FREE CHEESE ONLY COMES IN
MOUSETRAPS:
EXPLORING FOOD BANK USE IN THE UK
Madeleine Ellis-Petersen
Word count: 14,963
FREE CHEESE ONLY COMES IN MOUSETRAPS: EXPLORING
FOOD BANK USE IN THE UK
Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Introduction
The Nature of Food Bank Growth in the UK
Causes for the Growth in Food Banks
Entrenchment and Policy Drift
Relationship between National Government and Food Banks
Relationship between Local Authorities and Food Banks
Conclusion
Appendix
Bibliography
1
2
5
10
17
23
31
42
44
47
Introduction
‘When I give food to the poor, they call me a saint. When I ask why they are poor, they call
me a communist.’
-Hélder Câmara
This thesis examines food bank expansion in the UK and the extent to which such expansion
reflects a shift in welfare provision. In order to determine the nature of the rise in food banks,
the causes for this growth are first outlined. It is concluded that food bank use is a
consequence of increasing levels of food poverty, caused by: government non-policy in
relation to tackling increasing levels of poverty; government policy which has increased the
numbers of those in poverty; and welfare reforms which have decreased the efficacy of
previous mechanisms of state support. The interaction between the welfare state and food
banks, on both a national and local level, is then explored, with a particular emphasis on the
impact of welfare changes on the relationship between state welfare provision and food
banks. It is found that Social Fund localisation has inaugurated a nascent trend of food bank
entrenchment into UK welfare provision, which marks a fundamental shift in the nature of
the welfare state.
The emergence of food banks in the UK has been rapid, and the debate surrounding food
banks has been characterised by uncertainties regarding the precise reasons for their existence
and proliferation. Food poverty, defined as ‘worse diet, worse access, worse health, higher
percentage of income on food, and less choice from a restricted range of foods’ 1 is
increasingly prevalent in the UK; the number of malnutrition-related admissions to hospital in
England has doubled since 2008-092, and the British Medical Journal declared the rise of
1
Barling, D., Lang, T. and Caraher, M., Food Policy: integrating health, environment and society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009)
2
HC Deb 12 Nov 2013, vol 570, cols 619W-620W
2
food poverty to ‘have all the signs of a public health emergency’3. Since 2001, food banks
(the definition of which will be fully explored later, but is broadly taken to mean non-profit
charitable organisations that distribute food to those in food poverty) have emerged as the
principle mechanism by which the needs of those facing food poverty are met. Given that
food banks diverge from traditional modes of welfare provision in the UK, a) why is it that
they have emerged as the response to food poverty? And b) in light of their proliferation, how
have political responses to food banks shaped their trajectory? Finally, c) does the shift in
welfare provision embodied by food banks mark a permanent alteration in the nature of the
UK welfare state and the means by which the needs of those in poverty are met?
Given the rapidly evolving nature of food banks in the UK, comprehensive analysis of trends
in their use has not yet been undertaken. Nevertheless, clear patterns are evident. The most
significant of these for the nature of welfare provision are: the increasingly evident reality
that much of food bank use is a consequence of benefit changes; and the increasing funding
of food banks by local authorities, illustrating a process of entrenchment, in which a
circumstance or action (in this case, food banks as an aspect of welfare provision) is
normalised and embedded into accepted pathways of policy action. The first of the above
trends is illustrated by data provided predominantly from The Trussell Trust, who attribute
30% of food bank use in the 2012-13 period to benefit changes or delays 4 , and through
reports from the Citizens Advice Bureau and Joseph Rowntree Foundation, which explore the
broader impact of the welfare changes introduced under the coalition government. A series of
interviews with those running food banks was also conducted, to gain an understanding of
food bank use on the ground. The second of these trends, the funding of food banks by local
authorities, is explored through: an analysis of the guidelines issued by the Department for
Work and Pensions throughout the process of Social Fund localisation; an exploration of the
3
4
Taylor-Robinson, D. et al, ‘The Rise of Food Poverty in the UK’, British Medical Journal (3 December 2013)
Biggest Ever Increase in Food Bank Use, The Trussell Trust (April 2013)
3
precise nature of the changes; interviews with food bank managers regarding their funding
sources; and finally, an analysis of the Local Welfare Provision of 25 randomly selected local
authorities. This research leads to the conclusions that: firstly, food bank use is increasing in
the UK, and these increases are attributable to a combination of the macro-economic picture
and changes in welfare provision; and secondly, food banks are becoming an ingrained aspect
of welfare provision, particularly on a local level. International evidence suggests the
irreversibility of such entrenchment, indicating that food banks risk becoming permanent
aspects of the UK welfare state.
The examples of the US and Canada offer paradigm cases of food banks and food aid
becoming entrenched mechanisms of providing support to those in poverty. In the US,
charitable food banking is routinely used to plug the shortcomings of the Supplemental
Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), which assigns recipients less than $1.50 per meal.
90% of SNAP benefits are redeemed by the third week of the month and only 57% of foodinsecure individuals are eligible for the benefit5, leaving many reliant upon non-government
food aid. In Canada, where 851,014 individuals were fed by food banks in March 2011, food
bank use has become entrenched into welfare provision, and numerous food banks receive
government funding6. While the nature of welfare provision in both the US and Canada is
distinct from that of the UK—both regimes fit clearly into Esping-Andersen’s liberal
typology, and have typically placed far greater emphasis on self-reliance, individualism and
an endorsement of market forces7—the examples offer important points of reference for food
bank use in the UK, where welfare provision has typically emphasised the role of the state.
Consequently, it is particularly important when considering food banks to note that the UK,
5
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Benefit Redemption Patterns in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (February 2011)
6
Stimulating Canada’s Charitable Sector: A tax incentive plan for charitable food donations, Food Banks
Canada (January 2012)
7
Esping-Andersen, G. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990)
4
in contrast to the US and Canada, has little history of providing benefits in kind. Food banks
are incongruous with the traditional form of UK welfare, whose subscription, at least in
theory, to the European Social Model’s emphasis upon social progress and comprehensive
welfare provision, implies a far more ‘rights-based’ approach to welfare than that of its
transatlantic counterparts
8
. Yet, characteristics of UK food bank expansion (rapid
entrenchment and the depoliticisation of food poverty) reflect the experiences of Canada and
the US. Much of the literature on the US or Canadian experience thus acts to highlight trends
in food bank use which are equally applicable to the UK experience.
I
The Nature of Food Bank Growth in the UK
Understanding the nature of food bank growth in the UK is integral to understanding the
broader picture of food bank use. Food banks first emerged as a response to food poverty in
the UK in 2000 9 , with the country’s first food bank established by the Trussell Trust in
response to the ‘hidden hunger’ of low-income families 10 . Food bank usage has since
increased dramatically, particularly under the coalition government. The number of food
parcels distributed by the Trussell Trust increased from 3,000 in 2005/06, to 40,898 in
2009/10 and then to 913,000 in 2013/1411, and has continued to rise, in spite of an improved
macro-economic picture.
Moreover, UK data on food bank usage is incomplete. The government does not collect
official statistics on the use of food banks as
8
Walker, R.,‘European and American values: case studies in cash benefits reform’, in Culture and Welfare
State: Values and Social Policy in Comparative Perspective, Oorschot et al (London: Edward Elgar, 2008)
9
The Trussell Trust’s UK Foodbank Network, The Trussell Trust (May 2013)
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
5
‘the provision of food aid ranges from small, local provision, through to regional and
national schemes. The landscape is mostly community-led provision responding to
local needs. As such, the Government does not believe it is possible to keep a record
of the number of food banks, nor the potential number of people using them’12.
The true extent of food aid is far greater than that provided by The Trussell Trust, yet they
are the source of most data on food bank use. As demonstrated above, their figures show a
dramatic increase in food bank usage since 2005. These figures do not account for food
provided by non-Trussell food banks. A recent Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (DEFRA) report emphasised the complexity of ‘systematically capturing’ an accurate
picture of the food aid landscape in the UK13, illustrated by a Guardian-led initiative to map
food banks, which found over 60 independent projects14. Given that the survey relied upon
projects self-reporting, it is likely the true number is far greater. A 2013 report from Oxfam
and Church Action on Poverty estimated there to be 500,000 in 2012-13, compared to the
Trussell figure of 346,992 15 , when non-Trussell providers were taken into account 16 . An
additional function of The Trussell Trust is signposting individuals in need ‘to other agencies
able to help resolve the underlying cause of the crisis’ 17 . Many of these agencies will
continue to supply clients with emergency food. Moreover, the picture of food aid is far
broader than food banks; a recent DEFRA report, Household Food Security in the UK,
included information on ‘food banks; food provided as part of community care (for example
“Meals on Wheels”); food stamps or vouchers’18 as part of its exploration of the means by
which food poverty is met, concluding ‘it is impossible at present to give an accurate estimate
12
HC Deb 13 Feb 2013, vol 558, cols 740W-741W
Lambie-Mumford, H., Crossley, D., Jensen, E., Verbeke, M., and Dowler, E., Household Food Security in the
UK: A Review of Food Aid (February 2014)
14
‘Mapped: Food banks across the UK’, The Guardian (12 July 2012)
15
The Trussell Trust’s UK Foodbank Network, The Trussell Trust (May 2013)
16
Niall Cooper & Sarah Dumpleton, Walking the Breadline: The Scandal of Food Poverty in Twenty First
Century Britain (May 2013)
17
UK Foodbanks Double Numbers Fed in one Year, The Trussell Trust (26 April 2013)
18
Lambie-Mumford, H., Crossley, D., Jensen, E., Verbeke, M., and Dowler, E., op. cit.
13
6
of the numbers of people fed by food aid providers in the UK’. Clearly the true magnitude of
emergency food provision is extensive.
Furthermore, food bank growth suggests an even greater increase in levels of food poverty.
Food aid is not, in itself, a reliable indicator of food poverty. As highlighted by the DEFRA
report ‘the most food insecure households do not always turn to food aid’19, a phenomenon
explored in Canadian research, in which the reasons for households not utilising formal food
aid initiatives include ‘perceptions that they were not in extreme need or that the assistance
would be insufficient or inadequate; that the experience was degrading or shameful; and lack
of access to, or information about, food aid provision systems’20. It is likely that the relative
infancy of food banks as a form of food aid provision in the UK heightens such barriers, with
less information less readily available, increased stigma, and lack of knowledge surrounding
the nature of food aid. Additionally, numerous studies have deemed food aid to be ‘a strategy
of last resort… [employed] when households have exhausted all other strategies’21. Research
in Canada revealed that, of 317 low income families interviewed, 75% were judged food
insecure, yet only 23% had used a food bank22. Food bank use is by no means a required
characteristic of food poverty. Yet it offers important indications of levels of poverty. Olivier
de Schutter, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, highlights that ‘[food
banks]… represent the best and most up to date source of data on social marginalisation in
our societies…access to food is the perfect bellwether for broader socio-economic
inequalities’23. Food banks provide indications of social marginalisation; they act to highlight
the extent of the problem in an easily digestible format, and provide a powerful and emotive
depiction of poverty.
19
Ibid.
Loopstra, R., and Tarasuk, V., ‘The Relationship between Food Banks and Household Food Insecurity among
Low-Income Toronto Families’, Canadian Public Policy, 2012, 38 (4), 497-514
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Olivier de Schutter, ‘Food banks can only plug the holes in social safety nets’, Guardian (27 Feb 2013)
20
7
The problematic nature of food bank data is compounded by definitional problems
surrounding food banks in the UK. There exist myriad models, giving rise to a ‘food aid
landscape which is both diverse and difficult to document’24. The Trussell Trust provides
food directly to individuals who have been issued with a voucher by a frontline care
professional25. This voucher system limits individuals to three vouchers within a given timeframe, usually one year, a limitation designed to ‘help people break out of poverty rather than
create dependency on a food bank’ and prevent The Trussell Trust system of food banks
becoming entrenched into the welfare network26. A number of non-Trussell food banks, such
as The Food Bank Milton Keynes and the Community Emergency Foodbank Oxford (CEF),
operate a similar referral process, procedures aimed to ‘avoid client dependency and abuse of
the system’ 27 (however, in recent months CEF have increased the number of vouchers
individuals are permitted within a given timeframe, thereby limiting the efficacy of the
voucher system). Despite its popularity, it is by no means the only system of emergency food
provision. FareShare, a nationwide system of food redistribution, operates 17 depots across
the country, last year distributing over 3,800 tonnes of food to charities ‘working with the
vulnerable or disadvantaged’28. The Oxford Food Bank (OFB) operates on a similar model,
distributing surplus food to organisations rather than individuals, although a ‘delivery to
individuals’ scheme is being piloted, in which food boxes are distributed at community
centres by individuals capable of verifying need29. The model employed by FareShare and the
OFB involves food distribution to charities with a pre-existing food provision service, thus
24
Lambie-Mumford, H., Crossley, D., Jensen, E., Verbeke, M., and Dowler, E., op. cit.
Biggest ever increase in UK foodbank use, The Trussell Trust (April 2013)
26
Tripling in foodbank usage sparks Trussell Trust to call for an inquiry, The Trussell Trust (16 October 2013)
27
Lambie, H., The Trussell Trust: Exploring the growth of foodbanks across the UK (November 2011)
28
FareShare, Stepping up to the plate (March 2013)
29
David Cairns (Founder and Director of Oxford Food Bank), personal interview (13 November 2013)
25
8
operating as a capacity building, rather than a capacity creating, vehicle, enabling charities
and organisations to expand or improve an existing operation30.
These variations in the nature and style of food provision are integral to shaping the
relationship between food banks and the welfare state. The models employed by FareShare
and the OFB do little to fundamentally alter welfare provision. Each provides food to
charities with an existing food delivery service, many of whom cater for groups whose needs
have not traditionally been met by the state, or the service provided has generally been
supplemented by charitable provision. FareShare’s recipient charities include residential
homes for adults with learning disabilities, homeless shelters and breakfast clubs, whose
partnership with FareShare enables them to ‘offer better quality food more often’31. The OFB
asserts ‘by subsidising/supplementing meals that charities provide we both improve the
health of the recipients and enable charities to redirect funds towards the provision of the
service they exist for’32. The data supports these claims; on average FareShare saves each
recipient charity £13,000 a year, money which is used for the provision of other services33.
Both FareShare and the OFB are currently expanding, largely in response to increased
demand from recipients. This increase in demand is caused by the same phenomena as those
driving rising food bank use, notably benefit changes and insufficient welfare provision. Yet
such demand manifests itself through pre-existing channels of charitable assistance which
limits the extent to which such food aid alters the broader ecology of UK welfare. In
providing food through charities rather than directly to individuals, FareShare and the OFB
operate within existing structural mechanisms of welfare provision, and thus do little to alter
norms of how welfare needs are met. By contrast, the model employed by The Trussell Trust
30
Catherine Buglass (FareShare London Development Manager), personal interview (27 September 2013)
FareShare, op. cit. p9
32
David Cairns, personal interview, op. cit.
33
FareShare, op. cit. p3
31
9
and other similar food banks inaugurates a system in which charitable provision, rather than
supplementing the welfare state, acts as a substitute for it, as is evident in local authorities
issuing food bank vouchers in place of cash benefits or other state sponsored forms of
assistance. The direct provision of food to the individual, particularly with state agencies as
the vehicle through which need is verified, and the increasing funding of food banks by local
authorities, therefore acts as a paradigm shift in the nature of the balance between state and
charitable provision. While government officials and actors within the food bank movement
point to the temporary nature of this shift, the reality is that food bank use continues to rise
even amidst improving economic circumstances, indicating a structural shift towards food
banks as a permanent feature of the safety net.
II
Causes for the Growth in Food Banks
Given that food banks are a marked departure from traditional channels of UK welfare
provision, why is it that they have proliferated so dramatically in recent years? Myriad
explanations for their growth have been offered, which broadly fit into two categories:
demand (need) and supply.
Organisations providing food aid have typically delineated need into two categories:
immediate problems which have led to sudden reductions in household income, such as job
losses and problems with social security payments; and on-going, endemic circumstances
such as continual low household income and indebtedness34. Others have challenged such
explanations of food bank use, instead claiming it to be a supply-side story, with the
increasing numbers of users attributable to the increased availability of food aid. There is
little evidence for such an explanation. When food banks initially emerged in the UK, they
34
Lambie-Mumford, H., Crossley, D., Jensen, E., Verbeke, M., and Dowler, E., op. cit
10
met the needs of those who fell through gaps in the safety net. As shall be explored, demand
increased as macro-economic conditions worsened and costs of living rose, and this trend has
continued, and been compounded by government welfare changes and cuts.
The most obvious cause of rising food bank use is an increasing need for the service they
provide. This need cannot be divorced from the broader macro-economic climate. Food bank
use remained low until 2004, when The Trussell Trust adopted the social franchise model to
facilitate the expansion of its network. In the period between 2004 and 2009, the number of
food banks rose to fifty35, and the number of users increased from 2,814 in 2005-2006 to
25,899 in 2008-200936. The early growth of food banks evidently preceded the recession. It is
thus difficult to delineate the effects of broader economic changes from the natural growth of
the Trussell network. However, from 2009-10 food bank use increased rapidly, illustrating
the link between food bank use and macro-economic conditions. In 2009-10 food bank use
stood at 40,898. By 2011-12, 128,697 were reported to have used food banks, increases
which correlate with rises in unemployment. Given this data solely documents the use of
Trussell Trust food banks, the true growth is likely to be far greater. In 2009 unemployment
increased by 210,000 to 2.47m 37 and by 2010 joblessness reached 2.5million, the highest
level since 1994 38 . Unemployment fell slightly in 2012, but levels of underemployment
reached record highs, with 1.46 million people undertaking part time work as a consequence
of being unable to find full time employment39. Simultaneously, increases in the cost of living
have combined with falling incomes to reduce food affordability by over 20% for households
in the lowest income decile 40 , while increases in job insecurity have left more people in
working families living below the poverty line (6.7m) than in workless and retired families
35
Channel 4 FactCheck op. cit.
The Trussell Trust’s UK Foodbank Network, The Trussell Trust (May 2013)
37
Office for National Statistics, Labour Market Statistics 2009 (2009)
38
Office for National Statistics, Labour Market Statistics 2010 (2010)
39
‘UK unemployment: Record underemployment as 1.46m Brits working part-time’ The Huffington Post (13
Nov 2013)
40
DEFRA “Food Statistics Pocket Book” (2012)
36
11
combined (6.3m)41. This link between unemployment and underemployment and food bank
usage is reflected in the data; in 2012-13, 18.45% of those using food banks did so as a
consequence of low income, while 4.25% cited unemployment as the reason for their food
bank visit 42 . This mirrors the experience in Canada, where low incomes rather than
unemployment generated increased food bank use; in one survey three-quarters of households
surveyed reported incomes of less than $15,000, which is below the poverty line even for a
single person. However, while the economic downturn is evidently important in explaining
the growth in food bank usage, the increased need created by economic changes would
traditionally have been met by the state, and food bank use has not declined in spite of
economic improvement. Thus it is only when twinned with welfare reforms that the recession
notably increased demand for food banks.
The swathe of welfare reforms introduced under the coalition government is integral to
explaining increased food bank use. The trend of sanction-backed conditionality in benefits
inaugurated in the latter years of New Labour 43 has continued under the coalition, with a
record number of sanctions (875,000) imposed in the year to September 2013. More than
133,000 of those were subsequently overturned on appeal 44 , illustrating the errors and
oversights which are leaving many in a crisis situation. In November 2013 it was reported
that 600,000 Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants had their benefits docked in the five months
since the reforms had come into operation 45 , the number of those claiming Discretionary
Housing Benefit in April 2013 rose to 25,000 (compared to 5,700 in the same month the
previous year46) following the introduction of the Spare Room Subsidy, and the National
41
MacInnes, T., Aldridge, H., Bushe, S., Kenway, P., Tinson A., Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion
2013, Joseph Rowntree Foundation (December 2013)
42
Biggest ever increase in UK foodbank use, The Trussell Trust (April 2013)
43
Sanctions within Conditional Benefit Systems: A review of evidence, Joseph Rowntree Foundation (December
2010)
44
Panorama: Hungry Britain. BBC One (3 Mar 2014)
45
‘Benefit Sanctions soar under tougher regime’, The Guardian (6 November 2013)
46
‘Bedroom Tax sees thousands more claiming Council Funds’, The Huffington Post (May 2013)
12
Audit Office declared the replacement of Disability Living Allowance with Personal
Independence Payments to be causing ‘distress and financial difficulties’, with
mismanagement of the scheme leading to a backlog of 92,000 cases 47 . The reforms are
having far reaching effects; the Joseph Rowntree Foundation declared the changes can ‘only
have increased the extent and depth of poverty’ 48 and a Citizens Advice Bureau report
identifies benefit sanctions and delays as the main reasons for individuals requiring food
parcels49. Statistics from The Trussell Trust identify welfare changes as a main reason for
increasing numbers of food bank visits; in 2012/13 29.7% of those visiting food banks
attributed their visit to benefit delays, 14.7% to benefit changes and 4.3% to refused crisis
loans, while in 2013/14 over 50% of food bank users cited benefit delays and changes as the
reason for their visit50. Those running food bank provision on a local level have reiterated
these claims. Richard Blackburn, Bishop of Warrington and Wigan, an area in which
Universal Credit is being piloted, warned the ‘vulnerable’ were most affected by the changes,
and ‘those with little or no voice are bearing the brunt’. Vincent Nichols, the newly elevated
Catholic Cardinal, branded the welfare system ‘a disgrace’, while 27 Anglican bishops and
16 other faith leaders blamed the government’s benefit changes for a ‘national crisis of
hunger’51. However, in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Department for
Work and Pensions (DWP) continues to maintain ‘there is no robust evidence that welfare
reforms are linked to increased use of food banks’52. Parliamentary questions have reinforced
this repeatedly, with Lord Freud, under-Secretary of State for welfare reform, asserting ‘it’s
very hard to know why people go to them [food banks]’53, in spite of the conclusions of the
47
‘Personal Independence Payment: Early Progress’, National Audit Office (27 February 2014)
MacInnes, T., Aldridge, H., Bushe, S., Kenway, P., Tinson A., ‘Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion
2013’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation (December 2013)
49
Report on Referral to Food Banks, Citizens Advice Bureau (Spring 2013)
50
Lucy Fisher, ‘Christian charity hits back over Tory attacks on foodbanks’, The Guardian (19 April 2014)
51
‘Food banks or dignity: Is that the choice we offer the hungry’, The Guardian (February 2014)
52
HL Debate 16 Dec 2013, vol 750, colWA153
53
HL Debate 4 March 2014, vol 752, col 1215
48
13
DEFRA commissioned report, and a number of international studies, which link food bank
use to welfare changes54.
In turn, the supply-side argument for food bank proliferation has three main components:
unlimited demand for a free good; the Trussell Trust’s social franchise model and the media
attention it has generated; and food waste. Government interaction with food banks has
emphasised the supply-side story, questioning the extent to which the need expressed by
those using food banks is genuine or manufactured. The official position of the DWP
maintains ‘it is completely wrong to suggest there is a statistical link between the
Government’s benefit reforms and the provision of food banks’55. Lord Freud characterised
food banks as a ‘free good’ for which there is ‘infinite demand’56, while George Osborne
claims the expanding demand for food banks is derived from increased awareness of their
existence due to adverts in jobcentres57. Yet international research indicates that food aid is a
‘strategy of desperation, not a means of routine food acquisition’58, and UK specific research
found ‘many respondents had exhausted other avenues of support’ 59 . The DEFRA
commissioned report asserted ‘there is no systematic evidence on the impact of increased
supply and hypotheses of its potential effects are not based on robust evidence’60. Attempts to
explain food bank use solely in supply-side terms fail to recognise the extent of the need
experienced by food bank users, and are thus inadequate and inaccurate characterisations of
the phenomenon of food bank expansion.
54
Lambie-Mumford, H., Crossley, D., Jensen, E., Verbeke, M., and Dowler, E., op. cit.
HC Debate 14 May 2013, vol 563, col 511
56
‘Demand for food banks has nothing to do with benefits squeeze’, The Independent (July 2013)
57
‘Osborne branded out of touch for never having visited a food bank’, The Huffington Post (11 Jul 2013)
58
Loopstra, R., and Tarasuk, V., ‘The Relationship between Food Banks and Household Food Insecurity among
Low-Income Toronto Families’, Canadian Public Policy, 2012, 38 (4), 497-514
59
Sleightholme, D., Food for Thought: Emergency Food Relief at Rotherham CAB, Rotherham and District
Citizens Advice Bureau (2013)
60
Lambie-Mumford, H., Crossley, D., Jensen, E., Verbeke, M., and Dowler, E., op. cit.
55
14
The supply-side argument for the proliferation of food banks demonstrates a
misunderstanding and simplification of the causes and extent of food poverty. Yet the
position endorsed by Lord Freud and others within government is not entirely without tract.
The Trussell Trust has developed an effective social franchise model, with an explicit
objective of a ‘foodbank in every community’61. The Trust provides expertise and advice,
providing guidance which supports communities to establish food banks. When twinned with
the church volunteer base upon which the Trust relies, the model offers a highly effective
‘mechanism for the spread of food banks’62. However, while the social franchise model may
explain the proliferation of food banks, it fails to explain the continued rise in demand; the
referral system, in which 53% of referral agencies are in the public sector, 63 ensures that
those using food banks face genuine need, and many Trussell Trust food banks have reported
dramatic increases in the number of clients in recent months64, for example the Hammersmith
and Fulham food bank, which served 1,629 people in June-September 2013 compared to
2,600 in the entirety of 201265.
The increases in demand illustrated above cannot be delineated from the publicity such
growth has generated. Increased media coverage of food banks has done much to increase
public awareness of their existence. The Trussell Trust acknowledges the efficacy of
widespread media exposure in inspiring local communities to establish food banks and
highlighting the availability of the service to those in need 66 . Additionally, food banks
provide a mechanism by which a latent need can be expressed. Research into the growth of
The Trussell Trust network revealed that churches involved in the specific case studies had
61
The Trussell Trust’s UK Foodbank Network, The Trussell Trust (May 2013)
Lambie, H., The Trussell Trust: Exploring the growth of food banks across the UK (November 2011)
63
Chris Mould (Director of the Trussell Trust), personal interview (12 Nov 2013)
64
‘Demand for Darlington food bank doubles’, The Northern Echo (26 August 2013). ‘Exeter food bank
demand rises 78% as families continue to feel the pinch’, Exeter Express, (24 Oct 2013). ‘Summer of hunger:
Huge rise in foodbank use as demand linked to welfare reform’, The Independent,( 9 Aug 2013)
65
Daphine Aikens (Director of Hammersmith and Fulham foodbank), personal interview (6 Sep 2013)
66
Chris Mould, personal interview, op. cit.
62
15
been offering some form of ad hoc provision prior to taking on a food bank franchise 67, and
had simply formalised an existing provision. This formalisation subsequently facilitates the
assimilation of food banks into the network of welfare provision, in that it increases access to,
and awareness of, the service; interviews with Citizens Advice Bureau and Advice Centre
workers reveal that ‘people are coming in and asking for food bank vouchers. That never
used to happen’68. Such a trend has been evident in Canada, where data collected shows that
food bank use increased from just over 700,000 in March 1998 to over 840,000 in March
2004, in spite of increases in employment and average wages 69, suggesting that as food banks
become embedded in a given welfare culture, so too does their use. However, food banks
undoubtedly respond to a very real need. Particularly in the UK, where most food banks
operate strict referral policies, they do little to create or increase the demand for emergency
food assistance; they simply offer a formalised vehicle through which such assistance can be
provided.
The role of ‘surplus food’ offers a further dimension to the supply-side explanation for food
banks. Many claim the establishment of food banks reflects a desire to combat the current
food system’s ‘culture of waste’ rather than meet the needs of those in poverty. This is, to a
degree, true. The primary motivation of the founders of the OFB, for example, was the
enormous quantities of high quality food ending up in landfill 70. Similarly, the FareShare
model is reliant upon surplus food, and describes food waste as ‘an inevitable part of 21st
century life’71. In countries with more developed food bank networks, there exists a strong
link between food waste and food banks, with many in Canada citing surplus food as the
67
Hannah Lambie, The Trussell Trust Food Bank Network: Exploring the growth of foodbanks across the UK,
(November 2011)
68
Advice Centre and Citizens Advice Bureau workers in Oxford, personal interviews (March 2013)
69
M. Goldberg and D. Green, ‘Understanding the link between welfare policy and the use of food banks’,
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (April 2009)
70
David Cairns, personal interview (23 Sep 2013)
71
FareShare, op. cit. p14
16
primary reason for the growth of food banks 72 . However, most UK food banks do not
distribute surplus food. 90% of food distributed by Trussell Trust food banks is donated
directly by the public 73 . The recently announced partnership between the Red Cross and
FareShare74, in which members of the public will be asked to donate non-perishable food,
illustrates the integral part played by donations in UK food banking. Food distributed by food
banks in the UK is specifically purchased for that purpose.
It seems evident that, while other factors may come into play, food bank expansion in the UK
is primarily and fundamentally a consequence of greatly increasing levels of need. As
highlighted by the DEFRA report, ‘those providing food aid…are consistently reporting an
increase in demand’, with much of this demand attributable to changes in social security
provision. Clearly other considerations are relevant, with increased awareness of food banks
increasing the likelihood that people might seek out their services, yet need is the primary
driver of the increase. In turn, the proliferation of food banks shapes both this need and
responses to it.
III
Entrenchment and ‘Policy Drift’
The capacity of food banks to shape policy responses inaugurates path dependency75. This is
a process which generates ‘increasing returns’ over time to particular forms of institutional
set-ups, thereby increasing the ‘cost’, and so decreasing the likelihood, of alternative courses
of action. Path dependency is established by: direct reliance by the state on food banks; an
absence of other mechanisms to address poverty; and the reliance of clients on food banks,
72
Riches, G., Food banks and the welfare crisis, (Canadian Council on Social Development, 1986)
DWP has broken agreement between jobcentres and foodbanks, The Trussell Trust (5 Sep 2013)
74
Red Cross and FareShare tackle hunger in the UK, The Red Cross (10 Oct 2013)
75
Wilsford, D. ‘Path Dependency, or why history makes it difficult to reform healthcare systems in the big
way’, Journal of Public Policy, 1994, 14 (3)
73
17
and ‘once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse’ 76. Path dependency leads to
entrenchment, the process whereby food banks become accepted and expected aspects of
welfare provision. Entrenchment of food banks in the UK welfare network would mean:
widespread funding of food banks by the state; an expectation that food banks provide the
means through which the needs of those in food poverty ought to be met; and the absence of
government policy in relation to food poverty, all of which are increasingly present in the
UK, indicating a process of entrenchment is underway. Path dependency renders the state and
clients progressively more dependent upon food banks, and it becomes more ‘costly’ to revert
to other forms of organisation. Food banks thus become firmly entrenched into networks of
welfare provision.
Entrenchment is facilitated by a process of policy drift. That is, when the goal is the
maintenance of the status quo, the requisite process is simply one of political nonengagement; ‘in an environment of new or worsening social risks, opponents of expanded
state responsibility do not have to enact major policy reforms to move policy towards their
favoured ends’ 77 . For example, while the direct provision of food to individuals marks a
paradigm shift in the balance between state and charitable provision in the UK, there has not
been a political backlash to such a shift, indicating drift which enables the entrenchment of
food banks into the architecture of welfare provision.
The unprecedented nature of food bank use in the UK facilitates drift by precluding the
existence of a framework of expected political action. Within modern welfare states, the
sources of crucial social policy changes are not large scale legislative reforms, but subtler sets
of ‘decentralised and semiautonomous processes of alteration within existing policy
76
Pierson, P., ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science
Review (2001) 94 (2)
77
Hacker, J., ‘Privatising Risk without Privatising the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy
Retrenchment in the United States’, American Political Science Review (2004) 98 (2)
18
bounds’ 78 . Changes in welfare provision typically occur through gradual and informal
developments, rather than bold policy initiatives. In this sense, the systematic retrenchment of
institutions into welfare provision, in ways which ‘enhance the probability of such outcomes
in the future’79, are derived, not from explicit policy action, but by inaction, or drift. In the
case of food banks, drift acts as the mechanism by which food banks become the accepted
future response to food poverty.
We can look to Canada to find an example of such a process. When food banks first appeared
in 1981 80 their emergence triggered a series of government papers in which officials
‘agonised over the rise in food banks’81, attributing their proliferation to temporary cuts in
public spending. Yet food bank use in Canada has remained ‘stubbornly high’82 with many
citing ‘substantial cuts to welfare systems’, in particular the extensive welfare changes seen
across Canada from the mid-1990s, as the primary cause for increasing food bank use83. The
initial policy hesitation surrounding food banks created a precedent of political non-action,
instigating path dependency which entrenched food banks in welfare provision. Canadian
food banks fed 833,098 people in March 2013, 23% more than in the equivalent period in
200884, despite improved macro-economic conditions, thereby illustrating the divorce of food
bank usage from the broader economy. While food banks were initially considered a
temporary emergency response, they evolved into an accepted and expected aspect of welfare
provision, the existence of which shaped political and community behaviours. Food bank use
is particularly susceptible to such entrenchment as a consequence of the process of hysteresis,
whereby those who have used food banks in the past experience less acutely the stigma
78
Ibid.
Pierson, P., op. cit.
80
Riches, G., Food banks and the welfare crisis (Canadian Council on Social Development, 1986)
81
Ibid.
82
M. Goldberg and D. Green, ‘Understanding the link between welfare policy and the use of food banks’,
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (April 2009)
83
Ibid.
84
The Hunger Count, Food Banks Canada (Dec 2013)
79
19
associated with their use, and are consequently more likely to resort to food banks in the
future. Food banks are clearly powerful norm-generators, shaping both public and user
perceptions of food aid.
In Canada, the norms generated by food bank proliferation have dictated the framework
through which food poverty is considered. The ‘growing complexity of large-scale nongovernmental food aid systems and their increasing social acceptance as an appropriate way
to deal with problems of food access’ has ‘contributed to de-politicising household level food
insecurity’85. This depoliticisation: 1) allows explicit policy drift on a national level, and 2)
enables authority and client reliance on a local level. Combined, these two facets affirm the
apolitical prism through which food banks depict food poverty and perpetuate the idea that
such poverty is not the responsibility of government.
Depoliticisation thus enables entrenchment in two ways. Firstly, it creates expectations of
drift in relation to food poverty. This precludes government level action to tackle
entrenchment, as illustrated by the absence of policy on food bank use in the UK, US and
Canada. To take the example of the US, the process by which depoliticisation has facilitated
entrenchment is evident in the failure to extensively reform the SNAP programme, in spite of
its evident shortcomings. Legislative ‘victories’ regarding food poverty have involved
protecting the programme from further cuts 86 rather than examining the inadequacies of a
programme that leaves so many reliant upon food banks. Secondly, depoliticisation enables
entrenchment through the creation of a norm in which the needs of those in food poverty are
met by the charitable sector, as has become the case in the US and Canada. Altruistic efforts
85
Poppendieck, J. ‘Dilemmas of Emergency Food: A Guide for the Perplexed’, Agriculture and Human Values,
1994 , 11 (4)
86
Feeding America: Legislative Victories [viewed Feb 2014]. Available from:
http://help.feedingamerica.org/site/PageServer?pagename=advocacy_Victories
20
to ‘tackle the problem of hunger reinforce public attitudes that hunger is a private problem’87
existing outside the realm of state responsibility. Such efforts normalise situations such as
that seen in the downtown area of Vancouver, where few means of accessing food other than
charitable food provision exist, and such provision has become a publicly accepted norm88.
The manner in which food banks are framed is thus integral to the nature of the norms they
create. In Canada food banks portray household food security in an apolitical framework, as a
‘food [lack]’ problem, which is best ‘addressed by giving food [from charitable sources]’89.
The issue consequently becomes a material problem of the lack of food rather than a
reflection of systemic economic and social problems which preclude the ability to obtain
food. By contrast, those recognising the shortcomings of emergency food provision have
typically framed the issue in terms of the human right to food, and the impact of reliance
upon charitable provision on those rights: ‘the emergency food system may be able to meet
some of the urgent immediate needs of poor people, [but] they do so in ways that further
undermine rights and entitlements’90. How the issue is framed dictates policy responses to it.
In North America, and increasingly in the UK, the emphasis on the charitable nature of
provision detracts attention from the structural causes of household food insecurity, thus
recalibrating the focal points of the food bank issue.
Regardless of how actors may choose to frame food banks, across the international spectrum
they have been shown to be an ineffectual means of tackling food poverty. Food aid ‘has a
limited impact on overall household food security status’91 and fails to address the underlying
87
Riches, G. ‘Thinking and Acting Outside the Charitable Food Box: Hunger and the Right to Food in Rich
Societies, Development in Practice 2011, 21 (4)
88
Ibid.
89
Tarasuk, V., ‘A Critical Examination of Community-Based Responses to Household Food Insecurity in
Canada’, Health Education & Behavior, 2001, 28, (4)
90
Poppendieck, J., Sweet Charity? Emergency Food and the End of Entitlement (New York: Penguin Group,
1998)
91
Lambie-Mumford, H., Crossley, D., Jensen, E., Verbeke, M., and Dowler, E., op. cit.
21
causes of food poverty 92 . Yu et al (2010) conclude ‘food insecurity and hunger…persist,
despite efforts of both formal and informal food assistance programs’ 93 , and in Canada
research found ‘a high prevalence of persistent food insecurity among food bank users’94.
Food banks are essentially palliative in nature. They do little to tackle deprivation or offer
long term solutions to food poverty, and, as highlighted by FareShare, food insecurity
remains; ‘there is no guarantee of food supply’95. This is reflected in North America, where
‘despite the massive amounts of food distributed by food banks, they run out of food, cannot
guarantee nutritious food and have had to develop systems of rationing and eligibility to
protect their food supply’96. While food aid may have a role to play in meeting immediate
need, it is unable to tackle wider determinants of household food poverty, and, as will be
demonstrated, can in fact act to perpetuate such poverty through the shaping of political
climates, actions and attitudes. The entrenchment of food banks is thus a paradoxical process,
with food banks framed as a solution to the problem of food poverty whilst simultaneously
propagating policies which perpetuate its existence.
Through the norms food banks create, public and political attention is detracted from the need
for long term reform to tackle structural causes of deprivation97. The norms created by food
banks are harmful, in that they ‘allow us to believe that hunger is being solved’98. Regardless
of their structural inadequacies, food banks continue to exist and expand, largely due to path
dependency. Food banks, particularly in Canada and the US, illustrate this well. Food banks
92
Poppendieck, J., ‘Dilemmas of Emergency Food: A Guide for the Perplexed’, Agriculture and Human Values
1994, 11 (4)
93
Yu, M.L., Nebbitt, M., Von, E., ‘Food stamp program participation, informal supports, household food
security and child food security: a comparison of African American and Caucasian households in poverty’,
Children and Youth Services Review, 2010, 32 (5)
94
Loopstra, R., and Tarasuk, V (2012) ‘The Relationship between Food Banks and Household Food Insecurity
among Low-Income Toronto Families’, Canadian Public Policy, 38, 4, 497-514
95
Hawkes, C. & Webster, J., Too Much and Too Little: Debates on Surplus Food (Sustain 2000)
96
Riches, G., ‘Thinking and Acting Outside the Charitable Food Box: Hunger and the Right to Food in Rich
Societies’, Development in Practice, 2011, 21 (4)
97
Hawkes, C. & Webster, J., Too Much and Too Little: Debates on Surplus Food, Sustain (2000)
98
Riches, G. ‘Thinking and Acting Outside the Charitable Food Box: Hunger and the Right to Food in Rich
Societies’, Development in Practice, 2011, 21 (4)
22
have created a norm that food poverty will be met by non-state actors, yet the capacity of
these non-state actors to respond to need does not parallel the capabilities of government. The
proliferation in charitable responses to hunger reinforces the norm of food banks, a norm
which is sub-optimal in terms of providing effective long term solutions to food poverty.
IV
Relationship between National Government and Food Banks
As theorised above, entrenchment is enabled by a process of policy drift. This drift is
characterised by government non-policy on food banks. Active policy on food banks would
have three characteristics: measuring and collecting data on food bank use; explicitly
engaging with and addressing food bank use and its consequences for traditional welfare
provision; and the implementation of measures to address food insecurity. However, as will
be illustrated by the absence of government action in all three areas, a course of explicit nonpolicy has been undertaken. This process of policy drift is compounded, and further enabled,
by the localisation of the Social Fund, which has localised responsibility for emergency
welfare provision, removing the obligation of national government to provide such services
and facilitating the entrenchment of food banks into the UK welfare system.
Conflict between government and food banks arises primarily from disagreements regarding:
the reasons for food bank expansion; how food banks fit into the broader ecology of welfare
in the UK; and the appropriate government response to food bank proliferation. Chris Mould,
Director of The Trussell Trust, believes there to be ‘real confusion within government about
foodbanks’99. The breakdown of the relationship between The Trussell Trust and the DWP
illustrates both this confusion and its effects. In April 2013 the DWP altered the form used by
jobcentres to refer individuals to food banks, removing the need to explain an individual’s
99
DWP has broken agreement between jobcentres and foodbanks, The Trussell Trust (5 Sep 2013)
23
reason for requiring a referral. The form had been designed to enable The Trussell Trust to
effectively respond to the needs of its users by generating greater understanding of the causes
behind food bank use; it also had an oversight function, allowing The Trussell Trust to verify
that those referring were doing so responsibly. In altering the form, the government hindered
the capacity of The Trussell Trust to most effectively respond to need. The Trussell Trust
interpreted the changes, which were made without consulting the charity, as evidence that the
‘DWP are doing their best to block the agreement that makes this [food bank referral]
possible’100.
The relationship between national government and food banks is, on a formal level,
conflictual. Following reports of continued increases in food bank use, Iain Duncan-Smith
accused The Trussell Trust of ‘scaremongering’ 101 and claimed many involved in the
provision of food aid have ‘deliberately set out to politicise the issue of food banks’102. Both
Duncan-Smith and Lord Freud have refused meetings with the Trust’s chairman, and the
coalition government has detached the existence of food banks from welfare provision. Lord
Freud declared food banks to be ‘absolutely not part of the welfare system’103 and denied the
link between the proliferation of food banks and increasing levels of food poverty, while
Baroness O’Cathain, a Conservative peer, declared food banks to be ‘nothing at all to do with
the welfare system…pure charity’104.
Food banks are not only portrayed as the preserve of the charitable sector, but the service
offered is depicted as an emergency measure to meet immediate need rather than a
mechanism required to meet symptoms of long term poverty and structural failings in welfare
provision. Government, the media and even food bank providers tend to frame food banks in
100
Ibid.
‘Iain Duncan Smith accuses food bank charity of scaremongering’, The Independent, 22 December 2013
102
HC Deb 24 February 2014, vol 576, col 18
103
HL Deb 2nd July 2013, vol 746, cols 1071-2
104
Ibid.
101
24
‘stop-gap’ terms. This is highlighted by Mould, who emphasises that while food banks should
not be considered an alternative to sustained welfare provision, they act as a form of crisis
prevention, the need for which will always be present due to shortcomings in and structural
problems with the benefits system. Yet to frame endemic social problems as emergencies
deflects attention from more meaningful solutions to the problem and generates enormous
inequity in service delivery105. The depiction of food banks as an emergency response to
poverty thus perpetuates policy drift and preserves a climate in which food banks are
required.
As explored above, drift is enabled by the framing of food banks in depoliticised terms.
Government discourse, in which food banks are framed as examples of positive community
endeavour, is an example of such depoliticisation. Discussion of food banks occurs within a
specific framework of community action, as highlighted in the recent Commons debate on
food banks in which Esther McVey, Minister for Disabled People, declared food bank growth
to be ‘positive. The people are reaching out’106. Lord Freud asserted ‘charitable provision is
to be admired and supported’, Conservative MP Roger Williams declared ‘food banks have
come rather late to my constituency but I really welcome them’
107
and Duncan-Smith
announced ‘I celebrate the work they [food banks] do’ 108 . This depoliticisation shifts the
framework from one in which food banks are a manifestation of the shortcomings of social
security provision to a situation in which they represent a robust civil society. Within this
framework, drift is enabled through the non-recognition of food banks as a problem. The
recognition of an issue as a problem is the first stage in the process of the ‘policy cycle’109
and framing food banks as positive and distinct from the welfare system prevents such
105
Lipsky, M. & Smith, S., ‘When Social Problems are Treated as Emergencies’, Social Service Review, 1989,
63 (1)
106
HC Deb 18th December 2013, vol 572, cols 812-27
107
Ibid.
108
HC Deb 24 February 2014, vol 576, col 18
109
Knoepfel, P., Larrue, C., Varone, F. and Hill, M., Public Policy Analysis (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2007)
25
recognition, precluding the measuring and collecting of data on food banks, identified above
as the first step towards tackling drift.
Frequent instances of celebratory openings of food banks by MPs further illustrates the
framework within which government-food bank interaction occurs; in July 2013 Danny
Alexander, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, ceremonially opened a food bank in Inverness,
while myriad others have been involved in opening ceremonies that typically involve
balloons, ribbons and the press. This celebration of food banks is not confined to
Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs; many Labour MPs, notably Gordon Brown, have
been honorary guests at the opening of a food bank in their constituencies110. In June 2013,
The Spectator declared ‘food banks are not…a sign of society gone bad. In fact, their
emergence ought to be seen as a sign of how strong Britain’s social fabric is’ 111 . This
depiction of food banks as a triumph of private generosity rather than a failure of government
welfare is undermined by the realities of food bank operations, in which the referral system
verifies need, ensuring individuals who visit food banks are experiencing such acute poverty
that they are unable to afford food. Additionally, instances such as those reported by The
Trussell Trust, in which, rather than arresting individuals caught shoplifting police have
issued food bank vouchers112, illustrates the proliferation of need, and the extent to which
increasing levels of food bank use is not a supply-side story.
However, in spite of the realities of food bank use, the depoliticised framework in which they
are discussed leads to a policy vacuum on a national level. The Daily Telegraph declared ‘it
is obviously a tragedy…that in an age of unimagined riches, there are still those who go
hungry’, but simultaneously lamented those who sought to ‘politicise’ the rise of food banks
110
Rev. Stuart Campbell, ‘The Pride of Britain’, Wings Over Scotland (July 2013)
‘Why it’s wrong to be ashamed of Britain’s food banks’, The Spectator (26 June 2013)
112
The Trussell Trust’s UK Foodbank Network, The Trussell Trust (May 2013)
111
26
by tracing it back to the party in power113. Interviews with food bank volunteers revealed a
reticence to consider their actions in a political perspective, opting to emphasise the
community service they provide over the macro-economic and political circumstances which
necessitate their existence. Food banks avoid a politically focused articulation of the realities
of food bank use in order to occupy a neutral, apolitical standpoint unlikely to alienate
potential supporters. Given that independent food banks tend not to place their actions within
a political framework, The Trussell Trust serves as the primary source of politicised discourse
on food poverty. However, Trussell discourse is not exclusively politicised; the organisation
emphasises its ability to ‘galvanise community action’ and cites food banks as examples of
the ‘amazing resilience of local communities’ 114 . Government framing of food banks as
distinct from state action is thus compounded by the deliberate depoliticisation of food aid by
many of those who provide it. Such a climate, where only a minority of advocates assert the
political nature of food banks and the responsibility of the state to tackle the poverty which
necessitates their existence, promotes drift.
In many respects, however, it is surprising that policy drift is able to thrive amidst a climate
of food bank proliferation. Food banks offer a powerful depiction of food poverty115, and
food aid providers have a potentially influential role to play as advocates116. In Canada ‘the
very existence and practice of food banking serves to remind the public, almost daily…that a
number of critical social problems continue to plague the lives of millions’117. Food banks
make hunger, an essentially private problem, far more visible ‘as poor people, facing reduced
113
‘The Politics of Food’, The Daily Telegraph (30 May 2013)
Lambie-Mumford, H., The Trussell Trust Food bank network: Exploring the growth of foodbanks across the
UK (November 2011)
115
Katherine Beckler (Oxfam Policy and Advocacy Manager, UK Poverty Programme), personal interview (5
Nov 2013)
116
Tarasuk, V., ‘A Critical Examination of Community-Based Responses to Household Food Insecurity in
Canada’, Health Education & Behavior, 2001, 28, (4)
117
Riches, G. ‘Thinking and Acting Outside the Charitable Food Box: Hunger and the Right to Food in Rich
Societies, Development in Practice, 2011, 21 (4)
114
27
support from the state, resort to more public acts in their struggles to obtain food’118. Clearly,
food banks offer an emotive framework through which poverty can be both measured and
portrayed. The efficacy of The Trussell Trust’s publicity strategy, which sees at least weekly
mentions of the Trust in the national press, has increasingly acted to push the issue to the
forefront of public consciousness. The December 2013 petition on Change.org, the world’s
largest petition platform, was signed by over 100,000 people119, and led to the devotion of the
Opposition Day debate to the issues of food banks, largely as a consequence of the publicity
platform provided by The Trussell Trust.
While the existence of food banks, and the publicity they generate, has acted to raise the
profile of food poverty, this increased awareness has occurred within the discursive
frameworks of charity and community outlined previously. Such frameworks precipitate drift,
demonstrated throughout the aforementioned parliamentary debate. The government front
benches were almost empty by the end of the discussion, and Duncan-Smith, Minister for
Work and Pensions, remained in the chamber for less than an hour of the debate. Statistics
cited by government members differed markedly from data provided by The Trussell Trust;
Ester McVey asserted that there were 60,000 food bank users in the UK120, despite figures
from The Trussell Trust indicating the true number to be over ten times that figure121. The
motion for the government to release the long awaited DEFRA report failed to pass, and
although the report was eventually released in February 2014, the debate served as a potent
illustration of the policy drift perpetuated by the powerful opposition within government to
frame the food bank debate in politicised terms.
118
Poppendieck, J., ‘Dilemmas of Emergency Food: A Guide for the Perplexed’, Agriculture and Human
Values, 1994, 11 (4)
119
Debate UK hunger and rise in foodbank use [viewed Dec 2013]. Available from:
https://www.change.org/en-GB/petitions/parliament-debate-uk-hunger-and-rise-in-foodbank-use
120
HC Deb 18 December 2013, vol 572, col 814
121
The Trussell Trust reported 913,000 users in 2013/14. In Hilligan, B., ‘Food banks see shocking rise in
number of users’, BBC News, 16 April 2014
28
Policy drift in relation to food banks is not simply manifested in government non-action. The
failure to implement measures to tackle the root causes of food insecurity is a major
component of drift. Not only has government failed to implement such policies, but as
explored earlier, government policies, specifically welfare reforms, are a major cause of the
increasing levels of need which are driving food bank proliferation. Under the coalition, it is
not simply that social spending has been cut, but that the composition of social spending has
changed 122 . The 2014 budget revealed government plans to impose a cap on welfare
spending, continuing a trend seen since 2010 in which spending cuts have disproportionately
affected services used by the poor123. The spending changes implemented by the coalition
amount to ‘a substantial restructuring’ 124 of the UK welfare state, a restructuring which
removes or weakens existing pathways, notably the expectation that the needs of those in
poverty will be met by the state, and creates a vacuum which facilitates path creation and
subsequent dependency. Thus, government policy simultaneously enables drift and
entrenches it into the policy process.
In light of international evidence, which highlights the limitations of informally provided
food aid, government inaction on food poverty is surprising. Results in Canada found a ‘high
prevalence of persistent food insecurity among food bank users’, while others have
questioned not only the ability of food banks to tackle the causes of food poverty, but their
efficacy in meeting the immediate needs of those facing food insecurity: ‘food aid is not
necessarily designed around the needs of the user’125. In Canada, where ‘governments have
neglected the issues of hunger and food security’ 126 , the dearth of effective government
122
Hills, J., ‘The changing architecture of the UK welfare state’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2012,
27(4), 589-607
123
Can we assess the distributional impact of cuts to spending on public services?, Institute for Fiscal Studies
(2010)
124
Hills, J., op. cit. pp589-607
125
Dachner, N., Gaetz, S., Poland, B. and Tarasuk. V, ‘An Ethnographic Study of Meal Programs for Homeless
and under-Housed Individuals in Toronto’, Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, 2009, 12 (1)
126
Riches, G., ‘Advancing the Human Right to Food in Canada’, Agriculture and Human Values, 1999, 16 (2)
29
strategy to tackle food poverty has yielded a political climate in which ‘food banks are the
policy’127. The entrenchment of food banks as an arm of welfare provision enables alterations
in the role of the state in responding to the needs of those in poverty, perpetuating a hands-off
approach in which responsibility for responding to need is delegated to charities. This is a
sub-optimal outcome given that research across Europe, the US and Canada has shown
government intervention to be the most effective means of tackling food poverty:
‘government provided food assistance delivered measurable positive effects on household
food security, while informal food assistance did not’128. Moreover, informal food aid of the
type provided in the UK requires the support of government to maximise its efficacy and
stability. Yet policy drift precludes the offering of such support, instead enabling and
justifying state non-intervention.
As discussed previously, burgeoning food bank use is tied in to a broader picture of welfare
reforms; the think tank Policy Exchange declared nearly 70,000 jobseekers to have been
unfairly sanctioned, leaving them reliant upon food banks129. Much research has documented
the importance of adequate social support during times of economic downturn130. Increasing
reliance upon conditionality in benefit entitlement has occurred during a period of prolonged
economic hardship, particularly impacting the poorest sections of society and leaving many
reliant upon non-state forms of welfare provision. Moreover, while it is an overly simplistic
analysis of the policy process to suggest that government consciously acknowledges food
banks as a mechanism to enable the continued implementation of their policy programme,
food banks are emerging as a means to meet the need created by such policy. The retreat of
the state creates a vacuum which charities step in to fill, initiating a self-perpetuating process
127
Graham Riches, personal interview (27 Nov 2013)
Lambie-Mumford, H., Crossley, D., Jensen, E., Verbeke, M., and Dowler, E., op. cit.
129
Miscampbell, G., Smarter Sanctions: Sorting out the System, Policy Exchange (3 March 2014)
130
Hossain, N., Byrne, B., Campbell, A., Harrison, E., McKinley, B. and Shah, P. The impact of the global
economic downturn on communities and poverty in the UK, (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2011)
128
30
which facilitates further reductions in the scope of state welfare provision. Charitable food
provision ‘plays into the hands of governments wishing to cut services and privatise social
welfare’ 131 . Consequently, food banks do not only meet a pre-existing demand unmet by
welfare provision, but act to respond to a new demand created by government policy.
V
Relationship between Local Authorities and Food Banks
The process of entrenchment has two facets: the aforementioned non-policy which
characterises the interaction between food banks and national government; and the
emergence of active reliance upon food banks, evident in the relationship between local
authorities and food banks. The main interaction between food banks and government occurs
on a local level. In April 2013 the Social Fund, under whose remit fell the provision of
emergency welfare to those facing critical need, was localised, transferring responsibility for
meeting such need from national government to local authorities. This transference
precipitated increased interactions between local authorities and services such as food banks
in order to facilitate the continued provision of short-term emergency welfare. Consequently
interactions between local authorities and food banks were formalised through necessity;
many local authorities lacked the resources required to deliver emergency welfare and were
thus reliant upon existing institutions to deploy assistance.
In this section, I will illustrate that changes to the Social Fund have fundamentally altered the
nature of emergency assistance and facilitated the entrenchment of food banks into the
network of UK welfare provision. The changes have left those who face short term
emergencies with limited access to state support, and have acted to incorporate food banks
into networks of welfare provision and increase the numbers forced to turn to them (in that
131
Graham Riches, quoted in Hawkes, C. & Webster, J., Too Much and Too Little: Debates on Surplus Food,
(Sustain 2000)
31
other avenues of support are no longer available). Social Fund localisation instigated a shift
in the relationship between the state and food banks; many authorities are using the localised
Social Fund budget to fund food banks, and vouchers for food banks are replacing support
formerly controlled by the DWP and offered in cash form. Given the examples of the US and
Canada cited above, the informal integration of food banks into networks of welfare
provision seems set to continue. The nature of state support for those in need has clearly
changed; local authorities, in their deployment of the devolved Social Fund, have been
actively dissuaded from awarding cash grants, creating a precedent of in-kind state support.
Thus Social Fund localisation has entrenched food banks into the ecology of welfare
provision whilst simultaneously changing expectations surrounding the forms and nature of
state support.
Typically, decentralisation is considered a means of increasing efficiency. This was initially
explored by Tiebout (1956), who claimed discrepancies in service provision arising when
responsibility was devolved to local government reflected, not inequalities, but different
configurations of personal utility as perceived by individuals in specific areas. That is,
‘consumer-voters’ select local governments whose policies most precisely suit their needs132.
Consequently, services offered at a local level are most likely to be specifically tailored to the
recipient community, and thus provide the most efficient and effective means of meeting
need. This model is problematic in its assumption that consumers are free to choose their
communities and enjoy perfect mobility and perfect information, which is clearly not the
case, particularly for the most vulnerable. In reality, decentralisation often represents the
transference of responsibility from national to local government and is not accompanied by
increased efficiency in service delivery. Moreover, decentralisation often represents attempts
by national government to reform or abolish specific services. To take the case of the Social
132
Tiebout, C. M., ‘A pure theory of social expenditure’ The Journal of Political Economy, 1956, 64 (5)
32
Fund, decentralisation was the inauguration of a process which culminated in the government
announcement that the £180 million fund is to be cut altogether133.
The strategy of decentralisation dates back to political reforms of the 1980s, undertaken in
response to questions regarding the efficacy of a highly centralised state. Such a state was
considered overburdened and ungovernable134, necessitating a ‘long-term policy of reducing
the size of the public sector’ 135 . The rationale for decentralisation cited by the coalition
government today resembles that of the Thatcher governments; decentralisation is posited to
offer both a post-hoc response to financial difficulties and a means of streamlining the public
sector. However, decentralisation serves only to act as an effective and fair means of
providing public services in cases where the preferences of citizens are, not necessarily
similar, but broadly equal; an ‘aggressive local program [sic] for the support of low-income
households is likely to induce an influx of the poor and encourage an exodus of those with
higher income’136. Yet, in spite of this recognition, Oates (2006) opines ‘by tailoring outputs
of such goods and services to the particular preferences and circumstances of their
constituencies, decentralized provision increases economic welfare above that which results
from the more uniform levels of such services likely under national provision’. Both Oates
and Tiebout, as with many proponents of decentralisation, emphasise the capacity of
decentralised services to meet local need effectively, provided measures are taken to avoid
the inequalities such decentralised provision has the capacity to generate.
However, such a theoretical framework, in which fiscal decentralisation guarantees the
efficient provision of public services due to the better satisfaction of local preferences, fails to
recognise that in many cases decentralisation is not simply the localisation of services
133
Welfare Rights Bulletin 238, Child Poverty Action Group (February 2014)
King, A., ‘Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s’ Political Studies, 1975, 23, (2)
135
Rhodes, R., ‘The Hollowing out of the State: The Changing Nature of the Public Service in Britain’, The
Political Quarterly, 1994, 65 (2)
136
Oates, W. E., ‘On the Theory and Practice of Decentralisation’, Institute for Federalism and
Intergovernmental Relations (2006)
134
33
otherwise controlled by central government. As has been the case with the Social Fund, the
process of decentralisation involved dramatic decreases in the available budget, and the
devolution of responsibility to authorities lacking the expertise and resources necessary to
offer services equivalent to those provided by national government. As such, decentralisation
has provided a mechanism by which state support to the most vulnerable is cut rather than a
process of service improvement.
To explore the effects of the changes to the Social Fund and illustrate the above claims, the
alterations to the Social Fund must first be outlined. Prior to the 2012 Welfare Reform Act,
the Social Fund consisted of discretionary and regulated elements, intended to provide
assistance with costs not covered by benefit payments through both grants and loans.
Following the reforms, the four elements of the regulated Social Fund (Winter Fuel
Allowance, Cold Weather Payment, Sure Start Maternity Grant and Funeral Expenses
Payment) remain unchanged, while the discretionary aspects (Community Care Grants, Crisis
loans for living expenses, Crisis Loans alignment expenses and Budgeting loans) have been
abolished137. The responsibility for meeting short-term unforeseen need has been transferred
to local authorities.
Prior to the reforms, Community Care Grants were made payable to those in receipt of
specific income-related benefits. Intended to provide support to enable vulnerable people to
stay in or return to the community, or to ‘ease exceptional pressure on families’, the grants
were typically made available to those leaving prison, facing family breakdown or
homelessness, or caring for someone. In 2009/10 over 263,000 non-repayable Community
Care Grants were awarded, with the average award being £437138. A further aspect of the
Social Fund was Crisis Loans, interest free loans available regardless of benefit status to
137
Developing a Local Welfare Provision Policy Scheme 2013/14, Oldham Council (2013)
Local Welfare Assistance to replace Social Fund Community Care Grants and Crisis Loans for General
Living Expenses, Department for Work and Pensions (October 2011)
138
34
anyone who found themselves unable to meet their immediate needs. A common use of Crisis
Loans was replacing failed household appliances and enabling those who faced delays in
receiving benefits to afford essential items such as food. Repayment of the loan was deducted
from subsequent benefit payments. In 2011/12, around 2.1 million Crisis Loans were
awarded– at a cost of £133.3 million139. The average award was £64140. Both Community
Care Grants and Crisis Loans were administered by the DWP, through JobCentre Plus.
In spite of the importance of the Social Fund as a source of support for the most vulnerable,
the coalition government cited declining use as justification for cutting it. The figures do
indeed reflect falling numbers of cases; in 2010/11, applications for Crisis Loans stood at
3,422,000141, an all-time high142. This fell to 2,586,000 in 2011/12143, and decreased again to
2,358,000 in 2012/13144. Yet, as highlighted by a National Audit Office (NAO) report, lack of
awareness of its existence and the complexity of the application process are fundamental to
explaining the Social Fund’s lack of use. Signposting, particularly on the part of JobCentre
Plus, is integral to ensuring that those eligible to apply do so. While it is not within the remit
of this research to determine the nature of JobCentre Plus signposting, it seems that in recent
years fewer individuals in need have been made aware of the Social Fund, and consequently
the fund itself has seen less use. This has been reflected in the views of an Oxfam
spokesperson, who emphasised the inadequacy of JobCentre signposting since the Social
Fund’s localisation145. A lack of awareness translates into decreasing numbers of claims and
139
Annual Report by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions on the Social Fund 2011/12, Department for
Work and Pensions (July 2012)
140
Ibid.
141
Annual Report by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions on the Social Fund 2010/11, Department for
Work and Pensions (July 2011)
142
Delivering the Social Fund at London Level: Opportunities and Risks, Child Poverty Action Group (June
2012)
143
Annual Report by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions on the Social Fund 2011/12, Department for
Work and Pensions (July 2012)
144
Annual Report by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions on the Social Fund 2012/13, Department for
Work and Pensions (July 2013)
145
Ruth Jackson (Oxfam UK Poverty Programme Advocacy and Parliamentary Officer), personal interview (12
February 2014)
35
the underuse of the allocated budget; in Wales £5.4m of the fund went unspent in 2013-14146.
The coalition government has subsequently claimed that instances of local authorities
returning portions of the devolved budgets to central government indicates lack of need,
thereby justifying the cutting of the Social Fund altogether. This is the intention from April
2015 147 , from which point provision for local welfare schemes will be ‘a matter for the
Department for Communities and Local Government’ to be ‘funded from local authority
general funds’148.
Despite government claims, both the nature of the grants and the numbers using them
indicate that the Social Fund forms an integral aspect of short-term welfare provision. This
was highlighted in the 2010 NAO report, in which the discretionary Social Fund was declared
to play ‘an important role in helping the most vulnerable in our society’149, while a DWP
issued report of the same year described the fund as ‘vital’150. However, the same report
questioned the efficacy of the scheme, in which ‘demand outstrips the funds available every
year’151 . The flaws in the Social Fund were further highlighted by the NAO report, which
exposed a deeply inefficient system in which 2% of applications had to be processed off-line
due to the limitations of the IT system, and administrative errors amounted to £17 million in
2008-09152. Evidently, reform was required to ensure that the Social Fund, declared by a
government spokesperson to be ‘complex and poorly targeted’153, provide an effective and
cost-efficient service. The efficiency of the Fund was also questioned; the government argued
that ‘current remote administrative processes do not support the high levels of discretion
146
‘Unspent Millions in Former Social Fund Budget’, Wales Online (29 January 2014)
Proposal to cut the budget with effect from April 2014, Oxfordshire Support Fund (March 2014)
148
‘Government to stop funding for low income families facing emergencies’, The Guardian (3 January 2014)
149
The Community Care Grant, National Audit Office (July 2010)
150
Social Fund Reform: Debt, Credit and Low Income Households, Department for Work and Pensions (March
2010)
151
The Community Care Grant, National Audit Office (July 2010)
152
Ibid.
153
Annual Report by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions on the Social Fund 2011/12, Department for
Work and Pensions (July 2012)
147
36
needed to ensure that support is targeted at the most vulnerable’, while the NAO report
claimed ‘only around 50% of eligible customers were aware of Social Fund schemes’. Partly
in recognition of these shortcomings, as of April 2013 the Social Fund was reformed as
outlined above, transferring the responsibility for emergency welfare provision from national
to local government.
In addition to the localisation of control for the fund, the scope of provision changed. The
budget devolved to local authorities in April 2013 was set at 2005 levels 154, substantially
reducing the capacity of local authorities to provide a service equivalent to that of its
centralised counterpart. Given that inadequate resources were previously cited as a
shortcoming of the Social Fund, cutting the funds available seems unlikely to improve the
quality of service offered. Such concerns have been echoed by the Trussell Trust, who state
that: ‘with less funding available, the locally-administered replacements to the Social Fund
are likely to help fewer people in need of temporary assistance’155. Additionally, the money
devolved to local authorities has not been ring-fenced for the provision of services akin to
those of the discretionary Social Fund, nor is the expected nature of assistance specified; the
government has stated ‘there is no duty of local authorities regarding the exact nature of local
provision’156. Social Fund localisation leaves a situation in which local authorities are able to
use the budget as they see fit, the emphasis on which, in a time of increasing spending
constraints, may not be the continued provision of emergency welfare services. This is the
case in Oxfordshire and Nottinghamshire, where councils plan to redirect the money
apportioned by government to broader Social Services spending. Localisation of the Social
Fund has thus limited the resources available to those facing crisis situations, leading to
154
Social Fund Reform and Trussell Trust Foodbanks, The Trussell Trust (24 August 2012)
Ibid.
156
Local Welfare Provision Policy 2013/14, Bolton Council (2013)
155
37
circumstances in which more people are likely to turn to services such as food banks to meet
their needs.
Integral to the process of localisation has been the links forged between local authorities and
existing institutions to facilitate the provision of welfare services which previously fell under
the jurisdiction of national government. A government-issued toolkit encourages local
authorities to ‘utilise existing delivery mechanisms and structures wherever possible’157. The
focus in the process of localising the Social Fund has been upon the flexibility of local
provision, with the ‘key message’ of government advice being the capacity of local
authorities ‘to design schemes which reflect local needs and priorities. There is no
expectation or desire from central government that the new service will mirror the current
scheme in whole or in part’158. In Oxfordshire for example, localisation of the Social Fund
has precipitated decline in the nature of provision available. Of the £414,000 spent between
April 2013 and December 2013, 43% was apportioned to Auriga, the organisation to which
administration of the fund was outsourced159, while the County’s own figures show more
applications have been rejected than accepted and applicants have not been given a right of
appeal if their claim is refused160. The responses of local authorities to the changes have been
varied in light of disparities in need and the capacities and nature of structures with which
authorities are able to collaborate, leaving a situation in which many areas offer inadequate
emergency welfare provision.
The problems of inequity of provision inherent in service decentralisation are compounded
when the means of distribution are not explicitly provided by government. In the case of food
banks, the nature and capacity of services varies significantly, as does the concentration of
157
Social Fund Local Authority Toolkit, Department for Work and Pensions (April 2012)
Ibid.
159
Proposal to cut the budget with effect from April 2014, Oxfordshire Support Fund (March 2014)
160
Ibid.
158
38
food banks in specific areas. In Kent, for example, there are at least 13 food banks161, while
there are seven large food banks in Greater Manchester162. By contrast, the Trussell Trust
operated food bank in Coventry is the only food bank in the city. This disparity in provision
has been recognised by food bank volunteers; much of the impetus for setting up the
Shepherd’s Bush food bank came from the recognition that many users of an existing food
bank were having to journey across the borough163.
Charitable provision is often varied and disparate across regions. When government services
utilise such mechanisms to support the most vulnerable, government provision in turn
becomes varied and inequitable. One illustration is the opening hours of food banks; most are
open for a limited number of hours one or two days a week. As local authorities increasingly
rely upon food banks to provide emergency welfare, not only does the nature of welfare
change, but the ability of those in need to access support is significantly reduced.
Moreover, the nature of the relationship between food banks and local authorities affects the
nature of the service food banks are able to provide. In areas where local authorities enjoy
cooperative relationships with food banks, the service provided is more likely to be effective
and well-targeted, insofar as food banks are able to utilise the resources of social services to
verify need and streamline provision. In other areas, where there is little dialogue between
food banks and local authorities, provision is less effective than it might be if cooperative
relationships between the two prevailed. For example, in the case of the OFB, there is very
little dialogue with the local authority, as highlighted by a director of the food bank: ‘local
authorities have shown very little inclination to even acknowledge us, let alone get involved
with us, over the past five years’164. While this does not in itself greatly inhibit the work of
161
‘More food banks open in Kent to feed the hungry’, Kent and Sussex Courier (16 January 2013)
‘On the breadline: Foodbanks in greater Manchester’, BBC News (26 November 2012)
163
Daphine Aikens, personal interview, op. cit.
164
David Cairns, personal interview, op. cit.
162
39
the OFB, due to the food bank’s efforts to work with other organisations such as charities and
churches, the OFB highlights ‘identifying the individuals in need’ as its greatest difficulty,
concluding, ‘in an ideal world, there would be cooperation with local authorities’, and if the
food bank were to enjoy ‘a genuine working relationship with local authorities we [the OFB]
could achieve more and quicker’165. In cases where local authorities fail to engage with food
banks, it impedes their functioning. Nonetheless, authorities remain reliant on food banks as a
source of emergency welfare provision. In some instances, such as Wiltshire, Derby and
Barnsley, local authorities issue vouchers for food banks whilst supporting the service they
provide. In others, such as Oxford, the local authority offers referral services (primarily
through the Citizens Advice Bureau) but provides limited support to the Community
Emergency Foodbank, and no support to the OFB. Simultaneously, the Oxfordshire County
Council plans to abolish the provision of services offered under the remit of the Social Fund
from 2015, removing all forms of emergency welfare provision. It can justifiably be
hypothesised that the removal of such provision will increase need for emergency food aid
within the county, further necessitating the existence of food banks. The picture of policy
drift seen on a national level, which acts to entrench food banks, is thus compounded by
active cuts on a local level, with the existence of food banks reframing the responsibilities of
local authorities to engage with poverty and its causes.
Since April 2013, many local authorities have begun, or expressed an intention, to support
food banks as part of the emergency welfare provision they will offer. The Trussell Trust
claimed in 2012, as the changes were announced, that ‘some local authorities have already
approached foodbanks to explore if we can work together to support people who previously
would have been helped by a Social Fund loan’166. Since the Social Fund’s localisation, over
165
166
Ibid.
Social Fund Reform and Trussell Trust Foodbanks, The Trussell Trust (24 August 2012)
40
a third of the UK’s local authorities are subsidising food banks167, marking a distinct shift in
the nature of both food banks themselves (in that they become an explicit, rather than
indirect, form of welfare provision) and government responses to those facing need.
Examples of local authority engagement with food banks include that of Trafford, which has
apportioned ‘an element of the budget…to the payment of small grants to organisations
looking to establish additional food banks’. £90,000 has been allocated specifically to fund
the food bank, while a further £16,439 allotted to the ‘development fund’ the remit of which
includes the expansion and establishment of food banks168. Trafford are by no means alone in
their strategy. Rochdale Council has pledged £192,122 to a fund which includes the support
of food banks169, while Bolton Council have declared they ‘will actively develop partnerships
that will enable the right services and goods to be provided at the most efficient cost. This
will include the use of food banks’170. The provision of financial support to food banks by
local authorities deepens and consolidates the entrenchment of food banks, altering the
architecture of the UK welfare state.
To investigate the trends of local authority interaction with food banks, I randomly selected
25 of England’s local authorities, and researched their interaction with food banks. A
descriptive summary of this research and the information gleaned is found in Appendix 1.Of
these 25, only four authorities have retained the previous provision of Crisis Loans and
Community Care Grants, with all others either funding food banks or issuing food bank
vouchers. The localisation of the Social Fund has created a mechanism by which the
existence of food banks, and by extension the service they provide, is becoming entrenched in
welfare provision in the UK.
167
Panorama: Hungry Britain. BBC One (3 Mar 2014)
Implementation of “Trafford Assist”, an innovative model of Local Welfare Assistance in Trafford, Trafford
Council (March 2013)
169
A Local Welfare Provision Scheme: An updated report on the Discretionary Crisis Fund, Rochdale
Metropolitan Borough Council (April 2013)
170
Local Welfare Provision Policy 2013/14, Bolton Council (2013)
168
41
Local authorities facing budgeting constraints are increasingly turning to food banks to meet
need previously met by state provision. Within this picture, there exists a Catch-22 situation
for both food banks and local authorities. To partner with food banks is to assimilate their
services into a network of welfare ecology, implicitly supporting a form of welfare which is
essentially palliative. To cooperate is therefore, as illustrated by the reticence of the DWP to
acknowledge the increased role of food banks, fraught with complexities, representing not
simply the acknowledgement of a local service, but a broader, and more politically sensitive,
change in the character of the welfare state. Yet, for local authorities to fail to establish
partnerships with food banks hinders the service food banks will continue to offer regardless
of local authority support, and indeed, in many areas, offers as a substitute to such support.
Conclusion
Food banks are becoming entrenched aspects of UK welfare provision. Purposive neglect and
explicit non-policy on the part of national government facilitates such entrenchment, and
necessitates the forging of partnerships between local authorities and food banks, which in
turn compounds this process. Yet, ultimately, as demonstrated above, food aid is an
inadequate response to food poverty, and does little to tackle long term food insecurity.
The use of food banks as a response to food poverty raises important questions surrounding
social justice and distributional inequities endemic within UK society. The use of food banks
as a response to food poverty initiates a process of normalisation, whereby the problem of
food poverty is reframed in apolitical terms. In responding to food poverty with palliative
measures, food banks operate within a discourse of its inevitability which precludes
meaningful action to tackle its structural causes. The entrenchment of food banks into the
welfare state thus creates dependence on the service they offer, on the part of both the state
42
and individuals. This dependence then perpetuates a cycle of food poverty in which palliative
measures are the only response.
Meaningful action to tackle food bank use in the UK would have to go far beyond the
provision of emergency food aid. A first step would be reform of the welfare system, focused
not upon sanctions and reducing welfare spending, but instead with an emphasis on welfare
as a right, and the provision of levels of, and access to, benefits shaped by social justice and
fairness. In particular, there should be greater provision of emergency welfare measures akin
to that of the Social Fund. An appropriate minimum wage and greater access to quality,
affordable childcare would also counteract causes of food poverty. In the meantime,
government should clarify its stance on food banks, and engage with food banks and their
users to gain greater understanding of food bank use and food poverty. In areas where food
banks exist, social services and food banks should establish formal relationships to precipitate
greater understanding of local need and how that need might best be met and reduced.
Food banks represent a style of welfare provision which stigmatises those in poverty, and
does little to meet their long-term needs. Their entrenchment into UK welfare provision is a
negative development, marking a shift in both the nature of provision and the balance
between the state and charitable sectors. Food banks should not need to exist, and their
existence further enables welfare changes that necessitate the structurally sub-optimal service
they provide. Such welfare changes indicate a shift towards a welfare state which aims for the
basic survival of its citizens, rather than striving to increase social mobility and tackle
poverty. The food bank debate is consequently not a question of emergency food provision,
but a broader examination of, not only the kind of country the UK is, but the kind of country
it wants to be.
43
Appendix 1.
I randomly selected 25 local authorities in England. For each authority I examined
information on the Local Welfare Provision schemes replacing the centralised Social Fund,
looking for specific mentions of partnerships with, and funding of, food banks. The
information is outlined below.
Authorities funding
Other involvement
Authorities not funding
food banks
(support and referrals)
food banks
Bolton- developing
Barnsley-Issue food bank
Birmingham- pre-paid cards
partnerships with food banks
vouchers
Doncaster-Pre-paid cards
Redbridge- Redbridge food
Bury-partnering with food
Ealing- Will continue the
bank received £33,015.36 in
banks
existing scheme of cash
2012/13 from local authority
Cambridge-Provide food
payments
Rochdale- £192,122
parcels
Leeds- retaining framework
allocated to services
Chester and West Chester-
of crisis loans and grants
including food banks
Issue food bank vouchers (in
Somerset- Food banks
exceptional circumstances
receive a portion of £1.1m of
will also provide cash
local welfare budget
payments)
Trafford- £90,000 allocated
Derby- Issue food bank
to the CAB food bank, a
vouchers
further £16,439 allocated to
Lambeth- Issue food bank
the ‘development fund’
vouchers
Walsall-Working closely
Merton- directs individuals
44
with food banks.
to the food bank and local
authority agencies issue food
bank vouchers
Middlesborough- not clear
whether vouchers and
referrals reinforced by
financial support to food
banks
Oldham- Issue food bank
vouchers
Richmond-Upon-ThamesLocal authority directs
individuals to the food bank
The council also issues store
vouchers. Individuals limited
to 2 claims in 12 month
period
Salford- Plans to use a
portion of the Local Welfare
Provision budget to support
food banks
Stockport- Funding food
banks through vegetable
provision schemes
Warwickshire-Issue food
45
bank vouchers
West Sussex- Issue food
bank vouchers
Wiltshire-Provide food
either through a food bank or
pre-payment card
46
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‘Anglican bishops letter: benefit cuts will have deeply disproportionate effect’, BBC News (10 March
2013)
Anne Perkins, ‘Food poverty is an attack on society’, The Guardian (16 October 2013)
‘Bedroom Tax sees thousands more claiming Council Funds’, The Huffington Post (May 2013)
‘Benefit Sanctions soar under tougher regime’, The Guardian (6 November 2013)
‘Charities’ hardship fear over benefit sanctions’, BBC News (12 November 2010)
‘Demand for Darlington food bank doubles’, The Northern Echo (26 August 2013)
‘Demand for food banks has nothing to do with benefits squeeze’, The Independent (July 2013)
51
‘Exeter food bank demand rises 78% as families continue to feel the pinch’, Exeter Express, (24 Oct
2013)
‘Food banks or dignity: Is that the choice we offer the hungry?’, The Guardian (February 2014)
Gavin O’Toole, ‘UK food banks offer lifeline to thousands’, Aljazeera (16 March 2013)
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2014)
‘Half a million rely on UK food banks’, Aljazeera (30 May 2013)
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2013
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Guardian (30 May 2013)
Lucy Fisher, ‘Christian charity hits back over Tory attacks on foodbanks’, The Guardian (19 April
2014)
‘Mapped: Food banks across the UK’, The Guardian (12 July 2012)
‘More food banks open in Kent to feed the hungry’, Kent and Sussex Courier (16 January 2013)
Nigel Morris, ‘Anglican Church to investigate reasons for surge in food banks’, The Independent (16
October 2013)
‘Numbers relying on food banks triple in a year’, BBC News (16 October 2013)
Olivier de Schutter, ‘Food banks can only plug the holes in social safety nets’, Guardian (27 Feb
2013)
‘On the breadline: Foodbanks in greater Manchester’, BBC News (26 November 2012)
‘One food bank opening in the UK every four days’, Sky News (21 April 2012)
‘Osborne branded out of touch for never having visited a food bank’, The Huffington Post (11 Jul
2013)
Patrick Butler, ‘Breadline Britain: councils fund food banks to plug holes in welfare state’, The
Guardian (21 August 2012)
Patrick Butler, ‘Food banks are a “slow death of the soul”’, The Guardian (25 September 2013)
Patrick Butler, ‘Food poverty: “You don’t think it happens to normal people”’, The Guardian (6 June
2013)
Rev. Stuart Campbell, ‘The Pride of Britain’, Wings Over Scotland (July 2013)
‘Summer of hunger: Huge rise in foodbank use as demand linked to welfare reform’, The Independent
( 9 Aug 2013)
‘The Politics of Food’, The Daily Telegraph (30 May 2013)
‘Trussell Trust foodbank charity criticises Michael Gove comment’, BBC News (15 September 2013)
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‘UK unemployment: Record underemployment as 1.46m Brits working part-time’ The Huffington
Post (13 Nov 2013)
‘Unspent Millions in Former Social Fund Budget’, Wales Online (29 January 2014)
‘Why it’s wrong to be ashamed of Britain’s food banks’, The Spectator (26 June 2013)
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