[JCSR 2.2 (2014) 159–163] Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion (print) ISSN 2049-7555
doi:10.1558/jcsr.v2i2.22826Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion (online) ISSN 2049-7563
Book Reviews
Evolution, Religion and Cognitive Science: Critical and Constructive Essays,
Edited by Fraser Watts and Léon Turner. Oxford University Press, 2014. 272pp.,
Hb $99.00/£65.00. ISBN-13: 978-0-19-968808-1.
Reviewed by Eva Kundtová Klocová, LEVYNA —Laboratory for the Experimental Research of Religion, Masaryk University, [email protected]
Keywords
evolutionary theory, religion, cognitive science of religion
In 1909, at Darwin’s centenary (1809), Jane Harrison argued that it was Darwinism that allowed for the emergence of the scientific study of religion. A century
later (2009) two conferences were held in Cambridge, to celebrate the same
events, attesting the constant inspiration of Darwin’s legacy and focusing on the
impact of evolutionary theorizing on the current study of religion. Papers from
those conferences inspired publication of an anthology mapping an involvement
of the evolutionary theory in the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR): Evolution, Religion and Cognitive Science, published in 2014. Interestingly, the same
year (2014) marks another anniversary and yet another conference—the IACSR
conference: Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after 25
Years. This conference and the publication of the book coincide not only in
time, but also in the emphasis on the ever growing importance of evolutionary
theorizing within CSR and its implications for the identity of CSR.
The closing address of the conference by Richard Sosis tapped exactly into the
same questions and topics surfacing in the anthology, stressing their significance
for the CSR. Their co-occurrence suggests a necessity to re-evaluate the role of
evolutionary theorizing within the study of religion in general and specifically in
CSR. To outline those questions and topics, and to show how they challenge the
identity of CSR, the review is structured as a brief analysis of the understanding
of the three “pillars” of CSR’s identity, as indicated by its name.
Cognitive
The emergence of cognitivism in the study of religion was associated with the
renewed interest in functioning of the mind, mainly represented by Chomsky
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Book Reviews
(1959), Fodor (1983), and Tooby and Cosmides (1992). Building upon a modular account of cognition, the “standard model of CSR” is a testimony to those
foundations. It construes religion as a by-product of normally functioning
human cognition, its most prominent subjects are the origins and transmission
of religious beliefs and concepts, and its main goal is to overcome previous
mind-blind accounts. With research shifting towards new topics and inspirations from other disciplines, the following question arises: How “cognitive” is
in fact the CSR today? To illustrate the current situation, let us digress back to
the IACSR conference. In his talk, Sosis keenly observed that a large amount of
research published and presented at different CSR platforms does not focus on
truly “cognitive” mechanisms and functions at all, but rather on behaviour and
social interactions.
Although some notions of evolutionary theory were present within the CSR
from its beginning, it was not until evolutionary scientists came along that
the truly evolutionary theorizing influenced the change of focus in the CSR.
Although by then, the standard model was already in place. Some key evolutionary points thus seem to challenge the status quo; not only do prominent
evolutionary scientists seem to favour adaptationism (e.g. Wilson, Sosis, Bulbulia), their methodology and focus are in many other aspects quite different from
those of standard CSR. As the name of the chapter written by Benjamin Purzycki and colleagues (“Extending Evolutionary Accounts of Religion beyond the
Mind”), suggests, the interest of evolutionary scientists lies “beyond the mind.”
It is behaviour, social and environmental interactions, that concern evolutionary
approach, and even when ascertaining the importance of the mind, it is understood only as a component of dynamic relationship, studied with equal attention as natural and social environments and history (p. 85). The evolutionary
theorizing thus challenges cognition’s pivotal position in the spectrum of CSR
research.
The polemic with cognition as the prominent topic is not the only way the
“cognitive” in CSR is challenged. Even kept in the centre of attention, there
are many ways to approach cognition apart from the standard model. As the
anthology editor Léon Turner (“Introduction: Pluralism and Complexity in the
Evolutionary Cognitive Science of Religion”) lists criticisms to other parts of
this model (p.9), another question emerges: which cognitive approach should
CSR advocate? Fraser Watts claims that “…the particular cognitive approach
to the evolution of religion known as the […] (CSR) is in some ways narrower
than it needs be, and that it is worth considering a broader range of cognitive
approaches to the evolution of religion.” (p. 109). He suggests, for example, to
replace the notion of modularity of mind by the central processing mechanisms
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approach (p. 128). Similarly, Lesley Newson and Peter Richerson (“Religion:
the Dynamics of Cultural Adaptations”) advertise a “cognition-lite” position of
early acquired, culturally construed concepts against the innate propensity for
religion, that is, the “cognition-heavy” position of Pascal Boyer (p. 196).
The evolutionary shift brings many incitements, but also a need for rethinking boundaries and core theses of CSR. Based on the article by Slingerland and
Bulbulia (2011), the editors propose to call the CSR in evolutionary context
simply “evolutionary cognitive science of religion” (ECSR). What is not clear,
is what proportion of the CSR should be labelled with this acronym, or whether
the whole CSR should be renamed. Further on, this new label might not be the
best solution how to reflect the growing importance of evolutionary theorizing
within the CSR; the standard cognitive and evolutionary approaches are in many
traits too dissimilar to be just casually glued together.
Science
The CSR has always articulated its naturalistic standpoint, stressing scientific
principles as the basis of its existence against any theologizing or metaphysical
accounts. It also supports interdisciplinarity and open dialogue with other scientific disciplines. Contrarily, parts of the anthology and some implications of the
Sosis’ talk pose a question where are boundaries of interdisciplinarity, and what
still is a scientific dialogue?
Aku Visala’s chapter (“The Evolution of Divine and Human Minds: Evolutionary Psychology, the Cognitive Study of Religion and Theism”), dedicated
to evaluation of religious relevance of (E)CSR, concludes that CSR’s accounts
are quite neutral and give “very little reason to prefer atheism over theism.”
However, Wentzel van Huysteen (“From Empathy to Embodied Faith? Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Evolution of Religion”) talks about “Cognitive
science of religion and faith” (p. 146) and “scientific defence of theistic beliefs”
(p. 149), while Watts (“Religion and the Emergence of Differentiated Cognition”) ascertains a possibility of fruitful dialogue between theology and naturalistic approach to religion (p. 110). Then again, even without an atheistic
contribution to the book, this camp also disturbs the integrity of the field. When
enumerating possible improvements, Sosis in his talk suggested that CSR
should “hug the relevant academic superstars,” namely Dawkins and Dennett.
Although he meant just to increase popularity of the CSR and not to embrace
their metaphysics, it still shows certain unawareness of possible pitfalls, against
which Armin Geertz warns extensively in his 2008 article.
The anthology’s title might be misleading, as it could lead to expectation
of purely ECSR’s articles. While some chapters fit this description, others are
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rather outsider’s commentaries on ECSR, discussing metaphysical issues. Without denying the right of metaphysics informed by cognitive science to exist, the
anthology’s content shows the necessity to clearly demarcate the ground of CSR
as a scientific endeavour. Should atheistic or theological agendas be allowed
to play constitutive part of the CSR just as they are involved in the discussion
presented in this book? Should the questions of truth and value of religious
claims be inseparable parts of CSR research and theorizing? Alternatively, are
the chapters posing those questions to be understood as outsider’s comments
and expressions of different paradigms’ comprehension of CSR’s work? Those
problems also appear in more opaque ways, such as understanding scientific
terminology in value-saturated manner. The most striking example is the interpretation of by-product by the authors in anti-religious ways as “cognitive mistake” (Watts, “Religion and the Emergence of Differentiated Cognition,” p. 127)
or “accident” (Huysteen, “From Empathy to Embodied Faith? Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on the Evolution of Religion,” p. 147), while the adaptationism, as
observed by Visala (“The Evolution of Divine and Human Minds: Evolutionary Psychology, the Cognitive Study of Religion and Theism”), is often seen as
religion affirming (p. 69).
Religion
The standard model views religion as a system that can and should be broken into
fragments to be studied. Inversely, some evolutionary theorists claim that fragmentization, without understanding the interactions of individual features might
be misleading and it is necessary to study religion as a dynamic system (Purzycki, “Omar Sultan Haque, and Richard Sosis: Extending Evolutionary Accounts
of Religion beyond the Mind: Religions as Adaptive Systems,” p. 75). They
also see religion as a “universal social system with remarkable cross-cultural
similarities, [and] predictable differences” (p. 75). Religious studies scholars,
tired by endless discussions about definition of religion could be satisfied by
the fragmentization allowing stepping away, while the adaptationsts’ “holism”
resembles yet another essentialist conclusion. However, in this perspective, the
emphasis is not on some specific essence, but on particular combination and
interactions between components (p. 83), so it might be refreshing to rethink this
perspective and its possible contributions.
As reflected in several chapters, reservations are also coming from neighbouring disciplines of social sciences and humanities. Those might be troubled by
the way CSR emphasizes the naturalness of religion “in a way that excludes
sociocultural explanations at key points” (Turner, “Neither Friends nor Enemies: The Complex Relationship Between Cognitive and Humanistic Accounts
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of Religious Belief ” p. 170). Timothy Jenkins (“The Cognitive Science of Religion from an Anthropological Perspective: Nature and History Reconciled?”)
writes placably that the current evolutionary theorizing “emphasizes small
populations” and the naturalism is thus becoming “historicized” (p. 190). As
the CSR aims for interdiciplinarity and fruitful dialogue, bargaining about the
field’s own subject and identity becomes inevitable.
The anthology highlights a thought-provoking topic of the integration of evolutionary and cognitive science and maps nicely some important arguments in the
ongoing debate about this connection. However, some of the arguments are concerned with metaphysical issues and might thus not be worthwhile for those looking for the scientific side of the CSR. As illustrated by the case of the 2014 IACSR
conference, the book does not stand alone discussing the evolutionary theory
within the CSR; the theme is a key one for the whole CSR community nowadays.
References
Chomsky, N. 1959. “A Review of B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour.” Language 35: 26–
58. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/411334
Fodor, J. A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Tooby, J. and L. Cosmides. 1992. “The psychological foundations of culture.” In The
Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, edited
by J. Barkow, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, 19–136. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Slingerland, E. and J. Bulbulia. 2011. “Introductory essay: Evolutionary science and the
study of religion.” Religion 41(3): 307–328. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/004872
1X.2011.604513
Geertz, Armin W. 2008. “How Not to Do the Cognitive Science of Religion Today.” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 20(1): 7–21. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1163/157006808X260232
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