1
2
3
The Significance of National Implementation Measures Under
the Chemical Weapons Convention: Guarding Against Terrorist
Use of Commercial and Industrial Chemicals
Naeem Haider
SASSI Research Report 14
April 2008
Published by
South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)
36 Alie Street, London, E1 8DA
© South Asian Strategic Stability Institute 2008
4
Contents
Introduction
Factors That May Facilitate Misuse Of Commercial Chemicals…………………………7
Transformation Of Chemical Industry…………………………………………………...11
Scientific Developments……………………………………………………………………..15
Recommended Measures To Prevent Misuse Of Commercial Chemicals By Terrorists…17
Use of Convention………………………………………………………………………..17
International Cooperation………………………………………………………………....21
OPCW Implementation…………………………………………………………………....21
National Implementation Measures……………………………………………………….24
Measures Relevant to Chemical Industry………………………………………………….31
Scientific Measures………………………………………………………………………..32
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………...33
5
Abstract
Naeem Haider*
Many international and regional organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibitions of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL), the European Union, have registered a heightened
concern about chemical weapons proliferation, and have emphasized the
importance of harmonized monitoring and control measures to be taken by States.
In this paper the author addresses these issues from a national perspective.
*Lieutenant Colonel Naeem Haider is serving in the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorate of Pakistan’s Strategic
Plans Division.
6
the existing preventive measures in
The Significance Of
National Implementation
Measures Under the
Chemical Weapons
Convention: Guarding
Against Terrorist Use of
Commercial and
Industrial Chemicals
place, and to reinforce them with a
view to stopping illicit trafficking in
chemical substances covered by the
Chemical Weapons Convention.1
On 29 April 2007, the world
watched
in
dismay
when
Iraqi
insurgents blew up tanks of chlorine
gas to kill and injure unprotected
(Naeem Haider*)
civilians.2 In this case a commercial
chemical was misused as a chemical
INTRODUCTION
weapon. Chlorine bombing in Iraq
and
began in October 2006, and has
regional organizations such as the
carried out 13 attacks involving
International Atomic Energy Agency
chemicals until 13 June 2007.3 In
(IAEA),
fact, two chemicals employed as
Many
international
the
Organization
for
the
Prohibitions of Chemical Weapons
warfare
agents
(OPCW),
chlorine
and
the
World
Customs
in
World
phosgene
war-1,
are
now
Organization (WCO), the International
consumed in large volumes by the
Criminal
chemical industry.
Police
Organization
(INTERPOL), the European Union,
toxic
and
summits
isocyanate (MIC) is widely used for
heightened
producing insecticides. The extreme
have
some
international
registered
a
concern about chemical weapons
proliferation, and have emphasized
the
importance
of
harmonized
monitoring and control measures to
be
taken
international
by
States.
These
organizations
have
requested member States to review
industrial
Another highly
chemical
methyl
*
Lieutenant Colonel Naeem Haider is serving
in Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs
Directorate of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division.
1
Ercan Saka, “The Role of Customs Services and the
World Customs Organization’s Enforcement
Programme to Combat the Illicit Movement of
Chemicals”
2
DG OPCW Rogelio Pfirter address to the 10th
Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
29 April 2007
3
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_chlorine_bombing
s_in_Iraq
7
toxicity of MIC was witnessed in
184 States Parties.6 The CWC is not
1984,
were
a self executing treaty, therefore, it
a
is the national obligation of States
manufacturing facility in the Indian
to take necessary measures for its
city of Bhopal, killing more than
effective
3,000 people and causing 100,000
and to nurture its development.
when
released
serious
several
tons
accidentally
injuries.4
from
implementation
public’s
Adherence to the obligations
chemical
under CWC has immense safety,
weapons has been apparent since
commercial and security benefits for
the Sarin terrorist attacks in Japan
States,
vulnerability
in the
to
The
national
lethal
each
individual
chemical
mid-1990s.5
facility/ industry, local population
The CWC is one of the 25
and environment. However, certain
“core” treaties identified by United
scientific
Nations
as
developments, wrong interpretation
reflecting the fundamental purpose
of CWC, and inadequate national
of the United Nations.
implementation
Secretary
General
It is the
and
industrial
measures
world’s only legal instrument to
serious
prevent the use and proliferation of
verification
chemical weapons. It is functioning
Convention. For example:
successfully
as
a
disarmament
regime- one that is able to verify the
a.
(WMD)
approaching
universal
and
regime
for
the
of
the
It is widely but mistakenly
assumed that the chemicals
destruction of a weapon of mass
destruction
implications
carry
listed in the three Schedules of
is
the
adherence:
CWC
chemicals
are
to
the
only
which
the
Convention applies;7 and the
4
George W. Parshwall, “Scientific and Technical
Developments and the CWC,” The Chemical
Weapons Convention:Implementation Challenges
and Solutions, p.1
5
Smithson AE. Rethinking the Lessons of Tokyo.
In: Smithson AE, Levy LA. Ataxia: The chemical
and biological terrorism threat and the US response.
The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C.
2000; report no. 35:71-111.
6
“Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons
Convention,” See the OPCW website
http://www.opcw.org/html/db/members_frameset.ht
ml
7
The CWC establishes three lists of schedule
chemicals, which categorizes chemicals according to
their toxicity. Schedule 1 chemicals are super toxic
chemicals that have little or no commercial use.
8
OPCW is responsible for the
that has significantly evolved
effective implementation of the
for the last 20 years.
Convention. These two views
evolution impacts the CWC’s
are not in line with the object
Verification Annex.10
and
b.
c.
purpose
of
the
d.
The
sophisticated
This
scientific
Convention.
methods
Some States have still not
discovery and production of
established
a
new commercial products are
Authorityonal
Authority
National
developed
for
the
are
equally applicable to finding
carried out on an ad hoc
and making Chemical Warfare
basis.8
agents.
Number of States
Moreover,
Parties lack penal provisions
dissemination
to
technologies
criminalize
prohibited
of
and
the
these
chemical
activities, and many States
industry itself throughout the
lack
world is such that the OPCW
regulatory
and
enforcement measures.9
alone cannot ensure effective
Negotiations on CWC began in
control.
Here
1984, but had been preceded
important
role
by many years of discussions
Authorities
to
in Geneva. The design of the
implementation
Convention
Convention.
was
therefore
based on a chemical industry
Schedule 2 includes chemicals and precursors that are
high risk and have limited commercial applications.
Schedule 3 chemicals are used in quantities
commercially, but are also precursors for chemical
weapons.
8
Mtshana M. Ncube, “Divergent National
Implementing Legislation and Non-uniform
Implementation: Threat to the Object and Purpose of
the CWC,”
9
Dr Radoslav Deyanov, “National Export Control: A
Tool to Enforce Non Proliferation,” AG Training
Seminar on Strengthening Border Customs Control
on Shipments of Dual Use Goods and Technology in
the Western Balkans, Sofia, 4-6 October 2005
comes
of
the
National
ensure
the
of
the
As terrorist organizations replace
the major powers as the most
likely
candidates
to
employ
Chemical Weapons, the Twentyfirst century chemical warfare may
target civilians; and commercial
chemical industry or clandestine
10
George W.Parshall, “Trends in Processing and
Manufacturing that will Affect Implementation of the
CWC,” Pure Appl.Chem, Vol. 74, No. 12, 2002, p.4
9
production
facilities
manufacture
toxic
agents
may
the
verification
regime
of
from
Convention and the OPCW.11
the
industrial chemicals not monitored
under the CWC control regime.
Misperceptions
Therefore, there is a need for
Implementation Role of OPCW
The
following: a.
the
verification
regime
Enhanced focus of monitoring
overseen by the OPCW is based on
and verification is required on
the declaration and inspection of
dual-use industrial chemicals
activities involving Schedule1, 2 and
as
3 chemicals and industry producing
compared
to
scheduled
significant
chemicals.
b.
Regarding
National
play
the
should
Unscheduled
in
Chemicals
Authorities
lead
role
quantities
the
implementation of the CWC.
Discrete
(UDOCs).12
of
Organic
However,
within many States Parties, it is
likely that there are other activities
involving toxic chemicals and their
FACTORS THAT MAY
precursors,
which,
while
falling
FACILITATE MISUSE OF
within the scope of the Convention
COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS
according to the General Purpose
criterion,
fall
outside
of
its
ASPECTS RELATED TO CWC
international monitoring mechanism
Fallacy Regarding Chemical Weapons
because they are not declarable
and Scope of CWC
under the Convention.13
It is widely but mistakenly
assumed that the chemicals and
families of chemicals listed in the
three
Schedules
are
the
only
chemicals to which the Convention
applies. This view is not in line with
the text, object and purpose of the
Convention, and it seriously restrict
cases
the
In such
responsibility
for
monitoring rests with the individual
11
Working Paper for the Preparatory Commission
(11th Session) of the OPCW by Australia, “The Scope
of the CWC and the Role of its Schedules,”
Document No. PC-XI/B/WP.13, 25 July 1995, p.1
12
OPCW Website, “Determination of the Presence or
Absence of a Declarable chemical industry,”
Identification of declarable activities, Available at
http://www.opcw.org/html/db/natadv/id_decl_act.htm
l
13
Ibid
10
States Parties and, in particular,
successful
with the National Authority.
Convention.15
Yet
Convention thus creates a division
survey’s
the
of
implementing
labour
between
the
National
Authorities and the OPCW.
the
importance
of
the
The
Given
General
Purpose Criterion14 in upholding the
scope
of
the
Convention,
it
operation
on
of
the
OPCW’s
status
legislation
the
of
required
under Article VII shows following
facts16:
a.
is
Number of States Parties lack
penal provisions to criminalize
essential that National Authorities
treaty prohibited activity.
and other relevant state agencies
b.
are properly empowered by effective
and related enforcement measures.
national legislation to monitor and
c.
control
established a National Authority.
transfers
of
all
toxic
Many States lack regulatory
Some States have still not
chemicals, not just those in the
schedules.
Difficulties
in
Control
of
Intangible
Technology
Inadequate
National
Implementation
Measures
The CWC is not self-executing.
Article VII requires State Parties to
“adopt the necessary measures to
Intangible technology transfer
is becoming an important concern
in the export control community
worldwide.17 In the context of CWC,
the dangers posed by the transfer of
implement its obligations under the
convention” on its natural and legal
persons.
The
responsibility
for
upholding the Chemical Weapons
ban then falls not only to the State
Party itself, but also to individuals
and companies operating within it.
Adherence
to
the
Article
VII
requirements is thus central to the
14
Article-1, Chemical Weapons Convention
15
Meeting with Angela Woodward, VERTIC, 17
April 2007
Angela Woodward presentation to Foreign &
Commonwealth Office Seminar on the Occasion of
the 10th Anniversary of the Entry into Force of the
CWC, 26 March 2007
16
Meeting with Daniel Feakes, University of Sussex,
20 April 2007
Daniel Feakes, “Challenges in the Implementation of
Export Controls under the chemical Weapons
Convention,”
in
Treaty
Enforcement
and
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: with
Special Reference to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, Rodrigo Yepes-Enriquez and Lisa
Tabassi (eds), The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002
17
Ibid, p.334
11
intangible
technology
acknowledged
by
have
many
been
states.
exports and transshipment controls.
19
Although aware of the risk, States
have
found
that
intangible
technology transfers are particularly
Risk
Factors
are
not
Appropriately
Emphasized
During
difficult to monitor, and penalties
negotiations
of
the
can be hard to enforce. Many states
CWC, Schedule 1 and 2 facilities
have
introduced
were deemed to pose the greatest
controls on such transfers. Article 1
risk to the convention.20 Experience
that
of inspections to date proves that
only
is
recently
the
Criterion
General
contains
Purpose
no
explicit
production,
processing
or
requirement for the states parties to
consumption, of Schedule 1 and 2
enact
adopt
chemicals is not the only – or even
regulations implementing the article
the key indication of the potential
1 prohibitions.18 Moreover, the UN
threat to the Convention posed by
Security Council Resolution 1540
given
obligates
states
take
circumstances a Schedule 1 facility
effective
measures
establish
may pose less of a potential threat
domestic controls to prevent the
to the Convention than an OCPF
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or
plant site.21 For example a single
biological weapons and their means
small-scale facility may only consist
of delivery.
To achieve this goal,
of a small laboratory containing a
states have to develop and maintain
single fume cupboard, having the
appropriate and effective physical
capability
legislation
protection
system,
that
borders
efforts
they
to
measures,
enforcement
18
or
accounting
control,
and
law
national
Article 1, Chemical Weapons Convention
19
facility.
to
Under
produce
certain
a
few
Dr Radoslav Deyanov, “National Export Control:
A Tool to Enforce Non Proliferation,” AG Training
Seminar on Strengthening Border Customs Control
on Shipments of Dual Use Goods and Technology in
the Western Balkans, Sofia, 4-6 October 2005
20
Leslie Anne Levy, The CWC: A Unique On-Site
Inspection
Framework.
Available
at
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art211.pdf
21
The UK Paper, “The Changing Face of the
Chemical Industry: Implications for the Chemical
Weapons Convention”, OPCW Conference of the
States Parties, 24 April 2003, p.4
12
kilograms but more likely actually
comprised
producing a few grams of chemicals
multinational companies with major
per
a
plant sites that produced a range of
pharmaceutical plant producing a
diverse products on a large scale.
highly active ingredient in hundreds
Throughout
of tones per year that has corrosive
changes occurred such as:23
and
a.
year.
toxic
Conversely,
properties
could
be
a
number
the
of
1990s
large
major
Large plant sites have been
declared as an OCPF. Both facilities
broken up into smaller units,
have
with separate operations and
the
Schedule
capability
1
to
produce
chemicals,
but
owners
production at the SSSF is much
lower than the OCPF.
existing
within
the
former site boundary.
b.
Larger
companies
now
concentrate on ‘core’ activities
TRANSFORMATION
OF
such as specialized synthesis
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
or
final
formulation
of
products.
Evolution of Chemical Industry
Negotiations
on
the
CWC
c.
by
many
years
of
discussions in Geneva. The design
d.
impacts
Verification Annex.22
the
CWC
from
Rapid rise in the number of
and
plants
specializing in the production
of chemicals on a contract
has significantly evolved for the last
definitely
chemicals
facilities
based on a chemical industry that
This dramatic evolution
purchase
external suppliers.
of the Convention was therefore
20 years.
companies
specific
began formally in 1984, which were
preceded
Larger
basis.
e.
Industry
is
driven
towards
flexibility in production, which
In the late
means that they are able to
1980s the global chemical industry
respond quickly and efficiently
22
David P. Fidler, “The Chemical Weapons
Convention After ten Years: Successes and future
Challenges”, The American Society of international
Law, Vol 11, Issue 12, 27 April 2007
23
The UK Paper during Conference of the States
Parties, op.cit
13
to
f.
meet
new
customer
d.
It is possible to produce in
requirements and orders.
bulk, many chemicals that
The aforementioned changes
previously
have significantly altered the
synthesize.
design of chemical production
e.
facilities.
were
difficult
to
Knowledge of these advances
is
spreading
globally
and
could make it easier for nonTechnological
Advancements
and
its
state
impact on Chemical Plants
Modern
equipment,
production
synthesis
techniques,
f.
the
size
of
b.
Substantial
the
chemicals
can
be
of
g.
viable
and
have
determine
of the chemical industry.
Ibid and
George W. Parshall, Graham S. Pearson (et al)
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry
Technical Report, “Impact of Scientific
Developments on the Chemical Weapons
Convention”, Vol 74, 2002
traditional
of
chemical
inventories
are
to
detect
whether
a
and
plant
prohibited by the Convention.
Globally Dispersed Chemical Industry
From the economic incentive,
some
24
and
has been used for purposes
the
potential to change the nature
Chemical
difficult
commercially
synthesis
bulk
reduced thus it becomes more
quickly
plants.
Quick
costly
production plants.
produced in relatively small
c.
size
“signatures”
standard
quantities
for
use of catalysts, are changing
and
chemical plant configurations.
need
efficient heating methods, and
increased the capability and
versatility
in
solvent use and storage, more
following significant effects:24
reduced
engage
Solid state reactions eliminate
the
combinational chemistry, etc have
It
to
chemical terrorism.
use of automated ‘micro-reactors,
a.
actors
developing
countries
encourage chemical companies to
locate
production
throughout the world.
facilities
From the
standpoint of the Convention, the
14
effect has been to increase the
Above aspects in view, the definition
number
be
of plant site can be used to limit
monitored. The task of international
access afforded to OPCW inspectors
control is further complicated when
during routine verification. And this
such chemical industry sites are
access
location
understand the activities carried out
of
sites
in
that
countries
must
that
lack
competent regulatory authorities.25
Organizational Changes in Industry and
Impact on Transparency
Some
large
companies
owners
now
and/or
chemical
have
vital
to
completely
at the site.
Characteristics of New Other Chemical
Production facilities (OCPF) and
Schedule-1 facility are Nearly Similar
multiple
A
potential
threat
to
the
This
Convention is posed by the growth
change in organizational structure
in the number of Other Chemical
has following
a.
It
operators.
is
impacts:26
has
Production
restricted
the
currently
Facilities
capable
of
(OCPFs)
producing
transparency of the site operations.
Schedule 1 chemicals with little or
b.
OCPF
no physical conversion. The success
facilities, which were formerly part of larger
of such facilities often depends on
sites, now have very small plant site
their ability to perform a wide range
boundaries.
of chemical processes, anticipating
c.
Some
Schedule
3
and
Some of these small plant
sites share central resources such
as
The implications of ensuring the
long-term viability of plants would
medical,
waste
handling
and
distribution facilities, etc.
25
the changing needs of customers.
Meeting with Fillipa Lentzos, London School of
Economics, 27 April 2007
International Council of Chemical Associations
Paper for Second Review Conference of the Chemical
Weapons Convention,. This paper was presented
during an OPCW meeting of States parties and the
Chemical Industry on 11 June 2007, p.3
26
The UK Paper during Conference of the States
Parties, op.cit
be that the owners would install
latest
technology
unpredictable
to
range
handle
of
an
toxic
chemicals. Resultantly, such facility
will need most of the characteristics
of Schedule 1 production facilities,
such
as
chemically
resistant
15
equipment,
specialized
equipment,
etc.
capabilities
for
filtration
Moreover,
the
equipment, software, and know-how
are commonly available.
27
“Just-in-time”
production will reduce the need to
Reactor on a Chip can help Clandestine
store
Production OF Lethal Chemicals
large
quantities
of
raw
For
materials and products at plant
the
clandestine
have
production of toxic chemicals on a
previously indicated the existence of
small scale, “reactor on a chip”
CW related activities at a particular
technology offers a new means of
site.
production that might be relatively
sites.
Such
features
could
easy to conceal. Such reactors can
operate under automated control for
SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS
weeks
Automated Control of Chemical Industry
Since the last two decades,
there
is
an
increasing
use
of
computers to control manufacturing
processes.
Automated
control
permits production under the most
efficient
reaction
conditions
and
enhances safety for the operators.
In the context of producing chemical
weapons,
however,
automated
control offers similar advantages. It
minimizes operator exposure and
limits
the
release
into
the
atmosphere of toxic vapours that
might
be
detected
by
monitoring equipment.
sensitive
Moreover,
from the CW proliferation point of
view, it is troublesome that the
with
little
human
intervention. Despite its small size,
a micro reactor with a throughput of
two
grams
per
minute
could
produce a ton of material per year.28
Such devices would require only a
small,
ventilated
enclosure
and
might even be disguised as a piece
of research laboratory equipment.
The advantages of micro reactors for
safe and efficient production of toxic
and explosive chemicals have been
demonstrated by DuPont engineers
working in collaboration with the
27
George W. Parshall, Graham S. Pearson (et al)
International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry
Technical Report, “Impact of Scientific
Developments on the Chemical Weapons
Convention”, Vol 74, 2002
28
George W. Parshall, “Scientific and Technical
Developments and the CWC”, p.2
16
Massachusetts
Technology.
Institute
of
sufficient for terrorist use might be
They produced MIC,
diverted from a plant in which the
phosgene and hydrogen cyanide.
chemical is made and consumed as
an
Versatile Methods of Production and their
intermediate
production.
in
pesticide
29
Global Availability
The
chemical
industry
is
transforming rapidly and the pace of
change
is
constantly
Combinational
Chemistry
can
Help
Develop Chemical Weapons
Combinational
increasing.
chemistry
One major trend is an increased
makes it possible to synthesize large
emphasis
libraries
on
chemicals
biological
the
production
that
have
effects,
of
desirable
such
as
of
chemical
compounds
that can be evaluated for useful
properties.
In general this process
protection
involves mixing reactive chemicals
chemicals, etc. The methods for the
in multiple combinations to generate
discovery and production of such
hundreds
products are equally applicable to
compounds, some familiar and other
finding
and
new. From the CW nonproliferation
warfare
agents.
pharmaceuticals,
crop
making
chemical
or
thousands
of
the
viewpoint, the new drug discovery
dissemination of these technologies
methods are of concern because
is such that the OPCW alone cannot
they could also be used to develop
ensure effective control.
lethal
Moreover,
The interchangeability of large
chemicals
for
terrorist
purposes.
number of chemicals can also help
Large Distribution Facilities Complicates
in
Verification Process
the
weapons.
production
For
of
chemical
example,
the
Commercial
conventional production process for
could
MIC is based on phosgene, which is
development
controlled
weapons.
However,
under
quantities
the
of
CWC.
MIC
29
Ibid, p.1
be
technologies
misused
of
novel
for
the
chemical
Globalization
has
17
dispersed the means of production
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
of industrial chemicals and free
PREVENTING MISUSE OF
trade
policies
controlling
have
transfers
also
of
made
chemical
COMMERCIAL CHEMICALS BY
TERRORISTS
precursors more difficult for the
OPCW.
Therefore,
scientific
developments and globalization have
following implications:
a.
b.
Impact
CWC’s
Scope
should
be
Broadly
Interpret
on
CWC
The scope of the Convention
implementation.
needs to be interpreted as broadly
The increased global trade in
as
chemical materials has led to
Convention
increased
listed in the three Schedules is not
chemicals
transfers
through
of
large
distribution facilities.
c.
PROPER USE OF CWC
This
concept
The
view
applies
to
correct.31
large
misuse
that
of
all
CWC
prohibits
toxic
the
chemicals
The
comprehensively
of
distribution
possible.
the
chemicals,
facilities
regardless of their origin or method
complicates examination for
of synthesis.32 There are number of
verification
and
places in which the Convention
initial
makes it clear that the scheduled
thus
purposes,
obscures
the
manufacturer.30
chemicals are not to be seen as
defining
the
scope
of
the
Convention. For example:
a.
In Article- II it is stated that
toxic
chemicals
and
precursors listed in the three
31
30
The UK Paper, “The Changing Face of the
Chemical Industry: Implications for the Chemical
Weapons Convention”, OPCW Conference of the
States Parties, 24 April 2003
Julian Perry Robinson, “The CWC Verification
Regime: Implications for the Biotechnology and
Pharmaceutical Industry”, University of Bradford
Briefing Paper No.11, (July 1998)
32
The UK Paper, “The Comprehensive Nature of the
Chemical Weapons Convention with respect to
Verification and national Implementation Measures”
18
schedules are identified for
b.
c.
d.
Paying due regard to general-
the application of verification
purpose criterion is essential
measures.33
if the goals of the Convention
The preamble paragraph to
are to be realized. Historically
the schedules underlines that
States have not always used
“these
scheduled chemicals for the
schedules
do
not
constitute a definition of the
production
Chemical Weapons.34
weapons.
The
definition
of
of
chemical
For example, once
“toxic
restrictions were placed upon
chemicals” is “any chemical
procurement of Schedule 2
which through its chemical
mustard
action on life processes can
thiodiglycol in the mid-1980s,
cause
Iraq
death,
temporary
gas
acquired
incapacitation or permanent
chemicals
harm
chloroethanol
to
humans
or
animals.”35
Thus,
the
definition
of
a
chemical
precursor
unscheduled
such
as
and
2-
sodium
sulphide.36
e.
Some of the Research and
weapon is not based upon the
Development in the field of
properties
of
chemistry
chemicals,
but
purposes
to
specific
will
affect
on
the
Convention.
which
the
research in the field of non-
chemicals are put.
For
the
example
lethal incapacitants for the
counter-terrorism operations.
There are concerns that the
33
potential
During the Convention negotiations negotiators
development
and
reached compromise between political reality and
use of incapacitating chemical
risk assessment whereby some chemicals of most
or bio-chemical agents have
relevance were selected for the application of
physiological
effects
more
verification measures.
34
Annex on Schedule Chemicals, Chemical Weapons
Convention
35
Article II, Chemical Weapons Convention
36
Daniel Feakes, “Challenges in the Implementation
of Export Controls Under the Chemical Weapons
Convention”, Harward Sussex Programme, p.3
19
substantial and long lasting
with prohibited activities.38
those
dangers posed by the transfer of
produced
Control
by
Agents.37
developments
Riot
Such
may
take
intangible
technology
The
can
be
effectively addressed, if all States
advantage of the permissible
Parties
act
upon
‘law enforcement” provision of
Purpose
the CWC.
central to the object and purpose of
Criterion,
the
General
which
is
so
the Convention. Moreover, there is
CWC has Catch All Clause to Control
a need to read Article 1 (1) (d) in
Intangible Technology Transfer
conjunction with Article VII, which
The primary export control
obligates states not to permit any
provisions of the CWC are found in
prohibited activity and to enact and
Article 1.
extend penal legislation. These two
States
Article 1 (1) (d) requires
assist,
articles
together
encourage or induce, in any way”,
Parties
to
anyone to engage in any prohibited
national oversight and controls on
activity.
the
kind
Parties
of
not
“to
This Article represents a
catch-all
expands
the
clause
that
Convention’s
flow
and
require
establish
use
of
States
adequate
scheduled
chemicals, related equipment and
technologies.
Thus States would
nonproliferation obligation from the
put in place extra barriers to non-
core prohibition of activities with
state groups.39
chemical weapons to any activity
that
prohibits
the
provision
of
equipment, any kind of brokerage
activity,
research
any
type
of
cooperation,
military
financial
resources, and intangible technology
if they are to be used in connection
37
David P. Fidler, “The Chemical Weapons
Convention After Ten Years: Success and future
Challenges”, The American Society of International
Law, Vol 11, Issue 12, 27 April 2007
States to Enforce Export Control System
under CWC with Penal Sanctions
There is in fact an intimate
relationship between Article VI and
38
Urs A. Cipolat, “The New Chemical Weapons
Convention and Export Controls: Towards Greater
Multilateralism” ichigan Journal of International
Law, Spring 2000, p.12
39
Dr Radoslav Deyanov, “Strengthening Border
Customs Control on Shipments of Dual Use Goods
and Technologies in the Western Balkans”, Australia
Group Training Seminar, Sofia, 4-6 October 2005
20
VII.
The chapeau of Article VI (2)
does explicitly require States Parties
to
implement
controls
on
one
element of the “chemical weapon”
definition.
The chapeau states,
control system which includes penal
sanctions for violations.41
Declaration
Thresholds
of
Other
Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF)
under CWC may Require Review
“each State Party shall adopt the
The
thresholds
for
OCPF
necessary measures to ensure that
declarations may be reviewed in
toxic chemicals and their precursors
relation to the types of plant site
are only…transferred…for purposes
which pose threat to the object and
not
purpose of the Convention, not only
prohibited
under
this
Convention.” The key terms in this
in
chapeau are ‘necessary measures’,
produce Schedule 1 chemicals, but
and ‘ensure’. Therefore there is an
in
intimate
produce
toxic
Articles VI and VII (which deals with
general.42
This
national implementation measures),
better
reflection
and that the use of term ‘necessary
status
of
measures’ in both articles implies
relevant to the Convention.
relationship
legislative
and
between
which
of
addition,
their
their
the
potential
to
potential
to
chemicals
would
of
in
provide
the
chemical
a
current
industry
administrative
measures, as well as the penal
legislation,
terms
is
explicitly
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
required under Article VII (1) (a).40
States to Utilize the Avenue of Arms
The most effective way to prevent
control,
the
Nonproliferation
misuse
of
scheduled
and
disarmament
and
Discrete Organic Chemicals is by
establishing a legally-based export
40
Daniel Feakes, “Challenges in the Implementation
of Export Controls Under the Chemical Weapons
Convention”, Harward Sussex Programme, p.4
41
Views of Air Commodore Khalid Banuri who is
presently heading Arms Control and disarmament
Affairs Directorate of the Pakistan’s Strategic plans
Division
42
Graham S. Pearson and Malcolm R. Dando, “
Maximizing the security benefits from the first
review Conference of the Chemical Weapons
Convention”, Report of the NATO Advanced
Research Workshop, Slovak Republic, University of
Bradford, 19-21 September 2002, p. 10-11
21
Anyone with access to the
Internet
can
extremely
destructive
learn
possible model could be the dual-
to
produce
use goods regime established within
dangerous
and
the European Union. Although EU
this
is
an
exceptionally
technical know-how genie cannot be
regional
organization,
put back in the bottle.
elements of the regime, which could
reality
is
weapons.
that
And
the
Another
conventional
developed
there
be applied to other regions.
are
The
means of deterrence cannot work
regulation that created the dual-use
against the terrorists.
goods
the
course
of
This leaves
arms
control,
regime
member
states
States
“shall
that
take
EU
all
disarmament and non-proliferation
appropriate measures to establish
the only one remaining avenue to
direct cooperation and exchange of
pursue.43
information
between
authorities.”
The regime has thus
Enhanced
Administrative
competent
Cooperation
created a network of export control
between States Would be Beneficial for
officials from the 15 member States
Export Controls
who
Cooperation
States
Parties
between
is
an
the
essential
component
of
effective
implementation
of
Convention’s
export
provisions.
control
particular,
In
administrative
cooperation between States Parties
will
be
accurate
among
important,
reporting
States
to
of
Parties.44
ensure
are
obliged
to
take
all
appropriate measures to establish
direct cooperation and exchange of
information
between
competent
authorities and to consult regularly
on policy issues.45
States
to
Develop
Layered
Defence
Approach
transfers
In the context of chemical
One
proliferation, transportation security
measures must be developed and
43
Stephen E. Flynn, “New Approaches to Stemming
the Spread of Weapons Within International
Transportation Networks” p.344
44
Author’s meeting with Rahul Roy Chaudhary, 27
April 2007
45
Article 15, Chapter VI “Administrative
Cooperation” Community Regime for the Control of
Exports of Dual use Itemsand technology, Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1334/ 2000, 22 June 2000
22
coordinated globally. In this regard
numbers to monitor the movement
joint regional efforts might prove
of
beneficial.
purchases.
A
customer
get
Moreover,
security
tracking numbers by logging onto
must
apply
the company’s website.47 Access to
throughout the logistics networks,
“near real time” data would enable
because, if limited to ports of entry,
States Parties to:
new security measures may produce
a.
a “balloon effect”.46
resources on the higher risk targets.
improvements
Seek Access to “Near Real Time” Data
Achieving
the
in-transit
visibility of trade and passenger is
very much possible presently.
b.
c.
management
revolution
international
Enforcements
agents
could
controlled
sting
operations by delaying arrests
and confiscation.
d.
Such capabilities would also
serve as deterrents.
provide the companies with greater
levels of oversight and control within
enforcement
Regulatory and enforcement
launch
technologies and data management
chain
limited
agents gain “strategic depth”.
The
systems that are fuelling the supply-
Focus
Coordinated Transnational Response
transportation
The issue of the proliferation
networks. Such technologies could
of Chemical Weapons demands a
provide
coordinated transnational response
the
national
authorities,
customs and the chemical industry
and
the tools for monitoring the arrival
international
of goods.
Strengthened relationships between
Mart
Major retailers like Wal-
are
requiring
wholesale
all
full
compliance
relevant
with
obligations.
actors
in
the
suppliers to use trucks equipped
international community that are
with
pursuing
Global
Positioning
(GPS) transponders.
System
E-commerce
providers like Amazon.com provide
common
goals
are
paramount importance to address
issues
of
international
concern.
customers Federal Express tracking
47
46
Stephen E. Flynn, op.cit, p.349
of
See http://www.leatherup.com/showpages.asp?
pid=1004
23
Strengthened
are
provide further transparency in the
mandated of all States by applicable
growing capability of these sites.
United
relationships
Nations
Security
Council
A low number of inspections
Resolutions, including UNSCR 1373
have been carried out at OCPFs
(2001) that refers to international
relative to the size of the sector and
terrorism as a “serious challenge
number of declarable plant sites.49
and threat to international security”,
Toxic
and
to
distributed, and there is growing
enhance coordination of efforts on
evidence that terrorists might focus
national, sub regional, regional, and
increasingly
international
to
industry. Therefore, there is a need
response”.48
that the OPCW inspectors must beef
therefore,
up the number of inspections at
relevant
industrial facilities. Moreover, the
“emphasizes
strengthen
The
levels
a
OPCW
cooperate
the
in
global
should
with
need
order
all
international organizations.
chemicals
on
are
the
globally
chemical
bias of the selection process should
be towards those countries with the
largest number of facilities.
OPCW IMPLEMENTATION ROLE
50
In
both 1999 and 2000 the Secretariat
was able to conduct only three re-
OPCW
May
Need
to
Reassess
the
Industrial Declaration and Verification
Activities
The changes to the chemical
industry
indicate
reassess
the
the
emphasis
need
of
to
the
declaration and verification activities
of
the
Convention
especially
in
relation to OCPFs. Increasing the
number of OCPF inspections will
48
Matthew Meselson and Julian Perry Robbinson, “A
draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical
Weapons Under International Criminal Law”, p.453
inspections of Schedule 2 facilities,
38 inspections at Schedule 3 plant
sites, and a further 26 in the year
2000.The
rate
of
inspection
of
DOCs, which began in May 2000, is
of the same order. To enhance the
rate
of
support
49
inspections
would
be
budgetary
required,
Background Paper by the Technical Secretariat of
OPCW “Facilities declared and Inspected under
Article VI” 27 January 2003
50
Rogelio Pfirter Keynote address sponsored by
Global Green USA, “CWC Achievements and
Challenges” 29 march 2007
24
otherwise with present funding, it
the
might take 100 years to complete
documents and provide requisite
initial inspections of the currently
assistance to states.
declared DOC plant sites.51
Outreach
OPCW Assistance to States Regarding
National Implementation
The
OPCW
assistance
to
has
states
provided
regarding
national implementation, including
the
preparation
legislation.
responsible
of
Though
for
domestic
States
necessary
are
law
making, yet due to complexity of the
Convention, it might prove more
useful that States seek assistance
from the OPCW.52 This is important
because
national
implementation
form the basis for the effective
implementation of CWC worldwide.
Moreover, OPCW should also devote
more attention to the important
subject
of
national
legislations
under CWC, study the legislations of
States and where required, identify
51
shortcomings
Ron G. Manley, “The Role of Governments and
Research Institutes in the Implementation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, September 2001.
Available at
http://www.opcw.org/synthesis/html/s7/p15.html
52
Sergey Batsanov, “Approaching the 10th
Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
A Plan for Future Progress”, The Monterey Institute
of International Studies, Centre for Non-Proliferation,
Non-Proliferation Review, Vol.13, No 2, July 2006
to
the
in
those
Global
legal
Scientific
Community
Greater focus is needed on
education
and
outreach
to
the
worldwide scientific and technical
community to increase awareness
regarding obligations under CWC.
At the same time, major relevant
scientific societies could be involved
to play a role in providing technical
advice in efforts to control CW
proliferation.53
Ideally
those
scientists/ scientific societies should
be preferred who have chemical
industrial
backgrounds
verification
of
or
international
instrument related background that
are
directly
relevant
to
CWC
compliance monitoring.
OPCW may Emphasize Verification of
Discrete
Organic
chemical
(DOC)
Facilities
53
Graham S. Pearson, Peter Mahaffy, “Education,
Outreach and Code of Conduct to Further the Norms
and obligations of the Chemical Weapons
Convention”, International Union of Pure and
Applied Chemistry Technical Report, University of
Bradford, p.3
25
The
OPCW
verification
mechanism places heavy emphasis
on
the
destruction
of
OPCW Role for Chemical Defence may be
Enhanced
Although the OPCW conduct
chemical
War
several courses and exercises for
perspective, this approach seems
assistance and protection against
logical.
However, the international
chemical weapons, still there is a
security situation has immensely
need to pay more attention to this
changed.
vital area because any chemical
weapons.
From
the
Cold
It is felt, that presently
the enormously growing commercial
disaster
chemical industry that process or
OPCW timely response.
produce
of
OPCW should fine-tune the minute
chemicals poses bigger challenge
details of its response and regularly
than most of the declared schedule-
carry out exercises for the effective
1 facilities, which are in fact small
preparation
laboratories.
Moreover,
numbers
huge
quantities
As a result, large
assistance
its
the
training
the
Therefore,
obligation.
OPCW
joint
with
other
that
quantities
of
relevant organizations would prove
chemicals are still not inspected in
beneficial.55 But, such partnership
the course of routine verification.54
needs to be institutionalized.
The
DOC
of
necessitate
facilities
produce
of
would
huge
industrial
verification
would
surely grow more challenging in the
NATIONAL
time to come; therefore, the OPCW
MEASURES
should take necessary measures to
address
the
aforementioned
imbalance.
States
Parties
IMPLEMENTATION
to
Ensure
Effective
National Implementation
National implementation is an
absolutely essential foundation of
the Convention. Each State Party’s
54
Sergey Batsanov, “Approaching the 10th
Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
A Plan for Future Progress”, The Monterey Institute
of International Studies, Centre for Non-Proliferation,
Non-Proliferation Review, Vol.13, No 2, July 2006
international obligations under the
55
Chemical Terrorism Protection and Assistance
exercise, “Joint Assistance 2005”, held in Ukraine,
The OPCW Press Release No. 57, 10 October 2005
26
Convention must be given direct
The increased emphasis on
internal legal effect, because CWC is
preventing
not self-executing.
proliferation to non-state actors also
Without the
and
ability to apprehend and punish
requires
violators
monitoring
of
universality
the
convention,
remains
accomplishment.
a
prohibiting,
focus
on
and
national
enforcement.
hollow
Therefore, it is the responsibility of
Moreover, State
each State to ensure compliance
Parties are required to “adopt the
with
necessary measures to implement
territory.58 And the OPCW cannot be
its
held solely responsible for States
obligations
under
convention.”56
the
National
the
Parties,
CWC
failures
implementation is an area in which
implement
States Parties must develop their
Convention.
expertise
and
should
formulate
comprehensive
export
controls
covering
scheduled
Unsheduled
Chemicals
chemicals,
Discrete
(UDOCs),
Organic
States
throughout
to
and
Parties
effectively
enforce
Need
its
to
the
Enhance
Awareness regarding Obligations under
CWC
National
intangible
Authorities
must
transfer of technology and other
increase awareness of their officials
related activities. The Schedules-
and technical staff regarding new
based export controls in the CWC
production routes, processes and
are
technologies through OPCW courses
not
satisfactory
as
a
non-
proliferation tool. The Schedules is
and seminars.
meant to assist the verification and
them to carry out correct analysis
monitoring
and
regimes
of
the
Convention.57
draw
This will enable
accurate
conclusions
regarding the nature of activities at
industrial plant sites. Moreover, the
national
Authorities
must
56
Article VII, Chemical Weapons Convention
Dr Jean Pascal Zaners, “Technology Transfers and
Export Controls under the CWC” Available at
http://www.opcw.org/synthesis/html/s5/zanderspg16
_17final.html
57
58
Jonathan B. Tucker “Verifying the Chemical
Weapons Ban: Missing Elements”, Arms Control
Today, January/ February 2007.
27
implement
trade
suppliers
and
control
the
and responding to illicit traffic in
destination;
hazardous materials, including toxic
register all the equipment that can
chemicals.60 The OPCW, National
produce chemical weapons;59 and
Authorities
ask chemical industry to formulate
international and national agencies
policies that reflect the export and
can develop partnership with WCO
trade control provisions of the CWC.
and thus benefit from their excellent
the
on
and
other
relevant
networks and facilities. The salient
States to Develop Multi Agency Approach
aspects of the WCO action plan
and Harmonized Application of CWC
are61:-
The effective implementation
a.
The
WCO
of CWC by States parties requires a
Intelligence
multi agency approach with a view
Network
to
States
ensuring
harmonized
Global
Regional
Liaison
has
that
120
are
Offices
Member
organized
interpretation and application. The
through ten regional offices.
prohibitions and controls stipulated
Each
in the CWC bring national customs
intelligence
administrations
seizure
data
important role as the national cross
customs
offences
border
The
possible sources to identify
World Customs Organization (WCO)
new or unusual national and
has development of a comprehensive
regional smuggling methods.
to
management
assume
agency.
an
action plan to combat hazardous
materials smuggling.
b.
This
national
customs
unit
network
collects
relating
from
is
to
all
an
The overall
information system for data
objective of the programme is to
exchange and communication
assist Member administrations to
between customs services of
enhance
member States. It is based on
their
enforcement
capabilities for preventing, detecting
60
59
Daniel Feakes, “Export Controls, Chemical Trade
and the CWC” The Harvard Sussex Program on
Chemical and Biological Weapons
Ercan Saka, “The Role of Customs Services and
the World Customs Organization’s Enforcement
Programme to Combat the Illicit Movement of
Chemicals” p.319
61
Ibid, pp.317- 319
28
Internet technology and offers
national
opportunities to enhance the
levels.
exchange
of
information
between
customs
Customs
international
services
are
continuously
trained
administrations.This data is
regarding potential smuggling
then
of toxic chemicals and the risk
utilized
analysis
trends
c.
f.
and
to
in
for
strategic
ascertain
customs
new
posed to them, society and the
frauds
environment.
Most
customs
including illicit trafficking of
administrations
toxic chemicals.
their
The WCO encourage customs
programmes or attend other
administrations to implement
relevant regional or national
the
seminars.
MoU
concept
at
the
either
own
hold
training
national level to create and
enhance communication and
States should pay due Attention to the
cooperation
Safety
national
with
agencies,
relevant
trade
of
Chemical
States should identify high
The WCO has created legal/
priority chemical facilities.
administrative
instruments
prioritization should be based on
called
Convention.
the threat posed to public health
Customs administrations can
and safety due to proximity to
utilize
population
enhance
e.
Security
Facilities
representatives, etc.
d.
and
Nairobi
this
instrument
their
to
cooperation
centres,
The
type
and
amount of chemical involved, and
with other customs services.
threat to critical infrastructure.
The WCO public and private
this
websites have been created to
authorities
enhance
the
customs
community’s information and
communication
capacity
at
connection,
of
the
states
In
concerned
should
29
establish regulations to require each
To
effectively
proliferation,
the
threat
a.
chemical industry has to play a
b.
a
vulnerability/
hazard assessment.
pivotal role. In this regard, certain
Develop
approaches could be63: -
the
preparedness
plan
in
prevention,
and
the
response
light
of
vulnerability/
a.
Carryout
strategy could be to monitor
hazard
the sales and transfers of
scheduled
unscheduled
d.
e.
f.
site
dual-use chemicals to detect
and
visits/
suspicious
activity.
approach
would
require
chemical
Establish safety and security
industry trade groups to pay
advisory committee at each
more
facility.
their customers.
Organize exercises to practice
enable the industry to identify
prevention, preparedness and
unusual transfers of sensitive
response plans.
chemicals.
Organize
annual
related
training
workers
and
security
for
knowing
This would
Consequently
should
seek
clarification from the National
concerned
Authority and other relevant
agencies.
RELEVANT
TO
End-use Monitoring.
Industry
customers’
must
companies
are
use
of
their
products, a small number of
be
companies do so in certain
Intimately Involved
63
Frank Lautenberg/ Barak Obama, The Chemical
Security and Safety Act, 30 March 2006
Although
generally reluctant to monitor
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Chemical
to
and
the
chemical
MEASURES
companies
attention
Industry
b.
62
This
inspections.
officers.
Private
One
Monitor the Sales.
the
assessment of the facility.
c.
CW
the
priority facility to do the following:62
Conduct
of
address
Meeting with Michel Crowley, VERTIC, 17 April
2007
George W.Parshall, “Scientific and Technical
Developments and the CWC” p.5
30
instances.
c.
Moreover, despite
suspected
CW
facilities.
industry’s distaste, companies
Chemical analysis techniques for
may be required to assume
chemical pollutants are sensitive to
this role because small-scale
the
proliferation
sometimes
to
non-state
part
per
billion
to
parts
level,
per
and
trillion.
actors is becoming a serious
Great successes have also been
concern.
made
Develop
Software
Programmes.
It should be possible to
d.
from
in
detecting
minute
concentrations of pollutants in soil
and water.
In this regard, it is
develop software programmes
highly desirable that such advance
to spot unusual activity with
technology be made available to all
regard to dual-use chemicals.
States Parties.
The
Enhance Awareness.
chemical
make
concerted
enhance
their
industry
the
staff
should
DESTRUCTION
efforts
to
STOCKPILES
awareness
of
EXPEDITED
regarding
OF
CW
MUST
BE
their
The CWC required possessor
obligations under CWC.
States
Parties
to
destroy
their
chemical weapons within ten years
SCIENTIFIC MEASURES
from the CWC’s entry into force.
Modern Monitoring Technologies must be
This
Utilized
achieved.
Advances
in
analytical
objective
has
Most
possessing
not
States
chemical
been
Parties
weapons
chemistry and data analysis can
arsenals requested extensions on
help to deter the efforts of those
the deadline to finish destruction. In
seeking
chemical
December 2006, the OPCW granted
super-sensitive
deadline extensions to China and
weapons.
monitoring
to
produce
New
techniques
can
spot
Japan
(until
2012)
India
(until
illicit activity by remotely analyzing
2009), South Korea (until 2008),
trace amounts of chemicals leaking
Libya (until 2010), Russia (until
31
2012), and the United States (until
remote monitoring technology and
2012).64 Experts do not believe that
random
the United States and Russia, would
continuous on-site verification will
be able to meet the 2012 deadline.
enable the OPCW to substantially
Besides lack of political commitment
reduce the number of inspectors
and financial resources, the process
without
of destruction of chemical weapons
verification mechanism66.
checks
instead
affecting
the
efficacy
of
of
has proven far complicated than
what was anticipated.
CONCLUSION
The states concerned should
continue to fulfill their stockpile
destruction obligations.
such
Without
commitment
and
The
staff
should
demonstration of good faith, the
about
modern
treaty’s
processing
seriously
undermined.
stockpiles
agents
terrorist
risks
of
also
increase
destruction
in
Destroying
chemical
reduces
warfare
be
knowledgeable
production
trends
in
and
chemical
industry that are difficult to detect.
This would enable them to counter
potential
the
and
prevents
agents posed by the development of
weapons.65
With the
threats
diversion of
being
National
Authorities and inspectors of the
OPCW
credibility
of
the
number
facilities,
of
the
threat
modern
of
reactor
chemical
warfare
technology
and
global distribution of multipurpose
chemical industry.
Moreover, to
requirement of inspectors for on-site
enhance the capabilities of States to
monitoring would also increase. To
effectively
address such situation, the OPCW
efforts of those seeking to produce
can consider the introduction of
chemical
64
C Harrington, Chemical Weapons Deadlines
Extended”, Arms Control Today, January/ February
2007
65
Rogelio Pfirter Keynote address sponsored by
Global Green USA, “CWC Achievements and
Challenges” 29 March 2007
detect
and
weapons,
the
deter
the
Western
countries should be forthcoming in
66
Note by DG OPCW, “Report of the Scientific
Advisory Board on Developments in Science and
Technology” OPCW Conference of States Parties, 23
April 2003, p.10
32
sharing
advanced
monitoring
and
technology
with
the
detection,
as Australia Group or the European
analytical
Union’s dual-use goods legislation
developing
focus on a narrow list of specific
countries.
chemical precursors.
The export
control provisions of the CWC are
Effective national legislations
based
on
its
General
Purpose
and regulations are essential for the
Criterion. As Julian Robinson notes,
effective national implementation of
a chemical weapon under the CWC
the prohibitions of the CWC. States
is a “considerably broader concept”.
Parties implementing the CWC are
It allows the CWC to keep up with
required, in accordance with Article
the technological progress and it
VII, to make it a penal offence to
protects legitimate uses of dual-use
assist in the production of chemical
chemicals.
weapons.
But such material
assistance is not limited to the
The compliance with the CWC
supply of any particular set of
has to be linked to the definition of
chemicals (those on the schedules
chemical weapons as given in the
or on any other list).
There is a
CWC. The term “toxic chemical” is
clear obligation on States Parties to
defined as “any chemical, which
take
through its chemical action on life
whatever
steps
they
find
consistent
with
the
processes
of
the
temporary
Convention to prevent any such
permanent
material assistance.
animals.”
necessary,
object
and
The
scope
comprehensive
elimination
purpose
of
of
CWC
that
chemical
it
is
so
aims
weapons;
can
cause
death,
incapacitation
harm
to
humans
or
or
Thus, The definition of
chemical
weapons
proposed
use,
focus
on
purpose
the
and
properties of chemicals and their
precursors.
A
restrictive
and it also aims to prevent the
interpretation of the CWC, believing
proliferation of chemical weapons.
that the verification mechanism of
On the contrary other regimes such
the
CWC
is
designed
only
for
33
scheduled
chemicals,
would
To
prevent
the
misuse
of
establish loopholes and that would
commercial industrial chemicals by
defeat the object and purpose of the
terrorists, the chemical industry can
Convention.
make substantial contributions by
The issue of the proliferation
monitoring
suspicious
sales,
by
of Chemical Weapons demands a
enhancing awareness of their staff
coordinated transnational response
regarding CWC obligations, etc. The
and
with
chemical industry and the National
In
Authorities working closely with all
full
compliance
international
obligations.
particular,
administrative
other
relevant
national
cooperation between States Parties
international
will prove very useful in ensuring
customs,
accurate
community, commerce, police, etc
reporting
of
transfers
among States Parties.
The
timely
should
destruction
of
chemical weapons stockpiles and
prevention
of
any
development,
further
production
or
stockpiling of chemical weapons is
both a multilateral commitment and
expressed OPCW contribution to the
war
on
terror.
possessing
should
stockpile
Without
The
chemical
continue
to
destruction
such
states
weapons
fulfill
their
obligations.
commitment
and
demonstration of good faith, the
treaty’s
credibility
seriously undermined.
risks
being
agencies
and
relevant
continuously
such
as
scientific
work
on
improving risk based safety and
security measures at the chemical
plants and storage sites of industrial
chemicals for the safety of their own
environment
and
people.
34
35