WhoMakesRadioSpectrumPolicyintheEU?TheRoleofComplementaryGovernancein
theManagementofElectronicCommunications
Draft2
IrinaIordachescu
ABSTRACT The choice of regulatory tools for the management of radio frequencies is a
hotlydebatedtopicintheEuropeanUnion.Atthecoreofthisdebateisthegrowinguseof
mobile communications that rely upon allocation to the radio spectrum for their
transmission. This paper proposes the use of multi-sourced and complementary
governancetounderstandtheregulationofradiofrequenciesusedforcommercialmobile
communicationsacrosstheEU.Thepaperreliesonevidencefromtheharmonisationofthe
900MHzandthe800MHzbandsintheEUfor,respectively,secondandfourthgeneration
mobile communication systems. First, the paper argues that the mobile communications
industry has been an active rule-maker at transnational level, constraining the use of
authorisationregimesbydomesticregulatoryagencies.Second,itarguesthatthemobile
communicationsindustry,throughprivatetransnationalstandard-setting,hasdefinedrules
of access to radio frequencies that were adopted in regional legislation (EU) through
endorsement rather than through contestation in established policy-making venues. The
papermakesacontributiontothegrowingliteratureontheprivatesourceofregulationin
publicadministration.
Keywords:commonresource,governance,privateregulation,transnationalauthority.
I. Introduction
Themanagementoftheradiospectrum–thetotalityofelectromagneticfrequenciesused
for wireless communications around the world – has attracted considerable public
attentioninthepastdecade(FinancialTimesJune10,2010).Thereasonforthisinterest
has been the increasing demand for mobile communications relying on the use of radio
frequencies.IntheEU-28alone,therehasbeenaconsiderableincreaseintheproportion
ofthepopulationusingaportabledevicetoaccesstheInternet,from36%in2012to51%
in 2014 (Eurostat 2015). The political debate stems from the features of the radio
spectrum, a transnational natural common 1 prone to technology-driven scarcity that,
historically,resultedinthedomesticadministrationandinternationalcoordinationofthis
resourcebypublicauthorities.Thecentralpositionofpublicauthoritieswithstrongcontrol
rightsovertheradioresourcecanbeunderstoodinthehistoricalcontextinwhichwireless
communicationsdevelopedandthestrategicnatureofthepublicservicesthatoccupy,to
thepresentday,thelargestproportionofthisresource2.
1
Radiofrequenciesarenaturalresourcessharedbyagroupofusersandcharacterisedby
increased rivalry of consumption, whereby extraction by one user affects extraction by
2
Defence services occupy, to the present day, the largest proportion of electromagnetic
radiofrequencies.In2009,Ofcomreportedthatthepublicsectoroccupiesatotalof46%
oftheradiospectrumandfixedandsatelliteservicesoccupy24%.Bycontrast,terrestrial
broadcastingoccupies13%ofthespectrumandmobilecellularcommunicationsonly4%.
BBC(2009,February5)DigitalDividendSchemeSwitched.
1
However, in the past two decades, two main public policy developments have sparked a
new debate about the centrality of public authorities and the regulatory instruments by
which they determine access and use conditions on natural resources such as the radio
spectrum. First, with the deregulation and liberalisation of telecommunications markets,
there has been an increase in the number of stakeholders (Bauer 2001) and a
diversificationofpublicandprivateentitiesinvolvedintheregulatoryprocessoftheradio
spectrum.Second,withintheinternationalisationofstandard-settingforglobalmarketsin
electroniccommunications,therehasbeenanincreaseinthenumberofdecision-makers
sharing regulatory authority over the radio spectrum at domestic, regional and
internationallevel(Bekkers2001).
Therefore,theregulationoftheradiospectrumisahighlyrelevantpolicyissuetoexplore
thequestionofwhogovernsthenaturalcommonsinconditionsofincreaseddemandfor
this resource and its technology-driven scarcity. Specifically, the regulation of the radio
spectrum is highly relevant in order to explore tensions between the historically central
role of domestic public authorities in administering valuable resources on the one hand
and the increasingly relevant number of public and private entities sharing regulatory
authorityatmultiplelevelsofdecision-makingontheotherhand.Thepaperconsiderstwo
cases in the regulation of the radio spectrum in the European Union in order to explore
these tensions: a) the case of the regulation of the 900MHz frequency band for the
deploymentofsecondgenerationcellularmobilecommunicationsinthelate1980s,widely
known as 2G; and b) the case of the regulation of the 800MHz frequency band for the
deploymentoffourthgenerationmobilecommunicationsinthelate2000s,widelyknown
as 4G. The cases are interesting to study comparatively because they span through
different stages in the liberalisation of the electronic communications sector as well as
differentstagesintheintegrationofradiospectrumpoliciesinthecontextoftheEuropean
Union.
The paper is thus interested in answering two key questions. First, has stakeholder
diversification led to the consolidation or fragmentation of regulatory authority in the
administrationoftheradiospectrum?Second,hasanincreaseindecision-makinglevelsled
toincreasedcontestationanddeliberationoverthechoiceofuseandaccessconditionsto
theradioresource?Thetwocasestudiesareanalysedusingthemethodofprocesstracing,
focusingontherule-makingproceedings3thatledtothedeploymentof2Gand4Gmobile
communications in the EU, in order to test the causal relationship between increased
3
CEPTReportsandECCDecisions,RecommendationsandReportsarepublicallyavailable
at http://www.erodocdb.dk. GSM Plenary Meeting Reports (1982-1991) and GSM-CEPT
Documents(1982-1988)referencedhereareavailableatwww.gsm-history.org,permission
toreproducegrantedbyHillebrand&Partners.RareGSMDocuments(i.e.DigitalCellular
CooperationAgreementandAnnexesonIPRPolicy(1985),GSMMoU(1987))areavailable
atwww.gsmhistory.com,permissiontoreproducegrantedbyStephenTemple.Aselection
oftheseprimarysourcesisalsoarchivedintheCDROMattachedtoF.Hillebrand(2002)
GSM and UMTS: The Creation of Global Mobile Communication, John Wiley & Sons,
copyrightclearancegrantedbyJohnWileyandSons.
2
diversification of interests and decision-making levels and the structure of regulatory
authorityintheadministrationofscarceresources.
II. TheLogicandStructureofRegulatoryAuthority
Thereisconsiderablerecognitioninthespecialistliteraturethatthelogicandstructureof
regulatory authority has changed with the growth of liberalised and internationalised
markets,leadingtoregulatorydecentralisation(Black2001)andprivatisation(Büthe2010).
InthesectorofelectroniccommunicationsintheEU,onehasseenfundamentalchangesin
the market structure and institutional structure for telecommunications since the late
1980s,withanincreaseintheauthorityofindependentregulatoryagencies(Stern2014),
an increase in competition and private sector involvement (Künneke and Groenewegen
2009)aswellasgrowthinmulti-leveldelegationtonetworksofregulatoryagencies(Coen
and Thatcher 2008) and private sector technical bodies such as standard-setting
organisations(MattliandBüthe2003).
Does this increase in complexity obscure our understanding of the changing logic and
structureofregulatoryauthority4?Towhatextent,then,doesthisincreaseincomplexity
lead to the decentralisation of regulatory authority as a result of the involvement of a
larger number of participants in rule-making and the increase in deliberation and
contestationasaresultofthestratificationofdecision-makingonmultiplelevels?
The relationship between increased stakeholder participation and the decentralisation of
regulatory authority is not always straightforward due to the different forms that
decentralisation takes. Black (2001) noted that “decentering” describes a number of
different changes to the regulatory process: a) internal fragmentation of the tasks over
policy formulation and implementation within government and administration; b)
redistribution of power between public and private actors involved in the regulation
process,withdifferentcontrolfunctionsoverthedefinition,monitoringandenforcement
of rules; and c) stratification of decision-making on multiple levels, with the growth in
regionalism and transnationalism as mezzo-levels of government. The conclusion is that
these forms of decentralisation have led to a shift from a hierarchical organisation of
regulatory authority to a heterarchical distribution of power between private and public
actors situated at multiple levels of decision-making (Hooghe and Marks 2001, Scott,
CafaggiandSenden2011).Equally,decentralisationimpliesashiftfromthe“commandand
control”operationofaregulatorysystemtotheperformanceofcomplementaryfunctions
by several actors, achieved through “co-regulation” and “self-regulation” (Black 2001,
HéritierandEckert2008).
4
Thefocusonthispaperisonruleformulation.However,“regulatorygovernance”implies
anumberoffunctionandroles.Eberleinetal(2012:12)identifyregulatorygovernanceas:
“a)framingtheregulatoryagenda;b)formulatingrules;c)implementingruleswithinthe
targetsofregulation;d)gatheringinformationandmonitoringbehavior;ande)responding
tonon-complianceviasanctionsandotherformsofenforcement”.
3
Theregulationoftheradiospectrumpresentsaninterestingsituationinrelationtothese
dynamics. In the EU, changes in market and institutional structures in the electronic
communicationssectorhaveledtoincreasinglyheterarchicalformsofregulatoryauthority.
At the domestic level, there is evidence of internal fragmentation, with governments
setting spectrum policy strategies and independent regulatory authorities allocating use
andaccesstofrequencybandstocommercialentities.Thereisalsoconsiderableevidence
ofthestratificationofdecision-makingonmultiplelevels,particularlythegrowingroleof
the European Commission (EC) in defining a regional spectrum strategy as well as
proposing spectrum harmonisation for communication services across domestic borders
(Decision 243/2012/EU). Lastly, there is growing stakeholder involvement in regulatory
arrangements as evidenced by the participation of manufacturers and operators of
electronic communications in regional standard-setting bodies, such as the European
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI), which sets technical specifications for the
productsandservicestobedeployedonthespectrum.
However, the description of the multiple actors present in this regulatory system is
insufficient to understand whether and where a redistribution of authority has, indeed,
occurred. For instance, because of the strategic and scarce nature of the radio resource,
domestic regulators maintain strong command and control functions over frequency
allocations,regardlessofwhetherthespectrumlicenseeshavemoreflexiblerightsofuse
than in the past5. In this case, can we safely speak about fragmentation of regulatory
authoritybetweenprivateandpublicactorsandbetweenlevelsofdecision-makingwhen
domesticregulatorsstillexertcontrolfunctionsovertheresource?Whereshouldwedraw
the“decentralisationline”betweentheseactorsandwithinthisregulatorysystem?
Thesequestionsfurthercomplicatethesecondrelationshipthatwillbeaddressedbythe
casestudiesbelow:whetherthestratificationofdecision-makingonmultiplelevelsleads
toanincreaseincontestationanddeliberationbetweentheactorspresentinthiscomplex
regulatorysystem.Multi-levelgovernanceprovidesaconceptualframeworkthroughwhich
to examine the institutional complexity of policy-making within a particular issue area
(HoogheandMarks2001).However,inherentinthisconceptualframeworkisapluralistic
understanding of policy and regulatory governance, whereby multiple actors (individuals
and institutions) deliberate at various political levels and, in the process, create mutual
dependence(Stephenson2013:817).Thequestionhereiswhetherapolycentricsystemof
nestedgovernment,identifiedatseveraldomestic,privatetransnationalandinternational
levels,isinherentlyasystemofincreasednegotiationanddeliberation(Marks1993)?
Thereareatleasttwomaindirectionsevidencedfromavarietyofpolicyareas(Eberleinet
al2012).Ontheonehand,thereistheprivatisationandtransnationalisationofregulatory
governance, which impliesthatregulatory authority is increasingly located outside ofthe
establishedpolicy-makingandrule-makingvenuesofthestate(Cafaggi2011,Haufler2001,
BütheandMattli2011).Here,deliberationandcontestationhasshiftedfromthepublicto
theprivaterealm,whereregulatoryregimescanbeunderstoodinrelationtotheeconomic
5
Inthepastdecade,therehasbeenashifttowardstheuseoftechnologyneutralityand
largerflexibilityofspectrumusethroughtheintroductionofsecondarymarketsforlicense
trading.
4
resources and technical capabilities of non-state actors, which place some in positions of
power over others, creating winners or losers (Mattli and Büthe 2003). International
standard-settinghasbeenanalysedintheseterms,withtechnologicalleaderssettingthe
standards agenda and creating high switching costs for the laggards. On the other hand,
there is increasing evidence that private transnational regimes are constructed in the
“shadow of the state” (Abbott and Snidal 2009, Héritier and Eckert 2008, Vergurggen
2013). Distributive bargaining is still present and might occur in private transnational
settings,butstatesandintergovernmentalinstitutionsplayasignificantrolebylegitimating
andsupportingtheseregimes(AbbottandSnidal2009).Thisimpliesadegreeofinteraction
betweenprivatetransnationalregimesandstate-basedinstitutions.Thequestionisthento
identifywheredeliberationoccursandthepointofinteractionwithstate-basedregulatory
actorsandinstitutions(Eberleinetal2012).
Thefollowingsectionsareexploringthesequestions,stillhighlydebatedintheliterature,
by examining the regulation of the 900MHz and 800MHz bands for the deployment of
respectively, second and fourth generation mobile communications across the EU. As
discussed above, the main questions concern the degree of fragmentation in regulatory
authority between multiple actors and the degree and locus of contestation and
deliberationthatisotherwisepredictedinmulti-levelsystemsofregulatorygovernance.
III. Fragmentation,yetwhere?
This section addresses the question of regulatory fragmentation by exploring the
relationship between increased stakeholder participation and the decentralisation of
authority in the regulation of the 900MHz and 800MHz bands in the EU. It finds that, in
bothcases,thereisevidenceofdecentralisation,whichwasinformedbyalogicofcreating
regional (900MHz band) and global (800MHz band) markets for mobile electronic
communications. It also reveals that the “decentralisation line” can be drawn along the
regulatory power of domestic regulators to define usufruct rules and the increasing
regulatory power of private entities, particularly manufacturers and operators of mobile
communications systems, to define exclusion rules at transnational level in the radio
resource.
Theregionalharmonisationofthe900MHzbandwasachievedinthelate1980s,following
a decision by mobile operators in thirteen countries in Western Europe to sign the GSM
Memorandum of Understanding (GSM MoU 1987), a cooperation agreement on the
technicalconfigurationofsystemstobedeployedintheband,whichmadetheobjectof
the first GSM Directive6(Directive 87/372/EEC). The GSM Directive reserved the 900MHz
band,onanexclusivebasis,fordigitalcellularmobilecommunicationswithoutspecifying
the technical standard to be deployed in this band. However, at the time, GSM was the
onlydigitalcellularmobilecommunicationsstandardintheworld,havingbeenestablished
6
Council Directive 87/372/EEC on the Frequency Bands to be Reserved for the Coordinated Introduction of Public Pan-European Cellular Digital Land-Based Mobile
CommunicationsintheEuropeanCommunity.
5
and adopted by mobile operators and a select number of designated manufacturing
“champions”inGroupeSpécialMobile(GSM)–apurposefullycreatedstandardisationarm
of the intergovernmental Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administration
(CEPT).
Exploringtheconfigurationofactorsinthisgovernancesystemisrelevanthereinorderto
understand the logic of regulatory action that led to the GSM Memorandum of
Understanding(1987).Inthelate1980s,thetelecommunicationssectorinWesternEurope
was characterised by the strong presence of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone
Administrations (PTTs), with exclusive authority to define use and access conditions to
frequency bands within their territory as well as to single-handedly operate mobile
communication services, relying on an established national developer – a “national
champion” – to manufacture otherwise proprietary telecommunications systems. The
cross-border relationship between these PTTs was one of minimal coordination in the
intergovernmental CEPT and it was limited to establishing interconnection protocols
between fixed telecommunications systems at national borders and ensuring noninterferencebetweenwirelesssystems.TheEuropeanCommissionhadlimitedpowersto
propose harmonisation of telecommunications policies and, at the time, recognised that
coordinationshouldbeachieveintheestablishedCEPT(COM(80)422Final).
The shift in this configuration of regulatory authority was triggered by two factors, one
exogenous and one endogenous. The exogenous factor was the General Agreement on
TariffsandTrade,particularlytheTokyoRound(1973-1979),whichobligedmemberstates
to use international standards as the technical basis of regulations for product markets
(Büthe and Mattli 2010: 456). The endogenous factor was the limited economic benefits
thatdomesticoperatorsderivedfromnetworkdevelopmentanddeploymentwithintheir
territories,withfirstgenerationnetworksreachingfullcapacitybeforetheycouldcapitalize
on their investment. The logic of coordination was, thus, informed by the creation of a
larger,regional,marketformobilecommunicationsthatwouldallowforthedevelopment
ofeconomiesofscaleandwouldlimittheovercrowdingofexistingbands.
Coordination among the PTT started in 1982 in CEPT and was driven by the logic of
establishinginteroperabilitybetweenanalogmobilecommunicationssystems,ratherthan
thedevelopmentofasingledigitalstandards.ThisisconfirmedbyT.Haug,theChairmanof
Groupe Spécial Mobile, who noted that “the decision only mentioned “harmonisation”
whichindicatesthatthecompatibilityaspectwasthedominantfactorbehindthedecision
[…]”(Haug2004:155).However,competitionbetweenanalogproprietarysystemspushed
theworkofGroupeSpécialMobileawayfromitsoriginalmandatetoensurecompatibility
and more towards standard-development. By 1986, the majority of the manufacturers
involved in the process developed competitive proposals for a new digital standard for
cellular mobile communications in a bid to create first mover advantage. As it will be
outlined in the next section, it was this internal competition in Groupe Spécial Mobile,
whichgraduallybecameastandardisationbody,whichresultedintheadoptionofasingle
digitalstandardforcellularcommunicationssystemsintheEU.Theadoptionofthisdigital
standard resulted in the direct creation of technological controls on inclusion in the
900MHz band. To be more precise, only those who adopted this standard could bid for
domesticuseofthisband.Thus,theadoptionofGSMmeantthatregulatoryauthorityto
6
definerulesofaccessonthe900MHzbandhadnowshiftedfromthedomesticleveltothe
transnationallevel,beingdecidedbythemobilecommunicationsindustry.Thislimitsthe
function of domestic authorities – the PTTs and, with deregulation and liberalisation, the
NRAs–whohavelesscontrolovertherulesofaccessontotheradiospectrum(i.e.which
communicationstechnology/communicationsystemstaysin/out),butmaintainauthority
overtherulesofuseoftheradioresource(i.e.thelicensingregime).
[Insertfigurewithformaldynamicsbetweenactorsandlevels}
Theharmonisationofthe800MHzbandpresentsadifferentconfigurationofactorsinthe
regulatorysystembutfollowsthesamelogicanddecentralisationofregulatoryauthority
alongthelinesofestablishingcontroloverexclusionrulesbyprivatetransnationalactors.
In2010,theprocessofrefarmingthe800MHzbandwaskick-startedintheEUbyDecision
2010/367/EU7,whichconfirmedtheco-primarystatusofmobilecommunicationsservices,
withcapacitytoprovidemobilebroadband(4G),alongwiththebroadcastingservicesthat
hadoccupiedthisbandsincetheiroriginaldevelopmentinEuropeinthelate19thcentury.
Public debates about refarming the 800MHz took place in the context of the “digital
dividend”–anumberoffrequencybandsthatcouldbereleasedforotherusesasaresult
oftheswitchoverfromanalogtodigitalbroadcastingservices.
Theconfigurationofactorsoperatingintheregulatorysystemfortheradiospectrumhad
also changed. The European Commission had acquired competences in defining the
regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the EU, but only to the extent that it
couldproposecoordinationorharmonisationofpolicyapproaches(Decision676/2002/EC).
Standard-setting capacity had also grown in the EU, with the establishment of the
EuropeanTelecommunicationsStandardsInstitute(ETSI)inthelate1980s,whenGSMwas
transferredfromCEPTtoETSItoformthecoreofthestandard-developmentworkofthis
organisation. In addition, as a result of the internationalisation of mobile communication
markets,meta-standardisationbodiessuchas3GPPwereestablishedtocoordinatecrossregional standardisation activity. The question is, then, whether this increase in the
numberofactorsandinstitutionsoperatinginthisregulatorysystemledtoanyshiftsinthe
regulatory authority from the “decentralisation line” established between domestic
regulatorsandtransnationalstandard-settingbodiesinthe1980swithGSM?Theevidence
reveals that, although there was an increase in the number of actors and institutions
operating in the regulation of the radio spectrum, the decentralisation of regulatory
authoritywasmaintainedalongthesame“line”,withprivatetransnationalactorsdefining
rulesofaccessanddomesticregulatorydefiningrulesofuseoftheradioresource.
ThisisrevealedbythepositionoftheEuropeanCommissioninthedebateoverthefarming
ofthe800MHzbandaswellasbytheroleoftransnationalbusinessesindefiningrulesof
exclusion at the global level. Regarding the European Commission, in the early 2000s, it
identified the 800MHz band as a “digital divided” with potential to be considered for
7
Decision 2010/367/EU on Harmonised Technical Conditions of Use in the 790-862MHz
Frequency Band for Terrestrial Systems Capable of Providing Electronic Communications
ServicesintheEuropeanUnion.
7
refarming and, as a result, opened a process of industry consultation through the Radio
Spectrum Policy Group. The consultation revealed an expected rift between the
broadcasting industry, advocating the preservation of the 800MHz exclusive for their
services,andthemobilecommunicationsindustry,advocatingincreaseddemandfordatahungryservicesrequiringmoreradiospectrumcapacity.ThispushedtheCommissiontoa
positionofneutrality.In2003,itnotedthat“sofar,themomentumistowardskeepingthe
spectrum within broadcasting, though the potential alternative use of the spectrum by
otherservicesisbeingdevelopedinvariousfora”(EC2003:21-23).Bythelate2007,the
Commission was advocating some degree of flexibility in refarming spectrum, without
makingaclearrecommendationastotheamountoftheradioresourcetobereorganised,
theservicesthatwouldbenefitfromthisreorganisationortheoperationalarrangements
bywhichthiswouldbeachieved(EC2007:9).
This stalemate at the regional level pushed the leading manufacturers and operators of
mobile communications systems to advocate the co-primary status of mobile broadband
servicesinthe800MHzbandattheinternationallevelwithintheframeworkoftheWorld
Radiocommunications Conference (WRC-2007) of the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU). The most active industry association was the MiB Group (Mobile Industry
Backing Terrestrial Spectrum for IMT), who had privately developed a new standard for
mobilebroadband(LTE),approvedwithin3GPP.Theirstrategywastoadvocatetheneed
foradditionspectrumtoregionalcoordinationbodies,whichrepresentthedomesticNRAs
(such as CEPT) and which were present at the conference, showing requirements of
additional spectrum need of over 1,000MHz for mobile communications by 2020 (ITU-R
M2078).TheresultwastheadoptionofResolution224attheWorldRadiocommunications
Conferencein2007(WRC-2007),whichgavemobilecommunicationssystemsaco-primary
statusinthe800MHzband.
This resolution, which was then transposed in Decision 2010/367/EU, reveals that,
although the number of actors participating in the administration of the radio spectrum
hadformallyincreased,itdidnotleadtoafurtherredistributionofauthorityamongthese
actors. To the contrary, it reinforced the position of transnational businesses in defining
rules of access (inclusion or exclusion) in a given frequency band through technical
standards,aswellasthepositionofdomesticregulatorsindefiningrulesofuse(usufruct)
withintheirjurisdiction.
IV. Contestation,yetwhere?
This section explores whether the increase in the number of actors and institutions that
operateatthevariouslevelsofpolicyandruleformulationinradiospectrumgovernance
hasledtomoredeliberationandcontestationovertheaccessconditionstobeadoptedin
the radio resource. The contestation of use conditions is not treated here because, as
identifiedintheprevioussection,theseremainwithintheauthorityofdomesticregulators
who issue licenses that specify the rate of use within their territory and, consequently,
shouldnotbedirectlyinfluencedbythestratificationofradiospectrumgovernance.This
sectionfindsthat,inbothcases,thestratificationofpolicy-makingdidnotresultinmore
deliberation between these nested levels of authority. Instead, bargaining over rules of
8
access to the radio resource was “privatised” in technical committees. In the first case
(900MHz), bargaining took place over rules of technology exclusion (GSM) between
industryconsortiacompetingoverstandardsdevelopment.Inthesecondcase(800MHz),
bargaining took place over service inclusion (mobile broadband) between the mobile
communications industry and domestic regulators as a result of the relative bargaining
strengthofthemobilecommunicationsindustryvis-à-visthebroadcastingindustry.
In the case of the 900MHz band, contestation over the rules of access to the radio
spectrumtookplace,almostexclusively,withinGroupeSpécialMobileinCEPT.Atthetime,
political actors, particularly heads of states, did refer to the growth potential of
telecommunications markets across the European Economic Community (EEC), but the
discoursewasalwayslinkedtoadesiredindustrialleadershippositionoftheECC(EC1972),
rather than the regulatory regime for the radio spectrum. Similarly, the discourse of the
European Commission was linked mostly to the limited capacity of individual member
states to effectively compete on their own in international telecommunications markets,
ratherthandirectlytotheadoptionofnewrulesofregionalallotmentofradiofrequencies
(EC 1983). CEPT was, thus, the only regional framework where bargaining over
coordinationofradiospectrumpolicycouldtakeplace.
However, as previously noted, CEPT was not a standardisation organisation. Besides, the
common development of a single technical standard to be used for communications
systemsoperatinginaharmonisedfrequencyband,bycompetingnationalchampions,was
unheard of in Western Europe at the time. In this context, it is safe to say that the
participation of the PTTs and their designated manufacturing “champions” in Groupe
Spécial Mobile was a mechanism of pushing through a preferred proprietary technology
while also monitoring the research and development activity of competitors across
borders.Thisisevidencedbythecompetitionbetweenthe“NordicGroup”,aconsortium
of Scandinavian PTTs and their preferred manufacturers (Nokia, Ericsson) and the
“Continental Group”, a consortium of the French and German PPTs with their respective
manufacturers(Alcatel,Phillips).Bargainingbetweenthetwogroupswasstructuredalong
thechoiceoftechnologyforspeechtransmission:whetheritshouldbeanalogasproposed
by the “Continental Group” or digital as showcased by the “Nordic Group” (GSM Doc
53/83).Because,atthetime,the“ContinentalGroup”perceivedthedevelopmentofdigital
speechtransmissionasacompetitiveadvantageofthe“NordicGroup”,itpushedfurther
technical development within Groupe Spécial Mobile, that would allow continental
manufacturers to catch up with the technologies proposed by their counterparts and to
thenrecommendtheirpreferredtechnologyforselection(GSMDoc76/84).Theinclusion
oftechnicaldevelopmentchangedtheactivityofGroupeSpécialMobilefromacommittee
ofanintergovernmentalorganisation(CEPT)toastandardisationbodyinitsownright.
The process of bargaining between the two groups continued throughout the 1980s. In
1986,severalproposalsputforwardbythecompetingconsortiaweretestedwithinGroupe
SpécialMobile.Becausethewinningproposalcamefromthe“NordicGroup”,negotiations
were stalled until a middle-ground decision was arrived at, to combine the technical
specifications of the two groups8(Bonn Declaration 1987). This compromise led to the
8
Inannotatedhistory,theessenceofthiscompromiseiscapturedintheBonnDeclaration
9
creationofGSM9,anotherwisecomplexandhighlyproprietarystandardduetoitsmultiple
contributors. The configuration of this technical standard meant that exclusion from the
900MHzbandcouldbeensuredonatechnologicalbasisand,mostimportantly,thatthose
who contributed proprietary knowledge to the configuration of the standard would gain
frominclusionontheresource.ItwasonlyafterthePTTsagreedtocombinethetechnical
specificationsofthecompetingproposalsintheBonnDeclaration(1987)thattheEuropean
Commissionproposedtheharmonisationofthe900MHzbandtotheCouncil,whichpassed
itasDirective87/372/EEC.TheDirective,whichdoesn’tmakedirectreferencetothework
ofGroupeSpécialMobile,doesmakereferencetothedeploymentofdigitalcellularmobile
communications systems in the harmonised band, which at the time represented only
GSM. This analysis reveals that, although the outcome of these negotiations was the
adoptionoflegislationattheEUlevel,deliberationwithinandbetweenthesenestedlevels
ofdecision-makingwasminimal,andbargainingoverrulesofaccesstotheradiospectrum
tookplaceinthecontextofthestandardisationprocessinGroupeSpécialMobile.
The case of the 800MHz band in the 2000s presents a similar dynamic and outcome,
although the stratification of policy-making in radio spectrum governance had formally
increased. The European Commission had increased visibility in the policy process as a
result of the adoption of a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy following
Decision 676/2002/EC. In addition, stakeholder consultations were conducted by
regulators at domestic level as well as by the European Commission, due to the divisive
nature of the “digital dividend” between the broadcasting and mobile communications
industry.However,asnotedabove,intheearly2000s,thepositionofthetwoindustries
pushedtheEuropeanCommissioninazoneofneutralityvis-à-visthepotentialinclusionof
mobile broadband services in the 800MHz band. On the one hand, the broadcasting
industry had occupied the band since its inception. On the other hand, the mobile
communicationsindustrywasrecoveringfromthetelecomscrashoftheearly2000sand
didnotshowsubstantialgrowthtojustifyadditionalspectrumcapacity.
Instead,bargainingovertheinclusionofmobilebroadbandservicesonthe800MHzband
bypassedthepolicy-makinglevelestablishedintheEU.Contestationtookplaceovertwo
stages.First,bargainingoccurredwithinthemobilecommunicationsindustryinstandarddevelopment organisations and, specifically, between manufacturers and operators.
Second, bargaining occurred between the mobile communications industry and regional
coordination bodies representing the NRAs. The first stage in the bargaining process was
withinthemobilecommunicationsindustry.Comingoutofthemarketslowdown,mobile
operatorswerelesswillingtocoverthecostsofnewinfrastructuredevelopmentfornew
mobile broadband services. By contrast, key players of the manufacturing industry were
(1987):“EuropemusthaveasinglestandardsupportedthroughtheCEPT.Thisshouldbe
basedonanarrowbandTDMAconceptdefinedbyCEPTatitsMadeirameetinginFebruary
1987, enhanced in the area of modulation and coding to provide greatest flexibility in
receivingequipmentimplementation”.ThenarrowbandTDMAconceptistheproposalof
the“NordicGroup”whereasthe“enhancedmodulation…andcoding”istheproposalofthe
“ContinentalGroup”.
9
Currently, the GSM standard stands for “Global System for Mobile Communications”,
originallyGroupeSpécialMobile.
10
developing the next generation of cellular communications systems – 4G (LTE) – in a
voluntary association called the World Wireless Research Forum with the aim to get the
standardapprovedinthemeta-standardisationbody3GPP.However,withoutthebacking
ofthemobileoperators,themarketizationofthestandardwouldhavestalled.Onceagain,
negotiations between the two groups concluded with a compromise. Mobile operators
wouldbacktheshifttomobilebroadbandonlyifmanufacturesdevelopedaflexiblecore
network – system architecture evolution (LTE-SAE) – that would give operators a greater
sayinmigratingbetweengenerationsofsystems.Thisprivatebargainingstrengthenedthe
positionofthemobilecommunicationsindustryvis-à-visthebroadcastingindustryinthe
secondstageofthebargainingprocessthatoccurredwiththenationaladministrationsin
thecontextoftheWorldRadiocommunicationsConferenceof2007(WRC-07).
In the second stage of the bargaining process, the mobile industry was able to produce
detailedspectrumcapacityrequirementsandbargainforthesupportofNRAsandregional
coordination bodies such as CEPT (MIB 2007). As noted above, the MiB Group (Mobile
IndustryBackingTerrestrialSpectrumforIMT),avoluntaryindustryassociationformedby
the original founders of the World Wireless Research Forum, advocated the need for
furtherspectrumallocationofover1,000MHzformobilecommunicationsservicestothe
CEPT.ThispositionwasfurtherdetailedintechnicalcommitteesoftheITU,informingthe
Conference Preparatory Meetings of the WRC-07. Allocation to the 800MHz band would
invariably ease this need for further capacity. Besides, the technological flexibility
embedded in the new system architecture evolution (SAE) would meet the flexible use
conditions required by the NRAs, gaining additional support. As a result, the
recommendation to give mobile communications services co-primary status on the
800MHz band received support from domestic administrations within WRC-2007
(Resolution224).Onceagain,themobilecommunicationsindustrywasabletoalterrules
ofaccesstotheradiospectrumwithoutcontestingthemwithinandbetweenthenested
levels of decision-making established within the EU. Bargaining over inclusion of
communications services in the 800MHz took place in technical committees of standardsettingorganisationsorinthetechnicalcommitteesoftheITU.
V. Conclusion
This paper set out to explore the question of regulatory authority given considerable
discussioninthespecialistliteratureaboutthedecentralisation(Black2001),stratification
(Hooghe and Marks 2001) and privatisation of regulatory systems (Cafaggi 2011). The
paper applied this analysis on the regulation of the radio spectrum for mobile
communicationsintheEU,giventensionsbetweenthestrategicnatureofthisresourcefor
statesandtheinternationalisationofelectroniccommunicationsmarkets.Inparticular,the
paperaimedtoclarify,first,whetherthediversificationofactorsthatparticipateinradio
spectrumpolicy-makinghasledtothefragmentationofregulatoryauthorityand,second,
whether the stratification of radio spectrum policy-making has led to increased
deliberationovertheuseandaccessconditionstotheresource.
11
Onthefirstquestion,thepaperfindsevidencethattheregulationoftheradiospectrum
has become multi-sourced in the EU. However, it finds that the two sources of
complementary governance are domestic regulators on the one hand, and businesses,
operatingintransnationalstandard-settingbodies,ontheother.Interestingly,itfindsthat,
although the number of actors participating in radio spectrum policy-making increased
fromthefirst(900MHzband)tothesecondcase(800MHzband)studied,themainsources
of regulatory authority stayed the same. Thus, transnational businesses define rules of
access(inclusionorexclusion)inagivenfrequencybandthroughtechnicalstandardisation,
whiledomesticregulatorsdefinerulesofuse(usufruct)inagivenfrequencybandthrough
domesticlicensing.Thesefindingsrevealthatmultiplicationanddiversificationofactorsin
a particular regulatory system do not always result in further dispersion of regulatory
authority.
On the second question, the paper finds that the two sources of regulatory authority –
transnational businesses and domestic regulators – do interact with each other and that
bargainingwithinandbetweenthesetwosourcesofregulatoryauthoritydoestakeplace.
In addition, there is considerable evidence to support that the “privatisation” and
“transnationalisation” of access conditions still requires the legitimation of domestic
regulators.Thisshowsevidenceof“privatetransnationalregulation”intheshadowofthe
state(AbbottandSnidal2009,HéritierandEckert2008).However,theinterestingfinding
is that interactions between the two sources of regulatory authority take place directly
ratherthanthroughdeliberationbetweenthemulti-levelstructureoftheEU.Thisfinding
revealsthatkeyaspectsconcerningtheregulationoftheradiospectrumarepassedinEU
legislationthroughendorsementratherthanthroughdeliberationwithinitsnestedlevels
ofdecision-making.
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