Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:39
Page 1
CHAPTER 5
CONTROL OF THE AIR
If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it very quickly.
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein
Introduction
One of the primary considerations of any commander is to shape the battle space so that
friendly operations can proceed at the place or time of his choosing without prohibitive
interference from an opponent. A second important consideration is to ensure that
friendly military forces are safe from attack. One of the core capabilities of air power is,
therefore, to achieve and maintain the degree of control of the air required to achieve
mission success. The aim of this chapter is to offer the considerations necessary for
commanders, planners and those studying air power to understand the need for control
of the air across the spectrum of conflict. Friendly control of the air aims to restrict an
opponent’s ability to use air power against friendly forces.
Historical Experience
Historical experience of air operations suggests the following:
●
A degree of control of the air is of crucial importance not only to air operations but
also to virtually all types of surface and sub-surface operations.
●
To achieve control of the air, dedicated operations to suppress an opponent’s air
power may be required. The degree of control will depend on what is required and
what it is possible to achieve. Control of the air allows friendly air assets to operate
without serious interference from an opponent’s air assets.
●
Even in a generally hostile air situation, it is usually possible to achieve some degree
of air control for friendly operations.
●
The relationship between offensive and defensive counter-air action is dynamic. They
are complementary and not alternative elements; the balance between them will
depend upon a range of factors.
AP 3000
2.5.1
Control of the Air
Degrees of Control of the Air
Measuring control of the air is complex. In addition to the difficulty for commanders and
planners in determining the degree of control required for a particular operation, the
combination of own capability and availability has to be set against an assessment of the
opponent’s capability and intent. There are three recognised levels of control of the air;
these are:
●
Favourable Air Situation. A favourable air situation is one in which the extent of air
effort applied by the air forces of an adversary is insufficient to prejudice the success of
friendly land, sea or air operations.
●
Air Superiority. Air superiority is defined as that degree of dominance in the air battle
of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its
related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference
by the opposing force.
●
Air Supremacy. Air supremacy is defined as that degree of air superiority wherein the
opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.
Balancing Risk
It is essential that the commander defines the degree of control required. An important
variable is the degree of risk or attrition which systems using the airspace can expect to face.
It may be necessary to take into account the differences in vulnerability between air
vehicles. Systems such as cruise missiles and ballistic missiles can penetrate, but not
control, airspace.
AP 3000
2.5.2
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:39
Page 3
Airspace Control
Within the boundaries of friendly airspace, there is a requirement to exercise airspace
control. Airspace control is a combination of airspace organization and planning
procedures. These are intended to minimize risks and to allow all elements involved in
joint operations to use airspace efficiently and flexibly, taking account of the differing
demands which are made on air assets. Management of airspace can be complex particularly in coalition operations - and, therefore, requires a centralized controlling
authority with a robust communications system.
There are two basic methods of exercising airspace control:
●
Positive control. Positive airspace control is exercised by an agency with
responsibility and authority to track and direct air assets by using positive
identification provided by electronic means. Positive airspace control relies upon
primary and secondary radar and comprehensive communications systems.
●
Procedural control. Procedural control relies on a combination of previously agreed
and published orders and procedures. Procedural airspace control utilises techniques
such as segmenting airspace by volume and time. This method is more restrictive
than positive control but is less vulnerable to interference by electronic and physical
attack.
The Offence/Defence Balance
Attaining the balance between offence and defence in the counter-air campaign is a
complex challenge. The three most important variables in this challenge are depth, the
density of the opposing air defence system, and capabilities. The further attacks have
to penetrate over hostile territory to reach their targets, the more vulnerable they are
likely to be to defensive air action. The greater the effective defensive depth, the earlier
attacking air systems can be detected and defending forces assembled. This increases
the chances of a successful engagement. Defence in depth also allows a defender to
construct a layered air defence system, which employs different weapons systems. This
layering, although it does not provide complete protection, could cause progressive
attrition to an attacker.
AP 3000
2.5.3
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:39
Page 4
Force-to-Space Ratio
Assessing the balance between offence and defence can be described as force-to-spaceratio planning and may include factors such as:
●
Matching degree of control of the air to overall theatre objectives and strategic aims.
●
Availability of air defence (AD) assets and weapon systems.
●
Political constraints such as border crossing authority and rules of engagement.
●
Balance between enemy capability, intent and will.
Gulf War: Iraqi Air Force defects to Iran
The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) played little role in the Gulf War for two reasons: firstly,
Saddam Hussein believed that the Coalition would not be able to sustain the
initial effort more than four or five days and, secondly, the IAF learned very
quickly that they were no match for Coalition crews. Since the air effort by the
Iraqis was below the predicted levels, Coalition planners suspected that the Iraqis
were possibly preparing for an all-out effort. As the Iraqis could not be tempted
in the air, hardened airfield facilities were targeted in an attempt to negate the
enemy air threat. Two days later, on the ninth day of the War, the Iraqis stopped
operations and on the next day, 26 January, more than 120 aircraft, both combat
and support, departed from their home bases bound for Iran - ironically, the
country with which they had so recently been at war. Some ran out of fuel and
crashed in Iran and others were shot down by USAF F15s. Whether the Iraqis fled
by pre-arrangement or in an attempt to salvage a force is not definitively known,
nor is the effect which this sudden departure had on the remaining airmen of the
world’s sixth largest air force.1
Low force-to-space ratios may make offensive action a more suitable option for
commanders. In defence, low force-to-space ratios mean thinner defences with inadequate
reserves. On the other hand the attacker would still be in a position to concentrate what
forces he has in time and space so that the defences could be saturated with decisive effect.
The balance between offensive and defensive action is also affected by technological
change. The better the ground-based air defence (GBAD) system and the longer range
at which incoming raids can be detected, the greater the effectiveness of the defending
air defences. In such circumstances, defence may be a better option. In contrast, better
electronic countermeasures, longer-range air-to-surface stand-off missiles and stealth
technology can aid an attacking force. In these circumstances, offence may be the
better option.
1
Storm over Iraq, Richard Hallion, p.195.
AP 3000
2.5.4
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:39
Page 5
Offensive Counter-Air Operations
Offensive counter-air (OCA) operations are mounted to destroy, disrupt or confine
enemy air power as close to its bases as practicable. An important planning
consideration is the need for political approval and rules of engagement (ROE) to carry
out offensive air operations over an opponent’s territory. Within the sub-set of OCA, the
following roles may be employed:
●
Airfield attack against aircraft, operating surfaces and airfield facilities.
●
Suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD).
●
Fighter sweep.
●
Escort.
●
Command and Control Warfare (C2W) - targeting an opponent’s air tasking capability.
Airfield Attack
Offensive air action against aircraft before they take off and interfere with own force
operations can be highly effective. Airfields are static facilities and usually contain
densely packed high-value targets and so provide attractive targets for OCA action.
Attacks on operating surfaces can close airfields, but because operating surfaces can be
repaired, the effects of such attacks might be temporary.
Arab - Israeli War 1967
The actual start of the Third Arab-Israeli War of 1967 was marked by a carefully
planned, frequently rehearsed and extraordinarily well coordinated surprise
attack by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) on Egyptian airfields and aircraft. The
astounding success of the raids was even more devastating than the Israeli
General Staff had ever dared to hope. This sudden and massive aerial assault
had a most decisive influence on the subsequent course of the War, leaving
ultimate Israeli victory in little doubt. The geography of Israel does not allow
extended warning time of attack and the majority of IAF airfields are close
together, near the centre of the country. The Israeli strategy was based on
aerial attack as their main form of defence. The IAF’s primary task was to gain
immediate air superiority, both to protect Israel from air attack and to provide
an air umbrella under which ground forces could operate freely. The Israelis
had calculated that they had four hours in which to destroy the Egyptian Air
Force (EAF) before turning to face the remaining hostile Arab states. The EAF
dawn stand-to was over, crews were breakfasting, and many senior officers had
AP 3000
2.5.5
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:39
Page 6
not reached their offices when the Israelis struck. The IAF attacked airfields
first, not radar sites which would have afforded a measure of warning.
Synchronized low level attacks, making full use of natural terrain and
anticipated gaps in Egyptian radar cover, caught the enemy completely by
surprise. Less than three hours later, the IAF had destroyed nearly 300 aircraft
and disrupted 17 major airfields. The Israelis admitted to the loss of 10 aircraft.
An incredulous Egyptian President Nasser could not believe that the Israelis had
acted alone and was convinced that the Americans and British had participated
in the attack - he even persuaded King Hussein of Jordan to agree to an
announcement to that effect2.
Surface land or maritime forces can also make an important contribution to control of the
air operations, particularly in the defence suppression and airfield attack roles.
Pebble Island, Bekka Valley, Gulf War.
The Special Air Service raid on Pebble Island airfield in the 1982 Falklands Conflict
was an example of surface forces acting in the airfield attack role. Similarly, the
Israeli use of artillery to silence Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries in the 1982
Bekka Valley operation demonstrated the potential for surface forces to act in the
SEAD role. US Apache Attack Helicopters played an important SEAD role in the
Gulf Air Campaign.
OCA operations may, therefore, be joint or combined operations. Thus, to ensure
maximum effectiveness in OCA operations, the relevant capabilities of other component
forces should always be considered. Capabilities such as naval gunfire support, attack
helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, indirect artillery fire and Special Forces all may have
a role to play.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)
The purpose of SEAD missions is to neutralise, destroy or degrade enemy surface-to-air
defence systems, which could include parts of an integrated air defence system (IADS),
radars and early-warning systems. SEAD can include physical attack to achieve a hard kill
on a target, or a soft kill gained by the effective threat of anti-radiation missiles (ARM) or by
offensive EW which forces an opponent to switch off EW, SAM or anti-aircraft artillery (AAA)
radars, thereby degrading the opponent’s defensive system. Effective SEAD operations
allow other air operations to proceed without undue loss or interruption. Targets which
might be the object for defence suppression include radars and other air defence sensors,
SAMs and AAA batteries. SEAD operations can be conducted with specialist ARM, with
conventional air-to-surface weapons or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). SEAD operations
may require detailed integration with other surface and air forces. SEAD may also be
categorised as Combat Support Air Operations and are covered in Chapter 8.
2
The Third Arab-Israeli War, Edgar O’Ballance.
AP 3000
2.5.6
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:40
Page 7
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences - Tornado GR1 with ALARM
Fighter Sweep
Fighter sweep involves offensive action by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy enemy
aircraft or targets of opportunity in an allocated area of responsibility. The air-to-surface
attack force draws the opponent’s defending aircraft into the air where he can be
destroyed and the fighter sweep clears the way for the air-to-surface attack force’s
penetration to its targets. Fighter sweep is divided into two sub-roles: area sweep and
route sweep. Area sweep is used to establish air superiority within a given area. It might
be used indirectly to support an attack force by decoying or destroying enemy aircraft
which pose a direct threat to the attack force. Route sweep, on the other hand, is used
in direct support of an attack force by ensuring that the planned route is clear of enemy
aircraft.
Fighter Escort
The escort role involves the assignment of fighter aircraft dedicated to protect other
aircraft during a mission. Escort fighters present a counter-threat to the enemy’s air
defence fighters, and can be used in both offensive and defensive operations. In
practice, a combination of escort and fighter sweep has been found to be an effective
means of destroying an enemy’s air-to-air defensive capability whilst providing defence
in depth for attack force packages.
AP 3000
2.5.7
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:40
Page 8
Defensive Counter-Air Operations
Defensive counter air (DCA) operations consist of all the measures which might be used
to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. Establishing the correct aim is
fundamental to the success of DCA operations. Essentially, there are two choices: to
minimize the damage sustained by friendly forces and facilities, or to maximize the
damage inflicted by friendly forces on the opponent.
These aims are interdependent: the more enemy aircraft that are shot down, the fewer
there are available to inflict damage in future raids. The less damage that friendly forces
sustain, the more capable they are of defending themselves if the enemy continues with
his attacks.
Deciding where the priority lies between the ‘minimum damage’ aim and the ‘maximum
attrition’ aim will depend on the nature of the threat. For example, if the friendly
infrastructure is seen to be particularly fragile or if the enemy is able to attack only
intermittently, a ‘minimum damage’ approach may be preferable. On the other hand, if
friendly infrastructure is robust or if there is a threat of sustained attack then ‘maximum
attrition’ could well be the better option. In either case both active and passive air
defences are required and may require the integration of all joint or multinational air
defences under one air defence commander - see Chapter 3 for details.
Defensive Counter Air Operations - Tornado F3
AP 3000
2.5.8
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:40
Page 9
Active and Passive Air Defence Operations
Active Air Defence System - Requirements
The chosen aim determines how resources should be allocated between active and
passive defence systems. In all cases, some form of active air defence system is needed,
although its scale and complexity might vary depending on the opponent’s capability.
Active Air Defence System - Structure
Any active air defence system consists of three basic and closely integrated components:
●
A detection system to locate, track and identify the enemy and direct friendly weapon
systems.
●
A command, control, communications and information (C3I) system to link the
weapon and detection systems for most effective use of available assets.
●
A weapon system to intercept or engage attacking enemy air vehicles.
Detection System
Detection and tracking information on hostile aircraft can be obtained from a variety of
sources:
●
Visual sightings.
●
Infra-red or acoustic monitoring.
●
Conventional line-of-sight radar (fixed, transportable, maritime or airborne) and
over-the-horizon radar.
●
Space-based detection systems.
The information from these systems should be merged, if possible, into a recognized air
picture which can be disseminated to all agencies and forces involved in the air defence
infrastructure.
The Weapon System
An air defence weapon system will normally consist of two complementary components
- ground-based air defences and fighter aircraft:
AP 3000
2.5.9
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:40
Page 10
●
Ground-based Air Defences (GBAD). GBAD consist of SAMs, AAA and, possibly,
laser or directed-energy defensive systems. GBAD can maintain high readiness states
over long periods. They provide a quick response and, with modern technology, are
highly effective. Some systems have the ability to counter ballistic missiles.
In comparison with fighter aircraft, however, GBAD systems have limited range and
low mobility. Therefore, relatively large numbers of surface-to-air defence systems
may be needed to defend anything but point targets. AAA has, by nature, very
limited range. Similarly, SAMs may have limited flexibility since they are essentially
single-role systems. Accurate identification of friendly aircraft is an essential
requirement for GBAD.
●
Fighter Aircraft. Even with air-to-air refuelling, fighter aircraft have limited
endurance when compared to GBAD. Fighter aircraft are multi-role and can be
switched to tasks other than air defence should the operational situation demand it.
Moreover, fighter aircraft can be used to protect very large areas, or be concentrated
rapidly to counter enemy saturation raids.
Ground-based Air Defences - Rapier FSC
AP 3000
2.5.10
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:40
Page 11
Fighter Aircraft/GBAD Force Mix
The most appropriate balance of AD assets depends on a variety of considerations. At
the military strategic level, the relative merits of AD systems vary according to the nature
of the potential joint campaign. For example, the balance could be defensive within state
borders, but coupled to forward defence, projection of power, anti-guerrilla or antiterrorist operations. The balance is closely linked to the strategic depth available and to
the presence of common land borders, seas or non-critical areas between the
protagonists. In a coalition environment, differentials in the ability of personnel to
operate the various systems may also be a factor demanding simplicity in planning and
procedures. The appropriate balance of systems is also greatly affected by the capability
and intentions of an opponent and the nature of the threat. Whatever balance is adopted,
an integrated AD system should contain no weak link to be exploited. The mix should
present an opponent with a series of dilemmas where his response to one makes him
vulnerable to another.
Further Factors
The AD system mix is also affected by the following factors:
●
Warning Time. When warning time is short and interception opportunities limited,
effective defence may be best provided by a screen of high-readiness SAM systems
backed up by mobile reserves of AD fighters. As warning time increases, opportunities
grow for exploiting the AD fighter’s far greater mobility and ability to concentrate
firepower in space and time.
●
Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE remain an important planning consideration for
the employment of air superiority aircraft - particularly in a coalition environment
where differing national interpretations may apply.
●
Geography. The larger the area, the more difficult and expensive it is to provide an
effective level of surface-to-air defence cover. When large areas have to be defended,
the mobility offered by AD fighters makes them particularly cost-effective. On the other
hand, fixed surface-to-air defences can offer a useful option for providing a permanent
forward air defence presence along a continental border or around vital points.
●
Multi-role Aircraft. Some delegation of DCA tasks to GBAD can increase the
flexibility available to a commander given the growing availability of multi-role aircraft.
For example, much of the defensive task may be shifted to ground-based systems once
the required degree of air control has been achieved. This could allow a greater
proportion of the available aircraft assets to be re-roled for strategic effect or antisurface tasks. The freedom to shift aircraft into alternative roles promotes simultaneity
and ensures the tempo of operations can be maintained.
AP 3000
2.5.11
Control of the Air
Chapter 05
12/07/2000
14:40
Page 12
Command and Control System
The purpose of the air defence command and control system is to integrate all of the
various elements of the weapon and detection systems into a coordinated entity. With
advanced technology, this may require the fusion of data into a single picture to ensure
the optimum use of available resources against the threat. The overall command and
control of area air defence operations should be vested in one person, the air defence
commander, as described in Chapter 3. For large-scale operations, a number of
defensive sectors can be established, each under the control of a sector commander who
reports to the overall air defence commander.
Participation of Surface Forces
Organic AD systems and detection capabilities can add to effective defensive depth and
increase the level of attrition on attacking enemy aircraft. All AD systems should be
integrated within the overall C2 picture, to ensure that joint and multinational DCA assets
are employed in a fully coordinated fashion.
Passive Air Defences
Passive air defences are defined as all measures, other than active air defence, taken to
minimise the effect of hostile air action. These measures include deception, dispersion,
concealment and camouflage, the use of protective construction and the increased
redundancy of operating strips. These aspects are addressed in detail in Chapter 9.
The growing availability of multi-role aircraft - Eurofighter
AP 3000
2.5.12
Control of the Air