Bachelor Thesis
Floyd van Zoelen
4090950
Religiously framed conflict in Syria
A comparison of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Islamic State
Word count 8601
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Floyd van Zoelen
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INDEX
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Introduction
Chapter 1: Background and Theory
Chapter 2: Diagnostic Framing
Chapter 3: Prognostic Framing
Chapter 4: Motivational Framing
Conclusion
Appendices
Bibliography
page 3
page 7
page 13
page 18
page 22
page 27
page 30
page 31
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Floyd van Zoelen
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INTRODUCTION
On 29 June 2014 the radical Sunni Islamic movement known as the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) announced the establishment of a Caliphate led by Caliph Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, leader of the movement. It claimed a territory stretching from Diyala in Iraq to
Aleppo in Syria.1 Ever since, the movement calls itself ‘Islamic State’, claiming authority over
Muslims worldwide.
We clarify to the Muslims that with this declaration of khilāfah [the Caliphate], it is incumbent
upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the khalīfah Ibrāhīm [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] and
support him (may Allah preserve him). The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and
organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah’s authority and arrival of its
troops to their areas.2
This quote is part of the celebratory speech in which Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, the official
spokesman of Islamic State, made the announcement that the Caliphate was established. It
mentions that it is obligatory for Muslims to align themselves with the Caliphate, since all
other regimes are illegitimate regimes. This illegitimacy is, according to Islamic State, based
on the infidel and apostate character of the regimes. In the words of al-Baghdadi: “the
disbelievers were able to weaken and humiliate the Muslims […] spreading dazzling and
deceptive slogans such as: civilization, peace, co-existence, freedom, democracy, secularism,
Ba’athism, nationalism, and patriotism.”3
As people became more and more aware of the violent and terrorist character of
Islamic State, mainly because of the large amounts of foreign fighters that were attracted to
1
Marcy Kreiter, ‘ISIS Declares Caliphate From Diyala Province, Iraq, To Aleppo, Syria; Changes Name To Islamic
State’ (version 29 June 2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-declares-caliphate-diyala-province-iraq-aleppo-syria-changes-name-islamic-state1614854 (14 January 2016).
2
Official speech on https://ia902505.us.archive.org/28/items/poa_25984/EN.pdf (14 January 2016), as seen
on: Al Jazeera, ‘Sunni rebels declare new “Islamic caliphate” (version 30 June 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new-islamic-caliphate201462917326669749.html (14 January 2016).
3
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “A Message to the Mujahidin”, in: Robert Spencer, The Complete Infidel’s Guide to ISIS
(Washington DC 2015), 181.
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the movement, fear for Islamic State grew.4 The international community realised it had to
react, especially after several terrorist attacks were conducted in countries outside of Syria
and Iraq (Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and most notably two attacks in Paris, France). Despite
large-scale bombings of areas controlled by Islamic State, there has not been a substantial
advancement in defeating the movement.
In explaining IS’s success, two assets of the movement are mostly referred to. First, the
movement’s supposed efficiency: Islamic State is a very efficient, small-scale and mobile group
led by a professional, militarily trained group of former Iraqi officers. It knows exactly how,
when and what to target. Moreover, IS knows to take advantage of hostile bombings and to
use human shield tactics. As Patrick Cockburn argues, ‘being the target of US planes also has
advantages for them, because there will inevitably be civilian casualties.’5
Secondly, the success of the movement’s propaganda and recruitment. Here, religion
(Islam) is crucial. As the movement frames itself as an Islamic movement, a jihadi takfiri Islamic
movement to be exact6, it is able to gain huge support among Muslims in several stages of
radicalization. To gather this support the Islamic State developed an extremely efficient
propaganda machine, using videos and ideological statements as well as tweets and Facebook
posts to attract supporters worldwide.7
Thus, it seems clear that religion and support are inextricably related. The Islamic State
established itself, grew and survives because of its extremely religious character which could
provide the necessary support for, and thus members of, the movement. The movement
emphasizes its religious character at every turn, hereby convincing people (both friend and
foe) it is indeed a purely religious organisation, aiming to represent Muslims worldwide and
spreading the word of Allah.
4
Foreign fighters for Islamic State are estimated at a staggering 20.000 (as of June 2015) from over one
hundred different countries. – Alex P. Schmid, ‘Challenging the Narrative of the “Islamic State”’ (International
Centre for Counter-Terrorism 2015), http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-theNarrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf (14 January 2016).
5
Patrick Cockburn The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (London 2015) xviii.
6
Takfir refers to the practice of excommunicating Muslims judged to be insufficiently dedicated to their faith
and to sharia rule. Pronouncing against someone takfir turns those targeted into unbelievers (kufar) who can
be killed. – John L. Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford: University Press, 2003), p. 312; Since the
late 20th century, Islamic fundamentalists have applied the term to other Muslims who do not adhere to
their strict interpretations of the Quran.
(http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1229?_hi=6&_pos=15), in: Schmid, ‘Challenging
the Narrative of the “Islamic State”’, 1.
7
Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York 2015) 170-178.
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This research focuses mostly on the second asset, and analyses the frames used by
the Islamic State to legitimise its actions. The first asset comes in when looking at perceived
injustices. To provide a more general, historical analysis, a comparison with the Muslim
Brotherhood in Syria will be made. This political Islamic movement has been especially
important in the 1970s and 1980s, when it became involved in a struggle with the Ba’athist
government of former president Hafiz al-Assad.8 Thus, although in different periods of time,
both movements are (or have been) engaged in a conflict with Syria’s government. Both
movements, too, are (or have been) geographically active in Syria. Hence, comparing IS in
the 2010s and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s and 1980s seems highly feasible.
As said, both parties are or have been in conflict with the Ba’athist regime. More
specifically: the Muslim Brotherhood had been in conflict with the regime of Hafiz al-Assad,
while Islamic State is currently in conflict with the regime of his son Bashar al-Assad. The
Ba’ath party is often seen as a secular political party; opposite to the Muslim Brotherhood and
IS in the political spectrum. While the regimes of both Hafiz and Bashar al-Assad are seen as
secular, both Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood portray themselves as representing
true Islam. This paper tries to understand how these religious views could contribute to the
emergence of violent conflict.
The main question I will try to answer here, could be formulated as follows: How do
Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood use religion to legitimise their actions and how can
we understand this legitimisation? In order to answer these questions, several ideas and
theories about conflict and the role of religion in it will be used. The main theory used here
will be the theory of framing, since ‘in [the] competition over the legitimacy of violent acts,
these groups seek to refute or even appropriate the words and names used against [and by]
them in order to win the hearts, minds and support (either tacit or active) of the population.’9
Debate on the role of religion in conflict has thus far been characterized by
particularizing versus generalizing positions. The latter treats religion as a part of ‘a broader
conceptual or theoretical rubric; [it starts] with ethnicity, which [it defines] broadly enough to
embrace religion.’10 The former treats religious political conflict as if it is solely comprised of
8
Rafaël Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (New York 2013)
Michael V. Bhatia, ‘Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors’, Third World
Quarterly 26 (2005) 1, 5-22, page 6.
10
Rogers Brubaker, ‘Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence’, Sociological Theory 33 (2015) 1, 119, page 4.
9
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religious motivations: political conflict is generated or transformed by religion. Religion can,
on its own, ‘authorize, legitimate, enable, and even require violent action’.11 This debate is
particularly relevant to this paper as it is strongly connected to the theory of framing: if a
movement or conflict is framed as religious, does it generate violence simply because it is
framed religiously?
This paper aims to analyse the influence that religion has on the conflicts between the
Muslim Brotherhood and the government of Hafiz al-Assad, and between Islamic State and
the government of Bashar al-Assad. For this purpose, the framing theory will be used to treat
religion from a particularizing perspective. So, there are two underlying premises. First,
religion is framed in certain ways to legitimise actions. Second, in both cases religion could, on
its own, contribute to the conflict because frames based on religion are (or were) used.
These frames will be described, analysed and compared according to certain ‘framing
tasks’, 12 on which the following chapter will elaborate (page 9 and further). Using a
combination of primary and secondary sources, this paper tries to contribute to an
understanding of religiously framed conflict. Primary sources used here are statements made
by the organizations or key figures within them. As framing is a conscious and strategic act, 13
the organizations themselves should be examined. Since I will be looking at the role of religion,
the framing of both Assad regimes will be left out; as said, the Ba’ath Party’s ideology is secular
and therefore does not use clear religious frames.
The secondary sources on both movements are relatively limited compared to others.
First, due to its recent emergence, most literature on Islamic State is focused on its origins,
rise and methods. Its underlying motivations have therefore been left to speculation and
generalization. Second, the literature on the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria mostly focuses on
it being part of a broader Islamic movement, and has also not dealt much with its underlying
motivations. Aside from that, the literary corpus on the organization is just very limited. A
reason for this could be that it was generally understood to be extinguished after the Hama
massacre of 1982, in which a large-scale military operation destroyed the movements’ main
area of influence: the city of Hama and its population.
11
Ibid., 12.
David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’,
Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review 12 (2007) 2, 119-136.
13
Carrie Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York 2002), 120.
12
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND THEORY
A useful analysis of any conflict first requires a general understanding of the conflict itself.
Therefore, the conflicts between the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic State and the
governments of Hafiz and Bashar al-Assad will be described in the first section of this chapter.
Following this, I will elaborate on the theoretical framework introduced in the introduction;
this elaboration will specify how to compare the two cases.
The Muslim Brotherhood
The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government of Hafiz al-Assad
seemed, at first, not an antagonistic one. Rather, it looked like the new regime, after having
launched an effective coup against the previous leader of Syria (General Salah Jadid), aimed
at re-establishing a close relationship with the Sunni community. According to Lefebvre, ‘the
new Ba’athist leader sought to cultivate a public image associated with a personal
commitment to Islam.’14 However, this relationship completely deteriorated when Hafiz tried
to change the constitution in January 1973. He wanted to exclude a special statement in the
constitution saying that the head of state should be religiously tied to Islam. Consequently,
the Islamic opposition rose up to condemn this action by the ‘“Godless Ba’athist regime’ and
fiercely resisted the secular character of the government. For the Brotherhood, this eventually
led to a process of radicalization, as its members increasingly sought to oppose the regime by
promoting jihad.
However, the change in the 1973 constitution was not the only aspect of the Ba’ath
Party that was being resisted by the Brotherhood. The Ba’ath ideology was based on secular
nationalism: “religion is for God, country is for all’.”15 The Ba’ath party considered religion as
a part of Arabic nationalism. In fact, ‘A main feature of the party’s platform was a belief in the
existence of a single Arab nation and a commitment to the achievement of Arab unity.’16 The
Ba’athist secular nationalist views also included a commitment to social reform. All in all,
14
Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama, 47.
Olivier Carré and Gérard Michaud, Les Frères Musulmans (1928-1982) (Paris 1983), in: Lefèvre, Ashes of
Hama, 44.
16
William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder 2013) 303.
15
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according to Cleveland and Bunton, the ideology of the Ba’ath Party centered around a
‘doctrine of national revival and social reform.’17
As the Brotherhood continued to resist this secular, nationalist ideology, the
movement’s radicalization continued and increased from 1975 onwards. It reached its
explosion in late 1979 when the Fighting Vanguard (a jihadist organization that arose among
extremist members of the Brotherhood18) attacked the Aleppo Artillery School, killing 83 Alawi
cadets and wounding several others.19 Although officially denounced by the Brotherhood’s
leadership, the organization was blamed for the attack by the Assad regime. In Hama, on 8
February 1982, the radicalization process amounted to a large-scale, extremely violent
uprising against the regime. This was related to the shift in leadership towards the more
radical Muslim Brothers from Hama, who maintained a close relationship with the Fighting
Vanguard. Eventually, this led to the Brotherhood declaring jihad on the Ba’ath Party in
1979.20 The Hama uprising, however, was crushed completely by the Assad regime, issuing a
military operation that killed between 10.000 and 40.000 civilians and destroyed large parts
of the city.21
The shift in leadership towards the Hama Brothers had its roots in the 1960s, when the
long-term separation of the so-called ‘Damascus wing’ and a ‘Northern axis’ resulted in a
conflict between the two. Brothers from the Damascus wing were moderate in their views
and were supporting an ideology of ‘endorsing parliamentary politics and rejecting the use of
violence against the regime’, a view that was not shared by many young Syrians. 22 The
northern axis adopted a more radical view, which eventually resulted in a split from the
Damascus wing. The international body of the Muslim Brotherhood supported the northern
axis in their views, recognizing its leaders as the legitimate leaders of the Syrian Brotherhood.
Consequently, the radical vision of the northern axis came to dominate, indeed culminating
into a more radical stance towards the regime.23 This northern vision strongly contributed to
the previously mentioned radicalization process, and can be observed in chapter 3.
17
Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 415.
Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama, xvi.
19
Ibid., 105.
20
Ibid., 81.
21
Ibid., 77.
22
Ibid., 88.
23
Ibid., 88-101.
18
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Islamic State
The conflict between Islamic State and the government of Bashar al-Assad developed quite
differently. While the Muslim Brotherhood’s conflict was mainly about a religiously oriented
opposition movement, Islamic State’s conflict is predominantly territorial in its orientation.
Islamic State is, as said, a jihadi takfiri Islamic movement and is most often described as a
terrorist organization. It announced its involvement in Syria as late as April 2013 and became
operational by May, establishing distinct territorial presence in Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir az Zour
by June.24
In the context of the Arab Spring movement, Syria’s Sunni population started an
uprising against the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad. It demanded in 2011 that the
tyrannical regime of Bashar was to be replaced by ‘a secular, nonsectarian, law-bound, and
democratic state’.25 However, with Assad firmly refusing to step down as Syria’s head of state,
the uprising culminated into a large-scale civil war with multiple parties involved, among
which many jihadist organizations. Three years later, Islamic State (officially still called ISIS by
then) came to dominate the Syrian civil war. IS gained large amounts of territory in the north
of the country, which it still manages to hold on to (see appendix 1). Islamic State claims to
fight for the establishment of a caliphate, which includes not only parts of Syria and Iraq: it
revolves around gaining as much territory as possible throughout the world. In fact it has
detailed its plans to conquer other parts of the world in a series of e-books published online
in early 2015.26 With continuing and even growing international involvement, however, it is
becoming increasingly harder for Islamic State to reach these goals as it is under constant
pressure on their own territory.
To understand the motivation behind these goals, it is important to understand the
region’s context after 2003. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, their aim was to
topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. Hussein was part of Iraq’s Ba’ath Party and his
government was almost exclusively comprised of Sunnis. After his regime was overthrown,
‘More than 100.000 Sunni Ba’athists were removed from the government and military,’27 by
the US interim government called the Coalition Provisional Authority, in Iraq. According to
24
Charles R. Lister, Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (London 2015) 119.
Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State, 81.
26
Robert Spencer, The Complete Infidel’s Guide to ISIS (Washington DC 2015), 252.
27
Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (London 2015), 19.
25
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Lieutenant General Jay Garner, “the policy rendered a large number of educated and
experienced Iraqis ‘potential recruits for the nascent insurgency.”28 Before the regime was
toppled, however, the Shi’a population of Iraq was severely oppressed by the Iraqi
government. As a consequence, after the United States invaded Iraq, they put the Shi’a
population in power. With the Sunni population now in a position of subordination, the
possibility of large-scale sectarian conflict became even more realistic. This situation
contributed largely to the increase in support for Sunni jihadi organizations; the prime
example being al-Qaeda, which created its own department in Iraq. It was called al-Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI) and was led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi. AQI eventually became known as the ‘Islamic
State in Iraq (ISI). 29 However, in April 2010 an American-Iraqi air strike killed the main
leadership of ISI. In May 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the leader of ISI, bringing many
former Ba’athist leaders into its leadership. Within a year, he expanded the ISI to Syria, after
which it became known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).30 As said, the Syrian Sunni
population rose up against the Assad regime in 2011, showing a similar sectarian division
between population and regime as it did in Iraq. Consequently, the Sunni-Shi’a divide
constituted a main factor in the Islamic State’s conflict, as it provided them with large numbers
of supporters. This will be shown more clearly in the following chapter.
As can be seen, this conflict has a strong territorial character, but clearly also revolves
around religion and sectarianism. Islamic State invokes jihad, the caliphate and the caliph,
infidels, its Sunni character, and other such religious notions to legitimize its actions and
mobilize people for its organization. Therefore, it is possible to compare Islamic State to the
Muslim Brotherhood because both use religion as the main focus of their movement. How this
will be done throughout this paper, will be specified in the following section.
One of the most important themes throughout literature on conflicts is the role of grievances
in causing conflict. Here, the process of framing is essential. This theme is part of the structural
explanation focusing on preexisting conditions – such as poverty, inequality, failing
governments and discrimination or suppression – that motivate people to gather in collective
28
Stern and Berger, ISIS, 19.
Ibid., 21-26.
30
Ibid., 37-39.
29
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action against a perceived responsible party (often the state). 31 The key word here is
perceived, because this suggests that there is a collective understanding of who or what is
responsible. Without this understanding, it would not be possible to facilitate collective action
as there would not be a common goal unifying the people against the party responsible. This
perception can be created, sustained or elaborated upon by different actors (or so-called
‘conflict entrepreneurs’32) trying to make collective action possible.
The framing process is essential here, because these actors use certain frames. These
frames ‘help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize
experience and guide action.’33 For the purposes of this paper, however, we need a more
narrow conceptualization of the framing process. This can be found in the concept of so-called
‘collective action frames’, which are ‘action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire
and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization’.34 This concept
creates the possibility of explaining how religion is being used by Islamic State and the Muslim
Brotherhood. In their discussion of the framing process, Benford and Snow recognize three
functions or ‘framing tasks’: ‘diagnostic framing’, ‘prognostic framing’, and ‘motivational
framing’.35 Applying these to ideology, Snow and Byrd provide us with a framework that is also
applicable to the role of religion and secularity in conflict. Thus, the previously mentioned
particularization theory will be used here because, for the purposes of this analysis, religion is
being separated from other forms of identity such as ethnicity or nationality.
First, diagnostic framing refers to the framing task of pointing out a certain ‘aspect of
social life or system of government as problematic and in need of repair or change,’ and
essentially functions as a means of blaming something or someone. 36 Second, prognostic
framing is used as a way of ‘stipulating specific remedies or solutions and the general means
or tactics for achieving these objectives.’ 37 In other words, it suggests ways of solving the
problems that were pointed out by the diagnostic frame. And finally, motivational framing
fulfills an important role in the actual ‘activation or mobilization of ideological adherents –
31
Richard Jackson and Helen Dexter, ‘The Social Construction of Organised Political Violence: An Analytical
Framework’, Civil Wars 16 (2014) 1, 1-23, page 1-3.
32
Ibid., 7.
33
Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), 611-639, page 614.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid., 615.
36
Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, 124.
37
Ibid., 126.
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that is, those who subscribe to the diagnostic and prognostic frames’.38 This means that, after
the problem and possible solutions have been pointed by diagnostic and prognostic frames,
motivational framing functions as a way of actually creating motivations for people to gather
in collective action.
In the following sections, I will apply these framing tasks to the movements discussed
in order to understand the role of religion in the conflicts between the Muslim Brotherhood
and the government of Hafiz al-Assad, and between Islamic State and the government of
Bashar al-Assad. This will provide a framework for comparison which also enables us to
understand how religion is framed and how it contributes to the legitimization of actions.
38
Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, 128.
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CHAPTER 2: DIAGNOSTIC FRAMING
Having very briefly summarized the two conflicts discussed throughout this paper, a
comparison can be made according to the theory of framing described above. Although Islamic
State and the Muslim Brotherhood differ quite strongly, similarities on the level of framing
religion can indeed be found. This chapter analyses the diagnostic framing of both
movements. These diagnostic frames are made up of the problems society faces according to
the organizations, and the factors and actors responsible for those problems.
The Muslim Brotherhood
First it is important to mention that both the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic State are Sunni
movements. This is the most obvious similarity between the two. However, although they
belong to the same religious group, they do not necessarily use the same frames. The aspect
of society that needs to be reformed, according to both the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic
State, is the condition in which the Syrian ‘Shi’ite minority rules over a Sunni majority through
the secular Ba’th Party,’.39 This is emphasized by the following text from a 1979 issue of anNadhir, the Brotherhood’s clandestine newsletter:
‘Syria’s modern history has never before witnessed such despotism and intellectual and
administrative immorality as that which it witnesses today in the shadow of the regime of Hafiz
Asad and his reckless gang.’40
Here it is claimed that the regime of Hafiz al-Assad oppresses the Syrian people and is not a
legitimate ruler of Syria. Preceding this quote is a list of issues that show the non-religious
character of Assad’s regime, as its policies are clearly aimed at diminishing religion’s influence:
‘Mosques were destroyed; religious scholars were arrested; […] atheist and disintegrative
information and instruction were published; sectarian party domination increased steadily; […]
the [Alawi] sectarian party militia were allowed to take the place of the regular armed forces;’41
39
Yvette Talhamy, ‘The Syrian Muslim Brothers and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship’, The Middle East Journal 63
(2009) 4, 561-580, page 561.
40
Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle For Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party
(London 2011), 90.
41
Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle For Power in Syria, 90.
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This clearly shows that the Muslim Brotherhood was resisting the secular character of the
Ba’ath Party of Hafiz al-Assad, and thus framed it as an infidel regime. Moreover, it illustrates
the point made by Snow and Byrd that not all diagnostic frames of Islamic movements are
focused on the West as the enemy. They argue that ‘a number of them are nationalistically
focused’,42 which is clearly the case with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood that focuses on the
own regime as the one to blame. Since the Brotherhood is in fact a political party, for a long
period of time considered legitimate opposition by the Assad regime (until it was officially
forced into exile after the 1982 Hama massacre), this does make sense. To gain support of
their constituents, people from the religious Sunni majority, the Brotherhood depicted its
opponent as “the Nusayri [i.e. Alawi] enemy”, the “infidel Nusayri who are outside of Islam”,
and accused the regime of Assad of “having made Islam [its] traditional enemy’.”43 By the
1980s this anti-Alawi framing was increasing, according to Nikolaos van Dam, and ‘prepar[ing]
the ground for a religiously motivated large-scale Sunni Muslim movement aiming at toppling
the Alawi-dominated Ba’th regime by force”.44
The previously mentioned statements denounce the regime of Hafiz al-Assad as being
despotic, and by definition illegitimate. Religion is involved here in two ways: first, the framing
of the Assad regime as being secular, and thus infidel, contributed to the delegitimization of
the government. 45 Second, it is claimed that Islam itself is against the regime of Assad. As a
consequence, the regime is considered illegitimate by divine authority.
The diagnostic framing thus contributes to the legitimization for the Brotherhood’s
actions by focusing on, first, the marginalization of religious groups and, second, the secular
(infidel) character of the regime. Both resonated among the Sunni population because it felt
and noticed this marginalization in several ways (shown in the quote from an-Nadhir). At the
same time, it recognized its limited political influence because of the Alawites’ dominance.
Second, the diagnostic framing provided large numbers of supporters by feeding into this
feeling of marginalization. Sunnis were eager to join a movement that resisted the regime that
excluded them from many aspects of life, especially since it emphasized its own Sunni
character versus the regime’s infidel character, which delegitimized the regime even more.
42
Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, 125.
Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle For Power in Syria, 90.
44
Ibid., 109.
43
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Islamic State
After Islamic State announced the establishment of the Caliphate on 29 June 2014, it started
publishing an online magazine called Dabiq. The first issue dates back to July 2014, its title
referring to a town in Syria where ‘an apocalyptic battle between the Romans – that is, the
Christians – and the Muslims will take place.’46 This magazine is especially relevant for the
purposes of this paper, since it’s one of Islamic State’s primary propaganda tools. According
to Spencer, it not only justifies and legitimizes its actions, it celebrates them. In turn, this
celebration of the movement’s actions attracts large numbers of supporters. Moreover, the
extensive use of Qur’an quotes, ‘the deep knowledge of Islam, the fanatical loyalty to it’, and
the claim that it is ‘the fulfillment of the desires of so many Muslims’, 47 signals religion’s
importance in reaching those goals.
‘The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being
nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people’.48
Here, the Muslim community is depicted as being victimized by an oppressor, the latter being
named as, for example, disbelievers (kuffar), crusaders and polytheists. This distinction
between the Muslim community and the rest of the world is also present in the speech Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi gave on July 1, 2015. Baghdadi gave this speech after having been named
caliph:
‘The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the
Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies,
and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr.’49
46
Spencer, The Complete Infidel’s Guide to ISIS, 71.
Ibid., 71/72.
48
Dabiq, ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ 1 (2014), 8. Complete issue on: http://media.clarionproject.org/files/092014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf - found on: The Clarion Project, ‘The
Islamic State's (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine’ (version 10 September 2014),
https://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq (first visit: 29 February
2016).
49
Dabiq, ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ 1 (2014), 10. Spencer, The Complete Infidel’s Guide to ISIS, 11.
47
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This idea of the West as being the enemy is present in many contemporary Islamic
movements, Islamic State being no exception. However, Islamic State does not limit its ‘blame
game’ to the West. It also blames Shi’ites and even other Sunnis for not living according to the
Sharia (Sunni Islamic law), which is exemplified by a speech from al-Adnani:
Rafidha [another derogatory term for Shi’a] are more dangerous on the Umma [the Islamic
nation or Muslims around the world]. Rafidha are the most dangerous enemy that threatens
Islam and Muslims.50
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Sunni-Shi’a divide between the governments of
both Iraq and Syria contributed largely to the numbers of supporters of Islamic State. The
Shi’ites are depicted by Islamic State as being even more dangerous to Islam than the West
because the Shi’ite regimes of Iraq and Syria actively target the Sunni people in their
oppression. In Syria this has been the case since Hafiz al-Assad came to rule the country. In
Iraq Sunnis have been oppressed since the US established a Shi’ite regime after the Iraq war
in 2003. Islamic State uses this oppression to legitimize its actions against the Shi’ites but also,
perhaps even more important, to gain support of the Sunni population that is being
oppressed.
Moreover, and clearly related to this, even Sunnis who do not collaborate with IS are
targeted. These Sunnis do not fight the most dangerous enemy of Islamic State, the Shi’a and
are thus considered disbelievers. These Sunni are called Sahwah, referring to the Sunni tribes
collaborating with the US against al-Qaeda in Iraq since 2003.51 The targeting of Sunnis on
religious grounds is shown in another part of Adnani’s speech: ‘ETILAF, the National Council,
the General Staff, and the Supreme Military Council represent apostasy and
kufr [disbelief] who declared war on the State (ISIS).52 The groups named here are moderate
opposition bodies in Syria, and were hereby designated as legitimate targets for ISIS. The
moderate Syrian opposition is comprised mainly of Sunni Muslims, the main protesters against
50
Institute for the Study of War, ‘Iraq update 2014 #5: “The Time to Harvest is Coming” – ISIS statement’
(version 8 January 2014), http://iswresearch.blogspot.nl/2014/01/iraq-update-2014-5-time-to-harvest-is.html
(7 March 2016).
51
Myriam Benraad, ‘Iraq’s Tribal “Sahwa”: Its Rise and Fall’, Middle East Policy 18 (2011) 1, 121-131.
52
Charles R. Lister, Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency, 192.
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the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Despite their shared religious affiliation, however, the entire
moderate opposition was declared takfir53 by al-Adnani.
These quotes, although very few in relation to the vast corpus of religious discourse
used by Islamic State, are very useful for gaining a better understanding of how Islamic State
uses religion to frame its core problems and the factors or actors responsible. According to
Snow and Byrd, researchers tend to treat Islamic (terrorist) movements ‘as of one cloth
ideologically.’54 As shown, Islamic State does not see one particular regime (for example that
of Bashar al-Assad), but everyone and everything that is not part of the movement, as the
problem. The establishment of the caliphate signals a strong will to unite the Muslim
community. In reaching this goal, Islamic State does not distinguish between non-Muslims,
Sunnis and Shiites.
Therefore, the diagnostic framing that Islamic State uses, answers the questions
‘”What is or went wrong?” and “Who or what is to blame?”’ as follows. First, what is wrong is
the oppression of Muslims worldwide by regimes not obliging to Sharia law. This is done both
by Western and non-Western regimes throughout the world. The second question is
answered, put blatantly, by ‘everybody’ (with the exception of Islamic State’s followers). Thus,
diagnostic framing by Islamic State contributes to the justification and legitimization of actions
by referring to the oppression that Muslims worldwide had to undergo for years: it is
permitted, mandatory even, to fight this oppression. Furthermore, it contributes to gaining
supporters by making Muslims aware of this oppression (whether perceived or real) and
instigating them towards taking action against it.
53
Takfir is the ‘Pronouncement that someone is an unbeliever (kafir) and no longer Muslim.’ – Oxford
University Press, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2319 (7 March 2016).
54
Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, 121.
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CHAPTER 3: PROGNOSTIC FRAMING
The concept of prognostic framing answers the question ‘what is to be done?’55 and therefore
enables the movement to come up with a solution for the problematic aspects of society
shown in the diagnostic frames. In the following sections the use of prognostic frames will be
analyzed. First, however, it is important to mention the fact that Islam as a religion is often
framed as the solution for everything. Islamic movements make general statements such as
‘the main one [issue] that is the unification of the people under the divine law of Allah.’, 56
creating a plan of action that is easy to comprehend. The solution for the problems shown in
these diagnostic frames, lies in the embracement of religion. This is possible for everyone.
However, for the purposes of this paper, the specific ways in which religion should be
embraced are more interesting. In other words, what aspect of Islam is framed as providing
the base for changing the situation and take action against the party or parties responsible?
The Muslim Brotherhood
The diagnostic frame used by the Muslim Brotherhood focuses on, first, the illegitimacy of the
Assad regime, based on its secular (infidel) character, and second, on the marginalization of
Sunni religion. The 1973 change in the constitution was the breaking point for the
Brotherhood. That is to say, a more nationwide movement of protest began to emerge. This
was the first time, under the rule of Hafiz al-Assad, that such a large-scale movement took
place.
As said, Assad tried to relate to the Sunni Muslim community using ‘gestures of
appeasement’, which meant that the first period of his leadership was marked by relatively
good relations between the government and the Islamic opposition.57 However, due to the
constitutional change and the following radicalization process among the Muslim
Brotherhood’s members, this relationship deteriorated. As radicalization of protests
increased, reconciliation became impossible, thus resulting in a vicious circle of violence.
Therefore, the goal of the Muslim Brotherhood was to topple his regime and “[call] for a jihad
55
Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, 127.
Usama Bin Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places
(August 23, 1996), 5.
57
Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama, 47/48.
56
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against him and against his ‘atheist and corrupt regime.”58 Here we can see the use of religion
in the context of prognostic framing: the concept of jihad is called upon by the Brotherhood
as a way of getting rid of the despotic, infidel regime that marginalized and oppressed the
Sunni people. This can also be seen in the same issue of an-Nadhir that was quoted before,
saying that:
“It is necessary, therefore, that the dead be resurrected from the sleep of non-being, that
ambition and honour be activated, and that it loudly be acclaimed: ‘Allah is great; on to the
Jihad’: Permission to take up arms is hereby given to those who are attacked, because they
have been wronged. God has power to grant them victory [Qur’an, Surah 22, verse 39].”59
This quote clearly calls upon the religious duty of waging jihad against those who oppress the
people: the regime of al-Assad is to be toppled by fighting him in the name of Allah. The final
solution to the situation in which the Shi’ite (Alawite) minority rules over the Sunni majority
and marginalize them, is ‘to make the magnanimous Shari’ah the compassionate [Islamic] law
for all peoples, and for the Syrian people in particular. They have tried to do this in various
ways, and only the Jihad remains.’60
Thus, a combination of waging Jihad and establishing Sharia law in Syria would result
in, first, the toppling of the Assad regime, and second, in the creation of a Syrian state that
rules according to Islamic principles and does not marginalize or oppress the Sunni people.
Interestingly, the Muslim Brotherhood was a political party with actual oppositional legitimacy
in Syrian politics. Despite this, it undertook violent action against the regime (in the form of
jihad), instead of pursuing its goals through political measures. This had to do with the
leadership crisis mentioned before, during which the more radical vision of the ‘northern axis’
was adopted. The radicalization of the movement came to dominate not only its ideology, but
also its actions. Waging jihad on the regime meant that the organization switched from a
political to a more militant stance. As shown above, this can also be observed in the
Brotherhood’s prognostic framing.
58
Talhamy, ‘The Syrian Muslim Brothers and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship’, 566.
Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, 90.
60
Ibid.
59
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Islamic State
The problematic situation sketched by the diagnostic framing of Islamic State is the oppression
of Muslims worldwide by non-Islamic regimes. Framing of who or what is responsible for this
is, in fact, a matter of ‘if you are not with us, you are against us.’ Everyone and everything that
is not part of Islamic State, including the Sunni Muslims it claims to represent, is framed as an
enemy and as not being a true believer of Islam. As argued before, the Islamic State’s conflict
is a territorial conflict. On the one hand, this means that it focuses on military campaigns and
tactics to expand its influence in the region, as opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood that used
mainly political measures and urban protests by civilians to reach its goals. On the other hand,
even more important, the territorial character of Islamic State’s conflict is strongly related to
its prognostic framing. The solution brought forward by this framing task is the establishment
of a worldwide caliphate. In this caliphate, Sharia law will be the organizational feature of
society, as is shown by the following excerpt from Dabiq:
‘He [Islamic State’s head of Tribal Affairs] then spoke about the fact that the mission of the
Islamic State is neither local nor regional, but rather global. Furthermore, he called to
implementing the Shari’ah, establishing the religion, promoting virtue and preventing vice.’61
Islamic State does not only argue that Sharia law should be implemented, it also has a vision
on how this is supposed to happen. The process of actually implementing Sharia law in the
caliphate should happen as follows:
‘Its [Islamic State’s] jihad would be based upon hijrah, bay’ah, sam’ (listening), ta’ah
(obedience), and i’dad (training), leading to ribat and qital (fighting), then Khilafah or
shahadah.’62
This quote is full of traditional Islamic concepts. Hijrah ‘traditionally referred to Muslims'
peaceful migration to lands where they would be free from persecution’, 63 but has now,
because of Islamic State’s use of the concept, been changed into a tool for recruitment.
61
Dabiq, ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ 1 (2014), 12.
Dabiq, ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ 1 (2014), 34.
63
Rebecca Gould, ‘Islamic State's perversion of "Hijra"’ (version 15 September 2015),
https://en.qantara.de/content/jihadism-islamic-states-perversion-of-hijra (16 March 2016).
62
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According to Rebecca Gould, it came to be considered as a ‘physical migration for the purpose
of jihad.’64 Bay’ah is an ‘Oath of allegiance to a leader.’65 and is used by Islamic State to make
people pledge allegiance to its caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.66 Ribat is a ‘fort or stronghold’
used for both ‘defensive and missionary purposes.’67
Thus, the Islamic State’s jihad would be waged by joining the movement in its own
territory (hijrah), pledge allegiance to it and its leader (bay’ah), listen and obey its orders and
ideology (sam’ and ta’ah), be trained in order to defend and spread Islam through fighting
(i’dad, ribat and qifat) and, finally, establish the caliphate (Khilafa) and state the phrase “There
is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.”, which is the shahadah.68 This
quote is a very detailed example of prognostic framing, as it is a step-by-step guide to the
solution Islamic State has in mind. The oppression of Muslims by non-Islamic regimes has to
be solved by establishing a Sharia-ruled caliphate, which can only happen if jihad is waged
against those regimes. Once a caliphate has been established, Muslims will be able to regain
their honor and dignity: ‘you have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might,
rights, and leadership.’69
As of 29 June 2014, this caliphate has indeed been established. However, because of
the current international interventions Islamic State is not able to gain more territory. In fact,
it is being said that the organization is losing territory. According to a very recent report by
BBC News, it has ‘lost 22% of the territory [it] held in Syria and Iraq over the past 14 months.’
(see appendix 2).70 Probably as a result of this demise, the influx of foreign fighters to Islamic
State’s territory has strongly declined. It is becoming increasingly difficult to motivate people
to join the organization, which can also be observed when looking at the motivational framing
by Islamic State. This will be the subject of the following sections.
64
Ibid.
Oxford University Press, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e316 (16 March 2016).
66
Lister, Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency, 124.
67
Oxford University Press, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2014?_hi=0&_pos=4 (16
March 2016).
68
Jack Smith, Islam - the Cloak of Antichrist (Enumclaw 2011), 311.
69
Dabiq, ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ 1 (2014), 6.
70
Richard Watson, ‘Islamic State militants 'lose 22%' of territory’ (version 15 March 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35816552 (16 March 2016).
65
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CHAPTER 4: MOTIVATIONAL FRAMING
Mobilizing people to join a cause or movement is a difficult task. Especially if this cause or
movement aims to engage in (violent) conflict. Olson argues that every person will, in theory,
refuse to join in because of the so-called ‘free-rider’ problem: “why work for a goal that is a
‘public good’ in the sense of being an indivisible and nonexcludable benefit?”71 (for example:
democracy, freedom, justice). This would mean that everybody will eventually enjoy the
benefits, while there is no need to actively participate to gain them; others will do this for you,
so you don’t have to. Therefore, people have to be motivated to join and ‘overcome the fear
of risks often associated with collective action’, 72 which is what a movement tries to do
through motivational framing. Interestingly, religious motivations seem to be of great
importance as to how to motivate people. There are, according to Snow and Byrd, two ways
for religion to influence the people’s choice of action (decide whether and how to participate
in collective action). First, ‘appeals to religious or moral duty’, often related, can be strong
motivators to join a movement. Second, ‘the promise of divine rewards’ can provide the
incentive needed to overcome the risks of participating. These motivators are the subjects of
the following sections.73
The Muslim Brotherhood
In 1961, after the United Arab Republic (the unification of Syria and Egypt, motivated by
principles of Arab nationalism and unity) was dissolved, elections were held in Syria. Through
its political branch, the Islamic Front, the Muslim Brotherhood won ten seats in the Syrian
parliament. In 1981 the Islamic Front released a comprehensive document on its ideology,
goals and political program called ‘The Proclamation and Program of the Islamic Revolution in
Syria’. The topics discussed range from sectarianism to colonialism, and are a summary of the
Front’s views. Moreover, it is oriented towards a religious perspective, as it is clearly designed
to motivate people to join the Islamic movement in Syria.
The Brotherhood’s magazine an-Nadhir, on the other hand, framed the problems Syria
was facing, their solutions, and the people or things responsible for them, in a more compact
71
Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge 1965), in: Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing
Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, 128.
72
Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, 128.
73
Ibid, 129.
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manner. Therefore, it proved more effective to understand the diagnostic and prognostic
framing by looking into an-Nadhir instead of the Proclamation. However, the Proclamation
clearly called upon the people to join the Islamic movement, making use of many religious
statements. Consequently, it will be used here to understand the Brotherhood’s motivational
framing.
Already in its first chapter, it calls upon the religious and moral duty that every Muslim
has to protect and defend Islam and the will of Allah:
In order to stop idleness and dependence on others, the Islamic Revolution finds it its duty to
point out that the ruling will of Allah actually comes about in this life through the effort exerted
by man himself. This is a basic fact no believer who is engaged in the struggle against the
enemies of Allah and man ought to ignore.74
Besides this, they also have a duty to carry ‘the responsibility of jihād to uphold the word of
Allah’.75 In this part, the Islamic Front is already waging the jihad, after which it starts to sketch
everything that is wrong with today’s Islam and how this came to be. Creating an antagonism
towards certain ‘enemies of Islam’, the Islamic Front is implicitly and explicitly calling upon the
Muslim people to join in jihad.
The fulfilling of duties will eventually yield certain rewards, which is, as said, argued by
Byrd and Snow. Motivational frames often rely upon the promise of divine rewards. These
divine rewards are also clearly present in the following excerpt from the Proclamation: a
Qur’an quote used immediately after calling upon the people’s duties.
Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will,
of a surety, grant them in the land inheritance (of power) as he granted it to those before
them; that He will establish in authority their religion—the one He has chosen for them—and
that He will change (their state) after the fear in which they (lived), to one of security and
peace: “They will worship Me (alone) and not associate aught with Me.” (Qur’an 24:55).76
74
Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley 1983), page 2 of the appendix.
Ibid.
76
Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, page 2 of the appendix.
75
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Although not a statement made by the Brotherhood itself, it does say a lot that it uses a quote
from the Qur’an saying that those who adhere to their religious duties will receive divine
benefits. In this case, these benefits are divine in the sense that they come directly from Allah.
Snow and Byrd also give examples like martyrdom, meeting the Prophet, and being in
the presence of Allah.77 Martyrdom can obviously be a factor to overcome the risks of joining
in collective action, as it takes away the biggest risk, dying, and makes this in fact honorable
and desirable. It motivates be people to participate because sacrificing yourself for a particular
cause will have a positive influence:
But Allah aided his messenger (Peace be upon him) with men who had deep and strong faith.
They sacrificed themselves because they believed that it was their very duty to restore the
balance to people’s lives and and to rescue them.78
Thus, in motivating people to join, the Muslim Brotherhood clearly uses religious notions, and
even specific quotes from the Qur’an. It calls upon the people’s duties and points out the
benefits of participating. The duties as well as the benefits are depicted from a religious
perspective, thus creating a motivational frame based on religion.
Islamic State
Islamic State makes extensive use of motivational framing. With its huge propaganda
apparatus, it is able to reach a worldwide audience, which is the ultimate goal of motivational
framing: reaching as much people as possible, and provide motivations for them to join. As
shown in the introduction, estimates of Islamic State’s foreign fighters are around 20.000 (as
of June 2015), coming from over a hundred countries.79 However, as also stated before, there
is a strong decrease in the influx of these people. This has a lot to do with the motivational
framing. It is not the case that the frame created by Islamic State has changed, it is the
increasing presence of international actors that heightened the fear of risks of collective action
77
Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, 129.
Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, page 84 of the appendix.
79
Alex P. Schmid, ‘Challenging the Narrative of the “Islamic State”’ (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
2015), http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-IslamicState-June2015.pdf (14 January 2016).
78
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for many people. Therefore, the motivational framing by Islamic State has become less
effective in actually getting people to participate and join.
Again, duties and benefits will be central in the following sections. Islamic State
especially emphasizes the duties, simply by existing. The Muslim community as a whole has
several obligations. One of those is the establishment of a caliphate, because ‘the Islamic
community needs a ruler to uphold the religion’.80 Immediately following this, is the obligation
to wage jihad. A caliph has the right to call for an offensive jihad, which is the act of waging
war against non-Muslims until “they become Muslim or else pay the non-Muslim poll tax.”81
This offensive jihad is a duty for the Muslim community as a whole, which means individuals
are excepted from waging it when others take this responsibility.82
However, people who do not uphold their duties, can and will be punished.
Paradoxically, and very different from the motivational framing of the Muslim Brotherhood,
Islamic State extensively uses fear to make people overcome fear. Aside from divine rewards
for joining, there are also divine punishments for not joining. “So fear Allah, O slaves of
Allah.”83 People who do not pledge allegiance (bay’ah) to Islamic State will die an dishonorable
death, and are framed as non-Muslims. “Whoever dies without having bound himself by a
bay’ah, dies a death of jāhiliyyah [ignorance84] (Sahīh Muslim).”
Despite this, there are also clear examples of divine rewards. Especially with regards
to martyrdom these rewards fulfill a motivational task. Throughout all issues of Dabiq,
warriors of Islamic State are glorified; those who wage jihad and die in the process are
depicted as heroes and martyrs. Undoubtedly, they gained access to paradise: “he disobeyed
him and performed jihād. […] it is then incumbent upon Allah to enter him into Jannah.”85
80
Spencer, The Complete Infidel’s Guide to ISIS, 169.
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Dabiq, ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ 1 (2014), 10.
84
Jāhiliyyah denotes any government system, ideology, or institution based on values other than those
referring to God. To correct this situation, such thinkers propose the implementation of Islamic law, values,
and principles. Radical groups justify militant actions against secular regimes in terms of jihad against
jahiliyyah. – Oxford University Press, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1157 (22 March
2016).
85
Dabiq, ‘The Flood’ 2 (2014), 19. Complete issue on: http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isilislamic-state-magazine-Issue-2-the-flood.pdf (first visit: 29 February 2016) - found on: The Clarion Project, ‘The
Islamic State's (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine’ (version 10 September 2014),
https://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq (first visit: 29 February
2016).
81
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Jannah is the Islamic conception of heaven.86 Islamic State thus frames motivations primarily
in terms of punishment and reward. Those who participate are rewarded, but those who do
not are punished. All punishments and rewards are related to fulfilling the duties of Islam: ‘the
Islamic State actively works to educate its citizens, preach to and admonish them, enforce
their strict adherence to Islamic obligations’. 87 This quote shows that not fulfilling Islamic
duties can even be punished by earthly measures, as adherence to them can be enforced by
Islamic State itself.
So, although Islamic State’s motivational framing has not changed with regards to its
use of religious appeals in the form of duties, punishments and rewards, it has failed recently
to attract more foreign fighters. This is, as said, related to the international involvement
manifest in bombings on Islamic State territory. However, as shown, the motivational frame
created by IS strongly focuses on religion as a motivator to join the movement and participate
in the previously mentioned step-by-step guide provided by IS in its prognostic frame.
86
‘Definition of "Jannah"’ (28 October 2015), http://islam.about.com/od/heavenhell/g/gl_jannah.htm (22
March 2016).
87
Dabiq, ‘A Call to Hijrah’ 3 (2014), 17. Complete issue on: http://media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isisisil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-3-the-call-to-hijrah.pdf (first visit: 22 March 2016) - found on: The Clarion
Project, ‘The Islamic State's (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine’ (version 10 September 2014),
https://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq (first visit: 29 February
2016).
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CONCLUSION
A comparative analysis between the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s and 1980s and Islamic
State in the 2010s has pointed out that religion has been, and is, used by both movements in
order to create certain frames. These frames (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational)
focused on, respectively, the problems of society and the factors and actors responsible, the
solution to these problems, and ways to motivate people to participate in this solution. As
illustrated in the introduction, the current debate concerning the role of religion in conflict is
centered around particularization and generalization. This paper used a particularizing stance
towards the role of religion as it tried to answer the question ‘How do Islamic State and the
Muslim Brotherhood use religion to legitimise their actions and how can we understand this
legitimisation?’ This question, however, did not entail a strict analysis of differences and
similarities between the two movements, although they have been pointed out throughout.
Rather, it entailed an analysis of the mentioned framing tasks and how these were present in
statements made by the movements themselves.
Therefore, the main question can be answered by looking at the different frames. The
legitimization of both movement’s actions came from religiously motivated frames of
injustice. That is to say, the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames all use religion to
create or feed into a sense of injustice.
First, the diagnostic frames make this injustice visible. The Muslim Brotherhood did
this by pointing to the secular and Alawi character of Hafiz al-Assad’s regime, illustrating the
fact that the religious majority was ruled by an infidel minority. Thus, religion was used to
delegitimise the existing regime and therefore legitimised actions against it. Islamic State
made the injustice visible by pointing out the worldwide marginalization and oppression of
Muslims. Everybody and everything that contributed or contributes to this is responsible.
Second, the prognostic frames provide a solution to the sense of injustice. The Muslim
Brotherhood first used political measures but then started to radicalise, resulting in a
prognostic frame that focused on waging jihad and establishing Sharia law. Much the same is
true for Islamic State. Despite having a much more detailed, even step-by-step, plan, IS also
uses a prognostic frame of waging a jihad and ruling according to the Sharia. Importantly, it
add the dimension of a caliphate, which emphasizes its more territorial character. Jihad will
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establish the caliphate, which will be governed using the Sharia. The caliphate is the ultimate
solution, according to IS’s prognostic frame.
Finally, the motivational frames take away the risks of participating to change the
injustices. Here, both the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic State emphasize the religious and
moral duties Muslims have towards the ummah (the Muslim community) to do something
about the injustice. Both organisations also make use of the promise of divine rewards. In the
case of Islamic State, the prospect of being punished (either by divine or earthly measures) is
another important motivational factor. The fear of this punishment outweighs the fear of
participating in Islamic State’s actions.
All in all, we can see that both the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic State make
extensive use of religion to legitimise their actions. Understanding this legitimization through
the theory of framing proves very useful, since it provides a framework of analysis for the role
of religion in these two conflicts. As is obvious from their public statements and actions, both
organizations are religiously oriented. However, to understand religion according to the
particularizing stance, a division between the different aspects of the movements had to be
made. The theory of framing is able to isolate a single aspect and analyse how this aspect is
used; the same could be done, for example, with the role of colonialism or globalism in
conflicts. The framing tasks used here are certainly suited to understand the contribution of
those phenomena to either the conflicts described in this paper, or any other conflict.
Another possible addition to this paper could be the analysis of the ‘trueness’ of the
religious aspect in both, or one, of the movements. Especially in the case of Islamic State,
public opinion seems to be that it is all about power, money, or simply because its members
are ‘crazy psychopaths’. The religious aspect, however, seems to be central in its discourse.
How can we understand this?; is Islamic State in fact a religious organization?; what are the
actual goals of the organizations?; is the Brotherhood an actual, legitimate political party, or
is it in fact a jihadist organization, since its actions seem very similar to that of some jihadist
organizations? These and many other questions can be used to follow up on this paper.
Primary sources coming from the organizations themselves were the building blocks
of this research. However, sources from their opponents or possible defectors were not
included. Recently, a very fascinating site has emerged that claims to expose the truth about
IS. Here, people tell their personal stories to undermine the image people have of IS. Topics
range from the Islamic character of IS, to warnings not to join it. Using these sources, an
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analysis of IS could result into something completely different from the conclusion of this
paper.88
As is the case with every research, many follow-up questions and research ideas
emerge. However, having analysed the role of religion in conflict through the framework of
Snow and Byrd’s framing tasks, I think this paper has sufficiently contributed to an
understanding of how religion can influence people’s minds and legitimize actions.
88
http://openyoureyes.net/ (22 March 2016)
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Regional situation in the Middle East. In its first months of existence, Islamic State (Da’esh) gained incredible amounts of
territory in a very limited period of time. It managed to hold onto its territory for a long time (this is the situation in February
2016).
Taken from: http://www.businessinsider.in/US-officials-think-ISIS-will-attack-America-this-year/articleshow/50968995.cms
Appendix 2
‘IS territorial gains and loss, 1 January 2015-14 March 2016’
Taken from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35816552
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