Epistemology
Tihamér Margitay – Péter Hartl
4. Foundationalism
Justified beliefs
We think that there are beliefs which are justified, and which are not
justified.
We have good reasons to accept some beliefs, but of course there are
beliefs which we don't accept.
It is justified that:
Hemoglobin in the blood is what transports oxygen from the lungs or gills
to the rest of the body (i.e. the tissues) where it releases the oxygen
for cell use.
Napoleon has lost a battle at Waterloo.
Ordinary beliefs like: This course is held on Budapest University of
Technology.
It is not justified that: There are extraterrestrial intelligent beings, and
they have already visited the Earth.
The foundation of justified beliefs
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Some beliefs are known or justifiedly believed only
because some other beliefs are known or justifiedly
believed.
When we a justification for a belief, we usually appeal to
other beliefs.
Questions: Should all beliefs be supported by other
beliefs?
Are there beliefs which cannot be doubted? Is there an
absolute certain ground of our knowledge?
Are some beliefs rightly believed apart from receiving
support from other beliefs? What is the nature of the
proper support between beliefs?
How do you know...?
There are conditions in which we accept a statement without
further justification.
(When I'm reading):„ I am reading.”,
„Budapest is the capital of Hungary.”,
„The water freezes at the temperature of 0 degrees
centigrade.”
We don't doubt them.
But of course there are conditions in which we usually require
a justification.
If someone makes a statement, and others don't accept it, or
ask for reasons to believe it.
How do you...?
When we ask: „How do you know that?”, we ask for a justification.
Examples: Debates in everyday life.
On the court the prosecutor wants to prove that the defendant is guilt.
Scientific theories require justification. (There are different methods and
requirements of justification.)
But there might be situations in which even the statement 'Budapest is
the capital of Hungary' requires for a justification. (A foreign turist
confuses Bucharest with Budapest.)
Whan if the requirement of justification can be applied to every
beliefs? What if everything can be doubted?
The regress argument
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P1: If there is a justification of our beliefs, then it leads to the
infinite or ends at an unjustified belief or runs in a circle or there
are self-justified beliefs.
P2: The infinite reasoning cannot be a proper justification of our
beliefs.
P3: The circular reasoning cannot be a proper justification of
our beliefs.
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P4: Appealing to unjustified belief cannot be proper justification.
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P5: There are no self-justified beliefs.
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C: None of our beliefs are justified.
Argument for foundationalism
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Foundationalism is a one of possible responses to the sceptical
conclusion of the regress argument.
Foundationalist rejects P5, and claims that: there are selfjustified beliefs.
These are basic beliefs. They are immediatly justified beliefs.
Their justification is a non-infential justification.
These basic beliefs are usually considered incorrigible,
infallible, certain.
The basic beliefs support the other beliefs. Non-basic beliefs
are justified if they can be inferred from basic beliefs.
The structure of knowledge
Foundationalism
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Some beliefs are basic beliefs, and that the rest of
one’s beliefs inherit their epistemic status (knowledge
or justification) in virtue of receiving support from the
basic beliefs.
Two main problems: What are the basic beliefs, and
what kind of special character do they have?
How can the basic beliefs provide appropriate
support in favour of other, non-basic beliefs?
Classical version of foundationalism
Basic beliefs must be justified independently of reasoning.
Because a belief which can only be justified by inference, its justification is
dependent on the justification of other beliefs from which the reasoning
proceeds.
Ordinary perceptual beliefs can be fallible.
Examples of perceptual errors: If I see a red shirt in green light I may think it is
black.
They are influenced by expectations: If I expect to see my father sitting behind
the desk, I may think I do see him if someone is sitting there who resembles
him.
There are possible cases of perceptual illusion (and hallucination.)
Perceptual beliefs and fallibility
Problem: If perceptual beliefs are fallible, it seems that need
further justification, and hence cannot provide the stopping
point for justification.
Therefore the fallible perceptual beliefs cannot be
ultimate basis of our knowledge.
Traditional answer of foundationalism: Basic beliefs are
not the ordinary perceptual beliefs.
Ordinary perceptual beliefs are about physical objects (or
lead me to have beliefs about the external objects.) 'This is
a hand.'
I can be mistaken about what I see, but I cannot be mistaken
about what it seems to me.
'It seems to me...'
I looked at paper, it seems to white. And I cannot be mistaken
about: it seems to white.
This is certain, infallible, I cannot doubt about it.
We must use very restricted formulations.
It appears to me white.
It remains certainly true even if my perception is wrong.
'It seems to me it is bent.'
'The pencil is bent.' false, if the pencil is
not bent.
But if the pencil looks to
me bent, then it is
certainly true that:
'The pencil seems to
me bent.'
Classical foundationalism
Classical foundationalism: 1. Our basic beliefs are beliefs about our
sensory experience. 'How do you know...?' questions lead to beliefs of
immediate experience ('Because I see /hear.. it.')
The basic beliefs are about my present state sensory experience.
2. These beliefs are considered infallible.
3. Other beliefs can be derived from the basic beliefs about sensory
experiences.
Other version – Vienna Circle: protocoll-sentences are the basic beliefs “N.N has made a certain observation (at such and such conditions).”
(or 'confirmations' are the basic beliefs. 'Now it seems to me blue.')
Justified (verified) if and only if it can be derived from the protocoll
sentences.
Basic beliefs about experience
Classical foundationalism:
Basic beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal character of my
own present state experiences.
Now it appears to me...
These beliefs are infallible, incorrigible, cannot be doubted.
These beliefs provide the ultimate basis of our knowledge. They
are self-justified.
These basic beliefs provide justification for other beliefs.
A belief is justified if and only if it is a basic belief or can be justified
by means of basic beliefs (or by a belief which is justified by
basic beliefs...).
Incorrigible beliefs
Definition:
Incorrigibility: A proposition P is incorrigible for a person S if
and only if (1) it is necessarily true that if S believes P then
P is true, and (2) it is necessarily true that if S believes ~P
then P is false.
Believing P should guarantee that P is true, and believing ~P
should guarantee that P is false.
This is attempt to define incorrigibility for propositions: No one
could be in a position to correct an incorrigible belief.
Beliefs about the external world are corrigible, but according to
classical foundationalism appearance beliefs are incorrigible
(cannot be doubted).
Problems with definition
But there are beliefs which are certain (in a sense) and no one
could be in a position to correct them which are not selfjustifying.
When I believe in complex and true mathematical theorem, I
cannot be wrong, but it doesn't mean that I have a justification.
(example: Fermat theorem)
And mathematical theorems remain true (in some sense) even if
one disbelieves them.
They are not incorrigible according to the definition.
Another definition: self-presenting
We have certain knowledge about our own mental states.
If I'm in a mental state (I have pain), then it is
neccessary that I'm aware it.
This is an other formulation of incorrigility of basic beliefs.
Self-presenting: A belief p is self-presenting if it
neccessary true that if the proposition p is true at t,
than I believe p at t.
'I feel pain.' If I'm in this state (I feel pain), it is neccessary
that I'm aware it, it cannot be unnoticed by me.
Problems with foundationalism
None of the definitions of 'infallibility', 'incorrigibilty' are
proper coherent definitions of 'being justified'.
Problem: What does it mean 'neccessary true'?
1. Logical sense: 'The p proposition is true at t'. 'I believe nonp at t' are inconsisent propositions.
But: p:'I'm awake' this is proposition about my own mental
state, and if I'm really awake I believe that I'm awake. But is
possible that I'm mistaken.
Problem: Being self-presenting doesn't mean that the
belief is justified. I belive that p, when p is true. But it
doesn't mean that p is (self-)justified. I may believe p when
p is false.
Problems with foundationalism
2. Self-presenting in weaker sense:
Self-presenting is not equal to being justified.
Let p: 'I'm in a brain state S.' Suppose that it is true (because
of certain causal laws) that whenever I'm in a brain states
S, I always believe that 'I'm in a brain state S', but of course
I can image a situation when: 1, I'm in brain state S 2, I
believe that, but my belief isn't justified.
Example: A brain scientist causes my brain state S, and my
belief as well. In this case my belief cannot be considered
as a justified belief.
Problems with justification
Suppose that we have infallible beliefs (or phenomenal states).
Problem: 1, How can we infer to non-basic beliefs? What is
relation between the basic and non-basic beliefs?
These appearences (or 'appearance beliefs') are subjective. They
are about my own present experiences, but not about the
external world. How can they establish beliefs about the
external world?
2, The non-basic beliefs are fallible, even if the basic beliefs
are infallible. Because we don't have conclusive reasons to
conclude to non-basic beliefs.
Non-basic beliefs can be only probably true, even if the basic
beliefs are infallible.
Problems with justification
Classical foundationalism: justification of non-basic beliefs by means
of inference
Justification by inference. Suppose that appearance beliefs are infallible
in a sense. (They cannot be false.)
1. Deductive valid inference.
P1: Now A seems to me red – infallible (basic)
P2: If something seems to me red, it is red. - fallible
C: A is red.
Modus ponens, deductively valid, but P2 is not true. There are possible
cases when I have perceptual errors.
Even if P1 is true, C might be false.
Problems with justification
2. Inductive reasoning (hypothetical reasoning).
P1: Now A seems to me red. - infallible (basic)
P2: Usually when something seems to me red, it is (probably) red.
C: It is red.
Conclusion might be false, even all premises are true, because it is
an inductive inference (generalisation or hypothetical reasoning.).
Final conclusion: Even if we have infallible, basic beliefs, our other, nonbasic beliefs are all fallible (they can be only probably true).
Why are we seeking the infallible foundations of knowledge? At the
best, a very narrow part of our knowledge is infallible (in some
sense), but our most important part of knowledge remains fallible
(science etc.).
Problems with foundationalism
Are beliefs are foundations of our knowledge? Or experiences are the
foundations, and beliefs are based on direct phenomeal experiences
(which have a non-propositional content)?
Foundationalist theory has problems if the justification is
considered as an inference between beliefs (or other mental
states.)
1.) I believe that it is white paper, because it seems to me it is white
(I have an experience).
2.) Or: It belive in the proposition 'It seems white' is true.
1: How can we infer from a mental state which is not a proposition to a
proposition (belief)? Inference is logical relation between propositions.
2: The basic belief would be: 'It seems to me white', but this belief is
justified only because in fact I'm in a certain mental state. Therefore
this belief cannot be basic.
Problems of justification
Classical foundationalism: p is justified if p is basic belief (state) or can
be derived from justified beliefs.
But most of our knowledge depends on testimony.
Napoleon has lost a battle at Waterloo in 1815. There is a planet,
Neptune which is 17 times the mass of Earth and orbits the Sun
at a distance approximately 30 times the Earth-Sun distance .
These propositions cannot be derived from my present (or past) sensory
experiences (sense-data). I'm not familiar with the evidences for these
claims.
My beliefs (and knowledge) depend on others. I trust in other people's
claims.
But this trust cannot be entirely justified according to the notion of
justification of the classical, empiricist foundationalism.
Classical (strong) foundationalismsummary
The theory is inadequate for a philosophical reconstruction of our
knowledge.
We know much about the world around us, the facts about the past
and about the universe and about microscopic entities.
Even if this reconstruction is restricted to facts about an individual’s
own mind it is nearly impossible to find out how we can get
back to our ordinary picture of the world.
This strong version of foundationalism is not productive. We 'know'
that we know a lot of things which are not (or cannot) be justified
by means of my immediate sensory experience.
Weaker formulations of foundationalism
William Alston argues for a different version of
foundationalism. The former objections seem to harmless
against this theory.
Distinction between epistemic beliefs and non-epistemic beliefs.
Epistemic beliefs are beliefs whose content contains an
epistemic concept such as knowledge or justification.
Non-epistemic belief does not contain an epistemic concept.
The belief that there is a red circle before me is not an epistemic
belief because does not contain any epistemic concepts.
The belief that I am justified in believing that there is a red,
circle before me is an epistemic belief.
The classical version of foundationalism didn't make this
distinction.
Weaker formulations of foundationalism
An argument against (classical) foundationalism might require that
to be justified in believing that p one must justifiedly believe that
I am justified in believing that p.
Alston: 1. I can justifiedly believe that p, unless I'm justified in
'I'm justifiedly belief that p'.
2.Foundationalism doesn't require that: 'being justified' and
'the ability of making a justification' are the same.
S can be justified in believing that she has hands without being in a
position to exhibit her justification. S is justified in believing that
she has existed for more than five minutes but she cannot
demonstrate her justification.
Foundationalism without infallibility
3. Immediately justified beliefs may be fallible, revisable, and
dubitable.
S’s belief that she has hands is might be false and revised in light of
future evidence.
Perhaps she has been fitted with a prosthetic device that looks and
functions just like a normal hand.
But when she looks and appears to see a hand, she is fully justified in
believing that she has hands.
Externalism: Justification is not just a (logical) relation between my
mental states (beliefs of perceptions).
Being justified depends on factors which are external compared to
my mind.