The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making
Author(s): Alex Mintz
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 595-618
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The Decision to Attack Iraq
A NONCOMPENSATORYTHEORY OF DECISION MAKING
ALEX MINTZ
TexasA&M University
This articleattemptsto explainthe decision to use force againstIraqusing a noncompensatory theory of decision making.Ratherthan choosing an alternativethat maximizes utility on
the basis of a holisticcomparisonprocessas suggestedby the expectedutilitymodel, or selecting
an alternativethat "satisfices"a certain criterionas predictedby the cybernetic model, the
noncompensatorytheorysuggeststhatdecisions on the use of force are often madebased on the
rejectionof undesirablealternativeson the basis of one, or at most a few, criteria.
This articleattemptsto explain the decision to use force againstIraqusing
a noncompensatory,multidimensionaltheoryof decision making.This theory highlightsthe role of distinctcontextualdimensionsassociatedwith the
decision to use force and integratesnoncompensatorystrategiesof decision
making into this multidimensionalframework.At the core of this theory is
the assumption that policy makers are confronted with a set of feasible
alternativesand a set of contextualdimensionsthatenterinto theircalculus
of decision making.Associated with each policy alternative,there are consequencesthatfollow fromthe pursuitof the alternative.If a certainalternative scoreslow on a given dimension,thena high score on anotherdimension
cannot "compensate"for it, and hence the alternativeis rejected.
A decision situation typically consists of a set of "feasible alternatives
A = (a,. ...,
...,
am)and a set of attributes or evaluators of the alternatives (X1,
Xv).Associated with each alternativea in A, there is a corresponding
consequence (X,(a), X2(a) ....,
Xn(a)) in the n-dimensional consequence
space X = X1 x X2 x... X," (Sage 1990, 345). Rather than choosing an
AUTHOR'SNOTE:An earlierversionof this articlewas presentedat the annualmeetingof
the InternationalStudies Association,Acapulco,Mexico, March23-27, 1993. I am gratefulto
NehemiaGeva for manyinvaluablediscussions.
1993 595-618
Vol.37 No.4, December
OFCONFLICT
JOURNAL
RESOLUTION,
? 1993SagePublications,
Inc.
595
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
alternative that maximizes utility on the basis of a holistic comparison
process, or selecting an alternativethat "satisfices"a certaincriterion,the
theory suggests that foreign policy decisions are often made based on the
rejection of undesirablealternativeson the basis of one, or at most a few,
criteria.
This theory differs significantlyfrom the rationalactor-expectedutility
model of the use of force (see Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1985) and the
cyberneticsatisficingpoliticaluse of forcemodel (see OstromandJob 1986).
WhereasBueno de MesquitaandLalman(1990) and OstromandJob (1986)
used compensatorystrategiesof decisionmaking,the modelpresentedin this
articleuses a noncompensatorystrategy.
1. COMPENSATORYSTRATEGIES OF DECISION MAKING
According to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita(1981, 1984, 1985), nations are
led by rational,forward-looking,expected-utility-maximizingleaders. The
strategiesthese leaders select are a function of "the values they attach to
alternativeoutcomesandthe beliefs they hold regardinghow theiradversary
will respondto their strategicdecisions" (Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman
1990, 750). Decision makersevaluatethe costs and benefits associatedwith
each alternative to obtain "the largest net gain (expected utility) at an
acceptablelevel of risk"(Bueno de Mesquita 1984, 228).
The rationalist,microeconomic, expected utility approachto decision
making is a powerful one, but it has limitations. Cognitive psychologists
(e.g., Schwab,Olian-Gotlieb,andHeneman1979; Klein 1989;Mitchell and
Beach 1990) and students of behavioralorganizationtheory (e.g., Simon
1985) attributeto the expected utility and other analyticaldecision-making
strategies the requirementfor extensive processing time, cognitive effort,
concentration,and skills that in many cases are not available, especially
undertime pressuresandrapidlychangingconditions,and in othercases are
not worthy to the decision. Accordingly,these scholarsarguethat decision
makersseldom maximize utility.
Accordingto theboundedrationalmodel, of whichthe cyberneticsatisficing model of decisionmakingis one type (see Simon 1985;Steinbruner1974;
OstromandJob 1986), policymakersoperateunderconstraintswhile searching for an acceptable outcome (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990). These
limitationsor bounds stem from deficits in the informationbase and from
limitationof processingcapabilities(e.g., cognitive andmotivational).Consequently,the decision process is less comprehensivebecause only a subset
of alternativesand dimensionsis considered.
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THEORY 597
Mintz/NONCOMPENSATORY
Expected-utility studies (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990) and
cyberetic models of the use of force (OstromandJob 1986) have relied on
whatis known in the informationprocessing/cognitivepsychology literature
as the "compensatory"strategy of decision making (Ford et al. 1990).
According to this model, in choice situations,if a certainalternative(e.g.,
use of force) is low on a given dimension, then a high score on another
dimensioncan compensatefor it, and hence the alternativeis adopted.This
is reflectedin the elegantmathematicalequationsin Bueno de Mesquitaand
Lalman(1990) and OstromandJob (1986). In these studies,a high score on
one dimension (e.g., military)can compensatefor a low score on another
dimension (e.g., political). These are combined to maximize (Bueno de
MesquitaandLalman1990) or "satisfy"(OstromandJob 1986)utility.
Two models areused in describingthe compensatorystrategy.According
to the linear model,each dimensionfor a decision alternativeis given a value
and the dimensionsare combinedadditivelyto producean overall value for
each alternative.The decision makercomparesthe alternativeson the basis
of these overall values and chooses the alternativewith the highest value
(EinhornandHogarth1981;Fordet al. 1990). Accordingto this model, then,
a high score on the militaryor internationaldimensioncan "compensate"for
a low scoreon thepoliticalvariableandvice versabecausethepoliticalleader
makes a decision to use force based on the overall score.
The second model is the additivedifferencemodel,by which alternatives
are compared on each dimension and differences across dimensions are
summed.This summationresultsin a preferencefor one decision alternative
(Olshavsky 1979).
Compensatorymodels are additive.Compensatoryprocesses are marked
by interdimensionalsearch (i.e., a search within an alternative) using a
constantamountof informationper alternative(Billings and Scherer 1988).
The additive difference model is compensatorybut proceeds from an intradimensionalsearchpattern(i.e., across the portfolioof alternatives).
Using a compensatorystrategy,the decision makermay tradeoff a high
value on one dimension of an alternativewith a low value on another
dimension. The essence of this model is that the various componentsof a
multidimensionalobjectarecombinedfor a "score"(e.g., "netgain,""critical
value,""satisfactoryscore,"etc.) andcontributeindependentlyto its overall
worth or utility (Einhornand Hogarth1981). With a few exceptions, linear
equationshave been used to approximatethe cognitiveprocessesunderlying
decision making.
Although the expected utility and other analytic models have produced
accuratepredictionsof policy decisions andoutcomesin numerousinstances
(see Bueno de Mesquita1981, 1984, 1985), such models seldom capturethe
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
underlyingcognitiveprocesses involved in decision making.An alternative
theoryof foreignpolicy decision makingis presentedbelow.
2. THE NONCOMPENSATORY
DECISION-MAKING THEORY OF THE USE OF FORCE
A growing numberof studies of foreign policy decision making have
shown that policymakers adopt cognitive shortcuts to rational decision
making(see Jervis 1976, 1985;Jervis,Lebow,andStein 1985;George 1980;
Holsti 1990; Herek,Janis, and Huth 1987; Maoz 1990; Vertzberger1990).
George(1980), for example,pointsout thatin theface of valuecomplexityand
uncertainty,policymakersresortto a varietyof simple decisionrules.Among
these rules are the use of historicalanalogies (see also Neustadt and May
1986), the use of incrementalpolicies (Wildavsky1974), "consensuspolitics"
(George 1980), and differentmodes and mechanismsof defense avoidance
(e.g., "bolstering"or "spreadingthe alternatives"and procrastination-see
George 1980, chap. 2). Accordingto George (1980), policymakersattempt
to avoid value tradeoffsby using "cognitiverestructioning"and by "devaluating... one of the values or intereststhat[thepolicymaker]or othersclose
to him hold" (1980, 33).
Jervis(1985) attemptsto understandthe biases thatinfluenceinformation
processinganddecisionmaking.Accordingto Jervis,bothunmotivated(e.g.,
cognitive predispositions)andmotivated(i.e., affect-driven)biases influence
decision making.Implicitin the workof Jervis(1976), Holsti (1990), Jervis,
Lebow, and Stein (1985), andGeorge(1980) is the assumptionthatthereare
cognitive limits on the rationalist,microeconomictheoryof decision making.
These limits have profoundimplicationson foreignpolicy decision making.
No dominant model of the use of force has emerged, however, as an
alternativeto the expected utilityor cyberetic/satisficing models of the use
of force.
The noncompensatorydecision-makingmodel presentedin this article
suggeststhatdecisionsto use force aretypicallybasednoton a compensatory
calculus of decision making,but on a noncompensatorystrategy;that is, in
a choice situation,if a certainalternativeis unacceptableon a given dimension (e.g., it is unacceptablepolitically), then a high score on another
for it, andhence
dimension(e.g., the military)cannotcompensate/counteract
the alternativeis eliminated.The model capturesthe nonholistic natureof
the foreign policy decision-makingprocess. It focuses on a very restrictive
set of alternativesand dimensions.Moreover,it recognizes the noncompensatory natureof the decision process. Consequently,ratherthan relying on
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THEORY 599
Mintz/NONCOMPENSATORY
holistic decision rules (e.g., expected utility theory, subjective expected
utility theory,or multiattributeutilitytheory)thatrequirethe evaluationand
comparison of all alternativesacross different dimensions, the decision
makeradoptsheuristicdecision rules thatdo not requiredetailed and complicated comparisonsof relevantalternatives,and adoptsor rejectsundesirable alternativeson the basis of one or a few criteria.
The noncompensatorydecision-makingmodel employs less cognitively
demandingdecision proceduresthan the expected utility or other analytic
models. The model is associated with a nonexhaustive decision-making
process, implies curvilinearity,and is nonadditive(as a person who suffers
from high levels of cholesterol is unlikely to buy himself items rich in
cholesterol,even if these are offered at a huge discount).
Abelson and Levi (1985) found that decision makers use a variety of
choice strategies (see also Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988). Whereas
compensatorymodels can be appliedto some incidentsof the use of force, a
noncompensatorymodel can be appliedto othercases.
The use of a particularstrategy of decision making (compensatoryor
noncompensatory)is dependenton a numberof factors (such as task complexity or the numberof feasible alternatives).In information-processing
parlance,whereasthe expected utility and cybernetic/politicaluse of force
models are alternative-basedmodels, the model describedin this articleis a
dimensional or attribute-basedmodel. As Payne, Bettman, and Johnson
(1988, 536) correctly pointed out, in alternative-basedprocess models,
"multipleattributesof a single alternativeareconsideredbeforeinformation
abouta second alternativeis processed."In a satisficingmodel, a la Ostrom
and Job (1986), the alternativethatis above an "acceptable"thresholdlevel
is selected. In Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman(1990), the alternativewith
the highestnet gain is selected.In contrast,in the noncompensatorydecisionmakingmodel presentedin this article,the value of an alternativeon a single
dimensionis processedfirst,andalternativesthatscorebelow the cutoffvalue
on this dimensionareeliminated.Politicalleadersreview alternativesin light
of a political dimension and reject all alternativesthat may damage them
politically,then move to a substantivedimensionandreject alternativesthat
are low on this dimension.1
Tversky's(1972) eliminationby aspects(EBA) theoryimplies a noncompensatorydecision-makingstrategy.2EBA will eliminatean alternative"if it
1. Although in most cases politiciansdo view political supportand survivalas the salient
factors,thereare situationswherethis orderof processingmight be violated.
2. The noncompensatorydecision-makingmodel is not synonymouswith EBA. The conjunctive, disjunctive,and lexicographicdecision rules can also be viewed as noncompensatory
(Sage 1990).
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is below the cutoff on the first dimensionexamined,even thoughit may be
very good on the remainingdimensions"(Billings and Scherer 1988, 17).
EBA involves "searchingall alternativeson the most importantdimension
andeliminatingthose thatdo not have satisfactoryvalues on thatdimension"
(Billings andScherer1988,4). The nextmostimportantdimensionis selected
and the process is continueduntil only one alternativeremains.Because a
choice requiresthatone alternativebe selected andthe restrejected(Billings
and Scherer 1988, 2), choice involves "lookingfor dissimilarities,meaning
those featuresthatdistinguishbetweenalternatives(featuresheld in common
would be disregarded)"(Billings and Scherer 1988, 4). The EBA model
searches intradimensionallyand uses a variableamountof informationper
alternative(Payne 1976, 367). A dimensionis selectedwith a probabilitythat
is proportionalto its weightorrelativeimportance.Using a noncompensatory
strategy,the decision makeris left with fewer alternativesto consider.
The noncompensatorydecision-makingprocess does not always continue, however, until only one alternativeis left. There are situationswhere
severalremainingalternativesall pass a thresholdvalue (i.e., do not fail) and
are then evaluated based on a more analytic processing or by using a
lexicographicdecision rule. Even when one alternativeis left (by default),a
final refinementof the default choice is typically performedby trying to
minimize costs and maximize benefits.
The noncompensatorydecision-makingmodel is dimension-based.Dimensions typically involve groups of similar criteria.The criteriawithin a
specific dimensionareprocessedsequentiallyto arriveat an overall score on
that dimension.
A dimensioncan be conceived as an organizingtheme for relatedinformation and variables(T. Ostromet al. 1980). Thus if the decision makeris
concernedwith the political implicationsof a decision, then public opinion
polls, the leader'spopularity,the stateof the economy,domesticopposition,
and other variables that are related to this general theme may be used to
evaluate the consequenceof a chosen alternativeon this organizingtheme.
Withinthe EBA context,the decision makerassesses alternativeswithregard
to whether they pass or fail a threshold on a given dimension (or OT,
organizingtheme). The numberof criteriaand variablesthat areconsidered
for a particularOT may vary across alternatives.One alternativemay be
rejected on the basis of only one criterion(e.g., how it scored on public
opinion polls), whereas anotheralternativemay be rejectedor accepted on
the basis of polls, editorials,andmore.Whatdeterminesthe sequence of the
variablesthatenterthe processis usuallythe availabilityof information,and
its structure.If all variablesareavailableandthe sequenceof theirprocessing
is determinedby the decision maker,then the items that areconsideredmost
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THEORY 601
Mintz/NONCOMPENSATORY
relevant to the theme (highest decrease of uncertainty)will be first to be
considered(T. Ostromet al. 1980). Such a process is conductedfor the first
OT. The decision makercan then move to the second OT while operating
along the same principles.Accordingto the noncompensatorymodel, only
relevantand nontrivialOTs (e.g., political, military,etc.) are considered.
Foreign policy decision making is often characterizedby decision processes thatinvolve a numberof decisions takenover time (see Maoz 1990),
often as steps on an escalatory ladder and typically in an interactive
setting. The noncompensatorydecision-making model involves the analysis of alternativespresentedat each stage of the process. Decision makers
are not necessarily"forwardlooking,"althoughthey are influencedby their
own past decisions, which may restricttheirchoice set due to increasedsunk
costs, cognitive investment, and so on. The greaterthe prospective uncertainty (e.g., regardingthe opponent'sintentions,the outcome of a conflict,
etc.), the less the "forwardlooking"tendenciesof decisionmakers(Vertzberger
1992).
Political leaders almost by definition take into account (explicitly or
implicitly)politicalfactorsandconsequenceswhenmakingpolicy decisions.
As Morton (1991, 772) pointed out, althoughleaders do care about policy,
they areespeciallyconcernedaboutthepoliticalimplicationsof theiractions.
Isard(1992) has similarlyclaimed that
in seekingto be or stayin power,or in havinghis/herpoliticalpartybe and
remainincumbent,the politicalleadermustbe primarilyconcernedwith
constituency
support.Putotherwise,he is plaguedwiththeproblemof mainandinvolvesconstant
short-run
is primarily
Thisproblem
tainingvotersupport.
policy space.And long-runfactorsthat
shiftingwithina multidimensional
in rationalactionareby andlargedismissed.(P.7)
shouldbe incorporated
We arguethatbecauseorganizationalpolitics, bureaucraticpolitics, local
politics, and other forms of domestic politics are so pervasive in policy
making(Russett1990a),leaderseliminateoptionsthatarebelow the "cutoff'
level on the politicaldimensionanddo not maketradeoffsacrossdimensions
to compensatefor a low score on the political dimension. Thus they use a
noncompensatorystrategy.An alternativethatis likely to damagethe political prospectsof the leaderis rejectedbefore evaluatingthe "score"on the
otherdimension(s).Thus one set of calculationsthatentersinto the political
leader's decision-makingcalculus is political. This dimension has to be
satisfied (cannot be eliminated) before other dimensions are considered.
Remainingoptionsarethen evaluatedbasedon how they score on a substantive dimension (e.g., economic, strategic,diplomatic,legal, social, psychological, and so on).
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
The context of the other dimension(s) that enters into the calculus of
decision making varies as a function of the substance of the decision.
Therefore,it is common to identify at least two distinct (though typically
interrelated)dimensions-sets of calculations-that are "nested" in the
calculus of decision makingof political leaders.
In contrastto othermodels of theuse of force,the noncompensatorymodel
of decision makingsuggests thatif the decision to use force is unacceptable
politically, it will preventthe decision makerfrom using force even if the
score on the benefit/costratioon the militarydimensionis very high (historical examples show that the opposite is not always true,however-leaders
had initiatedconflicts when the score on the option to use force was high on
the political dimension but low on the militarydimension). Therefore,the
relationshipsarenot necessarilysymmetrical.Policymakerstypicallyexpect
the use of force to help thempolitically(at least in the shortrun)throughthe
"rally 'round the flag" effect, and thus the two dimensions (political and
military)are not always orthogonal(independent)of each other.The use of
force may increase the leader's utility because it may increase domestic
support.
Policymakers"weigh"the relativeimportanceof each dimension(Xi) of
the decision alternative(ai). In the compensatorylinear model, the values
across dimensions are summed as utility scores for an alternative.In the
additive difference model, the sum of the differences across dimensions
should be the greatestfor the alternativethat is being selected. In contrast,
the expected gain on a critical dimension should be higher than a certain
thresholdlevel in the noncompensatorymodel. In this model, if the expected
gain along a critical dimension is below the threshold value, then the
alternativeis eliminated.
Even if one adoptsthe noncompensatoryapproach,it is still importantto
analyze the hierarchyand orderin which dimensionsand/oralternativesare
enteredinto the calculus of decision making. It was shown elsewhere that
decision makersonly considerfeasible options, whereasimpracticaloptions
are not even raised (Klein 1989).
We agree with Bueno de Mesquita(1981) thatthe decision to use force is
made by a small group of leaders. We also agree that a crucial contextual
dimension underlying many policy decisions is domestic politics, or the
desire of politiciansto be popularandget reelected.This is being pursuedby
policy makersat an acceptablelevel of risk (Ostromand Job 1986; Russett
1990a). Furthermore,we concurwith JohnSteinbruner's(1974) assessment
thatdecision makersin crisis areconstrainedby time pressuresanduncertain
outcomes, and are thereforerelying on their innercircle of policy advisors
and expertsin assessing the threatsand gains associatedwith theirdecision
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THEORY 603
Mintz/NONCOMPENSATORY
(see also Klein 1989; Mitchell and Beach 1990). One can also incorporate
organizationaland bureaucraticaspects of decision making (see Allison
1971) into our conceptual model. These aspects represent instances of
political organizingthemes duringthe decision-makingprocess.However,
in contrastto all studies of internationalcrises and the use of force,3we use
a noncompensatorymodel of decision making that does not allow policymakers to "compensate"for a low score on the political dimension while
making decisions. In what follows, we review existing explanationsof the
decision to attackIraqandthen applythe noncompensatoryutility theoryof
decision makingto the president'sdecision to launchan attackagainstIraq
on January16, 1991 (January17, Baghdadtime).
3. THE DECISION TO ATTACK IRAQ:
PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS
There is a growing literatureon the moves and countermovesthat led to
the Gulf Warand the geostrategicconsequencesof that war.George (1991)
calls the Gulf Waran "inadvertentwar"(becauseduringthe crisis thatled to
the Iraqiinvasionof Kuwait,neitherside "wantedor expecteda warto result"
[p. 567]), Hussein'sinvasionof Kuwaita "miscalculatedfait accompli,"U.S.
policy a variantof coercive diplomacythathas beencalled "agradualturning
of the screw" (p. 571), and the processes leading to the war, a diplomatic
version of the game of "chicken."
FreedmanandKarsh(1991) have also analyzedthe strategiesof bothsides
in the war.Accordingto these authors,Hussein'sstrategiccalculationswere
shapedby Iraq'seight-yearwar with Iran(p. 9), whereasU.S. strategyhas
been influenced profoundly by the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War
(p. 15). Recent historical analogies (see Neustadt and May 1986) have
therefore played an importantrole in shaping U.S. and Iraqi strategies.
Freedmanand Karsh(1991) concludedthatthe Bush administrationadopted
a militarystrategythatwould minimizecoalitioncasualties"reinforcedby a
carefulleadershipof the alliance,"whereasSaddamHussein's strategywas
based "on increasingAmericancasualties and sowing division within the
coalition" (p. 6). (For a differentinterpretationfocusing on Hussein's per3. Blechmanand Kaplan(1978) andMintzandRussett(1992) pointedout that"thepolitical
use of force"is not synonymouswith the decisionto employ forcein war. Russett(1990b), Mintz
and Russett(1992), Ostromand Job (1986), Jamesand Oneal (1991), and othershave all dealt
with political use of force cases and decisions. The model presentedin this article may also be
applicableto situationswhere a favorablebalanceof force gives the decision makera choice of
whetheror not to engage in war (e.g., wars between majorand minorpowers).
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sonalityandhis politicalrise to powerwithinthe Ba'athparty,see Miller and
Mylroie 1990; othersfocus on the war as an importantelement in Hussein's
"state-building"efforts, where external conflict or coercion are used as
mechanismsto control conflicting groupsin Iraq'sheterogeneoussociety.)
Freedmanand Karsh pointed out (1991, 6) that the U.S. was successful
because the strengthof its military offensive "eased the pressure on the
internationalcoalition PresidentBush and Secretaryof State James Baker
have founded"(see also Bulloch and Morris 1991).
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal (1991) have analyzed the strategies and
motivationsof other anti-Iraqcoalition partnersand supporters(e.g., Syria
andEgypt,the Gulf states,the WestEuropeans,the Soviet Union, andChina).
They pointed out that the behaviorof SaddamHussein himself "increased
the costs of defection [fromthe coalition]"(p. 402) (see also Inman et al.
1992 on this point). Cooper,Higgott, and Nossal (1991) argued,however,
that the United States had far fewer genuine followers in the Gulf conflict
than "conventionalwisdom" would suggest (p. 408). (For a discussion of
political and militarytrendsin the post-Gulf WarNear East, see Herrmann
1991.)
Kugler's(1991) "realtime"analysisof the Gulf crisis is the most relevant
to our study,however.Kugler(1991) has appliedthe rationalactor-expected
utilitytheoryof the use of force to the Gulf crisis. His carefulanalysisof data
collected in September-November1990 producedsome accurateforecasts:
it showed thatHussein would survivethe war;thatthe Kurdand Shia would
rebel if supportedby outside actors;that the rebellion would collapse; that
Hussein "wouldbe defeated in a confrontationwith the U.S.-led coalition;
and attemptsby otherforces to negotiatea compromisesolutionwould fail"
(Kugler 1991). His studyalso disclosed thatHusseinhad a free handto alter
Iraq'spolicy withoutloss of domestic supportmainly because he has had "a
securedomesticposition"thatpermittedwide policy latitude(Kugler1991).
Kugler's analysis of Iraq'spolitical dynamics furtherdisclosed that, given
the arrangementof forces,Iraqwas in no positionto initiatemilitaryactivities
against Saudi Arabia or the U.S.-led coalition (1991, 26). According to
Kugler,if Husseinwouldhavefollowed the patternof unilateralconcessions,
the loss for Iraq would have been limited, while maximum benefits were
retained.Most important,a disastrouswar could have been avoided (p. 28).
However,Kugler's(1991) analysis(basedon an assessmentof the distribution of forces in the Gulf) predictedonly a low probabilitythat the crisis
would lead to a war (p. 28). These 1991 predictionswere based on the
assumptionsthat (1) the United States could have reached a compromise
solution with the help of Saudi Arabia,and (2) that SaddamHussein had a
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Mintz/NONCOMPENSATORY
THEORY 605
"unilateralability to obtain a more favorableoutcome by accommodation
thanby conflict"(p. 28).
While Kugler's expected utility analysis failed to anticipate that the
United States would attackIraq,it is unlikely that the cyberneticmodel of
the use of force would have faredbetter.Whereasin a cyberneticenvironment, the decision maker simplifies decisions and focuses on a subset of
alternatives,this model allows decision makers to make tradeoffs across
dimensions. Furthermore,the cybernetic approach emphasizes not only
limited searchof informationbut also hierarchicalprocessing.Thus, using a
cybernetic model of the use of force, the order in which alternativesare
evaluatedcould affectthe alternativechosen. Meetinga satisficingthreshold
may lead the decision makerto choose an alternativewith no furtheranalysis
of otheravailablealternatives.Forexample,if the no-use-of-force("containment")strategyhad been evaluatedfirst, based on a satisficingprinciple,it
is likely that because this option was less risky militarilythan the "use of
force"option, a high score on this dimensioncould have "compensated"for
a low score on the political variables.A total "score"may have exceeded,
then, a "satisfactory"thresholdvalue and hence, based on a compensatory
model, the "containment"alternativecould have been adopted. Based on
Woodward(1991) andothers,however,thereis plentyof evidence to suggest
that the containmentstrategy was indeed considered first but eliminated,
whereasthe use of force alternativewas approved.Moreover,an analysis of
Hussein's options based on a compensatorylogic has predicteda peaceful
outcome (see Mintz and Geva forthcoming).
In the rest of this article,I offer an alternativeexplanationfor President
Bush's decision to use force againstIraq.This explanationuses the noncompensatory decision-making theory of the use of force. It is a model of a
unitary actor operatingunderimperfect/boundedrationalityin an environment characterizedby imperfectinformation(prospectiveuncertainty).
4. THE DECISION TO ATTACK IRAQ:
A NONCOMPENSATORYPERSPECTIVE
Warand peace decisions arerootednot only in internationalpolitics, but
also in considerationsof domestic politics (Russett 1990a, chap. 2, 1990b;
MintzandRussett1992, 179).It obviouslymatters"whatthe militarybalance
of power is, but every political leader must also worry about his base of
domesticpopularsupport"(MintzandRussett1992, 179). MintzandRussett
have thus identified the political dimension and the militarydimension as
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most influentialin decisions to use force. A decision to use force typically
consists of politicalcalculationsbasedon conditionsin the domesticpolitical
economy and military/strategiccalculations based on an assessment of
military capabilities,balance of militaryforces, casualty estimates, and so
on. Below, we show thatthe domesticpolitical economy served as a crucial
dimensionin the calculusof the decision to use force againstIraq(it has had
a powerful impact on U.S. presidents'decisions to use force in the past 200
years; Russett 1990a, chap. 2) and that alternativesthat were below the
"satisfactory"level on the political dimension were eliminated. Military/
strategic considerationsserved as the other contextual dimension in the
decision maker'scalculusof decision (they servedhistoricallyas necessary,
althoughnot sufficient,conditionsto use force).
To achieve the policy of forcing SaddamHussein out of Kuwait, three
alternativeswere identified:(1) use of force; (2) containment,that is, continue the sanctionsand keep the diplomaticpressureon Iraq;and (3) withdrawal.4Mintz and Geva (forthcoming)showed that decisions in the Gulf
crisiswerecontingenton previousdecisions.Forexample,theadministration's
miscalculation of Iraqi intentions in the pre-August 2 invasion led to a
tendencyto reject any "passive"or "donothing"alternativesat a laterstage.
Similarly,PresidentBush's November 8 decision to switch to an offensive
posture limited his choice set at a later stage in the crisis, but put him in a
"win-win"situation.(FormerChairmanof the JointChiefs of Staff General
D. Jones claimed in a testimony before the Senate's Committeeon Armed
Services [1990], that the very presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf has
narrowedU.S. options and the coalition's ability to act with "patientresolve.") By the end of December,the presidenthad alreadymade a series of
such criticalpriordecisions. Mintz and Geva (forthcoming)showed thatthe
choices made on these (and other) previous occasions conditioned and
structuredthe choice madein lateDecember.sIn decidingto use force against
Iraq,the presidentfollowed the multidimensional,noncompensatory(EBA)
strategy.The political dimensionand the military/strategicdimension were
4. Mueller (1992, 8) points out that for many decision makers, the use of force and
containmentalternativeswere not that differentfrom one anotherbecause of the expectations
thatthe use of force would eventuallyfollow containmentif Iraqwould refuseto withdrawfrom
Kuwait.One option was thereforepartiallynested within another.
5. It is interestingto note that a two-stage, noncompensatorydecision-makingprocess
followed most of the previous decisions as well. Such considerationsas U.S. interestsin oil
supplies and oil markets,U.S. prestige and credibility,strategicconcerns regardingU.S. war
fighting and pressurefrom U.S. allies (e.g., MargaretThatcher)were reviewed for the decision
to deployforces in the PersianGulf in the firstplace, thus narrowingthe numberof optionsand
ensuring that the outcome would not result in a loss of political "capital."The fear that the
internationalcoalitionwoulddissolve also influencedBush'sdecisionto attackIraqimmediately
afterthe January15 deadline(see Freedmanand Karsh1991, 41).
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the crucialOTsinfluencingthe president'sdecision (see FreedmanandKarsh
1991, 39). An interview with SenatorWilliam Cohen (R-Maine) on PBS
(February7, 1991) has also confirmedthis assessment.
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
The literatureon the political economy of defense offers several theoretical explanationsfor the use of force, each of which can help explain the
president'sdecision to eliminatethe unilateralwithdrawaland containment
strategiesandto use force instead(see below). Thepoliticaleconomycontext
(dimension)consistsof severalfactors.These arederivedfromthe diversionary theoryof war (see Levy 1989a;Russett 1990a, 1990b); the referendum
model (see Williams 1990); the military industrial complex thesis (see
Russett and Hanson 1975); the spatial theory of elections (see Hinich and
Enelow 1984); and the rally 'round the flag element (see Mueller 1973;
Morrow 1991; Brody 1984). (For a comprehensivereview of the literature
on the causes of war, see Levy 1989b.) Below, we apply our noncompensatory theoryto the president'sdecision to use force againstIraq.
By all accounts,thepresidenthadmadeup his mindregardingthe decision
to attackIraqby December27, 1990.Therewas no comprehensiveevaluation
of the alternativesas would be requiredby a compensatoryprocessandthere
was "little or no process where alternativeswere systematically[and comparatively]weighedandargued"(Woodward1991,320), as wouldhave been
expected based on an expected utility model. The "withdrawal"strategy
would have hurt the presidentbadly because it would have left Mr. Bush
vulnerableon both the militaryandpoliticaldimensions.It would have been
perceived as a failure of U.S. foreign policy (because it would have highlighted the administration's"miscalculation"of Hussein's intentionsvis-avis Kuwaitin the pre-August2 period)and was thereforeeliminatedand not
even considered.Thepoliticaleconomyrationalefor eliminatingthe containment strategyconsistedof some of the following elements:
1. Presidentialpopularity. Previous studies of foreign policy decision
making showed that the public is more attentive to foreign policy than
traditionallydescribed(Aldrich,Sullivan,andBorgida 1989). Leaders'popularityis significantlyincreasedin the "jobperformance"polls in times of
internationalcrisis (Russett 1990a). The public gives an emotionalbacking
to the president.This effect is known as the "rally 'roundthe flag" effect
(Mueller 1973; Kernell 1978; Brody 1984). It varies somewhatfor different
actions and accordingto how the leaderis perceived by the voters. Russett
(1990a, 38) pointed out thatpresidentsmore often use militaryforce when
their performanceratingis "in the 'critical'40-60 percentrange"(when a
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boost is most useful) andwhen recenterosionin thatratingis evident, andis
greateramong their supportersthan in the opposition(see also Ostromand
Job 1986; OstromandSimon 1985). Assertivespeeches andrelativelyshort,
low-cost uses or threatsof use of militaryforce "almostalways invoke this
short-termpopularityincrease"(Mintz and Russett 1992, 181).6
Empirical evidence suggests that leaders of democratic countries are
likely to use force when their performanceratingin public opinion polls is
declining (perhapsbecause of the way they are handlingthe economy) and
are more likely then to eliminateotherpolicy alternatives.PresidentBush's
performanceratingquickly declined in the fall of 1990, largely due to the
Octoberfierce budget struggle,"when tax-unfairess and party-of-the-rich
debates took a big bite out of [his] job ratings"(Phillips 1991, xii). The
president'spopularityratingsdroppedto 53% (Jentleson 1992, 66), that is,
within the above-mentionedcriticalrangeof public support.Therewas also
a declining willingnessof the Americanpeople to supportprolongeddeployment of American forces (Jentleson 1992, 66). Problems in defining a
domesticagendahavenothelpedthe presidenteither.Accordingto Woodward
(1991, 42), the president told the chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Colin Powell, that "I don't think there's time politically for [the
containment] strategy."Consistent with prospect theory (Kahnemanand
Tversky 1979), the presidentwas in the domain of loss and was therefore
more likely to take a risk and go to war.7An eliminationprocess therefore
guided the president to reject the containmentalternative.According to
GeneralPowell (see Woodward1991), therewas no comparativeevaluation
of the otheralternatives.
2. Thestate of the economy.Governments'popularityis closely relatedto
the state of the national economy (Mintz and Russett 1992, 180). In the
post-1945 era,U.S. presidentshave been morelikely to use force when faced
with economic difficulties (inflationor high unemployment)(Ostrom and
Job 1986;Russett 1990a,chap.2). However,a democraticleaderwho wishes
to raise his level of popularsupportby stimulatingthe economy may not
always be able to do so (Russett 1990a).
Russett (1990b) pointed out that from the perspective of a "rational,
self-interestmaximizing"democraticnationalleader,an alternativeto manipulatingthe economy is the use of force againstforeignadversaries.Under
such circumstances,a policy advocatingcompromisewill typicallynot meet
a satisfactorycriterionand will therebybe eliminated.
6. Jentleson(1992, 50) pointedout, however,that"theAmericanpublic is muchmorelikely
to supportthe use of force for the restraintratherthanthe remakingof othergovernments."
7. Althoughthe presidenthadto make a choice between two risky prospects,it is clear that
the attackstrategyinvolved greatermilitaryrisksthan the alternative.
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THEORY 609
Levy (1989a) and Russett (1990b) argue that the use of force can help
divertattentionfromdomesticeconomic adversity.And historically,reduced
popularityand a deterioratingeconomyhave been two of the most important
variables explaining presidents' decisions to use force (Ostrom and Job
1986).
The looming recession, the twin deficits, the savings and loan crisis, the
collapse of severalmajorbanks,the continuedincreasein oil prices (to more
than$40 a barrel)due to the situationin the Gulfin thepre-January15 period,
the "sunkcosts" associatedwith the deploymentand maintenanceof a very
large air, land, and naval force (of 400,000 plus soldiers) on Saudi soil for
months, and SaddamHussein's threatsto blow out Kuwaiti and Saudi oil
fields (andBush's expertisein boththe oil businessandpolitics) have led the
presidentto concede thathe does not have time to wait for the containment
strategyto work.This has also guidedhim, then,in his decision to rejectthat
strategy.The situationin the Gulf only temporarilypushedthe economy off
the frontpage.
3. Partisanpolitics. Mueller(1992, 13) pointedout thatbecause the wars
in Korea and Vietnam "were begun under Democratic administrations,
Democrats tended to supportthem more than Republicans."Bendor and
Hammond (1992, 314-15) reportedthat during the Cuban missile crisis,
decisions were likewise made "in a partisancontext." They recalled the
criticismsby Republicanleadersandthe administration's"nervousnessabout
the upcoming congressionalelections." According to Mueller (1992), the
Gulf War was "begun and engineered"by a Republican president, and
Republicans,accordingly,were muchmore supportiveof the president'swar
policies than Democrats(see Morganand Bickers 1992 for the importance
of partisansupportin decisions on the use of force).
The Democraticparty's leadershipin Congress (Speakerof the House
Thomas Foley, MajorityWhip RichardGephart,MajorityLeader Senator
George Mitchell, and influentialsenatorssuch as Lloyd Bentsen and Sam
Nunn) and most other Democratsin Congresswere on record as opposing
the use of force againstIraq.They urgedthe presidentto adoptthe containment strategy,that is, to give the unprecedentedeconomic sanctions more
time to force Hussein out of Kuwait. Consequently,the president had an
opportunityto distinguish himself from potential presidentialrivals on a
critical issue, to enhance his party'spopularity,to reinforcethe image that
the Republicanpartyprotectsthe Americanpeople with a strongdefense and
bettermanages foreign policy, and to erase the so-called "wimp"image. If
the war would indeed be short,decisive, and relatively"low cost," then the
presidentwould have an opportunityto humiliatethe Democrats.Although
typically,the outcomeof a waris not knownwith certainty,in this case there
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was a consensus that the allies would win. In fact, there is substantial
evidence that the presidenthimself had thoughtso (see below), and that he
was able "topull off his warbeforethe oppositioncould get fully organized"
(Mueller 1992, 18). It was sufficientto see how decisive the Israelivictories
were againstvariouscoalitionsof Arabstateswhen Israeltook the initiative
(in the Sinai campaignof 1956, in the Six-Day Warof 1967, and on other
occasions).
4. Themilitaryindustrialcomplexthesis.Despite notabledivisions within
the capitalistclass (see Russettand Hanson 1975), capitalistinterests,especially those of militaryindustry,seldom oppose acts of militaryforce against
foreign adversaries,especially when the militaryindustrialsector is threatened by severe cuts in militarybudgetsandcontractawards,as was the case
in 1990.
The reduced threatof the Soviet Union to Westernsecurity,the administration'splansto withdrawforces fromEurope,to slashthe defense budget,
to sign unprecedentedarmscontrolagreementswiththe Soviets, to cut major
weapons systems, and to close militarybases have obviously threatenedthe
militaryindustrialsector.Drew (1991, 190) reportsthatdefense contractors
have even lobbied for the "president'sposition."
The crisis did not initiate,however,from domestic motivations.Nor did
the administration"create"a crisis to boost the president'spopularity.The
public has largely supportedthe president'shandling of the situation (see
Jentleson 1992 and Mueller 1992 for data),andmost consideredit as a "just
war."In fact, Michael Walzer(1991, 303) arguedthat,from the standpoint
of morality,"itis hardto imaginea bettercauseor a moreappropriateenemy."
But when faced with the options of unilateralwithdrawal,containment,and
the use of force, the presidenteliminatedthe withdrawaland containment
strategies(using the noncompensatorystrategyof eliminationby aspects),
primarily(althoughnot only) because of the political costs associated with
the pursuitof these strategies.The rejection of these alternativesleft the
president with the default option (use of force). The costs and benefits
associated with this alternativewere then evaluatedto maximize the benefit-to-cost ratio. (It is plausible to conceive of situations in which the
decision-makingprocess entails such a two-stepprocess; see Wright 1974;
Klein 1989.) Because the benefits had clearly outweighed the costs on the
political dimension, the focus had shifted to finding ways to minimize the
costs associatedwith the militarydimension.Domestic political considerations have not stood in the president'sway in making the decision to use
force.
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THE MILITARY/STRATEGICDIMENSION
The careersof presidentsare often defined by how they deal with wars.
The president'sdecision to use force servedmultipledomesticpoliticalgoals
as well as strategic/military/foreign
policy aims.Accordingto the Associated
Press(February4, 1991),PresidentBush placedhis bets on a short,swift war
thatcould be largelysuppliedfromexisting inventorieswith minimalloss of
lives. Drew (1991, 193), Mueller (1992, 16), Freedmanand Karsh(1991),
and Jentleson(1992), among others,also pointedout thatthe presidentwas
reasonablyconfidentthatthe overwhelmingmilitarypower of the coalition
force would securevictory,thatthe war would be short,andthatthe number
of Americancasualtieswould be relativelysmall.
Because Americanstypicallyturnsharplyagainsta war when it becomes
"extendedand expensive,"and endangering(ratherthanbenefiting)domestic economic prosperity,the administrationwas determinedto keepAmerican
casualties to a minimum.Russett (1990a, 46) pointed out that supportfor
leadersdropsfast when it becomes clear thatthe war would be neithershort
nor low cost (wars are not popularas they build in duration,casualties and
economic cost). The presidentwas told by some of his advisors to expect,
even in the worstcase, not morethanfive times as manyaircraftlosses in the
initial phase of the war as have been recorded.In fact, realizing the importance of public supportfor the war and the fact thatthe numberof casualties
is negatively correlatedwith domestic public support,his top priority in
planningfor the war was to keep casualtiesas low as possible.
The guidingprinciplesin the preparationfor war were the maximization
of firepower and troops and the minimizationof potential losses-Bush's
declarationthat "thiswill not turninto anotherVietnam"(Woodward1991,
324). Seniorofficers on the Joint Staff had estimatedthatthe Americanside
would sufferabout 1,000 casualties(killedin action)(Woodward1991). The
air campaignwas designed to try to keep losses to a minimum.Avoiding a
frontalgroundforces assaultinto Iraqistrengthwas anotherway to minimize
costs. Such a strategywas supposedto enhancethe chancesthatthe benefitto-cost ratio would be high. The presidenttried to convince the American
people that this would not be anotherVietnam.Accordingto Freedmanand
Karsh(1991, 16), the presidentsaid, "thiswill not be a protracteddrawn-out
war;the forces arrayedaredifferent;the oppositionis different;the resupply
of Saddam'smilitarywould be very different... the topographyof Kuwait
is different,and the motivationof our all-volunteerforce is superb."Interestingly, Jentleson (1992, 68) reports that support for the war was not
dependentstrictlyon expectationsof low casualties:it was high even when
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casualties were estimatedat 5,000, and droppedonly when the figure was
10,000.
Record (1991) points out thatmany analystshave grossly overestimated
the Iraqimilitarycapabilitiesandcreditedthe Iraqimilitarywith formidable
fightingpowerby analyzingpotentialmilitarycapabilities.Theydid so while
focusing on the quantifiabledimensionsof Iraqimilitarypower ratherthan
on importantunquantifiableindicators such as "moral, intellectual, and
organizationalfacets of militarypower" and existing capabilities (Record
1991). They underestimatedthe U.S. militarystrengthby looking at the U.S.
experiencein Vietnam,the failed attemptto rescueU.S. hostagesin Iran,the
involvement of the Marinesin Lebanon,and other incidents. They downplayed the overwhelmingsuccess of U.S.-made high-tech systems used by
the IsraelisagainstArabarmies,or the highly sophisticatedweaponsandthe
technological revolution in warfare developed by the military-industrial
sector during the military buildup of the eighties.8To minimize the risks
associatedwith the militaryoption,the Secretaryof Defense was thus going
to recommendmilitaryaction only if he was "sureof success" (Woodward
1991, 319).
To whom did the presidentlisten?Therewere basicallytwo groupsin the
president'sinner circle and his militaryadvisors:those who advocatedthe
use of force andthose who preferred"containment."
Interestingly,those who
have servedin the AirForce(formerAirForceChiefGeneralMichaelDugan;
the new commanderof the Air Force,GeneralMerrillMcPeak;Air ForceLt.
General [ret.]Brent Scowcroft [the National SecurityAdvisor];and former
Navy pilot George Bush) supportedthe use of force. According to the
WashingtonPost (September16, 1990), Dugan and othersfelt thatairpower
will shatterenemy resistance to the point that will preclude house-tohouse fighting in Kuwait. Representativesof the ground forces (Chief of
Staff Colin Powell, the Army Chief GeneralKarlVuono, andeven General
Norman Schwarzkopf) were more hesitant, however, to recommend an
attack.Some have even insistedthatthe size of the groundforcesbe expanded
to reducethe risk of an unsuccessfuloperation.
Thepresident'sadvisorscarefullyevaluatedtherelativecapabilitiesavailable to both sides. Real fearsthatU.S. forces would sufferheavy or moderate
casualtieswere expressedby 78%of respondentsin publicopinionpolls just
days before the election (Jentleson1992, 67). But an unusualcombination
8. But as RepresentativeLes Aspin put it in a memo to the House Committeeon Armed
Services, "theU.S. militarywas not as bad as it looked at Desert One and it is probablynot as
good as it looks afterDesert Storm."
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THEORY 613
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of "political, diplomatic, strategic, geographic, topographicand climatic
conditions"andthe Soviet Union's tacitapprovalof the U.S.-led warfavored
the allies (Record 1991, 4). Topmilitaryadvisors,includingAir Force Chief
as earlyas mid-September
GeneralMichaelDugan,advisedthe administration
that the Iraqi Air Force had very limited militarycapability.According to
Dugan, Iraqiair defenses areno matchfor U.S. airpower;the Iraqispossess
an incompetentarmythatdid notdistinguishitself in theIran-Iraqwar.Dugan
arguedthatunlike the situationin jungle-coveredVietnam,airpower would
have a tremendousadvantagein the desert.Accordingto Dugan(Washington
Post, September16, 1990), this view was also sharedby the otherchiefs. Air
Force Lt. General and Deputy Chief of Staff Jimmie V. Adams added that
attacking Iraq does not involve high risks and that the Air Force could
guaranteetremendousdevastationin Iraq(WashingtonPost, September16,
1990).9(Foran estimateof the numberof casualties,see Cioffi-Revilla1991.)
And although history shows that U.S. presidents used force even when
American lives were in danger(duringthe U.S. attackon Tokyo in World
War II, tens of thousands of Americans lived there), Saddam Hussein's
decision to release the foreignhostagesprovedto be a strategicmistakethat
made President Bush's decision to use force easier (as he himself had
admitted).There is also evidence that the presidentreceived confirmatory
informationfromotherkeyplayersin theregion(IsraeliPrimeMinisterShamir,
EgyptianPresidentMubarak,andSyrianPresidentAssad) thatthe warwould
be swift and relatively low cost-a "pushover"(Woodward1991, 360).
The hierarchyof informationandthe orderin which it was processed are
likewise importantfor understandingthe decision. For example, what if the
presidenthad met MotherTeresaor the Pope at the beginning of the crisis
and not MargaretThatcher(who, by all accounts, encouragedhim during
theirAugust 2 meeting to be "tough"with Saddam)?
CONCLUSION
Studiesof the use of forcein internationalrelationshave typicallyfocused
either on the question of why nations engage in interstateconflicts (i.e.,
becauseof political,economic,or internationalfactors)(see JamesandOneal
9. In contrast,duringthe Cubanmissile crisis, PresidentKennedy"wasapparentlyuncertain
whetheran air strikewould destroyall the Soviet missiles in Cuba.When he soughtadvice from
the TacticalAir Command,its commandertold him thatno such guaranteewas possible. This
judgmentapparentlyplayed a majorrole in Kennedy'srulingout the air strikeoption"(Bendor
and Hammond1992, 320, emphasisadded).
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1991; Russett 1990a),or on the questionof how leadersmake war andpeace
decisions (i.e., undertime pressure,grouppressure,informationuncertainty,
and so on; see Janis 1972; Maoz 1990; Schrodt 1991; Steinbruner1974).
However, the "why" and "how" of a decision certainly interactwith and
influence each other and the final outcome (Holsti 1990). It is important,
therefore,to incorporateelementsof both approachesinto a single model of
decision makingon the use of force. In this article,I presentedsuch a model
andappliedit to the decision to use force againstIraq.The model highlighted
the role of noncompensatorystrategiesof decision making.
The study shows thatthe decision to use force againstIraqinvolved:
-
A multidimensional
strategyof decisionmaking(whichincluded,at the
minimum,
militaryandpoliticalconsiderations);
A noncompensatory
(EBA) strategyof decisionmakingthat eliminated
optionsthatscoredlow on thepoliticaldimension;
Nonidentical
utilityfunctions.Althoughmostof the variablesidentifiedas
importantin this case are evidentin otherincidentsof the use of force
Americanhistory,andalthoughrecurring
patternsareevident,
throughout
of costsand
individualdecisionmakersvaryin theirsubjectiveestimations
benefits,evenwhenfacedwiththe sameinformation
(Buenode Mesquita,
of whohadbeen
thatregardless
Onecannotconcludetherefore,
forthcoming).
sittingin theWhiteHouse,he or she wouldhavealso decidedto use force
given identicalmilitary,economic,and politicalconditions(politicians
chooseequivalentcoursesof actiononly whenthey haveidenticalutility
functions-seeMorton1991,772).
Expected utility theories (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1985), cybernetic
models (Ostromand Job 1986), and political economy of defense theories
(such as Russett 1990a) help us identify the critical dimensions and
variables that influence decisions to use force.?1 However, decision makers often process information in a different way from that suggested by
the expected utility and cybernetic political use of force models. Many
analysts therefore expected Hussein to withdraw prior to January 15,
1991. Theory development in the field of the use of force will benefit
from incorporating noncompensatory strategies of decision making
into this multidimensional framework.The decision to use force against
Iraq clearly followed the noncompensatory strategy of elimination by
aspects.
10. Nye and Lynn-Jones(1989), Ross (1991), and Mintz (1992), among others, suggested
thatthe gap betweenthe politicaleconomy field andthe securityfield is one of the most serious
problems within the study of internationalrelationsand recommendedthat elements of both
fields be integrated.
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