The Theory of Mind Atlas
Tiffany L. Hutchins & Patricia A. Prelock © 2016
All entries in the Theory of Mind Atlas (ToMA) were developed for use with the Theory of Mind Inventory-2 (ToMI-2) for the
purposes of explaining theory of mind in the conduct of research and clinical practice. This document may be downloaded,
adapted, and shared for professional purposes provided that the names and copyright appearing in this header are retained.
Item 16: My child understands that when someone
is thinking about a cookie, they cannot actually
smell, eat, or share that cookie.
Subscale(s): Basic
.
This item is intended to tap the understanding of the mental-physical distinction which involves
the ability to distinguish the mental world from the physical world. The mental-physical distinction can
manifest in several ways with most tests designed to assess intuitive notions of how the two realms
differ (Wellman, 1985). For example, prototypical physical entities (e.g., rocks, trees, animals, people)
are physical objects that can be seen and touched. They cannot be “walked through, wished-away, or
occupy the exact same space as another real object. In contrast, a mental image or a thought about an
object fail this criterion” (Wellman & Estes, 1986, p. 912)
Contrary to early (i.e., Piagetian) conceptions of children as egocentric and moored in animism
(the tendency to attribute psychological causes to physical phenomena) and realism (the tendency to
attribute real physical properties to mental phenomena), research suggests that young children are
adept in the fundamentals of the mental-physical distinction (Estes, 1994; Wellman & Estes, 1986;
Pillow, 1988). For example, Wellman and Estes (1986) showed that 3.5-year-olds distinguish real and
physical objects from their mental and subjective counterparts and that they do so “on the basis of
eminently reasonable criteria. They argue differently and appropriately about mental entities and real
objects in their explanations, accurately sort objects that differ on mental-real criteria into real and not
real classes, and often spontaneously invoke such a classification in their talk about the ontological
status of entities” (p. 920). Although 3.5-year-old children appear to have a remarkable insight into the
mental-physical distinction, their understandings are incomplete and advances in this area continue to
consolidate in the preschool years (Wellman & Estes, 1986). Examples of these advances include the
understanding that the mind itself is representational (Perner, 1991) and the broader notion of beliefs in
general (Estes, 1994). Nevertheless, children’s precociousness with the mental-physical distinction may
be the cornerstone that initially paves the way for the understanding of the appearance-reality
distinction (see description of item 11), counterfactual reasoning (see description of item 29), futurethinking (see description of item 57) and more sophisticated forms of introspection (Baron-Cohen, 2000;
1989; Estes, 1994). As Estes (1994) argued:
“the distinction between the mind and external reality is woven into the very fabric of our lives.
We know, for example, that we can think about doing something, can plan some course of
action, but that even an elaborate plan can remain solely in the mind and never be carried out.
We also know that our fantasies, no matter how vivid, are not real in the way that external
objects of events are real. When we think longingly about something, for example, a cold glass
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of water when we are thirsty, we know that we cannot really see it, or touch it, or share it with
someone else” (p. 530).
Understanding the Mental-Physical Distinction in ASD
Limited research has been conducted to specifically examine the mental-physical distinction in
ASD. The first study on this topic was carried out by Baron-Cohen (1989). He found that whereas
typically developing children and children with intellectual disability had no trouble distinguishing
mental and physical phenomena, children with ASD performed poorly on the tasks and failure was not
due to difficulties in narrative recall or a lack of understanding of the lexical terms that were used in the
stories and test questions. Baron-Cohen (1989) concluded (in rather strong terms), that children with
ASD “treat mental phenomena as no different than physical ones. It may be that the physical level of
understanding is the only one available to them, leading them to force all phenomena into it” (p. 587).
In a partial replication, Ozonoff, Pennington, and Rogers (1991) found that individuals with highfunctioning ASD also performed poorly on tests of the mental-physical distinction relative to typically
developing controls but the ASD group also performed less-well on memory control questions. It is also
noteworthy that in these two studies, researchers were interested in between-group differences and
there were individual differences within groups such that not all of the children with ASD failed tests of
the mental-physical distinction. Taken together, the findings suggest that: 1) for some with ASD, there is
no deficit in the understanding of the mental-physical distinction as assessed via traditional methods, 2)
for others, there is a conceptual deficit that is independent of intellectual ability and, 3) for others still,
understanding of the mental-physical distinction is related to more general factors such as IQ and
executive functioning.
Understanding the Mental-Physical Distinction in ADHD
We are not aware of peer-reviewed literature examining the mental-physical distinction in
children with ADHD. To report literature in this area, please contact the authors at
[email protected].
Understanding the Mental-Physical Distinction in DoHH
Although children who are DoHH are known to have difficulty in social cognition more broadly,
we are aware of only one study examining their comprehension of the mental-physical distinction.
Analyses of caregiver report (i.e., Theory of Mind Inventory) data from a small sample of DoHH children
with corrected hearing loss revealed deficits in the understanding of the mental-physical distinction in
approximately 41% of children (i.e., 5/12 children; Hutchins, Allen, & Schefer, in preparation). These
difficulties appeared to be related to limited access to language in the prelinguistic and toddler years.
REFERENCES
Baron-Cohen, S. (2000). Theory of mind and autism: A review. Special Issue of the International Review
of Mental Retardation, 23, 169-184.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1989). Are autistic children ‘behaviorists?’ An examination of their mental-physical and
appearance-reality distinctions. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disabilities, 19(4), 579600.
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Estes, D. (1994). Young children’s understanding of the mind: Imagery, introspection, and some
implications. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 15, 529-548.
Hutchins, T., Allen, L., & Schefer, M. (in preparation). Scope and variability of theory of mind impairment
in oral and late-signing children with hearing loss.
Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B., & Rogers, A. (1991). Executive function deficits in high-functioning autistic
individuals: Relationship to theory of mind. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32(7),
1081-1105.
Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pillow, B. (1988). The development of children’s beliefs about the mental world. Merrill-Palmer
Quarterly, 34(1), 1-32.
Wellman, H. (1985). The origins of metacognition. In D. L. Forrest-Pressley, G. E., MacKinon, & T. G.
Waller (Eds.), Metacognition, cognition and human performance (pp. 1-31). New York: Academic
Press.
Wellman, H., & Estes, D. (1986). Early understanding of mental entities: A reexamination of childhood
realism. Child Development, 57, 910-923.
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