Political Psychology, Vol. 28, No. 5, 2007
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
Thomas J. Rudolph
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Elizabeth Popp
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
This paper analyzes the sources of ambivalence toward political parties and candidates. We
propose and test an information-processing theory of ambivalence in which systematic
processing is hypothesized to heighten partisan and candidate ambivalence. We show that
ambivalence is linked to several dispositional sources of systematic processing, including
individuals’ information, motivation, and cognitive style. Specifically, we find that ambivalence tends to be greater among the well informed and those who are high in need for
cognition while it tends to be lower among those motivated by directional goals. Collectively, our results suggest that levels of partisan and candidate ambivalence are greatest
among those most likely to engage in effortful processing of information and that these
effects are independent of value conflict. The results further suggest that the effects of
effortful processing on ambivalence are moderated by attitude commitment.
KEY WORDS: ambivalence, need for cognition, information processing, motivated reasoning
Attitudes have traditionally been conceptualized as unidimensional and
bipolar. Increasingly, though, attitude theorists have challenged the universality of
this view by underscoring the existence of attitudinal ambivalence, the simultaneous endorsement of positive and negative thoughts or feelings toward some
attitude object (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Thompson, Zanna, &
Griffin, 1995). Broadly conceived, ambivalence can be defined as “an individual’s
endorsement of competing considerations relevant to evaluating an attitude object”
(Lavine, 2001, p. 915). In the political world, ambivalence can occur during policy
choices in which an individual experiences an internalized conflict between
incommensurable values (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002). Similarly, ambivalence may
occur when an individual harbors multiple reasons to endorse competing political
candidates or parties (Basinger & Lavine, 2005; Lavine, 2001). From a theoretical
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perspective, the occurrence of ambivalence is significant because it undermines
traditional assumptions concerning the structure of political attitudes.
The theoretical import of ambivalence is not limited to its implications for
attitude structure. A growing body of literature demonstrates that ambivalence
has meaningful political consequences. Studies show that ambivalence not only
increases response variability in policy choices (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002;
Rudolph, 2005) and partisanship (Keele & Wolak, 2006b), but it weakens the
accessibility and stability of political attitudes (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 2000).
Ambivalence influences the accuracy and certainty of candidate placement and
shapes the formation of candidate evaluations (McGraw, Hasecke, & Conger,
2003; Meffert, Guge, & Lodge, 2004). Ambivalence influences electoral judgments by delaying the formation of voting intentions and attenuating the effects
of such intentions on vote choice (Lavine, 2001). Finally, ambivalence conditions
the determinants of vote choice by regulating the extent to which individuals
engage in ideological and economic voting (Basinger & Lavine, 2005).
While the consequences of ambivalence have been well documented, we
know comparatively less about its sources. To date, the leading explanation of
ambivalence in the extant literature is rooted in value conflict. Under this account,
ambivalence results when individuals are unwilling or unable to reconcile competing values. Endorsement of both pro-life and pro-choice considerations, for
example, can lead to ambivalence toward certain abortion policies (Alvarez &
Brehm, 2002). More broadly, recent work suggests that core values in the American ethos have bifurcated along ideological lines (Keele & Wolak, 2006b). It is the
failure of individuals to organize their value commitments across these ideological
lines, they suggest, that may result in value conflict and, in turn, ambivalence.
Indeed, individuals who simultaneously embrace core values associated with the
ideological left (e.g., egalitarianism, humanitarianism) and the ideological right
(e.g., moral traditionalism, limited government) exhibit greater ambivalence in
their partisan attachments (Keele & Wolak, 2006b). Although value conflict
appears to trigger ambivalence in some settings, the empirical linkage between the
two is far from universal (Alvarez & Brehm, 1997; Steenbergen & Brewer, 2004).
Apart from the proposed link between value conflict and ambivalence,
however, the literature has offered little theoretical insight concerning the antecedents of ambivalence at the individual level.1 Are certain types of individuals
more likely to experience ambivalence than others? What role, if any, do individuals’ information, motivation, and cognitive style play in shaping ambivalence?
More importantly, do any of these factors matter independent of value conflict?
Given the breadth of decisions impacted by ambivalence (e.g., policy choices,
candidate evaluations, vote choice), these are important questions to answer.
1
For an exception see Thompson and Zanna (1995). Recent work also suggests that ambivalence may
be sensitive to contextual factors such as campaign intensity (Kam, 2006) and political competition
(Keele & Wolak, 2006a).
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
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Using national survey data, this article analyzes the determinants of ambivalence toward political parties and candidates. Informed by research in social and
political psychology, we propose and test an information-processing theory of
ambivalence. We argue that ambivalence is a function of the cognitive effort
individuals expend during the formation of political judgments and that it varies
systematically according to individuals’ information, motivation, and cognitive
style. Our results contribute new insight to the burgeoning literature on ambivalence. Consistent with previous research, we find that value conflict is associated
with greater partisan and candidate ambivalence. More innovatively, we show that
ambivalence is heightened among those who are most likely to engage in effortful
processing of information. Finally, our results suggest that partisan commitment
moderates the effects of effortful processing on ambivalence. We find that effortful
processing can, depending on individuals’ level of partisan commitment, either
heighten or dampen their level of partisan and candidate ambivalence.
In the next section we present our theoretical arguments concerning the
informational, cognitive, and motivational sources of ambivalence. After laying
out our theoretical expectations, we describe our data and discuss the measurement
of key concepts. Next we subject our hypotheses to empirical scrutiny by analyzing the effects of information, motivation, cognitive style, and value conflict on
partisan and candidate ambivalence. We conclude by discussing the principal
findings of the analysis and assessing their implications.
An Information-Processing Theory of Partisan and
Candidate Ambivalence
Our model of ambivalence presumes a heterogeneous electorate that stretches
across a continuum of partisan and candidate ambivalence. At one extreme are
univalent citizens, those who express unilateral support for their preferred party or
candidate and disdain for the opposition. At the other end of the spectrum are the
genuinely ambivalent, those who hold mixed evaluative reactions toward competing parties or candidates. The location of individuals along this continuum is partly
determined, we argue, by the cognitive effort with which individuals process
information relevant to their political judgments.
Our theoretical expectations are informed by insights from dual-process
models in social psychology (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) and the study of belief
complexity (Barker & Hansen, 2005; Linville, 1982). In social psychology, both
the elaboration-likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the heuristicsystematic model (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) posit two qualitatively
different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, modes of information processing. These two modes differ principally in terms of how effortfully individuals
process relevant information or evidence. In the HSM, for example, systematic
processing, the more effortful mode of thinking, is characterized as a “comprehensive, analytic orientation in which perceivers access all informational input for
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its relevance and importance to their judgmental task” (Chaiken et al., 1989,
p. 212). Heuristic processing, by contrast, is described as “a more limited processing mode requiring much less cognitive effort and capacity than systematic
processing” (p. 213).
Systematic processing implies not only greater depth in thinking, but also
greater breadth. As a result, elaboration contributes to greater belief complexity,
the number of different dimensions upon which a person relies to represent and
evaluate an attitude object (Linville, 1982). The attitudinal implications of thought
inducement and belief complexity have been a source of some debate in social
psychology. Some have argued that thought inducement leads to attitude extremity
and polarization (Tesser, Martin, & Mendolia, 1995). Others contend that heightened thought leads to more moderate or mixed evaluative judgments in which
perceivers view attitude objects as “good in some respects yet bad in others”
(Linville, 1982, p. 196). The question of whether heightened thought produces
attitudinal polarization or moderation turns principally on the issue of redundancy.
To the extent that the considerations canvassed in a judgment situation are deemed
nonredundant or orthogonal, effortful thought leads to more moderate or mixed
evaluative judgments (Judd & Lusk, 1984).
In the present context, we anticipate that effortful thought will generally
increase an individual’s likelihood of experiencing partisan and candidate ambivalence. Systematic processing should lead individuals to carefully consider the
relative strengths and weaknesses of parties and candidates across multiple dimensions. By leading individuals to canvass a broad range of conflicting considerations about competing parties and candidates, effortful thought is expected to
increase the difficulty of electoral judgments and the opportunity for ambivalence
to develop. Under our theory, effortful thought operates as a mechanism that
heightens people’s exposure to competing considerations. Ambivalence is conceived as a potential byproduct of effortful thought and occurs among those who
endorse these competing considerations.
Our hypothesized link between effortful thought and ambivalence is most
directly supported by experimental work showing a link between systematic processing and attitudinal inconsistency (Barker & Hansen, 2005). In an innovative
experiment, Barker and Hansen (2005) randomly induced subjects to engage in
systematic processing across a range of candidate-related information prior to
casting their vote. Systematic processing of candidate-related information should
lead to attitudinal complexity and inconsistency among those with sufficient information, they argue, because electoral judgments involve “several relevant decision
criteria that are inherently orthogonal to one another (e.g., desired candidate traits,
issue stands, value predispositions” (Barker & Hansen, 2005, p. 322).2 They report
that, among the knowledgeable, systematic processing weakened response
2
The possibility that systematic processing may lead to ambivalence is suggested by Barker and
Hansen (2005) in a footnote, although they do not attempt to measure ambivalence.
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
567
predictability and attenuated the effect of party identification on vote choice, two
consequences that are indicative of ambivalence (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002;
Basinger & Lavine, 2005).
Our theory is also supported by the work of Leone and Ensley (1986), who
found that opportunity for thought among those likely to engage in systematic
processing manifested more moderate evaluative reactions toward a variety of
social and political issues. This occurred, they suggested, because such individuals
are more likely to consult multiple, and potentially conflicting, schemata when
evaluating an attitude object. Similarly, Zaller and Feldman (1992) found that
extra thought induced less attitudinal consistency and reliability among survey
respondents. Finally, analyses of in-depth interviews have shown that, when given
sufficient time for thought and reflection, individuals canvass a broader range of
considerations and, as a result, are more conflicted in their political judgments
(Chong, 1993). In the analyses to follow, we will test whether those most likely to
engage in systematic processing exhibit higher levels of partisan and candidate
ambivalence.
The Moderating Role of Attitude Commitment
The question of whether effortful processing produces attitude moderation
or polarization is also dependent, some research suggests, upon the strength of
individuals’ attitudinal commitments (Millar & Tesser, 1986). Among those who
are uncommitted to a particular attitude direction, the purported connection
between effortful processing and attitude moderation should remain intact. This
connection may not hold, however, among those who possess strong prior attitude
commitments; “[W]here there is a commitment to a particular attitude direction, a
well-developed schema should facilitate justification of the initial attitude, thereby
increasing attitude polarization” (Millar & Tesser, 1986, p. 260). Because prior
attitude commitments encourage people to devalue or discount attitudinally incongruent information they encounter during information processing, such commitments may attenuate or even reverse the positive relationship between effortful
processing and ambivalence.
This line of reasoning suggests a second hypothesis in which the effects of
effortful processing on ambivalence are moderated by attitude commitment. This
potential interaction between effortful processing and attitude commitment could
manifest itself in two complimentary yet distinct ways. Under the weak version
of this hypothesis, effortful processing should simply increase ambivalence less
among those with strong attitude commitments than among those without such
commitments. This implies that effortful processing among those with strong
attitude commitments will have little or no positive impact on ambivalence. Under
a stronger version of this hypothesis, effortful processing may actually decrease
ambivalence among people with prior attitude commitments. This implies a polarization effect in which effortful processing decreases ambivalence among those
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with strong attitude commitments yet increases ambivalence among those without
such commitments.
Dispositional Sources of Systematic Processing
Instead of inducing systematic processing in an experimental setting (e.g.,
Barker & Hansen, 2005), we rely on a select set of individual differences that are
believed to influence the likelihood of systematic processing.3 What sorts of people
are most likely to engage in the effortful thought that systematic processing
entails? A central tenet of dual-process models is that the choice of processing
mode is governed by individuals’ motivation and ability to cognitively elaborate
on their judgment task. To engage in more effortful modes of thinking, individuals
must possess sufficient cognitive capacity and motivation; “[t]he more motivated
and able people are to assess the central merits of the attitude object, the more
likely they are to effortfully scrutinize all available object-relevant information”
(Petty & Wegener, 1999, p. 43). In this section, we introduce three dispositional
sources of systematic processing and discuss how each is expected to shape the
formation of partisan and candidate ambivalence.
Information
Systematic processing requires a certain degree of cognitive ability. In social
psychology, information or expertise is recognized as an important source of
systematic processing because it implicates an individual’s ability to cognitively
elaborate on his or her decision task (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Information is
doubly important because it may also signify one’s motivation to engage in
systematic processing. Not surprisingly, then, recent work suggests that information is a critical determinant of effortful processing in the political world (Kam,
2005). Using a carefully crafted experiment, Kam (2005) investigates the extent
to which subjects rely on party cues versus issue-relevant values when forming
their opinions about a novel political issue. The politically aware were shown to
rely more on issue-relevant values and less on party cues than the less aware. She
finds that political awareness, measured in terms of political information, “crisply
distinguishes between heuristic and systematic processors” (Kam, 2005, p. 163).
From this perspective, she suggests, political awareness taps not only what people
know about politics, but also how effortfully they process information. Systematic
processing is more likely to uncover both pros and cons concerning political
targets. Since informed individuals are more likely to engage in effortful processing, we hypothesize that informed individuals will be more likely to experience
partisan and candidate ambivalence.
3
Linville (1982) reports that dispositional and instructionally induced complexity produce qualitatively identical outcomes with respect to attitudinal extremity.
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
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Ours is not the first study to suggest a link between information and ambivalence. Scholars have found that, at least on some issues, information increases
response variability, implying greater ambivalence (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002;
Rudolph, 2005). In other circumstances, however, information has been associated
with lower levels of issue ambivalence (Steenbergen & Brewer, 2004). With respect
to political figures, one study reported that information induced a greater number of
evaluative reactions toward candidates (Bizer et al., 2002), although it did not assess
the extent to which those reactions were mixed. More direct support for our
hypothesis comes from Kam’s (2006) finding that education increases “openminded thinking” about candidates, a condition she describes as a “precursor to
ambivalence” (p. 934). Also consistent with our expectations is Barker and
Hansen’s (2005) finding that the link between systematic processing and attitudinal
inconsistency is strongest among those with higher levels of political knowledge.
Cognitive Style
Systematic processing requires a certain degree of motivation. Not all individuals are equally willing to expend the cognitive effort needed to engage in a
comprehensive review of all available information. A leading indicator of such
willingness has been termed one’s need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).
Need for cognition refers to “an individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy
effortful cognitive endeavors” (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Davis, 1996, p. 197).
Distinct from cognitive ability, need for cognition is a chronic individual difference that reflects one’s cognitive style. Individuals who are high in need for
cognition (NC) are believed to possess the requisite motivation needed to engage
in effortful thinking (Cacioppo et al., 1996).
A wealth of evidence in social psychology suggests that need for cognition is
a key determinant of systematic processing. Specifically, studies show high-NC
individuals are more likely to cognitively elaborate on issue-relevant information
when forming their attitudes and are less likely to be influenced by peripheral cues
(Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992; Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992). There is also
evidence that need for cognition triggers effortful processing in the political world.
Compared to low-NC individuals, high-NC individuals elaborate more reasons to
choose a presidential candidate, are more knowledgeable of the candidates, and
claim to have thought more about the candidates (Ahlering, 1987; Cacioppo et al.,
1986; Condra, 1992; but see Kam, 2005). As an important source of systematic
processing, need for cognition should, our theory predicts, contribute to higher
levels of partisan and candidate ambivalence.
Our hypothesis that need for cognition will engender greater ambivalence
runs directly counter to some recent findings. In one of the few studies to investigate the antecedents of ambivalence, Thompson and Zanna (1995) found that
need for cognition was associated with lower levels of ambivalence toward three
social policy issues. Others have reported that need for cognition promotes attitude
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polarization (Smith, Haugtvedt, & Petty, 1994), a state implying less ambivalence.
This relationship reverses direction, however, when individuals are explicitly
encouraged to think. Under such circumstances, studies have shown that need for
cognition actually promotes attitude moderation rather than polarization (Lassiter,
Apple, & Slaw, 1996; Leone & Ensley, 1986), a state consistent with greater
ambivalence.
Motivational Goals
Theories of motivated reasoning posit that individuals are, to varying degrees,
motivated by accuracy goals, the desire to reach an accurate conclusion, and by
directional goals, the desire to reach a preferred conclusion (Kunda, 1990; Lodge
& Taber, 2000). Individuals motivated by accuracy goals tend to process information in an evenhanded and pseudo-scientific manner, while those motivated by
directional goals process information in a more biased or partisan manner and tend
to devalue information that runs afoul of their preferred position (Lodge & Taber,
2000). In other words, partisan reasoners are more likely to engage in defensemotivated processing, a “selective, closed-minded form of processing” designed
to confirm the validity of preferred attitude positions (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993,
p. 340). The partisan reasoner thus resembles an “intuitive lawyer” rather than
an “intuitive scientist” (Baumeister & Newman, 1994).
While directional goals do not necessarily preclude systematic processing
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), we predict that individuals motivated by directional
goals will be less likely to experience partisan and candidate ambivalence.
Research has shown that such individuals devalue objective information that
conflicts with their partisan affect when making political judgments (Rudolph,
2006). In the present context, this suggests that partisan reasoners will not engage
in an evenhanded evaluation of all considerations concerning a particular candidate or party. When asked to provide reasons to support or oppose a given
candidate, for example, the partisan reasoner is expected to discount negative
(positive) information about a preferred (nonpreferred) candidate. This closedminded review of relevant considerations should decrease the likelihood of partisan or candidate ambivalence.
Individuals motivated by directional goals are, by definition, more likely to
have prior attitude commitments. In the present context, then, partisan reasoning is
also expected to moderate the impact of effortful processing on levels of ambivalence. As outlined above, we expect that effortful processing will generally
increase feelings of partisan and candidate ambivalence. Among those identified as
partisan reasoners, however, our theory predicts that the positive effects of effortful
processing on ambivalence will, at a minimum, be attenuated and may even
reverse direction entirely. In other words, effortful processing by partisan reasoners may actually have a polarizing effect and lower levels of partisan and candidate
ambivalence.
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
571
Data and Measurement
We test our hypotheses using data from the 2000 and 2004 NES. These two
sources of data were chosen because they each contain the open-ended candidate
likes/dislikes and party likes/dislikes questions needed to construct measures of
partisan and candidate ambivalence. Moreover, they are the only NES data sets
that include both these indicators of ambivalence and measures of need for cognition, one of our central explanatory variables.4
Partisan and Candidate Ambivalence
Following Lavine and colleagues (Basinger & Lavine, 2005; Lavine, 2001),
we measure ambivalence by relying on the NES open-ended likes/dislikes questions for parties and candidates. The party instrument asks: “I’d like to ask you
what you think are the good and bad points about the two national parties. Is there
anything in particular that you [like/dislike] about the [Democratic/Republican]
Party?” The follow-up probe, “Anything else?,” is repeated as needed up to four
times, allowing respondents to offer as many as five likes and five dislikes for each
party in question. Similarly, the candidate instrument asks: “I’d like to ask you
about the good and bad points of the major candidates for President. Is there
anything in particular about [Al Gore/George W. Bush (in 2000); John Kerry/
George W. Bush (in 2004)] that might make you want to vote [for/against] him?”
This instrument, and its follow-up probes, invites respondents to think of as many
as five likes and five dislikes for each candidate in question.
To operationalize partisan and candidate ambivalence, we rely on Lavine’s
(2001; Basinger & Lavine, 2005) measures of comparative partisan and comparative candidate ambivalence, both of which are variations of Thompson, Zanna, and
Griffin’s (1995) numerical index of ambivalence. Using Basinger and Lavine’s
(2005) notation, PD and PR are defined as the number of positive reactions a
respondent has to the Democratic and Republican parties respectively. Similarly,
ND and NR represent the number of negative reactions one has to the specified party.
They define D as the average of positive reactions to the Democrats and negative
reactions to the Republicans (D = (PD + NR)/2) and R as the average of positive
reactions to the Republicans and negative reactions to the Democrats
(R = (PR + ND)/2). Their comparative measure of partisan ambivalence can be
expressed as follows:
Partisan Ambivalence comp =
4
D+R
− D−R
2
Need for cognition measures were first included on the 1998 NES Pilot. Those data, however, do not
contain the requisite measures of partisan and candidate ambivalence.
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Quantitatively, this formula creates an index of partisan ambivalence that ranges
from -2.5 to 5.0, with higher values indicating greater ambivalence and lower
values indicating more polarized views.5 Theoretically, this formula, like the
Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995) formula upon which it was based, models
ambivalence as a function of the intensity of individuals’ positive and negative
reactions toward an object corrected by the similarity of those reactions. We use
this formula to create separate measures of partisan and candidate ambivalence in
2000 and 2004. These four measures will serve as the dependent variables in the
analyses to follow.
Information
We employ two measures of information. The first is a 7-point index of
political knowledge that is based on respondent’s ability to identify four political
figures and the majority party in each house of Congress.6 The second is a 7-point
scale of education that indicates the amount of schooling completed by each
respondent. We expect that people with greater political knowledge and education
will exhibit greater partisan and candidate ambivalence.
Cognitive Style
The 2000 and 2004 NES include two indicators of need for cognition. The
first question taps respondents’ enjoyment of effortful thought: “Some people like
to have responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of thinking, and
other people don’t like to have responsibility for situations like that. What about
you? Do you like having responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of
thinking, do you dislike it, or do you neither like it nor dislike it?” This question,
along with its follow up, creates a 5-point measure ranging from “dislike it a lot”
to “like it a lot.” The second item produces a dichotomous measure that taps
respondents’ preferred depth of thinking: “Some people prefer to solve simple
problems instead of complex ones, whereas other people prefer to solve more
complex problems. Which type of problem do you prefer to solve: simple or
complex?”7 We transform each indicator to share a common range (0–1) and
5
6
7
A measure of comparative candidate ambivalence can be similarly constructed by using respondents’
evaluative reactions toward the Republican and Democratic nominee in each presidential election
year. While these measures are, in some sense, “limited” (-2.5 to 5.0 range), there are at least 25
unique values for each within that range. Accordingly, we estimate our models using OLS. Ordered
probit and censored regression models yield the same substantive results for each variable under
investigation.
In 2000, respondents were asked to identify the office held by William Rehnquist, Tony Blair, Trent
Lott, and Janet Reno. In 2004, the four figures were William Rehnquist, Tony Blair, Dennis Hastert,
and Dick Cheney.
The original need for cognition contained 18 items (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). The NES selected these
two items because they loaded most strongly on the overall construct (Bizer et al., 2002).
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
573
average them to create a need for cognition index in which higher values indicate
higher need for cognition.8 Our theory anticipates that individuals scoring higher
in need for cognition will exhibit greater partisan and candidate ambivalence.
Motivational Goals
In an effort to gauge the extent to which respondents are motivated by
directional goals, we employ a pair of measures. The first is a 4-point scale of
partisan strength that ranges from pure Independents to strong partisans. Stronger
partisans have more incentive to support a particular candidate or party than do
those with weaker partisan ties. The second is a dichotomous measure indicating
whether respondents care or do not care who wins the presidential election.
Individuals who care about the election outcome also have incentive to retrieve
considerations that are consistent with their preferred outcome. Our main hypothesis predicts that strong partisans and those who care about the election outcome
will be less likely to experience partisan and candidate ambivalence. To test
whether prior attitudinal commitment moderates the effects of effortful processing
on ambivalence, we examine interactions between partisan strength and indicators
of effortful processing.
Value Conflict
Importantly, our statistical model controls for an alternative explanation of
ambivalence by including measures of core values and value conflict. The 2000
and 2004 NES contain multiple indicators of three core values, egalitarianism,
limited government, and moral traditionalism. Separate value scales were constructed to capture individuals’ commitment to each of these three values.9 Following Keele and Wolak (2006b), we measure value conflict by forming
multiplicative interactions between values that elites organize on opposite sides of
the ideological spectrum. Specifically, we formed interactions between egalitarianism and limited government and between egalitarianism and moral traditionalism. We anticipate that individuals who endorse competing values will be more
likely to exhibit partisan and candidate ambivalence.
8
9
The need for cognition index is sufficiently reliable in 2000 (a = 0.61) and in 2004 (a = 0.63). As
developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) and employed by us, need for cognition is based on
respondents’ self-descriptions. The validity of these self-descriptions has been demonstrated in
numerous political and non-political settings (see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Davis, 1996, for a
meta-analysis). Citizens who score higher on the need for cognition scale are, in fact, more mentally
engaged in politics. Need for cognition is, for example, positively associated with political involvement, political interest, political discussion, watching presidential debates, knowledge of presidential
candidates, and congruence between vote intention and vote choice (Ahlering, 1987; Bizer et al.,
2002; Cacioppo et al., 1986; Condra, 1992).
The NES’ six-item egalitarianism scale was sufficiently reliable in 2000 (a = 0.68) and in 2004
(a = 0.72). The three-item limited government scale was also reliable in both years (a = 0.74,
a = 0.71). The four-item moral traditionalism scale was similarly reliable (a = 0.64, a = 0.67).
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Opinionation
To control for opinionation, the idea that some people are more likely to have
evaluative reactions than others, we include two additional measures as controls.
Our first measure of opinionation is an individual difference variable termed the
need to evaluate (Jarvis & Petty 1996). Using the available NES instruments, we
created a need to evaluate index in which higher values indicate a greater need to
evaluate.10 Our second measure of opinionation is a count of the total likes and
dislikes mentioned by each respondent toward the attitude object in question (i.e.,
candidate or party). We include these two measures of opinionation purely as
controls and make no predictions about their impact on ambivalence.
Empirical Analysis
We estimate separate models for partisan and candidate ambivalence in 2000
and 2004. Table 1 reports the results of these four similarly specified models. The
first data column displays the determinants of partisan ambivalence in 2000. The
second data column reports the determinants of partisan ambivalence in 2004.
The predictors of candidate ambivalence in 2000 and 2004 are displayed in the
third and fourth data columns, respectively. All variables were transformed to
share a common range of 0 to 1. The constituent terms of each interaction were
centered about their mean prior to forming the interactions.
Consistent with previous research, we find evidence that value conflict is
associated with greater ambivalence. As can be seen in Table 1, the coefficient
representing conflict between egalitarianism and moral traditionalism is positive
and statistically significant in each of the four columns. This implies that individuals who express strong commitment to both egalitarianism and moral traditionalism are more likely to experience partisan and candidate ambivalence. The
hypothesized interaction between egalitarianism and limited government proved
to be less reliable. Although the coefficient representing conflict between these two
core values is correctly signed in three of the four models, it reaches statistical
significance only once.
We turn next to the effects of cognitive style. Need for cognition was hypothesized to increase partisan and candidate ambivalence because it implicates one’s
10
The NES includes two items: (1) “Some people have opinions about almost everything; other people
have opinions just about some things; and still other people have very few opinions. What about you?
Would you say that you have opinions about almost everything, about many things, about some
things, or about very few things?” and (2) “Compared to the average person do you have fewer
opinions about whether things are good or bad, about the same number of opinions, or more
opinions?” A follow-up question asked whether respondents had “a lot more/fewer opinions” or
“somewhat more/fewer opinions.” After rescaling these four- and five-point scales from 0 to 1, we
averaged them to create a need to evaluate index in which higher values indicate a greater need to
evaluate. The need to evaluate index is also sufficiently reliable in 2000 (a = 0.69) and in 2004
(a = 0.64). Moreover, it serves as a valid measure of opinionation in political contexts (Bizer et al.,
2004).
0.001 (0.017)
-0.004 (0.017)
0.025** (0.012)
-0.074*** (0.013)
-0.036*** (0.011)
-0.082** (0.039)
-0.028 (0.022)
0.018* (0.011)
-0.017 (0.014)
0.069 (0.052)
0.145** (0.061)
0.005 (0.020)
0.191** (0.023)
0.310*** (0.017)
0.12
971
0.030** (0.014)
0.035*** (0.014)
0.023** (0.011)
-0.093*** (0.011)
-0.017** (0.009)
0.013 (0.034)
-0.026 (0.018)
-0.005 (0.009)
0.005 (0.016)
0.040 (0.045)
0.291*** (0.073)
-0.014 (0.015)
0.189*** (0.017)
0.266*** (0.012)
0.19
1,321
Partisan Ambivalence
Partisan Ambivalence
-0.026 (0.017)
0.055** (0.022)
0.286*** (0.014)
0.13
1,308
0.018 (0.021)
0.008 (0.011)
-0.054*** (0.018)
0.118** (0.050)
0.179** (0.082)
-0.086*** (0.012)
-0.050*** (0.010)
-0.156*** (0.038)
0.020** (0.010)
-0.020 (0.016)
0.055*** (0.016)
Candidate Ambivalence
2000
0.002 (0.023)
0.001 (0.001)
0.315*** (0.019)
0.14
980
-0.061** (0.024)
0.009 (0.012)
-0.028* (0.015)
-0.073 (0.057)
0.164** (0.067)
-0.100*** (0.014)
-0.077*** (0.014)
-0.187*** (0.043)
-0.005 (0.013)
0.001 (0.018)
0.036** (0.018)
Candidate Ambivalence
2004
Note. Dependent variables appear at the top of each column. Table entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All
variables were scaled from 0 to 1. Constituent terms in the interactions were centered about their mean.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
Information
Political Knowledge
Education
Cognitive Style
Need for Cognition
Directional Goals
Partisan Strength
Care Who Wins
Partisan Strength ¥ Political Knowledge
Value Conflict
Egalitarianism
Limited Government
Moral Traditionalism
Egalitarianism ¥ Limited Government
Egalitarianism ¥ Moral Traditionalism
Opinionation
Need to Evaluate
# of Evaluative Responses
Constant
Adj. R2
N
2004
2000
Table 1. Determinants of Ambivalence toward Parties and Candidates, 2000–2004
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
575
576
Rudolph and Popp
cognitive motivation to engage in systematic processing. As Table 1 makes clear,
the results are largely supportive of that expectation. Three of the four coefficients
representing need for cognition are correctly signed and statistically significant.
These findings imply that individuals who are more likely to engage in and enjoy
effortful processing are more likely to become ambivalent. To illustrate the magnitude of these effects, we calculate the effects of a one-unit increase in need for
cognition in terms of the percent change it triggers in the dependent variable.11 In
2000, for example, a one-unit increase in need for cognition increases candidate
ambivalence by 0.02 points, an increase of more than 7%. A similar increase in
need for cognition elevates partisan ambivalence by roughly 7% in 2000 and by
8% in 2004. It should be noted that the observed associations between need for
cognition and ambivalence are independent not only of value conflict, but also of
individuals’ level of information (i.e., education, political knowledge) and any
tendency to express multiple evaluative reactions (i.e., need to evaluate, number of
evaluative reactions).
Consider next the influence of motivational goals. As people motivated by
directional goals, strong partisans and those caring about the election outcome are
less likely to engage in a systematic review of the evidence and, as a result, were
predicted to be less likely to exhibit partisan and candidate ambivalence. Consistent with expectations, partisan strength reduces the level of ambivalence across
each of the four models. Moreover, these effects are, substantively speaking, quite
sizable. A one-unit increase in partisan strength lowers partisan ambivalence by
roughly 28% in 2000 and by 22% in 2004.12 The effects of partisan strength are
even more pronounced in the two candidate models, where a similarly sized shock
decreases ambivalence by 30% and 38%, respectively.
Additional support for our hypothesis concerning motivational goals is provided by the coefficients denoting whether respondents care about the outcome of
the presidential election. As shown in Table 1, all four of these coefficients are
negatively signed and statistically significant. Caring about the election outcome
decreases the likelihood of partisan ambivalence by 5% in 2000 and by nearly 11%
in 2004. Such concern decreases ambivalence toward the candidates by about 18%
in 2000 and 29% in 2004. Although these effects are smaller in magnitude than
those associated with partisan strength, they point to the same substantive conclusion; motivation to pursue directional goals diminishes one’s level of partisan and
candidate ambivalence.
Next we examine the effects of information. Because they implicate one’s
ability and motivation to engage in systematic processing, education and political
knowledge were hypothesized to increase the likelihood of partisan and candidate
11
12
Our point of departure for these calculations is the sample mean of the appropriate dependent
variable. In 2000, partisan ambivalence has a mean of 0.33 with a standard deviation of 0.12. In 2004,
these values are 0.33 and 0.12 respectively. Candidate ambivalence has a mean of 0.28 with a
standard deviation of 0.14 in 2000 and a mean of 0.26 with a standard deviation of 0.14 in 2004.
The direct impact of partisan strength is calculated with political knowledge fixed at its mean value.
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
577
ambivalence. Consider first the effects of education. The coefficients representing
education are positively signed and statistically significant in three of the four
models. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the results indicate that bettereducated respondents are more likely to experience ambivalence toward political
parties and candidates. A one-unit increase in education raises partisan ambivalence 0.035 points, an increase of approximately 11%. A similar increase in
education elevates candidate ambivalence by about 20% in 2000 and by nearly
14% in 2004.
The results provide qualified support for our hypotheses concerning the
effects of political knowledge. In the 2000 partisan model, the coefficient for
political knowledge is both positively signed and statistically significant. Consistent with our theory, this result indicates that knowledgeable respondents are more
likely to exhibit partisan ambivalence. A one-unit shock in political knowledge
increases partisan ambivalence by more than 9% in 2000.13 In the two candidate
models, however, the results are less supportive. Only one of the two coefficients
is correctly signed, and neither is distinguishable from zero. These null results
signify the absence of any direct or unconditional relationship between political
knowledge and candidate ambivalence.
Although we generally expect that effortful processing will increase levels of
ambivalence, we have also argued that the effects of effortful processing may be
moderated by individuals’ prior attitude commitment. To test this moderation
hypothesis, we formed an interaction between indicators of attitude commitment
(i.e., partisan strength) and effortful processing (i.e., political knowledge).14 If the
moderation hypothesis is correct, we should observe a negatively signed interaction between partisan strength and political knowledge. As can be seen in Table 1,
we observe precisely that in three of the four models. Substantively, these interactions imply that the extent to which effortful processing increases ambivalence
diminishes as partisan strength increases.
To further illustrate the moderating influence of partisan commitment,
Figure 1 visually depicts each of the four interactions. We begin with the two
panels on the left, which show the interactions for the partisan ambivalence
models. Among those with low partisan strength, the slopes for political knowledge are positive and quite steep. Among those with high partisan strength,
however, the knowledge slopes are modestly positive or demonstrably flat. This
implies that effortful processing increases partisan ambivalence more among
those with low partisan commitment than it does among those with high partisan
commitment.
13
14
The direct impact of political knowledge is calculated with partisan strength fixed at its mean value.
We selected political knowledge to represent effortful processing because it implicates both individuals’ ability and motivation to engage in systematic processing. Since additional analyses
revealed no evidence of interaction between partisan strength and any of the other explanatory
variables, these interactions are not explored further.
Partisan Ambivalence, 2000
Partisan Ambivalence, 2004
High Knowledge
0.32
Low Knowledge
0.28
0.32
High Knowledge
0.27
0.38
Low Strength
High Strength
Low Strength
High Strength
Interaction between Political Knowledge and Partisan Strength
Low Knowledge
0.28
0.36
0.41
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
High Knowledge
0.19
Low Knowledge
0.28
0.29
High Knowledge
0.18
0.41
Low Strength
High Strength
Low Strength
High Strength
Interaction between Political Knowledge and Partisan Strength
Low Knowledge
0.28
0.31
0.39
Interaction between Political Knowledge and Partisan Strength
Figure 1. Partisan Commitment and the Conditional Impact of Effortful Processing
Note: Each panel in the figure reports the predicted level of partisan or candidate ambivalence given the specified values of political knowledge and
partisan strength while all other variables were fixed at their mean values.
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
Interaction between Political Knowledge and Partisan Strength
Candidate Ambivalence, 2000
Candidate Ambivalence, 2004
0.5
578
Rudolph and Popp
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
579
As shown in the two panels on the right-hand side of Figure 1, the story for
candidate ambivalence is similar in some respects yet visibly different in others.
Among individuals with little partisan commitment, the knowledge slopes are
again positive and steep. Among those with strong partisan commitments, by
contrast, the slopes for political knowledge are markedly negative. This result
implies that, among committed partisans, effortful processing has a polarizing
effect and actually reduces candidate ambivalence. This polarization effect helps
to explain why the coefficients representing the unconditional effects of political
knowledge on candidate ambivalence in Table 1 were insignificant. Since the
effects of knowledge are positive among certain types of respondents yet negative
among others, the unconditional effect of knowledge on candidate ambivalence
was understandably muffled.
Discussion
There is a growing recognition among scholars that ambivalence is politically
consequential. The factors that give rise to ambivalence have received relatively
less attention. This study enriches our understanding of ambivalence by developing and testing an alternative theory of its origins. Ambivalence toward parties and
candidates should be greatest, we have argued, among those most likely to engage
in systematic processing. Such processing is anticipated to engender greater
ambivalence because it leads individuals to evenhandedly canvass a broad range of
potentially conflicting considerations when forming their political judgments.
The results of the analysis lend empirical credence to the proposed theory.
They demonstrate that individuals’ ambivalence is closely tied to several dispositional sources of systematic processing. Ambivalence levels tend to be higher
among the better informed and those with higher levels of need for cognition.
Individuals motivated by directional goals exhibit lower levels of ambivalence.
Collectively, these results suggest that ambivalence is more likely to occur among
those who engage in and enjoy effortful processing of information. Our analysis
further indicates that the linkage between effortful processing and ambivalence is
conditioned by attitude commitment. Among those with strong partisan commitments, information has an attenuated and, in some cases, a negative (polarizing)
impact on ambivalence levels.
Although we predicted that partisan commitment would attenuate or even
reverse the positive association between information and ambivalence, we did not
expect that the nature of this interaction would vary systematically across the four
models. Why does partisan commitment have an attenuating effect in the case of
party evaluations but a polarizing effect in the case of candidate evaluations? The
answer, we suspect, has to do with the nature of decision making in electoral
contests. Presidential elections typically require voters to make a dichotomous
choice between the two major-party candidates. The expectation of an impending
choice between two specific candidates may imbue strong partisans with height-
580
Rudolph and Popp
ened motivation to devalue attitudinally inconsistent information in an effort to
reduce any ambivalence and simplify their choice. If effortful thought is focused
on attitudinally consistent information, it should amplify the strength of prior
attitudes, thereby creating a polarizing effect.
In contrast, elections seldom require voters to make a single choice between the
two parties. Voters can and often do split their ticket for different offices within and
across different levels of government. Although partisan reasoners still have incentive to discount inconsistent information when evaluating parties, that incentive is
arguably dampened by the absence of a single choice looming on the electoral
horizon. This explanation could explain why partisan commitment is strong enough
to weaken the relationship between information and partisan ambivalence but not
strong enough to reverse the sign of that relationship. It could also explain why the
direct effects of party strength are slightly (but not significantly) weaker in the
two-party models than they are in the two candidate models.15
Before considering any theoretical or normative implications of our findings,
two caveats are particularly worthy of note. First, we remind the reader that we
have not experimentally induced systematic processing among the survey respondents. Rather, we infer a connection between systematic processing and ambivalence based on a set of observed relationships between dispositional sources of
systematic processing (i.e., information, cognitive style, and motivation) and
ambivalence. While our cross-sectional research design naturally prevents us from
making any firm claims about causality, the reported associations between indicators of systematic processing and ambivalence provide suggestive evidence in
support of our causal story. These limitations notwithstanding, an observational
approach does lend some external validity to our substantive inferences and
provides an unobtrusive way of measuring systematic processing. Moreover, we
are comforted by the fact that Linville’s (1982) findings of a link between complexity of thought and attitudinal moderation were separately produced using both
dispositional and experimentally induced measures of complexity.
Second, the theory developed here argues that effortful thought begets
ambivalence. That expectation is grounded in empirical findings from both experimental (Barker & Hansen, 2005; Leone & Ensley, 1986; Zaller & Feldman, 1992)
and observational studies (Chong, 1993). Given the nature of the current research
design, we cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that the causal arrow may also
run in the opposite direction.16 Indeed, some have argued that ambivalence may
15
16
An alternative explanation for these asymmetric results may be that party identification is more
closely tied to partisan ambivalence than to candidate ambivalence, which could potentially restrict
the variance of partisan ambivalence. As noted earlier in Footnote 11, the standard deviations for
partisan ambivalence are slightly but not significantly smaller than those for candidate ambivalence
(i.e. 0.12 vs. 0.14).
As a precaution, we performed a series of Hausman specification tests to test for simultaneity
between ambivalence and each of our indicators of systematic processing. These tests all failed to
reject the null hypothesis of no simultaneity at the 0.05 level, indicating that the OLS estimates we
report are consistent.
An Information Processing Theory of Ambivalence
581
motivate individuals to pursue systematic processing in an effort to reduce internal
conflict (Maio, Bell, & Esses, 1996) or to increase confidence in their attitudes
(Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997). Such an argument is also consistent with the
observation that ambivalence can, under certain conditions, increase ideologically
based voting and diminishes voters’ reliance on partisan heuristics (Basinger &
Lavine, 2005). These alternative views need not be viewed as mutually exclusive.
It is quite possible that effortful thought may initially result in ambivalence toward
a political figure. As time progresses and a moment of decision (e.g., an election)
approaches, however, the ambivalent may systematically seek out additional information in an effort to reconcile their mixed evaluative reactions. Sorting out the
dynamics between systematic processing and ambivalence over time is an important task for future research.
The possibility that effortful processing and ambivalence may be reciprocally
linked does not mean that they are conceptually identical. Effortful thought is a
process that increases individuals’ exposure to potentially conflicting considerations. By doing so, it creates an opportunity for ambivalence to develop. Ambivalence, though, does not occur unless an individual actually endorses the competing
considerations that he or she encounters. Effortful processing and ambivalence are
empirically as well as theoretically distinct. This is exemplified by our finding that
information, a key indicator of effortful thinking, does not always produce ambivalence. Importantly, among committed partisans, effortful thought fails to raise
partisan ambivalence and actually reduces candidate ambivalence. Consistent
with Millar and Tesser’s (1986) research on thought-induced attitude change, this
suggests that effortful thought can, depending on the circumstances, lead to
increased univalence or increased ambivalence.
From a theoretical perspective, our results imply that ambivalence is partly
shaped by the depth and breadth of information processing. In so doing, they
provide an alternative perspective concerning the origins of ambivalence. The
information processing and value conflict-based accounts differ somewhat in terms
of how narrowly they construe ambivalence. A value conflict account takes a
relatively narrow view, suggesting that ambivalence is the result of internalized
conflicts between core values. An information processing account is less stringent in
that it allows conflicting considerations, whether they consist of core values or not,
to elicit ambivalence. We wish to emphasize that an information processing theory
of ambivalence does not necessarily undermine a value-conflict based account.
Empirically, our own results provide further evidence that value conflict is a key
determinant of ambivalence. Rather, the two accounts are potentially complimentary. Since individuals who engage in effortful processing are more likely to
entertain a broad range of considerations, they may become more likely to experience value conflict, which, in turn, heightens ambivalence. From this perspective, it
is possible that value conflict may actually help to mediate the effects of effortful
processing on ambivalence. However, any such mediation is likely incomplete since
our indicators of systematic processing still matter independent of value conflict.
582
Rudolph and Popp
Democratic theorists typically assume that effortful thought among citizens is
desirable in a democratic society. Effortful thought is presumed to lead to more
informed and qualitatively better judgments. To the extent that systematic processing engenders greater ambivalence, the normative implications of our theory and
findings are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, ambivalence has been linked to a
number of outcomes that are normatively unsatisfying. As noted earlier, ambivalence has frequently been associated with less stable, less predictable, less predictive, and less accessible political attitudes. From this perspective, effortful thought
does not appear to be the panacea for which many political scientists pine.
On the other hand, recent research has begun to suggest the consequences of
ambivalence are not all unattractive. Among those who are knowledgeable or who
have been exposed to stimulating campaigns, for example, ambivalence increases
ideologically based voting (Basinger & Lavine, 2005). Moreover, recent work
reports that the ambivalent attach greater weight to objective economic information when forming retrospective evaluations of the economy, resulting in more
accurate perceptions of the economy (Lavine, Parker-Stephen, & Steenbergen,
2005). Because the ambivalent possess a more valid set of economic beliefs upon
which to draw when rendering their political judgments, they may actually have an
increased opportunity to make an informed and reasoned set of judgments. Taken
together, these findings suggest that the cloud of ambivalence may have a silver
lining. From this perspective, the finding that systematic processing heightens
partisan and candidate ambivalence underscores the normatively desirable properties of effortful thought.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Jennifer Jerit, Cindy Kam, Jim Kuklinski, Howard Lavine,
and Jeff Mondak for helpful comments and suggestions. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Thomas J. Rudolph, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, 361 Lincoln Hall, 702 S. Wright St., Urbana, IL 61801.
E-mail: [email protected]
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