Negotiating and controlling water:
The case of large mining industry in Cajamarca, Peru
Milagros Sosa and Margreet Zwarteveen 1
(Working document, not for citation)
Paper prepared for the International Conference Nature TM Inc? Questioning the Market Panacea in
Environmental Policy and Conservation, held at the ISS, The Hague, The Netherlands.
30June – 2 July, 2011
Abstract
The paper proposes a way to understand impacts of large mining industries,
established in rural Andean areas. We argue that the establishment of these
industries bring along a full re-structuration of how land and water are used,
managed and controlled; affecting existing local livelihoods that depend on those
resources and provoking reactions or conflicts. It provokes the erosion of
communities territories, behaviors, cultures and identities with for instance the
introduction of commodification or negotiation notions in dealing with natural
resources or communities’ grievances. Negotiations take place when mining
industries impact or recognize their impacts on water resources or peasant
irrigation canals and can be specified in activities concerning drainage of entire
water sources, resign, relocation of water rights and control over water sources.
All of these activities are backed up or allowed by the Peruvian state agencies.
The paper uses evidence from the establishment and operations of one of the
largest gold mining companies in Latin America, Yanacocha mining company.
This company is currently operating in the rural areas of Cajamarca -northern
Peruvian Andes-. The paper provides insights in Yanacocha’s strategies to secure
water for mining exploitation. It shows how water access and rights are disputed
as well as negotiated and how peasant communities cope with or accommodate to
the changes induced by the mine.
Keywords: Negotiation, water rights, water control, conflicts, peasant communities,
Yanacocha, Cajamarca, Peru.
1
Contact: [email protected], PhD candidate and [email protected] senior researcher, both
working at the Irrigation and Water Engineering Group, Wageningen University, the Netherlands.
http://www.iwe.wur.nl/UK/ and http://www.iwe.wur.nl/UK/Research/SWAS
1
INTRODUCTION
Mining is quickly becoming one of the most important economic activities in Peru. The
country is rich in minerals such as gold, silver, copper, and the exploitation of the ore
deposits is becoming a very attractive and profitable enterprise. The different Peruvian
governmental regimes during those years are actively welcoming investors to develop
mining activities in the country, by implementing measures to attract, satisfy and even
secure mining investment. Among other measures, the state warranties private
properties investments; stabilizes taxation and establishes the same conditions for
granting mining concession to foreign investors as to Peruvians (General Mining law,
1992; Foreign Investment Promotion Law, 1991).
Hence, from 1992 onwards, Peru promoted itself as a stable and secure investment
country, stimulating participation of private/foreign companies and increasing mining
claims throughout the country (Bury 2004). The combination of the implemented
measures with the increase of mineral prices placed Peru on the firsts rankings of
mineral production, both in Latin America and worldwide (Torres 2007). Yet, although
positive for the national trade balance, not all are equally positive about mining
influence in Peru. As Bebbington et al. (2008) state many remain unconvinced and with
serious doubts about such influence.
In this paper, we argue that the entrance and establishment of large mining operations
exacerbate a full re-structuration of how land and water are used, managed and
controlled; affecting existing local livelihoods that depend on those resources provoking
reactions or conflicts. Also, the establishment of those industries provokes the erosion
of communities behaviors, identities and cultures with for instance the introduction of
commodification or negotiation notions in dealing with natural resources and/or
communities’ grievances.
First, we present context information about Cajamarca and Yanacocha, for instance how
the company established in rural areas of Cajamarca. Secondly, some conceptualizations
about water and water rights. Then issues about Yanacocha water mining use, peasant
water struggles and the negotiations for water are fully described and finally the
conclusions.
2
CAJAMARCA ANDES AND YANACOCHA MINING COMPANY
Cajamarca
Cajamarca is located in the northern Peruvian Andes. Since the hacienda times up to
now, it is well-known as one of the most important regions for livestock and dairy
production in Peru (Armijos, 2005 quoting Deere,
1990). Currently, the milk produced in this region
supplies two large milk companies, Gloria and
Nestle, that process and distribute their products
to the entire country. Thus most of the rural
households’ activities are focused on grazing,
milking schedules, milk delivery and milk related
production. Also great attention is paid to the
maintenance of grasslands and cattle care.
Cajamarca is considered one of the regions living
in extreme poverty conditions in the country
(INEI, 2007).
Fig. N. 1. Map of Peru and Cajamarca location. ING (2005)
Besides the importance of Cajamarca due to its livestock and milk production, this
region is historically well-known because it was in Cajamarca that the Inca Atahualpa
was captured and murdered by the Spanish conqueror, Francisco Pizarro, in 1532.
History tells that Atahualpa offered one room full with gold and two with silver for his
freedom 2. The Spanish accepted and then, precious artifacts were collected across the
entire Inca Empire and transported to Cajamarca to accomplish the promise. However,
once the rooms were totally full and the time had arrived to acknowledge the agreement,
Pizarro decided to not release Atahualpa, but instead killed him (Sarmiento and
Ravines, 2009; Galeano, 1997; Diamond, 1997). This invasion and conquest of the Inca
Empire established a turning point in the Peruvian history. It is recognized as a
historical gold plunder and its meaning is still very much present in this region during
conflicts that involve a foreigner that wants to get the local gold [mining companies],
calling these as a “second conquest” (Elizalde et al., 2007).
2
Some chronists argue that such a reward was not a shy or unconditional request, instead it was an
exigency from Pizarro (Sarmiento and Ravines, 2009).
3
Currently Cajamarca is considered by the State
as an important mining department at national
level (Baez, 2009). In Cajamarca region at least
10 transnational mining projects are being
implemented and developed since the last 10
years. On the 2008 about 40.88% of the
Cajamarca’s territory (3 295 263.87 Ha) was
given on mining concessions (Grufides, 2008).
Fig. N. 2. Map of mining concessions in Cajamarca.
Grufides (2008).
Yanacocha
Yanacocha mining company is an open cast gold mine located in the Cajamarca region 3.
It started operations in 1993 and is a joint venture owned by the largest gold company in
the world, the American Newmont Mining Corporation (51.35%) located in Denver,
Colorado. They own it together with the Peruvian mining company Buenaventura
(43.65%) as a second partner, and the financial sector of the World Bank (5%)
(Kuramoto, J. 1999; Bury, 2005). This company was established within the context of
the neoliberal reform package implemented by the Fujimori regime constituting the first
large foreign investment in the country (Bury 2005).
Currently Yanacocha is considered the largest gold producer in Latin America –it
produced 1.5 million oz. of gold in 2007 (see figure N.3) and it is considered one of the
most profitable enterprises in the world (Bury, 2005). Yanacocha gold production costs
are low due to the type of technology employed: open pit mining and cyanide heapleaching, “It is the first large-scale heap leaching project in Peru and in 2001 became the
largest heap-leaching operation in the world” (Newmont, 2002 quoted by Bury,
2005:203).
3
From 3500 to 4100 m.a.s.l., 48km. north of the city of Cajamarca and 603 km. north of the capital city.
(Golder associates, 2008)
4
Yanacocha gold production
(1993 - 2007)
3500000
3000000
Gold oz.
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
1993
1994
1995 1996
1997 1998
1999 2000
2001 2002
2003 2004
2005 2006
2007
Years
Figure N. 3 Yanacocha Gold production (1993-2007). Yanacocha (2008b)
The operations cover an area about 10000 ha, constituting the large land owner in
Cajamarca. The mine site includes Quebrada Honda Llaucán, Chonta and RejoJequetepeque catchments and the sub-catchments Grande-Mashcón, and PorcónMashcón, in total about 100 communities. Yanacocha mostly acquired the land by
direct purchase or negotiations and in some cases by forced expropriation. The direct
purchase or plot negotiations were done between Yanacocha representatives and the
land owners. The trading conditions were established by the mine representatives and at
very low prices for example 25.00 USD/ha. Those transactions were the cause of
several socio-environmental conflicts between Yanacocha and its neighbors. In case the
land owner opposed or resisted the negotiations, the plot would be expropriated by
force, imposing the “ley de servidumbre” or right of way. Then, land was registered as
‘property acquired during rebellious resistance’ (SCG, 2004). The land acquisition
process occurred already more than fifteen years ago but because of all of these events it
is still very much present in communities’ memories and it is considered as a violent
process, full with pressure and threat.
The families that sold their lands to Yanacocha constitute the group of ex-propietarios
or ex-owners and according to the agreements made during the selling process they
would qualify for future benefits such us employment. However, many families
denounced that they did not receive such benefits or that they were limited (Armijos,
2005). This is contrasted by Yanacocha (2008a), arguing that it employs about 10000
workers: approximately 3000 steady employees and 7000 temporal contractors and 65%
of them are Cajamarca inhabitants.
5
In the reasoning of the families that sold their lands, the selling process turned
Yanacocha into the new owner of the means of subsistence and production. In that
sense, Yanacocha should be responsible for creating employment and assisting those
who were now deprived of the means of production. The families’ perception was that
“the work replaces the land, which is not a gift, it is their right”, so it must be
considered as permanent and inherited (SCG, 2004). The deception of those who sold
their lands about the non-compliance of Yanacocha generated even more conflicts
between the company and the communities. This land acquisition process carried out by
Yanacocha and by other mining companies along Peruvian Andes could be explained
by Li when she argues that “places (or their resources) are useful, but the people are
not…”(2009:69).
CONCEPTIONS ABOUT WATER AND WATER RIGHTS
The Peruvian legislation establishes that water belongs to the state 4 and the state gives
water on concessions or water rights. Water concessions only allow the holders to have
access and use the sources, but those rights are strictly not tradable. Water concessions
are given for a specific purpose and period of time. After the concession period has
expired, the holder ceases to have the right to access and use the water, and its
management turns back to state administration (Boelens, 2008). This means that
officially water cannot be purchased or sold: only granted by the state. However, in the
everyday practice and outside state regulations or decrees, water and water rights are
seen and utilized as tradable goods, negotiating, buying and selling water.
In a context of multiple water uses and users, water becomes a contested resource
(Meinzen-Dick, R. and M. Bakker (2001). This is to say that, water allocation to some
uses is prioritized over others uses and thus, restricting or denying water to some uses
and users are often the core issue for water conflicts. Water and specially water rights
are an expression of power (Boelens and Hoogendam 2002), the power to determine
water allocation mechanisms, access and extraction -that is to say, to benefit from the
resources. As well as water rights to manage the resource implying regulation,
transformation of the resource and even alteration of streams as well as rights to exclude
4
Water Resources Law 29338, new law enacted on 2009. Previously water issues were regulated by the
Water Law 17752 that considered as well that water resources belong to the State.
6
users from having water access and in some water system the right to sell or lease the
resource (Schlager and Ostrom 1992 in Meizen-Dick and Bakker 2001]. Therefore by
having water access, rights and control over water management one user can execute
control over users and uses. Illustrations about such tension between different users or
water rights holders are shown in this paper, but, before a brief view about how water is
used for mining purposes.
STRUGGLING AND NEGOTIATING FOR WATER
Yanacocha: mining water use
To develop open pit mining activities with a long term perspective, it is necessary to
have permanent and secure access to land and water. This is why it is very important for
mining industries -like Yanacocha- to apply and unfailingly get access to land from the
owners and get water rights/concessions from the State. Mining industries need to
formalize their water use applying to the respective water authorities, at the local level,
to the Local Water Authority or ALA (Autoridad Local del Agua) and/or to the
Administrative Water Authority AAA (Autoridad Administrativa del Agua) to get their
water rights and thus the permission to utilize and manipulate water resources.
Also, it is necessary to develop different actions to secure water supply for mining
operations, to do so, Yanacocha, for instance, built water reservoirs and secure water 24
hours per day. Even more with the implementation of water treatment plants Yanacocha
is able to use and reuse water, labeling it a closed water use cycle. In this sense
Yanacocha representatives could refer that the water consumption for the mine is not
excessive –compare with other uses like agriculture- it is about 2 Mm3 per year.
During operations in the open pit, it is required to remove large amounts of topsoil and
while doing that small lakes and water springs (called by the locals as “ojos de agua”)
are found and needed to be drained in a process called “dewatering”. Then water is
diverted and storage into the mine reservoirs. This dewatering process had impacts on
ground water lowering the water table but also affected water sources that feed rivers,
creeks and/or peasant canals. Because of those impacts Andean communities
neighboring Yanacocha complained against the company and different water conflicts
arose. Peasant communities considered that their local activities such as agriculture and
7
dairy production were negatively affected by mining operations (Arana, nd. Deza,
2008). In other words, by grating water rights to Yanacocha to use or even drain water
sources, restricted the water access and use for other users like peasant communities.
In the following paragraphs we will illustrate how peasant or comuneros users struggle
for water, negotiate with it and how the mining industry plays an important role in
restructuring how water is being used, managed and controlled in rural Cajamarca.
Struggling and protesting for water
Many Andean communities consider water as ‘theirs’ because the sources are in their
territories and because of the often huge amounts of labor they have historically
invested in constructing and maintaining water infrastructure. The organization of water
access and distribution often forms the basis of the wider social fabric of communities,
and constitutes the heart of their economic, productive, and cultural activities (Boelens
and Zwarteveen, 2005). Water users associations are thus responsible for the
construction, management and maintenance of the communal irrigation systems. These
organizations are also considered by the State as the legal representatives of the water
users.
The following is an example 5 of a current water conflict between communities and
Yanacocha about water access and water rights. It shows the comuneros struggles to get
their water back.
Farmers or water users from La Ramada, Manzanas Alto and Plan Manzanas,
communities located in the vicinity of Yanacocha mining company face more than
seven years of conflicts against the company. The farmers complain because the water
sources that fed their canal Cerro Negro-La Ramada were given by the State to
Yanacocha. The company simply denied that the canal had ever conducted water. Yet,
farmers had collectively constructed the canal thirty years ago from 1982 to 1986, with
great efforts and difficulties because of the roughness of the territory and the remoteness
of the water sources. The construction was supported by the missionary organization
5
Information gathered during fieldwork at La Ramada 2009, and Community assembly acts La Ramada.
2008 – 2009; ATDRC, 1989, 2001, 2003; ATDRJ, 2003.
8
Cooperación Popular and the farmers got the official water rights from the government
in 1989 for agricultural purposes. The canal was 17km and had a capacity of 80 L/sec. It
benefited about 160 rural families. There are nine water sources (natural springs and
creeks) from which the peasants took water into their canal, these sources are located in
the Cajamarca, as well as, in the Jequetepeque watersheds. Therefore there are two
different water authorities from each watershed dealing with this case. According to the
farmers, La Ramada canal joint the water flows of another canal called Colpa–La
Ramada 6 and together irrigated the farmers’ plots.
After Yanacocha was established in the area, the leaders in turn of the water users
association (wua) of La Ramada canal engaged in negotiations with the mine. Those
negotiations consisted in economical payments from the company to the farmers with
the condition to stop doing operation and maintenance activities in the canal, and
instead, receive this incentive to do other productive activities and also as a
compensation for the work displayed during the construction of the canal. Then, every
comunero received 2000 US dollars. Some comuneros accepted the payment as
compensation for the work, but they did not consider it as a selling their water neither
their infrastructure. However less work was organized and devoted for keeping the
canal infrastructure in optimal conditions. Irrigation for agricultural crops declined
because there was less water and farmers prioritized irrigation of pastures. Those
leaders –without informing the other water users- also left behind the updating
processes of official recognition or water rights/concessions for the canal, thus the
farmers water user association lost its official water rights. Years later, in 2003,
Yanacocha acquired the water rights to use 11.5 L/sec. (from the available volume of
13L/sec.) from the nine water sources, that used to feed the peasants canal, located in
the high parts of Cerro Negro mountain.
In 2004 and with new leaders of the water user association, the farmers tried to do the
cleaning and maintenance to the canal, but Yanacocha tried to stop them arguing that
they were trespassing private property. It was only after this event that farmers found
out that the nine water sources were given out as concessions to the company. They
discovered that the water used by the communities was not taken into account because
they did not have formal concessions or documents to prove they were users.
6
This canal is in optimal conditions and the water users are the same than for La Ramada canal.
9
From 2006 onwards, the community leaders approached various authorities and other
influential organizations on water allocation in the region, trying to reverse the process
and asking to invalidate the Yanacocha’s concessions; arguing that they were using
water for irrigation while the mine does it for industrial purposes. However the request
was rejected by the local authority the same year and instead Yanacocha’s rights were
again asserted. Then, the peasant struggle and conflict situation about La Ramada
reached the Ministry of Agriculture, which ordered to the Local Water Authorities from
Cajamarca and Jequetepeque to determine the canal use feasibility and the water
availability in the area, in order to, “…give water rights -in priority- to those who were
affected because of the expiration of such rights…” (Ministry of Agriculture, 2006).
Up to 2008 no solution was found, and out of frustration one of the group of farmers
organized a public protest and blocked the road that connects the mine site with
Cajamarca city. Their intention was to demand a solution. Instead, what happened is
that they were accused of causing public disturbance, and a judicial case followed.
Representatives of the mine claimed that the canal is not viable, and maintain that it
never conducted water to the communities’ fields. Based on that criteria, the canal was
partially blocked by Yanacocha, this action
provoked many complaints from the
farmers and after some protests and mobilizations, the Local Water authority ordered to
Yanacocha to rehabilitate the affected area of the canal. Currently the canal is almost
abandoned, does not convey water regularly and maintenance work is hardly ever done.
According to the farmers, this is because the canal is located in the mine’s private
property and to enter there they need an authorization from the Water Authority but also
from the mine. They argue that, “the intention of the company is to delete any trace of
the canal” 7. This conflict is going on for already more than seven years and the farmers
are still struggling for getting their water rights.
The emergency of conflicts within communities made this case more complicated. The
leaders had disputes about legitimacy and authority and appeared to be two groups
confronting each other trying to get the water rights back for their own groups. Then
sometimes one leader was denying the legitimacy of the other and/or sabotaging each
other’s actions, these circumstances delayed solutions and effective actions from both
sides. The tensions are not over between these two groups, however, the one which
7
Leaders of the water user association who conducted the public protest. Personal communications.
10
remained as legal representative of the users and for irrigation purposes, was one
founded in 1989 and the other group engaged into drinking water issues.
In 2009 and following the order of Ministry of Agriculture, the National Water
Authority ANA hired an independent consultant to do the water availability studies. In
response to that, water flow measurements were carried out in the area, especially
during dry season, the water crop requirements were also elaborated and finally
feasibility studies about the canal infrastructure were also done. The conclusions of
these studies were that the water demands were higher than the water availability, that
the canal -to conduct water- urgently needed reconstruction, and that maintenance work
and implementation of sprinkler irrigation must be undertaken in the area.
In August 2010, the two local water authorities that were dealing with this case about
giving water rights or concession to the La Ramada communities resolved that there is
not enough water to fully cover communities’ demands. Therefore farmers can not get
the water rights over the disputed sources neither to share water because sources are
already allocated to Yanacocha’s activities. The resolution also implied the situation of
the canal, considering this as totally unviable. Between the end of 2010 and the
beginning of 2011 under the influence of many changes at the local water authorities,
other observations and inspections to the canal were carried out; thus case is reopened
and continues to be in a process of evaluation.
11
Negotiating water rights
Water rights are assumed to take an increasingly important place in negotiations
between peasant water users associations and Yanacocha mining company. These
negotiations take place after Yanacocha recognizes its impacts over water sources or
flows, which occurred when Yanacocha impacted peasant canals by reducing or
disappearing water flows that fed rivers, creeks and those canals. These impacts could
be produced during mining exploration, exploitation, or when there are mining
expansion plans. For instance, the water sources are impacted during the dewatering
process ; then the idea is to provide water to those canals as a mitigation strategy.
Negotiations about water and water rights constitute a common practice and it was -and
still is- actively carried out by Yanacocha and its neighboring communities. There are
three well-known cases of negotiations with the peasant canals: Tual, Quishuar-Corral
and the Encajón-Collotán canals. These cases are considered by the company as one of
its achievements and good examples of dealing with impacts on natural resources and
communities (Yanacocha, 2008).
The mine negotiates with the water users associations and offers them to supply water
from its water treatment plant and reservoir. In this sense, Yanacocha collects the
residual water from mining operations, treats it and after that, diverts it to the San Jose
reservoir. This reservoir was constructed by Yanacocha -25 US million dollars
investment-; it was an old open pit and currently stores up to 6Mm3 of water. To
complete the process, and as part of the negotiation, treated water is pumped by the
company to supply water to creeks and communal canals. However it is important to
mention that this water can be used only for irrigation purposes 8 and not for drinking
water purposes. By pumping water, Yanacocha replaces then the water sources and
flows that were affected. To conclude the negotiations, the farmers resign to their
acquired or former water rights given by the State over those affected sources and then
apply for new water rights. In the new application the farmers have to indicate that they
are aware of and willing to receive treated water from the San Jose Reservoir. Hence,
the process continues and the former communities’ water rights returned to the State
8
The water quality after treatment corresponds to type III, that according to the previous Water Law
17752 it is strictly for irrigation purposes not for animal or human consumption (Water law, 1969).
12
administration and Yanacocha is then able to apply and get them, thus ensuring the
continuity of its operations without troubles with neighboring canals.
These negotiations often involve as well economical payments to every peasant water
user association with whom Yanacocha has agreements.
Below there is a statement of the administrative resolution enacted by director of the
Cajamarca Water Authority on the 2009 acknowledging the negotiation process and
agreements 9 between the Quishuar-Corral canal and Yanacocha.
…Yanacocha, a private mining company that develops exploration and
exploitation activities in the Quinua Project [mining site], between 2000 and
2002 and since that time there is not water flow of about 56 L/sec in the
irrigation canal Quishuar that used to come from the Tuyo and Derrumbe
creeks. … Now water flows from these creeks are captured by Yanacocha,
constitute part of its mining operations and later pass to its acid water treatment
plant (AWTP) of La Quinua to finally be storage on the San José reservoir”.
Because of the impacts on those 56 L/sec to the Quishuar canal and with the
purpose to guarantee water provision to the mentioned canal Yanacocha
constructed the San José reservoir to storage water and then provide it in a
controlled basis during drought seasons”.
The peasant canal Quishuar-Corral was constructed by the users on 1953 using the
water sources of the Tuyo and Derrumbe creeks; these are the sources affected by the
mine. The canal is 12 Km., it has a capacity of about 90 L/sec, it irrigates agricultural
fields of about 30 peasant families and water is mainly used for irrigating pastures.
Since its construction, the canal was managed by a water user association, which was
responsible for its operation and maintenance, as well as, for getting the official
recognition or water rights/concessions from the Local Water Authorities. The water
distribution was done in turns and according to their own schedules and receipts (hours
of water per day). According to their customs, the cleaning of the canal was done
yearly, every 1st of June in a collective work or minga; very early in the morning, about
4.00, all the beneficiaries of the canal walked until the main intake with their tools to
work and clean the canal. The journeys were accompanied by community musicians to
encourage the work.
9
004-2009-ANA-ALA-C (2009), Community Assembly Act. Nov. 2008 and interviews with leaders of
the Quishuar-Corral water user association.
13
According to the users and their advisors, the collective work is not done anymore.
“Since 2002 and because of mining impacts such as increased solid sedimentation,
spillage of mining effluents and/or industrial waste into canals and creeks, decreasing of
water flows during dewatering operations, acid water spill on farmers’ plots and mining
expansion plans beyond permitted areas, there is a permanent monitoring of the canal’s
main intake located at Yanacocha’s property. The monitoring is done by the farmers in
groups, 18 farmers per group and by turns of 15 days. The work is paid by Yanacocha,
in this way: from 2002 to 2008 the payments were arranged by agreements between the
farmers and Yanacocha and from 2009 until 2018 (closing phase of the mine) payments
are managed by a trust fund. Every farmer receive a daily payment of 30.00 PEN 10.
The president -in turn- of the water user association processed the expiration of the
former water rights or water use license given by the State to the canal on 2004 for
agriculture purposes. At the same time the president initiated the application for a new
water license for agriculture purposes as well, but now, from water dischargers from the
San José reservoir. The yearly maximum amount of water to provide by Yanacocha to
this canal would be 1’357 000m3… Then the resolution from the water authority
concludes stating that “…Therefore this canal will conduct 56 L/sec of treated waterand 29 L/sec from natural sources, rounding up to 85 L/sec to benefit to 203 water
users, mainly agriculture families…”. About water quality flowing into the canal, the
farmers said that “Water sources and flows were natural before, and we were drinking
that water and using it for irrigation as well as, for our animals. There was not idea
about environmental pollution and water was consumed without any fear 11”.
In the following paragraph, there is the statement from another peasant canal association
that was engaged on negotiations for water with Yanacocha; in this case the farmers
agreed to resign their water rights over water flows and over part of their canal
infrastructure.
“The water users from Encajón-Collotán canal 12 agreed to renew our previous
request about the nullity of our water rights issued by the Cajamarca ATDR on
2004. The permit gave us the right to use 63.28L/s for agriculture and livestock
production, benefiting 70 farmers’ families…”. “…Currently our water user
association does not use this given water flow. On the contrary it is convenient
for us to use water from the San José reservoir owned by Yanacocha mining
10
Peruvian currency, 1PEN equal to 0.35US dollars.
Quishuar-Corral water users association - Personal communication
12
Community assembly, 2008
11
14
company which is supplied by treated water from the mining operations of La
Quinua, Carachugo, Maqui Maqui and Yanacocha mining sites. The agreement
with this company is to receive 42 L/sec from its reservoir into our canal
(maximum yearly water discharge of 946000m3) and 21.28 L/sec from the other
natural springs”. We also “ask for the closing of the aqueduct of our canal and
its right of way (700m) and we give the permission to Yanacocha to use this part
of the canal and land for the its own purposes with the condition of receiving
water from San José”.
Then by signing this type of agreements and with acknowledge and authorization from
the state, Yanacocha becomes the water provider for those canals. The company is
responsible for releasing water permanently specially during dry season from April to
September. The Water authority is aware of this situation however there is little
evidence to refer that permanently the state controls or corroborates that the water flows
are released in the amount that it was established. The fact that water control and
management move from state administration and community organizations to private
owners, in this case the largest gold mining company, provides insights about
accumulation and monopolization of water management and governance. Then the
private user gains more presence and control over water-related decisions.
CONCLUSIONS
Control over natural resources like water and land allow to any users to ensure their
productive activities. In this example, water access, control and management done by
mining companies like Yanacocha, make its mining operations possible and ensure
them in a sustained way. These issues explain why it is so relevant for the company to
develop strategies to access to the resources but mainly to control them.
Water access and rights from Yanacocha’s neighboring communities are restricted once
mining operations started, and thus, peasant livelihoods were negatively affected. This
provoked several conflict situations between the farmers and the mine. Conflicts that
could take several years, as the first case presented in this paper, where peasant
communities struggle to get their water back; but also, conflicts that could be addressed
by negotiation strategies. That is the second case presented, where affected communities
negotiated with the company to receive, as a compensation, both, treated water from the
mine operations to complement their water needs and economical payments.
15
These type of negotiation processes reinforce notions of commodification of natural
resources, particularly water, as well as water rights and water control. Therefore, in
rural areas where Yanacocha mining company operates, it becomes the water source
and the water provider on which peasant communities and their livelihoods activities
rely.
In this sense, the presented cases, their developments and specific features, give us
arguments to state that the establishment of large mining operations in an area -like
Cajamarca- goes accompanied with a thorough re-structuring of how land and water are
controlled and managed. It provokes reactions, like local resistance and implies the
irreversible erosion of existing livelihoods and production systems - and indeed- of
communities territories, cultures and identities.
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