international probe into the Andijan crisis – Fuller’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 25 May 2005.
‘Great powers want to control Central Asia - Uzbek leader’ UzReport.com, 18 June 2005.
‘Uzbek president warns against “plan” to dominate in Central Asian region’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 6 July 2005.
‘US, Israel Russia helped set up bloody events in eastern Uzbekistan, says report’ BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, 29 June 2005.
‘Kyrgyzstan frees half of its refugees wanted by Uzbekistan’ Agence France Presse, 28 July
2005.
‘Uzbek leader’s independence speech urges vigilance – fuller’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 1 September 2005.
‘Uzbek defendant says foreign media supported Andijon plot – TV’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 28 September 2005.
‘Uzbek leader urges greater ties with Malaysia’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 October
2005.
‘Uzbek leader laments lack of cooperation in Central Asia – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
8 October 2005.
‘Putin Karimov sign allied relations treaty’ Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin, 14 November
2005.
203
‘Uzbek leader says democracy cannot be universal – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8
December 2005.
‘Uzbek president calls for vigilance in New Year message’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31
December 2005.
‘Uzbek leader outlines economic tasks for 2006’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 February
2006.
‘Uzbek leader assesses work of parliament's upper house – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
25 February 2006.
‘Uzbek leader makes Nowruz speech’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 March 2006.
‘Uzbek president accuses West of waging “information war” against ex-Soviet Nation’
Associated Press Worldstream, 20 March 2006.
‘Uzbek leader talks up gains from SKorean visit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 March 2006.
‘Uzbek leader hails Shanghai body before anniversary summit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13
June 2006.
‘Iran, Uzbekistan leaders hit out at interference by foreign powers’ Agence France Presse English, 15 June 2006.
‘Uzbek leader at CICA warns against linking terrorism to Islam’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17
June 2006.
‘Uzbek president comments on decision to rejoin CIS security body’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 24 June 2006.
‘Uzbek leader calls on Shanghai Body to Fight Treats “Decisively”’BBC Monitoring
International Reports, 4 July 2006.
‘Uzbekistan invites Japan investment in energy sector, offers uranium’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 29 August 2006.
‘Uzbekistan, Japan pledge to step up trade, business ties – statement’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, August 2006.
‘Uzbek leader warns “aggressive forces” against undermining stability’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 31 August 2006.
‘Uzbek leader sets up ideological propaganda centre’ BBC Monitoring BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 31 August 2006.
‘Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan see their future only with Russia – leader’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
4 September 2006.
‘Kyrgyz president urges closer ties with Uzbekistan, end to “isolation”’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 4 October 2006.
‘Uzbek leader urges fighting Islamic group – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 October
2006.
‘Uzbek leader’s speech to eastern Fargona region’s officials –fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
23 October 2006.
‘Uzbek leader optimistic about ties with Germany’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 November
2006
204
‘Uzbek leader urges European countries not to teach democracy’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8
December 2006.
‘President of Uzbekistan stresses importance of parties' role’ UzReport.com, 11 December 2006.
‘Uzbek leader's New Year speech’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31 December 2006.
‘Uzbek leader calls for boosting oil and gas sector, fighting “shadow economy”’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 14 February 2007.
‘Uzbek leader urges long-term approach to cooperation with Ukraine’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 27 April 2007.
‘Uzbek president says “full understanding” with China’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 May
2007.
‘Uzbek leader says relations with Arab world “a priority”’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 June
2007.
‘Uzbek leader calls for creating “real conditions” for freedom of speech’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 28 June 2007.
‘President resolves to intensify privatization, attraction of foreign investments’ UzReport.com,
24 July 2007.
‘Uzbek leader outlines Muslim world’s “most topical” tasks’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15
August 2007.
‘SCO important in fighting terrorism, drug trafficking – Karimov’ Central Asia General
Newswire, 16 August 2007.
‘Uzbek leader against military presence in Afghanistan’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 August
2007.
‘Central Asian presidents hail SCO Bishkek summit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 August
2007.
‘Uzbek leader highlights importance of new railway line’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 24 August
2007.
‘Uzbek leader warns of foreign influence at his Cabinet speech’ BBC Worldwide monitoring, 31
August 2007.
‘President's address at the ceremony dedicated to Uzbekistan's independence’ UzReport.com, 3
September 2007.
‘Backgrounder: Tajikistan cancels giant Russian dam project’ BBC Monitoring Research, 11
September 2007.
‘Uzbek leader recalls presidential polls in New Year address’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31
December 2007.
‘President delivers inauguration speech’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 16 January 2008.
‘Uzbek leader hails Russian military assistance’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 February 2008.
‘Uzbekistan's, Russia's positions in intl organizations mostly coincide – Karimov’ Central Asia
General Newswire, 6 February 2008.
‘Uzbek leader says all work to focus on raising life standards – fuller’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 10 February 2008
205
‘Kyrgyz president urges closer ties with Uzbekistan, end to “isolation”’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 7 March 2008.
‘Uzbek, Turkmen leaders upbeat on bilateral ties’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 March 2008.
‘President addresses participants of international conference on Aral’ Uzreport.com, 13 March
2008.
‘President's address at celebrations dedicated to Navruz holiday’ UzReport.com, 24 March
2008.
‘Uzbek President Calls for Resumption of Peace Talks’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3
April 2008.
‘President attends Partnership for Peace NATO summit’ Uzreport.com, 4 April 2008
‘Uzbek leader calls for coordinating water projects in Central Asia’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
23 April 2008.
‘Uzbek leader says US official’s visit to boost relations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 June
2008.
‘Uzbek leader voices concern over Afghan security – fuller’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28
August 2008.
‘Uzbek leader independence speech lists foreign policy priorities’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1
September 2008.
‘Uzbek leader says Afghan situation has “extremely” negative impact on security’ BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, 8 October 2008.
‘EU eases Uzbek sanctions despite reporter’s jailing’ BBC Monitoring World Media, 15 October
2008.
‘Uzbek leader urges better use of untapped potential with Bulgaria’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
6 November 2008.
‘Uzbek leader says economy protected from financial crisis’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6
December 2008.
‘Uzbek leader sacks regional, district governors’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 17 December
2008.
‘Uzbek leader highlights achievements of 2008 in New Year Message’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 31 December 2008.
‘Uzbekistan ready to supply to Gazprom 16 billion cubic meters of gas in 2009 - President
Karimov’ Russia & CIS Business and Financial Newswire, 23 January 2009.
‘Uzbek leader focuses on Afghan security during Russian counterpart’s visit’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 24 January 2009.
‘Global crisis negatively affects Uzbek exports’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 February 2009.
‘Uzbek leader against politicizing Central Asian water issues’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26
February 2009.
‘Uzbek President urges public to remember Uzbek contribution to V-day’ UzReport.com, 11 May
2009.
206
‘One should not fetish market relations’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 May 2009.
‘Uzbek leader urges border guards to be more proactive’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 31 May
2009.
‘Uzbekistan ready for pragmatic relations with U.S. - President Karimov’ Central Asia General
Newswire, 13 July 2009.
‘Uzbekistan marks constitution day, President addresses the nation’ Uzreport.com, 8 December
2009.
‘Leader says living standards rising in Uzbekistan despite global crisis’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 29 December 2009.
‘Uzbek leader praises achievements of 2009 in New Year Message’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
1 January 2010.
‘Uzbek leader calls for strengthening of army's combat readiness’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
14 January 2010.
‘Uzbek leader says stability in region depends on Afghanistan – fuller’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 28 January 2010.
‘Kyrgyzstan unrest could become permanent – Karimov’ Russia & CIS General Newswire, 20
April 2010.
‘Uzbek leader notes need to increase Shanghai body's efficiency’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
23 April 2010.
‘Kazakh paper: Uzbek leader scolds Russian media as ties remain tense’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 25 April 2010.
‘Uzbek leader addresses Asian Development Bank Summit’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 May
2010.
‘Uzbek leader gives positive assessment of SCO summit results’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11
June 2010.
‘SCO leaders express readiness to help Kyrgyzstan - President Karimov’ AKIpress News Agency,
11 June 2010.
‘Uzbek leader says no revenge to be allowed for Kyrgyz violence’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19
June 2010.
‘Uzbekistan: Islam Karimov congratulated Roza Otunbaeva with “being granted presidential
power in Kyrgyzstan”’ Ferghana.ru, 30 June 2010.
‘Uzbekistan marks Independence Day Uzbekistan’ National News Agency (UzA), 2 September
2010.
‘Address by H.E. Mr. Islam Karimov, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, at the Plenary’
Session of the UN Millennium Development Goals Summit, 29 September 2010, available at
http://www.gov.uz/en/press/politics/6612, accessed September 2010.
‘Uzbek president calls for probe into riots in Kyrgyzstan’ Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama,
21 September 2010.
‘‘President: Uzbekistan supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity’ Trend Daily News, 27
September 2010.
207
‘Uzbek president vows to settle Aral Sea problem – TV’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 October
2010.
‘Agenda behind clashes’ IPS Inter Press Service, 12 November 2010.
‘Address by President Karimov at the joint session of Legislative Chamber and Senate’
UzReport.com, 15 November 2010.
‘Uzbek president warns against “dangerous” projects to protect nature’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 17 November 2010.
‘Closure of Uzbek borders helps stabilize situation in Kyrgyzstan – Karimov’ TASS, 10 December
2010.
‘Lessons must be learnt from Kyrgyz June ethnic clashes - Uzbek leader’ BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, 13 December 2010.
‘Uzbek leader says remained neutral during Afghan conflict’ BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19
December 2010.
208
Appendix II: Coding Rules for Content Analysis
A)
To avoid journalistic bias, statements have to be an ample body of text and not just selected
quotations made by reporters. These will not enter the tabulations indicated above, but may
nonetheless be used to later contextualize and discuss the results. The sources are all indicated
in Appendix I.
B)
Analyze the paragraph (P) by filling in the table below and relating it to three variables:
Status, Motivational Orientation and Substantial Issue-area. A paragraph may be related
to more than one attribute in each given variable.
P
Bi1
Bi2
(…)
STATUS
Capability
Status
(0,1,2,3)
A
0
0
(…)
(0,1,2,3)
B
0
0
(…)
-
-
MOTIVATIONAL ORIENTATION
Wish to
Systemic
expand
Coop/Comp
change
(0,1,2)
C
0
0
(…)
(0,1,2)
D
2
2
(…)
(0,1,2,3,4)
E
0
3
(…)
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE-AREAS
Political
Eco Security Other
Aims
Universal Unilateral
+
+
(0;1) (0;1)
(0;1) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1) (0;1)
(0;1)
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
(…) (…)
(…) (…) (…) (…) (…)
(…)
Status refers to which domestic endowments or capabilities leadership attributes
greater absolute advantage (A) and how it perceives its relative position in the
international system (B). The coding for those attributes works as follows:
o In the case of attribute A,
§ if there is no reference, mark 0;
§ if there is an indication of its human resources or people as being the
primary quality place 1;
§ if there is an indication that its domestic resources are the main
endowments, place 2
§ if there is an indication that qualities other than 1 and 2, such as
culture, arts and language are the primary advantages, place 3.
o In the case of attribute B,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If leadership argues that the state is less strong, influential, or powerful
than others, place 1;
§ If leadership argues that the state is equally strong, place 2;
§ If leadership argues the state to be stronger, more influential or
powerful than others place 3.
Motivational Orientation corresponds to statements on political and international
affairs, meaning if it is willing to expand internationally (C), if it is for being cooperative
or competitive in politics (D) and to which degree it wishes to change both its internal
and external system (E). Their numerical classification works as follows:
o In the case of attribute C,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If there is an indication of willingness to participate in international
affairs, place 1;
§ If there is a reference of unwillingness to participate in international
affairs, place 2;
o In the case of attribute D
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If there is a reference to the following sub-categories, place 1:
· If it rejects verbal or physical conflict;
· If it emphasizes cooperation with others;
209
Integration
(0;1)
N
0
0
(…)
·
-
If it does not argue against opponents, different ideologies or
points of view;
· If it connotes either a positive outlook or neutral one toward
known opponents.
§ If references oppose the cases above, place 2.
o In the case of attribute E,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If there is a reference calling for a change in the international political
arena, borders, or of global norms, place 1;
§ If there is a reference calling for the status quo, place 2;
§ If there is a reference to internal reform, place 3;
§ If there is a reference to not wishing to pursue internal reform, or a
reluctance to do so, place 4576.
Substantial Issue-area corresponds to the main themes being discussed: economics (F),
security (G), others (H), such as culture or history, the defence or dismissal of political
ideologies and systems (I,J)577, the defence or dismissal of universal values (K,L), the
pursuit of unilateral goals or own interests (M), the wish to practice bilateral, multilateral or political/economic integration with other partners (N).578 Their numerical
classification works as follows:
o In the case of attribute F,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If there is an emphasis on economic related issues, place 1;
o In the case of attribute G,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If there is an emphasis on security related issues, such as imminent
threats, military goals, social crises, wars, revolution, place 1;
o In the case of attribute H,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If the attribute is discussing environment, culture, history, or issues no
related to foreign policy, economics or security, place 1;
o In the case of attribute I
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If leadership is emphasizing the benefits of a political system, such as
democracy or authoritarianism, mark 1;
o In the case of attribute J,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If leadership is emphasizing the downfalls of a political system, such as
democracy or authoritarianism, mark 1;
o In the case of attribute K,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If leadership is arguing for the respect for universal values, such as
respect for certain human rights, place 1;
o In the case of attribute L,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If leadership is arguing against universal values, place 1.
o In the case of attribute M,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If leadership emphasizes the pursuit of its own goals or isolationism
rather than the wish to follow a path of international integration or
multi-lateral contacts, fill in 1;
o In the case of attribute N,
§ If there is no reference, mark 0;
§ If leadership emphasizes the opposite of what is indicated in M, fill in 1.
576
Recognizing the reluctance to actually pursue reform is a difficult task. Perhaps the best way of
classifying such an attribute is by assuming that reluctance exists when an actual leader underlines more
the difficulties of pursuing reform, instead of actually emphasizing the advantages.
577
The emphasis on Political Aims is given primarily to political ideologies and systems.
578
Paragraphs may discuss more than one issue and they should all be accounted for. Nevertheless, if the
emphasis is clearly given to one over the other, the least important one should not be accounted for.
210
Appendix III: Content analysis on status, motivational orientation and issue-areas
Periods
1989-1993
1994-2001
2002-2005
2006-2008
2009-2010
1989-2010
Table 4: Sample Description
Number of Speeches
Total Paragraphs
/Statements
36
313
181
1929
80
1314
52
853
31
673
380
5082
Total Issue-area Assertions
392
1908
1408
917
705
5330
A total of 380 statements and speeches were categorized by status, motivational orientation and
issue-areas according to Wish’s (1980) paradigm for national role conceptions. The following
categorizations, especially the discussion on substantial issue-areas demonstrate the quantity of
themes discussed by President Karimov.
Substantial issue-areas
Graph 1: Substantial Issue Areas 1989-2010
as a percentage of total paragraphs
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Economic
Security
Other
Political
Uni versal
Unilateral
Mul tilateral
According to Graph 1, the issue that dominated President Karimov’s rhetoric between 1989 and
2010 was economics, accounting for nearly 30% of all analyzed paragraphs. In second place
came both security and international cooperation; both above the 15% mark. Other issues and
politics were relatively frequent and the lowest rankings are unilateralism and universal values.
The latter was classified in only 2% of all paragraphs.
211
Graph 2: Issue Areas from 1989 to 2010 as a percentage of total assertions
for each period
40%
35%
30%
1989-1993
25%
1994-2001
2002-2005
20%
2006-2008
15%
2009-2010
10%
5%
0%
Economic
Security
Other
Political
Universal
Unilat
Multilat
When looking at how issue-areas varied through time, economic related issues were the main
theme discussed at any given time period. President Karimov tends to start many of his formal
parliamentarian speeches by presenting lengthy accounts of Uzbekistan’s macroeconomic
situation. Also, when questioned by sceptical media he habitually reveals economic figures to
reinforce the prowess of his country’s performance. As Graph 2 reveals, these became
particularly prominent after 2006, when President Karimov declared frequently that Uzbekistan
was able to avoid economic crisis.
Both security and political issues were relatively volatile. The former was invoked
mostly in the 1990s, which suggests that they are heavily correlated with the civil wars in
Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Other issues-areas increased steadily since independence, showing
the growing importance that President Karimov gave to Uzbekistan’s culture, spirituality
(‘Manaviyat’) and ideology. It is also interesting to observe how in a post-Andijan crisis scenario
these matters of cultural authenticity subsumed around 20% of the assertions between 2006
and 2008 and then nearly 25% after 2009.
Both graphs 1 and 2 also show the pervasive concern of President Karimov with
international politics. If one adds the multilateral issue-area assertions with the unilateral ones,
it becomes evident that external matters were routinely discussed. Also interesting to note is
that multilateral concerns are a relatively stable and recurrent theme and tended to outrank
unilateralism.
Table 2 below shows which were most numerous composite issue-areas articulated by
President Karimov. The three main themes indicated in Table 2, demonstrates the relevance
given by President Karimov to external affairs. The most recurrent interconnected theme was
international economic cooperation which accounted for 7% of total analyzed paragraphs and
27% of all interrelated assertions.
212
Table 2: Interrelationships between attributes 1989-2001
Absolute Frequency of
% of total interrelated
assertions
assertions
% of total
paragraphs
1)
Economic/Multilateral
376
27
7
2) Security/Multilateral
229
17
5
3) Security/Unilateral
121
9
2
4) Economic/Unilateral
110
8
2
5) Other/Economic
79
6
2
6) Economic/Security
78
6
2
7) Other/Political
67
5
1
8) Economic/Political
55
4
1
9) Other/Multilateral
42
3
1
10) Security/Other
40
3
1
11) Other/Unilateral
39
3
1
12) Security/Political
31
2
1
13) Political/Unilateral
26
2
1
14) Security/Universal
21
2
0
15) Other/Universal
14
1
0
16) Political/Universal
15
1
0
17) Economic/Universal
18)
Political/Multilateral
19)
Universal/Multilateral
20)
Universal/Unilateral
9
1
0
14
1
0
11
1
0
4
0
0
1381
100
TOTAL interrelations
The fourth interrelationship indicated in table 2 is a key connection to take into account,
since President Karimov frequently emphasized the importance of economic self-sufficiency.579
Accordingly, he made recurrent announcements about the need of mitigating economic
dependence, which may conflict with the apparent wish to propound trade.
The fifth category, Other/Economic, is associated primarily with statements calling for
the interests of economic growth and justice to be intertwined. As President Karimov claimed
gradual economic reform, he would state the need of not forgetting those left behind. Hence,
welfare issues were frequently discussed, particularly to emphasize the importance of the
state.580 This subject may also be connected to the sixth interrelationship, namely tying security
to economics. President Karimov consistently invoked attaining economic stability to prevent
social upheaval - arguments that were especially predominant in the early 1990s, when
economics and security were the two most discussed issues.
Finally, Table 2 reveals President Karimov’s dominant concern with security. Even
though economics is the issue that was most articulated, it is not the most interconnected issue579
See for example ‘Speech by the President of Uzbek SSR’ Russian Press Digest, 25 March 1990.
See for example ‘Karimov interview with a Russian Paper’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1
June 1994.
580
213
area. Accordingly, economics is connected to five other variables (multilateral, unilateral, other,
political and security), whilst security to six (multilateral, unilateral, other, political, security
and
universal).
Moreover,
if
one
were
to
remove
economic/multilateral
and
security/multilateral assertions from Table 2, themes connected to security would be almost
systematic. Security is therefore the subject matter that tends to permeate all his rhetoric,
implying that almost all issues are securitized and presented as potential threats to a particular
way of life.
Status
Table 3: Status from 1989 to 2010
% of total status
assertions
Capability
People
29
Economic Resources
48
Military
15
Other
8
Status toward others
Less
5
Equal
93
More
2
The status variable is divided into two categories (capabilities and status toward others) and
seven respective sub-categories, each describing different subjects. As concerns capability,
Uzbekistani leadership overwhelmingly underlined the country’s economic resources and the
quality of its people as the prime advantages to face the international system. President Karimov
argued continuously that Uzbekistan’s main absolute advantage resides in its economic
resources, specifically in the country’s endowments, such as oil, gas, cotton, fruits and
vegetables. A second but important quality President Karimov underlined was his people’s
readiness for the challenge of transition, especially during the immediate independence period.
President Karimov was not militaristic in spite of arguing persistently for Uzbekistan to
maintain its own forces; but not necessarily to oppose anyone besides invaders.581 Furthermore,
assertions with regards to military capabilities were perhaps the most volatile ones; even though
they were mentioned less than economic and human resources, they rose from 1994 to 2001 and
also after the Andijan crisis.582
Local culture or history was rarely articulated as an advantage for engaging with the
international system. Besides economic, human and military factors, only the geography of
581
See for instance ‘“Speaking of borders means breaking up Central Asia: Islam Karimov Speaks in an
Interview with Foreign Journalists’ Kremlin News Broadcast, 15 May 1992.
582
These observations are based on analyzing the relative frequencies and were not statistically tested.
Yet it is not too farfetched to assume that they were not random incidents but genuine increases because
of the increased military threats coming from the Taliban in the 1990s.
214
Uzbekistan was frequently presented as a capability or advantage. Nevertheless, this category
was difficult to code because while President Karimov sometimes recognized the potential of
Uzbekistan’s geographical position, he would in other circumstances mention that it was a
drawback.583
Statements deliberating that Uzbekistan was a lesser partner were rarely mentioned.
However, the contexts and the persistence with which President Karimov argued for equality
bring a degree of subjectivity to coding and therewith to Table 2. Indeed, the constant emphasis
given to equality might hide an inferiority complex. For example, he argued in 2004 that his
country should not be treated in a backward manner, rather as an equal one by other more
advanced economies.584 Regardless of the subjectivity of the explicit calls for equality, references
were usually coded as equal unless the complex was clearly shown, such as in the case when
President Karimov underlined that Uzbekistan was not strong enough to achieve independence
by itself.585
Lastly, there were a few explicit references to Uzbekistan having greater than other
status. These statements tended to be hidden through certain wordings. For example, an
interesting indication occurred during a heated moment in October 1999 when the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan mobilized into Kyrgyzstan. At the time, President Karimov said that
his country’s armed forces had the right to enter the territory of neighbouring states to defend
their own people,586 thereby demonstrating that he considered Uzbekistan to be more than
powerful enough to intervene.
Motivational orientation
Graph 3: Motivational Orientation and Willingness to Change the System 1989-2010
Relative Frequencies as a percentage of total assertions
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
No
Yes
Internal
Expansion
Cooperate
External
Willingness to Change
583
See for example ‘Uzbek President Interviewed on visit to Ukraine aboard aircraft’ BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 10 October 1999.
584
‘Uzbek leader says God saved Uzbekistan during recent terror attacks’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 7 April 2004.
585
‘Uzbek President Tells “Pravda” he is looking for Cooperation, not aid’ BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 7 August 1993.
586
See for example ‘Uzbek President Vows to defend his territory “with all available means”’ BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 October 1999.
215
Graph 1 illustrates three Motivational Orientation variables as percentages of their total
assertions: Wish to expand or participate in international affairs; Cooperative/Competitive
and Willingness to change.
As regards the wish to participate category, President Karimov expounded to be fully in
favour of Uzbekistan participating in international affairs. References to this variable were 98%
of total motivational orientation assertions. Logically, as a percentage of total paragraphs, these
kinds of statements were much lower, around 2%. Still, very few arguments denoted a reluctant
attitude toward participating in international affairs. Only before independence was a degree of
unwillingness to participate in international affairs found, as President Karimov mentioned that
it was too early to consider whether the jurisdiction of Uzbek SSR should fall under
international law.587
Regarding the Cooperation/Competitive attribute, President Karimov’s assertions from
1989 to 2010 tend to be worded in a cooperative manner (around 60% of assertions) or, in other
words, without portraying negatively certain issues or actors. However, these different wordings
depend very much on the issue that was being argued. For example, in the pre-independence
period, competitive references were slightly higher. When the Union treaty was being reformed,
President Karimov showed again and again impatience toward the way journalists summarized
his public statements. After independence he continued to make negative allusions against
cooperating with specific political rivals or the media. Also, during the 1990s, competitive
assertions were used to describe the general threat of terrorism and, after 2002, to portray the
activities of NGOs.
Cooperative references occurred usually when subject-areas were not related to politics
or journalism, such as economics. Also, after international summits, such as CIS or SCO
meetings, he remained mostly cordial.
As for the Willingness to change attribute (see Graph 1), President Karimov showed
himself to be a reluctant changer of the international system. Before independence, there were
no obvious pro-external external change assertions, given that Uzbekistan was not yet
independent. During this period, though, he was in favour of reforming the Soviet space,
especially on matters of constitutional revision and economic dependence on Moscow. Looking
to statements after independence, little willingness for changing the international system was
shown. For example, President Karimov rejected the aims of major regional institutions, such as
the CIS. Also, he constantly argued for respecting sovereignty and delivered routine statements
calling for respect of all borders and internal differences between countries.
Nonetheless, outliers existed, particularly for issues outside Central Asia. He stated that
he was in favour of Security Council reform if it meant granting permanent seats to Germany
and Japan (coincidentally, two of Uzbekistan’s biggest commercial partners).588 Moreover,
587
See for example ‘President of Uzbekistan interviewed’ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 15 April
1991.
588
See for example ‘Uzbek leader supports UNSCE seat for Japan’ Japan Economic Newswire, May 17
1995.
216
during the second Iraqi invasion debate, in 2003, he positioned himself deliberately against
Sadam’s regime and favoured the ‘coalition of the willing.’
Graph 1 also shows that President Karimov portrayed himself as an internal reformer
(81% of all willingness to change assertions). Uzbekistani leadership constantly discussed the
need of adopting market reforms (which does not mean that they were actually implemented).
Still, it is important to note that these references were usually accompanied by a disclaimer
invoking the need for gradual change, which may be interpreted as actual reluctance to reform.
Also, he showed some concern for economic reform but little for political change. In fact,
interest in political reform only became slightly more prominent after 2001 and in 2008, which
suggests that Washington’s involvement in the country triggered a certain kind of prodemocratic discourse.
217
Appendix IV: Ethical considerations for interviewees
I conducted thirteen interviews during my visits to Uzbekistan although they were not a
significant feature of my research. The closed nature of the regime as well as my lack of contacts
in the country prevented me from engaging with important political actors in Uzbekistan.
Nonetheless, the interviews were perhaps relevant to raise my awareness on some issues.
I contacted most interviewees to check whether they would be available to answer some
questions about the regime. Most interviews were structured around a pre-determined set of
questions on foreign policy, but I otherwise allowed respondents to digress on what they felt
were the important issues for around thirty to forty minutes.
The interview could have brought some risk to the participant, given the authoritarian
nature of Uzbekistan’s regime. To minimize that risk, any information on the interviewees is not
accessible and all their responses are made strictly confidential and anonymous. Accordingly, all
respondents are encoded and no description of the interviewee, such as the nature of his/her
work and the date of our meetings, is indicated throughout my research.
218
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