Rethinking reputation: Group
membership and trustworthiness
Margaret Foddy
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada
Third CEFOM/21 International Symposium,
Sapporo, Japan
Outline of talk (for the tired ones)
• Review theoretical background for ingroup trust
• Summarize work on selective interaction that results from ingroup trust
• Convince you that category based trust is robust but not necessarily
strong
• Consider reputation in the context of ingroup identity, and its effect on
group-based trust
• Report a study on reputation (when it means, what does x know about
what y did to a person in the ingroup/outgroup)
• Speculate on possible implications across societies, and theoretical
models (especially the role of category based trust)
• Consider links to other processes such as exclusion from groups,
willingness to stay in, or leave groups,
BACKGROUND
The allocator studies and trust in strangers:
• Focus on unilateral trust, not cooperation
• Explored the utility of social identity and selfcategorization theory for understanding groupbased trust in strangers
• Collaboration with Michael Platow, (now
Australian National University) & Toshio
Yamagishi and Toko Kiyonari, Hokkaido
University
Trust: expectation that an other person will
perform an action which is beneficial, or not
detrimental to us
When we trust, we commit ourselves to an action
• agree to put one’s outcomes in another’s hands
• take a cooperative action
• Make oneself vulnerable
Before we know what the other will do
When there is no assurance mechanism
Trust in strangers is important in
establishing new relationships
Whom shall we trust?
• People whose interests are aligned:
assurance (encapsulated trust; Hardin)
• People who share category and/or group
membership with us: group-based trust
• People who have proven trustworthy to
us, or to others (reputation)
(In)group heuristicnaïve theory of groups
• People believe others in their own groups will treat them well
• People do in fact show higher ingroup fairness, are “subject to”
principles of ingroup fairness and trustworthiness (Yamagishi)
• Ingroup trust may be a “second order” belief, or one based on taking
the perspective of other(s), producing a consensus that groups can be
relied on if you are included within its boundaries (Tyler)
• The effects are relatively weak—people trust ingroup more, but still
place trust in strangers outside own group
(because)
Group boundaries are relatively fluid (Brewer)
– Salience principles
– People extend and contract the boundaries of the group; this may limit the
utility of group-based trust for both theorist and actors
• Interesting question: is this a psychological, sociological or economic
question? (for discussion later)
Group identity and trust: what is the basis?
Shared group membership affects:
• Evaluations of ingroup members vs outgroup
(ingroup more positive? And if so, why?) Turner
• Differential distribution of positive outcomes to
ingroup members Tajfel
• Expectations of fairness and cooperation
from others in the group (Yamagishi)
• Provide a categorical basis for trust in
strangers
Experimental paradigm
• Allocator game: a 2-dictator game
• Allocator has $X to split between self and recipient: focus
is on recipient
• 2 Allocators: one each from
• the person’s ingroup (e.g.La Trobe Uni)
• an outgroup (e.g. Melbourne Uni)
– RECIPIENT chooses one allocator to receive money
from, and gives reasons for choice, predicts how much
each allocator would have given him or her
– We assess relative, not absolute, trust, but results
are similar when third choice option of sure thing is
provided; similar when there is direct reciprocity as
in the Berg game)
Results from choose the allocator studies
• Strong preference for ingroup allocator, but not
extreme differences in expectations of positive
treatment
• Preference holds for large and small ingroup categories (in
the West and East?); for intact, minimal and categorical
groups
• Preference disappears if allocator does not know of
shared identity: blocks group based trust
• Preference for ingroup allocator even if outgroup
stereotype is more positive (even economics students
prefer ingroup (economics) allocator)
• Group stereotype has weak effect on expectations and
preferences
• **Ingroup heuristic includes expectations of fair treatment
from fellow group membersreduces uncertainty, forms
basis for trust
Does shared identity matter only if
there is no other information?
What about a person’s reputation?
Is it more important than shared
group membership ?
How has reputation been conceptualized?
“the estimation in which one is held; character in public opinion; the
character to attribute to a person, thing or action; repute”
(plus a large literature in economics, political science, sociology etc.
indicating that there are multiple dimensions to reputation)
Personal reputation: first or second hand knowledge of the pattern of a
person’s past behavior (e.g. fair; cooperative; competent)
Organizational reputation: as above
• Summarized in trait terms, generalized; or a record of behavior and
outcomes (e.g. a university)
o reputation is “owned” by a person, and can be manipulated,
communicated, tested in law, etc.
• Reputation reduces uncertainty; can be a positive or negative resource
• Little research attention to the group contexts in which a person
establishes a reputation
– Who is the relevant public?
– What mechanisms are in place to govern true and false reputation (Toshio)
Groups, identity and reputation
•
•
•
•
Category vs target based reputation: Reputation developed by/attached to
the group may be transferred to individuals with no information about the
individual’s behavior (e.g. nurses; used car salesmen): naïve theory says
people can be expected to act in accordance with the group stereotype, but
individuating information may reverse the stereotype-based inference
****** Ta da! (Main point)
Effects of reputation on trust depend on the relationship between the
truster and the target of trust
Group membership may condition interpretation of information about
another’s behavior
– Expect different behavior from ingroup and outgroup members towards self
– A third person’s behavior towards an outgroup member may not be
informative of their likely behavior towards an ingroup
– Category based ingroup trust may:
• Replace reputation
• Combine with reputation
• Be replaced by reputation
How does reputation work
in the group context?
• Reputation information may individuate the allocator and
produce attributions to traits, or inferences about the
person’s values (e.g. fair; shady; exploitative)
• Individuating information may be regarded as more
reliable/informative than shared group membership as
basis for trust
• Information about allocator’s behavior may block group
categorization effects; block effects of group heuristic and
in-group favoring norm
•
Forecasting cross-cultural questions:
– Is reputation information more important in the East or the West?
– Are contextual effects of the group relationship between truster and trustee
more important in East or West/
Or, is reputation’s effect on trust moderated by
the group identities of the people involved?
• Information about outgroup members’ treatment
of their own groups may not be informative:
fairness within the outgroup does not predict
fairness to those not in it
• Information about ingroup members’ treatment of
outgroup may not be predictive of how they will
treat ingroup members, or may confirm that
positive ingroup bias will operate for ingroup
(confirm the naïve theory about ingroup behavior)
Experimental paradigm: reputation
• Choose between ingroup (A) and outgroup (B)
• Recipient told allocators scheduled to make two
separate allocations—one to ingroup (A), one to
outgroup (B) recipient
Experimental conditions:
• 1.There is “reputation” information about neither
allocator (baseline)
• OR about what ONE allocator has given another
recipient who was:
• 2. From allocator’s ingroup
• 3. From allocator’s outgroup
• No reputation information about the other
allocator, who “has not done second allocation”
Information about ONE allocator’s division of $16
in a previous trial
Allocator fair to past
Recipient (50-50 split)
Allocator unfair to past
recipient (75-25 split)
Ingroup
Allocator
Outgroup
Allocator
Ingroup
recipient
AA
*BA
Ingroup
recipient
*AA BA
Outgroup
recipient
AB
BB
Outgroup
recipient
*AB BB
Ingroup oriented
or universally
fair?
Ingroup
allocator
A=ingroup; B=outgroup
Control group: no reputation information
Selfish?
Grouporiented?
Outgroup
allocator
Predictions
• If individual reputation is basis of choice, the fair allocator
(regardless of target) will be preferred over the allocator
with no reputation information, regardless of group, and
the “no-reputation” allocator preferred to the one who has
been unfair in the past
• If group membership affects the meaning of past fair
behavior, then:
– Past fairness within the outgroup (BB) will not
increase choice of outgroup by A
– Fairness by outgroup to ingroup in past (BA) will
reduce ingroup preference (not a typical intergroup
situation)
– Unfairness within the ingroup (AA) will reduce
ingroup preference (allocator violates ingroup norms)
Frequency of choice of allocator when allocator has
been FAIR (all choosers from group A)
Control
Ingroup(A)
18
Outgroup(B)
3
Reputation info
AA
AB
BB
*BA
18
17
17
6
2
4
4
14
Expected % of funds: Allocator was FAIR
Ingroup(A)
Outgroup(B)
.48
.46
.48
.37
.34
.38
.34
.42
Reputation info
AA
AB
BB
BA
Note: recipients made predictions for both allocators,
regardless of choice made
Frequency of choice of allocator when allocator has
been UNFAIR (all choosers from group A)
•
Ingroup(A)
Outgroup(B)
Reputation info
*A-A
*A-B
B-B
B-A
Control
10
10
17
17
18
9
10
3
3
3
Expected % of funds to new recipient:
Allocator was UNFAIR
!AA
AB
#BB
BA
Ingroup(A)
Outgroup(B)
.32
.28
.39
.32
.28
.32
.18
.29
Overall lower expectations than in FAIR condition
Smaller difference in expectations from A and B
Reputation information does not undermine trust in ingroup allocator as in ingroup
allocator
(!here is an ingroup member who does not treat an ingroup member well
(#here is an outgroup person who does not treat an ingroup member well)
When ingroup allocator has been unfair, why
do at least half still choose ingroup?
• Recipients gave reasons for choice of allocator;
• Reasons coded:
Those choosing the “unfair” ingroup allocator
referred to shared reciprocal obligation, common
interests and similarity as a basis for expecting
fairer treatment from ingroup compared with
outgroup
Those choosing outgroup did not refer to shared
group membership; main reasons were the unfair
past behavior of the ingroup allocator (reputation),
and decision to take a gamble with the outgroup
Summary of results
People do NOT prefer an outgroup allocator who has
been generous to a fellow outgroup member
(allocator’s ingroup), over an ingroup allocator
about whom they have no information
People DO prefer an outgroup allocator who has
been generous to a member of the person’s own
ingroup (B was fair to A)—attribution to
individual traits? People are evenly divided about
reputation information when:
• Ingroup member is unfair to the ingroup
• Ingroup member is unfair to the outgroup
Conclusions: 1
• Reputation is not set up in a vacuum—behavior of a target
towards others is interpreted in part in terms of the
relationships of self and the target, and the target with
others (this information may not always be known)
• Expectation of ingroup fairness is the default option; not so
clear that outgroup unfairness is the default (Brewer,
1981; Mummenday, 2000)
• Reputation may help identify the prevailing group norms,
and a given actor’s adherence to them; clearer basis for
trust or distrust
• When reputation information is ambiguous, person may
apply a group, individual, or universalistic template to
interpret the information; may reflect level of selfcategorization, situational cues
• We know little about the relationship between the source of
reputation information (ingroup; outgroup) and its
influence on future trust of ingroup and outgroup members
Group-based reputation and trust: the same
across cultures?
• Will simple shared category activate trust in cultures where “group”
implies a network of obligation and sanction (assurance)?
• Is reputation information more important in “collectivist” or
“individualistic” cultures? Will it destroy the ingroup preference
completely?
• Are the norms of ingroup favouritism the same across cultures?
• Are the effective groups the same across cultures? Categories—
minimal groups—connected groups—dyads? Reputation can operate
in all of these, but may have different effects
• How is reputation information conveyed? Do we trust some informants
more than others (second-order trust may arise from shared group
membership with informants). Does it matter who told us? (e.g. an
outgroup member told me that Toshio is not reliable; will I believe
this? If an ingroup member tells me he is unreliable (joke), I may be
more willing to believe it
Is individual reputation more important in collectivist societies?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The “yes” side
If trust is based more on assurance and specific relationships in collectivist societies (i.e.
not generalized trust), reputation should be more important—target-based trust should
dominate
Category-based trust is weaker in collectivist societies, so reputation information will
dominate (evidence is mixed)
formal assurance systems in Western cultures may make reputation irrelevant
Group loyalty makes universal principles of fairness irrelevant
The “no” side
Individual reputation in Western societies is very important, and is used to make
attributions to individual as a basis for predicting future behavior and trustworthiness;
the same applies to organizations
Particularistic familism is as common in the West as in the East
Reputation is an important part of English common law (you can sue someone for
damaging your reputation)
E-business puts a lot of emphasis on reputation
However, the issue of whether reputation is interpreted in group terms has not
been systematically explored across cultures
Why does reputation matter?
•
•
•
•
Conditions the interpretation of behavior to ingroups and outgroups
Forms the basis for selective interaction
May form the basis for inclusion or exclusion of people from groups
Affects people’s estimates of whether a common resource is viable,
and therefore willingness to stay in a group (e.g. if all members have a
negative reputation, group will be less viable than if all positive)
• Why do ingroup effects on reputation matter?
–
–
–
–
Double standards in judging people (more lenient to ingroup)
Informative about naïve theory of groups
Important to theories of group identification
Window on cross-cultural differences in how trust is formed, and how
trustworthy behavior is generated
Conclusions 2
•
Cultural differences in trust, the importance of reputation, and the willingness
to exclude others from the group are not yet well-established
– Minimal group effects are obtained in Japan and China
– Trust in category members occurs in both types of culture (sometimes)
– There is not a lot of information about how group processes may differ between the
East and the West
– Globalization means that the social structural sources of differences may be
disappearing
– We have almost no idea how the “Middle East” fits into the picture!! Is behavior in
these cultures a reflection of shared beliefs and second order beliefs, or coercion?
•
We need theoretical frameworks to understand any differences
– Naïve theory of groups
– Content of cultural beliefs
– Social structural influences incentive structures