University of Utah
Exploring Gender Differences in State Legislators' Policy Preferences
Author(s): Sarah Poggione
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jun., 2004), pp. 305-314
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
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in
ExploringGenderDifferences
State Legislators'PolicyPreferences
SARAH POGGIONE, FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL
UNIVERSITY
Whilea greatdealofresearch
documents
womenelectedofficials'
moreliberalpolicyattitudes
andconcludes
thatincreased
women's
willproducemoreliberalpolicies,I arguethattheinfluence
ofgender
representation
and ultimately
theinfluence
of women'srepresentation
remainunclear.First,constituency
demandsmay
ofgendermayvaryamonglegislators.
I findthat
Second,theinfluence
explainobserved
genderdifferences.
interests
do havea significant
womencontinue
toexpresssignificantly
morelibeffect,
although
constituency
eralwelfare
I findthatgenderdifferences
thanmen.In addition,
in legislators'
policypreferences
preferences
aregreater
andconservative
thanamongDemocratic
andliberallegislators.
ConamongRepublican
legislators
theimpactofincreasing
women's
on policyis likelytobe morecomplex
sequently,
predicting
representation
thanpreviously
thought.
dealofworkonwomenandpolitics
contends
great
thatwomenelectedofficials
interest
expressgreater
inrepresenting
women'sissuesandholdmoreliberal
policyopinionsthantheirmalecolleaguesbecauseof their
in theprivatesphere(e.g.,
and responsibilities
experiences
and
Powell
Diamond 1977; Leader
Niemi,
1998;
Carey,
1977). Muchofthisworkconcludesthatincreasednumbers
ofwomenelectedofficials
willproducemoreliberalpublic
Mandel
and
Dodson 1993; Mezey 1994;
(see
policy
e.g.,
Thomas
Thomas and Welch 1991).
1981;
1994;
Sapiro
the
volume
of
the
research
womenlegDespite
documenting
islators'
moreliberalpolicyattitudes,
theinfluence
ofgender
on members'preferences
remainsunclear.Manystudiesof
in menand womenstatelegislators'
differences
policyattitudesareinconclusive
becausetheyfailto accountforalternativeexplanations
of observedgenderdifferences,
namely
theeffect
of constituency
demands.If constituency
characratherthangender,
observed
teristics,
explain
genderdifferencesin legislators'
then
the
conclusion
thatthe
preferences
electionofmorewomento publicoffice
willproducemore
liberalpolicymaybe incorrect.
In thisarticle,
I conducta morecompletetestoftheeffect
ofgenderon statelegislators'
policypreferences.
Usingdata
I estimate
collectedfroma mailsurveyof statelegislators,
theeffects
ofgenderand constituency
interests
on statelegislators'welfarepolicy attitudes.This projectexamines
in legislators'
rather
genderdifferences
policypreferences,
than observablelegislativebehavior,because policyattitudesmayprovidea betterestimate
oftheimpactofgender.
NOTE: A previousversionof thisarticlewas presentedat the annual
meetingof the SouthernPoliticalScience Association,Atlanta
2000. This researchwould not have been possiblewithoutthe
generoussupport of the National Science Foundation(SES
9905432) and assistancefromtheCollegeof LiberalArtsat the
I wouldalso liketo thankMichael
StateUniversity
Pennsylvania
WilliamBianco,JannaDeitz,and SusanWelchfortheir
Berkman,
helpfulcomments.
Political
Research
Vol.57, No. 2 (June2004): pp. 305-314
Quarterly,
In comparison,
members'recordedvoteson legislation,
the
mostcommondependentvariablein studiesof legislative
behavior(see Tamerius1995),maybe theproductofstrateof genderedattigic calculationsratherthana reflection
tudes.For example,ifa womanlegislator
believesthather
constituents
a
bill
that
is
oppose particular
unlikelyto pass
of
her
she
decideto vote
vote,
regardless
maystrategically
bill
the
and
her
ifshe herconstituents
even
against
satisfy
selffavorsthebill. However,in otherless observablelegislativearenas,like the committee
stage,she mayactively
work towardthe objectivesspecifiedin the bill and the
eventualpassageof similarlegislation.Investigating
men's
and women'spolicypreferences
an
to
provides opportunity
estimatethe influenceof genderoutsideof thesestrategic
considerations
and gaina betterunderstanding
oftheeffect
of genderon legislators'less public legislativeactivitiesactivities
thatnot onlycomprisea greatdeal of legislative
workbut also have a substantial
influenceon the policyHall
1996).
makingprocess(see
I focuson legislators'attitudestowardwelfarepolicy
because more generalideologicalorientations
and policy
mask
small
but
in men
differences
priorities
may
significant
and women'spolicypositions.In addition,priorworksugare likelyto express
geststhatmenand womenlegislators
different
on
like
thataffect
welfare,
policyopinions issues,
in
and
families
children,women,
particular(Diamond
1977; Leader1977). So ifgenderdoeshavean independent
one would expectto observeitseffect
on legislainfluence,
tors'welfarepolicypreferences.
Consistentwithpreviousresearch,I findthatwomen
hold moreliberalpreferences
on welfarepolicythantheir
malecolleagues,evenafteraccounting
forotherfactors
like
I
and
find
demands,party, ideology.
However,
constituency
in legislators'
thatgenderdifferences
aregreater
preferences
and
conservative
among Republican
legislators.While
Democraticand liberalwomentypically
hold moreliberal
welfarepolicyopinionsthanRepublicanand conservative
womenand Democraticmen;Republicanand conservative
women hold significantly
more liberalpreferences
than
305
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306
POLITICALRESEARCHQUARTERLY
men. These resultssuggest
Republicanand conservative
of
thattheincreasing
presence womenin stategovernment
willproducemoreliberalstatepolicies,and thatincreasesin
women'srepresentation
mayhave a larger,relativeimpact
on policywherewe mightleastexpectit-whenconservative
and Republicanwomenreplacetheirmalecounterparts.
EXPLAININGGENDER DIFFERENCES
IN LEGISLATORS' PREFERENCES
bothin
has foundthatwomenlegislators,
Priorresearch
liberal
thestatesand in Congress,hold moreideologically
attitudeson policythan men, even afteraccountingfor
politicalparty(e.g., Carey,Niemi,and Powell1998; Flammang 1997; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991).1
Womenlegislators'
greaterliberalismis evidencedin their
like
areasofwomen'sinterest
on
traditional
policypositions
(Clark1998; Diamond1977;
health,andwelfare
education,
forgender
Leader1977). The widelyacceptedexplanation
in legislators'
attitudesis thatwomen'sexperidifferences
in the privatesphereinfluence
ences and responsibilities
theirattitudesand behavior(Mandel and Dodson 1993;
Mezey1994; Tamerius1995; Thomas1994).
Althoughthe genderexplanationappears to be supin members'policyopinions,
portedby genderdifferences
cannotbe disalternateexplanationsforthesedifferences
demandsare
missed. Because measuresof constituency
absentfromtheseanalyses,it
eitherinadequateor entirely
is impossibleto conclude that gender and men and
in their
women'sexperiencesexplainobserveddifferences
notes
of
Burrell
For
attitudes.
157)
(1996:
example,
policy
womenin Congressthat,"The femalemembers'slightly
of
greaterliberalismduringthisperiodmaybe an artifact
bases ratherthansex: thatis, womentended
constituency
witha moreliberalpoliticalouttobe electedfromdistricts
a liberalvotingrecordin accordwiththe
look, fostering
ratherthan an ideology
ideologyof theirconstituencies
their
from
gender."
emanating
in menand women'sconstituenIfsystematic
differences
betweengenderandlegislators'
ciesexplaintherelationship
than
rather
itself,thenthe impactof
gender
preferences,
in previousresearch
have
been
overestimated
may
gender
The commonconcluinterests.
thatexcludesconstituency
sion of thesestudiesthatthe electionof morewomento
will alterthe policiesadoptedby these
statelegislatures
institutions
maybe erroneous.On theotherhand,ifmen
and womenareelectedfromsimilartypesofconstituencies,
thenconstituency
pressures
maycausethemtoexpresssimilar policyattitudes.In thiscase, priorworkthatfailsto
demandsmay
includeadequatemeasuresof constituency
in men and womenlegislators'
differences
underestimate
impactof conpolicyopinions.Giventhe demonstrable
in legislative
behavior
genderdifferences
1 Researchalso findssignificant
and Haynie1999; Dodson 1991; Dolan 1997; Frankovic1977;
(Bratton
Leader 1977; Swers 1998, 2002; Tamerius1995; Thomas 1991; and
Thomasand Welch1991; Vegaand Firestone1995; Welch1985).
stituencypressureson legislators'decisionsobservedby
scholars(Fenno1978; Fiorina1974; Kingdon
congressional
1989), the omission of constituency
preferencesfrom
in legislators'
modelsofgenderdifferences
policyattitudes
work.
the
need
for
further
suggests
in legislators'
attiThe fewstudiesofgenderdifferences
findthat
tudesthathaveincludedmeasuresofconstituency
and may
attitudes
thesemeasuresare relatedto legislators'
reducethe observedeffectof gender(Carey,Niemi,and
Powell 1998 and Thomasand Welch 1991). While these
moreliberalpreferstudiessuggestthatwomenlegislators'
encesare,in part,a productof theirconstituencies;
given
or
eithertheirroughmeasuresof constituency
preferences
theirfailureto includerelevantcontrolvariables,theydo
not providerigoroustestsof the independenteffectof
attitudesinclude
Whilefewstudiesof legislators'
gender.2
severalstudiesofgender
measuresofconstituency
interests,
in thebehaviorofCongressmembersand state
differences
measuresof conlegislatorshave includedsophisticated
and Haynie1999;
characteristics
(see e.g.,Bratton
stituency
Swers 1998, 2002). These studies also find that conon legislahavea significant
effect
characteristics
stituency
tors'behavior.Giventhisevidence,I arguethatin orderto
ifgenderexplainswhymenand women'spolicy
understand
in legislamodelsof genderdifferences
differ,
preferences
mustalso includemeasuresof constituents'
tors'attitudes
controlvariables.
and relevant
preferences
MODELING LEGISLATOR'SPREFERENCES
of
as a function
I modellegislators'
welfare
policyattitudes
controlvariand relevant
preferences,
gender,constituency
ables. Previousstudiessuggestthat party,ideology,and
like age, socioeconomic
characteristics
sociodemographic
controlvariablesto
status,race,and religionare important
includein modelsoflegislators'
(Bamello1999;
preferences
Bratton
and Haynie1999; Carey,Niemi,and Powell1998;
Darcy,Welchand Clark1994; Thomas1994; Thomasand
arenot
Welch1991).Giventhatmanyofthesecharacteristics
butmayalsobe correlated
attitudes
onlyrelatedtolegislators'
theindependent
withgenderand constituency
preferences,
as controlvarivariablesofinterest,
includingthesefactors
areestimated
ablesinsurethatthekeyrelationships
correctly.
Usingdata collectedfroma mail surveyof morethan
from
in 24 statesas well as information
2,500 legislators
effect
webpages,I evaluatetheindependent
statelegislative
welfarepolicypreferences.
of genderon statelegislators'
2
Thomasand Welch's(1991) measure,district
urbanization,
maybe an
opinion.The measureof district
inadequatemeasureof constituency
witheither
used in thisanalysisis not highlycorrelated
urbanization
demographicor subjectivemeasures of constituencypreferences.
Niemi,and Powell(1998) includeadequatemeasuresof
Although
Carey,
characteristics,
pertheydo notcontrolforthelegislators'
constituency
likeeducationand age. Giventhatthesecharacteristics
sonalattributes
theirexclusion
withgenderand policypreferences,
maybe correlated
oftheimpactofgender.
mayproducebiasedestimates
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EXPLORINGGENDERDIFFERENCESIN STATELEGISLATORS'
POLICY PREFERENCES
The survey,
conductedin 2000, was mailedto 2,526 state
all
legislators, membersof thelowerhousesof24 selected
statelegislatures.3
After
threeseparatemailings,
530 legislatorsrespondedto thesurvey,
including407 men and 123
an overallresponserateofabout21 perwomen,producing
centand a responserateof 21 percentforbothmen and
women.Theresponseratevariedconsiderably
amongstates
froma low of8 percentin Texasand Illinoisto a highof39
percentin Nebraska.
Theoverallresponserateofthesurvey
is lowerthanthose
however,
reported
byotherstudiesofstatelegislators;
many
otherstudiesof genderand statelegislators
relyon interin a singlestateora few
viewsordatacollectedon members
states(Flammang1985; Kathlene1995; Reingold2000;
Saint-Germain
1989). Whilethesestudiesmakesignificant
it maybe inaccurateto generalize
scholarlycontributions,
to thelargerpopulafromthesestudiesoffewerlegislatures
In orderto confirm
tionofstatelegislators.
thatgenderdifferences
existamongthelargerpopulation
ofstatelegislators
itis imporandnotjustwithina particular
setoflegislatures,
in a largenumberofdiftantto collectdatafromlegislators
ferent
selectedfor
typesof states.The 24 statelegislatures
thisstudyvaryby region,statelegislative
professionalism,
and partycontrolofthe
percentofwomenin thelegislature,
Thisinsuresthattheresultsdo notapplyto only
chamber.
or a particular
one particular
typeof legislature
legislature
for
More importantly
(e.g., onlyprofessional
legislatures).
thisstudy,collectingdata froma largenumberof states
insuresvariationin legislators'
partisanbackgrounds,
personalcharacteristics,
andconstituency
interests
andprovides
fora morerigorous
testofthegenderhypothesis.
in the.
Despitetherelatively
largenumberof legislators
studyandthelargenumberofstatesincludedin thesample,
Ifcertaintypesof
thelowresponseratemaybe problematic.
in a survey,
are less likelyto participate
then
respondents
can introduce
selectionbiasintoevena
surveynonresponse
randomsampleand ultimately
threaten
theinferential
value
oftheempiricalanalysis(see Groves,Cialdini,and Couper
forpossibleselectionbias
1992). In ordertotestand correct
fromthelowresponserate,I use a Heckmanselecresulting
tionmodel(see Sherman2000 fora discussionofHeckman
modelsin surveydata).The HeckmanmodelI employuses
maximumlikelihoodto simultaneously
full information
estimatea systemoftwoequations.The first
equation,the
selectionequation,predictstheprobability
thata member
ofthesamplerespondedtothesurveyandis includedin the
second equation.The second equation,the substantive
regressionequationof interest,
predictsstatelegislators'
The 2,526legislators
includethepopulationoftheunicameral
Nebraska
statelegislatures:
and thelowerhousesoffollowing
Arkansas,
legislature
Colorado,Connecticut,
Delaware,Idaho,Illinois,Louisiana,
California,
North
Maine, Michigan,Missouri,Montana,Nebraska,New Jersey,
SouthCarolina,SouthDakota,Tennessee,
Dakota,Ohio, Pennsylvania,
WestVirginia,
and Wyoming.
These24 stateswereranTexas,Vermont,
levelsoflegislative
professionalism,
domlyselectedto represent
varying
and thepercentofwomen.
partycontrol,
307
Thisprocedure
corrects
forselecwelfare
policyliberalism.
biasandproduces
efficient
consistent,
asymptotically
tivity
estimates
(see Greene1993; Heckman1979).
parameter
thecoefficients
oftheHeckman
modelcanbe
Consequently,
variable
wasobserved
as though
thedependent
interpreted
inotherwords,
as though
all legforthecomplete
sample,
islatorshad respondedto survey.4
PolicyPreferences
Welfare
Measuring
To measurethedependentvariable,I developa summative index of welfarepolicy liberalismcomposed of 17
itemsindicating
dichotomous
supportor oppolegislators'
sition to principlesof welfarereformand initiatives
or populationsat risk.Table 1
designedto help recipients
liststhe17 itemsand theircorrelations
withtheindexcomwiththerequirements
of
putedwithouttheitem.Consistent
correlated
with
summative
scalesall 17 itemsarepositively
one anotheras well withtheindexcomputedwithoutthe
coeffiitem;this,combinedwiththe largeand significant
cientof reliability
forthescale (Cronbach'soa= .84), indicates thatthe itemsdo reflectthe underlying
dimension,
welfarepolicy liberalism.5
The welfarepolicy liberalism
index rangesfromzero, indicatingthe mostconservative
themostliberal
policy,to 17, indicating
positionon welfare
is 9.13. The
position.The meanscoreforall respondents
meanscoreformale legislators
is 8.44, and the mean for
womenis 11.46,suggesting
thatwomendo appearto hold
moreliberalpreferences
thantheirmale colleagues.A difinmeanstestrevealsthatthisthreepointgenderdifference
ferenceis statistically
significant(t = -8.56, p = .000). How-
ifwomen'sgreater
welfare
ever,in orderto determine
policy
in
liberalism
is a productofgenderratherthandifferences
a multivariate
or othercharacteristics,
theirconstituencies
testis necessary.
Variables
Independent
In thisanalysis,genderis coded 1 forwomenand 0 for
men. Other sociodemographicvariablesincludingage,
relaregression
underlying
4 The Heckmanmodelassumesthefollowing
However, is onlyobservedifzA + u2j> 0 where
tionship: = x P
yj
yj
N (0,1) and corr(u1,u2) = p. Whenp #0 OLS will
, ~-N (0,or),u2 -+ulj.
producebiasedestimatesof 3. The Heckmanselectionprocedureproduces consistent,
estimatesof P thatrepresent
efficient
asymptotically
the marginaleffectsof the independentvariablesin the underlying
regression
equation(see Heckman1979).
Summative
scalingassumesthattheitemsand thesumoftheitemtrace
5
linesaremonotonically
dimensionand thatall
relatedto theunderlying
itemsare relatedto a single commonfactor(McIverand Carmines
aremet,thena summative
scale ofordinal
1981). Iftheseassumptions
or dichotomousitemsis an intervallevel measureof the underlying
dimension
andcorrected
scale
(seeJacoby1991). Thepositiveinter-item
and itemcorrelations
as wellas a factoranalysisin whichall 17 items
load highly
thattheseconditions
on a singlecommonfactor
demonstrate
are satisfied
and thattheresulting
scaleis an interval-level
measure.The
resultingsummativeratingscale correlateshighly(r = .97) withthe
factor
measure.
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308
POLITICALRESEARCHQUARTERLY
TABLE1
WELFAREPOLICY INDEX ITEMS
fundedwelfare
Oppose eliminating
government
Oppose family
caps
Oppose timelimits
forable-bodiedrecipients
Oppose workrequirements
Allowindividualdevelopment
accounts(IDA) forrecipients
Providerelocation
for
expenses workingrecipients
Providechildcareservicesforat-risk
children
Provideincreasedpublictransportation
forworkingrecipients
Provideincreased
for
job training recipients
Matchrecipients'
depositsto IDAs
Supportchildcareforworkingrecipients
ProvideGED andjob counseling
forteenparents
shelters
for
at-risk/homeless
families
Support
state
earned
income
tax
credit
Support
Providetuitionvouchersforrecipients
Rewardrecipients
foracademicorjob relatedsuccesses
Supportteenagepregnancy
prevention
programs
Mean
St. Dev.
.69
.24
.16
.03
.46
.34
.70
.68
.89
.28
.69
.92
.70
.62
.56
.29
.86
.46
.43
.36
.18
.50
.48
.46
.47
.31
.45
.46
.27
.46
.49
.50
.45
.35
Correlationa
.41
.48
.42
.25
.47
.42
.58
.59
.45
.45
.59
.37
.54
.48
.48
.33
.30
ofreliability
Note.Allitemsaredichotomous
variables.The coefficient
(Cronbach's
or)is .84.
betweentheitemand thecorrected
aCorrelation
welfare
policyindex(theindexcomputedwithouttheitem).
maritalstatus,religion,
and socioeconomic
statuswerepriweb sitesof statelegislamarilyobtainedfromtheofficial
tures,members'ownweb sites,and theProjectVoteSmart
databaseofstatelegislators.
Maritalstatusis measuredusing
a set of dichotomousvariablesindicating
whetheror not
legislatorsare divorced,single,or widowed.Religionis
measured using a set of four dichotomousvariables:
andno religious
non-traditional
Catholic,
Christian,
Jewish,
Marriedand Protestant
are the omittedcatepreference.
gories.Socioeconomicstatusis coded 1 ifthememberhas
obtaineda collegedegreeand 0 otherwise.
Race,coded 1 for
black legislators
and 0 otherwise,
was obtainedfromthe
NationalBlackCaucusofStateLegislators'
NBCSLLegislative
and theJointCenterforPoliticalEconomicStudDirectory
ies' BlackElectedOfficials:
A Statistical
2000.
Summary,
in
I employseveralmeasuresofconstituency
preferences
thisanalysisincludingdemographic
variablesand legislaoftheirconstituents'
tors'subjectiveassessments
concerns.
Basedon themeasuresemployedin previousstudies(Brattonand Haynie1999; ThomasandWelch1991),I use aver(in thousands
agehouseholdincomein statehousedistricts
in thedistrict,
ofdollars),thepercentunemployed
thepercentofthedistrict
havingearneda collegedegreeas wellas
a dichotomous
measureofdistrict
urbanesstomeasureconstituents'
welfarepolicypreferences.6
District
welfareliberalism, a subjective measure of constituencyopinion
obtainedfromthesurvey,
has fivecategories
from0
ranging
to 4 (veryliberal).
(veryconservative)
6 Allfourvariablesreflect
forstatehousedistricts
fromLilley,
1997 figures
TheAlmanacofStateLegislatures:
PatDeFranco,and Bernstein,
Changing
terns1990-1997(Washington
DC: Congressional
1998).
Quarterly,
Legislatorpartyis measuredusing two dichotomous
ifthelegislator
variablesindicating
is a memberofa Democraticor Progressive
is a member
partyand ifthelegislator
of thirdpartyor is unaffiliated
withany party.Beinga
is theexcludedcatRepublicanor Independent
Republican
egory.The measureof legislator's
ideologywas obtained
fromthesurvey;based on a questionfroma similarstudy
to place them(Welchand Peters1977), I ask legislators
selveson a five-point
scalethatrangesfrom0 (veryconservative)to 4 (veryliberal).
Selection
EquationVariables
on surveynonresponse
Literature
suggeststhatsociodecharacteristics
likeage,gender,race,and socioemographic
conomicstatusare important
of thedecisionto
predictors
in a survey(see e.g.,DeMaio 1980; Smith1983).
participate
In additiontothesegeneralcharacteristics,
theprofessionalismofthelegislature
and members'
legislative
seniority
may
also influence
thelikelihoodthatlegislators
willparticipate
I expectthatmembers
in a survey.
who servein moreprofessionallegislatures-institutions
thatgenerally
havehigher
workloadsandmeetforlongersessions-may
be lesslikelyto
completethesurveygiventhenumerousdemandson their
time(see Squire1992).7Moreseniormembers
mayalso be
lesslikelytoparticipate
giventhattheyaremoreinvolvedin
7 The measureof statelegislative
professionalism,
developedby Squire
sessionlength,and staff
(1992), reflects
salary,
support.States'scoreson
all threeattributes
areexpressedas a percentage
oftheCongress's
score,
and thenthe threepercentages
are averagedforeach state.I use an
updatedversionoftheindex(see Reenock2001).
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309
EXPLORINGGENDERDIFFERENCESIN STATELEGISLATORS'
POLICY PREFERENCES
TABLE2
HECKMANMODEL OF LEGISLATORS'
ATTITUDESON WELFAREPOLICY INDEX
Age
District
income
District
education
District
unemployment
Education
Gender(female)
Liberalism
Divorced
Single
Widowed
Democrat
Otherparty
Race (blacklegislator)
Catholic
Jewish
Non-traditional
Christian
No religious
preference
Statelegislative
professionalism
Yearsin legislature
(constant)
Uncensoredobservations
Totalobservations
p
X2(p = 0)
X2
Welfare
PolicyIndex
-.01
(.01)
-.01
(.02)
.03*
(.02)
.04
(.06)
.45
(.40)
1.25***
(.38)
1.52***
(.21)
.61
(.50)
.55
(.69)
-.63
(.68)
1.80***
(.53)
.91
(1.24)
-1.05
(.88)
.29
(.30)
.61
(.69)
.25
(1.38)
.42
(.27)
1.58
416
2198
.72
21.38***
889.95***
SelectionModel
.02**
(.004)
.20**
.001
(.08)
(.07)
.03
.45
-.50***
(.06)
(.60)
(.19)
-.84
-.01
-.69
(.81)
(.01)
Note.Robuststandarderrorsin parentheses
forclustering
on states).
(corrected
*p< .05,**p< .01,***p< .001
In addition,party
thedecisionsmade in theirlegislatures.
in
thedecisionsof membersto participate
mayalso affect
thesurveyThe survey's
focuson welfare
policymayinterest
Democraticlegislatorsmore than theirRepublicancolleagues,and Democratsmay be morelikelyto respond.
ConsequentlyI model the decisionto participatein the
surveyas a functionof age, gender,race,socioeconomic
ofthelegislature,
senstatus,theprofessionalism
legislative
and
iority, party.8
Table 2 presentstheresultsof the Heckmanselection
model.First,considertheselectionmodel.Note thatage,
and racehavesignificant
effects
on theprobabileducation,
8
is characterized
lower
Onlyonesubgroupoflegislators
bya substantially
thatwere
responserate.Elevenpercentofthe192 blackstatelegislators
surveyedresponded.This low responserateand the resultingsmall
numberofblacklegislators
does notprovidesufficient
variationin the
uncensoredobservations
fromwhichto draw conclusionsabout the
effect
of race on legislators'
welfarepolicyattitudes.Othersubgroups,
like widowedand Jewishlegislators
and otherpartymembers,have
fewmemhigherresponseratesbutarequitesmall,producing
relatively
bersof thesegroupsin theuncensoreddata. Becausethe presenceof
thesevariablesprovidesfora morerigorous
testoftheeffect
ofgender,I
includerace,maritalstatus,and religiondespitethe smallnumberof
in someofthesesubgroups.
respondents
itythata legislator
respondsto thesurveyOlderand more
educatedrespondents
are morelikelyto participate
in the
and blacklegislators
arelesslikelyto do so. In addisurvey,
indicatethattheselection,theHeckmanmodelparameters
tionmodelis usefuland appropriate
in thissituation.The
estimate
ofp, thecorrelation
oftheerrortermsoftheselectionequationand substantive
regression
equation,is quite
large(p = .72), whichindicatesthattheerrortermsof the
two equationsare relatedand thatordinaryleastsquares
(OLS) would produce biased parameterestimates.The
Wald testofindependent
equations,whichteststhesignificance of p, the X2(p = 0) statistic,
is largeenough(X2 =
=
thatp equals
21.38, p .000) to rejectthenullhypothesis
0 and thatthetwoequationsareindependent.
Basedon the
of theHeckmanmodeland thepossibility
of
performance
inferences
theeffects
ofkey
drawinginaccurate
concerning
variablesfromOLS results,I reportHeckman
independent
selectionmodelresultsforthisanalysis.
THE INDEPENDENT EFFECT OF GENDER
Table3 presentstheHeckmanmodelresultsusingthree
different
measuresof constituency
preferences
including
demographicmeasures,legislators'
subjectiveassessments
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310
RESEARCH
POLITICAL
QUARTERLY
-
TABLE
3
THE EFFECTS OF GENDERAND CONSTITUENCYON WELFAREPOLICY LIBERALISM
Model2
Model 1
Age
income
District
District
education
District
unemployment
welfare
liberalism
District
Urbandistrict
Education
Gender(female)
Liberalism
Divorced
Single
Widowed
Democrat
Otherparty
Race (blacklegislator)
Catholic
Jewish
Non-traditional
Christian
No religiouspreference
(constant)
Uncensoredobservations
Totalobservations
p
X2(p = 0)
X2
-.01
-.01
.03*
.04
.45
1.25***
1.52***
.61
.55
-.63
1.80***
.91
-1.05
.29
.61
.25
.42
1.58
416
2198
.72
21.38**
889.95***
(.01)
(.02)
(.02)
(.06)
-.02
(.40)
(.38)
(.21)
(.50)
(.69)
(.68)
(.53)
(1.24)
(.88)
(.30)
(.69)
(1.38)
(.27)
.47
1.29***
1.47***
.80
.49
-.53
1.61**
.86
-1.08
.21
.42
.17
.37
1.97
403
2198
.70
18.37***
990.96***
.50**
Model3
(.01)
(.17)
(.37)
(.36)
(.22)
(.47)
(.70)
(.77)
(.56)
(1.17)
(.84)
(.31)
(.72)
(1.27)
(.28)
-.01
(1.24)
.59**
.51
1.28***
1.60***
.59
.30
-.73
1.64**
.81
-1.39
.30
.73
.29
.47
1.82
416
2198
.73
19.40***
879.47***
(.21)
(.38)
(.37)
(.21)
(.69)
(.69)
(.57)
(.56)
(1.23)
(.82)
(.31)
(.69)
(1.24)
(.28)
withrobuststandarderrorscorrected
forclustering
on statesin parentheses.
Note.Heckmanmodelcoefficients
*p< .05,**p< .01,***p< .001
oftheirconstituents'
on welfare,
liberalism
and thedistrict men,evenafteraccounting
fortheeffects
ofparty,
ideology,
urbanessmeasure.9
Giventhattheselectionequationsforall
and personalcharacteristics.
Models2 and 3
constituency,
three specifications
are nearlyidenticalto the results
estimate
similareffects
forgender.In orderto puttheeffect
in Table2, I reportonlytheresultsofthesubstanof genderin context,
it maybe usefulto compareit to the
reported
tiveequationspredicting
statelegislators'
welfare
effect
ofparty.
Democratic
scorebetween1.61 and
policyliblegislators
eralism.Allthreeanalysesutilizerobuststandard
errors
cor1.80 pointshigheron the welfareliberalismscale than
In comparison
rectedforclustering
on statesto allow forthe factthat
arestathen,genderdifferences
Republicans.
in all threemodelsand
observations
withinstates.
andsubstantively
maybe correlated
tistically
significant
and
Acrossall threemodelsgenderexertsa significant
smallerin magnitude
thanpartisan
differences.
justslightly
In eachmodel,themeasuresofconstituency
Womenlegislators
do havemoreliberalprefpositiveeffect.
preferences
erenceson welfarepolicy than theirmale counterparts. havea significant
welfare
impacton legislators'
policyliberNoticethatevenafter
forparty,
andvaralism.Legislators
whoseconstituencies
havea greater
controlling
ideology,
perious measuresof constituency
whoassesstheirconstituencies
concerns,genderhas a subcentageofcollegegraduates,
stantialimpact on members'welfarepolicy attitudes.
as more liberalregarding
welfarepolicy,and who have
to Model 1, womenlegislators
scoreabout1.25
urbanconstituencies,
aremorelikelyto holdliberalpreferAccording
than
enceson welfare
thatconstituency
policyliberalism
pointshigheron theindexofwelfare
policy.Thisdemonstrates
concernsdo influencelegislators'attitudes,and more
thatgendercontinuesto influence
importantly,
legislators'
policypreferences
despitetheinclusionofseveraldifferent
9 There are 2,198 censored cases. Although2,526 legislatorswere
used in theselectionmodelcould
includedin thesample,information
measuresofconstituency
opinions.
only be obtainedfor2,198 legislators.While about 530 legislators
Liberalismand politicalparty(Democrat)exertsignifiinformation
on the dependentvariablewas
respondedto the survey,
on legislators'
welfare
cant,positiveeffects
policyliberalism
In addition,severalotherindeunavailableforabout 30 respondents.
as
for
the
coefficients
and education
expected.
Although
age
in
not
be
obtained
for
variables
all
could
pendent
resulting
legislators
arein thepredicted
about416 uncensored
cases.
directions,
theyfailto achievestatistical
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EXPLORING
INSTATE
GENDER
DIFFERENCES
LEGISLATORS'
POLICY
PREFERENCES
=
311
TABLE4
THECONDITIONAL
EFFECT
ONWELFARE
OFGENDER
POLICY
LIBERALISM
Model2
Model 1
Age
District
income
District
education
District
unemployment
Education
Gender(female)
Gender*Democrat
Gender*
Liberalism
Liberalism
Divorced
Single
Widowed
Democrat
Otherparty
Race (blacklegislator)
Catholic
Jewish
Non-traditional
Christian
No religiouspreference
(constant)
Uncensoredobservations
Totalobservations
p
X2(p = 0)
X2
-.02
-.02
.03*
.03
.52
2.42***
-1.82**
(.01)
(.02)
(.02)
(.06)
(.43)
(.61)
(.69)
1.53***
.72
.53
-.50
2.09***
.57
-.99
.33
.68
.26
.40*
1.62
416
2198
.72
(.21)
(.49)
(.67)
(.70)
(.48)
(1.22)
(.87)
(.30)
(.71)
(1.27)
(.25)
1.31
24.03***
-.02
-.01
.03"
.04
.52
3.03***
(.01)
(.02)
(.02)
(.06)
(.43)
(.83)
-.88**
1.75***
.80
.56
-.56
1.71***
.82
-1.02
.23
1.02
.64
.37
(.31)
(.25)
(.49)
(.67)
(.74)
(.55)
(1.33)
(.86)
(.29)
(.73)
(1.49)
(.26)
416
2198
.76
21.91***
896.63***
898.61***
Note.Heckmanmodelcoefficients
withrobuststandarderrorscorrected
on statesin parentheses.
forclustering
*p < .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001
in all threespecifications
of the model. The
significance
coefficient
forrace is negativebut not statistically
signifiin the
cant. Giventhe small numberof black legislators
of
analysis,thisresearchis not a reliabletestof theeffect
race on statelegislators'
welfarepolicyattitudes;
however,
theinclusionofracedoes providefora morestringent
test
of the effectof gender.None of the religiouscategories
in anyof thespecifications,
achievessignificance
and joint
testsof significance
findthatthereligionvariablescollecadditionalexplanatory
tivelyfailto contribute
powerto the
models(e.g.,formodel1, x2= 2.72, p = .61). Whilenone
oftheindividualcoefficients
forthethreemeasuresofmaritalstatusarestatistically
a jointtestshowsthat
significant,
maritalstatusdoes contribute
additionalexplanatory
power
to themodels(e.g.,formodel1, X2= 10.32,p = .02).
CONDITIONING THE EFFECT OF GENDER
The resultsof this analysisconfirmthatgenderdoes
exertan independent
impacton legislators'
policyopinions,
forconstituency
ideevenafteraccounting
concerns,party,
and
other
the
characteristics;
however, relationship
ology,
betweengenderand members'
policyopinionsmaybe more
differences
complex.As previousworksuggestssubstantial
existamongwomenlegislators
(e.g.,Dolan and Ford1998),
I
especiallyin termsof partyand ideology.Consequently,
examinetheinteractive
effects
of partyand ideologywith
gender.Table 4 presentsthe effectof genderon welfare
thehighcorpolicyliberalism
includingtheseinteractions;
relationofthetwointeraction
terms(r = .88) precludesestiin one model.1'
matingtheireffects
The resultsofModel 1 indicatethattheeffect
ofgender
is significantly
ofgender,as
conditioned
bypartyTheeffect
in thepreviousmodels,is positiveand significant.
However,
10
Thegender-ideology
interaction
at .87 withgenderand .49
is correlated
withideology.The gender-party
is correlatedat .72 with
interaction
thatthefindings
genderand .39 withpartyIn orderto establish
regardofgenderarenota productofmulticollinearity,
effect
ingtheconditional
I createinteraction
terms
fromstandardized
measures
ofgender,
ideology,
and partyThe interaction
ofstandardized
genderand ideologyis correlatedwithgenderat .35 andwithideologyat .17. Theinteraction
ofstanis correlated
withgenderat .00 andat .11 with
dardizedgenderandparty
I re-estimated
themodelsfrom
terms,
partyUsingthesenewinteraction
Table4. The resultsofthisanalysisproducednearlyidenticalresultsto
thosepresented
inTable4. In bothmodels,theinteraction
termsarenegativeandstatistically
and thecomponent
arepositive
variables
significant
and significant.
Thissuggeststhattheconditional
effects
ofgenderpreofmulticollinearity.
sentedin Table4 arenotproducts
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312
POLITICALRESEARCHQUARTERLY
-
FIGURE 1
THE CONDITIONALEFFECT OF GENDERON WELFAREPOLICY LIBERALISM
16-
14
12
Welare
Female
Average
10
Legislator
LibLiberaleralism
8ism
-1
.....--~-
AverageMale
2-
021
Legislator
1
3
4
Liberalism
of
oftheinteraction
thesignificant
and negativecoefficient
thatgenderdifgenderand Democratic
partydemonstrates
areless pronouncedamongDemocratic
ferences
legislators
and more pronouncedamong Republicans.Because the
effect
ofgendercan no longerbe interpreted
independently,
scoreson theindex
it maybe helpfulto considerpredicted
of welfarepolicyliberalismforaveragemale and female
Democratsand Republicans.
in the firstcolumnof
coefficients
Usingthe regression
ofthe
Table4 and themean,median,or modalcategories
I computedthewelfare
liberalotherindependent
variables,
woman
ismscoresofan averageDemocratic
andRepublican
and an averageDemocratic
and Republicanman.The averon
womanhas themostliberalpreferences
age Democratic
welfarepolicyofall averagelegislators,
scoringa 7.2 on the
index.The averageRepublicanwomanscores6.9 on the
lessliberalin herwelfare
scale,onlyslightly
policyopinions
thanherfemaleDemocratic
colleague.The averageDemoclessliberal
raticmanhas a scoreof6.6 on theindex,slightly
thaneithertheaverageDemocraticor Republicanwoman.
In contrast,
theaverageRepublicanmanholdssignificantly
on welfareas indicatedbythescore
less liberalpreferences
of4.5 on theindex.Whileonlya modestgenderdifference
of averagemen
existsbetweenthewelfarepolicyattitudes
and womenDemocraticlegislators
(.6 points),genderdifferencesare much morepronouncedamongRepublicans
ofparty,
womenaremoreliberalin
(2.4 points).Regardless
their opinions on welfarepolicy than men, especially
withpriorwork
is consistent
Republicanmen.Thisfinding
thatfindsthatRepublicanwomenaremorelikelyto defect
fromtheirpartyand castliberalvotes,introduce
bills,and
theirparty's
moreconact in otherwaysthatdo notreflect
servative
agenda(see e.g., Carey,Niemi,and Powell1998;
Wolbrecht
2000).
Model2 in Table4 demonstrates
thatideologyalso sigconditionsthe effectof gender.Similarto the
nificantly
withgender,thesignifiresultsforpartyand itsinteraction
of gender
cant and negativecoefficient
of the interaction
and liberalism
demonstrates
thatgenderdifferences
areless
andmorepronounced
pronounced
amongliberallegislators
Figure1 graphstheaveragemaleand
amongconservatives.
femalelegislator's
predictedscoreson theindexofwelfare
policyliberalismforthe rangeof all possibleideological
values. For mostvalues of ideology,the averagewoman
on welfarethantheaverexhibitsmoreliberalpreferences
theconservative
age man.At thelowestvaluesofideology,
end of the spectrum,genderdifferences
are most promore
nouncedand womenon averagehold considerably
thanmen.Forhighervaluesofideology,
liberalpreferences
bothmenand womenexpressmoreliberalpreferences
on
betweenthe averageman and
welfareand the differences
woman'sscorenarrows.For thehighestvalue of ideology,
theaveragemalelegthemostliberalend ofthespectrum,
islator's
scoreis justslightly
higheror moreliberalthanthat
of the averagewoman; howeverthis difference
is quite
small.For themostpartwomenhold moreliberalpolicy
attitudes
on welfare
thanmen,and thesegenderdifferences
are more pronouncedamongconservatives.
Conservative
withrespecttowelwomenareactuallyfarlessconservative
farepolicythantheirmalecounterparts.
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313
IN STATELEGISLATORS'
POLICYPREFERENCES
EXPLORING
GENDERDIFFERENCES
CONCLUSION
Consistentwithpreviousworkon womenelectedofficials, I findthatwomenstatelegislatorsdo in facthold
on welfarepolicythanmen,even
moreliberalpreferences
afteraccountingfornumerousmeasuresof constituency
While
demands,party,
ideology,and othercharacteristics.
both men and women legislatorsrespondto theirconstituents,women legislators hold significantlymore lib-
eralopinionson welfarethanmen.I also findthatgender
differences
are greateramongRepublicanand conservativelegislators.
withtheexpectaAlthoughtheseresultsare consistent
tionthattheincreasing
presenceofwomenin electedoffice
will produce more liberalpolicy,the policy impact of
is mediatedbylegislative
and
womenlegislators
institutions
and O'Connor
withinthem(see Berkman
women'spositions
1993; Dodson 1998; Norton1995, 2002; Reingold2000;
Rosenthal1998; Saint-Germain
1989; Swers2002; Thomas
demandsmay constrain
1994). In addition,constituency
somelegislators,
womenrepresenting
conservaparticularly
in termsofrollcallvotingand other
tivedistricts,
especially
easily observed activities.However,women legislatorsmay
have the opportunityto influence policy in less public
venues. For example,the decisionto take part and be
on a givenbill,espeactivelyinvolvedin thedeliberation
motivated
ciallyat the committee
stage,affords
legislators
an opportunityto influencepolicy that is not easily
observedby thepublicand maybe less structured
by condemands(see Hall 1996, 1987; Hall and Wayman
stituency
issues
1990). Giventhatwomenaremoreactiveon welfare
and more likelyto serveon welfarerelatedcommittees
and Haynie1999; Dodson 1991; Dolan and Ford
(Bratton
1998; Saint-Germain
1989; Thomas1994, 1991; Thomas
and Welch1991), womenlegislators
maybe able to act on
and influence
theirmoreliberalwelfarepolicypreferences
and even
policydespitetheirpositionin the institution
when theyrepresentconservativeconstituencies.
While this researchspecifically
addressesthe issue of
welfare,it mayhave implicationsforotherpolicyareas.
This workdemonstrates
thatmenand womenlegislators'
policy preferences differfor welfare, a highly partisan
issue. If gender exerts such a strong effectin this policy
on other
influence
area,thengendermayhavea significant
policyareas,especiallyareasin whichthepartieshaveless
defined positions. In fact, many scholars argue that
on a numberof
womenwillexpressdistinctive
preferences
policy issues. For example,Carroll(1990: 11) argues,
"[R]egardlessof whetherthe issue is foreignaid, the
womenare morelikelythan
budget,or theenvironment,
men to considerthepossibleimpactof thepolicyon the
livesofwomenand children."Giventhestronginfluence
of genderevidencedin this and otherstudiesand the
expectationthatgenderis likelyto influenceotherpolicy
areas, understanding how gender structures legislators'
attitudesand behavior is vital to understandinglegislative
decisionmakingand representation.
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