11/07/2013 | ICSD
Information Search
and Social Value
Orientation in
Social Dilemmas:
An Eye-tracking Analysis
Susann Fiedler, Andreas Glöckner,
Andreas Nicklisch, & Stephan Dickert
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Motivation
Contributions in one-shot games
(De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002; Van Lange, 1999 )
Belief about others
(Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976)
Evaluation of cooperative behavior
(Iedema & Poppe, 1994; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976)
Decision times
(Dehue, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1993; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988)
see e.g., Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Kocher, Cherry, Kroll, Netzer, & Sutter, 2008, for overviews
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Option A
Payoff maximization
Cooperation
Option B
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Models for Social Preferences
• Individuals maximize utility but are not purely selfish
▫ Take into account own and others‘ wellbeing (e.g., Andreoni
& Miller, 2002; Bolton, 1991; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox, Freidman, &
Sadiraj, 2008; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levin, 1998, Liebrand & McClintock, 1988; McClintock, 1972)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Models for Social Preferences
• Individuals maximize utility but are not purely selfish
▫ Take into account own and others‘ wellbeing (e.g., Andreoni
& Miller, 2002; Bolton, 1991; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox, Freidman, &
Sadiraj, 2008; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levin, 1998 ; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988; McClintock, 1972)
Limitation: „as-if“ models – no descriptions of
cognitive processes! (e.g., Luce, 2000)
• Importance of investigating underlying processes
has been highlighted repeatedly
(e.g., Franco-Watkins & Johnson, 2011; Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Willemsen, 2008; Payne,
Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, & Raynard, 2011)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Models for Social Preferences
• Individuals maximize utility but are not purely selfish
▫ Take into account own and others‘ wellbeing (e.g., Andreoni
& Miller, 2002; Bolton, 1991; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox, Freidman, &
Sadiraj, 2008; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levin, 1998 ; Liebrand & McClintock, 1988; McClintock, 1972)
Adaptive Decision Maker Approach
Evidence Accumulation Approach
= qualitative different strategies
= 1 strategy with different weighting
Assumptions:
(I) Decision strategies can be
described in terms of sequential
elementary information
processes
Assumptions:
(I) Information is sampled
proportionally to the weight it has
in the decision process
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988)
(II) Information irrelevant for choice
is ignored
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004)
(II) Quick & automatic process
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
What are the underlying processes?
Information
Search
Parameters
•
•
•
•
•
Decision Times
Number of
Fixations
Proportion of
Fixations
Inspected
Information
Direction of
the Saccades
(Transition
Index)
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Predictions of the Adaptive Decision Maker Approach
Type
Predictions
Decision
time
Number of
Fixations
Inspected
Information
Attention
Transitions
Cooperator
(w1 = 1, w2 = 1)
Long
Many
All
Payoff self
& other
All payoffs
Individualist
(w1 = 1, w2 = 0)
Short
Few
½ of the info
Payoff self
Own
payoffs
Competitor
(w1 = 1, w2 = -1)
Long
Many
All
Payoff self
& other
All payoffs
Weighting types
(w1≠w2 and w {0,1,-1})
Very
long
Very many
All
Payoff self
& other
All payoffs
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Predictions of the Evidence Accumulation Approach
Type
Predictions
Decision
time
Number of
Fixations
Inspected
Information
Attention
Transitions
Gradual
increase
Gradual
increase
Gradual
increase
Gradual
increase
Gradual
increase
Very
long
Very many
All
Payoff self
& other
All payoffs
Cooperator
(w1 = 1, w2 = 1)
Individualist
(w1 = 1, w2 = 0)
Competitor
(w1 = 1, w2 = -1)
Weighting types
(w1≠w2 and w {0,1,-1})
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
General Research Questions
(I) Are differences in Social Preferences are reflected
in specific stable patterns of information search ?
(I) Money allocation decisions
(II) Public Good Games
(II) Are differences reflected in qualitatively different
decision strategies or gradual differences within
one strategy?
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Study 1: Methodes & Procedure
• Eye-tracking of the decision making process
Study 1: Money allocation tasks
(38 participants, øage 22, 45% female)
1. Social Ring Measure
(Liebrand & McClintock, 1988)
•
Classification
2. Additional allocation task: Social
Value Slider
(Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2010)
Areas of Interest (160x100 pixel)
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Individualist
Cooperator (Competitor)
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Decision times (in sec)
6
8
10 12 14
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Results: Study 1
*
*
***
***
0
10
20
30
40
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
individualistic
cooperative/ competitive
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
***
30
6
***
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
40
*
**
0
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
10
20
30
40
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
*
.4
Fixation on others payoffs(in %)
30
40
50
60
70
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
Number of inspected information
4
6
8
10
12
14
*
*
Number of fixations
40 50 60 70
Decision times (in sec)
8
10 12 14
80
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Summary: Study 1
Transition index
-.4 -.2
0
.2
**
Study 1
SVO Ring Measure
SVO Slider
-.6
**
0
10
20
30
40
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
0
10
20
30
40
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
Experiment with Glöckner & Dickert, 201314
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Study 1: Results SVO Ring Measure
Results of regression models for information search in SVO Ring Measure
(within-measure prediction).
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Study 1: Results SVO Ring Measure
Results of regression models for information search in SVO Ring Measure
(within-measure prediction) – test for distinct types, interactions U-shape
effects
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Public Good Game
• Study 2: one-shot and 10 periods(36 participants, øage 24, 61% female)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
**
*
0
10
20
30
40
0
10
20
30
40
30
40
**
10
20
30
40
Study 1
Transition index
-.4 -.2 0
.2
20
*
*
SVO Ring Measure
SVO Slider
_______________
Study 2
**
-.6
10
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
*
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
**
0
*
0
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
.4
Fixation on others payoffs(in %)
30
40
50
60
70
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
Number of inspected information
4
6
8
10
12
14
*
30
6
*
**
80
*
*
Number of fixations
40 50 60 70
Decision times (in sec)
8
10 12 14
16
Summary Results: Study 1 & Study 2
One-Shot PG
Repeated PG
0
10
20
30
40
absolute SVOangle (in degree)
Experiment with Glöckner & Nicklisch, 2013 18
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Conclusions
First step to learn more about underlying processes in
decision making in social dilemma situations
People with more individualistic SVO …
… search less information
 Fewer number of fixations
 Smaller Amount of inspected information
… allocate more attention to own payoff and
also compare mostly these information
… than people with more cooperative/ competitive
Orientation.
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Qualitatively different strategies or gradual differences
within one strategy?
• Most analyses revealed effects were comparable for
individuals who cared positively or negatively about others
• Hypothesis concernning higher values of the DV for
weighting types (0 < |SVOangle| < 45) not supported by the
data
• Alternative explanation - Mixture of distinct strategies
– not supported
 Gradual differences are in line with our results
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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Thank you for your attention!
I am very grateful to Andreas Glöckner & the iExperts Group for their
help in collecting the data , collaborating and the great feedback!