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Personality and Individual Differences xxx (2006) xxx–xxx
www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
Wholist–analytic cognitive style: A matter of reflection
Jo Davies *, Martin Graff
Department of Psychology and Education, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,
University of Glamorgan, Glamorgan CF37 1DL, UK
Received 4 November 2004; received in revised form 17 August 2005; accepted 8 September 2005
Abstract
This study explored the influence of a reflective–impulsive approach on wholist and analytic processing,
by counterbalancing presentation of the embedded figures and matching figures subtests of RidingÕs cognitive styles analysis (CSA). One hundred and ninety three participants completed a variation of the CSA test.
The results revealed that the wholist–analytic ratio is extremely sensitive to the order in which each subtest
is presented. Significantly higher ratios are produced when the matching figures subtest is presented first
and lower ratios are produced when the embedded figures subtest is presented first. This reflects a general
tendency for respondents to react more slowly to early test items. However, this tendency to produce slower
response times during early test items is greater for individuals with a reflective style. There was significant
interaction between the presentation order of the subtests and individual differences in reflective–impulsive
style. Reflective individuals were significantly more analytic than the impulsive individuals when the matching figures subtest was presented first and were marginally but not significantly more wholist when presentation order was reversed. The implication is that the methodology of the CSA is likely to inflate differences
between wholist and analytic individuals by comparing differences in part–whole processing and concomitant differences in reflective–impulsive style.
Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cognitive style; Wholist–analytic; Reflective–impulsive; Embedded figures; Matching figures; CSA
*
Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 (0)1443 654534; fax: +44 (0)1443 482138.
E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Davies).
0191-8869/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2005.09.011
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1. Introduction
The term Ôcognitive styleÕ has been used to describe and explain individual differences in the
strategies used for representing and processing information (Riding & Rayner, 1998). An array
of labels have emerged over the years under the general rubric cognitive style, for example: field
dependent–independent (Witkin, 1965; Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp, 1962);
impulsive–reflective (Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert, & Phillips, 1964); diverger–converger (Hudson, 1966) and holist–serialist (Pask, 1976; Pask & Scott, 1972). Increasingly researchers have
noted systematic and conceptual links between the proposed style labels (e.g. Allinson & Hayes,
1996; Brumby, 1982; Coan, 1974; Ehrman & Leaver, 2003; Fowler, 1980; Riding & Buckle, 1990;
Riding & Rayner, 1998), suggesting that they are merely emphasising different aspects of a superordinate dimension of cognitive style (Miller, 1987; Riding & Cheema, 1991). Riding and Cheema
(1991) proposed such a superordinate model of cognitive style based on two orthogonal dimensions: verbaliser–imager and wholist–analytic. The cognitive styles analysis (CSA) (Riding,
1991 & Riding, 1998) was designed to positively assess each pole of the superordinate dimensions.
The CSA has a strong theoretical basis and has amassed a substantial body of empirical evidence, which provides support for its construct validity (Riding & Agrell, 1997; Riding & Craig,
1999; Riding & Douglas, 1993; Riding, Glass, Butler, & Pleydell-Pearce, 1997; Riding & SadlerSmith, 1992). Despite this, an important methodological limitation will be described, which renders the test vulnerable to individual differences in reflective–impulsive style and casts doubt on
the validity of the CSA measure of wholist–analytic style. There are four factors that combine
to make the wholist–analytic measurement sensitive to the influence of reflective–impulsive style.
1.1. The wholist–analytic style measurement is based on differential speed of processing tasks
that favour either part or whole processing strategies
The wholist–analytic dimension is conceptualised as an individualÕs preference for processing
information either in complete wholes or in discrete parts. An individualÕs position on the wholist–analytic dimension is determined by their relative speed of processing Ômatching figureÕ tasks
and Ôembedded figureÕ tasks. The matching figures task features items containing pairs of geometrical shapes, and the respondent is required to match these and indicate whether they are the same
or different. The test involves judgements about the similarity of two figures and a relatively fast
response to this would indicate a wholist tendency. The embedded figures task contains items comprising a simple shape and a more complex geometrical figure. For this part of the test, the task of
the respondent is to indicate whether or not the simple figure is contained within the complex one.
As this task requires a disembedding skill, a relatively fast response time is taken to indicate an analytic tendency. An individualÕs wholist–analytic style is then identified by the calculation of a ratio
between the speed of processing the matching figures and disembedding figures parts of the test.
1.2. The presentation of the tasks that favour whole or part processing is not counterbalanced
within the CSA
The order of presentation of the matching figures and embedded figures subtests in the CSA is
not counterbalanced; all the matching figures items are presented first, followed by the embedded
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figure items. Therefore, individuals with slower response times to the items in the first half of the
test will produce a higher wholist–analytic ratio, which indicates a more analytic style. However,
there may be a systematic difference between reflective and impulsive individuals in the tendency
to produce slower response times during early test items; this would provide an alternative explanation for high wholist–analytic ratios.
1.3. Speed of processing is a distinguishing characteristic of reflective–impulsive style
Reflective individuals are characterised by a tendency to focus on accuracy rather than speed of
response, whereas impulsive individuals are characterised by the tendency to focus on speed rather
than careful avoidance of mistakes (Gullo, 1988). Kagan and colleagues proposed the reflective–
impulsive style distinction in the early 1960s (Kagan et al., 1964). They developed the Ômatching
familiar figuresÕ (MFF) test as a measure of reflective–impulsive style. The MFF test presents a
stimulus object with eight variants and the respondentÕs task is to select the variant, which is identical to the stimulus object. Reflective individuals are those who take relatively longer to produce
their first response, produce less incorrect responses and more regularly produce the correct response on their first attempt.
1.4. Individuals with a reflective style are expected to have relatively longer response times
to early test items
In conditions of uncertainty, reflective individuals are more likely to approach each novel task
with a degree of caution, assessing the difficulty of the task to ensure that they respond accurately.
When presented with a very simple novel task, they may begin more slowly until they are satisfied
that the items are consistently simple. As their confidence increases, their response time is likely to
decrease accordingly. In the CSA, the matching figure tasks are presented before the embedded
figure tasks; therefore individuals with reflective styles may respond more slowly to the early test
items producing higher wholist–analytic ratios. In this way, some individuals would produce more
analytic ratios because they have a reflective style not because they have an analytic style.
The validity of the wholist–analytic construct requires that it correlates with similar cognitive
style constructs (Riding, 1997), such as reflective–impulsive style (Kagan et al., 1964). This theoretical assumption suggests that individuals with a wholist style are likely to be more impulsive
and individuals with an analytic style are likely to be more reflective. Therefore, the sensitivity
of the CSAÕs wholist–analytic ratio to differences in reflective–impulsive style is likely to exaggerate differences between wholist and analytic individuals. Furthermore, Jones (1997) suggested that
the reflective–impulsive style was more pervasive than the wholist–analytic style and consequently
would have an effect on how individuals would respond to a wholist–analytic type test.
The validity of the wholist–analytic ratio will be assessed by employing appropriate counterbalancing techniques to examine the influence of reflective–impulsive style. A computer presented
measure, the Ôwholist–analytic styleÕ analysis or WAS test, has been developed based on the wholist–analytic sections of RidingÕs CSA. Two versions of the WAS test have been devised: the first
presents the matching figure items (wholist items) followed by the embedded figure items (analytic
items) and is throughout referred to as the ÔWAS-WAÕ; the second presents the embedded figure
items followed by the matching figure items and is referred to as the ÔWAS-AWÕ. Therefore, the
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WAS-WA presents the subtests in the same order as the CSA whereas the WAS-AW reverses the
order of presentation.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
The participants in this study were 193 undergraduates (52 male, 141 female) with a mean age
of 22.05 years (SD 6.16 years).
2.2. Measurement
The wholist–analytic style analysis (WAS test) is an 80-item test based on the wholist–analytic
sections of the CSA and is presented via computer in a similar fashion to the CSA. The test is in
two sections, the wholist section, which consists of 40 matching figure items and the analytic section, which consists of 40 embedded figure items. The matching figure tasks present a pair of complex figures, which require a yes/no response indicating whether the two figures are the same. The
embedded figure tasks present a simple shape and a complex figure, which also require a yes/no
response to indicate whether the simple shape is contained within the complex figure. Respondents are required to complete four example items prior to each subtest.
Presentation of the embedded figures section and the matching figures section is counterbalanced to explore the influence of a reflective–impulsive approach to the wholist–analytic ratio
score. Of the 193 participants who completed this test, 107 completed the embedded figures section first (WAS-AW) and 86 completed the matching figures section first (WAS-WA). Furthermore, the true and false comparisons were also counterbalanced within each section and all
items were presented randomly without replacement.
The test demonstrated satisfactory split half reliability, coefficient of 0.76. Split half reliability
was lower for the ÔWAS-AWÕ test version than the ÔWAS-WAÕ version, coefficients of 0.65 and
0.76, respectively.
3. Results
3.1. The effect of counterbalancing on the wholist–analytic ratio
The wholist–analytic ratio was calculated by dividing the median response latency to items in
the matching figures section by the median response latency to items in the embedded figures section. A ratio of below 1 indicates that an individual responded relatively faster to the matching
figure (wholist) items and a ratio of above 1 indicates that an individual responded relatively faster
to the embedded figure (analytic) items. Summary statistics for the wholist–analytic ratios produced for each test version are summarised in Table 1.
A t-test revealed that the mean ratio was significantly lower for participants presented with the
embedded figures section first than for participants presented with the matching figures section
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Table 1
Mean and spread of wholist–analytic ratios produced by test version
Wholist–analytic ratio
Mean ratio
Standard deviation
Standard error mean
Kolmogorov–Smirnov Z
AW
WA
0.99
1.23
0.22
0.32
0.02
0.03
Z = 1.088, p = 0.19
Z = 0.951, p = 0.33
99.9% Confidence intervals - Wholist-Analytic ratio
Test condition
1.40
1.35
1.30
1.25
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.05
1.00
.95
.90
.85
.80
EFT - MFT (WAS-AW)
MFT - EFT (WAS-WA)
Order of presentation of the wholist and analytic sections
Fig. 1. Confidence (99.9%) limits and means for the wholist–analytic ratio by test version.
first, means of 0.99 and 1.23, respectively (t = 6.099, df = 143, p < 0.001). The mean difference
represents a large effect size of (d = 0.92) and there is no overlap between error bars based on
99.9% confidence intervals (Fig. 1).
When the embedded figures section was presented first, lower ratios were produced, with an expected population mean of between 0.92 and 1.06. When the matching figures section was presented first, higher ratios were produced, with an expected population mean of between 1.12
and 1.35.
Participant scores were further analysed according to the order in which subtests were presented. The lowest 30%, mid 40% and highest 30% of ratios obtained in the WAS-AW and the
WAS-WA were labelled as wholist, intermediate and analytic, respectively. The ratio cut-off
points are illustrated in Table 2 below. RidingÕs CSA guidelines for classification are provided
for comparison.
The effect produced by manipulating the order of presentation may be partially accounted for
by the tendency of individuals to produce slower response times to early test items. 67.8% of the
total sample had slower median reaction times to items in the first subtest than in the second sub-
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Table 2
Classification of wholist–analytic style ratio
Classification labels
WAS-AW
Wholist
Intermediate
Analytic
WAS-WA
CSA guidelines
N
Ratio
N
Ratio
Ratio
35
40
32
60.88
>0.88, <1.05
P1.05
28
33
25
61.05
>1.05, <1.33
P1.33
61.02
>1.02, <1.36
P1.36
test. This has the effect of lowering the ratio when embedded figure items are presented first and
inflating the ratio when matching figure items are presented first.
3.2. The influence of reflective–impulsive style on the wholist–analytic ratio
It was hypothesised that the tendency to respond more slowly to early test items will be more
pronounced for individuals with a reflective style; this would result in reflective individuals
appearing more analytic in the WAS-WA condition and more wholist in the WAS-AW condition.
To test this hypothesis, participantsÕ test completion speed and accuracy were categorised as either
high or low by creating two equal groups for each variable. Individuals in both the low speed and
1.40
1.35
Group Mean Wholist-analytic ratio
1.30
1.25
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.05
Style
1.00
impulsive
.95
reflective
.90
Analytic- Wholist
Wholist-Analytic
Presentation order of wholist-analytic sections
Fig. 2. Wholist–analytic ratios produced by reflective and impulsive individuals when order of presentation of wholist–
analytic sections is manipulated.
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high accuracy groups were labelled ÔreflectiveÕ (N = 67), those in the high speed and the low accuracy groups were labelled ÔimpulsiveÕ (N = 61), the remaining participants were labelled ÔfastÕ if
they had both high speed and high accuracy or ÔslowÕ if they had low speed with low accuracy
(N = 35 and 30, respectively).
A greater proportion of the reflective individuals responded more slowly to items in the first
half of the test, 77.6% of reflective individuals compared to 63.9%, 60% and 63.3% for the impulsive, fast and slow groups, respectively, providing initial support for the hypothesis.
A univariate analysis of variance examined the effect of presentation order (WAS-WA versus
WAS-AW) and reflective–impulsive style (reflective versus impulsive) on the wholist–analytic ratio.
The results revealed significant interaction between reflective–impulsive style and the presentation
order of the wholist–analytic sections (F(1, 124) = 7.210, p = 0.008). Two post hoc t-tests revealed
that when analytic items were presented first (WAS-AW), there was no significant difference between the wholist and analytic ratios produced by reflective and impulsive individuals (ratios of
0.96 and 1.04, respectively, p = 0.062). However, when the matching figure items were presented
first, reflective individuals produced significantly more analytic ratios than the impulsive individuals (ratios of 1.35 and 1.18, respectively, t = 2.062, df = 53, p = 0.022, d = 0.58) (see Fig. 2).
4. Discussion
The wholist–analytic ratio is extremely sensitive to the order in which the matching figure and
embedded figure subtests are presented. There is a general tendency for respondents to produce
slower median reaction times in the first subtest and faster times in the second subtest. This
has the effect of increasing the wholist–analytic ratio when the matching figures section is presented first and decreasing the ratio when the embedded figures section is presented first. The
implication of this finding is that since the CSA always presents the matching figure subtest first,
respondents will produce inflated ratios and therefore appear more analytic. However, more interesting is the systematic difference that emerged between individuals characterised as having a
reflective or impulsive style.
Reflective individuals were identified by their relatively slower test completion times and their
greater accuracy. The tendency to produce slower median reaction times to the first subtest was
greater amongst the reflective group and resulted in reflective individuals appearing more analytic
when the matching figures section was presented first. However, it is important to note that when
the embedded figures section was presented first, there was no significant difference between the
wholist and analytic ratios of reflective and impulsive individuals. The findings suggest that the
wholist–analytic ratio is influenced by individual differences in reflective–impulsive approaches
and part–whole processing style.
It appears that when the matching figures subtest is presented first, as in RidingÕs CSA, the differences between analytic and wholist styles are amplified by concomitant differences in reflective–
impulsive style, for example, individuals with an analytic style and a concomitant reflective approach will be relatively faster in the second subtest by virtue of the order of presentation and
the nature of the task. Conversely, when the embedded figures section is presented first, differences
between analytic and wholist styles are cancelled out by the concomitant differences in reflective–
impulsive style, for example, an analytic style would produce relatively faster responses to the first
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subtest by virtue of the nature of the task but a concomitant reflective approach would produce
faster responses to the second subtest by virtue of the order of presentation.
This paper has questioned the validity of the wholist–analytic measure. It seems that the reliance on differential speed and the problems relating to the order of subtest presentation confounds the wholist–analytic ratio with the influence of reflective–impulsive style. When the
wholist section is presented first, as in RidingÕs CSA, the confounding influence inflates the wholist
and analytic differences in a way which is consistent with RidingÕs theoretical assumptions.
Two future approaches may adequately control for the influence of reflective style. The first is
to use a measurement of wholist–analytic style, which does not involve processing speed or accuracy as the basis of the measurement. For instance, completion of embedded figures and matching
figures tasks could be conducted whilst using apparatus that would track eye movements. This
would be a more direct measure of the tendency to use part or whole processing. The second option, and perhaps the most practical alternative, would be to adapt the existing measurement,
employing counterbalancing methods in a similar fashion to those used for the verbaliser–imager
dimension of the CSA. Rather than presenting wholist and analytic items in different subsections,
the two task types could be randomly presented within the same section. In this way a tendency to
produce slower processing speeds at the beginning of the test would affect the speed of processing
wholist and analytic items alike.
In conclusion, this paper questions the validity of the CSA measure of the wholist–analytic
dimension, providing evidence that the present methodology of the CSA renders the wholist–analytic ratio very sensitive to the influence of reflective–impulsive style. However, the research is also
consistent with RidingÕs theoretical assumption that analytic–wholist style is likely to correlate
with similar constructs, i.e. reflective–impulsive style, thus providing support for the validity of
the wholist–analytic construct.
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