Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Global Environmental Change
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha
Show some enthusiasm, but not too much: carbon capture and storage
development prospects in China
Mark Jaccard a,*, JianJun Tu b
a
b
School of Resource and Environmental Management, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Way, Burnaby, Vancouver, Canada
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, United States
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Article history:
Received 8 May 2010
Received in revised form 8 March 2011
Accepted 9 March 2011
Available online 17 April 2011
China is the world’s largest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter and its energy system is dominated by coal. For
China to dramatically reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over the next few decades, it must either
replace most of its uses of coal with energy supplies from renewables and nuclear power or install
demonstration-size and then scaled-up carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. Currently, China is
pushing ahead with increased investment in renewables and nuclear power and with demonstration CCS
projects. This strategy is consistent with a country that seeks to be ready in case global pressures prompt it
to launch an aggressive GHG reduction effort while also not going so fast that it reduces the likelihood of
receiving substantial financial support from wealthier countries, as it feels it is entitled to as a developing
country. At such a time, given the magnitude of the coal resource in China, and the country’s lack of other
energy resources, it is likely the Chinese will make a substantial effort to develop CCS before taking the
much more difficult step of trying to phase-out almost all use of coal in the span of just a few decades in a
country that is so dependent on this domestically abundant and economically affordable resource.
ß 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
CCS
Coal
China
Climate
1. Introduction
With China’s fossil fuel-related CO2 emissions now the highest in
the world, at about one quarter of the global total, its participation is
obviously crucial to the success of any global effort to significantly
reduce GHG emissions by mid-century. But China’s fossil fuelrelated efforts thus far have been mostly in the opposite direction. Its
expansion of coal-fired electricity generation, at an astonishing 12%
annually since 2000, has rapidly increased CO2 emissions (NBS,
various years-b). Its efforts to slow the growth of oil imports via
investments in coal-to-liquids (CTL) technologies (producing
synthetic gasoline and diesel) provide an additional and potentially
massive source of growing CO2 emissions. Its political leaders
continue to note the responsibility of wealthier countries for today’s
high atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and other greenhouse gases
(GHG) and argue that these countries should make the initial GHG
reductions as well as paying much of the costs of GHG abatement in
China and other developing countries.
China’s plentiful coal resources are the foundation of its energy
system and made a critical contribution to its economic miracle of
the last three decades. Coal currently accounts for 71% of the
country’s primary energy consumption and represents 93% of its
proven fossil fuel reserves (BP, 2010). At a mere 32 million tonnes in
1949, China’s coal production has skyrocketed to about 3.3 billion
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 778 782 4219.
E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Jaccard).
0959-3780/$ – see front matter ß 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.03.002
tonnes in 20101 and the Chinese coal industry notes the potential for
production to continuously grow strongly in the coming decades
(Task Force on Sustainable Use of Coal in China, 2009).
There are only two ways for China to reverse this trend and
actually reduce GHG emissions over the next few decades. Either it
moves quickly to replace almost completely its use of coal with
renewable and nuclear forms of energy, or it rapidly applies an
ambitious program of carbon capture and storage (CCS) to its coal
uses in concert with efforts to also increase the market share of
renewables and nuclear. Both of these options are difficult to
envision from technical, economic, social and institutional
perspectives. Moreover, the Chinese government has thus far
not expressed a serious interest in pursuing either option.
This situation in China, with smaller-scale parallels in India and
other developing countries, explains why many observers are
pessimistic about the likelihood of the global community acting in
time to avert major climate change. This view is reinforced if one
simply observes the lack of substantial effort over several decades by
wealthy countries, notably the US which is the world’s second
highest CO2 emitter.
Nonetheless, there are scenarios under which China would seek
to rapidly reduce its CO2 emissions. One possibility is that trade
threats from major global economies change its perspective on
what is in its self-interest. Another possibility is that its political
1
http://www.sei.gov.cn/ShowArticle2008.asp?ArticleID=194243, accessed on
February 21, 2011.
M. Jaccard, J.J. Tu / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
leaders become convinced that an effort by China would ensure a
global effort for which the China-specific costs of GHG abatement
are exceeded by the benefits of averting China-specific ecological
and economic damages from climate change. Yet another
possibility is that wealthy countries provide enough financial
support to tip the calculus of costs and benefits for the Chinese and
other developing countries, or that global R&D efforts reduce the
costs of GHG emissions reduction and likewise tip this balance in
favor of taking strong abatement actions. Another possibility is
that China comes to see leadership on climate change as a strategic
interest from a global diplomacy perspective, even without the
threat of emissions-related tariffs, and even though abatement is
quite expensive. Finally, it is possible that all of these factors play a
role and in conjunction succeed in convincing the Chinese
leadership to act aggressively in reducing GHG emissions over a
relatively short timeframe of just a few decades.
This question of whether China will eventually act aggressively
to reduce its GHG emissions is obviously of paramount concern. It
should not, however, be confused with a secondary question,
which is how, were China to become committed to a major
abatement effort, it is likely to reduce its emissions. We think it is
important to not confound these two questions. Sometimes one
hears the argument that China is unlikely to pursue CCS because
this technology is currently too expensive at today’s energy prices.
One also hears the argument that CCS will not succeed because the
Chinese government is not interested in acting on GHG emissions.
And, finally, one hears the argument that CCS will have great
challenges achieving social and institutional support in China.
We contend that all of these arguments are true today. But they
equally apply to the other options for reducing China’s GHG
emissions, namely the rapid scale-up of nuclear power and
renewables to replace virtually all uses of coal and other fossil fuels
(such as gasoline and diesel in transportation) in a matter of just a
few decades. First, it is obvious that if China does not pursue GHG
abatement it will also not pursue CCS. Instead, it will continue its
rapid expansion of coal use, even more rapidly than it develops
nuclear or renewables, for coal is China’s cheapest energy source
for electricity generation and perhaps even for domestic production of liquid fuels like gasoline and diesel. Second, it is equally
obvious that CCS will be expensive and difficult to scale-up in a
matter of just a few decades, and that China is ill prepared
technically, educationally, legally and institutionally for such an
endeavor.
Of course, one could note the lack of a current commitment to
CCS and also ignore the formidable scale-up challenges facing its
renewable and nuclear competitors, in order to conclude that CCS
is unlikely to happen. But this hardly seems helpful. What we
believe is of more relevance to governments, industry, nongovernmental organizations and independent researchers is an
assessment of the likelihood that CCS will be a significant part of an
aggressive Chinese GHG abatement effort, should such an effort
ever materialize. To this end, we seek in this paper (1) to show
some of the challenges of China abandoning its use of coal without
instead first pursuing a major CCS effort, (2) to describe some of the
current tentative efforts to probe the CCS option in China, and (3) to
reflect on national and international drivers and institutional
reforms that might be integral to the development of CCS in China.
For CCS, or any other GHG abatement option, to be developed at
a large-scale in China, the government will need to virtually wage
war on GHG emissions, which is likewise the case for other
countries. Such a comprehensive commitment will require, among
other things, economy-wide policies that cause a substantial and
rising charge on GHG emissions. It will also most likely require
complementary regulations on technologies and fuel, and massive
subsidies for R&D and demonstration projects for zero- and lowemission options. If China, or any other country, does not
403
implement such aggressive policies, GHG emissions will not fall
substantially. The reason is quite simple. Fossil fuels, even coal
which is sometimes considered a poor cousin to oil and natural gas,
are an extremely high quality source of energy, and these fuels are
still so abundant and our economies so dependent on them that
humanity will continue to exploit fossil fuels intensively in the
absence of GHG abatement policy. Without such policy, emissions
of CO2 will not fall and indeed are much more likely to keep rising
rapidly. Most scenarios of the IPCC and other independent
organizations confirm this view, showing rapidly rising emissions
of CO2 and other GHGs over the coming decades in the absence of
aggressive GHG abatement policies (IPCC, 2007).
If, however, key countries like China decide to seriously attack
GHG emissions, then a key research objective is to assess the likely
prospects for CCS under a regime of aggressive GHG emissions
pricing and technology and fuel regulations. Before the Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009, Chinese president Hu
Jintao presented a specific target for China’s CO2 emissions
intensity in 2020, promising that its emissions per unit GDP
would be 40–45% lower than the 2005 level. To meet China’s
international commitment, the National Development and Reform
Commission is currently setting national targets on energy
intensity, carbon emissions intensity, renewable energy penetration, and carbon storage in the forest sector in preparation of the
12th Five Year Plan, the overarching guideline for China’s
economic, social and environmental development between 2011
and 2015 (Long et al., 2010). As a result, this paper will explore the
prospects and conditions for CCS if China were to aggressively
pursue GHG abatement.
In addressing this issue, we follow to some extent the analytical
approach demonstrated by Jaccard (2005) when assessing the
comparative prospects for the rapid scale-up of nuclear power,
renewable energy and CCS. This approach considers factors such as
the thermodynamic, technological and economic prospects for
decreasing the investment and operating costs of each option, the
implications and constraints due to competing uses for land and
water resources, the global distribution of energy resources and
resulting geopolitical considerations, and challenges facing each
option due to socio-political factors such as education levels,
technical training, public acceptance, risk acceptance and institutional arrangements.
The assessment in Jaccard (2005) concluded that combining
CCS technology with continued fossil fuel use has good prospects
in certain regions of the world, especially those characterized by
high energy needs, plentiful fossil fuel resources, adequate
prospects for carbon storage, and substantial challenges to scaling
up renewables and nuclear power to a degree that would eliminate
the use of fossil fuels in just a few decades. This conclusion was
based in part on the dramatic increase in the demand for electricity
for industry, buildings and transportation that would occur under a
scenario of rapidly reducing GHG emissions from all sectors, which
in turn would present a monumental task for the expansion of
nuclear power and renewables if these were to quickly become the
only primary energy sources.
Thus, our approach in this paper is to take an energy systems
perspective in which we avoid the assumption that one can
determine in isolation the prospects for just one of the options for
GHG abatement. Certainly, in this paper, we focus on specific
aspects of CCS and its potential in China, especially with respect to
its application to the use of coal. But we do this in the context of
considering also the prospects for rapid scale-up of the alternatives
to CCS and we assess these considerations within an energy system
modelling framework.
Our paper has the following components. Section 2 provides an
overview of the importance of coal within China’s energy system
and the importance of China within the global energy system,
M. Jaccard, J.J. Tu / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
404
including global GHG emissions. Section 3 produces a reference
scenario of the likely increase in China’s GHG emissions in the
absence of aggressive climate policies. Section 4 provides a
preliminary assessment of the technical and geological potential
for CCS in China, with implications for the cost evolution of this
option. Section 5 describes the current institutions and responsibilities for governing the Chinese energy system and, within this
context, suggests policies and institutional arrangements that
would promote early CCS experiments and demonstrations in
China, as well as establish an effective regulatory environment if
this technology were to become a significant component of the
Chinese energy system. Section 6 briefly highlights potential
national and international drivers for the pursuit of CCS in China
and policies that would enhance the prospects for this development. Section 7 provides concluding comments.
2. China’s importance in global energy use, coal use and GHG
emissions
With over 1.3 billion inhabitants, China represents one fifth of
the world’s population. After the United States, China has the
world’s second largest economy, is the second largest energy
producer and consumer, and has the greatest emissions of CO2.
Table 1 highlights China’s growing importance in the world in
terms of its percentage share of global population, economic
output, energy consumption and CO2 emissions.
China’s energy sector is dominated by coal and it is now
responsible for 44% of global coal production. With such an
important role for coal and such a large economy, China’s CO2
emissions from fossil fuel combustion have increased dramatically
since 1949, at an average annual growth rate of 5.2%, and in 2006
China surpassed the United States (Fig. 1). Coal alone represents
83% of China’s cumulative, energy-related CO2 emissions over the
past six decades, with the remaining 17% originating from oil and
gas combustion.
During international negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol
of 1997, in which industrialized countries committed to reduce
their GHG emissions, China strongly opposed suggestions that it
should constrain growth of its emissions. It argued that since
today’s higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations were produced by
wealthy countries, as they industrialized over the past two
centuries, China and other developing countries should not accept
CO2 emission constraints until their level of economic well-being
reached that of industrialized countries. Moreover, initial reductions of emissions in China and other developing countries should
be paid for by industrialized countries.
In recent years, however, the perspective of the Chinese
government appears to be shifting. The growing strength of the
Chinese economy has enabled the Chinese to reassert themselves
as a world power and with this stature comes an assumption of
greater responsibility for issues of global concern. China now
provides significant aid to Africa and other developing countries.
Table 1
China as the percentage of the world total.
Primary energy consumption
Coal demand
Oil demand
Gas demand
Power generation
CO2 emissions
GDP in current PPP term
Population
1970
1990
2009
4.7
12.9
1.3
0.3
2.3
5.8
8.5
23.7
3.6
0.8
5.2
10.9
3.6
21.5
19.5
46.9
10.4
3.0
17.5
24.2
12.6
19.7
22.2
Source: World Development Indicators online, NBS (various years-a, various yearsb) and BP (2010).
China played a major role in stabilizing the global economy in
response to the financial crisis of 2008–2009. And, more recently,
Chinese leaders speak about climate change as a global threat that
requires all countries to play a role in reducing emissions, even
though China still maintains that industrialized countries should
do more domestically as well as paying some of the costs for
developing countries to acquire more expensive, lower-emission
technologies.
Prior to, and again during, the Copenhagen climate summit in
late 2009, the Chinese government presented a specific target for
its CO2 emissions intensity in 2020, promising that its emissions
per unit GDP would be 40–45% lower than their 2005 levels. While
some might see this as a major breakthrough for international
negotiations, others might note that China’s emissions intensity
has fallen substantially in recent years, even while emissions grew
rapidly. According to the IEA (2010a), China’s carbon intensity per
unit GDP declined by 87% between 1990 and 2008 but its
emissions, as Fig. 1 shows, grew more rapidly than ever.
If the Chinese economy continues to grow at a rate approaching
that of the last two decades, its emissions in 2020 – even while
achieving the 45% target for reducing its emissions intensity – will
be more than double their current level (Jiang et al., 2009). With
China as the world’s largest GHG emitter, such a growth in
emissions would make it impossible for humanity to achieve the
level of reductions that climate scientists are calling for. But for
China to have significantly lower levels of growth in its GHG
emissions, it needs to either deploy CCS technologies or shift even
more rapidly from fossil fuels towards renewable energy, nuclear
power and accelerated improvement in energy efficiency.
3. Reference scenario of China’s energy sector to 2050
Using international and Chinese projections, and an energy
system simulation model, we projected China’s demographic and
economic changes to mid-century and used this as a basis for
forecasting the growing demand for energy services and specific
forms of energy. The simulation model is described in Tu et al.
(2007). Fig. 2 presents the general economic trends underlying our
projection of China’s energy service demand to 2050. In 2005,
China had 1.31 billion people, with 43% categorized as urban, and
its GDP was US$ 1.62 trillion ($2000).
The population projections represent the medium forecast from
established demographers (United Nations, 2006). During the 45year modelling period, China’s population is expected to increase
by 12% to peak at 1.46 billion in 2030 and then gradually decline to
1.41 billion in 2050. The urbanized proportion of the population
will reach 1.1 billion people, or 75% of the population, by 2050. The
GDP projections are based on the Chinese government’s goal of
quadrupling GDP between 2000 and 2020, with continued rapid
growth to 2050.
In this study, we applied CIMS, a hybrid energy economy model
to explore China’s reference energy and environmental trajectories. CIMS is an integrated, energy-economy equilibrium model
that simulates the interaction of energy supply-demand and the
macroeconomic performance of key sectors of the economy. As a
technology vintage model, CIMS tracks the evolution of capital
stocks over time through retirements, retrofits, and new purchases,
in which consumers and businesses make sequential acquisitions
with limited foresight. The model calculates energy costs (and
emissions) at each energy service demand node in the economy. In
each time-period, capital stocks are retired according to an agedependent function, and demand for new stocks grows or declines
depending on the initial exogenous forecast of economic output,
and then the subsequent interplay of energy supply-demand with
the macroeconomic module. A model simulation iterates between
energy supply demand and the macroeconomic module until
[()TD$FIG]
M. Jaccard, J.J. Tu / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
FueCombuson Emissions (GtCO2 )
7.0
6.0
5.0
405
China -Gas
China -Oil
China -Coal
Total U.S.Emissions
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
1949
1959
1969
1979
1989
1999
Fig. 1. Fuel combustion CO2 emissions: China vs. United States. Note: China’s updated energy statistics released in 2010 indicate that China has already passed the U.S. as the
world’s largest carbon emitter in 2006, which is one year earlier than what the previous energy statistics imply.
Source: NBS (various years-a, various years-b), ONCCCC and EIA (2007), U.S. EPA (2011) and the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center.
[()TD$FIG]
20
GDP
GDP -Agriculture
Index(2005= 1.00)
15
GDP -Industry
GDP -Service
Urban Population
10
Rural Population
5
0
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Fig. 2. General economic assumptions on China’s GDP, population and urbanization.
Source: Analysis by authors.
energy price changes fall below a threshold value, and repeats this
convergence procedure in each subsequent five-year period of a
complete run, which extends 45 years between 2005 and 2050 in
this study. The CIMS model does not differ significantly from many
other simulation models used to forecast energy use and
associated emissions, but it differs from simulation models which
tend to produce a somewhat optimistic description of future
technology choices by firms and households.
Table 2 illustrates our reference model simulation results for
China’s energy sector. Between 2005 and 2050, primary energy
consumption in China is expected to grow from 2230 million
tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) to 5841 Mtce.2 This is the result of
increasing demand for mobility (transport) and consumer goods,
which cause increased use of energy in industry and electricity
generation. Although the development of natural gas, nuclear and
renewables is projected to grow quickly, coal still represents more
than 50% of China’s primary energy consumption in 2050,
compared with 23% from oil, 11% from natural gas, and 14% from
primary electricity (nuclear, large hydro, other renewables).
Compared with similar studies, our reference forecast falls in
2
1 Mtce = 29.31 Petajoules.
the mid-range of fossil-fuel energy and carbon emission estimates
made by IEA (2010b), UNDP (2010), ERI (2009) and US EIA (2010).
The development of electricity generation by source is
noteworthy. By 2050, more than 80% of China’s potential hydro
resources are expected to be exploited, accounting for 14.6% of
electricity output. The shares of nuclear and other renewables in
the electricity generation mixture rise to 12% and 1.5% in 2050,
exhibiting rapid rates of growth, but starting from an initially low
level. In comparison, the percentage of fossil fuel thermal power
(coal and natural gas) declines to 71% in 2050, but this still means
that the generation of electricity from coal increases from
1962 TWh in 2005 (2502 TWh 78.4%) to 6460 TWh in 2050
(9954 TWh 64.9%). This occurs while the efficiency of coal (and
natural gas plants) increases from today’s average of 35% to an
average of 46% in 2050. As a result, the use of coal in this scenario
almost doubles and China’s fuel combustion CO2 emissions
continue to grow by about 2% annually until 2050.
The simulation illustrates the point that an improvement in
emissions intensity in a rapidly growing economy will not
necessarily reduce absolute emissions and, indeed, may be
associated with significantly rising emissions. While China’s fuel
combustion CO2 emissions intensity drops 81% between 2005 and
406
M. Jaccard, J.J. Tu / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
Table 2
Reference scenario of China’s energy sector, 2005–2050.
Final energy consumption (Mtce)
Agriculture (%)
Industry (%)
Transportation (%)
Commercial (%)
Residential (%)
Primary energy consumption (Mtce)
Coal (%)
Oil (%)
Gas (%)
Hydro (%)
Nuclear (%)
Other new and renewable (%)
Electricity output (TWh)
Coal (%)
Oil (%)
Gas (%)
Hydro (%)
Nuclear (%)
Other new and renewable (%)
Fuel combustion carbon emissions (MtCO2)
2005
2009
2030
2050
1579
3.2
69.3
14.0
3.4
10.1
2230
69.5
20.6
2.9
6.2
0.8
0.0
2502
78.4
2.8
0.7
15.9
2.1
0.1
5052
2178
1.7
70.6
13.8
4.0
9.9
3066
70.4
17.9
3.9
6.5
0.8
0.0
3715
79.4
1.7
2.0
14.7
2.0
1.6
6848
3130
3.0
62.7
17.8
4.8
11.7
4506
59.9
21.8
7.6
6.6
3.5
0.7
6419
69.7
0.8
4.8
15.5
8.2
1.0
9624
4086
2.8
55.4
20.5
7.3
14.0
5841
52.6
23.1
10.8
6.6
5.7
1.2
9954
64.9
0.6
6.0
14.6
12.4
1.5
11,900
Source: analysis by authors.
Note: the most recent available data in 2009 are provided for comparison.
2050, China’s fuel combustion CO2 emissions increase 136% during
the same period. It also shows that while coal can lose its market
share to nuclear and renewables, and coal conversion to electricity
become much more efficient, nonetheless the total production and
consumption of coal might still increase by 100% or more, driving
the rise in CO2 emissions.
The simulation suggests that if China were to dramatically
reduce its emissions while phasing out coal (as opposed to
investing in CCS), it would need even more dramatic gains in
energy efficiency alongside an extremely rapid deployment of
nuclear power and renewables. If we assume substantially higher
energy prices (from emission charges at $10/tCO2e in 2013 rising
exponentially to $100/tCO2e in 2050) and aggressive complementary regulations including (1) accelerated closure of small power
plants in the electricity industry, (2) subsidies for renewables, (3)
accelerated de-commissioning of inefficient heavy industrial
plants, (4) vehicle efficiency standards, and (5) voluntary
initiatives within an public environmental action campaign, one
might conjecture that total energy consumption would grow more
slowly, and China would thus be able to stabilize its carbon
emissions between 2010 and 2050, the equivalent of a 47%
emissions reduction during the same period. However, electricity
generation would still be above the reference case level in 2050
because electricity would be replacing fossil fuel-derived transport
fuels and fuels used in industry and buildings.
Our preliminary estimates suggest that China would need to
complete a nuclear plant every few weeks for the next 45 years
(assuming 40 year plant life). Because of security considerations
and water cooling needs, the surface land requirements alone
would be considerable and this is before considering the
unresolved challenge of storing radioactive wastes and decommissioning old plants (Harding, 2008). In contrast, CCS requires
underground storage and much less surface land. Most costs of
nuclear ignore full-scale insurance costs (because of government
liability guarantees) and waste disposal costs. When these are
included, nuclear may well be more expensive than coal with CCS,
especially as nuclear expansion finds itself in ever greater
competition for scarce land in China.
An even greater land requirement confronts the massive scaleup of renewables, which because they are of much lower energy
density require large areas of land for solar, wind, biomass, run-of-
river hydro and other small renewables. And because most of these
electricity sources are non-dispatchable (their time of generation
depends on uncontrollable natural conditions–wind, waterflow,
sunlight) there would also have to be huge investments in energy
storage, be these batteries, flywheels, underground storage of
compressed air, hydrogen in tanks, or some other storage
technology. Current estimates are that the cost of energy from
intermittent renewables will be two to five times higher when
energy storage costs are considered (Poonpun and Jewell, 2008).
Thus, scale-up of renewables will be a very expensive proposition
in much of China.
These alternatives to CCS, scaled-up at an extremely rapid rate
involve a great many impacts and risks and require technological,
financial, geological, institutional, training and other capacities
that neither developing countries nor developed countries possess
today. Jaccard (2005) details just how challenging would be such a
complete elimination of fossil fuels in the matter of just a few
decades, especially in a country like China that is not rich and yet
has an impressive wealth of coal and extensive technical and
organizational skills in dealing with this energy source.
This comparative exploration of low- and zero-emission
options is examined in much greater detail in other publications,
for which Tu et al. (2007) provides references. In the following
sections, we focus more specifically on key factors that might
influence the development of China’s CCS potential.
4. CCS technical, geological and economic potential
The contribution of CCS relative to other options depends on
technological capability, geological storage capacity and costs, but
also on critical policy goals such as energy security and
international cooperation. In this section, we discuss the technological, geological and economic factors.
Li et al. (2009) reports that China’s 1623 large stationary CO2
sources collectively emit over 3.9 GtCO2 annually with the
following sector breakdown:
629 fossil-fired power plants (72% of large, stationary CO2 source
emissions);
554 cement plants (14%);
M. Jaccard, J.J. Tu / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
407
Table 3
Summary of China’s potential CO2 storage capacity.
Onshore
Percentage (%)
Offshore
Percentage (%)
Total
Percentage (%)
Deep saline
formations (GtCO2)
Oil fields by proved
OOIP (GtCO2)
Gas fields by proved
OGIP (GtCO2)
Unmineable coal
seams (GtCO2)
Total (GtCO2)
2288
99.1
778
99.9
3066
99.3
4.6
0.2
0.2
0.0
4.8
0.2
4.28
0.2
0.90
0.1
5.18
0.2
12
0.5
0
0
12
0.4
2309
100
779
100
12
100
()TD$FIG][Source: Dahowski et al. (2008).
Fig. 3. CCS opportunities in China.
Source: adapted and updated from Fig. 19 in APEC (2005) according to Li (2009),
NRDC (2009), Innovation Norway (2009), Morse et al. (2009), E3G (2009), Zhao et al.
(2009), ChinaFAQs (2009), http://www.co2-coach.com and http://www.nzec.info.
160 ammonia plants (3%);
127 iron and steel mills (7%);
84 refineries (2%);
69 other facilities (1%).
Under our reference scenario, thermal power output in China is
expected to increase by nearly 250% by 2050. Not surprisingly,
coal-fired power plants offer by far the greatest opportunity for
CCS projects in China. A potential new source for CCS is coal-toliquid plants, a technology only recently pursued by the Chinese.3
Over 80 potential coal-to-liquid projects have been announced in
China in the last few years. But, in 2006, the Chinese government
decided the sector was growing too quickly and announced a halt
to new project approvals. Nevertheless, China’s coal-to-liquid
capacity has already reached 1.6 Mt/annum with the completion of
projects already approved (Tu, 2011). This could become a
significant source of CO2 emissions and, being concentrated, has
a significant potential for CCS, albeit with greater technological and
economic uncertainty than CCS at coal-fired electricity generation
facilities–a technology that is better understood although not yet
developed at commercial scales.
Like other regions of the world, research in China into the
geological potential for CO2 storage is still in its infancy. Dahowski
et al. (2008) identified and evaluated four major classes of deep
geologic reservoirs as candidates for long term geological storage of
anthropogenic CO2 in China. Their preliminary analysis (Table 3)
suggests that China has a potential capacity to store the rising CO2
emissions produced from its major point sources. In particular,
China’s potential for geological storage of CO2 totals 2309 GtCO2 in
onshore basins with potentially an additional 780 GtCO2 capacity in
relatively close offshore basins. The researchers also found that 54%
of large CO2 emission sources in China have a candidate storage
formation in the immediate vicinity, 83% have at least one storage
formation within 90 km, and 91% have the potential to reach a
candidate storage formation within 160 km. Finally, their preliminary analysis suggests that the majority of emissions from China’s
large CO2 point sources can be stored in large deep saline formations
at estimated transport and storage costs of less than $10/tCO2.
In order to stabilize China’s GHG emissions between 2010 and
2050, our modelling exercise, comparable to several other studies,
indicates the need for a carbon price starting at $10/tCO2e in 2013
and rising exponentially to $100/tCO2e in 2050. Other necessary
complementary regulations include (1) accelerated closure of small
power plants in the electricity industry, (2) subsidies for renewables,
(3) accelerated de-commissioning of inefficient heavy industrial
plants, (4) vehicle efficiency standards, and (5) voluntary initiatives
and public environmental campaign. Our analysis suggests that CCS
alone can account for 24% of China’s aggregate GHG emissions
reduction during our modelling period, compared with 35% by
energy conservation, 17% by fuel switching, 13% by other policy
measurements, and the remaining 11% as the overlapping between
energy conservation and CCS due to the energy penalty associated
with CCS implementation (Bataille et al., 2008).
CCS development activity in China is focused on a number of
small, stand-alone demonstration projects to test different
elements of the technology. Morse et al. (2009) suggest that the
primary driver of this research and development is to protect
China’s ability to continue to rely on its plentiful, domestic coal
resources while potentially developing domestic technical capaci3
Coal-to-liquid plants convert coal into synthetic carbon-based fuels such as
gasoline and diesel with a technology that was initially developed in the 1920s and
used at large scale to provide fuel for the German war effort during World War II.
The technology is used in South Africa today to meet about half of that country’s
demand for liquid fuels for transport. The production process of a CTL plant
produces considerably more CO2 emissions than a conventional oil well. The use of
CCS with this process would, however, not reduce the 80-85% of emissions that
come from the vehicle use phase of the CTL fuel cycle and so this option, while
desirable from an energy security perspective, has no benefit, even with CCS, from a
climate perspective.
M. Jaccard, J.J. Tu / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
408
Table 4
Summary of CCS activities in China.
Project
Status
Technology
Specification
Huaneng Gaobeidian Thermal
Power Plant in Beijing
Operational in 2008
Post-combustion capture only, amine
absorption
Huaneng Shidongkou II Power
Plant in Shanghai
Construction started in July
2009, and is expected to finish
by the end of 2009
Phase one under construction
Post-combustion capture only
3000 tCO2/annum capture only, which is then
processed and used by local beverage, firefighting
and pharmaceutical industries. US$ 4 million
research project by Australia CSIRO.
100,000 tCO2/annum capture only, which is then
processed and used by local industry.
GreenGen
IGCC pre-combustion de-carbonization
gasification or partial oxidation shift
plus CO2 separation
Shenhua CTL
Planned with the aim to be
operational in 2010/11
U.S. China Clean Energy
Research Center
At planning stage
Jiangsu/CAS Lianyungang IGCC
in Jiangsu
Datang Dongguan IGCC in
Guangdong
At planning stage
Huadian Banshan IGCC in
Zhejiang
CPI Langfang IGCC + EOR
At planning stage
IGCC
Waiting for government
approval
IGCC with carbon capture and 8% EOR
UK–China NZEC
Agreement signed in 2005 with
Phase I implemented between
February 2008 and 2009
TBD
COACH Project
R&D starting from 2006
China–EU STRACO2 Project
The STRACO2 project covered
the period January 2008 to
August 2009
China–Australia Geological
Storage (CAGS) project
Duration 2009–2011
Preparation for large-scale polygeneration energy facilities with options for
coal based power generation as well as
production of hydrogen and synthetic
fuels
Facilitate and increase Science and
Technology cooperation with China by
including Chinese partners in project
activities
Capacity building and research on
geological storage of CO2
Jilin Oil Field EOR Pilot
2006
CO2 flooding
Shengli Oil Field EOR Pilot
2007
CO2 flooding
Daqing Oil Field EOR Pilot
Japan–China EOR project in
Heilongjiang
2007
Agreement signed on
May 7, 2008
CO2 flooding
Post combustion capture and EOR
Qinshui ECBM
ECBM pilot project has been
completed with follow up
activities in 2008
ECBM
At planning stage
Direct coal to liquid plant
with capture and storage of
high purity process CO2
To be determined
IGCC with combined CCS
and EOR
IGCC with combined CCS
and EOR
Stage One (2005–2010): 2000 t/day gasifier, 250
MW IGCC operation, hydrogen production and CO2
separation at pilot scale. Stage Two (2010–2015):
3000 t/day gasifier, 400 MW IGCC, hydrogen
production and CO2 separation at 100 MW scale.
Stage Three (2015–2020): 3000 t/day gasifier, 400
MW GreenGen Demonstration, full scale CO2
capture.
100,000 tCO2/annum CCS, with an aim to eventually
sequester 2.9 MtCO2/annum.
Initial research priorities will be building energy
efficiency, clean coal including carbon capture and
storage, and clean vehicles.
Aiming to eventually build 1200 MW of IGCC plant,
with 200 km distance north of the Subei oil field
There are two options, the repowered option with
capacity of 2 60 MWe, and the second option with
plant capacity at 4 200 MWe. The plant will be
situated 100 km from two depleted oil fields
200 MWe IGCC plant with carbon capture option
under study
The China Power Investment Corporation has
proposed to build an IGCC facility in Langfang
(Beijing area) aiming to capture 8% of the CO2 from
the syngas produced by two 488 MWe IGCC units
Phase 1 is to explore the options for demonstration
and build capacity for CCS in China. Phase 2 will
carry out further development work, leading to
Phase 3, which aims to construct and operate a coalfired demonstration plant with CCS by 2020. Phase I
is supported by £3.5 million from the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change.
20 partners (R&D, Manufacturers, Oil & Gas
Companies, etc..), 12 for Europe and 8 for China.
Partially funded by Europe Union under the 6th
Framework Program.
The Support to Regulatory Activities for Carbon
Capture and Storage (STRACO2) Project is financed
by the European Union’s Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7).
CAGS was initiated and is funded with A$2.86
million by the Australian Government under the
Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and
Climate.
CO2 source: natural gas, 10–14% of CO2, 10 injection
wells and 28 production wells.
CO2 source: power plant, 13.5%, 4.15 106 t/year, 4
injection wells and 12 production wells.
CO2 source: natural gas, 20% of CO2.
1–3 MtCO2 will be captured annually from the
Harbin Thermal Power Plant and potentially other
plants elsewhere. It will then be transported by
pipeline about 100 km to China’s largest oil field–
the Daqing Oilfield, and injected and stored into the
oilfield.
Phase 1 is a single well micro-pilot designed to
quantify reservoir properties. Phase 2 expands the
single well effort into a 5-spot pilot with five wells.
Phase 3 expands the 5-spot pilot into a nine-pattern
commercial demonstration. Progression from one
phase to the next depends on the success of each
stage.
Source: Li (2009), NRDC (2009), Innovation Norway (2009), Morse et al. (2009), E3G (2009), Zhao et al. (2009), US Embassy in Beijing (2009), ChinaFAQs (2009), http://
www.co2-coach.com and http://www.nzec.info.
M. Jaccard, J.J. Tu / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
409
Table 5
Institutions and responsibilities related to CCS in China.
Stakeholders
Responsibility
State Council
National Development and Reform Commission
National Energy Commission
The State Council is the chief executive authority (cabinet) of the People’s Republic of China.
The Department of Climate Change is responsible for climate change-related issues including CCS.
The NEC is responsible to coordinate the overall national energy policies with the NEA
as its executive body.
The NEA under both the NEC and the NDRC is responsible for the management of China’s
energy sector.
The SASAC owns key state enterprises, but is supposedly not to directly intervene daily operations
of those enterprises.
The MEP is responsible for approving environmental impact assessments for new projects, submitted
during the feasibility stage, and monitors project operations for any breaches of pollution control
regulations.
The MWR is responsible for regulating and monitoring water-related impacts of CCS development.
The MLR is responsible for regulating and monitoring surface and subsurface impacts
of CCS development.
The SAWS is responsible for enforcing safety and health regulations.
The ASQIQ is responsible for setting official standards such as CO2 concentrations and
pipeline materials.
The MOF is responsible for channelling state funding for CCS development.
The MOST funds CCS-related R&D projects.
Develop sector-level action plan on climate change with the potential of promoting
CCS R&D at sector level.
Executive entities of most CCS projects in China.
Participate in R&D and international cooperation on CCS.
National Energy Administration
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission
Ministry of Environmental Protection
Ministry of Water Resource
Ministry of Land Resources
State Administration of Work Safety
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection
and Quarantine
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Science
Various Industrial Associations
Key State-owned Enterprises
Research Institutions
Source: Task Force on Sustainable Use of Coal in China (2009) and Seligsohn et al. (2010).
ty for this emerging energy technology. Table 4 lists the major CCS
activities in China and the map of Fig. 3 shows their location.
In recent years, Chinese national oil companies have experimented with CO2 injection for enhanced oil recovery in several
major oil fields including Shengli, Zhongyuan, Jilin, Daqin, Jiangsu,
and Songliao (Chen, 2010). Enhanced oil recovery is of interest
especially because it provides an opportunity to offset at least part
of CCS costs by providing value for oil recovery activities.
Another prospect for CO2 storage is via its injection into coal
beds to release methane for commercial production.4 China United
Coalbed Methane Co Ltd successfully conducted coal bed methane
extraction tests as early as 2004 in the south Qinshui basin of North
China’s Shanxi Province, although commercialization activities
have been slow so follow (Chen, 2010).
The electricity-related development of CCS in China has a
particular focus on pre-combustion technologies, notably integrated gasification combined cycle plants that enable separation
and capture of CO2 during the production of a hydrogen rich gas
that can be refined into pure hydrogen or combusted for thermalelectric generation. As part of the National 863 Program, a 36 t/day
dry pulverized coal pressurized gasification pilot plant was built at
the Xi’an Thermal Power Research Institute to test out the
technology that will be used for GreenGen, China’s first IGCCbased CCS project.5 The goal is to complete a 400MW IGCC
GreenGen power plant before 2020 with efficiency between 55 and
60% and over 80% of the CO2 separated and stored.6 Similarly, there
are several ongoing IGCC initiatives in Guangdong, Zhejiang and
Hebei with CO2 capture option under study (Xu, 2009).
4
Methane trapped in underground coal can be extracted and distributed as
natural gas after processing. Recent research suggests that the global coal bed
methane resource is enormous.
5
IGCC (integrated gasification combined cycle) is a newer technology that
gasifies coal or another solid fuel and then uses this gas to run a combined cycle
turbine – a turbine that generates electricity by combustion that drives a turbine
(like a jet engine) in a first cycle and uses the exhaust heat to drive a steam turbine
in a second cycle. The combined cycle technology is commonly used with natural
gas to generate electricity, but only a few large-scale IGCC plants are now under
construction.
6
http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/greengen.html, accessed on February 22, 2011.
China is also examining the potential for post-combustion
capture of CO2 from the flue gas of coal-fired electricity plants. A
3000 tCO2/annum CCS facility commissioned at Huaneng Group’s
Gaobeidian Thermal Power Plant in 2008 is China’s first
operational CCS pilot plant (IEA, 2009).
However, the first large-scale CCS project in China is slated to
occur at a coal-to-liquid plant. Shenua’s coal-to-liquid project in
Inner Mongolia will capture and store 100 thousand tCO2 per
annum.7 Although this represents only a small fraction of the
plant’s annual carbon emissions of 3.6 MtCO2, the technology can
be scaled up if it proves successful.
In summary, the majority of large point sources of CO2
emissions in China are located along the more heavily industrialized coastal zones and the Huabei plain. In comparison, the total
onshore storage capacities of depleted oil and gas fields and
unmineable coal bed seems amount to 20.9 GtCO2, which is only
about 3.5 times China’s total CO2 emissions in 2007 (Dahowski
et al., 2008). As a result, while enhanced oil and gas recovery and
unmineable coal beds may represent good opportunities for initial
CCS projects in China at significantly lower costs, large-scale CCS
deployment will require the country to develop more expensive
geological storage sites such as deep saline aquifers, perhaps
offshore where costs will be even higher.
As noted in the introduction, these projects do not represent a
Chinese commitment to CCS. Such a commitment is highly unlikely
without a major national commitment for rapid decreases in GHG
emissions. These projects show, however, that the Chinese
government and some of its major industries, especially in the
electricity generation sector, are developing experience with this
non-commercial technology, perhaps as part of a defensive
strategy to ensure preparedness should the country change its
views on the importance of GHG abatement and yet not wish to
abandon completely its valuable coal endowment and its
longstanding, successful engagement in coal-fired electricity.
Currently, approved IGCC projects in China include DatangShenyang; Datang-Beijing; Datang-Tianjin (under construction);
CPI-Langfang; Jiangsu/CAS-Lianyugang; Guodian-Haimen, Jiangsu;
7
http://www.nrcce.wvu.edu/cleanenergy/docs/4-Ren.pdf, accessed on February
22, 2011.
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CPI-Wujing, Shanghai; Huandian-BanShan, Hangzhou; GuohuaWenzhou; Tianming Electric Power – Dongguan; Datang-Dongguan; Datang-Shenzhen. Proposed IGCC projects offer opportunities for capture-ready CO2 and represent an important carbon
abatement potential, although there are no concrete plans for
geologic storage associated with most of these projects (ChinaFAQs, 2009).
In terms of economic potential, there is still great uncertainty
with respect to how the costs of CCS scale-up will compare with
those of scaling up its nuclear and renewables competitors for lowemissions energy supply. Preliminary cost estimates by international organizations and research centers suggest that China, with
its huge coal endowment and widespread sedimentary basins,
appears to have regions where CCS may well become competitive
over the coming decades. This will depend, of course, on both the
future evolution of CCS costs and the future costs of scaling up
nuclear and renewables. New nuclear plants in China are currently
able to provide electricity at lower cost than would a full-scale CCS
plant. But the cost of radioactive waste disposal and storage are not
included in these costs of nuclear power. Moreover, as China
increases its nuclear capacity, the cost could rise significantly,
particularly as the nuclear path in China would require hundreds
and eventually thousands of individual nuclear facilities occupying
a great deal of land and using great quantities of water. In the same
vein, some renewables may be lower cost than coal with CCS, but
as China tries to scale-up its use of renewables the costs will rise as
investments proceed from the best sites for wind power and
hydropower to less favourable sites. In any case, windpower, solar
and small-hydro costs are misleading on a direct per KWh basis
since these are non-dispatchable sources of electricity, so the
comparable cost should include the cost of scaled-up energy
storage, which is likely to be high. Likewise, biomass and waste
energy can be low cost in modest quantities, but there are physical
limits to the availability of waste energy and biomass energy must
compete with alternative uses of productive land for food and fibre,
which in turn will increase its cost considerably.
5. Governance of the Chinese energy system with relevance
for CCS
We have noted that the development of CCS in China, as
elsewhere, requires a very strong government commitment to
rapid reductions in GHG emissions. This is certainly not the case in
China today. But even if this were the case, the governance of the
Chinese energy system needs to be organized in a manner that can
enable CCS development. In this section, we describe briefly the
current governance system for the Chinese energy sector. This
provides the basis for discussion of agency reforms or new
institutional arrangements that might improve the prospects for
an effective exploration of the CCS option in China.
Table 5 summarizes the key institutions and their responsibilities as they potentially relate to CCS in China. While some
institutions relate to national economic management others are
focused on the energy sector in particular. The main references for
this information are China Council for International Cooperation
on Environment and Development’s Task Force on Sustainable Use
of Coal (2009) and Seligsohn et al. (2010).
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has
been assigned management responsibilities for (1) formulating key
strategies, plans and policies for addressing climate change, (2)
leading related ministries in attending international negotiations
on climate change, and (3) undertaking relevant work in regard to
the fulfillment of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change at the national level. Within the NDRC, the
Department of Climate Change is the primary agency responsible
for climate change assessment and climate policy development,
inter-departmental and international cooperation on climate
change, international relations related to the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, and undertaking concrete work
assigned by the National Leading Group Dealing with Climate
Change, Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction.
In July 2008, the National Energy Administration (NEA)
replaced the Energy Bureau of the NDRC. It has eight departments,
and its responsibilities include: drafting energy development
strategies; offering reform advice; implementing energy sector
management; proposing policies on new energy; international cooperation; and managing national strategic oil reserves. The NEA is
another central government agency with potentially strong
influence on CCS development in China. In 2010, the National
Energy Commission was created with premier Wen Jiabao as
chairman to supervise the NEA and coordinate the overall national
energy policies, further signaling the rising priority of its mandate
within government (Tu, 2011).
Other important ministries include the Ministry of Science and
Technology, responsible for CCS R&D projects, and the Ministry of
Environmental Protection, responsible for environmental impacts
assessment and monitoring of CCS projects in China.
The State Electricity Regulatory Commission of China is
currently developing a climate change action plan for the industry
with a focus on possible mandates and incentives for improved
energy efficiency and greater use of renewables in the electricity
sector. The role of SERC is to regulate the Chinese power sector, this
commission lacks the authority at this point to issue specific
regulations on CCS without a specific policy or regulation from
higher levels of government. In December 2009, the China
Electricity Council established the Center for Climate Change of
Power Industry to combat climate change challenges and
encourage the Chinese power sector pursuing a lower carbon
development path (CEC, 2009).
In addition to these various government departments and
agencies, China’s large state-owned enterprises will play a key role
if CCS is to develop in China. Currently, China’s state-owned coal
and electricity companies are reluctant to pursue CCS at scale since
their principal mandate is to provide coal and electricity as cheaply
as possible to fuel China’s economic growth while maximizing
corporate profits. As noted earlier, without a strong directive from
government, they may explore CCS demonstration projects in
order to develop expertise in this area, but they would not
undertake a wholesale effort to deploy CCS at scale.
There are various laws and regulations in China that have
repercussions for the development of CCS. Some of these are
supportive of CCS while others can be constraining. We describe
the key elements below.
China’s 11th Five Year Plan states that China’s energy intensity
per unit GDP must decline by 20% between 2005 and 2010 (Chinese
Government, 2006). Given the increase in energy use that CCS
causes–to separate, transport and inject CO2–this goal and related
policies may act as a barrier to CCS development in China.
In contrast, the Guidelines on National Medium- and Long-term
Science and Technology Development (2006–2020) formally
establish CCS as a cutting-edge technology that China should
develop for strategic reasons of technology and expertise capacity
building (State Council, 2006). In the same vein, a report to the 17th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China states that
China should strengthen its capacity building for responding to the
challenges of climate change, which again augers well at least for
demonstration projects into zero-emission technological options
like CCS.
Furthermore, the Chinese government has developed a National
Climate Change Program that sets the goal of strengthening the
development and dissemination of advanced and suitable technologies, including CCS (NDRC, 2007). In 2007, China’s Ministry of
M. Jaccard, J.J. Tu / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 402–412
Science and Technology, along with 13 other departments, issued a
special report on science and technology action in response to
climate change, establishing R&D in CCS as a key task.8 Finally, the
previously mentioned goal of the State Council to lower China’s
carbon intensity by 40–45% between 2005 and 2020 will
undoubtedly influence the objectives and activities of various
ministries, agencies and state-owned corporations, although the
contribution of CCS relative to accelerated energy efficiency,
nuclear power and renewables is still highly uncertain.
6. Possible domestic and international drivers of CCS in China
In line with China’s impressive economic growth, the middle
class in China is expanding rapidly. The World Bank estimates that
the global middle class is likely to grow from 430 million in 2000 to
1.15 billion in 2030, with China alone contributing 52% of this
expansion (Thomas White, 2010). As witnessed elsewhere around
the world, the growing middle class in China is expected to apply
pressure for improved environmental protection. In this vein,
China’s burgeoning middle class has become increasingly vocal
about local air, water and other environmental contaminations in
recent years (French, 2008; Hu and Guan, 2008; Wong, 2008;
McCabe, 2009). Recently, some domestic NGOs and the national
offices of international NGOs in China have focused their public
awareness and government lobbying campaigns on climate
change, including the promotion of CCS in China. But the effect
of these developments on public awareness and public expressions
of concern is still difficult to gauge.
At the same time, China’s growing economic strength has
enabled it to reassert itself as a legitimate world power in more
than just a military sense. China’s economy is now a critical
component of the global economy, certainly in terms of production
and trade, but also in terms of its overseas loans and investments
and its ability to provide a stabilizing force in the global business
cycle. But with this increased global profile comes increased
expectations for the role China should play in helping with other
global problems, like climate risk. As noted, China is now the
number one producer of GHGs and its importance will grow as
emissions in most industrialized countries slow and perhaps
decline over the next decade or so. Expectations for China to play a
significant role in addressing the climate threat are bound to
increase.
One concern is that the global community will be unable to
negotiate effective international treaties to reduce GHG emissions
without the threat of emission-related tariffs on goods imported
from countries with weak or non-existent GHG abatement policies.
To some extent this threat already exists given that the various
climate bills considered by US legislators, currently and in previous
incarnations, have all included provisions to apply emissionrelated charges of some form to imports from non-compliant
countries (Arimura et al., 2007). It is difficult to predict whether
this approach will succeed in triggering a coordinated global effort
to reduce GHG emissions or instead ignite international trade wars
with very little progress on the climate objective.
Although the Chinese are interested in CCS as a potentially
desirable technology from a national perspective, the question
remains whether they or wealthier countries should pay most of
the costs of wide-scale adoption of CCS in China. For negotiating
purposes alone, the Chinese cannot be seen to be moving too
quickly to develop CCS lest industrialized countries conclude that
international assistance for CCS in China is unnecessary. From a
self-interest perspective, this is a delicate balancing act: show
some enthusiasm, but not too much.
8
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/photonews/200706/t20070619_50563.htm,
accessed on November 11, 2009.
411
7. Concluding comments on the prospects for CCS in China
At this early stage, assessing the potential for CCS in a given
jurisdiction, such as China, is a perilous exercise. Like other
technological options for GHG reduction, CCS is costly. Governments will only seriously pursue these technologies when they are
seriously committed to reducing GHGs. Few governments in the
world have shown this type of commitment and certainly not the
governments of developing countries. These countries feel less
responsible for current atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and
also argue that they lack the financial means to bear the high costs
of abatement. In any case, an aggressive effort to reduce GHG
emissions would undermine their argument that they need
financial help from wealthier countries. Addressing the climate
risk is a global public good problem with the attendant incentives
for individual countries to wait for others to act first and perhaps
even free-ride on these efforts. This may explain in part why so
many countries talk about taking aggressive action to reduce GHG
emissions but have made little progress in implementing the
compulsory policies that would actually have a profound effect
over the next decades. It may also explain why financial support
and other policies favoring nuclear power, energy efficiency,
renewables and perhaps especially CCS have thus far been only
tentative and preliminary.
But, just as with nuclear, renewables and energy efficiency, this
current tentative effort at developing CCS by China and other
countries does not prove that CCS will be absent from an eventual
aggressive effort to reduce GHG emissions, should that ever occur.
As we show in this paper, it will be extremely difficult and
expensive for a country like China to phase out its use of coal in the
span of just a few decades. Coal is China’s premier energy resource
and a key factor in its rapid economic development of the last few
decades. The alternatives to coal will be as expensive and perhaps
more so. If there is any chance for CCS to be scaled up as a bona fide
option for GHG reduction, China is one of the countries (perhaps
along with the US) where this technology is likely to be applied.
Coal is extremely important to the Chinese, not a resource that they
will easily walk away from.
Given the public good nature of global GHG emissions
reduction, the current strategy of the Chinese is consistent with
a desire to not only keep the CCS option open but even to position
China to be a major CCS player in the decades to come, both with
domestic application of the technology and with eventual export of
the technology and associated knowhow. The Chinese are
developing a good number of small carbon separation projects
and exploring carbon geological storage potential without
committing themselves to a major effort. This enables them to
develop the technical capacity while waiting to decide if the
country will mount an aggressive effort at CO2 reduction and
waiting to see how much of the extensive costs will be borne by
wealthier countries.
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