Former MI chief: U.S. must choose the 'best worst'
option in Syria
Amos Yadlin’s analysis of U.S. military options in response to
alleged chemical attacks in Syria suggests there’s no quick fix to
removing Bashar Assad or stopping the bloodshed.
By Gili Cohen | Aug. 29, 2013 | 2:38 PM
Former Military Intelligence head Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin says there is currently no
military option available to the United States that would bring an immediate end to the
bloodshed occurring in Syria and force the ouster of President Bashar Assad.
In a paper published by Yadlin and Avner Golov for the Institute for National Security
Studies (of which Yadlin is the director), the two wrote that none of the present options including continued American restraint - are optimal options, and may even be bad. They
claim there is no military option that could quickly remove Assad from power or
guarantee a moderate democratic government for the country.
"In light of the understanding that inaction is the worst strategy, immoral, and harms
American interests, there is a need to examine what is 'the best worst strategy,'" they
explained.
Yadlin was also the former deputy head of the Israel Air Force and the Israel Defense
Forces' military attache in Washington. Golov is a researcher at INSS.
The authors describe the concerns facing the United States before taking military action.
First, intervention in the Syrian civil war is opposed to American aspirations to put an
end to the wars of the last decade in the Middle East. In addition, such actions would
increase the fears of another war in a Muslim country, similar to others the Americans
have fought in recent years in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yadlin and Golov say the main
concern is that an American military operation would bring with it "unexpected
consequences" that would expand the extent of the military operation in Syria and its
duration. For example, such an operation against Assad could help strengthen the jihadist
organizations fighting the regime.
"Military intervention could possibly bring Washington into direct confrontation with
Moscow, and could also provoke a response from Assad's Iranian patron, and open a new
front against Iran and Hezbollah, which is already involved in the fighting in Syria," they
noted. The authors are of the opinion that Iran and Hezbollah are not interested in an
escalation of the situation, but in containing it and preserving the momentum Assad
gained after his army’s victory at Al-Qusayr last June.
There are six practical possibilities available to the Americans, Yadlin and Golov believe.
One does not include a military attack but simply the continued training and supplying of
the rebels. The former head of MI says such a strategy would have been appropriate for
the conditions that existed up to a few months ago, before the American declaration that
the Assad regime used chemical weapons in its own country, and therefore "it does not
provide an appropriate response at this point."
They also propose a number of limited military options. One is a pinpoint "punishment"
attack, such as an aerial or cruise missile attack against the units that took part in the
chemical attack; or an attack against military targets and government assets. Yadlin and
Golov call this "a local act of punishment, which does not change the situation in Syria in
a significant fashion." This could prevent broader use of chemical warfare, but there is
great doubt as to whether it would influence Assad's considerations regarding the
ongoing massacre of his own people.
Another possibility is declaring a No-Fly Zone, which could seriously compromise
Assad's battle plans, the authors state. If a "No Movement" zone was added to the plan making certain areas off bounds to all movement of tank and artillery forces - this could,
possibly, significantly decrease the harm to civilians. However, the authors note setting
up such restricted zones would require long-term intervention, and that would mean
significant financial resources.
If the United Sates were to cooperate in the use of allied forces in such a scenario, this
could significantly reduce the major disadvantage of such a scenario.
Another possibility is to declare the areas near the Syrian borders with Jordan and Turkey
as demilitarized zones and to establish a "humanitarian corridor" in the area. This would
allow Jordanian and Turkish troops to protect the areas along their borders.
The United States could also conduct a longer aerial operation that could include a
number of attacks on Assad's forces - on air, land and sea. These forces currently enable
Assad to maintain his fight against the rebels, but the authors warn that this could cause
the Americans to be sucked into the civil war itself.
Another possibility - possibly the most extreme, but the most effective in eliminating the
use of chemical weapons, the authors state - is to take physical control of the regime's
chemical weapons stores. This would require the use of special forces and having them
operate on the ground in Syria "until all the chemical materials were destroyed."
However, Yadlin and Golov note, even this option doesn’t eliminate the danger of the
transfer of chemical weapons to other groups, and it is not clear how the United States
would respond in the event of additional use of chemical weapons.
The authors say the analysis of the relevant options available to U.S. President Barack
Obama suggests a strategy requiring gradual but direct American intervention. Such a
strategy would "change the rules of the game in Syria," in addition to punishing and
deterring Assad from additional use of chemical weapons.
The United States should also base its military operation on the broadest possible
framework, the authors believe - whether through the UN Security Council or, if that isn’t
forthcoming, within the framework of cooperation with its allies in the region, including
countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Israel. Yadlin and Golov even
say there is the possibility of including Egypt in such actions in order to improve
relations.
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