Personality and Individual Differences 51 (2011) 478–482
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Personality and Individual Differences
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
Cognitive reappraisal reduces the susceptibility to the framing effect
in economic decision making
Andrei C. Miu ⇑, Liviu G. Crisßan
Emotion and Cognition Neuroscience Laboratory, Department of Psychology, Babesß-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, CJ 400015, Romania
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 28 January 2011
Received in revised form 26 April 2011
Accepted 27 April 2011
Available online 24 May 2011
Keywords:
Cognitive reappraisal
Framing bias
Gambling
Emotion regulation
Economic decision making
a b s t r a c t
Recent studies have suggested that emotions play an important role in the susceptibility to the framing
effect (i.e., decisions change depending on the description of the same outcomes as gains or losses). These
suggestions raise the question of whether emotion regulation would reduce the susceptibility to framing.
We used a neuroeconomic gambling task in which outcomes of decisions were framed as gains or losses,
and instructed the participants to use cognitive reappraisal (i.e., reformulating the meaning of a situation
in order to reduce its emotional impact) or expressive suppression (i.e., inhibiting behaviors associated
with emotions) in order to modulate their emotions during the task. We found that in comparison to suppression, reappraisal reduced the framing effect. The use of reappraisal during the decision task was associated with increased positive affect, and decreased negative affect immediately after the task. We
suggest that cognitive reappraisal reduces the susceptibility to framing by effectively regulating the emotions associated with the decision frames.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. The framing effect and emotions
Violations of invariance (i.e., the independence of preferences
between options from their description) have played an important
role in the critical discussion of normative decision making models
(i.e., expected utility theory; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944)
and the development of prospect theory (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). This theory argues that the wording of
decision alternatives, which are objectively equivalent (e.g., a program that lets 200 people of the 600 expected fatalities of an Asian
disease be saved vs. one that lets 400 people out of 600 die), affect
choices by changing the reference point (i.e., perception of the outcomes as gains or losses). This change in perception influences the
subjective judgments on the probability and utility of outcomes,
and modulates risk taking. Extensive investigations of framing effects have shown that ‘‘losses loom larger than gains’’, that is, people display risk aversion when alternatives are framed as gains, and
risk seeking when objectively equivalent alternatives are framed as
losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Although it has been suggested for a long time that emotions
are involved in framing effects (see Kahneman, 2003), only recently have researchers started to explore the influence of emotion
and emotion regulation (ER) on this common decision making bias.
Focusing on affect may increase the susceptibility to framing (Fag-
⇑ Corresponding author. Address: 37 Republicii, Cluj-Napoca, CJ 400015, Romania. Tel./fax: +40 264 590967.
E-mail address: [email protected] (A.C. Miu).
0191-8869/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2011.04.020
ley, Coleman, & Simon, 2010; but see Seo, Goldfarb, & Barrett,
2010). The hypotheses that different frames evoke emotions, and
framing effects are driven by an affect heuristic are apparently supported by the observed activation of the amygdala for risk aversion
in gain frames, and risk seeking in loss frames (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006).
2. Emotion regulation and the susceptibility to the framing
effect
If emotions play a role in the framing effect, one may speculate
that ER may reduce the susceptibility to this decision bias. Indeed,
this relationship has been indirectly supported by several studies
from cognitive neuroscience, which suggested that decision invariance (i.e., reduced susceptibility to framing) and the effectiveness
of ER may share a common neural substrate. Maintaining decision
invariance is associated with the activation of the orbitofrontal/
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (De Martino et al., 2006). This prefrontal region is known to modulate emotion-related amygdala
activation and plays a crucial role in the effectiveness of ER strategies such as cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008).
Other reports have documented the reduced economic rationality associated with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(Koenigs & Tranel, 2007), and the reduced serotonin synthesis that
affects prefrontal functions (Crockett, Clark, Tabibnia, Lieberman, &
Robbins, 2008), and conjectured that these effects are due to ER
impairments. More recent studies also found that a common
A.C. Miu, L.G. Crisßan / Personality and Individual Differences 51 (2011) 478–482
genetic polymorphism in the serotonin transporter gene influences
the susceptibility to framing (Crisan et al., 2009; Roiser et al.,
2009). This genetic effect is based on the modulation of the functional coupling in a prefrontal-amygdala network (Roiser et al.,
2009), similar to the one that has been linked to the effectiveness
of ER (Goldin et al., 2008).
In light of these results, the importance of investigating the
relationship between ER and the susceptibility to the framing effect has been emphasized in economic psychology and neuroeconomics (Kahneman & Frederick, 2007; Miu, Miclea, & Houser,
2008). To our knowledge, this is the first study that directly tested
this issue.
479
5. Methods
5.1. Participants
Twenty eight participants (23 women; mean age = 21.6 years)
were selected for this experiment, based on their over-average
scores of habitual cognitive reappraisal (N = 14; mean ± st. dev. of
reappraisal scores: 6.1 ± 0.3) and expressive suppression (N = 14;
mean ± st. dev. of suppression scores: 4.27 ± 0.44) on the Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). These ER ‘‘specialists’’ were selected in order to maximize the instructed use of reappraisal and suppression during the experimental task. All the
participants were students from the Babes-Bolyai University
campus.
3. Cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression
5.2. Measures and procedure
The present study investigated the effects of two common ER
strategies, cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression (Gross,
2002; Ochsner & Gross, 2005), on the susceptibility to framing in a
gambling task. Cognitive reappraisal involves reformulating the
meaning of a situation in order to reduce its emotional impact.
Expressive suppression is directed toward inhibiting behaviors
associated with emotions, such as facial expressions, verbal utterances, and gestures (Goldin et al., 2008).
Whereas both cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression
are based on modulations of the functional coupling between the
prefrontal cortex and the amygdala (Goldin et al., 2008), they differ
in several important ways. Cognitive reappraisal is focused on
antecedents and acts before an emotional response develops
(Sheppes & Gross, in press). In addition, it involves an early (i.e.,
0–4.5 s) activation of the prefrontal cortex associated with subsequently reduced amygdala activation (Goldin et al., 2008). It is relatively non-effortful and effectively decreases the experience of
both positive and negative emotions. Consequently, reappraisal
mitigates against risk aversion in economic decision making (Heilman, Crisan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010).
In contrast, expressive suppression acts after an emotional response has developed and biased behavior. It involves a delayed
(i.e., 10.5–15 s) activation of the prefrontal cortex and a subsequently increased amygdala activation. In comparison to reappraisal, expressive suppression is more effortful and less effective
in decreasing the experience of emotion. Moreover, by contributing
to cognitive load, expressive suppression impairs cognitive performance such as declarative memory (Richards & Gross, 2000). Considering that maintaining invariance in decision making also
requires the controlled and effortful processing of the alternatives
(Kahneman, 2003), expressive suppression might interfere with
this process.
4. Aims of the present study
Based on the process model of ER (Gross, 2002; Sheppes &
Gross, in press), we hypothesized that cognitive reappraisal would
be associated with reduced susceptibility to framing, in comparison to expressive suppression. Cognitive reappraisal may increase
decision invariance by more effectively mitigating against emotions associated with the frames. Alternatively, the same effect
may be explained by the relatively reduced effort required by reappraisal, which would save cognitive resources that are necessary
for maintaining invariance. In addition to the framing effect, we
measured affect immediately after the decision making task, and
reaction times (RTs) during the task in order to explore the two
dimensions (i.e., ER effectiveness vs. effortfulness) that differentiate reappraisal and suppression.
The gambling task included 96 trials (32 loss frame, 32 gain
frame, and 32 catch trials) in which the participants were presented with a starting amount (i.e., 25–100 Romanian lei) and instructed that they would not be able to retain the whole amount
but would next have to choose between a sure and a gamble option. The sure option was presented in the gain frame as the
amount of money retained from the starting amount, and in the
loss frame as the amount of money lost from the starting amount
(Fig. 1). The gamble option was identical for both frames and represented by a pie chart of the probabilities (i.e., 20–80%) of winning
and losing. The expected outcomes of the options were mathematically equivalent between frames, with the exception of control
catch trials in which either the gamble or the sure option was obviously preferable. The options were displayed on the screen for 4 s,
and the participants had to make their decision in this interval. All
the experimental variables were counterbalanced between the
frames. A rationality index was calculated for each participant,
based on the difference between the proportion of trials in which
a given participant chose the gamble option in the loss compared
to the gain frame. This task was described in more detail in previous research reports (Crisan et al., 2009; De Martino et al., 2006).
The participants were instructed to use reappraisal (e.g., Think
about your decisions in this task in a way that helps you stay calm)
and suppression (e.g., Try to control the emotions associated with
your decisions in this task by not expressing them) during the economic decision making task. They had been trained to effectively
implement these ER strategies in two learning sessions that involved images and trials similar to those in the framing task,
respectively.
The RTs of decisions were recorded during the task, as a
measure of effort. Immediately after the gambling task and before
they were informed of their individual winnings, the participants
completed the Specific Affect Scales of PANAS-X (Watson & Clark,
1994) as a measure of their current emotional state. This offered
a global measure of the effectiveness of ER during the decision task.
In addition, the participants completed a questionnaire (see Egloff,
Schmukle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger, 2006) related to the degree to
which they had succeeded to use the instructed ER strategy during
the decision making tasks.
6. Results
6.1. Manipulation checks
Each ER group reported that they successfully applied the ER
strategy that they had been instructed to use during the gambling
task. The participants who were instructed to use reappraisal reported significantly increased use of this strategy (t[27] = 2.8,
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Fig. 1. Examples of gain, loss, and catch trials from the gambling task. RON, Romanian new currency.
p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.7), and significantly reduced use of suppression during the gambling task (t[27] = 2.25, p < 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.5), in comparison to those who were instructed to use suppression. The analyses of PANAS scores indicated that reappraisers
reported significantly more positive affect (t[27] = 2.15, p < 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 1.34), and marginally significantly less negative affect
immediately after the gambling task (t[27] = 1.45, p = 0.1, Cohen’s
d = 0.75), in comparison to suppressors. We found that the success
of implementing reappraisal during decision task positively predicted the positive affect reported immediately after the end of
the task (R2 = 0.3, b = 0.552, p < 0.01), and negatively predicted
the negative affect (R2 = 0.15, b = 0.39, p < 0.05) (Fig. 2). The success of implementing suppression was not related to affect after
the decision task. There were no significant differences in the RTs
of decisions made by reappraisers (mean ± one st. dev.:
1.66 ± 0.44 s) and suppressors (1.83 ± 0.55 s). The mean number
of errors (i.e., no decision in the 4 s interval of the trial) did not differ between reappraisers and suppressors (mean = 0.5 for both
groups).
6.2. Framing effect
The participants’ performance in the gambling task indicated a
significant framing effect. On average, the participants chose the
sure option more often in the gain frame, gambling on
41.34 ± 11.9% of trials, and the gamble option more often in the
loss frame, gambling on 52.62 ± 12.62%. The difference in risk-taking behavior was highly significant between the loss and gain
frames (t[26] = 5.71, p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 0.9). There were no significant differences in the average decision making latencies (i.e.,
1.71 ± 0.54 s for gain trials, and 1.77 ± 0.62 s for loss trials).
6.3. Emotion regulation and the framing effect
The type of ER that the participants used during the task significantly modulated the framing effect (Fig. 3). The participants who
used cognitive reappraisal displayed a significantly reduced framing effect compared to those who used expressive suppression
(t[27] = 2.81, p < 0.01, Cohen’s d = 1.08). Consequently, reapprais-
Fig. 2. Relationships between the use of cognitive reappraisal during the gambling task, and positive (A) and negative affect (B) immediately after the gambling task.
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481
in the RTs of decisions. We found no significant differences between the decision RTs of the participants that used reappraisal
or suppression during the gambling task. This does not eliminate
the possibility that expressive suppression was more effortful,
but indicates that the effort put into implementing this strategy
(versus reappraisal) did not increase the time taken to make decisions. In line with the process model of ER (Gross, 2002; Sheppes &
Gross, in press) and one of our previous studies on ER and decision
making under uncertainty (Heilman et al., 2010), the present results suggest that ER impacts the susceptibility to framing via the
‘‘emotional route’’ (i.e., effective modulation of emotions) rather
than the ‘‘non-emotional route’’ (i.e., effortfulness).
Fig. 3. The magnitude of the framing effect in the gambling task, represented as the
difference between the gamble options in the loss and gain frames.
ers also had significantly higher rationality scores in this task, in
comparison to suppressors (t[27] = 2.41, p < 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.85). There were no differences between reappraisers and suppressors in catch trials, in either the gain or the loss frames.
7. Discussion
The results of the present study supported our hypothesis that
cognitive reappraisal reduces the susceptibility to framing (or increases invariance) in comparison to expressive suppression. This
hypothesis was confirmed in a neuroeconomic gambling task, under conditions that involved thorough control of the specific ER
use.
7.1. Invariance through effective emotion regulation
Using the same gambling task, previous studies have suggested
that different frames trigger distinct emotions, and the regulation
of these emotions may be critical to the susceptibility to framing
(De Martino et al., 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2007). The
hypothesis of this study rested on the assumption that cognitive
reappraisal is an antecedent-focused strategy that acts before an
emotional response develops, and it is thus more effective and less
effortful than expressive suppression (see Gross, 2002; Ochsner &
Gross, 2005; Sheppes & Gross, in press). Reappraisal may therefore
promote decision invariance by effectively reducing the experience
of emotions that would otherwise interfere with the framing and
editing phase of the choice process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).
The present results indicated that the use of reappraisal during
the decision task significantly decreased the framing effect, in comparison to suppression. In addition, the successful use of cognitive
reappraisal, but not suppression during the gambling task resulted
in higher positive affect and lower negative affect immediately
after the task. This pattern of results suggests that reappraisal, an
ER strategy that effectively modulates the experience of emotion,
reduces the susceptibility to framing.
However, it was possible that cognitive reappraisal reduced the
susceptibility to framing in this study by taking less cognitive resources from the decision making task. Implementing a relatively
more effortful strategy such as expressive suppression may have
interfered with ‘‘System 2 rationality’’ that effortfully monitors initial impressions and the ability to reason accurately (Evans & Over,
1996). By competing for cognitive resources that are otherwise
necessary for maintaining invariance, expressive suppression
may promote the type of intuitive rationality that is vulnerable
to the framing bias (Kahneman, 2003). We expected that the differences in effortfulness between the two ER strategies were reflected
7.2. Limits and implications
There are four potential limits of this study. First of all, the sample size included in this study was rather small. This was a cost
that we paid for selecting reappraisal or suppression ‘specialists’
(Gross & John, 2003) who were more likely to successfully implement the ER strategies that we instructed them to use. The results
of a pilot study that included participants with low or high scores
on both cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression (i.e., they
equally used both strategies in daily life) indicated that they were
less able (in comparison to the ‘specialists’ in one of the ER strategies) to maintain the instructed ER strategy during the decision
making tasks. Although we argue that selecting participants that
habitually use an ER strategy in daily life increases the chances that
they use that strategy when instructed in laboratory conditions, we
acknowledge that the present effects of the manipulated ER on
decision making may be confounded by habitual ER.
Second of all, this sample was not balanced in terms of sex. Recent studies found that men were more susceptible to framing effects in the financial domain, whereas women were more
susceptible to framing effects in the life-death domain (Huang &
Wang, 2010). Moreover, women tend to focus more than men on
emotions during decision making (Fagley et al., 2010).
Third of all, we only measured affect immediately after the decision making task. Our suggestion that reappraisal was more effective in regulating emotions may be more extensively tested in
future studies by repeatedly measuring affect during decision making, using self-report and/or physiological measures (Heilman
et al., 2010; Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 2008).
Fourth of all, the present study did not include a control condition, in which no ER was used. This would have been useful in order to illustrate the influence of emotions on the framing effect
(see Fagley et al., 2010; Seo et al., 2010). A more extensive study
should take these four variables into account.
Although preliminary, the present findings may have economic
and practical implications. Previous studies have shown that cognitive reappraisal predicts profit in simulated economic negotiations (Yurtsever, 2004, 2008), reduces emotional arousal to losses
and behavioral loss aversion in decision making (Sokol-Hessner
et al., 2009), and reduces economic risk aversion associated with
negative emotions (Heilman et al., 2010). The present results contribute to this literature by indicating that cognitive reappraisal
also reduces the susceptibility to framing. Therefore, learning to
reappraise emotions may be a valuable skill in economic negotiation and decision making (see also Diefendorff, Richard, & Yang,
2008).
The present results also raise the intriguing possibility that cognitive reappraisal may promote invariance in relation to other
common decision making biases. In comparison to suppression,
reappraisal does not impair declarative memory (Richards & Gross,
2000; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). Therefore, cognitive reappraisal
may also reduce the susceptibility to the availability bias in
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A.C. Miu, L.G. Crisßan / Personality and Individual Differences 51 (2011) 478–482
decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) by increased declarative memory of the occurrences of an event.
In light of the prospect theory (Kahneman, 2003; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986), future studies might directly investigate the effect of ER on the subjective probabilities and utilities of decision
outcomes in a framing task. This might contribute to the potential
extension of the prospect theory, to include emotion and emotion
regulation, together with subjective probabilities and utilities, as
mediators between frames and risk taking.
8. Conclusions
In comparison to expressive suppression, cognitive reappraisal
reduces the susceptibility to the framing effect. We suggest that
this difference is related to the increased effectiveness of reappraisal in modulating emotions. The present evidence contributes
to the rapidly expanding literature on emotions and the framing effect (Fagley et al., 2010; Seo et al., 2010), and offers a potential
straightforward explanation for the common neural substrate
shared between ER and invariance in economic decision making.
Acknowledgment
This study was supported by Grant 411/2010 from the National
University Research Council of Romania (CNCSIS) to A.C.M.
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