THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT AND CONCENTRATION
AMONG FOOD SUPPLIERS AND RETAILERS
IN VARIOUS OECD COUNTRIES
Gabor Konig, PhD
Session 2.2. Promoting responsible
international investment in agriculture
This paper is distributed as part of the official conference documentation and serves as background
material for the relevant sessions in the programme. The views contained within do not necessarily
represent those of the OECD or its member governments.
OECD Global Forum on International Investment
OECD Investment Division
www.oecd.org/investment/gfi-8
THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT AND CONCENTRATION AMONG FOOD SUPPLIERS
AND RETAILERS IN VARIOUS OECD COUNTRIES
Gabor KONIG, PhD
Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture – Agricultural Economics Research Institute (AKI)
Zsil utca 3-5, Budapest, 1093, Hungary
[email protected], [email protected]
ABSTRACT
In developing and transition countries, agriculture depends heavily on foreign direct investment
(FDI). FDI commonly flows into food retailing, where the anticipated profit is higher, rather than into food
production and processing. FDI brings needed capital and growth and leads to increased concentration of
market players. Food retailer concentration increases competition, enhances efficiency, and lowers
consumer prices, which benefits consumers and the general economy. Supplier (producer or processor)
concentration is slower and occurs on a smaller scale but as is the case for retailers, concentration makes
suppliers more competitive and allows them to lower their costs and selling prices. With a higher level of
concentration, retailers have more turn-over and better financial standing/capital intensiveness, giving them
stronger buying and bargaining power. This increased power has had disadvantaged suppliers. The
retailers’ leverage (higher concentration and bargaining power) over suppliers increases retailers’ profits.
Food retailers are often large and foreign-owned in developing and transition countries and
unreasonably burden smaller, national food producers. National producers’ concerns have increased
protectionist pressure on investment policies, a fact that governments need to address. This paper aims to
help governments 1) Understand supplier-retailer relations and FDI and 2) Strengthen and more effectively
target their investment and policy commitments. The paper presents possible conflicts between food
suppliers and retailers; explains reasons for concentration including market structure and foreign
ownership; and supplies regulatory examples and recommendations for policies to address the problem.
Keywords: FDI, bargaining power, food industry, processors, retailers
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
1. Conflicts
2. Concentration trends: market structure, foreign ownership
3. Regulations
Recommendations and Conclusion
3
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally suppliers are the sellers and retailers are the buyers. Today, retailers act as sellers
who sell their services suppliers, who are obliged to buy these services if they want to sell their products to
retailers. Retailers act as customers by directly forwarding customer needs to suppliers. Smaller local
suppliers basically produce products and ship them to large and increasingly fewer foreign-owned retailers,
meaning suppliers have moved further and further away from the final buyers or consumers. This
concentration trend in the supply chain has had adverse effects. For example, large retailers with
increasingly greater "buying and selling power" sell suppliers’ products below cost. This paper addresses
some interesting questions:
-
What are the determinants of the supply chain concentrations?
-
How is it possible to counterbalance the adverse effects of the strong buying power of foreign retailers
against local food suppliers?
-
How is it possible for governments to handle conflicts between retailers-suppliers and better
investigate vertical conflicts between suppliers and producers?
-
How is it possible to improve producer and supplier bargaining power in various OECD countries to
ultimately enhance greater acceptance of FDI into national agri-food supply chains.
The paper methodology includes primary and secondary research: statistical databases,
publications, and consultations with specialists at USDA, ERS, AMS, CSREES, FTC, DOJ, WB, OECD,
Wal-Mart, Winn-Dixie, Provera, and Kroger. Some methodological considerations: 1. How to address the
challenges of analyzing concentration of producers, processors, and retailers, by product and by country
based on a variety of data sources. 2. Analyze market structure (concentration) because it is more effective
than other factors in determining market power development (e.g. value-added, innovation, information,
marketing, quality, contracts, and services) and market structure is a common tool for consumers,
associations, and for policymakers who regulate mergers and market concentration.
4
1. CONFLICTS
In general, the rising concentration in food retailing has several advantages. It increases turn over
and consumer demand as it decreases consumer prices. It also induces the need for improved supply chain
efficiency where suppliers sell their products to retailers at a lower price in larger volumes and retailers
pass the lower prices to consumers. In ideal circumstances the suppliers and retailers can profit.
However, there are some critical elements that require further investigation:
1. Loss-leading, resale below-cost benefits consumers and suppliers because it leads to increase in
consumer demand, sales, and turn over. The advantage of loss-leading appears in the case where the
supplier has only one buyer, and where the supplier has a long-term contract with retailer where the
supplier/producer can plan its production and marketing in advance. However if a supplier tries to sell
its products to other retailers the supplier often faces retailers that also want to pay a reduced price at a
resale level below cost without providing added benefits and services.
2. When international retailers neglect products from small countries, and rely on the retailer’s
home country suppliers (e.g. Germany’s Lidl supermarket in Hungary), host country production
suffers because of a higher concentration of international retailers who import home country goods into
the host country’s market.
3. A retailer’s profit comes from increased sales and wider profit margins (lower supplier price and
moderate consumer price). A supplier’s profit comes from increased sales and wider profit margins
(lower input prices and higher output prices the supplier charges the retailers). Suppliers have limited
ability to determine input prices and therefore must concentrate on output prices. In order to increase
profits, suppliers must decrease their production costs to a greater extent than retailers decrease the
price they pay suppliers for their products. Suppliers would greatly benefit from greater concentration
and increased efficiency but have been unable to achieve this because they lack bargaining power and
food production is less lucrative and less attractive to foreign investors.
Free market and free competition is good, but many small countries have a large number of
smaller producers operating in isolation that lack capital and bargaining power. The producer concentration
is very low compared to larger countries with higher levels of retail concentration. These retailers often sell
products from their home country suppliers in small countries’ markets. Import usually provides wider
variety of products at low price but it also limits the ability of home country suppliers to compete. Indeed,
there is a normal degree of selection when producers fail because they are unable to compete against
cheaper foreign imports but it is also in a nation’s strategic interest to maintain its own production while it
encourages retailers to provide cheap and diverse products to its consumers.
Country examples: In Hungary, there is increasing concern among suppliers about the harmful
effects of the buying power of foreign retailers who put unreasonable burden on food producers. In turn,
food producers suffer greatly and must pay slotting fees and pay-to-stay fees to the retailers. In the
United States, a similar phenomenon exists where retailers receive mainly volume discounts from food
producers, buying in bulk where producers often barely turn a profit (Figure 1.).
5
[Figure 1] Proportion of Retailers that Require Various Services from US Producers
automatic inventory replenishment
24
%, of retailers
special merchandising displays
41
third-party food safety certification
53
special packs and plastic containers
59
special transportation arrangements
59
electronic data interchange
71
category management
71
private labels
71
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Source: Arizona State University, ERS, 2000
The most popular services that producers must provide retailers are private labels, category
management, and electronic data interchange. Producers are greatly concerned over slotting fees and
pay to stay fees (Figure 2. Arizona State University, ERS, 2000).
[Figure 2] Proportion of Retailers that Charge Various Fees to US Producers
other fees
6
per-unit fees for new products
18
buy-back unsold products
29
capital improvements
41
fixed upfront fees for new product
41
% of retailers
free product discounts
53
coperative advertisements
71
other rebates
82
promotional allowances
82
88
volume discounts
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Source ASW, ERS, 2000
Hungarian and European examples are similar. In Hungary volume discount, fixed fees,
contribution to logistic and marketing fees, slotting fee, resale below cost are dominant while in the EU (in
France and the UK) resale below cost, slotting fees are wide spread.
Retailers require greater contributions from producers in selling value-added products. Larger
producers usually can meet these requirements. When large producers are able to assist retailers to obtain
market access and in return retailers lower or eliminate contribution requirements. Smaller producers do
not benefit and cannot compete for these special terms and relationships.
6
In a smaller country facing increased competition from international retailers against theirs home
country products, the national food market relies heavily on state competition regulation and protectionist
policies to assist in their survival.
2. CONCENTRATION TRENDS: MARKET STRUCTURE, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
There are several factors that determine the relationships among food producers and food
retailers: concentration, size, and potential to change partners, contract type, quality, and price. In the US,
the dynamics of the concentration of the production and manufacturing are quite similar, and are higher
than in the food retailers.
[Figure 3] US and European Food Industry Concentration Trends
50 to 80 %
US meat supplier concentration
US dairy supplier concentration
US food retailers
Top 4 EU-15 food retailers
Top 4 food retailers in Hungary
45 %
30 %
20 %
60 %
Source: AKI, ERS, and author’s analysis, 2007
The top four US meat packers’ concentration varies by sector from 50 to 80 percent, the dairy
sector concentration is about 45 percent, and thus both surpass the concentration of the grocery retailers
which is 30 percent. The retail sector’s buyer power still remains higher because of other factors. The level
of food retailer concentration in the EU-15 is considerably low; the top four groceries hold 20 per cent of
market share. In Hungary the top 4 food retailers are foreign hold 60 percent of market share. The
concentration is lower in the EU food processing sectors than in the US. Foreign ownership by fellow
EU member states is prevalent in the retailer sector and regulation in the US seems to be less important in
this area compared to the EU.
7
[Figure 4] Grocery Retailers’ Concentration, United States
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
%
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Top 4
2000
2001
Top 8
2002
2003
2004
2005
Top 20
Source: US Census Bureau, ERS, 2008
In the United States, supercenters (superstores or hypermarkets) and warehouse clubs
increasingly have gained ground and the importance of traditional groceries has declined. Supercenters and
warehouse clubs’ share in food at home expenditures increased to 20 percent, while supermarkets' share
has stabilized at 60 percent. The concentration dynamic of the production and manufacturing sectors was
quite similar but the level much higher compared to the grocery sector and therefore the retail sector’s
market power has remained moderate. As foreign retailers enter the market, competition and
concentration increase, as does the importance for regulation.
Concentration in food retailing in Hungary and in Switzerland surpasses the US’s retail
concentration. There is a strong relationship between the foreign ownership (or more developed country’s
ownership) and the increased level of concentration.
[Table 1] Foreign food retail concentration (CR-4), %, 1998 - 2003
Switzerland
Poland
Hungary
..
82
22
54
19
85
21
59
US*
EU-25
1998 – CR-4
20
2003 – CR-4
30
Source: Juhász et al. 2008, US Census Bureau Food Retail 2006 and author’s calculation, * (1997-2002)
In the EU, there is an increased need to regulate the market due to high levels of retailers’ and
producers’ concentration by member states level, and the low concentration of production, and the higher
presence of foreign capital.
8
[Table 2] Market share and foreign ownership of production, manufacturing, and retail
US
Concentration
Foreign ownership
EU-15
Medium
~40%
19%
varies
Production: high
Manufacturing: top 4- ~50%
Grocery Retail: top 4- ~30%
Less important
Hungary
Low: top 4- 6%
15%
~60%
High: 50%
Source: Martinez 2007 (US-2002), Hendrickson-Heffernan 2007, Orbánné 2006, Juhász et al., 2007, Food Retail 2006
In Hungary retail’s concentration is higher than in the EU and the US, and in Hungary the
production’s and processing’s concentration is lower than in the EU and in the US. Thus there is a bigger
difference between the producer and processor concentration (and foreign ownership) and the
retailer concentration in Hungary than in more developed countries.
[Table 3] The distribution of agriculture and food processing companies by percentage, number
and sales in Hungary
Million euros
5000<
1000 – 5000
1000 – 5000< together
1 – 1000
<1
Total number = 100%
Total number
Total sales, Million Ft
Agricultural companies
%, number, million euros
2002
2004
2006
0,1%
0,1
0,2
11 number
11
16
382.6
410.6
572.7
1,8%
1,7
1,9
133 num
155
169
1,9%
1,8
2,1
144 num
166
185
79,7%
77,6
76,4
5889 num
7149
6662
18,3%
20,6
21,5
1353 num
1897
1873
0.8
1.1
1.1
100%
100
100
7386
9212
8720
3942.9
4074.9
4223.4
Food processing companies
%, number, million euros
2002
2004
2006
2,7
2,0
1,9
93
85
79
6728.4
5958.3
5545.8
6,1
5,4
5,6
208
225
230
8,8
7,4
7,5
301
310
309
74,3
73,8
74,1
2539
3073
3063
16,9
18,7
18,5
577
779
764
0.3
0.4
0.3
100
100
100
3417
4162
4136
9911.6
9242.2
8764.3
Source: Author’s calculation based on AKI, Hungarian company data (A kettős könyvitelt vezető szervezetek gazdálkodásának fő
adatai) 2001-2006, 2008
In Hungary the agriculture’s concentration lags the food industry’s concentration (table 3). The top
10 agricultural companies have hardly represented the 0.2% of the total number of the agricultural
companies, while in processing this was much higher in 2006. The top 10 agricultural company
represented about 10% of the total sales, while in the processing it was more than 60%.
9
[Table 4] Agriculture, food industry, and food retail sales in Hungary, Million euros
Agriculture
Processing
3.9
3.8
4.1
4.3
4.2
..
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Food retail
9.9
9.3
9.2
9.1
8.8
..
8.4
8.9
9.8
10.5
10.8
12.2
Source: KSH
In Hungary food retail sales were higher than processing sales in each year after 2004. From 2004
to 2006 processing sales decreased by 400 thousand euros, while retail sales increased by 1 million euros.
This was due to the slow increase of consumption and the rapid growth of imports.
[Table 5] Agriculture and food processing and food retail sales in Hungary, 2006, million Euros
2006
ranking
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Top 10
Agricultural
production
companies
Hunland-Trade
Bólyi Zrt.
Syngenta
Hungapig
Nagisz
Bács-Tak.
Táp
Pioneer hi-bred
Hage
Baromfi-Coop
sales
Food
processing
companies
Philip Morris
BAT
Unilever
Nestlé
Coca-Cola
Bunge
Pick
Sole-Mizo
Borsodi sör
Friesland
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.44
Source: HVG, 2008. January, Nielsen, and own calculation
sales
0.48
0.48
0.31
0.30
0.28
0.22
0.20
0.19
0.17
0.17
2.78
Food retail
companies
sales
Tesco
CBA
METSPA
CO-OP
Real
Provera
Auchan
REWPlusE
Plus
Lidl
1.94
1.93
1.77
1.43
1.12
0.79
0.72
0.47
0.36
0.32
10.86
Meat and poultry processors concentration in the US surpassed that of Hungary in 2003, but in
other cases the concentration was lower than in Hungary, partly because sales volumes were much
higher in the US.
[Table 6] Top 4 companies share in the food industry in the United States and in Hungary, 2003
Classification
1511
1512
1513
1561
1571
1572
1584
CR-4 share from sales, %
United States
Hungary
64
56
49
63
34
63
51
Sectors
Meat processing
Poultry
Meat and poultry products
Flour-products
Feed processing –livestock
Feed processing –pets
Candy, confection
Source: Martinez 2007, Hendrickson-Heffernan 2007, Orbánné 2006, Gehlhar 2003, APEH-AKI and author’s calculation
10
39
51
57
68
44
96
75
3. REGULATIONS
I found while conducting primary research in the US, that there seems to be a widely accepted
attitude not to intervene in the market. Regulators at the USDA, Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice seem to observe a sufficient number of market actors and competitors in the food
industry and the trend of consolidation is not yet alarming and regulators rely on regulations in place to
control some aspects of supplier-retailer relations and investment. Regulations that play an important role
include:
a. The USDA’s Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), which protects businesses
dealing in fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables by establishing and enforcing a code of fair
business practices and helping companies resolve business disputes and timely payments.
b. The Packers and Stockyard Act protects meat packing industry against players who try to
manipulate markets, restrict food flows, control prices, defraud producers and consumers of
food, crush competition, regulate payments methods, and require solvency guarantees.
c. The Robinson Patman Act (R-P) regulates vertical relations between producers and retailers
and prohibits the retailers from charging different fees, requiring different services, or
requesting discounts from the producers, if that differentiation has negative effects on the
competition. In other words; according the R-P Act, a retailer must make similar offers to
purchase from all different sizes of supplier firms, that is, it cannot discriminate against
smaller suppliers by paying them less at lower prices. The R-P Act has been criticized that
it protects smaller suppliers while it raises costs to buyers. Concentrations increase and as the
foreign investors continue to enter the market, and regulation gains importance. The US
National Farm Union policy recommendations would probably prove more successful because
they favor such regulation.
d. Other US regulations including the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, and Merger Guidelines,
Federal Milk Marketing Orders also make recommendations on the regulations.
European and Asian examples show a rather diverse picture too. France, Italy, the UK, and
Germany have several tentative measures that mostly have proven to be ineffective in harmonizing
retailers and suppliers. In Hungary, a regulation was introduced that prohibited food sales below the cost of
purchase and enforced timely payment, but it also proved to be ineffective. Japan has tightened regulations
and relatively rigorous enforcement of supplier-retailer concentration.
The decrease of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the US was more significant in manufacturing
compared to retail. In food manufacturing the level of concentration is more developed. In retail there
is more potential for further concentration. The number of M&A and FTC investigations has decreased
because of more intense concentration in the previous period (Figure 2.).
11
[Figure 5] Mergers and Acquisitions by Type of Food Operation, in the US, 1992-2006
Number
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
ic
e
R
et
ai
l
le
sa
le
Fo
od
se
rv
an
u
W
ho
fa
ct
ur
in
g
40
20
0
1992-1996
1997-2001
M
2002-2006
Source: ERS, Kauffman, Martinez 2008
FTC investigated primarily Horizontal cases, while the numbers of the vertical investigation were
more moderate.
[Table 7] FTC key investigations, in the United States, 1996-2005
Horizontal-merger
Vertical
Potential competition
Buyer power
Joint venture
Other
Total
188
21
13
9
3
92
326
Source: FTC, 2008
Supermarket share in grocery retail is 60% and super centers grew 4 times to 20% from 1995-2006.
M&A among supermarkets decreased significantly in 2005, but from 2006 the M&A regained its place.
12
[Figure 6] Merger and Acquisition among Supermarkets in the United States
40
36
35
30
25
27
2006
2007
20
19
20
28
15
9
10
5
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
Source: FTC, 2008
The increase of mergers and acquisitions stabilized between 2002 and 2006 but in 2007 the
concentration of the retailers jumped.
[Table 8] Competition regulation
US
regulation
EU
civil litigation – less
state regulation
Strong- common law
Hungary
Strong-common EU
law, but intention to
strong state law
Source: Author’s results
US regulation has enhanced a generally complex, open food industry supply chain with a several
market actors and a slower trend toward supplier and retailer consolidation. Free competition is at work,
but civil litigation also plays an important role and foreign investment faces tough competition from
national retailers and suppliers.
The EU consists of a community of smaller markets, dominance of foreign owned retailers is
greater and the supplier concentration is lower. Civil litigation is not as prevalent in the EU as it is in the
US. Therefore smaller countries are in need of more targeted regulation of supplier-retailer relations and
foreign investment into the national food supply chains.
Retailers in Europe face different regulations when they enter different markets. The degree of
regulation that allows businesses to set up new shops, is described by the chart below. The degree of
regulation is higher in France and lower in Czech Republic.
13
[Figure 7] The Degree of the Regulation in the Retail
6
4.8
5
4.1
3.5
4
2.5
3
2
1.9
1.1
0.9
1
0
14
a
Austria
Fr
en
ch
A
us
tri
Poland
ol
an
d
UK
P
U
K
Hungary
y
H
un
ga
r
Source: OECD, 2001
Germany
an
y
G
er
m
Tc
he
qu
e
Czech
France
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Current tools, strategies, and recommendations:
1. Market actors use proactive push strategy to positively affect the food supply chain.
1. State regulation: for example, competition law has not yet been a successful tool. In the US and
EU, among competition violation cases handled by competitions commissions, there are few
cases that have affectively addressed the vertical conflicts between suppliers and producers.
Competition commissions do not seem equipped to deal with conflicts between food suppliers
and retailers. Nevertheless, competition laws are important; they should serve to better protect
and encourage fairer treatment toward smaller producers. Laws could also potentially direct
needed foreign investment into national producing and processing.
2. Self-regulation: for example, code of behavior, has not been highly successful either, since
producers do not turn to this tools because retailers may apply sanctions against them.
2. Government and supplier advocates have attempted to further laissez-faire, pull strategies by
enhancing consumer demand with market-friendly tools including advertising and public service
announcements but these actions have not yet proven to be effective enough in harmonizing
relationships in the long term.
3. Governments could employ direct support mechanisms including financial aid, training, technical
assistance, and the distribution of targeted, marketing information. These tools would help suppliers
increase their bargaining power and better adapt to current market trends and concentration in the short
term.
4. National food and market authorities could greatly help suppliers’ market power if they:
1) Enhance competition among all food retailers by supporting smaller, local retailers.
2) Promote the concentration and cooperation among suppliers in order to increase their
competitiveness, efficiency, and bargaining power.
Conclusion
Large retailers increasingly dictate trends and small producers try to adapt to the situation. Greater
supplier bargaining power would increase supplier profits and attract greater foreign investment, which
now mainly focuses on large international retailers.
Regulations tailored to enhance or promote supplier bargaining power do not address effectively
the root of the problem. In the US there is less incentive to introduce more rigorous regulations because of
the free-market tradition, market structure, and legal system. In the EU, regulations remain the dominant
tool that producers have to promote their interests. However, regulations are not keeping up with changing
market practices and with increasingly uneven concentration trends, and their negative effects on suppliers.
Indirect regulations that promote concentration among suppliers and further competition among retailer
would probably be more effective in addressing retailer-supplier conflicts.
More evenly distributed foreign investment among suppliers and retailers, particularly in smaller
countries, would probably lower resistance and strikes against foreign investors and owners, especially if
small suppliers are able to participate and benefit from concentration trends and increased efficiency.
15
REFERENCES
1. Arizona State University, Morrison School of Agribusiness (2000): Understanding retailer Purchasing
Trade Practices in the Produce Industry
2. Competition Commission (2000): Supermarkets: A report on the Supply of Groceries from Multiple Stores
in the United Kingdom, ReportCm-4842
3. Denbaly et al. (2001): U.S. Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Marketing, Economic Research Service, USDA
4. Dobson, Paul W. (2003): Buyer Power in Food Retailing: The European Experience Conference on
Changing Dimensions of the Food Economy: Exploring the Policy Issues 6-7 February, The Hague,
5. Dyckman J.L. (2000): Slotting Fees, Study the use of these payments in the grocer industry., GAO
6. European Commission (1999): Buyer power and its impact on competition in the food retail distribution
sector of the European Union DGIV, Brussels.
7. FTC, (2007): Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, Fiscal Years, 2007, 2003
8. Food Institute Report (2008): Supermarkets, Convenience stores register significant acquisitions in 2007,
www.foodinstitute.com
9. FTC, Slotting Allowances in the Retail Grocery Industry (2003): Selected Case Studies in Five Product
10. FTC, (2007): Grocery Store Antitrust: Historical Retrospective & Current Developments, Washington
11. Federal Trade Commission (2007, a): A Conference on Grocery Store Antitrust: Historical Retrospective &
Current Developments
12. Gulati A., Minot N., Delgado C. and S Bora, 2005. Growth in high-value agriculture in Asia and the
emergence of vertical links with farmers. Paper presented at the workshop 'Linking Small-scale Producers
to Markets: Old and New Challenges', The World Bank, Washington D.C.
13. http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch2.htm#a3
14. Hausman, J. - Leibtag, E. (2005): Consumer Benefits from Increased Competition in Shopping Outlets:
Measuring the Effect of Wal-Mart, MIT and Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Revised Draft, October 2005
15. Juhász A. (szerk.), Béládi K., Kertész R., Kőnig G., Kürti A., Stauder M. (2005): Piaci erőviszonyok
alakulása a belföldi élelmiszerpiac szereplői között, AKI, Budapest
16. Juhász A., Seres A., Stauder M.(2008): A kereskedelem koncentrációja, OTKA
17. Kőnig G. (2008): A kiskereskedelem, az élelmiszerfeldolgozás érdekharmonizálása, AKI, kézirat
18. Kaufman P. et al (2000): Understanding the Dynamics of Produce Markets, Consumption and
Consolidation Grow, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
19. Kaufman P. et al (2003): U.S. Fresh Produce Markets Marketing Channels, Trade Practices, and Retail
Pricing Behavior, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
20. Leibtag E. (2006): The Impact of Big-Box Stores on Retail Food Prices and the Consumer Price Index
21. Leibtag E. (2007): Market dynamics keep food prices stady, Amber Waves, 2007 februar 3.
22. Maertens M. - Swinnen J. F.M. (2006): Transformations in agricultural markets: FDI and vertical
coordination, World Bank Institute, Washington Dc.
23. Martinez S. W. (2007): The U.S. Food Marketing System: Recent Developments, 1997-2006, Economic
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
24. Martinez S. W., Stewart H. (2003): From Supply Push to Demand Pull Agribusiness Strategies for Today’s
Consumers, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
25. NFU, (2007): Policy of the National Farmers Union
26. Orbánné N. M. (szerk.), Kartali J., Juhász A., Kőnig G., Stauder M., (2006): Az élelmiszeripar strukturális
átalakulása (1997-2005), AKI, Budapest
27. Phillips B. J. (2005): Supermarkets: Competition, Regulation, and Economic performance, OECD
28. Popp J. (2002): Az USA agrárpolitikájának gyakorlata, AKI, Agrárgazdasági Tanulmányok, Bp.
29. Stewart H. (2006): How Low Has the Farm Share of Retail Food Prices Really Fallen? Economic Research
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
30. Torjákné Amberger Teréz (2005): Versenyfelügyeleti és szabályozási kérdőjelek az élelmiszerszektor és a
kereskedelem szabályozásában.
16