Introduction: Prosperity, Energy, and Climate
Energy is critical to global prosperity, as it underpins
economic growth, social development, and poverty
reduction. It has fuelled global economic development
since the industrial revolution, and countries aspire
to further inclusive economic growth. However, with
more than 80% of global energy sourced from fossil
fuels, growing energy demand has led to increasing
greenhouse gas emissions. Today’s challenge is to
decouple economic growth and social development from
increasing emissions. This requires action by central
and local governments, publicly and privately owned
businesses, communities, and individuals.
Challenges to this transition include locked-in
infrastructure, short-term market conditions favouring
coal, fossil fuel subsidies, and inadequate carbon
pricing. Solutions lie in greater efficiency and switching
to cleaner energy sources. This document sets out
five priorities for immediate action: interventions with
short-term impact, a focus on electricity emissions, longsighted investment and innovation, and mobilising other
goals in service of decarbonisation. Finally, while working
to limit temperature rise, the energy sector needs to be
more resilient to a changing climate.
Figure 2
Key decarbonisation technologies
Energy sector emissions
The energy sector generates approximately two thirds of
global greenhouse gas emissions and over 80% of total
CO2. It produced 31.7 Gt of CO2 in 2012, the largest share
of which came from power generation. If current energy
policies remain unchanged, emissions will continue to
grow, driven by increases in non-OECD countries and
steady OECD emissions.
Figure 1
2012 Energy Sector CO2 emissions
Gt CO2
50
40
30
20
10
0
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
■■ Power 39%
■■ Industry 26%
■■ Transport 20%
■■ Buildings 8%
■■ Other transformation 6%
■■ Agriculture 1%
Source: Energy Technology Perspectives, 2014.
There are pathways to lower emissions. In the IEA Energy
Technology Perspectives 2°C scenario (2DS), stringent
policies cause emissions to fall 19% globally by 2030
compared to 2012 levels, instead of rising more than
30%. Likewise, OECD emissions fall by 38% in the same
timeframe. Non-OECD emissions drop to 8% below 2012
levels by 2030 after peaking in the 2020s, rather than
increasing 47%.
■■ Nuclear
■■ Power gen. eff. and fuel switch
■■ Renewables
■■ End-use fuel switch
■■ CCS
■■ End-use fuel and elec. eff.
Source: Energy Technology Perspectives, 2014.
The climate negotiations
Countries are negotiating a new United Nations climate
agreement. Text proposals will be available in early 2015,
as will countries’ intended actions. By the December
2015 Paris COP21, countries intend to reach agreement.
To inform these pivotal 12 months, the IEA offers the
following insights into the immediate actions required
to reduce short- and long-term energy sector emissions.
This document focuses particularly on the period
2020 to 2030, to inform the first round of mitigation
contributions (goals) in the new agreement.
With concerted efforts, energy emissions could fall
19% by 2030 instead of rising by 30%
01
Seize the benefits of immediate action
to bend the global emissions curve
Increasing short-term action is critical to keep the global
goal of limiting temperature rise to below 2°C within
reach. Actions taken before 2020 can pay off in their own
right, and enable countries to achieve their post-2020
mitigation goals more easily.
Four key actions
In the period to 2020, the difference between the IEA
World Energy Outlook 2014 New Policies Scenario (3.6°C
long-term warming), and the 450 Scenario (50% chance
of below 2°C) is a set of four key actions that together
have zero net GDP cost. These deliver 80% of the
reductions needed to reach an economically optimal 2°C
scenario, and provide additional co-benefits such as air
quality improvements.
Figure 3
GDP-neutral set of pre-2020 actions
■■ Efficiency 49%
■■ Power generation 21%
■■ Upstream
CH4 reductions 18%
■■ Fossil fuel subsidies 12%
Source: World Energy Outlook Special Report: Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map, 2013.
The most important element is energy efficiency, which
provides half of the projected savings. The energy
efficiency package consists of quick-to-implement
improvements to heating and cooling in buildings,
appliances and lighting, industrial motors, and vehicle
fuel economy standards. Other energy efficiency actions
can also have large impacts. The IEA has produced
25 Energy Efficiency Recommendations, and an energy
efficiency indicators framework to enable countries to
track progress.
The second of the four key actions is reduced use of
inefficient coal-fired power generation, and the final
two are a partial phase-down of fossil fuel subsidies,
which is beneficial economically and environmentally,
and reduced methane venting and flaring in upstream
oil and gas production.
This set of actions is GDP neutral for all regions, with
different combinations of the four actions applied in
each. For example, in the Middle East, priority actions
are fossil fuel subsidy phase-down and reduced methane
emissions, while in Europe they are energy efficiency and
addressing inefficient coal generation.
Other priority actions
Other actions can also deliver pre-2020 results, notably
accelerated expansion of renewables in power and heat.
While these may come at additional cost, many countries
may see this as justified given the wider co-benefits of
renewable power generation. These co-benefits will vary
depending on country-specific resources, policies, and
goals such as improving local air quality.
Transport actions can also produce emissions reductions
by 2020, and greater savings afterwards. With fuel
economy standards for passenger and freight vehicles
and a transition to hybrid and electric vehicles, transport
emissions are almost 20% lower in 2030 in the
World Energy Outlook 2014 450 Scenario than the New
Policies Scenario.
Long-term impacts of short-term actions
When considering what package of short-term measures
to deploy, countries should also keep in mind consistency
with longer-term decarbonisation. For example,
switching to natural gas power generation can reduce
emissions from coal, but by 2030 power generation must
be moving beyond natural gas to a greater share of zerocarbon options. New investments in gas infrastructure
should take this into account.
To 2020, bridging 80% of the gap to an optimal
2°C path comes at no extra GDP cost
02
Focus on electricity decarbonisation
Electricity generates 25% of all global GHG emissions.
With current policies, Energy Technology Perspectives
finds that annual electricity emissions could increase to
nearly 18 Gt by 2030, while in the 2°C Scenario (2DS)
they decrease to 8 Gt, 53% lower. Reduced demand and
cleaner supply make electricity the largest contributor to
emissions savings over this timeframe.
Figure 4
Emission reductions by sector to 2030
Gt CO2
6DS
Maintaining momentum in the expansion of renewable
power generation will require financial support
mechanisms to adapt to falling technology costs, while
maintaining policy and regulatory stability. In the 2DS,
between 2020 and 2030 renewables increase their share
of power generation from 29% to 42%. Carbon capture
and storage will need to be deployed commercially for
continued use of fossil fuels, scaling up from 50 Mt
captured annually in 2020 to 1.5 Gt by 2030. Additionally,
nuclear power generation can play an important role.
Integrating these low-carbon technologies in a costeffective manner requires a system-wide transformation
involving smart grid infrastructure and flexible demand.
Fleet-average and new-build emissions
intensity of electricity generation
2DS
■■ Power generation
■■ Buildings
■■ Industry
■■ Other
■■ Transport
Source: Energy Technology Perspectives, 2014.
Emissions Intensity (gCO2/kWh)
Figure 5
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2DS Average
■■ 2DS new build
Historical
Source: Energy, Climate Change and Environment: 2014 Insights.
Improvements on the demand side include energy
efficiency measures and more flexible, responsive
demand that can balance variable renewable supply. Early
investments in electrification of transport and buildings
bring early benefits (lowered noise, improved air quality,
reduced gas demand, increased flexibility options), and
enable these sectors to begin decarbonising with the
power sector.
Electricity supply must shift to lower-carbon options.
More efficient coal can assist this goal in the short term.
Natural gas will be part of the mix for longer, but the
average emissions intensity of power generation must fall
to below that of natural gas generation before 2030. This
fall is propelled primarily by new investments in zerocarbon sources: between 2020 and 2030, the average
emissions intensity of new power generation in the 2DS
is only 52 gCO2/kWh.
Much high-emissions infrastructure has already been
built and can be considered “locked in”, but policy
interventions for early retirement or retrofit can “unlock”
these assets. Many of these policy options are already
being implemented, with some motivated by non-climate
objectives.
To propel power sector decarbonisation forward, strong
policies with wide reach are required. Carbon pricing
(including carbon taxes and emissions trading) is
critical, and is being used increasingly in developed and
developing countries. A challenge will be to achieve the
high carbon price levels needed to shift plant investment
and retirement decisions. Regulation (such as fleetwide or
individual technology performance standards) can also be
a useful, pragmatic policy tool.
Strong policies supporting low-carbon electricity could
more than halve electricity emissions in 2030
03
Reshape investment and accelerate innovation
now in low-carbon technologies
Lowering emissions will require shifting energy supply
investment from fossil fuels to clean energy, and
mobilising additional investments in energy efficiency.
These investments will be most cost effective and
impactful when coupled with innovation in technological
development and deployment. While investment
and innovation actions may not significantly impact
short-term emissions, they are essential to long-term
decarbonisation.
Figure 6
Cumulative investments in the New
Policies and 450 Scenarios 2014 to 2035
frameworks that have been adapted to national energy
market structures encourage such investment. An
international climate agreement can improve countries’
willingness to implement climate policy and establish
financing structures such as risk sharing for high-capital
investments. International financing (such as the Green
Climate Fund) can also be a catalyst.
State-owned enterprises and financial institutions will
be key actors in implementation and investment funding,
notably in many large emerging economies. Often, their
motivations will differ from those of private sector
investors; so incentive frameworks need to be adapted.
Innovation in technology
development and deployment
Trillion Dollars (2012)
■■ Fossi fuels
■■ Low-Carbon
■■ Power T&D
■■ Energy efficiency
Advances in the availability and cost of low-carbon
technologies will underpin long-term decarbonisation.
For example, photovoltaic modules have reduced
dramatically in cost from USD 4/W in 2008 to USD 0.8/W
in 2012, and are expected to further halve by 2030. At
this time, however, most technologies are not developing
at a rate consistent with the 2°C goal. Increased support
for technology development is required.
Source: World Energy Investment Outlook, 2014.
Shifting investment
Investment in the energy sector is expected to grow
substantially, particularly in emerging economies. The
World Energy Investment Outlook finds that average
annual energy investment 2026-2030 is expected to be
USD 0.9 trillion in OECD countries and USD 1.3 trillion in
non-OECD countries. Much of this financing will be from
domestic resources, but international capital flows also
play an important role.
Long-term decarbonisation requires a significant
shift in investment patterns. For example, in the 450
Scenario, 80% of power plant investment needs to be
in low-carbon technologies after 2020, and 90% after
2025. Credible, ambitious, and effective domestic policy
The IEA technology roadmaps identify how to accelerate
key technologies such as solar energy and biofuels. One
critical technology is carbon capture and storage (CCS).
As long as fossil fuels are a significant contributor to
future energy supply, CCS will be required.
Innovation also relates to improved implementation,
including developing locally-adapted low-tech solutions,
fostering local innovation capacity, improving policy
frameworks, and strengthening business practices.
Multilateral collaborations are critical. For example, the
IEA portfolio of technology Implementing Agreements
and collaborative work on technology roadmaps enable
OECD and non-OECD countries, the private sector,
and other stakeholders to share knowledge and best
practices regarding both technologies and polices.
Multilateral collaboration is critical to the development and tailoring of
nationally appropriate technology solutions
04
Mobilise non-climate goals to promote
energy sector emission reductions
Climate change policies are not the only catalyst for
energy sector decarbonisation: there are a number
of motives for introducing cleaner energy supplies or
reducing energy demand that also lead to
GHG emission reductions:
Figure 7
Non-climate drivers of GHG reductions
Energy
security
■■ Air quality and the associated public health efforts to improve
air quality by targeting energy efficiency, conventional coal
generation, and transport emissions.
■■ Energy security and initiatives to diversify energy sources and
Fiscal
balance
reduce energy dependence through vehicle fuel economy,
generation diversity, renewable energy development, and
energy efficiency.
■■ Reduced road congestion and measures to improve public
transit and land-use planning to achieve net mobility benefits
along with net reductions in transport spending, energy use,
and emissions.
■■ Growth and sustainable economic development, including
increased green energy productivity, power generation
efficiency to support access, research and development of
such technologies as nuclear energy, renewable energy, low
or zero energy buildings, and efficient transport modes that
create new jobs.
■■ Quality of life improvements through upgrades in city
infrastructure, including efficient and expanded public
transport, and more efficient and comfortable buildings.
■■ Stronger government budgets and related initiatives to phase
out fossil fuel subsidies that put strain on budgets (in 2013,
global fossil fuel subsidies totalled USD 550 billion).
Even for energy efficiency – the most important
contributor to emission reduction – climate benefits are
not necessarily of primary importance. Energy efficiency
actions can be taken to save on energy bills and improve
health outcomes. They are also an essential mechanism
to reduce energy import bills and enhance energy security
while also stimulating economic growth and reducing
air pollutants and GHG emissions. Carbon capture and
storage (CCS) is the only energy sector action that would
be undertaken mostly for climate-change mitigation,
and even this has been developing in association with
enhanced oil recovery in early stages and could also
create new jobs and other local economic benefits.
Economic
development
GHG emission
reductions
Road
congestion
alleviation
Liveable
communities
Air quality
improvement
As explored in Energy, Climate Change and Environment,
while economy-wide GHG targets are critical to keeping
emissions at a level consistent with global warming of
less than 2°C, they alone may not stimulate sufficient
decarbonisation of energy supplies, nor provide an
adequate motivation for national action. By integrating
multiple energy policy objectives and accounting for
their various benefits up front, including non-climate
goals, energy and climate policies could have increased
overall effectiveness. Policy packages that address
multiple objectives simultaneously could lead to more
cost-effective outcomes by helping to rationalise longterm investment decisions and creating synergies
between actions.
Health, transport, energy security, and other
goals can also drive emission reductions
05
Strengthen energy sector resilience
to climate change
Energy security – the uninterrupted availability of energy
sources at an affordable price – is critical for economic
and social development. As highlighted in the recent
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change poses
a new threat to energy security. Risks arise from both
long-term gradual changes, such as rising air and
water temperatures, and more frequent and stronger
extreme events, such as heat waves, droughts, heavy
precipitation, and storms. Even with aggressive efforts
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the temperature
increase that we face from emissions already locked in
will pose important threats to energy infrastructure and
challenges for the energy system as a whole. Even in a
strong mitigation scenario, temperatures are expected
to be 1.6°C above pre-industrial levels by 2035, twice the
current level of increase.
To ensure that energy assets and systems can cope with
a more challenging future, action is needed. Impacts
can be expected on energy supply, whether renewable,
nuclear, or fossil fuel technologies, and on energy demand
patterns, particularly in fast-growing urban areas.
There are already examples of major disruptions in
the energy sector due to extreme weather. In 2012,
Hurricane Sandy cut power to more than 8 million
customers in the north-eastern United States. Since
2000, heat waves have impaired cooling processes at
nuclear reactors in Europe and the United States,
forcing production cuts. In India, a delayed monsoon in
2012 raised power demand and reduced hydropower
output, causing blackouts that affected more than 600
million people.
One degree celsius of warming can be expected to
reduce available electricity generation capacity in the
summer by up to 19% (Europe) and 16% (the United
States) by the 2040s. Transmission and distribution
networks’ efficiency is also compromised by a rise in
temperature. Higher temperatures will either require
additional peak generation and transmission capacity
or greater demand-side response at peak times.
The World Energy Outlook Special Report Re-drawing the
Energy-Climate Map explored climate change impacts
on global energy demand for space cooling and heating.
With climate change, demand for heating decreases, but
demand for space cooling increases.
Increases in energy demand for space
cooling after accounting for climate change
Figure 8
■■ 2035
■■ Additional
2035-2050
Source: World Energy Outlook Special Report Re-drawing the Energy-Climate Map, 2013.
Reduced water availability and increased competition for
water resources are major threats to the energy sector
in the coming years. Water is needed, in particular, for
thermal power plant cooling and hydropower generation.
A changing climate can also reduce the availability of
fuels for electricity generation.
To address these threats, the energy sector will need
to develop resilience through technological solutions,
flexible management, and preventive emergency
preparedness and response measures. As governments
encourage action through policy and regulatory
frameworks, the private sector needs to reflect on how
best to bring climate change risks into its investment
decision-making, particularly regarding critical or longlived energy assets.
Even in a 2°C world, climate change poses threats to energy security
that need to be addressed through policy and commercial action
Possible inputs to UNFCCC: INDCs and the 2015 Agreement
This document has highlighted five key areas where
immediate action is required to put the energy sector
on course to meet short- and long-term climate goals.
Strong domestic policies will drive these actions, and
an international climate agreement can help motivate
policy implementation. The following table presents
a range of possible ways that countries could address
these five issues in their Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) and negotiators could address
them in the 2015 agreement. These ideas are intended
to spark thinking, and should not be seen as prescriptions
or desired outcomes.
In INDCs
In the 2015 Climate Agreement
0 1 Promoting emissions reductions before 2020
■■ Set ambitious 2020 starting point: countries should undertake
cost-effective action pre-2020.
■■ Ambitious post-2020 mitigation targets will encourage pre-2020 action.
■■ Continue technical expert meetings process to share best-practice.
0 2 Decarbonising electricity supply and demand
■■ Complementing GHG goals, countries could set INDCs for the power
sector such as emissions intensity, energy efficiency or renewables,
based on country-specific opportunities.
■■ Encourage countries to report on actions targeting underlying drivers of
change in the electricity sector, in addition to overall GHG outcomes
■■ Support carbon markets for those countries wishing to use them.
0 3 Promoting clean investment and technology development and deployment
■■ Complementing GHG goals, countries could set INDCs for drivers of
long-term transformation (investment, technology development).
■■ Set long-term global and/or national emissions goal(s), with tracking
based on energy sector decarbonisation metrics as well as GHG levels.
■■ Mitigation INDCs for 2025 and 2030 should take into account the future
availability and costs of technologies.
■■ Publish a review of technology progress and availability (including 10
year forecasts) ahead of each round of mitigation target-setting
■■ Parties to report RD&D actions in National Communications.
■■ The UNFCCC Technology Executive Committee (TEC), or an agency such
as the IEA, could track adequacy of RD&D of key technologies.
0 4 Mobilising non-climate goals to drive emissions-reducing actions
■■ Consider whether setting additional INDCs in terms of non-GHG drivers
could support greater ambition than emissions targets alone.
■■ Work with other ministries to identify non-climate goals that can
address mitigation objectives and design policies that achieve
win/win outcomes.
■■ Create reporting and tracking frameworks that support achievement
of short- and long-term GHG goals by complementary use of non-GHG
metrics (e.g., share of renewables, energy efficiency, fossil fuel subsidies)
and long-term decarbonisation metrics (e.g. investments, RD&D).
■■ Recognise non-UNFCCC (including sub-national) goals and actions.
■■ UNFCCC, or an agency outside the UNFCCC such as the IEA, could track
aggregate global progress in key drivers such as energy efficiency.
0 5 Building energy sector resilience
■■ Explore mitigation actions that can serve to enhance resilience (e.g.,
energy efficiency, decentralized renewables generation, etc.).
■■ Encourage resilience and adaptation measures in the energy sector by
all countries. Facilitate exchange of best practices and technologies.
■■ Provide financial support to developing countries to enhance their
energy sector’s resilience to climate change impacts.
■■ Incorporate climate risks to energy infrastructure, supply and demand
in Green Climate Fund investments decisions.
Refer to these IEA publications for in-depth analysis:
Energy, Climate Change and Environment: 2014 Insights
IEA Technology Roadmaps
Energy Efficiency Indicators Manual 2014
Energy Technology Perspectives 2014
World Energy Outlook 2014
World Energy Outlook Special Report Re-drawing
the Energy-Climate Map 2013
World Energy Investment Outlook 2014
Energy Efficiency Policy Pathways
25 Energy Efficiency Recommendations
This publication reflects the views of the IEA Secretariat but does not necessarily reflect
those of individual IEA member countries. The IEA makes no representation or warranty,
express or implied, in respect of the publication’s contents (including its completeness or
accuracy) and shall not be responsible for any use of, or reliance on, the publication.
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