THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT
BOARD: AN EXERCISE IN RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT OR AN ACT OF POLITICAL
WILL?
A Thesis
Presented to the faculty of the Department of Government
California State University, Sacramento
Submitted in partial satisfaction of
the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
in
Government
by
Lisa Ann Macumber
SPRING
2013
© 2013
Lisa Ann Macumber
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT
BOARD: AN EXERCISE IN RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT OR AN ACT OF POLITICAL
WILL?
A Thesis
by
Lisa Ann Macumber
Approved by:
__________________________________, Committee Chair
James Cox
__________________________________, Second Reader
Kimberly Nalder
____________________________
Date
iii
Student: Lisa Ann Macumber
I certify that this student has met the requirements for format contained in the University format
manual, and that this thesis is suitable for shelving in the Library and credit is to be awarded for
the thesis.
__________________________, Graduate Coordinator ___________________
James Cox
Date
Department of Government
iv
Abstract
of
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT
BOARD: AN EXERCISE IN RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT OR AN ACT OF POLITICAL
WILL?
by
Lisa Ann Macumber
Statement of Problem
For decades, California’s governors, legislators, and various policy-developing
organizations have initiated concepts to reform the State’s waste and recycling oversight
organizations, although none were successful until the passage of Senate Bill (SB) 63
(Strickland, Chapter 21, Statutes of 2009). The California Integrated Waste Management
Board (CIWMB) and the Division of Recycling (DOR) within the Department of
Conservation conducted similar activities. Since the inception of the Beverage Container
Recycling Program and creation of DOR, interest to combine the two organizations have
surfaced many times over more than two decades. Considering both administrative and
political theories of organization, I examined why SB 63 was successful in eliminating
the governing board of CIWMB and merging the State’s waste and recycling programs
into one organization, the Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery
v
(CalRecycle). Additionally, I examine whether SB 63 resulted in any of the
administrative efficiency goals it was intended to achieve.
Sources of Data
Data for this thesis were gathered in two ways: through one-on-one interviews
with individuals who worked for or with the organizations affected by SB 63; and,
through a thorough review of articles, legislative analyses/publications, and budgetrelated documents prior and subsequent to the reorganization of CalRecycle. Specific
budgetary data were collected and analyzed for Fiscal Years 2007-08 through 2011-12 to
help explain whether any cost savings occurred as a result of SB 63.
Conclusions Reached
Using administrative and political theories of organization, I show that the
elimination of CIWMB and the reorganization of the State’s waste and recycling
programs were ultimately politically driven, though generally constructed out of the
desire for a more efficient government. By evaluating interviews with individuals who
played a role in the decision-making relative to CIWMB or DOR and review of relevant
budgetary data, I conclude that the reorganization did not benefit from any immediate
cost savings or improved efficiencies. However, under the new governing structure,
CalRecycle may realize longer-term cost and functional efficiencies.
_______________________, Committee Chair
James Cox
_______________________
Date
vi
DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my Uncle, Robert Grazzini. Your passion for politics and
teaching remains my strongest memory of you. That passion influenced me in more ways that I
can explain. Although we lost you early, you continue to warm our hearts every day.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe a tremendous amount of thanks to a tremendous number of people for
supporting me and sticking by my side throughout this long and arduous process. First, a
big hug and kiss to my husband Scott, for putting up with the years invested and for
pushing me, constantly, to just get this over with. It’s all done, babe! Thank you, and I
love you!! Many thanks to E for reading my first and subsequent drafts, and for
providing such great editing and advice throughout the entire process. Thank you to my
many friends (too many to count…I’m a lucky woman!) and amazing family that have
encouraged, enlightened, and endorsed me throughout the past decade as I pursued
incredible employment opportunities while seeking a higher education. Thank you to
Rob, James, and Pat for making an early investment in me by recommending me to the
program and for serving as important role models as I commenced this journey. Thank
you to the interviewees for your time and perspective: I enjoyed the opportunity to visit
this topic with you! Finally, thanks are definitely in order for my Advisor, Professor Jim
Cox, who didn’t let me fall off the radar, and who put in a lot of time and effort to help
make this happen. Thank you, Professor!!
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Dedication .............................................................................................................................. vii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... viii
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ x
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................... xi
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................... 7
3. THE HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA’S WASTE AND RECYCLING PROGRAMS....... 16
4. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 30
5. THE RESULTS ................................................................................................................ 40
6. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................. 59
Appendix A. Consent to Participate in Research ................................................................... 63
Appendix B. Works referenced but not cited ......................................................................... 65
References ............................................................................................................................... 68
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Tables
Page
Table 5.1. Fiscal Year 2007-08 through Fiscal Year 2011-12 Actuals ....................................... 49
Table 5.2. Percent Difference in Positions and Expenditures Before and After SB 63 .............. 50
Table 5.3. Percent Difference in Positions and Expenditures from Multiple Organizations
Before and After January 1, 2010 .............................................................................. 53
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figures
Page
Figure 1.1. Arrangement of State’s Waste and Recycling Programs Pre- and Post-SB 63 ........... 3
Figure 5.1. Actual Positions for Fiscal Years 2007-12 ................................................................ 51
Figure 5.2. Actual Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2007-12 ......................................................... 52
Figure 5.3. Actual Positions from Multiple Organizations for Fiscal Years 2007-12 ................. 54
Figure 5.4. Changes in Positions for Multiple Organizations Before and After
January 1, 2010 ......................................................................................................... 55
Figure 5.5. Actual Expenditures from Multiple Organizations for Fiscal Years 2007-12........... 56
Figure 5.6 Changes in Expenditures for Multiple Organizations Before and After
January 1, 2010 ......................................................................................................... 57
xi
1
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that during difficult economic times, governments scour various
cost-cutting options to alleviate pressures on the State’s overall economy. An approach
often taken by state governments is to find ways to streamline programs and policies
within its internal bureaucracy to both save money and present a responsible appearance
to its constituencies. Chackerian (1996) finds that reorganizations of government
programs and agencies tend to be more likely to occur during long periods of economic
decline, but that policy trends also affect the demand for institutional changes by various
political interests as well. While reorganizations may result in some level of improved
efficiency over time, costs typically go up as political forces fine-tune internal processes
(Conant, 1986). Despite the appearance of consolidated processes and reduced costs, the
real product of reorganization is merely a statement of political will. Power, the most
fundamental element of politics, plays a more significant role in the initiation and
outcome of reorganizations as the perceived driving force of general improvement.
Twenty-first century California provides an interesting case for examining the
roots and outcomes of bureaucratic reorganizations because of several recent attempts to
streamline California’s government. Under the direction of Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger, who served as California’s chief administrator from 2003-2010, the
executive branch promoted hundreds of options for reorganization, and successfully
began implementing a few large-scale changes to systems and departments in the State.
2
Consistent with history, Schwarzenegger’s efforts unfolded in a piecemeal process,
despite his efforts to overhaul every facet of the bureaucracy.
Of much curiosity is the abolishment of the California Integrated Waste
Management Board (CIWMB). Senate Bill (SB) 63 (Strickland, Chapter 21, Statutes of
2009) reorganized the State’s oversight of waste management – something that
environmentalists, industry, legislators, advocates, and critics alike had been debating for
decades. Specifically, the bill abolished CIWMB’s governing board, created a new
department called the Department of Resources Recovery and Recycling (CalRecycle),
transferred the technical and policy staff that made up the former CIWMB to the new
agency, and likewise transferred the Beverage Container Recycling Program, operated by
the Division of Recycling (DOR) from the Department of Conservation (DOC). The bill
also placed CalRecycle under the California Natural Resources Agency (Resources
Agency). Subsequently, Governor’s Reorganization Plan (GRP) 2, under Governor Jerry
Brown, was enacted in May of 2012, and moved CalRecycle from under Resources
Agency to the California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) where the former
CIWMB had resided. DOC remains a separate department within Resources Agency, but
no longer oversees the State’s Beverage Container Recycling Program. This
transformation creates a single waste and recycling oversight agency from two previously
fragmented organizations.
The arrangement of these organizations before and after the passage of SB 63 and
GRP 2 is illustrated in Figure 1.1 below.
3
Figure 1.1. Arrangement of State’s Waste and Recycling Programs Pre- and Post-SB 63.
Under Resources Agency
Under CalEPA
Pre-SB 63
California Integrated Waste
Management Board
Board Governance
Programmatic Divisions:
Sustainability Program
 Local Assistance and Market
Development
 Financial Assistance
 Statewide Technical and Analytical
Resources
Waste Compliance, & Mitigation Program
 Permitting and LEA Support
 Compliance Evaluation and
Enforcement
 Cleanup, Closure, & Financial
Assurance
Department of Conservation
Director Governance
 Division of Recycling
 Division of Oil, Gas & Geothermal
Resources
 Office of Mine Reclamation
 Division of Land Resource
Protection
 California Geological Survey
Post-SB 63
Department of Resources Recycling
and Recovery
Director Governance
Programmatic Divisions:
 Materials Management and Local
Assistance
 Waste Permitting, Compliance, &
Mitigation
 Recycling
Department of Conservation
Director Governance
 Division of Oil, Gas &
Geothermal Resources
 Office of Mine Reclamation
 Division of Land Resource
Protection
 California Geological Survey
The passage of SB 63 raised many questions for policymakers. Alternative plans
for reorganization of CIWMB and DOC, specific to waste and recycling, have circulated
since the 1980s when the Beverage Container Recycling Program was first placed with
DOC. The Little Hoover Commission’s “Report on Solid Waste Management: The
Trashing of California” highlights the lack of credibility and ineffectiveness realized by
the California Waste Management Board, the 1980s version of the board, and the
4
Legislature’s desire to keep the critical Beverage Container Recycling Program from
failing under its watch (1989). The California Waste Management Board, formerly a 9member part-time board, became CIWMB, a 5-member full-time board, in 1989 with the
enactment of the Integrated Waste Management Act (AB 939, Sher, Chapter 1095,
Statutes of 1989). At this time, CIWMB began to take on some initiatives related to
recycling, but remained separate and distinct from DOC’s program.
Since that time, a number of reorganization plans to meld the two entities have
surfaced. Several reports from the Little Hoover Commission and Legislative Analyst’s
Office (LAO) have called for fundamental shifts in both the policy and governance
driving the State’s waste and recycling programs. Since the 1980s, Legislators have
initiated concepts for reform, and Governors have floated reorganization plans that failed
to gain traction.
After two decades of deliberation, what finally led to the creation of CalRecycle?
Did politics play a significant role, or was the reorganization simply the result of a
collective desire for administrative efficiency? Secondarily, since the passage of SB 63,
CalRecycle has had to adjust to its new role in State government. Have the elimination
of CIWMB’s governing board and the reorganization of the State’s waste and recycling
functions resulted in any of the administrative efficiency goals it was intended to
achieve?
5
What’s to come?
Using administrative and political theories of reorganization, I will show that the
elimination of CIWMB and the reorganization of the State’s waste and recycling
programs were ultimately politically driven, though generally constructed out of the
desire for a more efficient government. I will provide an historical account of
reorganization considerations and attempts; an overview of politics, policies, and other
factors that played a role in those attempts; and provide some answers that help to explain
the successful passage of SB 63. By evaluating the responses given during interviews
with individuals who each played a role in decision-making relative to CIWMB or DOC
and review of relevant budgetary data, I will show that the reorganization did not result in
immediate cost savings or improved efficiencies, but under the new governing structure,
CalRecycle may realize longer-term cost and functional efficiencies. This thesis will
conclude with a summary of my findings, and a prediction for the future success of
CalRecycle.
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a thorough literature
review that outlines the different reasons for reorganizing bureaucracy and the various
benefits and drawbacks. Chapter 3 will set the stage for the heart of this thesis by
providing a detailed history of California’s waste and recycling governing bodies.
Chapter 4 explains the methodology behind interviewing key waste and recycling policy
makers and reviews quantitative budget data for use in the analytical portion of this
thesis. In Chapter 5, the results of my interviews and analysis of data is divided into two
parts that help answer the key questions as to why the reorganization was successful,
6
what it intended to achieve, and what it ultimately realized. Specifically, the first part
focuses on answering these questions qualitatively using insight gained from the
interviews, and the second part provides the quantitative analysis centered around the
results of the reorganization. Chapter 6 will conclude this thesis with an overview of the
findings and recommendations for future research.
7
Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theory or Fact: how we should think about reorganization
The literature surrounding how and why governments seek to reorganize is thick,
broad, and enlightening. Most American state governments, as noted by Barrows, are
organized in an unscientific manner and they often “suffer from unfortunate traditions”
(1915). They endure poor organization, poor management, and outdated administrative
practices and procedures (Conant, 1986). Many authors argue that the motives behind
reorganization are divided between two theoretical camps known as administrative and
political views of organization (Arnold, 1974; Barrows, 1915; Conant, 1986; Dimock,
1951; Peters, 1992; and Schachter, 1995).
Simply stated, the administrative view of government organization rests on the
assumption that government is expected to operate in an efficient and effective manner.
Pratt explains that bureaucracies are not built from careful planning, but instead they
come together in pieces, as different agendas gain sufficient power and legislative
support (1921). Because of this, Peters argues that reorganization should be done
holistically as a re-grouping of agencies and reassignment of activities into the most
economical and effective configuration (1992). Many governments seek reorganization
because there is an alleged political need to change the government’s structure due to
inadequacies in the existing administrative landscape. Realizing efficiency and
effectiveness in government is assumed to result in cost saving and improved service to
the public (Conant, 1986; Pratt, 1921). In an administrative model of organization,
8
bureaucracies should be structured by like functions and purpose, with minimal
overlapping functions, and unified control, typically at the executive level (Arnold,
1974).
The more political view of organization posits that executives and legislatures
serve their constituencies and seek reorganization as a means to further their political
agendas (Arnold, 1974; Chakerian, 1996; Dimock, 1951; March and Olson, 1983; Moe,
1985 and 1989). Reorganization occurs due to political struggles between competing
interests that seek access, representation, control, and policy advantages (March and
Olson, 1983). This view recognizes that while the end result of reorganization may be
perceived as a matter of streamlining and improving government, it is in fact merely a byproduct of larger political forces that seek control. Chakarian notes that much of the
dominating literature on reorganization “suggests that reorganization events are grounded
in short-term struggles for political access and symbolic rewards” (1996, p. 43). Dimock
highlights the link between both the input and output products of reorganization to
explain the important role that political considerations play in reorganizations:
“A basic rule is that organization is not a ‘good’ (goal, value) in and of itself; it is
only a means to a social objective.”
Additionally, the political view of organization is over-laid by the role power
plays with regard to political institutions. Long states that “the lifeblood of
administration is power” (1949). He discusses the link between power and
administration and the important metamorphosis that occurs as power shifts over time
among political leaders. Each level of government reacts to pressures from the public,
stakeholders, and competing institutions within government. Moe notes that government
9
institutions are not cooperative with or mutually beneficial for most of the people that are
impacted by them (2005). Instead, institutions merely operate in order to exercise power.
Government structures are at the behest of whoever controls the agenda. In fact, Moe
further notes that political groups intentionally impose rules that constrain bureaucratic
power and try to build organizations in such a way that it is difficult for opponents to
change later (1985).
Many authors recognize that while these two lines of thought differ on
motivation, they are intertwined in action and results (Conant, 1986; March and Olson,
1983). While many authors make a distinction between these two theories, both are
useful for understanding how motives and circumstances affect the likelihood of
successful reorganization. The circumstances that lead to reorganization often link a
desire to improve administrative function while pacifying political desires, regardless of
how the corresponding reorganization proposal is marketed.
Meier studied 16 state governments to help provide some insight to the growing
and conflicting literature regarding the overall benefits of reorganization (1980). His
study, which evaluated short- and long-term impacts on state employment and
expenditures resulting from reorganizations, found that no significant reductions in these
variables were realized. Multiple studies conducted by Conant also examine whether
reorganizations save states money (1986 and 1992). Conant found that while marginal
savings could be realized from reorganization, State expenditures more often increased.
Some reorganizations simply move people and processes around, and rarely make the
10
necessary cuts needed to realize a savings. Conant argues that savings could be achieved
with or without reorganization, as long as real cuts are made (1992).
Berkman and Reenock challenge Meier’s study, that they believed was too
limited, and found that gradual elimination of agencies does lead to greater efficiencies in
government (2004). After reviewing Meier’s work, and the work of Conant and others,
they took a broader approach to evaluating past reorganizations by looking at both
incremental and comprehensive reorganizations over a longer period of time. Their data
showed that the more agencies a state consolidated over time, the more the state realized
a savings with respect to employment.
What is the problem?
Miles and Snow et al. point out that internal restructuring occurs often and is
typically undertaken as a means to solve a problem related to success or survival
(1978, p. 547). They note:
“Organizations…constantly modify and refine the mechanism by which they
achieve their purpose–rearranging their structure of roles and relationships and
their managerial processes.”
However, there are a variety of circumstances that prompt forced reorganizations of
public agencies through termination or mergers. These include, among others, economic
uncertainty or downturns, failure of an agency to operate properly, poor perception of
government response to a significant problem, political power struggles between
complementary institutions, general political opposition to an agency, periods of conflict,
and obvious duplication of missions or tasks between multiple organizations (Arnold,
1974; Chackerian, 1996; Conant, 1986; Lewis, 2002; March and Olsen, 1983).
11
But what makes an agency vulnerable to potential reorganization and what is the
likelihood of consolidation or termination of an agency? Agencies that are targeted
frequently for reorganization include agencies that administer programs that are not
consistent with the department’s mission; agencies that conduct the same or similar work
as another, more accepted agency; agencies that are unable to adapt to shifting needs; and
agencies that lack executive direction or control (Kaufman, 1976; Pratt, 1921).
Ultimately these criteria represent the degree to which an agency is able to perform.
Gormley and Balla examine how well different agencies perform, and where the
variations in their performance lie (2004). They focus on how tasks, political support,
and leadership affect the ability of agencies to perform well. They argue that the most
successful agencies are those that distribute money to individuals; have observable
outcomes; are pressured by diverse sets of constituencies; have programs and policies
that generate broad constituent support; have enough flexibility to carry out their agenda
in a way that affords them some discretion; and have strong leaders that are experienced,
credible, and often in the public eye. It isn’t likely that many agencies are able to
successfully meet all of these criteria. However, depending on the politics of the
moment, a deficiency in any of these criteria may target an agency to be considered for
consolidation or termination.
One of the most recognized concerns with regard to performance is the ability of
any agency to carry out a unique mission or distinctive task. Many consider duplication
to be one of the most critical reasons to initiate reform. Duplication is often created from
the desire to place new programs within new agencies, as opposed to within existing
12
agencies that already have a long list of functions to undertake (Kaufman, 1976). While
duplication may spur competition between agencies, Eavey explains that duplicating the
functions of an agency is not sufficient for generating increased efficiency (1987). After
conducting an experiment that compared monopolistic agenda control to a model of
bureaucratic competition, Eavy found that collusion was equally as important as
competition. However, recognizing that some competition can result in the desired
outcomes, he notes:
“The success or failure of competitive reforms depends on how they are
structured, and it is unlikely that a single structure will prove effective across all
policy arenas.”
Bender evaluates the different types of redundancy in government, and while he
makes an argument for how some redundancies are necessary, he also recognizes that
redundancy may not always result in efficiency (1985). Bender notes that the solution to
many societal problems requires a multidisciplinary approach, and that this often results
in redundant programs that are administered with varying degrees of expertise. He
evaluates the claim that monopolistic organization, or a lack of any redundancy within
the government’s bureaucratic organization, saves money. By comparing redundancy
and monopoly in governments, Bender argues that redundancy, in the face of competition
and lack of careful management, may yield a higher probability of error, however those
errors are more likely to be absorbed by overlapping processes. He, like Eavey, points
out the importance of structure and function of agencies that competition may more
strongly affect.
13
In addition to those factors that may specifically target an agency for
reorganization or termination, there are specific factors that affect an agency’s ability to
survive such a proposal. Kaufman takes an alternative approach to the concept of agency
termination and evaluates the reasons why bureaucracies tend to last for a long time
(1976). Most public agencies, as he points out, are codified in statute. It takes significant
political will to manipulate statute in order to make significant changes to government.
In addition, some agencies are created with “immunity to executive supervision” (p. 8).
In California, the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) provides a perfect example. The
PUC is codified within the State Constitution that isolates it from executive influence.
Entities established outside of executive control, as Kaufman notes, often go untouched.
Kaufman also argues that while the budget process seems as though it would
provide a simple way to terminate agencies and related programs, the sheer size of
governmental budgets (the federal budget specifically, in his example) allows agencies to
hide amid the thousands of line items that carry over from year to year. The size of the
federal budget is so large that it would take too much time for a legislator to single out
one bureau’s budget for full evaluation and termination.
Similar to the argument provided by Gormley and Balla, Kaufman highlights the
importance that partisan politics and the Executive (or the controlling party) have on the
ability of an agency to function (1976). The level of power awarded to the department
head plays a significant factor in an agency’s ability to perform. A leader who has the
ability to prescribe the functions of the agency and its employees, also has the ability,
14
absent legislative approval, to reorganize, create, and terminate programs, and could
spearhead a larger realignment of the organization as a whole (p. 18-19).
Finally, natural opposition also threatens the existence of an agency. Kaufman
explains that agencies, and in particular regulatory entities, walk a tightrope to ensure
satisfaction for both consumers and industry. Agencies operate in response to demands
for service from “politically mobilized segments of society, both inside and outside the
government” (p. 66). Kaufman’s analysis supports many other arguments that have been
made regarding the importance of agenda setting in governmental organization
(Chackerian, 1996).
Chapter Summary
According to administrative theories of government, the most successful
bureaucracies are organized by like functions and purpose, with strong, central
leadership. When government agencies are reorganized, they should be done so in a
manner that minimizes or eliminates duplication and overlap, ensures efficiency, and
reduces cost to the public (Conant, 1986; Pratt, 1921). In contrast, the foundational
arguments for the political view of government reorganization are exemplified by power
and public perception. Poor economics, power struggles, and simply the need to appear
as though government is addressing a problem, are some of the key reasons for
reorganization (Miles and Snow, 1987; Long, 1949). However, both lines of thought
share several elements of their theories, such as the roles redundancy and economics play
with regard to the need for, and outcome of reorganizations.
15
In Chapter 3, I will describe the history of the reorganization this thesis seeks to
examine and explain. After careful review of news articles, published reports, legislative
documents, and other sources, I was able to compile a detailed history of CIWMB and
DOR, and help explain how the creation of CalRecycle came to be. The interviews,
explained in Chapters 4 and 5, also helped contribute to parts of the history compiled in
the next chapter.
16
Chapter 3
THE HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA’S WASTE AND RECYCLING PROGRAMS
Decades of politics
Waste management in California continues to be a shared responsibility between
local and State entities. Before the 1970s, cities and counties largely managed waste
collection and disposal on their own. In 1972, Senate Bill 5 (Nejedly, Chapter 342,
Statutes of 1972) established the Solid Waste Management Board (SWMB) and required
the board to adopt a state policy for solid waste management by January 1, 1975. SB 5
also established the State Solid Waste Management and Resource Recovery Advisory
Council within the SWMB, placing the council in an advisory role and charging them
with making recommendations regarding the Solid Waste Resource Recovery Program to
be administered by the SWMB. Although SB 5 left the primary responsibility for local
solid waste management oversight and planning with local governments, the State for the
first time was given a larger oversight and enforcement role.
The board created by SB 5 consisted of 10 members that participated on a parttime basis. Seven members served as voting members and were appointed as follows:
five appointed by the Governor, one by the Speaker of the Assembly, and one by the
Senate Committee on Rules. Each of these appointees had to meet explicit expertise or
representation requirements. Specifically, the five Governor’s appointees included:
(1) a city councilman from a city with a population of 250,000 or more;
(2) a county supervisor from a county with a population of 500,000 or more;
17
(3) a representative of the public with specialized education and experience in
environmental quality and pollution control;
(4) a northern California representative from the solid waste management
industry; and
(5) a southern California representative from the solid waste management
industry.
The appointee chosen by the Speaker of the Assembly was required to have
specialized education and experience in natural resource conservation and resources
recovery, and the choice made by the Senate Committee on Rules was required to be a
registered civil engineer. The remaining three, nonvoting members of the board included
the State Director of Public Health, the State Director of Agriculture, and the Chief of the
Division of Mines and Geology of the Department of Conservation, or their representing
deputy.
The passage of SB 1395 (Joint Committee on Job Development, Chapter 1246,
Statues of 1976) brought a significant change to the structure of the SMWB. The
previously established 10-member board was increased to 12 members, of which 9 had
voting rights, and some of the original requirements were altered. The Governor retained
the city council and county supervisor appointments, shed the specialization requirement
for the public appointee, and added two additional generic public appointees. This gave
him opportunities to place three representatives that did not have to meet any special
requirements. The remaining members of the committee were not changed, with the
exception of representative appointed by the Committee on Rules who was now required
18
to specialize in natural resources conservation and resources recovery in addition to being
a registered civil engineer.
Like many other agencies at the time whose purview included environmental
concerns, the SWMB was initially housed under the Resources Agency. At the time, an
oversight agency dedicated to environmental protection issues did not exist. In 1975, the
first successful steps to establish a more prominent focus on environmental protection
were taken. Through Executive Order B2-75, Governor Jerry Brown expanded the role
of the Chair of the Air Resources Board to also serve as a cabinet-level Secretary for
Environmental Affairs (California Environmental Protection Agency, 2001). However, it
was not until 1981 when the Secretary for Environmental Affairs was formally assigned
the role of advisor to the Governor for major policy and program matters on
environmental protection. SB 900 (Montoya, Chapter 982, Statutes of 1981) formally
directed the Secretary to serve as the principle communications conduit to effectively
transmit policy concerns and decisions relating to the State Water Resources Control
Board and the State Solid Waste Management Board to the Governor. Throughout the
1980s the Secretary for Environmental Affairs continued to oversee policy and budgetary
responsibilities over various environmentally-focused departments, but an agency
dedicated to environmental protection was not established until 1991, with the passage of
the Governors Reorganization Plan (GRP) 1.
The Solid Waste Management Board underwent minor changes throughout the
1980s, until its complete redesign in 1989 through the passage of the Integrated Waste
Management Act. In 1980, SB 261 (Nejedly, Chapter 364) adjusted the board’s structure
19
to allow five members to constitute a quorum. The bill also retitled the board’s
governing statutes from the “Litter Control, Recycling, and Resource Recovery Act of
1977,” to the “Solid Waste Management Act of 1980,” thus signaling a stronger focus on
waste management than on recycling. In 1982, the board was renamed the “California
Waste Management Board;” city and county board members were no longer required to
represent specific populations; and the ex officio members, that included the Chief of the
Division of Mines and Geology from DOC, were removed from board membership (AB
2906; Lehman, Chapter 1158).
While the priority concerns relating to the management of waste collection and
disposal were safe collection and discard of waste in landfills, the need for more
responsible waste management, such as recycling, was gaining strength. In 1982, SB
1874 (Dills, Chapter 1054) contained legislative declarations to ensure that recycling
efforts continued. However, faith in the California Waste Management Board began to
shrink as critics highlighted the strong industry influence on the board (“The Department
of Resources Recycling and Recovery,” 2012). In 1986, the Legislature passed AB 2020
(Margolin, Chapter 1290), the “California Beverage Container Recycling and Litter
Reduction Act” (Beverage Container Recycling Program). Also known as the “Bottle
Bill,” the Beverage Container Recycling Program was a unique deposit program for
recycling individual beverage containers. The Beverage Container Recycling Program
has become a billion dollar program, focused primarily on recycling specific single-use
beverage containers, by charging consumers a deposit on their purchased container. A
recycling business returns the deposit to the consumer when they recycle the container.
20
Over the years, the Legislature lost confidence in the California Waste
Management Board’s capability or willingness to implement the Beverage Container
Recycling Program, and placed the Bottle Bill program at DOC (Eowan, 2009). Over the
course of the next few years, pressure from environmentalists, the recycling industry, and
various studies produced by the Legislature (including a 1988 study by Price, Umino, and
Lipper; and the work compiled by the Senate Task Force on Waste Management) drew
attention to the perceived dysfunction and mis-directed priorities of the California Waste
Management Board.
In 1989, after a failed attempt by the Legislature to overhaul the California Waste
Management Board, AB 939 (Sher, Chapter 1095) was signed into law, and replaced the
part-time board with a six-member full-time board and prioritized the State’s waste
management as follows: (1) source reduction, (2) recycling and composting, and (3)
environmentally safe transformation and land disposal. The new full-time board
consisted of four Governor’s appointees: a representative of the solid waste industry; a
non-profit environmental protection organization representative; and, two members of the
public; as well as two additional public representatives, each appointed by the Senate and
the Assembly.
AB 939, coupled with SB 1322 (Bergenson, Chapter 1096), codified several new
responsibilities for CIWMB, which helped give the board the relevancy it needed to
survive over the next two decades. Specifically, the bills established waste diversion
mandates and a comprehensive statewide system of permitting, inspection, enforcement,
and maintenance for solid waste facilities; authorized financing at the local jurisdiction
21
level to fund waste reduction efforts; and established a series of recycling, recovery,
market development, and research related activities at the board to tackle the responsible
management of everything from compost to tires. In total, CIWMB had more than 40
mandates to carry out, including oversight of local government plans to achieve 25 and
50 percent diversion of solid waste from landfills by 1995 and 2000, respectively.
Even with a “do-over,” the new board was almost immediately under political
fire. The Los Angeles Times reported in September of 1989 that the creation of the new
board was to provide then Governor George Deukmejian with easy, high-paid positions
for him to reward members of his cabinet (Jacobs, 1989). In 1990, environmentalists
attacked two back-to-back appointments made by the Governor for the environmental
seat: first John E. Gallagher, a beverage container industry representative, then Nan
Drake, a city council representative with a limited environmental background (Daunt,
1990; Frammolino, 1990a; Frammolino, 1990b; Frammolino, 1990c). But despite
political fanfare, CIWMB slowly began to develop into a two-decade long successful
organization.
Throughout the 1990s, CIWMB reported growing success with their efforts to
meet waste reduction goals. In its 1993 Annual Report, the board highlighted a reduction
in the amount of waste disposed in landfills at five tons since 1990, and predicted that the
first goal of diverting 25 percent of the State’s solid waste from landfills would occur on
time (California Integrated Waste Management Board, 1994). The report also touted the
increase of “new markets for recycled products, resulting in a multi-million dollar boost
to California’s economy (Report transmittal letter to the California State Legislature).”
22
By 1996, the board cheerfully announced the success of achieving its 1995 waste
diversion target, in addition to promoting efforts made through establishing market
development zones, and redrafting landfill regulations to blend and simplify efforts made
by CIWMB and the State Water Resources Control Board.
However, while CIWMB was basking in its success, outsiders were already
beginning to pick apart areas of dysfunction within the new board and beyond. In 1994,
the Little Hoover Commission released “Beyond Bottles and Cans: Reorganizing
California’s Recycling Efforts,” an extensive report calling for an overhaul of the State’s
waste and recycling oversight agencies. The report argued that while recycling efforts
associated with DOC’s Beverage Container Recycling Program were working, limitations
of the program were holding the State back from achieving greater success. They argued
that by having two agencies oversee recycling, the efforts were inherently inefficient, and
the agencies were not accountable. The report made several recommendations that called
for either eliminating both CIWMB and the Division of Recycling (DOR) and creating
one new consolidated board, or restructuring CIWMB to include DOR (Little Hoover
Commission, 1994). Two bills introduced during the 2003-04 legislative session, SB
2026 (Bergeson) and SB 1089 (Killea), attempted to combine responsibilities of these
two units into one agency.
In 1999, SB 332 (Sher, Chapter 815) was signed, requiring CIWMB, in
consultation with DOC to prepare a report to analyze suspected overlap or duplication
between the two agencies related to public information and education, local government
review and assistance, and recycled materials market development programs. The
23
resulting report, titled “Duplication and Overlap in Recycling Programs of the Integrated
Waste Management Board and the Department of Conservation: Report to the Legislature
March 2001,” published in 2001, found that several points of overlap existed and
recommended “a formal process to establish more effective communication,
coordination, and collaboration” in all areas of overlap (Page iv). It also recommended
forming a joint DOC/Board committee to develop the details of the formal process,
establishing the agreements in a Memorandum of Agreement, and several statutory
measures to address reporting and review at the local level. The report, however, did not
contain any recommendations for consolidating or eliminating either agency.
A Turning Point
In the early 2000s, the State’s economy spiraled downward into recession that
endured from 2002-2005 (“Profile of a Recession – The U.S. and California,” 2002;
Oliff, Mai, and Palacios, 2012). At the same time, the success that CIWMB enjoyed in
the 1990s was waning as many local jurisdictions continued to fall short of meeting the
50 percent waste diversion mandate. In 2000, CIWMB fell under heavy criticism, when
it was not able to report accurate diversion rates due to unreliable reporting in prior years
by local jurisdictions (Mehta, 2000). In 2001, roughly 46 percent of California’s waste
was being diverted from landfills, and environmental groups criticized the lack of
enforcement by CIWMB to account for the lack of diversion within some of the larger
jurisdictions (DeFao, 2001). In 2002, CIWMB reported that 48 percent of Californian’s
waste was being diverted from landfills and that more than 60 percent of the state’s local
jurisdictions had met the target, but by 2003, diversion estimates had dropped one point,
24
to 47 percent (California Integrated Waste Management Board, 2002; California
Integrated Waste Management Board, 2004a).
In 2003, California was also facing a $38 billion budget deficit, and the political
climate was supercharged with talk of recalling Governor Gray Davis. Frustrated with
the economy and several policy decisions made by the Governor in 2002, California’s
electorate recalled Davis in November of that year and replaced him with actor Arnold
Schwarzenegger. During the recall efforts and throughout his first year in office,
Governor Schwarzenegger vowed to reform California’s government, and in February of
2004, he signed Executive Order S-10-04, establishing the California Performance
Review (CPR) to “restructure, reorganize and reform state government to make it more
responsive to the needs of its citizens and business community (California Performance
Review, 2004a).”
The CPR, which consisted of more than 260 volunteers from various State
departments, invested 5 months to analyze and compile recommendations for a largescale reform of California’s government. The resulting report, “Government for the
People for a Change” contains four volumes of recommendations for restructuring
agencies and the programs they oversee, and adjusting or redesigning processes of state
government, including improving financial controls associated with the State Budget. A
statewide public outreach campaign was conducted to gather public feedback on the
recommendations, and the Legislature and the LAO spent much of the next year
reviewing and debating many of the recommendations.
25
Critical to the recommendations of the CPR were the concepts of aligning the
State’s activities by function, in contrast with by program, and consolidating the State’s
administrative functions, such as fee assessment and collection (California Performance
Review, 2004b). To achieve these principles, the report recommended eliminating more
than 100 boards, departments, offices, and commissions; creating a single office for the
oversight of statewide operational activities; establishing one commission for the
oversight of motor vehicle, corporate, and personal income taxes; establishing one
organization for independent community service and volunteer programs; and realigning
existing agencies and departments into 11 assimilated departments. Under the proposal,
CIWMB was identified to be eliminated and replaced by a new Division of Pollution
Prevention, Recycling, and Waste Management within a Department of Environmental
Protection.
The CPR did not gain enough political traction to become fully enacted. After
introducing GRP 1 in January 2005, the Governor subsequently withdrew the proposal,
citing the need for more review (“Schwarzenegger promise to blow up boxes fizeled,”
2010). Soon thereafter, the LAO presented recommendations to the Senate Budget and
Fiscal Review Committee that urged a reorganization of CIWMB and DOR (Hill, 2005).
Their report specifically identified areas of overlap, or “missed opportunities” for the
agencies to collaborate, and provided recommendations to realign priorities from
CIWMB, DOR, and the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) into two
departments: the Department of Recycling and Waste Prevention, and the Department of
Waste Management. They cited the fact that CIWMB, by 2003, had still not met the
26
state’s diversion goals, and argued that better collaboration between these organizations
could dramatically improve efforts.
In 2006, CIWMB reported that the State had finally achieved waste diversion of
more than 50 percent. Specifically, efforts reported by local jurisdictions for 2005
revealed a combined 52 percent diversion rate for California (California Integrated Waste
Management Board, 2006). In similar fashion, DOC reported an all-time record of 12.4
billion beverage containers recycled in 2005 (Department of Conservation, 2006). By
2008, Californians were recycling 76 percent of their bottles and cans, and the State had
achieved a 58 percent waste diversion rate (Department of Conservation, 2008; California
Integrated Waste Management Board, 2009). These successes temporarily removed the
agencies from undue scrutiny.
Final Straw
But these successes and the period of calm productivity were short-lived. At the
end of 2008, two termed out Legislators were appointed to CIWMB by the Senate and the
Assembly, followed by Governor Schwarzenegger’s more controversial appointment of
Carole Midgen, a former incumbent Senator who had been unseated by a fellow
Democrat. Migden, a 10-year veteran legislator, had alienated the public by committing
a series of indiscretions, including inappropriately casting a vote for a piece of her own
legislation by pushing the vote button at a Senate Republican member’s desk; being
charged with campaign finance violations, that led to a fine of $350,000; and rear-ending
a vehicle while driving recklessly in a State-owned vehicle (Gledhill, 2005; Lagos, 2007;
Powell, 2008; Lee, 2009). Because of Migden’s track record, her appointment
27
immediately spurred negative press, as well as criticism over the salaries and
responsibilities of the members that make up the CIWMB’s governing board (Harris,
2008; “It’s official: Migden named to waste board,” 2008; Russell, 2010; Mai-Duc,
2011).
By the beginning of 2009, the public was beginning to feel the effects of a second
economic downturn, as well as frustration over a perceived ineffective government in
California (Public Policy Institute of California, 2009). Just after the first of the year the
Governor released a new proposal to eliminate several boards and commissions,
including CIWMB. This time, the proposal recommended a slightly different approach
than past reorganization proposals: it called for the elimination of CIWMB; for DOR to
take on all recycling functions in the State; and, for DTSC to manage all solid waste
functions. In an evaluation of the proposal, the LAO argued that recycling and waste
activities should not be split between environmental and resource agencies, but instead be
overseen by CalEPA. They further recommended that DOC be eliminated, and its
functions be split among other, similar departments (Legislative Analyst Office, 2009).
Later in the year, a reported $157 million shortfall in the billion dollar Beverage
Container Recycling Fund began to spark attention just as budget conversations were
heating up as part of the May Revise (Godkin, 2009). The condition of the Fund
garnered much attention from legislative leaders and stakeholders, had prompted a flurry
of bill activity as the 2009-10 Legislative Session was coming to a close. However, in
July of 2009, SB 63, which eliminated CIWMB and consolidated the State’s waste and
28
recycling functions under CalRecycle, passed the Legislature as part of a package of bills
accompanying the State Budget.
Chapter Summary
In the years following California’s initial creation of a government entity to
oversee waste and recycling issues in California, the governance and scope of the
organization has fallen under near-constant scrutiny. During the first 15 years of its
existence, the governing body of the “waste board” evolved by means of several minor
transformations, that culminated in the establishment of the CIWMB, whose mission
differed from earlier entities by way of a broader purpose and more defined statutory
requirements. During this time, the Beverage Container Recycling Program remained a
critical statewide recycling program governed, however, not by CIWMB, but by DOC.
While legislators and stakeholders discussed and attempted combining the Beverage
Container Recycling Program with CIWMB numerous times over two decades,
satisfactory levels of performance helped the board avoid elimination. However, the
perfect political climate of economic strife, a Governor’s unmet legacy, and public scorn
over questionable political figureheads with supersized salaries eventually drove the
Legislature to pass SB 63 in 2009; a move that finally merged the Beverage Container
Recycling Program with waste management.
The history presented in this chapter was developed in part by the interviews
conducted to help instruct and educate this thesis. In Chapter 4, I will explain the
methodology by which I conducted interviews, and identify the other data I consulted and
the purpose for which it was used. In Chapter 5, I will describe the results of the
29
interviews and how they link to the history in Chapter 3. Also, in Chapter 5, I will
evaluate an additional subset of data to help explain the results of the reorganization.
30
Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY
In order to gain a more complete picture of the history associated with the State’s
waste and recycling governing bodies, I relied on individuals who interacted with those
governing bodies. While I was independently able to locate many materials to help build
and support this thesis, it was through conversation with individuals that much of the
story was unfolded. The interviews provided much of the missing historical events and
political perceptions. This chapter explains the methodology I used in developing
interview questions, selecting individuals for interviews, and searching for supporting
materials to help substantiate both actual and perceived history.
Data Gathering and Analysis
I gathered the data used in this thesis in two ways: one-on-one interviews to
establish the context for the themes of the paper; and a thorough document review of
articles, legislative analyses/publications, and budget-related documents prior and
subsequent to the reorganization of CalRecycle. Much of the document review helped to
build an historical account of the organizations that I presented in Chapter 3. In this
chapter I will explain how I conducted the interviews, present interview questions and
their rationale, and provide an overview of the budgetary documents I used and their
relevance to this thesis.
Interviews
I conducted these interviews to gain a better understanding of the circumstances
that resulted in the reorganization of CIWMB and DOC/DOR into CalRecycle. As noted
31
by Schmidt (2005), “Personal interviews are valuable for providing background
information, individual perspective, and insider information about political events”
(p. 82). With this in mind, I was interested in understanding the impetus for initiating the
reorganization, the goals and anticipated outcomes of this action, and the perceived
results of the exercise. As I discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of merging the State’s
waste and recycling functions into one department had been discussed, debated, and
attempted several times in the past three decades. In 2009, a reorganization of these
agencies was finally accomplished. My thesis examines the conditions that supported the
current reorganization, and presents observations on why this attempt differed from
previous efforts. It will look at the impetus and goals of the reorganization, and whether
the results are in synch with those goals. The information I collected from the interviews
was intended to support or challenge the theoretical evidence and shed light on the
conditions surrounding the reorganization, thus developing the various arguments in this
paper. I designed the interviews to gather historical, policy, and political anecdotes to
accompany the document research I conducted.
To protect confidentiality and allow for complete and candid responses, none of
the participants that I interviewed are identified by name; participants are grouped into
one of three categories (described below). I conducted informal interviews with nine
individuals each of whom could be characterized by one of the following three
categories:
Three participants identified themselves as current or former employees of
CalRecycle, CIWMB, DOC, CalEPA, or Resources Agency; three participants served as
32
members or staff of the California State Legislature; and three participants were
independent representatives (consultants or lobbyists) from waste or recycling industries.
All participants were identified as Executives, high-level managers, policymakers,
legislative staff, consultants, or lobbyists that had either participated in meetings and/or
decision-making activities regarding reorganization of the identified organizations; or had
a direct investment as a stakeholder to the decisions made by the affected organizations.
Using agency organizational charts, a legislative roster, and a lobbyist directory, I
identified and selected 12 individuals that appeared to meet my participant criteria. In
addition, as a State employee who worked on legislative policy and waste and recycling
issues, I was familiar with many of the key players I sought to interview. Unfortunately,
not all of those contacted were able to participate. However, the initial group of contacts
also recommended additional potential candidates, and to ensure a sufficiently diverse
group within the selection parameters, I pursued those contacts.
I recruited participants through email contact. I sent all participants the same
introductory information, and used a standard format to schedule interviews. I sent all
participants a consent form prior to the interview. At the time of the interview I provided
a copy of the form for the interviewee to review and sign to confirm their understanding
of their role as a participant. The consent form also presented the measures being taken
to ensure their anonymity throughout the process. A copy of the form can be found in
Appendix A of this thesis.
I conducted all interviews in a similar fashion, with a meeting location and time
selected by the participant. Each meeting lasted between 40 minutes and 1 hour, and I
33
conducted all interviews between August and November of 2012. Most interviews were
held in a public location, such as a restaurant or coffee shop, and the remaining were held
in an office location. Because interviews were conducted in an informal fashion to
ensure participants could be at ease and candid in their responses, I did not record
answers to the questions. Instead, I made extensive notes, and subsequently paraphrased
and organized these to help illustrate the findings discussed later in this paper.
I intended the interview questions to help participants recall history, provide their
account of policy considerations, or explain political influences surrounding past attempts
to reorganize the State’s waste and recycling agencies. I asked no questions that were
specific to a participant’s role/function within the group or organization with which they
are identified.
Below are the interview questions with explanations for their purpose in the
study.
Question 1. I am interested in learning about your relationship or
interest in the State’s waste and recycling programs:
a. Are you, or have you been an employee of the Waste Board (or
the former California Waste Management Board, or Solid
Waste Management Board)? If so, what do you think the
strengths and weaknesses are of having a Board, as opposed to
a Director, govern an agency? Please provide any specific
examples you can related to the Waste Board/CWMB/SWMB.
Also, please note which Board structure you worked under (9member part time or 6-member full time).
b. Are you, or have you been an employee of the Department of
Conservation’s Division of Recycling? If so, what do you think
the strengths and weaknesses are of having a Director, as
opposed to a Board, govern an agency? Please provide any
specific examples you can related to the Department of
Conservation.
34
c. Are you, or have you been an employee of the Resources
Agency or CalEPA? If so, did your role allow you to work
closely with the Waste Board or the Department of
Conservation? And if so, what do you think are the strengths
and weaknesses of Board governance versus Director
governance? Is there a benefit to operating a department
without multiple voting decision makers?
d. Are you, or have you been a Member of, or employee to the
State Legislature? What was your position? If so, did your
role allow you to work closely with the Waste Board or the
Department of Conservation? And if so, what do you think are
the strengths and weaknesses of Board governance versus
Director governance? Is there a benefit to operating a
department without multiple voting decision makers?
e. Are you, or have you been a stakeholder or representative of a
stakeholder to an individual or entity affected by the
governance or decision-making of the Waste Board or the
Department of Conservation? (to be further identified as a
“stakeholder”) If so, did your role allow you to work closely
with the Waste Board or the Department of Conservation?
And if so, what do you think are the strengths and weaknesses
of Board governance versus Director governance? Is there a
benefit to operating a department without multiple voting
decision makers?
The purpose of Question 1 was to identify the participant’s background for proper
inclusion in the study. Each of the participants interviewed identified themselves as
meeting the criteria listed in one of the sub-parts above. Additionally, this question was
designed to help explain how different governance structures operate, and provide some
insight on the participant’s biases.
Question 2. I’d like to get your thoughts on reorganization:
a. If you are a former employee of the Waste Board, the
Department of Conservation, Resources Agency, or CalEPA,
were you ever involved in discussions surrounding
reorganization of the Waste Board and/or the Department of
Conservation’s Division of Recycling? If so, can you tell me
when this reorganization was being considered, what details
you can remember about the proposed reorganization, and
35
what occurred? Can you explain what you think the purpose of
the reorganization was, and what it was intended to achieve?
b. If you are a current employee of the Waste Board, Department
of Conservation, Resources Agency, or CalEPA, were you
involved in discussions surrounding the recent reorganization
of the Waste Board and the Department of Conservation’s
Division of Recycling? If so, can you tell me any details you
remember about the proposed reorganization and what
occurred? Can you explain what you think the purpose of the
reorganization was, and what it was intended to achieve?
c. If you are a member of the Legislature or a stakeholder, were
you involved in discussions surrounding the recent
reorganization of the Waste Board and the Department of
Conservation’s Division of Recycling? If so, can you tell me
any details you remember about the proposed reorganization
and what occurred? Can you explain what you think the
purpose of the reorganization was, and what it was intended to
achieve?
i.
ii.
As a follow-up to the above question, have you been aware of,
or part of other discussions surrounding potential
reorganization of these agencies? For example, if you are a
current employee and you are able to recall the circumstances
surrounding the creation of CalRecycle, are you also familiar
with past attempts to reorganize Waste Board and the
Department of Conservation’s Division of Recycling? Please
explain.
Another follow-up: Given the various options for how to
reorganize the Waste Board and the Department of
Conservation’s Division of Recycling (which includes some
options for reorganization with the Department of Toxic
Substances Control), why do you think SB 63 ended up as it
did? For example, why was the new CalRecycle created under
Resources Agency, as opposed to Cal/EPA? Why wasn’t DTSC
included in the reorganization? And, why did the waste and
recycling functions stay together, as opposed to being split into
two departments?
Question 3. Who was involved in the decision to pass SB 63,
which led to the reorganization? Who was pushing for it? Why?
Questions 2 and 3 were intended to frame the larger discussion of the overall purpose of
the interview. I asked participants about the role they played as the reorganization took
36
place in the Legislative arena, and their recollections about the history of reorganization
discussions related to the State’s waste and recycling programs. Responses to this
question shed some light on the behind-the-scenes activities of the reorganization: the
story not told by the document review. Responses to these questions are grouped
together in the following analysis.
Question 4. What do you think the result of the reorganization has
been? Do you think the decision making process has been
affected? Do you think that the elimination of the Board changed
anything politically about the department?
The interview provides insight on the overall result of the reorganization, the critical
element of the study. As with the circumstances leading to the reorganization, each
participant views the result of the reorganization through his own particular bias.
Question 4, when combined with Question 6 below, was designed to prompt a personal
qualitative response that helps to support or negate a quantitative analysis conducted
using staffing and expenditure data from various State Budget Fiscal Years. I will
discuss the quantitative analysis more in the next section.
Question 5. What do you think the Governor’s role was with
regard to control over the Board? How do you think that has
changed by eliminating the Board? (Do you think the new
relationship between the Governor and the Director of the
department will be different than the relationship the Governor
had with the Board? Please explain.)
The importance of Question 5 was to highlight the roles, responsibilities, and
relationships that surround the reorganization. My interest in asking this question was to
learn about whether the structure of an organization really matters with respect to
relationships and hierarchy.
37
Question 6. In your opinion, has the reorganization been
successful? Why or why not?
a. Do you think the elimination of Waste Board and transfer of
DOC’s DOR to a newly created agency, CalRecycle, has
resulted in cost savings or improved efficiencies? Why?
In retrospect, Question 6 could have been combined with Question 4. Many participants
addressed this question, and its sub-part, when responding to Question 4. However, some
useful insight was still provided since cost savings and improved efficiencies were
specifically highlighted in this question. As noted above, this question was designed to
generate a response that could be compared with the quantitative analysis of State Budget
information to determine whether the goals and perceived outcomes of the reorganization
(i.e., whether or not the State claimed any cost-savings) are aligned with the actual
results.
Question 7. Do you have any other thoughts you’d like to share
regarding the creation of CalRecycle?
The last question was intended to provide the participant with an opportunity to reflect
back on any of their comments, add to or clarify them, or include anything else to the
discussion that the participant felt appropriate. No participant submitted any substantial
comments.
Quantitative Data
To gain a better understanding of any associated cost-savings that may have
occurred because of SB 63, I conducted a detailed analysis of five years of State Budget
data. I used actual reported values for Fiscal Years 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11,
and 2011-12 found in the Governor’s Proposed Budget for Fiscal Years 2009-10, 2010-
38
11, 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14, respectively. Because actual revenues and
expenditures are not available until the January following the close of a Fiscal Year (e.g.,
the Department of Finance publishes Fiscal Year 2010-11 figures in January 2012), the
latest actual data I could gather was for Fiscal Year 2011-12. Estimated revenues and
expenditures for Fiscal Year 2012-13 are available in the Governor’s Proposed Budget
for Fiscal Year 2013-14, but because the estimated values are often significantly different
from the precise figures reported in the following year, I chose to exclude those values
from my examination. Also, the reorganization occurred half-way through Fiscal Year
2009-10, which falls directly in the middle of the five years examined.
I evaluated two specific data sets for the multiple agencies to try to show what, if
any, reduction in costs occurred because of the reorganization. The two data sets include
the number of staff positions reportedly held by each organization for each year, as well
as the value of expenditures for those years. First, I examined the trends of staffing and
expenditures over the course of five fiscal years for CIWMB, DOC, and CalRecycle. I
separated the positions and expenditures related to DOR (DOC) during the first two and a
half years so that I could track how that portion of the organization changed once it was
merged with the waste management activities from CIWMB. For the latter two and a
half years, I separated the waste management and recycling activities from CalRecycle so
that I could accurately compare it to the previous year’s activities under the other
organizational titles.
Because State Budget activity is often unpredictable and can differ significantly
from year to year, I also evaluated staffing and expenditure data from other State
39
agencies to compare with the data collected for waste and recycling activities to
determine whether any shifts in the activity were inherent to the overall State budget or
were specific to the agencies in question. I conducted a similar analysis of data from six
other organizations housed under Resources Agency and CalEPA that had relatively
similar staffing and expenditure activity. After reviewing data associated with each of
the 27 departments and conservancies under Resources Agency and each of the 6 boards
and departments under CalEPA, I selected the 3 most similar to CalRecyle from each
agency, with at least one organization larger and one organization smaller with respect to
both positions and expenditures. As you’ll see later, this analysis helps to show how the
budget activity observed for the waste and recycling programs compares to activities
undertaken by similar agencies.
Document Review
I also conducted a review of public bill analyses from the State Legislature and
the Department of Finance; scoured news articles for any discussion of the
reorganization; and reviewed reports prepared by various organizations related to this
topic. Most of these documents were used to develop Chapter 3 that builds the case for
the analysis in Chapter 5. Appendix B provides a list of documents reviewed, but not
directly cited in this thesis.
40
Chapter 5
THE RESULTS
This chapter provides the results from the interviews and analysis of quantitative
data to explain why the reorganization of CalRecycle occurred, what the reorganization
was intended to achieve, and the result of the reorganization thus far.
I divided this chapter into two parts. The first will detail my analysis of interview
responses, supported by the history detailed in Chapter 3, regarding why the
reorganization occurred and what it intended to achieve. Part 2 will focus on the actual
results of the reorganization through continued analysis of interview responses and by
presenting a detailed review of budget data for the affected organizations for a relevant 5year period. Each part is further organized into several themes that emerged as I
analyzed the interview data; these themes are aligned with the positions presented in the
theoretical investigation detailed in Chapter 2.
It is important to note that although I did not record the interview participants’
names, their affiliation with the specific organizations identified can be characterized by
one of three descriptive categories:
1. Employee Respondent
2. Legislative Respondent
3. Stakeholder Respondent
Respondents of a particular category did not necessarily make the same observations or
share the same thoughts on each topic; therefore, few special references to these
41
categories are made. However, there are cases in which I underscored a particular
response, or combined responses to represent a particular respondent category.
Part 1: The perfect political climate
As discussed in Chapter 2, Chackerian (1996) and other theorists observed that
reorganizations often occur during periods of economic decline, while March and Olson
argued that they are a by-product of larger political forces. In the case of CIWMB and
DOR, these theories played an interesting role in the enactment of SB 63. When asked
how and why the reorganization occurred, only two respondents noted economic factors
as an impetus, while all respondents, to some degree, argued that the reorganization was
highly political. More than half of the respondents noted that SB 63 was negotiated as
part of a “budget play” among the “Big 5,” (i.e., the Governor, President and Minority
Leader of the Senate, and the Speaker and Minority Leader of the Assembly). And while
the respondents noted that this budget maneuver was designed to report cost-savings to
the citizens of California, they did not necessarily highlight the larger economic factors in
play. Several respondents explained that the “Waste Board” (CIWMB) had been seen as
a “Wasteful Board” consisting of members who received high salaries with few
responsibilities. Eliminating the board, whether savings were realized or not, gave the
public the perception that savings would be achieved. As one respondent noted, it
showed that government was “being responsive to economics.”
But while economics may have been a factor on some level, politics played a
resoundingly larger role. Consistent with the reasoning of March and Olson (1983), one
stakeholder respondent highlighted in particular the Governor’s desire for more control.
42
She explained that the Governor wanted power over the decisions being made by the
board, but because the board was not solely comprised of Governor’s appointees, he
lacked this desired power. Similarly, other respondents noted that the composition of the
board, which included two legislative appointments, allowed the board to act
independently, and in general was immune to an overabundance of gubernatorial
influence. While gubernatorial appointees serve at the pleasure of the Governor, and
therefore can be absolved of their duties at any time, the fact that the board governance
was split between appointing powers precluded any particular power from having too
much influence. Respondents further explained that under the board structure, only the
Chair of the board, as the most visible member, was subject to influence by the
Governor’s administration. However, respondents supported the concept that the history,
politics, and relationships of a given Governor and the individual members of a board, as
well as the critical policy issues of a given period also play into the degree of control
exerted by a Governor over a board.
One employee respondent cautioned that assuming that a Governor has more
control over a department than a board only applies when the department has a
sufficiently high profile. Other respondents mirrored this observation by noting that
without the board, CalRecycle had lost its relevance. Respondents identified air and
water as the top environmental priorities that consistently appear to overshadow waste
issues in the eyes of the Governor and the public. Most of the respondents agreed,
however, that Governor Schwarzenegger’s desire for control was a factor that led to the
success of SB 63.
43
Added gubernatorial control may also change the dynamic with regard to
stakeholder influence over policy-making. During early iterations of the board, CIWMB
was heavily influenced by industry representatives, as reported by the Little Hoover
Commission (1989) and various interview respondents. They explained that the part-time
boards and some iterations of the full-time board were made up of industry
representatives, and that often, the waste industry often had significant influence over the
decisions of the boards. One stakeholder respondent noted that the elimination of the
board and appointment of a director makes it easier for all external stakeholders to have
an equal influence over policy, as they only have to lobby the Governor and Director, and
not each board member. Another stakeholder respondent noted, however, that as with the
board, industry stakeholders are only successful when their objectives align with the
majority of the decision-making members.
In addition to wanting control over policy decisions related to waste and
recycling, Governor Schwarzenegger desperately wanted to show the citizens of
California that he controlled the politics of the State during his governance and was
successful at consolidating and streamlining state government. Early in his term, he
coined the phrase “blowing up the boxes” to describe his vision for reforming California.
Most respondents explained that SB 63 was the ideal opportunity for the Governor to
claim success for blowing up a box – a box that in particular was not supported by the
general public. One stakeholder respondent noted that in recent years CIWMB had
become a media target. However, and unfortunately for the board, the attention was
focused on the appointments and basic bureaucratic function of the board, rather than on
44
the policy issues facing the board or the board’s success (or lack thereof) at meeting its
waste reduction goals.
A superficial, yet critical example of the negative press that targeted CIWMB at
the time, related to the appointment of Carole Migden by Governor Schwarzenegger. As
discussed in Chapter 3, Migden’s recent career was peppered with indiscretions, and she
was often a sensational headline in the news. As various respondents stated, Migden’s
appointment was a tipping point in the events that culminated in the elimination of
CIWMB. Specifically, respondents described her appointment as “fuel to the fire,” “the
nail in the coffin,” and most importantly, the “epitome of political patronage.” One
respondent speculated that her appointment was intentional, explaining that the press had
critically assumed that the Senate would appoint her to the board after she lost her bid for
reelection. When Senator Sheila Keuhl was appointed instead, the Governor had an
opportunity to capitalize on her negative appeal by placing her on the board, and then
offering up the board for elimination.
Another concept highlighted by most of the respondents was that leadership is the
key to the success of any organization, thus supporting the notion that poor leadership
can stimulate the desire to reorganize a department (Kaufman, 1976). Gormley and Balla
(2004) specifically note that strong, experienced, and credible leaders typically direct the
most successful agencies. One stakeholder specifically identified that these organizations
were targeted because stakeholders and members of the Governor’s administration were
unhappy with current leadership at both CIWMB and DOR.
45
In addition to leadership as it relates to specific individuals, one respondent
provided insight linking leadership, relevancy, and structure. The stakeholder respondent
explained that the structure of an organization and its statutory mandates could elevate an
organization’s relevance and credibility with regard to leadership. One example of this is
the structure and the responsibility of the Air Resources Board (ARB). ARB is a
regulatory agency, overseen by a board of 12 members, with the Chair holding the only
full-time position. The stakeholder respondent explained that ARB has the right level of
stature, and decision-making is typically consistent with statute. On the other hand, he
stated, CIWMB would often compromise with its constituencies and act in conflict with
statute. Because of this, the credibility of the organization was often compromised, and
in turn, its ability to be a leading organization.
As discussed by every interview respondent, the desire to combine waste and
recycling functions from CIWMB and DOR, which dates back to the inception of the
Beverage Container Recycling Program, was a critical factor in the success of SB 63.
These comments are aligned with the belief that reorganizations are targeted toward
agencies that conduct the same or similar work as others (Kaufman 1976; Pratt, 1921).
When DOR was created within DOC, recycling was part of the mission of the then
California Waste Management Board, though the agency was focused primarily on
managing the disposal of solid waste. At different times throughout both organizations’
histories, one respondent pointed out that the missions of each organization often
conflicted – while one was fighting for more to be done in the area of diverting waste
from landfills, the other was claiming success at meeting recycling goals. This
46
discrepancy in the message for virtually the same issue further underscored the need to
have one governing body manage both waste and recycling programs.
All but one respondent agreed that the combination of the State’s waste and
recycling functions made sense. One employee respondent argued that recycling policy
is more of a resource management activity, as opposed to an environmental protection
activity, hence placing recycling activities under CalEPA isn’t entirely appropriate. The
respondent noted that the recycling of products is a commodity best overseen as a
resource management issue, whereas environmental leaders best oversee the management
of garbage. His argument is consistent with those made by Bender (1985), that explain
why a multidisciplinary approach to problem-solving often results in redundant programs
within different departments. Specifically, placing DOR within a department guided by
resource conservation goals allowed policy for the program to be shaped by leaders with
different expertise and different agendas. This would have been less of an issue under the
umbrella of an environmental protection organization. While this arrangement may have
led to duplicative efforts and periodic informational discrepancies, Bender would argue
that those types of problems would be obscured by other activities within each
organization over time.
Similarly, one stakeholder respondent noted that the placement of CalRecycle
under Resources Agency per SB 63 did not make sense. Respondents generally believed
that CalRecycle belongs under the agency oversight that most closely relates to their
represented group. For example, respondents that work closely with the recycling
industry argued that CalRecycle should have remained under Resources Agency, while
47
environmental stakeholders argued that it is appropriately housed under CalEPA.
Ultimately, respondents explained that the majority of stakeholders and decision-makers
believed that all CalRecycle efforts have environmental components to them, and that
makes the placement of the department under CalEPA appropriate.
Part 2: Short and long term realities
The interview responses, when coupled with budget data, helps to illustrate what
benefits and disbenefits resulted from the elimination of CIWMB and consolidation of
the State’s waste and recycling programs into CalRecycle. Respondents were asked to
reflect on the reorganization and respond with its results, especially with regard to how
the reorganization affected the department’s decision-making process and political
climate. Most respondents noted that the result of the reorganization was simply a
singular entity to oversee waste and recycling. Two of the respondents stated that no
change thus far had been made in the decision-making process, while three respondents,
one from each respondent category, stated that the decision-making process had slowed.
Nearly all of the respondents shared insight on the merger of two cultures and the long
process the organization would have to endure to blend those two cultures.
Respondents were also asked to comment on whether or not they thought that the
reorganization resulted in cost-savings or improved efficiencies. All respondents
believed that no immediate cost savings were realized; this corresponds with committee
reports that analyze elements of the State budget (Senate Committee on Budget and
Fiscal Review, 2009). This conflicts with the department’s claim that at least $2 million
was saved by eliminating the appointed board members and their advisors. Some
48
respondents underscored that moving staff, changing logos, updating websites, and other
administrative activities associated with the reorganization accumulated cost, and this
cancelled out any actual savings gained from eliminated salaries. A few respondents also
noted that the duties of the affected organizations did not change; therefore, significant
cost savings are unlikely to occur.
However, several respondents argued that longer-term cost savings would likely
be realized as internal policies and programs were aligned, thereby eliminating
duplicative activities performed by the former CIWMB and DOR. Some examples
included consolidating enforcement, market development, and outreach to local
jurisdictions and the public. Additionally, several respondents stated that over time, they
hoped that the best management practices from each prior organization would surface,
and that this would result in a more efficient and more effective department.
To shed light on actual potential cost savings, I conducted an analysis of reported
budget data from Fiscal Year 2007-08 through Fiscal Year 2011-12. Table 1 below
provides the actual expenditures and positions associated with CIWMB, DOC, and
CalRecycle over that time period. Because the reorganization took effect
January 1, 2010, budget data for Fiscal Year 2009-2010 is a hybrid scenario. Prior to
January 1, 2010, budget data for waste management activities was reported by CIWMB
only, and DOC reported beverage container recycling activities. After that date,
CalRecycle reported both activities. To simplify presentation of the data, I separated
waste management activities from CIWMB and CalRecycle and combined them over the
5 years into a single “waste management” category. I did the same for beverage
49
container recycling from DOC and CalRecycle. (Note: for ease of description, I will at
times substitute the term “Pre-SB 63” to refer to the period from Fiscal Year 2007-08
until, but not including January 1, 2010. Similarly, I will use the term “Post-SB 63” to
refer to the period that begins on January 1, 2010, and terminates at the end of Fiscal
Year 2011-12.)
Table 5.1. Fiscal Year 2007-08 through Fiscal Year 2011-12 Actuals
Fiscal Years
Waste Management
Beverage Container
Recycling
Waste Management
Beverage Container
Recycling
2007-08
420.2
212.3
2008-09
Positions
432
223.7
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
437.14
384.2
359.4
223.8
228.8
233
$193,775
$185,667
$1,337,230
$1,262,965
Expenditures (in millions)
$215,570
$195,072
$188,494
$1,215,731
$1,330,618
$1,121,379
These results show that while positions increased in the first three years for waste
management activities, they dropped substantially after the 2009-10 fiscal year. To
quantify the degree of change that occurred after the reorganization compared to before, I
used the following calculation for both positions and expenditures:
(Fiscal Year 2007-08 + Fiscal Year 2008-09 + .5(Fiscal Year 2009-10)) / 2.5 = X
(.5(Fiscal Year 2009-10) + Fiscal Year 2010-11 + Fiscal Year 2011-12) / 2.5 = Y
(Y – X) / X = % difference in positions and expenditures
50
Table 5.2. Percent Difference in Positions and Expenditures Before and After SB 63
Pre-SB 63
Post-SB 63
% Difference
Positions
Waste Management
428.3
384.9
-10.1%
Beverage Container
Recycling
219.2
229.5
4.7%
Expenditures (in millions)
Waste Management
$201,956
$189,476
-6.2%
Beverage Container
Recycling
$1,242,815
$1,264,354
1.7%
Expenditures and staffing for waste management activities generally declined
each year subsequent to the reorganization, resulting in a roughly 10 percent reduction in
positions and 6.2 percent reduction in expenditures in the Post-SB 63 period. Beverage
container recycling activities grew only slightly, showing a total increase of 4.7 percent
in positions, and only 1.7 percent in expenditures. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate how
these actuals changed over this 5-year period.
51
Figure 5.1. Actual Positions for Fiscal Years 2007-12
450
400
350
Positions
300
250
Waste Management
200
150
100
50
0
Beverage Container
Recycling
52
Figure 5.2. Actual Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2007-12
$1,400,000
Expenditures (in millions)
$1,200,000
$1,000,000
$800,000
Waste Management
$600,000
$400,000
Beverage Container
Recycling
$200,000
$0
To help put this into perspective, I also analyzed the budgets of six other
organizations, three from CalEPA and three from Resources Agency that had similar
levels in staffing and expenditures. The additional organizations I analyzed are ARB,
DTSC, and the Department of Pesticide Regulation (DPR) under CalEPA, and the
California Energy Commission (CEC), the California Conservation Corps (CCC), and the
Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) under the Resources Agency. The purpose of
this analysis was to see if other organizations experienced similar changes in their
budgets over the same time period.
Using the same formula described above, Table 5.3 and Figures 5.3 through 5.6
offer visual and numerical representations of the data from multiple organizations using
53
the enactment of SB 63 as the date to which data are compared (i.e. January 1, 2010).
Additionally, I combined positions and expenditures for Waste Management and
Beverage Container Recycling into one category representing the collective positions
from CIWMB/DOR/CalRecycle.
Table 5.3. Percent Difference in Positions and Expenditures from Multiple Organizations
Before and After January 1, 2010
Pre-SB 63
Post-SB 63
% Difference
Positions
CIWMB/DOR/CalRecycle
647
614
-5%
ARB
1234
1311
6%
DTSC
970
923
-5%
DPR
348
377
8%
CEC
513
554
8%
CCC
297
302
2%
DFW
CIWMB/DOR/CalRecycle
2256
2273
Expenditures (in millions)
$1,444,771
$1,453,829
1%
1%
ARB
$528,682
$422,135
-20%
DTSC
$169,607
$167,114
-1%
DPR
$68,214
$74,241
9%
CEC
$419,462
$410,239
-2%
CCC
$71,125
$70,450
-1%
DFW
$353,367
$336,197
-5%
54
Figure 5.3. Actual Positions from Multiple Organizations for Fiscal Years 2007-12
2500
Positions
2000
1500
CIWMB/DOR/
CalRecycle
ARB
DTSC
1000
500
DPR
CEC
CCC
0
55
Figure 5.4 Changes in Positions for Multiple Organizations Before and After
January 1, 2010
2500
Number of Positions
2000
1%
6%
1500
5%
1000
5%
8%
8%
500
2%
0
Organizations
Before January 1, 2010
After January 1, 2010
%
%
Indicates Percent Change
56
Figure 5.5. Actual Expenditures from Multiple Organizations for Fiscal Years 2007-12
$1,800,000
Expenditures (in millions)
$1,600,000
$1,200,000
CIWMB/DOR/
CalRecycle
ARB
$1,000,000
DTSC
$1,400,000
$800,000
DPR
$600,000
CEC
$400,000
$200,000
$0
CCC
57
Figure 5.6 Changes in Expenditures for Multiple Organizations Before and After
January 1, 2010
$1,600,000
Expenditures (in millions)
$1,400,000
$1,200,000
1%
$1,000,000
$800,000
$600,000
$400,000
2%
20%
5%
1%
$200,000
1%
9%
$0
Organizations
Before January 1, 2010
After January 1, 2010
%
%
Indicates Percent Change
As is shown in Figure 5.3, beginning with Fiscal Year 2009-10 some
organizations did in fact see reductions in staffing similar to CIWMB/DOR/CalRecycle.
However, when comparing the degree of change between the Pre-SB 63 period and the
Post-SB 63 period, as demonstrated in Figure 5.4, most organizations grew in size. As
detailed in Table 5.3, only two of the seven organizations analyzed realized a reduction in
positions in the Post-SB 63 period (when compared with the Pre-SB 63 baseline) despite
the fact that five of the seven organizations experienced a reduction in expenditures.
Position changes ranged from a loss of about five percent, to an increase of almost eight
percent. For expenditures, the range falls between the loss of about 20 percent and an
58
increase in 9 percent, although only one agency (ARB) experienced a loss of more than
9 percent.
CIWMB/DOR/CalRecycle underwent a similar reduction in positions as DTSC,
an agency relatively similar in size and under the auspices of CalEPA. Collectively,
CIWMB/DOR/CalRecycle experienced a slight increase in expenditures, as shown in
Figure 5.6, although given that the level of expenditures for the Beverage Container
Recycling Program is much higher than that of waste management activities, the percent
difference is skewed. Each organization clearly experienced its own set of
circumstances, which makes the data difficult to draw solid conclusions from.
59
Chapter 6
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Stakeholders, legislators, and governors have generated many concepts for reform
of CIWMB over the last few decades in a fashion consistent with administrative theories
of governmental organization. Reorganization proponents sought to align like functions
and remove overlap by combining the responsibilities of CIWMB and DOR into one
organization (Hill, 1998; Legislative Analyst Office, 2005; Little Hoover Commission,
1989, Little Hoover Commission 1994). Administrative theorists would argue that
CIWMB was targeted because it, and DOR, conducted similar work, and more unified
executive control was needed (Kaufman, 1976; Pratt, 1921).
Those that hold a more political view of organization would contend that CIWMB
and DOR were targeted because of a political need to change the structure and base of
control for the organizations affected (Chakerian, 1996; Conant, 1986; Pratt, 1921).
Many reorganization proponents noted at different times that CIWMB was too heavily
controlled by the waste industry and it lacked strong executive control (Little Hoover
Commission, 1989; Eowan, 2009). However, despite a desire to streamline programs and
centralize power, as long as the organization’s performance remained relatively
satisfactory and no other pressing need for restructuring existed, the organization was
able to remain intact.
SB 63 was successful due to the confluence of factors existing in an atmosphere
that supported both approaches to reorganization; it was both the right time and the right
political climate. The reorganization of the State’s waste and recycling functions made
60
sense from an efficiency and perceived cost-savings standpoint at the same time that the
Governor sought more effective control while needing to pacify growing public concern
about high-paid political figureheads. The state was experiencing a multi-year economic
slump, the governing board of CIWMB was drawing negative press, and the Governor
had a commitment to the people of the State to streamline government that was yet to be
fulfilled.
Even though the basis for merging CIWMB with DOR aligns with administrative
theories of government organization, the effects of the merger thus far do not demonstrate
increased performance, improved efficiencies, or cost savings as a direct result of the
reorganization. Despite the small savings realized by the elimination of positions
associated with the members of CIWMB’s governing board, consistent with findings
made by Conant related to other organizations, the reorganization that led to CalRecycle
mostly moved people around instead of making noticeable cuts to achieve savings
(1992). Many interview respondents that work closely with the organizations reported
that CalRecycle would likely benefit from improved efficiencies overtime as policies and
programs become better streamlined. The new leadership of CalRecycle has an
opportunity to improve efficiencies by eliminating the redundancy that existed between
CIWMB and DOR, and applying best management practices from successful programs
and applying them to less successful, relevant programs. However, evidence that ties
future efficiencies or longer-term cost savings to the reorganization may be difficult to
identify over time as the department undergoes other potential changes mandated by the
Governor or Legislature.
61
The merger did, however, serve as a symbolic victory for Governor
Schwarzenegger in his effort to “blow up the boxes” in State government. Public
perception of the governing board, illustrated in the form of negative press, had
plummeted with the appointment of several termed out legislators to the board. One in
particular had been scrutinized in the recent years for reckless behavior and participating
in inappropriate financial activities (Gledhill, 2005; Lagos, 2007; Powell, 2008; Lee,
2009). Additionally, the need to report cost savings as well as show that bureaucracies
were being collapsed to improve efficiency helped drive support for SB 63. Ultimately,
political will brought on by these factors played the most critical role in the enactment of
SB 63.
Future Research
While it might be diffiult to track and report the evolution of CalRecycle as it
relates to the passage of SB 63, future research on the organizations success could be
relevant. Examining how the decision-making process has changed, and the time in
which it takes policy decisions to be implemented under the new Director, as opposed to
the former board, might help demonstrate how some efficiencies have been gained.
Comparing CalRecycle to other state organizations over a larger period of time might
provide a more concrete explanation of changes observed in positions and expenditures.
Also, taking a deeper look at other reorganization proposals that were successfully or
unsuccessfully attempted by Governor Schwarzenegger might provide other explanations
relevant to the passage of SB 63.
62
In terms of liturature related to general government reorganizations, a closer look
at the pros and cons of different organization types would be useful for testing further
case studies. While some liturature exists related to the performance of government
organizations over time, much of these studies focused on government agencies at the
Federal level instead of the State level. Futher, since 2009, the Legislature and Governor
have authorized several other reorganizations of California boards, departments, and
agencies. An analysis of these reorganizations over time could help inform policy
makers when designing future reorganizations.
63
APPENDIX A
Consent to Participate in Research
You are being asked to participate in research that will be conducted by Lisa
Macumber, a graduate student in the Government Department at California State
University, Sacramento. The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding about
the circumstances that resulted in the recent reorganization of the California Integrated
Waste Management Board and the Department of Conservation’s Division of Recycling
into the Department of Resources Recovery and Recycling, through the discovery of
historical, policy, and political anecdotes that may be used to support or refute research
that has already been conducted as part of a Masters Thesis.
You will be interviewed for approximately 30 minutes to 1 hour, depending on
your knowledge and recollection of the situations inquired about. Interview questions are
intended to help you recall history, provide your account of policy considerations, or
prompt your explanation of political realities surrounding past attempts to reorganize the
State’s waste and recycling agencies.
A list of interview questions will be provided to you at the time of the interview.
Given that the interview questions ask your recollection or opinion about a matter that
might be sensitive or personal to you, you are not required to respond to every question
that is asked. Also, because of your affiliation with one of the above listed organizations,
and any risks you fear you may encounter by participating in this interview, you may
decline to respond to any particular question or end the interview at any time.
There are no substantial benefits to participating in this research.
All information obtained in this study, personal or circumstantial, will be
confidential. Interviews will not be recorded, and personal information will be kept
separate from your interview responses. Your personal information will not be
maintained or distributed, and your responses in the interview will not be attributed to
you, your affiliation, or your rank, when reported in the researcher’s Masters Thesis.
Information you provide on the consent form, during the interview, or information
gathered previously as participants were screened for participation, will be destroyed
once the Masters Thesis is complete.
There is no compensation provided for your participation in this research.
If you have any questions about this research, you may contact Lisa Macumber at
[phone number] or by email at [email address].
64
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary; you may opt to not
participate at any time. Your signature below indicates that you have read this page and
agree to participate in the research.
_____________________________
Signature of Participant
_________________
Date
_____________________________
Signature of Interviewer
_________________
Date
65
APPENDIX B
Works referenced but not cited
California Environmental Protection Agency. (2009). Cal/EPA Environmental
Enforcement Report: Integrated Waste Management Board. Sacramento, Ca. Retrieved
from http://www.calepa.ca.gov/enforcement/Publications/2009/IWMB.pdf
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (1993). 1992 Annual Report for the
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. 503-1993-0001).
Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (1995). 1994 Annual Report of the
California Integrated Waste Management Board: Progress Through Partnership.
(Publication No. 520-1995-0002). Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (1996). 1995 Annual Report: The Quiet
Revolution in Waste Management. (Publication No. 520-1996-0004). Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (1997). 1996 Annual Report for the
California Integrated Waste Management Board: Getting the Job Done. (Publication No.
530-1997-0008). Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2001). 2000 Annual Report for the
Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. 530-2001-0003). Sacramento,
Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2007). 2005-2006 California
Integrated Waste Management Board Annual Report. (Publication No. 530-2008-0002).
Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2008). 2007 Annual Report for the
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. 530-2008-0003).
Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2009). 2008 Accomplishments: A Year
of Progress. (Publication No. IWMB-2009-0006). Sacramento, Ca.
California Performance Review. (2004) Form Follows Function: A Framework to
Improve the Performance and Productivity of California State Government. Vol. 2.
Sacramento, Ca: Office of State Publishing.
California Performance Review. (2004) Keeping the Books: California’s Budget,
Financial and Performance Review. Vol. 3. Sacramento, Ca: Office of State Publishing.
66
Carlton, J. (2008). Targeting the wasteful, activists seek end to California’s waste board.
Consumer Watch Dog. Retrieved from
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/story/targeting-wasteful-activists-seek-endcalifornias-waste-board
Clifford, F. (1994, April 16). California significantly lightens garbage load: Environment:
Trash to landfills is expected to drop 25% by end of 1995. Orange county has cut its
waste by 1 million tons. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-04-16/news/mn-46498_1_solid-waste
Conant, J. (1988). “In the Shadow of Wilson and Brownlow: Executive Branch
Reorganization in the States, 1965 to 1987.” Public Administration Review. 48:892-902.
Edgar, E. (2009). BOARD, California Integrated Waste Management. [Obituary].
Retrieved from http://www.ivrma.org/obituary.php
Hill, E. (1991). Organizing State Government to Meet California’s Environmental
Protection Priorities. Sacramento, Ca: Legislative Analyst’s Office.
Legislative Analyst Office. (2005). Reorganizing the State's Recycling Programs.
Retrieved from
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2005/resources/res_02_cc_recycling_programs_anl05.ht
m#_Toc95972410
Legislative Analyst Office. (2010). The 2010–11 Budget: Funding and Policy Options for
the Beverage Container Recycling Program. Retrieved from http://www.lao.ca.gov/analy
sis/2010/resources/bev_recycling/bev_recycling_031810.aspx
Little Hoover Commission. (1985). Letter to the Governor and Members of the
Legislature regarding GRP 1. Retrieved from
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/reorg/1985_reorg_1.pdf
Meier, K. J. (1980). “Executive Reorganization: Impact on Employment and
Expenditures.” American Journal of Political Science. 24:396-412.
Moe, T. M. (1987). “Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the
NLRB.” Studies in American Political Development. 2:236-299.
Roth, A. (2008). “California Legislature: Some Facts and Figures.” Rose Institute of
State and Local Government.
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/8134/CALeg.pdf
67
Shuit, D. (1988, September 24). Waste recycling bill vetoed as unneeded. Los Angeles
Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1988-09-24/news/mn-2136_1_solidwaste
Shuit, D. (1989, September 16). 1989 Legislative session: The final hours: Legislature
approves an ambitious solid waste program. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-16/news/mn-190_1_solid-waste-program
The aptly named waste board (2009, June 16). San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved from
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/The-aptly-named-waste-board-3295155.php
Wildermuth, J. (2006, November 27). 2 termed-out dems given plum waste board posts.
San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/2termed-out-Dems-given-plum-waste-board-posts-3183504.php
Yi, M. (2009, June 14). Waste board key battleground in budget fight. San Francisco
Chronicle. Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Waste-board-keybattleground-in-budget-fight-3295146.php
68
REFERENCES
Arnold, P. E. (1974). “Reorganization and Politics: A Reflection on the Adequacy of
Administrative Theory.” Public Administration Review. 34:205-211.
Bender, J. (1985). Parallel Systems; Redundancy in Government. Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Berkman, M. and Reenock, C. (2004). “Incremental Consolidation and Comprehensive
Reorganization of American State Executive Branches.” American Journal of Political
Science. 48:796-812.
Barrows, D. P. (1915). “Reorganization of State Administration in California.” California
Law Review. 3:91-102.
California Environmental Protection Agency. (2001). The History of the California
Environmental Protection Agency. Sacramento, Ca: California Environmental Protection
Agency.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (1994). 1993 Annual Report for the
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. 600-1994-0001).
Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2001). Duplication and Overlap in
Recycling Programs of the Integrated Waste Management Board and the Department of
Conservation: Report to the Legislature March 2001. (Publication No. 520-2001-0001).
Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2002). 2001 Annual Report for the
Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. 530-2002-0006). Sacramento,
Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2004a). 2002 Annual Report for the
Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. 530-2004-0002). Sacramento,
Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2004b). 2003 Annual Report for the
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. 530-2004-0003).
Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2005). 2004 Annual Report for the
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. 530-2005-0001).
Sacramento, Ca.
69
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2006). 2005 California Integrated
Waste Management Board Annual Report. (Publication No. 530-2006-0002).
Sacramento, Ca.
California Integrated Waste Management Board. (2009). 2008 Annual Report California
Integrated Waste Management Board. (Publication No. IWMB-2009-0020). Sacramento,
Ca.
California Performance Review. (2004a) The Report of the California Performance
Review - Government for the People for a Change: Prescription for Change. Vol. 1.
Sacramento, Ca: Office of State Publishing.
California Performance Review. (2004b) Issues and Recommendations. Vol. 4.
Sacramento, Ca: Office of State Publishing.
Chackerian, R. (1996). “Reorganization of State Governments: 1900-1985.” Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory. 6:25-47.
Conant, J. (1986). “Reorganization and the Bottom Line.” Public Administration Review.
46:48-56.
Conant, J. (1992). “Executive Branch Reorganization: Can it be an Antidote for Fiscal
Stress in the States?” State & Local Government Review. 24: 3-11.
Daunt, T. (1990, December 1). Selection for waste board job protested: Appointments:
Environmentalists urge state senate to block Gov. Deukmejian’s choice for former
councilwoman Nan Drake. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-12-01/local/me-4897_1_state-senate
DeFao, J. (2001, December 27) California's recycle race / Attitudes changing, but cities
still struggle to meet mandate to cut landfill dumping by half. San Francisco Chronicle.
Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/California-s-recycle-raceAttitudes-changing-2821068.php
Department of Conservation. (2006). California recycles record number of bottles and
cans. [Press Release] Retrieved from
http://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/Archive/DORPR/2006/16.htm
Department of Conservation. (2008). California recycling rate reaches 76 percent. [Press
Release] Retrieved from http://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/Archive/DORPR/2008/25.htm
Dimock, M. E. (1951). “The Objectives of Government Reorganization.” Public
Administration Review. 11:233-241.
70
Eavey, C. L. (1987). “Bureaucratic Competition and Agenda Control.” The Journal of
Conflict Resolution. 31:503-524.
Eowan, G. T. (2009) Transformation of Governmental Organizations: The Case of the
California Integrated Waste Management Board (Doctoral Dissertation) University of
Southern California.
Frammolino, R. (1990a, July 8). Waste panel nominee no friend of the earth, critics say :
Recycling: Retired can industry executive from O.C. spent years fighting
environmentalists. Then Deukmejian appointed him to environmentalist slot. Los Angeles
Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1990-07-08/news/mn-530_1_solidwaste-industry
Frammolino, R. (1990b, June 28). Deukmejian's O.C. nominee to new board drawing
fire: Politics: Selection of a former can industry member for an environmental post on a
panel created to promote recycling infuriated environmentalists. Los Angeles Times.
Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1990-06-28/local/me-1115_1_environmentalgroup
Frammolino, R. (1990c, August 16). Deukmejian Drops Board Nomination : Politics:
The governor faced overwhelming opposition to his plan to nominate a can industry
retiree to a waste-management post reserved for an environmentalist. Los Angeles Times.
Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1990-08-16/local/me-1163_1_waste-board
Gledhill, L. (2005, November 8). Migden quits chair of key Senate committee / She says
she wants to help Westly in his bid for governor. San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved
from: http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/SACRAMENTO-Migden-quits-chair-ofkey-Senate-2596896.php#ixzz2QMfNfOYi
Godkin, C. (2009). Governor’s May Revision Proposal: Restructure Beverage Container
Recycling Program (Item 3480-001-0133, Department of Conservation). Unpublished
document. Retrieved from www.cawrecycles.org/files/mayrevisiondocbevcontainer.doc
Gormley, W. and Balla, S. (2004). Bureaucracy and Democracy; Accountability and
Performance. Washington D.C : CQ Press.
Harris, S. (2008) What a waste. Fox&Hounds. Retrieved from
http://www.foxandhoundsdaily.com/2008/12/what-a-waste/
Hill, E. (1998). LAO Recommended Legislation. Sacramento, Ca: LAO Publications.
Hill, E. (2005). The 2005-06 budget: perspectives and issues. Sacramento, Ca.
71
It's official: Migden named to waste board. (2008, December 5). Sacramento Bee.
Retrieved from http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2008/12/its-officialmi.html#storylink=cpy
Jacobs, P. (1989, September 16). Bills pushed to let governor name aides to 3 top jobs.
Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-16/news/mn196_1_top-jobs
Kaufman, H. (1976) Are Government Organizations Immortal?. Washington D.C:
Brookings Institution.
Lagos, M. (2007, August 10). Migden pleads no contest to reckless driving. San
Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Migdenpleads-no-contest-to-reckless-driving-2510940.php
Lee, H. (2009, July 7). Migden’s wild ride costs state $335,000. San Francisco Chronicle.
Retrieved from http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Migden-s-wild-ride-costs-state335-000-3293342.php
Legislative Analyst Office. (2009). 2009-10 Budget Analysis Series: Resources:
Governor’s Reorganization Proposals. Retrieved from
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2009/resources/res_anl09004007.aspx
Lewis, D. E. (2002). “The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of
Agency Immortality.” The Journal of Politics. 64:89-107.
Little Hoover Commission. (1989). Report on Solid Waste Management: The Trashing of
California. Sacramento, Ca. Retrieved from
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/096/report96.PDF
Little Hoover Commission. (1994). Beyond Bottles and Cans: Reorganizing California’s
Recycling Efforts. Sacramento, Ca. Retrieved from
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/125/report125.pdf
Long, N. E. (1949). Power and Administration.” Public Administration Review. 9:257264.
Mai-Duc, C. (2011) Migden appointment: A surprise, even by capitol standards. Capitol
Weekly. Retrieved from http://www.capitolweekly.net/article.php?xid=zeee95vre99rvl
March, J. G. and Olson, J. P. (1983). “Organizing Political Life: What Administrative
Reorganization Tells Us about Government.” The American Political Science Review.
77:281-296.
72
Mehta, S. (2000, January 10). Reducing Trash: No Time to Waste. Los Angeles Times.
Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jan/10/local/me-52633
Miles, R. E. and Snow, C. C. et. al. (1978). “Organizational Strategy, Structure, and
Process.” The Academy of Management Review. 3:546-562.
Moe, T. M. (1985). “The Politicized Presidency.” in J. E. Chubb and P.E. Peterson (eds),
The New direction in American politics. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.
Moe, T.M. (1989) ‘ The politics of bureaucratic structure’, in J.E. Chubb and P.E.
Peterson (eds), Can the Government Govern?. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
pp. 267– 329.
Moe, T. M. (2005). “Power and Political Institutions.” Perspectives on Politics. 3:215233.
Oliff, P., Mai, C., & Palacios, V. (2012) States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact.
Center on Budget Policy Priorities. Retrieved from
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711
Peters, B. G. (1992). “Government Reorganization: A Theoretical Analysis.”
International Political Science Review. 13:199-217.
Powell, JB. (2008). FPPC chair: Migden “deceitful … we will fight her.” San Francisco
Bay Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.sfbg.com/politics/2008/03/21/fppc-chairmigden-deceitful-we-will-fight-her
Pratt, J. T. (1921). “A Proposal for Government Reorganization.” Academy of Political
Science. 9:17-30.
Profile of a Recession – The U.S. and California. (2002). FRBSF Economic Letter.
Number 2002-04: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Retrieved from
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2002/el2002-04.html
Public Policy Institute of California. (2009). Fed Up With State Leadership, Californians
Want Change But Approach Reform Cautiously. [Press Release]. Retrieved from
http://www.ppic.org/main/pressrelease.asp?i=969
Russell, R. (2010). In Carole Migden, a board appointee poster child. Bay Area Observer.
Retrieved from http://www.sfbayareaobserver.com/2011/05/in-carole-migden-boardappointee-poster.html
73
Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review. (2009). The Governor’s Special Session
Reduction Proposals and Proposed 2009-10 Budget. Retrieved from
http://sbud.senate.ca.gov/sites/sbud.senate.ca.gov/files/QuickS/QuickSummarySSRed200
910ProposedBudget.pdf
Schachter, L. (1995). Reinventing Government or Reinventing Ourselves: Two Models
for Improving Government Performance. Public Administration Review, 55(6), 530-537.
Schmidt, D. (2005). Writing in Political Science. New York. Pearson Longman.
Schwarzenegger promise to blow up boxes fizzled. (2010, December 28). CBS Los
Angeles. Retrieved from http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2010/12/28/schwarzeneggerpromise-to-blow-up-boxes-fizzled/
The Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery. (2012). Allgov.com. Retrieved
from http://www.ca.allgov.com/departments/natural-resourcesagency/department_of_resources_recycling_and_recovery?agencyid=161