Perception versus Memory: An A rgument against Representation alism
Abstract
This paper presents an argument against both strong and weak varieties of Representationalism; the
thesis (broadly construed) that the phenomenal content of a conscious mental state is either
exhausted by, or supervenes on, that state’s representational content. In short, I argue that the initial
perception of an experience and the memory of that very same experience can—under certain
conditions—be identical in their r-content while differing in their p-content. Because Strong
Representationalism entails the supervenience commitment of its weaker cousin, a counterexample
to the supervenience claim will serve to topple both versions of the representationalist thesis.
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§1. Introduction
We are conscious beings. As conscious beings, we enjoy a variety of mental states: intense
bodily sensations like pain, auditory experiences like listening to a symphony, or rich visual
experiences like watching a sunset. These mental states have unique phenomenal character. That is, they
possess a qualitative subjective ‘feel’; there is ‘something it is like’ (for the subject) to undergo a pain
experience or view a sunset. For example, when I stub my toe on an unfortunately placed piece of
furniture, the resulting pain experience has a distinctive (phenomenal) raw feel to it. These raw feels
or qualitative character are often called qualia. But the ontological status of qualia, however, is highly
contentious. Are they non-physical, irreducible, ubiquitous features of our world? Or, if some
phsyicalists are right, perhaps qualia are simply oscillations of different brain fibers?
Yet the phenomenal does not exhaust the mental. Not only do we enjoy phenomenally
conscious states, we are also intentional beings. When I watch a sunset, I see that it is beautiful.
In other words, our mental states refer to or are about things. And like qualia, the ontological status of
so-called ‘intentional-objects’ is divisive. If I were to have a thought about a unicorn, in what way
would such an intentional object be different from anything that does exist in this world, say,
George W. Bush, for example? Do we perceive these intentional objects directly, or are we users of
mental representations—semantically evaluable mental constructs of such intentional objects.
My concern is where qualia and intentionality meet in the Representational Theory of
Consciousness. The representationalist (Harman 1990; Tye 1995; Lycan, 1996) claims that qualia,
whatever they may be, either supervene on or are exhausted by representational (or intentional)
content. The latter option is often called ‘Strong Representationalism,’ where the phenomenal
character of our mental states just is its representational (intentional) content. Weaker versions of
Representationalism are typically just committed to the supervenience thesis. Though typically
branded as a physicalist theory, Representationalism is not itself strictly anti-dualist; one can be a
non-reductive physicalist (read ‘Property Dualist’) and still be a representationalist.1 And it is
important to note that the representationalist will not deny there is a ‘what’s-it-like’ character to our
conscious experiences; rather, he will claim that this strikingly familiar feature is not found in some
distinct property such as qualia. When we attend to the content of our mental states, all we can
For most representationalists, however, there is greater hope that a reduction will be possible (than it not being
possible), and therefore the default position is a physicalist one.
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introspect is what that state is of; viz., its intentional content. Qualia, if they exist at all, cannot be
introspected directly.
This paper will argue that both weak and strong varieties of Representationalism entail a
commitment to the phenomenal content supervening on representational content, yet reflections on
a distinction between the perception of an experience and the memory of that very same experience
presents a powerful counterexample. Thus, if my argument is correct, each version of
Representationalism will fail. I call this the ‘Perception-Memory Argument.’
Full disclosure: while my argument should be strictly seen as an objection to
Representationalism, my underlying motivation is the promotion of ‘Qualia Realism’ (QR), the thesis
that for every conscious mental state, the instantiation of certain non-intentional properties (qualia)
make it like something for the subject to undergo that conscious mental state. While I do not offer a
positive argument for QR here, if my argument against Representationalism is successful (and one is
still inclined to believe our conscious mental states actually have a phenomenal character) then QR
should emerge as a very live option for understanding how this phenomenal character is instantiated.
Here is the game plan. In §2, I provide a detailed explication of the commitments and
motivations of Representationalism and describe it two primary variants. Then in §3, I lay out the
details of the argument and head-off some possible objections and misinterpretations. I conclude in
§4 with a short exposition of how QR seems to emerge as the best candidate theory in light of
Representationalism’s collapse.
§2. Representationalism Articulated
The first question we must ask is this: what is a (mental) representation? To answer this we
must first consider an inherent, defining fact about human beings: we are intentional agents. That is,
our mental states—beliefs, imaginings, desires, thoughts perceptions, etc.—refer to or are about things.
Accordingly, we can say that a mental state is intentional if and only if there is some object upon
which it is directed. While originating in the work of Saint Anselm, it was Franz Brentano who
perhaps first emphasized the very idea’s ontological consequences. Consider the following quote
from his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint:
“…in the idea, something is conceived, in judgment something is accepted or directed, in
love, loved, in hate, hated, in desire, desired; and so on” (1874: 125).
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So, for example, my ‘desire that the Yankees will win’ is an intentional mental state with an object
that it refers to, viz. the Yankees. But it also is something else. It is a propositional attitude; I have a
mental posture towards the content of my intentional state. Thus, if X desires (believes, hopes,
thinks) that P, X is said to have a propositional attitude to P. And my attitude towards the object is a
‘desiring-relation’ that that object ‘win.’
But intentional states have another distinctive feature. Not only is there (i) some object
(existent or nonexistent) that that state is directed upon, but (ii) that object is also presented to us in
a certain way. Call (i) an intentional object and (ii) that object’s mode of presentation. By ‘mode of
presentation’ we mean something similar to Frege’s notion of sense, the way the referent (the object)
is presented. Our thoughts are directed on their referents in a particular way. When I think of New
York City, I may think of it as having certain features—bustling streets, yellow cabs, majestic steel
and glass buildings. The reference (in this case, NYC) is thought about in a certain fashion.
Importantly, this fashion, the mode of presentation, is not presented itself. Rather, it is the
intentional object—NYC—that is being presented. The mode this presentation takes is cashed out
by these various features.
So how does intentionality relate to mental representation? Broadly, a mental representation
is a semantically evaluable mental construct.2 When I have a conscious experience of my cat Squishy
being yellow-brownish, having three legs, being a few inches from my face, all the while wearing an
unruly expression on his face, that experience itself is neither three-legged nor a few inches away
from me. The experience itself is a state of my nervous system that represents a yellow-brown cat
being so close to my face. And if I introspect about that experience, I form a second-order
representation of the initial first-order representation of my cat Squishy. This experience of Squishy
is also an intentional state, and the semantic content of my representation is derived from that
intentional content.
So, Representationalism tells us that the phenomenal content (hereafter, p-content) of my
experience of Squishy is exhausted by or supervenes on its r-content (hereafter, r-content). What is
p-content, then? P-content is simply the collection of phenomenal properties whose instantiation
accounts for the qualitative nature of our conscious mental states. For the strongest of
representationalists, these phenomenal properties, and thus p-content, are simply representational
(intentional) properties or r-content. In contrast, the QR will claim that the p-content of a conscious
My discussion of mental representations is a basic and broad one as my aim is only to lay some preliminaries for the
coming argument. We must note, however, that while representations can be understood computationally, they need not
be. As it does not directly pertain to our concerns with the thesis of Representationalism, I will bypass this distinction. 2
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mental state is not intentional at all (or at least, not entirely intentional for some weaker versions of
the view); they are some other, non-intentional property. These properties are often called qualia.
Thus, the debate between Representationalism and QR is not just nominal quibble: it is a debate
over which the victor makes a claim to our very ontology. The QR is adding something to our
ontology; the representationalist (or at least a Strong Representationalist) is not.
Now that we understand the notions of both r-content and p-content, we are in a position to
understand Representationalism more deeply, including its foundational motivations and various
kinds. Let us first differentiate the two primary versions:
1. Weak Representationalism claims that the p-content of a conscious mental state
supervenes on its r-content. Accordingly, any two experiences identical in their rcontent will be identical in their p-content.
2. Strong Representationalism takes the weaker thesis a step further. Not only does
p-content supervene on r-content, but also the phenomenal character of a sensation
or visual perception consists purely in its (intentional) r-content. We do not have
direct introspective access to any qualitative features of our mental states; we
experience the object of our states and that object alone.
Both versions admit reductive and non-reductive forms. For the former, any
representational/phenomenal content can be further analyzed into physical-functional terms. The
latter version denies this. It is also important to note that the representationalist need not locate the
phenomenal character of a mental state in its intentional object. Rather, the Fregean Representationalist
will claim that such character is instantiated by its mode of presentation (see above).
Our expository focus, however, will be restricted to Strong Representationalism. My reasons
are twofold: (1) it is the position in greatest contention with QR, and (2) it encompasses the main
tenants of any weaker version. Kind (2000) gives a useful characterization of we shall borrow it to
start off our depiction.3
Let’s compare a physical object and its features with a mental image of that object. First,
consider a painting of Santa Claus. Santa is represented as having typical Santa-ish properties: having
a big, round belly; a white beard and mustache; wearing a red suit and so on. These are not
properties of the painting itself, but properties of what the painting represents—clearly, the painting
does not have a big belly. Yet the physical painting has its own properties. It may be square or
rectangular, or perhaps it is oval-shaped, and it could be flat or round. Now let’s consider a mental
3
See Amy Kind, Qualia Realism (2000: 145). I have appropriated liberally from her powerful example. Page 5
image of Santa, where that image has identical intentional content as the painting. The mental
representation of Santa has properties similar to the painting’s representation of Santa. But does the
image also have intrinsic properties akin to the properties of shape and color of the physical
painting? This question is critical. Its answer is what divides QR and representationalists. QR will
answer in the affirmative. Contra the QR, the representationalist will answer no; our experiences are
transparent in the sense that when we attend to those experiences, our awareness “slips through” to
the intentional content. Here is Gilbert Harman’s depiction:
When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the
tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor
does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experience…Look at a tree
and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I predict that the only
features there to turn your attention to will be features of the presented tree (1990:39).
This story illustrates the primary motivation behind Representationalism: the Transparency Thesis. We
do not—and cannot—attend directly to the features of our experiences; that is, our experiences
themselves—not what they are of—are transparent. If we try to focus on our experiences themselves,
our awareness cannot help but ‘slip through.’ Upon introspection of our conscious mental states, the
only thing we attend to is the objects that are represented by our experiences. So, considering our
example of Santa above, we do not attend to any of the intrinsic features of the perceptual
experience; when we imagine Santa Claus we do not experience any what’s-it-like intrinsic features
apart from the actual object of our experience. Here is another illuminating characterization from
Michael Tye:
Focus your attention on a square that has been painted blue. Intuitively, you are directly aware of
blueness and squareness as out there in the world away from you, as features of an external surface.
Now shift your gaze inward and try to become aware of your awareness itself, inside you, apart from
its objects. Try to focus your attention on some intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes
it from other experiences, something other than what it is an experience q. The task seems
impossible: one's awareness seems always to slip through the experience to blueness and squareness,
as instantiated together in an external object. In turning one's mind inward to attend to the
experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on external features or
properties. (1995: 30)
The transparency thesis does seem prima facie true, but it faces serious objections.4 Regardless, our
argument will not be focused on whether or not it is true, but instead on one of its implications. The
transparency thesis, and thus Representationalism, does not deny that there is something ‘it-is-like’
to have a visual experience of a tree or a blue square. P-content, rather than being a unique property
4
Among others, see Amy Kind’s (2008) How to Believe in Qualia, in The Case for Qualia (ed. E.O. Wright). Page 6
of mental states that is itself introspectable, simply is r-content. Consequently, any two mental states
identical representationally will also be alike phenomenally; p-content supervenes on r-content. Here
is one rather clear formulation of the supervenience thesis from Chalmers (1996):
B-properties supervene on A-properties if no two possible situations are identical with
respect to their A-properties while differing in their B-properties (33).
Here, B-properties are “high-level” properties whereas A-properties are the more basic “low-level’
properties of modern physics.5 Biological facts supervene on physical facts; once all the physical
facts about the world are fixed, the biological facts are fixed as well. On one popular way of putting
it, if supervenience is true, once God settled all the physical facts about the world, He had no more
work to do.
So, the representationalist, in holding that a conscious state’s phenomenal properties
supervene on its representational properties, is committed to the following claim: two experiences
identical in their r-content will also be identical in their p-content. Accordingly, there can be no
change in p-content without a change in r-content. And therefore the path to a counterexample is
clear: find two conscious experiences that have identical r-content, yet differ in terms of their pcontent. It is here that I concentrate my attack in the following section. The upshot of this strategy
is that rather than attacking the transparency thesis and thereby only rebutting the strong
representationalist, we disabuse both strong and weak varieties by upending supervenience.
§3. The Perception-Memory Argument
“...there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain
of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory
this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions
of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment."
- from Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1778: Book 2)
In this section I present the Perception-Memory argument against supervenience. Hume’s
well-known claim above expresses the very heart of my argument. If true, Representationalism will
have been shown to be false. Here is its formal presentation:
1. Representationalism entails the claim that p-content supervenes on r-content.
While Chalmers introduces a number of different types (logical, natural, etc.) we only need the basic template for our
purposes. Again, following his lead, an ‘A (or B) fact’ are simply facts about the instantiation of A (or B) properties.
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2. Thus, any two experience identical in r-content must also be identical in p-content
(from 1)
3. Our perception of X (Px) at T0 is representationally identical to our memory of X
(Mx) at T1, so long as:
a) The time elapsed between T0 and T1 is reasonably short. (Premise)
b) X is an event of significant personal import. (Premise)
c) The representational detail to be remembered is also reasonably simple. (Premise)
4. The conditions in [3a-3c] obtain for Px. (Assumption)
5. Accordingly, Px and Mx will have identical r-content, and thereby have identical pcontent as well. (from 2,3, 4)
6. But Px and Mx do not have identical p-content. (Premise)
7. So, there are cases where two states identical in r-content are not identical in pcontent. (from 5,6)
8. Representationalism is false. (from 1, 2, 7)
Consider the following conscious mental states: (i) my memory (Mx) that I watched fireworks on the
4th of July, and (ii) my perception (Px) that I am watching fireworks on the 4th of July. On my
argument, Mx can, under certain constraints, perfectly preserve the r-content of Px. That is, under
the context specified, Mx and Px can be representationally identical. Despite this, Mx will necessarily
have different p-content in virtue of the difference in experiential intensity between the perception of a
thing on the one hand, and a memory of that same thing on the other. Here is another way to
visualize my argument.
Consider Mx as a time-function—one that maps our memories of x starting from our initial
perception of x, and has a vertical asymptote at t=0. T0 denotes our initial, singular perceptual
snapshot of Px. Mx can occur—in-principle—at an infinitesimally small time (Δt) after, but it cannot
occur at T0 so defined, for Mx then would just be Px. Accordingly, if we measure time in increments
of Δt moves along the curve, a move of Δt from T0 would be Mx occurring at some time point
immediately following Px. And the further we move ‘down’ the curve, we continue to accumulate
moves of Δt —our memories thereby becoming more and more distant from the initial perception
of x. The less Δt moves that are made, the more likely Mx will be to perfectly preserve the r-content
of Px (see (3a)). And because I claim that the p-content of Mx can differ from that of Px, with each
1-d move, the mapping between changes in r-content and changes in p-content need not be
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isomorphic. If p-content supervened on r-content, we would expect there to be an isomorphic
relation. I am claiming that within a relatively short (here, small) number of Δt moves from T0 (zero)
the r-content can be identical—and this is virtue of the function of memory in conjunction with the
further constraints found in (3b) and (3c). In contrast, P-content, I claim, will change faster. In fact,
with each Δt move, unique p-content is instantiated (see (6)).
This argument is valid; if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot fail to be true as well.
But is it sound? Clearly, the premises found in lines (3) and (6) will need to be defended. The
remainder of this section will address each premise in turn.
§3.1 Can our Memories perfectly preserve r-content?
Can (i) and (ii) have identical r-content? While it is clear that, under most circumstances, they
will differ in r-content, there seems to be no prima facie reason why they could not—in-principle—be
identical in r-content. The key is finding the proper context in which this would be likely. Our first
contextual constraint found in (3a) is time. If the time passed between T0 and T1 is reasonably short, it
is judicious to suppose that for a properly functioning memory the r-content will identically
preserved. Talk of this is typically gestured by locutions like “I remember it like I was there
yesterday.” Such sayings are of course typically uttered when a significant amount of time has passed
from the original experience, but its truth (and we have every reason to assume the speaker is being
truthful) speaks to the ability of our minds to preserve the details of our experiences’ r-content. And
of course “relatively short” is meant to be pragmatic. There is no hard cut-off for when Mx will have
different r-content from Px. But suppose a singular instantiation of Mx—my memory at T1—occurs
only but a few minutes (or a few Δt moves, if you prefer) after the singular occurrence of Px at T0.
Say, for example, my Mx occurs at the moment the fireworks show is commenced. Given such a
circumstance it is not at all unreasonable to think the r-content of both Px and Mx could be
identical.6
But perhaps this is not enough. Our memories are not perfect—they tend to ‘fade’ over
time. Details fall out, and sometimes, even new details are added. After all, even claims of so-called
6
And if one still has their doubts, we can invoke the possibility of a subject with an ideal, perfectly functioning memory.
If such a being is possible—and I certainly see no prima facie reason why it would not be possible—then we must
conclude (barring any modal skepticism) that it is also possible (for the subject with ideal memory) to have identical rcontent in Px and Mx irrespective of the time elapsed between them.
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eidetic memory have been doubted.7 While these considerations seem less problematic given
constraint (3a), some may be unconvinced. In lieu of this, we add a second contextual constraint
(3b): personal import.
The purchase of (3b) should be relatively clear. Given two events, we are more likely to
remember in greater (representational) detail the event that is a significant personal landmark in
one’s life. Thus, if Px is my perception of some random lightning in the sky, and Pz is my perception
of lightning striking my house, Mz will be more likely to have perfectly preserved the r-content of Pz
then Mx of Px. Also, we should note that whether the event has positive or negative moral or
psychological import is irrelevant. It seems that we are just as likely to remember “bad” events as
“good” ones. Of course, if the event is bad enough, one might retroactively conceal or “block” the
memory as a protective measure. Such cases, however, seem few and far enough between to remain
undeserving of any further qualifications of (3) on their behalf.
But we do not have to argue for the importance of (3b) on a priori grounds alone. Declarative
(or ‘explicit’) memory is perhaps the most frequently—albeit tacitly—type of memory referenced
under normal conversation. A type of long-term memory, declarative memory requires conscious
recall to retrieve stored facts and events. Declarative memory can be divided further into semantic and
episodic varieties. Semantic memory allows the encoding of abstract knowledge about the world, such
as ‘Barack Obama is the president of the U.S.’ But our concern here is with episodic memory or
autobiographical memory, which is used for more personal memories, such as the emotions and personal
associations of a particular place and time.8 Autobiographical memories are often unreliable, and it is
reasonable to conclude that memory simply has a coarser grain, thereby accounting for any
difference in p-content. But the relevant question is this: given the personal import of a certain
autobiographical events, is it at least possible to have a memory that perfectly preserves the r-content
of that event? Recent literature in neuroscience is promising on this front and confirms the
relevance of my supposition in (3b).
7
See Marvin Minsky’s The Society of Mind (1988). It is unclear whether purported cases of eidetic memories are really
anything above and beyond very accurate and detailed memory. Yet are such cases even pertinent to (3)? It may be
helpful to briefly pause here to reflect on and stress just what my argument requires. It is not enough for my Mx to
merely be representationally similar, or even virtually alike in r-content to Px. To show that p-content can fail to
supervene on r-content, we must find to experiences that are identical in their representational features and yet do not
have identical p-content. Thus, it is at best unclear whether purported cases of photographic or eidetic memory—even if
they were not controversial—would actually be helpful. Unless
eidetic memory entails the perfect preservation of rcontent (and there is no indication that it does) such cases are irrelevant.
8 It has also been claimed that autobiographical memory is actually a subset of episodic (declarative) memory. Because
the only difference seems to be the requirement that autobiographical memory involve memory for particular events
within one's own life, we can put this distinction aside. Nothing in my argument will turn on this.
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Cases of ‘super-autobiographical memory,’ where subjects have a startlingly accurate ability
to recall select events from their personal history are not infrequent in the neuroscience and
psychology literature. One especially relevant variant can be found in the case of ‘AJ’ described in
Parker et al. (2006). AJ is a woman has what the authors call Hyperthymestic Syndrome (a particular type
of super-autobiographical memory), where remembering is a dominant and uncontrollable feature of
her life. Recollection of one event ‘cues’ a cascade of other recollections; one theory postulates that
she is in a permanent episodic retrieval state, shown by continuous activation in the right and left
prefrontal cortexes and anterior cingulated gyrus (46). Her superior recall ability is closely tied to
personally relevant and important events of her self-sustaining autobiography; give her a date, and if
it falls within her personal mental calendar, she can recall its details with remarkable accuracy. Parker
et al. detail one particularly astonishing example (39) where she accurately recalled, with no prior
warning or chance to practice, the exact month and day, and what precisely she was doing for each
for each Easter from 1980 to 2003. For example, in 1991, Easter fell on March 31, and her friend ‘B’
visited for the day. Also on that day, she was asked to show identification when attempting to buy
cigarettes. (39, table 1). Each other Easter within the time-span is recalled in similar fashion. Perhaps
most importantly, AJ is not simply a “calendar calculator” like some autistics and her memory is
highly selective. She has difficulty recalling certain things, which, for whatever reasons she may have,
are of no personal import.
It is inconclusive whether AJ’s memory perfectly recalls the r-content of the initial event
(McGaugh, personal conversation). Nevertheless, the findings of Parker et al. yield a vital empirical
result for our argument: AJ’s ability demonstrates the relevance of personal import to superior
memory. Indeed, it certainly seems conceivable that, if AJ’s memory had also met the constraints
found in (3a), we have all the more reason to believe that the r-content of her episodic state would
have perfectly preserved. Of course, most people are not like AJ. But this need not matter when all
we need is one counterexample.
To tighten the screws, I add one final contextual constraint in addition to those found in (3a3b): the simplicity of the relevant representational detail (3c). Now, not only does Mx occur shortly
thereafter Px, where X is personally important event, but the intentional object(s) of my Px is (are)
also presented to me as being representationally simple. What does it mean for a perception to be
representationally simple? In our original story, X was the fireworks on the 4th of July. Undoubtedly,
X is complex in detail. That is, a singular perceptual snapshot of fireworks will include much
representational detail: the various types and colors of fireworks, the background night sky, amongst
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other things. Of course, there can be no straightforward measure of representational complexity, but
it should be easy to tell what is more or less simple or complex. So, for example, if X was a single
firework, the representational detail of Px—and thus Mx—will be comparatively simpler compared
to a cluster of different fireworks. And if X is representationally simple, we have all the more reason
to believe Mx capable of perfectly preserving this simple r-content. Like the constraint of personal
importance (3b), given two events, we are more likely to remember in greater representational detail
the event that has the simpler representational detail. The brain just has less work to do.
Yet some may object that Mx is necessarily simpler (representationally) than Px, and
accordingly, supervenience would still hold. Thus, when compared to Px, Mx will be thinner in detail
simply because it is a memory. Yet what reason is there to believe this? Of course most memories will
not retain all of the r-content of Px, but this need not be an essential property of memory. If anything,
we may be inclined to believe that our memory has evolved in such a way that—provided the requisite
circumstances—we can, in principle, maintain identical r-content. Remembering in greater detail will, in
most cases, be more beneficial than less detail.
Thus far I have been defending the truth of (3); namely, that two experiences—a perception
of some event and the corresponding memory of that event—can have identical r-content, provided
certain contextual constraints obtain. I have also introduced the case of AJ, a woman with
unprecedented autobiographical memory. Of course, the time constraint found in (3a) may not
apply to her, but there certainly is no reason to suppose it would hurt. The upshot is found when we
take cases like hers in conjunction
with (3a-3c). In addition, I do not limit my argument to only
unconventional examples like AJ. It should be clear that, given (3a-3c), this ability seems tenable for
most competent memories. I now turn to my defense of (6).
§3.1 Disparate P-Content: The Failure of Supervenience
The last section defended (3). Here my focus is (6), which, if true, will establish a failure of
supervenience: two states identical in r-content, yet different in p-content. How can we defend (6)?
When Hume speaks of the “the force and vivacity of the original sentiment” he is concerned with
the origin and formation of our “less lively” ideas from our “more lively” impressions. But we can
co-opt his insights here.
Consider the difference in intensity between our perception of such-and-such and our
memory of such-and-such. Watching fireworks is a vivid, intense experience. It is hard to forget
what it is like to watch fireworks because such experiences leave an indelible mark on us. To put it
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quite simply: the phenomenal character of Px has a distinct and rather powerful richness to it the
instantiation of which is wholly unique to that experience and thereby unrepeatable. So, for example,
we can say the p-content of Px feels like ‘fireworkish+1.’ Now comparing Mx to Px, does Mx have
different phenomenal properties that that of Px? That is, does it have its own unique what’s-it-like
character? I submit that it must. And this is so—just like our discussion of r-content—purely
because of the function of memory. Our memories, while capable of preserving r-content, do not
always preserve p-content. There is something strikingly differing in terms of what it is like to
perceive fireworks then and there on a beach, compared to recalling that perception on the way home
in your car—even if that recall occurs shortly after T1. The difference is a difference in intensity, or
vivacity if you will, of the what-it-is-likeness. Our memories are necessarily dimmer—not in the
sense that content falls out, but in the sense that we can never relive the rapturous intensity of our
initial experience. A change from ‘vivid green’ to ‘faded green’ would, of course, be a change in rcontent. But a change from ‘lively-remembered fireworks’ to ‘less-lively remembered fireworks’
would be a change in p-content. And it is in this sense in which I mean the reductions in vivacity or
increases in dimness that naturally occurs with memories. We can say then, that this difference in
intensity is actually the instantiation of a distinct phenomenal property (or quale).9 It is a quale that
feels like ‘fireworkish-1.’ And this of course, is different from fireworkish+1. Consider it a weaker
cousin.
The properties of our experiences are intrinsically tied to the occurrence of that experience.
Accordingly, when we recall an experience, the act of recalling (remembering) is an experience unto
itself, and will therefore have its own phenomenal character. If it did not, we would be left with much
less reason to even distinguish between the two experiences to begin with. Earlier, I argued that it is
possible for Px and Mx to be identical in r-content. If this is true, and we then did not conclude that
Mx must differ from Px in p-content, we would be simply left with the re-tokening of the initial
perceptual state. For, if Mx had the same r-content and p-content as Px, in what way would they be
different? I submit that they would not be different, and we would thus have no reason to
differentiate between them. But, of course, we do know that there is some difference. And that
difference is usually (most apparently) realized in differences in r-content. But it need not be given
(3a-3c). Thus, it is a difference in p-content that distinguishes Px and Mx. Put another way: there is
Of course, this view commits me to admitting that for every gradable difference in “intensity” of an experience, the
what-it-is-likeness changes, and therefore we are adding a new, distinct quale (that is, a new distinct phenomenal
property) to our ontology. I am prepared to swallow this. In fact, I believe there is an infinite amount of possible qualia
(phenomenal properties) that can be instantiated for any given experience. 9
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something it is like all on its own to have a Mx. M is a distinct experience with its own unique
phenomenal nature—it is not simply the re-tokening of P.
Perhaps one may worry: why must an appeal to ‘intensity’ mark the instantiation of distinct
p-content, rather than a change in r-content? I confess that I am not sure what such an objection
would amount to. How could an intentional object, such as a red ball or fireworks, be represented
less intensely? The fireworks are either represented or they are not. If by this it is meant that certain
details of what is being represented are hazier than the initial perception then, of course, this would
amount to a change in r-content. But if we grant (3a-3c), any r-content, as argued will be preserved.
Any change in intensity or haziness will therefore be a property of the experience itself, and thus
count as a change in p-content.
§4. Qualia Realism?
I have argued that Representationalism is false. There are cases, namely the perception of X
compared to the memory of X, where p-content fails to supervene on r-content. But what does this
mean for the nature of our conscious mental states? At the outset of this paper, I had mentioned
that QR should emerge as a live candidate theory for the ontological status of qualia, should
Representationalism fail. I want to discuss this possibility briefly now.
It is important to be quite clear that the failure of Representationalism does not itself imply
the truth of QR. But if we can have direct introspective access to the qualitative features of our
mental states (which Strong Representationalism via the transparency thesis denies), and the pcontent responsible for the instantiation of these qualitative features do in fact fail to supervene on
its r-content, we have every reason to believe in QR.10 And if QR is true, we need not posit dualist
properties to account for those new non-intentional properties. Speculatively, qualia can still simply
be identical to some physical property in the brain. (This, of course, is made even more plausible by
positing some form of the Phenomenal Concept strategy to explain our a priori anti-physicalist
intuitions found in Zombies and Mary). And it is important to make clear that there is nothing
contradictory about claiming the truth of QR on the one hand, and claiming that qualia are identical
to some physical property on the other. We should not interpret identity theories as denying the
Strictly speaking, a rebuttal of the transparency thesis itself is needed to affirm our direct introspective access to the
qualitative nature of our conscious states. And this, of course, was not my intent here. However, since the main thesis of
Strong Representationalism—namely, that p-content is exhausted by r-content and that we have no direct introspective
access to the p-content of our mental states (all we can introspect is r-content)—is in strict contention with QR, its
rebuttal ‘opens the door’ for QR as a viable option.
10
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existence of some feature of mentality. All they claim is that a mental state M is the very same thing
as a physical state P. Yet this should not be troublesome for the QR. We are no more denying that
M exists than the identity claim ‘Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens’ denies that Twain or Clemens
exist. In fact, identity claims tell us quite the contrary; in order for P = M to be true, both P and M
must exist.
I was upfront that I take QR to be a credible, live option for the nature of our conscious
mental states, but admittedly—and purposefully—no positive reasons for its truth have been given.
And further, the Perception-Memory argument against Representationalism should not be
interpreted as a shill for the opposition in QR. If Representationalism is false, serious consequences
for the philosophy of mind lay in its wake—whatever they may be.
References
Brentano, Franz. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. (1874, 1st ed.) English edition ed. L.
McAlister (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).
Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford UP, 1996.
Harman, Gilbert. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.” Philosophical Perspectives 4. (1990): 31-52.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. New York: Oxford UP, 1748/1999. Kind, Amy. “Qualia Realism.” Philosophical Studies. 104. (2001):143-162.
Parker, Elizabeth S.; Cahill, Larry; McGaugh, James L. “A Case of Unusual Autobiographical
Memory.” Neurocase. 12. (2006): 35-49.
Tye, Michael. Color, Consciousness, and Content. MIT Press, 2000.
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