Dave Griffiths
University of Stirling
 What
are quangocrats?
 How do they govern?
 What do they govern?
 How do they gain positions?
 “the
large range of bodies of appointed,
non-elected, non-civil service people
running things, overseeing things, or
advising about things, and usually
spending or controlling public money”
(Andrew Marr, Ruling Britannia, 1995)
 or: governmental
bodies which provide a
civil service independent of the Civil
Service

“But it would be naïve to think that every
state action can be undertaken by
democratically accountable ministers
acting through government departments.
The political process has its limitations, and
there are circumstances where it makes
sense for ministers to delegate power to an
independent body. The overriding test for
this should be clear: it is whether the
execution of policy should be subject to
political influence. Where it is not, it is right
to keep execution at arm's length. And
there are three particular areas where the
public would want reassurance that actions,
decisions, or the provision of services are
insulated from political influence.”
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/07/David_Cameron_People_Power_-_Reforming_Quangos.aspx
“The first is when a precise technical operation needs to
be performed to fulfil a ministerial mandate. In these
circumstances the public needs to know that people with
the right training, professional knowledge and specialist
skills are carrying out the work.”
“The second area where it may be right to delegate power
to an independent body is when there is a need for
politically impartial decisions to be made about the
distribution of taxpayers' money. In areas like the arts and
science, the public expects funding on merit, not
favouritism.”
“The third area where there is likely to be a need for independent action is when
facts need to be transparently determined. We have seen how information, once in
a politician's hands, can be distorted to score a political point. A freeze becomes a
zero percent rise. Cuts in capital expenditure become increases. Of course this has
not been the preserve of any particular government, at any particular time.”
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/07/David_Cameron_People_Power_-_Reforming_Quangos.aspx
 Quango
distracters have long argued
decisions are more commonly made in
theatres (Jenkins 1996) and tennis clubs (Sampson 2001)
than boardrooms
 Stevenson and Radin (2009) – board meetings
are places to formalise decisions made
elsewhere, often highly influenced by those
with connections to other institutions and
networks of directors
 Well-established literature on benefits of
sitting in Inner Circle (Useem 1985), for directors
(Scott 1982) and corporations (Carroll 2009)
 Four
principal capitals are: economic; social;
cultural; and symbolic.
 Symbolic can be adapted towards any
framework
 Cultural capital can refer to the cultures and
trends of certain situations
 Social capital can refer to knowing the right
sort of people
 Therefore, we can create the notion of
boardroom capital, encompassing all these
things
 Knowledge
of how boardrooms operate
 Knowledge of practices and trends
moving throughout boardrooms
 Ties to networks of other directors – peer
support opportunities
 Operating as a member of the ‘governing
classes’
 Are
quangos governed by the public, by
experts, or by members of the governing
classes?
 By
experts = Cameron’s vision of effective
governance
 By the public = Fulfilment of their
democratic function and non-partisan ethos
 By governing classes = delegation of power
and resources to higher strata groups, at
expense of wider public involvement
 Ombudsmen
= independent authorities
holding sectors to account on behalf of
general public
 Regulators = independent authorities
holding sectors to account on behalf of
practitioners

Regulators
Architects Registration Board 14
British Hallmarking Council
23
Civil Aviation Authority
7
Consumer Council for Water 12
Energywatch
9
Gambling Commission
8
Gangmasters Licensing Authority25
General Teaching Council
63
Horseracing Betting Levy Board 8
National Consumer Council 11
Ofcom
7
Passenger Focus
14
Pension Protection Fund
6

Postwatch
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
Ombudsmen
13
 Data
collected as at 1st January 2007
 Taken from quango’s websites, annual
reports and registers of members’
interests
 Biographical directories (such as Who’s
Who) also used
 Details of any institutions governed,
regardless of their type, coded
 217
individuals
 Only 3 sitting on multiple boards
 144 govern other organisations
 37 currently share additional positions on
other boards
 159 have previously governed
organisations
 67 have served on the same boards
previously
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Air Travel Trust
Association of Consultant Architects
Association of Teachers and Lecturers
Birmingham Assay Office
British Transport Police
Edinburgh Assay Office
Food Standards Agency
NASUWT
Norfolk, Cambridgeshire and Suffolk Strategic Health Authority
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Responsibility in Gambling
Sheffield Assay Office
Trading Standards Institute
Trefoil House
Civil Air Authority (2 members)
Architects Registration Board (2 members)
General Teaching Council (2 members)
British Hallmarking Council (3 members)
Passenger Focus (2 members)
British Hallmarking Council (3 members)
National Consumer Council (2 members)
General Teaching Council (4 members)
Passenger Focus (two members)
National Consumer Council (2 members)
Gambling Commission (2 members)
British Hallmarking Council (2 members)
British Hallmarking Council (2 members)
British Hallmarking Council (2 members)

DTI
Civil Aviation Authority & Gangmasters Licensing
Authority

Financial Services Authority
British Hallmarking Council & Ofcom

GMB
Gangmasters Licensing Authority & National
Consumer Council

General Medical Council
Consumer Council for Water & Postwatch

ICSTIS
National Consumer Council & Ofcom

Local Government Association

Gangmasters Licensing Authority, General
Teaching Council, National Consumer Council &
Passenger Focus
National College for School Leadership General Teaching Council & Postwatch

NSPCC
Horseracing Betting Levy Board, National Consumer
Council & Passenger Focus
 Bonded
connections within institutions
 Stakeholder influence appears to be
strong in terms of multiple positions
 Little evidence of quangocrats currently
sitting on same boards
 No signs of nepotism or ability for
directors to share information between
themselves
 Very weak connections between
directors – largest component only 5
 159
directors have previously governed
organisations
 37 connected in largest component of
mutual ties
 Experience
of governing one board appears
important for gathering new positions
 No signs of centres to the network, nor cliques,
just that governing is important
 Absence of voluntary and arts organisations
demonstrates power and influence does not
come from those positions
 Relatively small size of component (37 of 217
individuals) suggests these are largely
individuals who do not know each other and
hold few ties
 Graphs
for number of ties for each
organisation
 Graph for relevant subject ties
 Graph for relevant ombudsman ties
 Overall levels of capital
 Overall levels of relevance
 Connections which occur
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
members
people with ties
160
140
120
100
80
60
Ties
40
20
0
quangos
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
quangos
quango relevant
5
4
3
2
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Types:
quangos; companies; charities; educational bodies; professional institutions.
 These
directors are well-versed in governance
capital
 They have much depth to their capitals,
covering voluntary and arts organisations as
well as public bodies
 As a general rule, their connections to quangos
are on different issues to their current role, but
their connections to outside agencies are
similar
 Does this suggest quangos are a way for
experts to access an inner circle of the
governing classes?
 Millie
Banjeree: board member for
Postwatch and Commission for Judicial
Appointments; trustee of Carnegie UK
Trust; board member of Tanaka Business
School at Imperial College; previously sat
on the boards of Channel 4, Prisons
Board, Sector Skills Development Agency
and Strategic Rail Authority; formerly
CEO of ICO Global Communications and
a director at British Telecom.

Sara Nathan: board member of Criminal Injuries
Compensation Appeals Appeal, Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Authority, ICSTIS, Judicial
Appointments Committee and Marshall Scholarships;
advises Animal Procedures Committee and Financial
Services Authority; formerly Children First’s
Commissioner for Lambeth, and board member of
Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeal Tribunal and
Gambling Review Body; board member of the Jewish
Museum; former producer of The Commission for BBC
Radio 4, editor of Channel 4 News and programme
editor for BBC Radio 5 Live.
 Only
unconnected tie for Gangmasters
Licensing Authority is a directorship of a
local tennis club
 Only one member of Architects
Registration Board holds positions
outside of the industry
 For
consumer protection agencies, governance
capital is essential
 Ombudsmen have diverse social capital, even
if representing stakeholders (representatives of
the sector within the elite)
 For industrial protection agencies, governance
capital from within the sector is essential
 Governing other organisations an hinderence
for such positions
 Quangos
are ruled by members of the
governing classes – but differences
between types of body
 For consumer protection, representatives of
the governing elite govern. For agency
protection, the sector elite govern
 This questions the degree to which these
quangos are independent, and the extent to
which they are merely controlling things
themselves.
 But, quangos should not be viewed as all
being the same.