Today’s Lecture
• One more thing about your first assignment
• David Hume
• Some comments on religious experience
One more thing about your first
assignment
• I need your first assignments back. It won’t
take long, but I forgot to do something with
them. I’m afraid that I won’t be able to
return your second assignment until I see
your first assignment. Sorry about the
inconvenience.
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part III
• Demea proffers the following replies to Cleanthes.
• (1) Cleanthes’ argument assumes a strong
resemblance between the Divine and human. This
is suspicious on at least two grounds. (i) (As even
the pagans will admit) the Divine is beyond
comprehension or description. (ii) We appear to be
showing a partiality to our ourselves in likening
the Deity to humanity (rather than something or
someone else) (FP, p.63).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part III
• (2) An examination of the human mind makes it unlikely
that the Divine resembles it in any substantial way. After all,
human sentiments aid in our survival and well-being ...
something we cannot reasonably say of a Divine Mind. Our
mental content, all of which is derived form the senses,
often lacks veracity ... something again we cannot
reasonably say of a Divine Mind. Our thought, which is all
that remains of the human mind, is “fluctuating, uncertain,
fleeting, successive and compounded” (FP, p.64) ... again
something we cannot reaonsably say of a Divine Mind (FP,
pp.63-64).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• Cleanthes has three important responses to these
contentions.
• (1) Theists must presume that there is some correspondence
between the Deity and humanity if they are to be left with
anything to regard, worship or talk about at all (FP, p.64).
• (2) Those ‘theists’ who insist that we cannot intelligibly
anthropomorphize the Deity, and that the Deity’s nature is
wholly incomprehensible to mortals such as ourselves,
commit themselves to a view of Deity irrelevant to their
lives and the lives of those around them (FP, p.64).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• (3) Perfect Being Theology does not describe a
Divine Person (or the Goddess), as it does not
describe what can be sensibly called a person at all
(FP, pp.64-65).
• “A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are
not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly
simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has
no thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no
love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at all” (FP,
p.65).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• Note that Cleanthes rejects the view of Deity
assumed in the Ontological and Cosmological
Arguments, as Philo points out (FP, p.65).
• “You are honouring with the appellation atheist all
the sound, orthodox divines, almost, who have
treated of this subject; and you will at last be,
yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the
only sound theist in the world” (FP, p.65).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• Philo now begins a critical assessment of the
anthropomorphic view of God proffered by
Cleanthes.
• Note his aim is to show that “there is no ground to
suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the
divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently
arranged, in the same manner as an architect forms
in his head the plan of a house which he intends to
execute” (FP, p.65).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• (1) There is no good reason to think that only the
material or physical world requires an explanation
involving a Cause. If, indeed, we ascribe mind to
the Deity we ascribe a mental world as diverse and
rich as the physical or material universe. If these
effects resemble each other (i.e. if the universe of
objects and the Divine ‘universe’ of mental ideas
relevantly resemble each other in their complexity
and arrangement), then they also resemble each
other in having a cause (FP, p.65).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• Philo contends that Cleanthes can’t have it both
ways.
• (1) Either the Divine World of ideas, to which we go
in the Teleological Argument to explain the material
or physical world, is in need of explanation for its
own existence, or, if it is appropriate to go no further
than that ‘World of ideas’, then we need not begin
the journey in search of a cause of the material or
physical world in the first place (FP, pp.65-66).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• (2) If we do pursue a cause for the Divine
World of ideas we are threatened with an
infinite regress of causes.
• (3) This is not acceptable.
• (4) So, we need not begin the journey in
search of a(n ultimate) cause of the material
or physical world in the first place. (I.e. it is
enough that we find a cause for its existence
within itself.) (FP, pp.65-66).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• We could preempt this move, argues Philo, only by
cheating on the explanation of the order held to exist
in the mind of the Deity. After all, if we have no
substantial explanation of such order except that it is
the nature of the Divine Mind to be so ordered (i.e. it
is by nature rational), why not explain the order of
the material or physical universe through an appeal
to its own natural tendency to move towards order?
(FP, p.66)
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• Cleanthes has two responses for Philo.
• (1) Even in common investigations of
causes we do not demand that an
explanation is complete unless we
definitively finish the chain of relevant
causes.
• (2) Despite the difficulties highlighted by
Philo, it is still plain (or self-evident) that
the universe was created (FP, p.67).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part IV
• Philo’s response to Cleanthes is to grant (1),
but with the caveat that no one would view
an explanation complete if the explanatory
cause is in as much need of explanation as
the effect to be first explained. This is the
trouble with Cleanthes’ view, according to
Philo (FP, p.67).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part V
• The beginning of this Part of the Dialogues
consists of Philo getting Cleanthes to admit
that his Teleological Argument will only
work if he supposes that the mind of the
Deity is relevantly similar to the minds of
humanity. But this lies in tension with
discoveries of a macro and micro universe
that no human mind could duplicate or
maintain (FP, pp.67-68).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part V
• Cleanthes so agrees, and Phil provides the following
concerns about such an anthropomorphic view of
God.
• (1) We need only propose a cause necessary to bring
about the perceived effect. We must also be wary,
under Cleanthes account, of describing the mind of
the Deity in such a way that it no longer relevantly
resembles that of humanity. This means that, on both
counts, we must jettison “all claim to infinity in any
of the attributes of the Deity” (FP, p.68).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part V
• (2) We need not regard the Deity perfect even in His finite
capacities to create and maintain the universe, as we cannot
assume this universe to be itself perfect (FP, p.68).
• (3) Even if the universe is itself perfect, this does not
require a perfect creator, just a good learner of what works
and what, in the long or short term, does not (FP, p.69).
Thus, we cannot eliminate the possibility that the Deity has
created many universes, and that this universe is the result
of His (or Her) cumulative learning experience (predicated
on His or Her past failures) (FP, p.69).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part V
• (4) Once down this road we also cannot rule out the
possibility that the creation of the universe was a
group effort. Only Perfect Being Theology
necessitates monotheism (FP, p.69).
• (5) This possibility also raises the possibility that the
Deities so involved are by no means perfect. After
all, the effort of a group requires less expertise from
any one member to successfully coordinate the
activities of the whole (FP, p.69).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part V
• (6) This, now, only gets worse. We need not,
at this point, insist that the relevant Deity or
Deities are immortal. Cleanthes, remember,
is not interested in worries about infinite
regresses, so this worry need not restrain
our philosophical sensibilities within this
context of conversation (FP, p.69).
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: Part V
• (7) We need not restrain our philosophical sensibilities
concerning the form of the Deity or Deities either. After all,
the Transcendence of Deity is not to be thought of, at least
in this context, as beyond anything recognizably human. So,
it is possible that the relevant Deity or Deities have a
physical, and not just a mental, form that relevantly
resembles humanity (FP, p.69).
• Think of it this way. Cleanthes doesn’t want us to radically
depart from the human model of mentality or cognition. But
of course embodiment is an important aspect of human
cognition. Consequently, to remain relevantly human-like,
the Deity or Deities should, perhaps, be thought of as
embodied.
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part V
• “In a word, Cleanthes, a man who follows your hypothesis
is able perhaps to assert, or conjecture, that the universe,
sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond
that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance;
and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by
the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. ... From the
moment the attributes of Deity are supposed finite, all these
have place. And I cannot, for my part, think that so wild and
unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, preferable
to none at all” (FP, p.70).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part VII
• In this Part of the Dialogues you have Philo suggest a
competing model of the universe than the model suggested
by Cleanthes.
• Solely on the grounds of relative ‘fit’, Cleanthes has likened
the universe to the artifacts created by human ingenuity or
skill.
• Philo suggests that Cleanthes method of generating
adequate models of the universe from which to infer its
ultimate cause cannot exclude, at least in principle, likening
the universe to biological organisms, be they fauna or flora
(FP, pp.70-71).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part VII
• Through this suggestion Philo hopes to raise
suspicions about the choices Cleanthes has
made along in this argument ... including
Cleanthes’ willingness to relax the criteria
for what counts as principled argument and
what counts as rational or reasonable. Philo
does not, himself, take this suggestion
seriously (FP, p.71).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part VII
• “This is the topic on which I have all along insisted. I have
still asserted, that we have no data to establish any system of
cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so
limited both in extent and duration, can afford us no
probable conjecture concerning the whole of things. But if
we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray,
ought we to determine our choice? .... And does not a plant
or an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation,
bear a stronger resemblance to the world, than does any
artificial machine, which arises from reason and design?”
(FP, p.71)
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part VII
• “Now, that vegetation and generation, as well as reason, are
experienced to be principles of order in nature, is
undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former,
preferably to the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems
entirely arbitrary. And when Cleanthes asks me what is the
cause of my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am
equally entitled to ask him the cause of his great reasoning
principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on
both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present
occasion to stick to this agreement” (FP, p.72).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part VIII
• Note that Philo is giving Cleanthes room to move
here. All he is saying is that, given the parameters of
the conversation, Cleanthes cannot rule out, in any
principled way, the alternative models of the
universe Philo has suggested. Cleanthes can regard
his path so far as adequate, but only at the price of
regarding various antithetical models as legitimate
competitors to his own model (FP, p.73).
Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion: Part VIII
• Cleanthes cannot even use the criterion of ‘that which
admits of no problems or inconsistencies with experience’
as a way of ruling out antithetical models of the universe.
His own model is as liable to fail such a criterion than
anything Philo might suggest (FP, p.75).
• This, Philo, thinks generates, at best, a stalemate between
the anthropomorphite and the Perfect Being Theologian or
atheist. Given that there is no principled way, in this
context, to decide between the alternatives, it is best,
contends Philo, to totally suspend judgment of the matter
(FP, pp.75-76).
Some comments on the philosophical
analysis of religious experience
• As I have already said, there is no principled reason
to exclude the phenomena of religious experience
from philosophical discussion.
• I think we can make this claim stronger. If we are
not going to beg questions against theism, we need
to make room for philosophical analyses of religious
experience.
Some comments on the philosophical
analysis of religious experience
• On the other hand, we have no good reason to
suspect that religious experience is directly tied to,
or immediately gives rise to, a particular theological
system of beliefs.
• That is to say, despite similarities in the reports of
those who experience a presence of the Divine, there
is not a corresponding similarity in the doctrinal
expressions used to interpret said experiences.
What’s more, there are, in many cases, no particular
set of doctrinal expressions that best fits the
experiences in question.
Some comments on the
philosophical analysis of
religious experience
• There are at least two competing nonnaturalistic models of religious experience
discussed in the literature: (1) Perceptual
models of religious experience and (2)
‘Other Minds’ models of religious
experience.
Some comments on the philosophical
analysis of religious experience
• (1) Perceptual models of religious experience liken an
individual’s experience of the Divine to our common
experiences of objects in the external world.
• (2) ‘Other Minds’ models of religious experience liken an
individual’s experience of the Divine to our common
experiences of other (human or nonhuman) minds.
• (1) and (2) primarily differ on (i) the ‘proximity’ of
religious experience to the relevant religious beliefs and,
consequently, (ii) the relevant cognitive mechanisms or
processes used to acquire certain rudimentary or
theoretically simple interpretive beliefs about the
experience.
Some comments on the philosophical
analysis of religious experience
• Given what I have already said about the
underdetermination of many, if not most,
religious beliefs, perceptual models of
religious experience lack prima facie
plausibility.
Some comments on the philosophical
analysis of religious experience
• A naturalistic model of religious experience seeks to find an
adequate explanation of religious experience that does not
require the existence of supernatural or non-natural entities.
• We might, for instance, think that a continuing need for a
parental figure in certain individuals’ lives inclines some to
have experiences that confirm their safety or security in a
Power that is both invincible, loving and ever present.
• Alternatively, we might think that certain religious
experiences help various oppressed or disenfranchised
members of society deal with their ongoing encounters with
said oppression or disenfranchisement.
Some comments on the philosophical analysis of
religious experience
• One philosophical approach to Natural or Dogmatic
Theology is to see it as providing the details of a working
hypothesis for interpreting past, and predicting future,
religious experience.
• The cost of such an approach is the tentative epistemic
status accorded the relevant Natural or Dogmatic Theology.
I.e. the individual seeking to confirm or disconfirm the
relevant religious hypothesis ought to remain open to the
possibility that her religious framework is false or, at the
very least, deeply flawed.
• This makes it very difficult, though not impossible, to
integrate a philosophical approach to Natural or Dogmatic
Theology into an ongoing devotional practice.