The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution
(Rowman and Littlefield, 2001) by Nicholas Maxwell
Chapter Two: The Human World: What is of Value?
1 Introduction
2 A Conjecture: Lovability as that which is of Value
3 What do Value Assertions Mean?
4 Are there Objective Values?
5 Moral, Metaphysical and Epistemological Objections to Objective Value
6 Objections to Relativism
7 Reply to Moral Objections to Objective Value
8 Reply to Metaphysical Objections to Objective Value
9 Reply to Epistemological Objections to Objective Value
10 Objective Value in the Physical Universe
Notes
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1 Introduction
What is it about our human world that is of most value that seems to be most under threat
from what modern science tells us about the nature of the universe? In this chapter I first
put forward a conjecture as to what is of value in existence. My conjecture is that it is what
deserves our love that is of supreme value in existence. I conclude from this that we should
live life lovingly. But all this presupposes that we are conscious and have free will (just that
which seems most problematic given what modern tells us about the world). I then go on to
discuss questions about what it means to say that something is of value, what grounds we can
have for holding that this is of value rather than that, what grounds we can have for accepting
one philosophical view as to what is of value in life and rejecting a rival view. I shall discuss
questions about the nature of value. Are value judgements objective or subjective? Is value
some kind of objective property of things that are of value; or, in speaking of what is of value
are we merely expressing, in a somewhat misleading way, our own likes and dislikes, our
own desires and hatreds? What is the relationship between what is of value and the morally
good, and the politically good? Do we need to recognize the existence of disvalue as well as
value, the bad as well as the good, evil as well as goodness?1
Throughout this chapter I take for granted what might be called a common sense view of
the world: grass really is green, the sky really is blue, people really are conscious and, for
much of the time, more or less responsible for what they do (i.e. in possession of free will).
The question, for the moment, is: What is of most value granted this common sense view? In
the next chapter we will consider how modern physics calls all this into doubt.
We are still at the stage of formulating and clarifying the human world/physical universe
problem, in other words. I shall endeavour to give the problem the most severe, the most
difficult-to-solve formulation possible. In this chapter I argue that value-features of things
actually exist in the world, as real a part of what there is as perceptual properties, or even as
real as physical properties such as shape, mass, charge. In the next chapter I shall argue that
modern science has established that everything is made up of some common, unified physical
reality, yet to be captured precisely in the true physical theory-of-everything. If this is correct,
it is difficult indeed to see how consciousness, free will, meaning and value can be anything
more than persisting human illusions. The problem of accommodating our human world in
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the physical universe confronts us in the harshest form imaginable.
2 A Conjecture: Lovability as that which is of Value
Everything that is of value in existence has to do with life, especially with sentient life,
and even more especially with conscious life. The miracle upon miracle is the existence of
conscious life in the universe: it is this that is infinitely precious, supremely of value.
We discover what is of value partly as a result of learning from others, partly as a result of
attending to our own feelings and desires. But not everything that feels good is good, and not
everything that we desire is desirable (just as not everything that others say is of value is of
value): hence the need for the distinction between feeling and desire on the one hand, and
desirability or value on the other. We need to learn what is of value as we live.
That which is of value, for each one of us, arises in the particular circumstances of our
lives. Generalities about the nature of value, such as the present ones, fail to capture the
essence of what is of value just because value is specific and particular to this person, this
couple, these friends, and evaporates at the level of generalities.
That which is of value is incredibly diverse in character. But this does not mean that any
one person's view about what is of value is as good as any other person's. Diversity of value
does not imply subjectivism of value, or relativism.
That which is of value in existence is that which is lovable; it is that which deserves to be
loved, as it were. Love combines pleasure and concern. We love something when we take
delight in it, enjoy it, adore it, gain pleasure from experiencing it; but when we also cherish it,
seek to further its interests, protect it against harm, exercise care and concern for it.
Paradigms of human love are the love of a mother for a new born infant, and the love of
lovers for each other expressed above all in sexual love-making. But human love of course
shoots far beyond these cases. It includes the love that friends have for each other, the love
that a craftsman has for the objects of his craft, the love of an artist, or lover of art, for works
of art, the love of a scientist for what he seeks to know and understand, the love of a gardener
for her garden, the love of nature, sport, laughter, good company, mathematics, and even,
perhaps the love of a philosopher for the solution to those problems she struggles to solve.
Wherever there is clear-sighted delight, enjoyment, care and concern, there is love to be
found.
There are, of course, all sorts of different degrees of loving. The exalted height of loving
is perhaps the supreme intimate ecstasy of true lovers, the mutual joy and cherishing that goes
with the intimacy of true lovers. Love between two people may be somewhat less exalted
than this in a variety of ways, and for a variety of reasons. The sexual aspect may not be
present, or may be suppressed for obvious reasons; the aspect of care may predominate, as
when an elderly parent is cared for, or as when a nurse cares for a patient. The relationship
may, quite properly, lack the aspect of intimacy, and may be much more formal or
professional, as in medicine, teaching, counselling, and a host of other professional
relationships. Love may be more or less selfish or corrupt, the moral dimension of care being
sacrificed to pleasure, of one kind or another. Love may be more or less blind, the lover
loving not what is there, or even what is most lovable, potentially, in the other, but rather
some hallucination or illusion of the other, what is hoped for rather than what is. All too
often human loving is corrupted by possessiveness, cruelty, selfishness, blindness, fear of
loss. The very act of possessing and being possessed can, all too easily, become morally
corrupt.
All other value and moral notions derive from the supreme value and moral notion of
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loving the lovable. In a wide range of circumstances, much of what we ordinarily associate
with loving at its most exalted becomes inappropriate. Instead of love we speak of such
things as freedom, civil rights, wisdom, intellectual integrity, rationality, democracy,
knowledge, friendship, dedication, generosity, kindness, clear-sightedness, moral goodness,
duty, courage, justice, sensitivity, honour, creativity, perceptiveness, skill, and so on.
Nevertheless, in all of life there should be as much love as circumstances permit, including
the circumstances of one's own interests and concerns.2
Morality exists to remind us how to be loving, or to help us to be loving, to the extent that
the circumstances warrant, when the dimension of delight and enjoyment is lacking, or
though present, is being abused, and the instinctive impulse towards care and concern is
absent. Morality concerns loving when the instinct to love is absent, inappropriate, or being
abused. The law seeks to empower morality with sanctions, of varying severity, where this is
justified or practical. Everything illegal is (ideally) immoral, but not everything immoral is
illegal.
Does living life lovingly involve living life selflessly, dedicating oneself to the interests of
others? No. Our primary concern ought to be ourselves, our own best interests - although
we would have to be some kind of psychopath if this did not also involve the best interests of
those close to us (in a variety of ways). Even if our attitude is the god-like one that we ought
to devote our lives selflessly to the interests of people, still there is no other person we can
know so intimately and be of such service to, as ourselves. Enlightened selflessness implies
enlightened self-interest. If we do not love ourselves, who will love us? On the other hand, if
we love ourselves alone, what kind of love is that? And how lovable will we become if we
make ourselves the victim of such a narrow, unloving self-love?3
The proper way to live is to love the lovable in the context of our life.4 What, then,
becomes of the unlovable? Are they to be condemned to the hell of living life unloved, and
to the even harsher hell of suffering the attentions of the law when indifference to others, or
resentment, spills over into crime? Is the idea of a loving society really compatible with that
of a free society? Freedom includes the freedom to be unloving and become unlovable within
the constraints of the law; but would not the loving society put immense emotional, moral and
other pressure on people to conform to the norm of living life lovingly? How can such an
ideal survive politically in a free society (let alone the kind of world we mostly have today)?
Genuine love for another desires the other's autonomy and freedom; loving implies
freedom. A loving society would need to protect itself, however, from those who would seek
to destroy it, just as a free society would need to do this. In our world, full of suffering,
injustice and desperation, people who live life lovingly will need to act more or less
unlovingly in all sorts of circumstances in order to survive, and to enable that which is
lovable in their lives to survive; and likewise, if anything remotely approaching a loving
society existed, it too would need to act in unloving ways in order to survive.
We can imagine a spectrum of methods for resolving conflicts between people, from allout murder or genocidal war at the most violent end of the spectrum, via inflicting of harm or
damage to varying degrees, the threat of such things, to bargaining, adopting some procedure
for resolving the conflict such as voting, to the cooperative, loving attempt to discover that
resolution which is the best available for all those concerned. We live life lovingly (to the
extent that this is possible without being suicidal) in a more or less unloving world if, when in
conflict with others, we try to move methods of conflict-resolution away from the violent end
of the spectrum towards the lovingly cooperative end, in so far as this is consistent with
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survival.
Tradition tends to juxtapose selflessness (good) and selfishness (bad). The true
juxtaposition is between loving cooperation with others (good) and, at the other extreme,
violent resolution of conflict.
3 What do Value Assertions Mean?
I have claimed that what is of supreme value in existence is lovability, and everything else
of value devolves from this. But what does this claim mean? What, in general, does it mean
to assert that something is of value - lovability, happiness, wisdom, success, money, or
whatever?
We need to distinguish between what is of value to X (whether X is a person, a group of
people, a society, humanity as a whole, or all conscious or sentient beings) and what X
desires for at least two reasons.
First (substituting me for X), something may be of great value to me and yet I may not
desire it because I have it and take its possession for granted. Health might be an example.
What decides what is in fact of value to me is what my priorities would be, in fact, in a
variety of possible circumstances. What is in fact of value to me is not necessarily what I
declare to be of value; and it is not confined to what I desire: it is what I in fact would choose
in a variety of possible circumstances.
Second, although I may desire something, this may not really be desirable for me. I may
desire success, but when I achieve it I discover it makes me miserable and was not what I
really wanted at all. The heroin addict desires heroin, but is the heroin really desirable, i.e. of
value? We need to distinguish between what is desired and what is desirable just because, in
desiring X we can be mistaken; for all sorts of reasons, X may not really be desirable at all.
In considering what is of value, we need to consider the following five possibilities:
(1) X is of value to this individual person.
(2) X is of value to this group of people.
(3) X is of value to humanity, to all people.
(4) X is of value to all conscious beings, or all sentient beings.
(5) X is of value per se.
If we restrict our attention to (1), it is clear that what is of value to John may be quite
different from, or may conflict with, what is of value to Jane. But let us suppose that John
and Jane are members of a group: what ought we to mean when we assert that such and such
is of value to the group? As a first shot, we might declare that X is of value to the group if it
is of value to individual members of the group in such a way that any conflicts between
members have been rationally, justly and successfully resolved in a lovingly cooperative way.
The group might have been formed, however to attain some goal of value; it might, for
example, be made up of doctors, or scientists, or teachers, devoted to promoting health,
knowledge and understanding, or education. In this case, the overall goal of the group, may
conflict with the interests of individual members of the group, and it is insufficient to say that
conflicts between individuals are resolved cooperatively: in addition, we require that conflicts
between individuals and the interest of the group as a whole are resolved in a just, rational,
cooperative way.
Generalizing case (2) to cases (3) and (4) introduces no new conceptual problems. Case
(5) is however radically different. Does it even make sense to say that something is of value
per se, irrespective of whether it is of value to some person, or sentient being? I leave the
question hanging, as an open one: in what follows I will restrict myself to (1) to (4).
4
It should be noted that case (3) has major political consequences. It is to be interpreted as
implying that society is, fundamentally, for its individual members, and not the other way
round (there also being concern for potential future members of the society). In other words,
(3) implies liberalism, at the very least. The conception of the ideal world society, a
genuinely "civilized" world, implicit in (3), might encapsulated as follows.
A civilized world is one in which people share equally in enjoying, sustaining and
creating what is of value in life in so far as this is possible. Within this framework of
liberalism, political conflict and debate concerns what is of value, and how possible it is for
people to share equally in enjoying, sustaining and creating what is of value. The basic
political task, even in a civilized world, is to discover how to increase freedom, increase the
capacity of people to realize what is of value, by restricting freedom, restricting the right, the
capacity of some to realize what is of value to them. The ideal, of course (given the basic
view being advocated here) is the lovingly, rationally cooperative society in so far as this is
possible (there being at least justice where love is inappropriate).5
The assertion "X is of value to Jane" may be interpreted to mean any of (1) to (4). If, for
example, it is interpreted in sense (4), then X is only of value to Jane if this does not conflict
unjustly with what is of value to any other sentient being. A delicious joint of roast pork may
be of value to Jane in senses (1), (2) and (3), but it cannot be of value to Jane in sense (4),
assuming that the pig has not died in an accident to provide the pork, but is to be slaughtered.
In what follows, in speaking of that which is of value in senses (2) to (4), we have to
assume that immense problems as to what does constitute the just resolution of conflict have
been solved.6
4 Are There Objective Values?
Are there objective values? Is it possible to make sense of the idea that one can be
mistaken about what is of value, and that one can learn about what is of value? Are there, in
some sense, value properties, value facts, in virtue of which value statements can be true or
false, irrespective of what anyone believes about the matter, analogously to the way in which
straightforward factual statements are true or false, depending on what is, objectively, the
case? Or, in speaking of what is of value are we merely speaking about what people value, or
we value? Are we, in other words, speaking in a somewhat misleading way about personal
preferences?
The question concerns not just moral value, but value of any kind; the question arises
whenever something is - or is deemed to be - in some way desirable, worthwhile, good, or
of value.
Subjectivism has been the dominant view in moral philosophy during much of the 20th
century.7 In opposition to this, I have long defended value realism, the doctrine that there are
value features of things, as objective and real as perceptual features such as colours and
textures.8 Until about a year before the publication of this book, I thought I was a lone voice
crying in the wilderness. In fact, in recent years, a number of others have defended versions
of value realism, using arguments which overlap with, but which also differ from, those that I
have employed: see, in particular, works by E. L. Bond (1983), John McDowell (1998), part
II, and David Brink (1989). Discussion of value realism in the philosophical literature has
become technical and intricate,9 but seems so far to have had little influence outside academic
philosophy, where subjectivist and relativist views largely prevail. This is due, in my view, to
general acceptance of certain standard objections to value realism, widely regarded as lethal.
But these objections are at most only lethal against versions of value realism which one
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should not defend in the first place; they are harmless when directed against viable, but
overlooked, versions of value realism.
In these circumstances, what is at present most needed, I believe, is not more intricate
philosophical discussion, but rather a clear account of why standard objections to valuerealism do not apply to a viable version of the doctrine. This is what I do in the rest of this
chapter, reformulating and developing arguments I have used in my earlier contributions.
I should perhaps add that one important reason for the widespread acceptance of
subjectivist views about value will not be discussed until chapters four and five. This has to
do with the link between value-subjectivism and Cartesian Dualism - an early, and
enormously influential attempt at solving the problem of this book. According to Cartesian
Dualism, everything in the external world is such that it can, in principle, be described and
understood by physics. Everything that physics leaves out is accommodated within the
conscious mind. This includes value. Thus, accept Cartesian Dualism, and one is led
immediately to the view that value has to do with our minds, with subjective judgement and
not objective fact. Value-features of things cannot exist out there in the world because
science tells us that such features do not objectively exist.
I do not discuss this all-important link between Cartesian Dualism and value-subjectivism
here, in this chapter, because this would plunge us into a discussion of attempted solutions to
the human world/physical universe problem, which would anticipate too much of what comes
later, in chapters four and five. For the moment, let me just announce that in chapter four,
Cartesian Dualism will be criticized and rejected, and in chapter five a better approach to
solving the human world/physical universe problem will be outlined, one which implies that
value-features can indeed be understood to be objective features of the world around us, in
just the sense to be expounded below, in sections 7 to 9.
5 Moral, Metaphysical and Epistemological Objections to Objective Value
Objectivism (or realism) - the doctrine that there are objective values - may seem
objectionable for a number of reasons. It may seem objectionable morally, metaphysically,
and epistemologically.10
To begin with, we may hold it to be immoral to proclaim the existence of objective value,
and then invoke it in an attempt to influence the conduct of others. The mother tugs the
restless child's hand and exclaims "Be good!" when what she really means is: "Do what I
want you to do!" The act of telling the child to be good is an act of manipulation and deceit.
The same thing happens when the authorities tell the public to "cooperate with the
authorities": this does not mean "work in partnership (i.e. cooperatively) with the authorities";
it means "Do what the authorities tell you to do". Moral systems can be regarded as systems
of control and exploitation, put about by those in power to induce others to act in the interests
of those who hold power. Interpreting such moral systems as "objective" further obscures the
manipulation and deceit that is involved; it makes it that much more immoral.
Similarly, it may be argued, those who proclaim the existence of objective values do
violence to liberalism in that, instead of questions of value being left to individuals to decide
for themselves, such questions are decided by the authorities, the experts, those who are in a
position to "know" what is best for the rest of us. Objectivism, it may be argued, is
authoritarian, even totalitarian in spirit, a ploy used to indoctrinate and enslave. Objectivism
provides a ready justification for imperialists and religious fanatics, for those who know with
certainty what is right, and on that basis strive to gain power over others by means of force,
persuasion or terror.
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Yet again, it may be argued, at a milder level, objectivism, in the field of the arts leads
straight to elitism. Those who are in a position to do so proclaim that those arts that they
enjoy are objectively of greater aesthetic value than those enjoyed by others, and on that basis
ensure that what they enjoy receives much more patronage and state funding.11
In addition to the moral objections to objectivism, there are also metaphysical objections.
What are these mysterious value facts, in virtue of which value statements are either true or
false? What are value properties, and how are they related to physical properties? Do we,
with G.E. Moore (1903), think of the Good as an unanalysable property which cannot be
defined? Or do we, even more radically, with Pirsig (1974), think of Quality as the basic stuff
of existence, undefinable, neither objective nor subjective, from which everything else
emerges? Are we to suppose that value is some sort of mysterious invisible fluid, valuable
things being soaked in it, valueless things being bereft of it? Might chemists one day distil
drops of this precious fluid in a flask? Or is it more like electric charge, things charged
positively being good, things charged negatively being bad? The whole idea is surely
preposterous. And even if this mysterious value substance or property existed, it would
remain a mystery how we can come to know that some things possess it; and even if we could
know this, it would be utterly mysterious why we should especially value things that are rich
in this mysterious property of value.
If objective value exists, then it ought to be possible to determine, objectively, whether
something is or is not of value. It ought to be possible to decide disputes about what is of
value by an appeal to the objective value facts, much as factual disputes can be decided in
science. But notoriously, disputes about what is of value are endless and seem inherently
unresolvable. This, again, seems decisive grounds for rejecting objectivism.
Objectivism is, it seems, untenable, and we are obliged to hold the opposite view, which
may be called subjectivism or relativism. There is no such thing as the objectively good, the
objectively bad, there are only the diverse preferences of individuals. Different people hold
different things to be good and bad, and that is all there is to it; one cannot say that some are
correct, and others incorrect in what they judge to be of value. What I hold to be good others
may hold to be bad, and vice versa; but I cannot justifiably say that I am right and they are
wrong, any more than they can justifiably hold the opposite.
6 Objections to Relativism
But relativism seems to lead to unacceptable consequences as well. We should ordinarily
want to say, surely, that we can make discoveries about what is of value. This is surely
strikingly apparent in the field of art. A piece of music, by Mozart perhaps may, to begin
with, strike us as being little more than a pleasant sound; another piece, by Stravinsky
possibly, may strike us as being merely a horrible noise. Then, gradually, we discover hidden
depths in the music; we discover meaning and passion. And this cannot be reduced to a
change, merely, in our preferences; it involves making discoveries about the value of the
music construed as a work of art. Much great art, whether music, painting, literature, poetry
or drama, does not yield up all its richness, its value at once; in order to discover what is of
value in the work of art we need to explore, to learn, to discover.
An analogous point can be made in connection with people. We do not see what is of
value (or disvalue) in people all at once, when we first meet them; we more or less gradually
learn about the value of people. A person may strike us initially to be rather cold and distant;
then, gradually, we learn that this reserve, or shyness, conceals such sterling qualities as
honesty, integrity, a capacity for deep and sincere, if not always demonstrative, friendship. Or
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Vice versa, we may initially be charmed and delighted with the spontaneity and fun of
someone we meet, only gradually to discover, subsequently, that this person is really rather
empty headed and boring.
Similar points arise elsewhere, in connection with such things as institutions, customs,
laws, societies, cultures, historical periods or movements, political parties, governments. In
all these fields, what is of value, good or bad, is not always immediately apparent; we need to
discover, to learn.
But if relativism is true, learning about what is of value is impossible, meaningless: there
can be no such thing. There can only be a change in preferences. And if a later set of
preferences seems preferable to an earlier set (so that there is, in a sense, learning) it will
always be the case, of course, that just the opposite holds for some other, equally viable
preference about preferences. Whether we say someone has learned and made progress, or
has gone through precisely the opposite process of unlearning and degenerating, is merely a
matter of preference, the first preference being as valid as the second.
Relativism allows change in desires and preferences, but cannot make sense of the idea
that we gradually discover or learn what is of value. And as a result, relativism, if taken
seriously, is likely to exert a harmful influence on the value of life. For if it is indeed the case
that much of what is of value in life is not immediately accessible and apparent but has to be
discovered through learning, it is very important that we take seriously the task of learning
about what is of value as we live. If we do not, the chances are that our learning about what
is of value will suffer; the value of our lives will suffer. Relativism, however, cancels the
very possibility of learning about value;12 thus the more seriously and widely relativism is
accepted, so the more will learning about what is of value suffer; and this means that the
value of life itself will suffer, as a result. Lack of learning about what is of value will have
the consequences that public values will tend to be crude and ill-informed, inherited without
much (if any) improvement, from the past. Public decision-making (whether made by those
few in power, or by people quite generally by means of voting or the free market) will
nevertheless be informed by, influenced by, these crude public values (with inevitable adverse
affects).
In cancelling the possibility of learning about what is of value, in short, relativism is both
wrong, and harmful if taken seriously in practice.
In response to these charges, it may be argued that learning is possible given relativism,
for we can of course always learn about ordinary (value-neutral) matters of fact. And such
learning, in an entirely straightforward, rational and justifiable way, may well affect what our
preferences are. We prefer Hilda to Mary until we learn new facts about Hilda: that she is a
liar, or a murderess. We prefer beef to pork until we learn that beef gives us mad cow
disease.
But learning about what is of value is not only a matter of learning value-neutral facts.
Learning to discern the value in a work of art may not involve merely learning new valueneutral facts about it; it may involve discovering hitherto overlooked or misunderstood
aesthetic qualities of the work. Many contemporaries of J.S. Bach regarded his music as dry,
intellectual exercises in various musical forms, devoid of real musical worth; those of us who
regard Bach as one of the greatest artists ever, do not know more value-neutral facts about his
music than his contemporaries did: we hear, we have discovered, musical qualities in the
music (its profound compassion, its joyful exuberance, its all-encompassing gentleness, grace
and thoughtfulness, its massive integrity, its grandeur, its haunting melancholy, its passionate
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longing) to which contemporaries were deaf. According to relativism, of course, all this is
just acquiring a taste for Bach's music, coming to have pleasurable emotions stirred up in one
through listening to the music: it does not involve learning anything objective about the
music. But it is just this relativist gloss on what constitutes coming to appreciate the value
inherent in Bach's music which seems to belittle, to rubbish, the genuine learning that is
involved.
And analogous points can, it seems, be made about learning about the value in people, in
institutions, and in other such things of value (whether good or bad).
In brief, relativism seems wrong and harmful because it rubbishes the possibility of there
being learning about the value-aspect of things: the purely factual learning that relativism
permits seems inadequate.
Another objection that may be made to relativism is that it is morally objectionable.
Confronted with unspeakable crimes (Hitler's for example, or Stalin's), it seems inadequate
and beside the point to declare simply: "I prefer people not to do such things", or "I personally
hate such actions". Actions (such as those of Hitler or Stalin in killing millions of people) are
objectively unimaginably evil, whatever anyone may think or feel about the matter.
Relativism, in reducing morality to personal preference, annihilates morality; or rather, more
accurately, it immorally implies that morality (as something more than personal preference)
does not exist.
Finally, relativism may be objected to because of what seem to be its nihilistic
implications. If in reality there exists nothing that is objectively of value, the whole idea of
learning, of discovering what is of value being nonsense then, so it may seem, life is a bleak
affair indeed. Not surprisingly, the meaning and value of life seem to drain away (since,
according to relativism, such things do not exist).
We have, in short, a fully fledged dilemma on our hands. There are decisive objections to
the view that objective values do exist; but equally, there are decisive objections to the
opposite view, that objective values do not exist. If both views are equally objectionable,
what are we to believe?
The solution to this dilemma is to recognize that a number of different versions of
objectivism or realism can be distinguished; most succumb to the above moral, metaphysical
or epistemological objections, but at least one does not.
7 Reply to Moral Objections to Objective Value
In order to overcome the moral objections to objectivism we need to recognize that there
are at least THREE, and not just two, positions, namely:
1. Dogmatic objectivism: There are objective values, we know what they are, and anyone
who disagrees must be (a) taught better, (b) converted, (c) conquered, or (d) assassinated.
2. (Dogmatic) relativism: What is wrong with dogmatic objectivism is the objectivism.
There are no objective values, there is only what people desire, prefer or value.
3. Conjectural objectivism: What is wrong with dogmatic objectivism is the dogmatism!
Precisely because values exist objectively, our knowledge of what is of value is conjectural in
character. If two parties disagree about what is of value, the chances are that each has
something to learn from the other.
Dogmatic objectivism is the sort of view upheld (in its milder forms) by the Victorians
when confronted by primitive people: Victorians not only believed in the existence of
objective values, but "knew", beyond all doubt, that the correct values were those of Victorian
England. Primitive people, with very different systems of values were, in the eyes of
9
Victorian travellers and anthropologists, simply wrong, ignorant and primitive. Today it is,
typically, various sorts of religious fundamentalists who uphold versions of dogmatic
objectivism.
Relativism arises as a result of a reaction against dogmatic objectivism. It seems appalling
that people should be so convinced of the correctness of their views on what is of value that
they feel justified in converting or conquering everyone else so that they too come to live by
and believe in these views - even to the extent of feeling justified in eliminating those who
refuse. People proselytize their values, their religion and way of life, so aggressively because
they believe they have the might of objective value behind them, in the form of gods, God,
the Tribe, The Race, the chosen People or Class, the Nation, History, Civilization, or
whatever. These are regarded as objectively existing embodiments of value, and it is this, so
incipient Relativists believe, which leads to the drive to dominate and convert, to offend basic
principles of morality and liberalism. It is the value-objectivism of dogmatic objectivism
which is the cause of the problem, relativists argue, and as a result defend value-subjectivism.
The whole idea of value existing objectively, of value-judgements being objectively true and
false, is a nonsense: there are simply a multiplicity of preferences of people, some embodied
in diverse value-systems, no one being better or more correct than any other, in any objective
sense. Those who belong to so-called "western civilisation" should regard so-called
"primitive" people as merely different, not inferior.
But relativism, despite its good intentions, is hardly an improvement over dogmatic
objectivism. Given the latter view, it is at least possible to hold that the imperialist actions of
the Victorians were objectively wrong. Given relativism, this becomes impossible; one can
only say that these actions are not to one's own personal taste. Relativism seems to defend
liberalism and tolerance against imperialist aggression, but the defence destroys the very
possibility of declaring liberalism and tolerance to be morally good and imperialist aggression
to be morally bad. The defects of relativism defeat its own good intentions. And there are
the other adverse consequences to take into account as well, already pointed out: the
annihilation of value, the cancellation of the possibility of learning in the realm of value.
It is important to note that relativism objects to the objectivism of dogmatic objectivism,
and not to the dogmatism. There is indeed a sense in which the transition from dogmatic
objectivism to relativism intensifies the dogmatism. A dogmatic objectivist is convinced that
he is right and those who disagree are wrong; at the same time he holds that this is a
significant issue, one worth going to war and dying for, and thus certainly not meaningless.
In other words, it is definitely meaningful that he might be wrong about what is of objective
value; but he knows he is right. For the relativist, however, it is meaningless that one can be
wrong about one's personal preferences: what higher authority than one's self could there be?
There are of course somewhat trivial senses in which one can be wrong: one may be wrong
about what one's actual preferences are; or one's actual preferences may be the result, in part,
of false value-neutral factual beliefs. Putting these points on one side, it is, according to the
relativist, meaningless to say that one person's preferences are right, another's wrong. In this
respect, yet again, relativism is hardly an improvement over dogmatic objectivism.
Relativism is right to object to dogmatic objectivism, but wrong to object to the
objectivism of the view. It is the dogmatism of objective dogmatism that is objectionable, not
the objectivism. It is the dogmatism, the absolute conviction in the correctness of ones own
position, that makes it possible for one to be convinced that non-believers should be (a)
taught better, (b) converted, (c) conquered, or (d) assassinated. Not only does relativism
10
miss-locate what is wrong with dogmatic objectivism; it actually has the effect of intensifying
what is wrong, as we have seen. Relativists may hope that general acceptance of their view
would promote tolerance, but the hope is misplaced. Relativism puts those who seek to
convert, conquer or assassinate on a par with those seek to live cooperatively and tolerantly
with their fellow human beings. Furthermore, general acceptance of relativism is as likely as
not to sabotage growth of tolerance, since tolerance is, by and large, something that needs to
be learned and, as we have seen, relativism cancels the very idea of learning in the realm of
value.
Dogmatic objectivism and relativism make the same blunder: both take it for granted that
objectivism leads to dogmatism. In fact precisely the opposite is the case: objectivism
demands that we recognize that we cannot know for certain what is, and what is not, of value;
at best our value judgements must be conjectures. If there really are value features of things
that really do exist whether we perceive them or not, it becomes all but inevitable that we
will, more or less frequently, get things wrong. Just because the physical world really does
exist, we often make mistakes about it; we do not have an infallible access to all that there is.
On the contrary, much of the fallible knowledge that we do possess about the physical
universe has only been won as a result of centuries of effort by science. What possible
justification could there be for supposing that the situation is different as far as value features
of things are concerned? If such features really do exist, then surely here too we must
acknowledge that we cannot hope to be infallible, that our views about what is of value are all
too likely to more or less wrong, and hence such views need to be held as conjectures.
Objectivism, in other words, all but implies conjecturalism, and demands that one rejects
dogmatism.
As long as we believe that only the two views of dogmatic objectivism and relativism are
possible, we are forced to choose between them, even though both, as we have seen, have
highly undesirable consequences. The all important point to appreciate is that a third view is
available, conjectural objectivism, which need have none of the moral and intellectual defects
of the other two views. Dogmatic objectivism and relativism, as we have seen, clash with or
undermine liberalism. By contrast, conjectural objectivism, far from clashing with liberalism,
may be held to be necessary for liberalism. For, granted conjectural objectivism, we may
conjecture that it is people, and what is of value to people, that is ultimately of value in
existence. In other words, the basic tenet of liberalism, which one might state as "It is
individual persons that are of supreme value in existence", needs to be formulated as a
conjecture about what is objectively of ultimate value, and for this one requires conjectural
objectivism. If relativism is presupposed, the basic tenet of liberalism disintegrates into
nothing more than a personal preference.13
8 Reply to Metaphysical Objections to Objective Value
The metaphysical objections to value objectivism are clearly closely related to the basic
problem being tackled by this book. In what follows I anticipate a line of argument which
will be developed in more detail later on. Here, I merely indicate how the above
metaphysical objections to the idea that value-features exist objectively in the world are to be
rebutted.
In order to overcome these metaphysical objections to objectivism the all important point
to appreciate that there are at least two very different ways of drawing the distinction between
objective and subjective, two meanings that can be given to "objective" and "subjective". The
first distinction has to do with whether something really exists, or does not exist (but only
11
appears to exist). The second has to do with whether something is utterly impersonal,
unrelated to human beings, or whether it is in some way personal, or related to human
beings.14 The all important point is that something may be subjective in the second sense, but
objective in first sense. That is, something may be related to human concerns, aims or
physiology and yet, at the same time, may really exists out there in the world. Value features
are of this type: related to human concerns and aims, but really existing for all that.
Let us call the first meanings of "objective" and "subjective", connected with existence and
non-existence, "existential objectivity" and "existential subjectivity".
If some object or property is existentially objective, then it really does exist; if it is
existentially subjective, then it does not really exist even though it may appear to do so, or
may be thought by some to exist. Tables, trees and stars are existentially objective; ghosts,
demons and spells are existentially subjective.
Let us call the second meanings of "objective" and "subjective", connected with being
human-unrelated and human-related, "humanly objective" and "humanly subjective". An
object or property is humanly objective if it is wholly impersonal, unrelated to human aims,
interests, experiences or physiology; it is humanly subjective if it is related to human aims,
interests, experiences or physiology. Physical entities and properties, such as stars and atoms,
mass and electric charge, may be taken to be humanly objective, in that these objects and
properties are entirely unrelated to human interests, aims or physiology. By contrast, works
of art, constitutions, legal systems and languages are all humanly subjective in that these
objects are all quite essentially related to human beings. Furthermore, properties such as
poisonous, green, delicious and friendly are humanly subjective in that these properties are all
human-related.
The crucial point in all this is that, even though something is humanly subjective this does
not mean that it is existentially subjective. On the contrary, it may be existentially objective.
Bach's St. Matthew's Passion, Britain's constitution, legal system and language all exist (are
existentially objective) even though they are also human-related objects (i.e. humanly
subjective). Arsenic really is poisonous, grass really is green, zabaglione really is delicious,
and Einstein really was friendly (i.e. all these properties are existentially objective) even
though these properties are human-related (i.e. humanly subjective).
It is into this category of existential objectivity and human subjectivity that value features fall.
Like colours, value features really do exist out there in the world; but also like colours, value
features are human-related.
If we hold that there is just one distinction between the objective and the subjective, we
thereby make it impossible to declare that colours, and value-features of things, are
existentially objective but humanly subjective. Declaring value-features to be objective
commits us to declaring them to be human-unrelated, like mass or electric charge, which is
absurd; but also, declaring value-features to be subjective commits us to declaring that they
do not really exist, which seems equally absurd. The above dilemma, in short, arises as a
result of failing to appreciate that there are two quite different distinctions between objective
and subjective: the dilemma is readily solved once one appreciates this point, which permits
one to say that value-features are objective in one sense (really existing) but subjective in
another sense (human-related).
Put another way, once we recognize that there are two distinctions between objective and
subjective to be made, then, in declaring values to be objective there are two possibilities.
We may mean that values are existentially objective and humanly objective: let us call this
12
view impersonal conjectural objectivism. Or we may mean that values are existentially
objective but humanly subjective: let us call this view human-related conjectural objectivism.
The above metaphysical objections to objectivism apply devastatingly to impersonal
conjectural objectivism: it is indeed absurd to suppose that a value-fluid exists in the
universe, which chemists might one day distil in a flask. But these metaphysical objections
fail completely when directed against the more modest view of human-related conjectural
objectivism. The value-features of things are as familiar, unmysterious and non-metaphysical
as colours, sounds and smells. In order to perceive value features we may need to have
emotional responses, just as in order to see colour we need appropriate visual responses: but
in neither case does this mean that the property is existentially subjective - though it does
mean it is humanly subjective.
Typical familiar value-features of people are: friendly, mean, jolly, stern, witty,
courageous, warm-hearted, dull, frivolous, shifty, kind, spontaneous, strong-willed, earnest,
gloomy, calculating, mischievous, cold, boring, gushing, loyal, ambitious, argumentative,
generous. These are both descriptive and value-laden, factual and imbued with value.
People, like works of art in a somewhat different way, are essentially value-imbued, moralityimbued things: we cannot describe a personality, we cannot state facts about a personality,
without employing value-imbued factual terms of the kind just indicated, any more than we
can describe a work of art as work of art without employing analogous aesthetic terms, valueimbued factual terms.
Those who wish to maintain the traditional distinction between fact and value will argue
that terms such as the above can always be interpreted in two ways, first in a purely factual,
non-evaluative way, and second in an evaluative and non-descriptive, non-factual way. We
can describe without evaluating, and in adding an evaluation we do not provide additional
factual information, we do something quite different, namely evaluate.
In this chapter I have not argued for the existence of value-features; I have confined myself
to rebutting arguments against the view that value-features really do exist in the world. This,
in my view, is the crucial task that needs to be performed. No one, I believe, would take
relativism or subjectivism seriously if they were not persuaded that value objectivism is
untenable. What needs to be done is not to prove that value features of things really do exist
(a hopeless task in any case), but rather to prove that arguments against objectivism are
invalid. Continuing in this vein, let us consider what grounds there are for insisting that the
above value-laden factual terms must be split into two distinct parts, the factual and the
evaluative.
Consider "friendly". On the face of it, this is doubly evaluative, first because friendliness
may be deemed to be a desirable quality in a person, and second because friendliness may be
deemed to be such that a genuinely friendly person, at the very least, acts in a moral way
towards other people. One cannot be friendly and mean, friendly and cruel, at one and the
same time. What obliges us to split off a purely factual, non-evaluative meaning from the
evaluative, moral meaning? Doubtless this can be done. We can, for example, render
"friendly" purely factual by specifying some set of values and interpreting "friendly" in terms
of this set, there being no presumption that this set embodies what is really of value. But
what grounds are there for holding that this must be done, apart from the mistaken idea that
value-features of things cannot exist?
In my view, a particularly strong reason for holding that value-features exist, for
supporting human-related conjectural objectivism, arises from the following sort of
13
consideration. Think of a friend or relative that you have known personally, neither a saint
nor a fiend, who has lived her life, and has died. A number of people have known this
person, in different contexts, and to differing degrees. The deceased person will have
revealed different aspects of her personality to these lovers, friends and acquaintances. No
one, it is all too likely, know all that there is to be known about this person. No one knows
all the good qualities of this person. Even the dead person, when alive, may not have been
aware of her good qualities; she may have undervalued herself, been too aware of failings and
insufficiently aware of countless acts that have brought pleasure, delight or happiness to
others. No one sees all that is of value in this person. But we should not conclude that it
therefore does not exist. To do so would have the dreadful consequence that it is only those
who are widely believed to be of value that really are of value, and those who have quietly
contributed much to the quality of people's lives, unnoticed and unsung, are nothing, and have
done nothing.
In the realm of value, to believe that to be is to be perceived, which is what subjectivism
and relativism amount to, is to be a cynic and nihilist of dreadful proportions. Late 20th
century (and early 21st century) life suffers horribly from these doctrines. Even fanatical
fundamentalism may be seen as a sort of hysterical reaction to the cynicism and nihilism
implicit in value subjectivism and relativism, widely upheld because philosophical blunders
(indicated above) appear to leave liberalism, and a sane scientific outlook, no alternative.
9 Reply to Epistemological Objections to Objective Value
The epistemological objection to objectivism, considered above, is that if value features of
things really exist then it ought to be possible for people to agree as to what they are.
Notoriously, people disagree, and there appears to be no procedure for achieving agreement,
as in science or mathematics. Hence objective values do not exist.
The lack of universal values is often taken as a strong argument for relativism, and
objectivists often assume that, in order to establish their position they must demonstrate,
somehow, that there is some set of values that arise universally in all cultures. But all this is a
mistake.
The physical universe exists independently of us; here, unquestionably, there are objective
facts.15 But when it comes to cosmological theories concerning the nature of the universe, we
do not find that there is some universal theory, accepted by people in all cultures at all times.
On the contrary, we find an incredible diversity of views. But this does not mean that there is
no such thing as the true nature of the universe; it just means that this truth is inaccessible,
difficult to get hold of (and hence the need for science).
The same point arises in connection with value-features of things. Long-standing,
widespread disagreement about what is of value does not mean that there is no such thing as
that which is of value objectively; it just means that it is more or less inaccessible, more or
less difficult to determine or establish.
To this it may be objected that there is still a big difference between the two cases. As far
as the physical universe is concerned, different societies and cultures may have produced
radically different cosmological theories; and even different physicists may defend different
theories: nevertheless in this domain we possess the means for resolving debates between
conflicting views. In gradually improving knowledge, science sooner or later decides
between diverse conflicting hypotheses.
But in the realm of value, nothing of the kind is discernable. Notoriously, different
people, different societies and cultures disagree radically about questions of value, and no
14
amount of argument or experience seems capable of resolving these conflicting views. There
is no science of value; the very idea seems somehow absurd. Do not these considerations
support the view that in the realm of value we are concerned merely with various purely
subjective tastes or desires, there being no such thing as an objectively existing value feature?
A number of points can be made in reply to this objection. First, it may be that, even
though value features exist, nevertheless questions of value are inherently more difficult to
settle than scientific questions of fact. Second, it may be much more difficult and
problematic to set up a team of experts to decide value-questions than it is to set up a team of
experts - the scientific community - to decide questions of scientific fact. Third, apart from
fundamentalists of various persuasions, our modern world is awash with subjectivism and
relativism, doctrines that deny the very possibility of learning about what is of value. In such
a cultural climate, it is hardly surprising that people fail to learn about what is of value, and
do not know how to resolve conflicting views about what is of value rationally. Finally, the
idea that we might one day develop, what we do not have at present, something like a
"science" of value is not nearly as absurd as it may at first seem to be. Indeed elsewhere16 I
have argued for the urgent need to develop just such a "science" of value, an argument that
will be outlined in chapter 9 below.
At present academic inquiry seeks to help promote human welfare by, in the first instance,
acquiring factual knowledge. First, knowledge is to be acquired; then, secondly, it can be
applied to help solve social problems.
In From Knowledge to Wisdom I have shown that this official conception of the aims and
methods of inquiry is damagingly irrational. I argue that we need to put into practice a new
conception of inquiry that gives intellectual priority to tackling problems of living over
problems of knowledge. This new conception of inquiry would take, as its basic intellectual
aim, to acquire and promote wisdom - wisdom being defined as the capacity to realize what
is of value in life for oneself and others (thus including knowledge, understanding and
technological know-how). This new kind of inquiry would be rationally designed to help us
learn about what is of value in life; it would be rationally designed to help us achieve what is
of value in life; and at the same time it would do better justice to the intellectual values
inherent in natural science. We urgently need a revolution in the overall aims and methods of
inquiry, from knowledge to wisdom, so that we may learn gradually how to create a better
world.
If this revolution had occurred we would, no doubt, be rather better at resolving conflicts
rationally about what is of value than we are at present.
10 Objective Value in the Physical Universe
That which is of value is suffused throughout our human world. It is in the natural world
around us, in quiet woods, misty estuaries, meadows and mountains; it is in the laugh of a
child, the greeting of a friend, the kind act of one stranger to another; it is in passionate love;
it is in great works of art, in pleasures and joys of all kinds; it is in us conscious human
beings, but also in conscious or sentient animals and, potentially, in all life; in the absence of
sentience, consciousness and free will it exists only potentially, but with the coming into
existence of consciousness it flares into actuality. It is inextricably intermingled with what
we see, hear, feel. And our problem is to understand how this mysterious realm of
consciousness, experience, meaning and value can exist embedded in the physical universe.
Key parts of this problem are to understand how sentience, consciousness and free will can
exist in a physically comprehensible universe. For without these, nothing is of value. But the
15
problem is not restricted to understanding how these can exist: in full generality, the problem
is to understand how our whole human world, imbued with meaning and value, can exist if
the universe really is more or less as modern physics seems to tell us it is.
The problem of value is not a gratuitous addition to the problems of sentience,
consciousness and free will; these latter things are quintessentially value-imbued. We are
scarcely in a position to say what consciousness and free will are if we do not include the idea
that these things are supremely of value.
Notes
1. The views about what is of value expressed in this chapter develop aspects of the doctrine
to be found in Maxwell (1984a), ch. 10.
2. How is the thesis that what is of supreme value in existence is the lovable to be justified?
The thesis is a conjecture, to be assessed by comparing it critically, and by means of
experience, with rival conjectures. Better still, what needs assessment is a philosophy of life:
to live life lovingly, loving what is actually and potentially lovable. This proposal as to how
we should live and what we should live for is to be assessed by comparing it, critically, and by
means of experience, with rival philosophies of life, rival proposals as to how we should live.
For a much more thorough discussion of how we should develop and assess rival
philosophies of life see Maxwell (1984a), especially chs. 5 and 7, and in particular p. 110 and
paragraph 12 on pp. 254-255. See also section 9 of the present chapter, and ch. 9 of the
present book.
3. This is a free adaptation of Talmudic questions quoted in Fromm (1960).
4. It could be construed as unloving to advocate that one should live life lovingly, in that, if
taken up, it lays one open to exploitation. Perhaps the supreme injunction for life should be:
Live life lovingly, but guard against exploitation. But this in turn could be criticized, on the
grounds that if one constantly checks for the possibility of exploitation, one is not likely to
live very lovingly. Nevertheless, how the balance between concern for self, and for others,
ought to be struck is bound to depend on the circumstances. Life among friends is not the
same as life in a concentration camp.
5. It is not possible for everyone to share equally in enjoying, sustaining and creating what is
of value for all sorts of reasons. Babies, the sick and the handicapped cannot share equally in
sustaining what is of value. Some individuals are far more energetically creative than others.
Equality of enjoyment of value cannot be arranged without destroying individual liberty, and
ultimately without destroying equality (since, if equality is to be enforced, some have to be
more equal than others). Justice must be limited by practical considerations of detection,
conviction and enforcement. Freedom hardly makes sense without justice and equality; and
yet if justice, or equality, is pursued too enthusiastically, freedom is sabotaged.
6. There is an inherent circularity built into questions of value and politics. In order to solve
problems of political philosophy, problems about what is of value must first be solved, since
politics is about the procurement of value. But equally, in order to solve problems about what
is of value, problems of political philosophy must first be solved, because this is required in
order to say what is of value.
16
7. Subjectivist views are to be found in Ayer (1936), Stevenson (1944), Hare (1952), NowellSmith (1956) and Mackie (1977).
8. See Maxwell (1976b), 138-146 and 242-254; (1984a), ch. 10.
9. For an excellent review article see Little (1994).
10. And there is the objection from science as well. But, as I have just indicated, that
objection takes us to the heart of this book, and will be taken up later. At present, we are
concerned with preliminaries.
11. For an excellent discussion of moral objections to objectivism or realism that adopts a line
not dissimilar to the one taken here, see Brink (1989), 90-98.
12. Given some relativistic conception of value, there can be learning relative to this
conception; but relative to some other, equally viable conception, this would constitute
unlearning, acquiring more and more mistaken views.
13. For an earlier discussion of these issues see Maxwell (1984a), 255-258.
14. For an earlier formulation of this distinction see N. Maxwell (1966), 310-311; see also
Maxwell (2000a).
15. Some philosophers and historians of science have questioned whether there are objective
facts about the physical universe. I assume here that this "cognitive" version of relativism is
untenable. If based on the anthropological evidence that different societies have held different
views about the universe, cognitive relativism tends to become inconsistent in that it
recognizes the existence of people, presumably living on the surface of the earth, these being
objective facts, and then goes on to assert that there are no objective facts. If this is put
forward as a reductio ad absurdum argument, the assumption that people exist on earth
leading to the conclusion that there are no objective facts (because people disagree as to what
these facts are), the straightforward reply is that disagreement about facts does not establish
non-existence of facts.
16. See Maxwell (1984a); see also (1976b), (1980), (1984b), (1985a), (1986), (1987), (1991),
(1992a), (1992b), (1993b), (1994b), (1997), (2000b).
17