Political Theory, Political Theology, or Political Metaphysics?
And How to Supersede It?
Summary: Here, I first give a brief account of the different approaches about the relations between
the religious & secular, or theological & political. I briefly explain political liberalism’s, political
metaphysics’ and political theologies approaches to the issue. Then I continue with three ways of
dealing with this problem which in my view are avoiding, reproducing or superseding. Although
agreeing with the aim of superseding, I try to show the problems that I find in these methods, and
also suggest how superseding can be achieved through a moral justification process. Then I continue
with certain possible criticisms and objections that can be raised about such an idea, and I try to
respond to such criticisms. Finally, I make very a short entry to Iqbal’s renewed God and his
political theory.
Introduction
The questions of whether metaphysics/theology and political theory are related, and if so how, are
being debated within contemporary political theory for some time now. Roughly two main groups
can be identified within this debate.
On one hand, there are scholars, such as Richard Rorty, Mark Lilla, John Rawls, who argue that in
our contemporary pluralist democratic societies, political theory needs to be, and can be,
independent of metaphysical or theological backgrounds. Rorty, for instance, criticizes the attempts
to provide metaphysical foundations for liberal democracy. In doing this, he tries to develop “a kind
of postmodern utopia, a society whose members have given up the search for a unifying theory of
human nature, and are content to treat the demands of self-creation and of human solidarity as
equally valid, yet forever incommensurable.”1 In a similar way, Mark Lilla praises the separation of
politics and religion which he claims to have taken place in the West during the 17th century by an
intellectual revolution when political theology was separated from its theological roots by Thomas
Hobbes in a process which Lilla names as The Great Separation. For him, Hobbes was able to change
the subject “by demonstrating that it was possible to establish the legitimacy of a state’s authority
over its citizens without making any appeal to a divinely revealed nexus of God, man, and world. He
showed how to replace political theology with a humanistic political anthropology.”2 Furthermore,
Lilla argues that the principles of contemporary liberal democracies in the West depend crucially on
this Great Separation, and this critique of political theology, and therefore this separation needs to
be maintained if a return to an apocalyptic politics, such as that of Nazism, or the wars of religion is
not desired. John Rawls was one of the most prominent political theorists within the contemporary
liberal tradition who also tried to contribute to the intellectual separation of politics and religion, and
O’Shea, Michael, “Interview with Richard Rorty: Toward a Post-Metaphysical Culture”, The Harvard Review of
Philosophy, Spring, 1995.
2 Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West, Vintage Books, 2007, New York, p. 313.
1
1 developed his version of political liberalism upon a certain conception of justice, that is justice as
fairness, which for him was political, and not metaphysical. This is so, he argues, because his
conception of justice avoids claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and
identity of persons in his theory.3
On the other hand, there are other scholars who claim that there is no political theory that is
independent of some sort of theological or metaphysical4 foundations. Within this group, one can
also distinguish between two different positions. Some scholars approach the issue from a
metaphysical point of view, and argue that all political theories are actually some kind of
metaphysics.5 For instance, Ian Adams, writing in response to Rawls, claims that metaphysics is not
merely a foundational element in many normative theories, but actually an essential and pervasive
element for all such theories. In that regard, normative theory, for Adams, can only be properly
understood as a form of metaphysics.6 He further argues that “since politics necessarily involves a
normative or ideological dimension, political metaphysics must be a necessary part of political life.”7
In a similar way, Kristen Deede Johnson argues that “every theory relies upon an ontology that is
held as a matter of faith, either implicitly or explicitly invoking deep beliefs about the nature of
reality and human being. Political liberalism is undergirded by an ontology that prioritizes the
universal over the particular, post-Nietzschean political theory and radical democracy by an ontology
that celebrates diversity at the cost of unity.”8
The second position is that of the scholars who approach the issue from a theological point of view,
and writing under the label of political theology. In this group, there are various scholars9, who
Rawls, John, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer, 1985),
pp. 223-251.
4 In this paper, I use metaphysics in line with Ian Adams’ usage: “What then is metaphysics? [...] Metaphysics is simply
that which is beyond physics. In other words, factual claims about the nature of reality that cannot in principle be
investigated or tested by physical science. Remote from our experience as this may sound, metaphysics does in fact
touch us closely. Metaphysical assumptions frame our everyday thinking, while the way we live our lives is colored by a
variety of metaphysical beliefs from the existence of god to the nature of the self. The archetypical form of metaphysical
belief is religion. Here life is encompassed by some notion of the divine, usually divine beings, gods or god, often
benign, although not necessarily so. Such beliefs have, of course, profoundly shaped the normative political tradition.”,
Adams, Ian, “The inevitability of Political Metaphysics”, Journal of Political Ideologies, 4:3, 1999, pp. 269-270.
5 See: Armstrong, A.C., “Philosophy and Political Theory”, The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol.
16, No. 16 (July 31, 1919), p. 424.; White, Stephen K., Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political
Theory, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).; Naticchia, Chris, “Justice as Fairness: Epistemological, Not
Political”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1999) Vol. XXYVII, pp. 597-611.; Steinberger, Peter J., “The
Impossibility of a Political Conception”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1, February 2000, pp. 147-165.; Neal,
Patrick, “Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?”, Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 24-50.
6 Ibid., pp. 269-288.
7 Ibid., p. 269.
8 Johnson, Kristen Deede, Theology, Political Theory, and Pluralism: Beyond Tolerance and Difference, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge – 2007, p. 251.
9 Espejo, Paulina Ochoa, “On Political Theology and the Possibility of Superseding It”, Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy, 2010, 13:4, pp. 475-494.; Johnson, Kristen Deede, Theology, Political
Theory, and Pluralism, 2007, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.; Crockett, Clayton, Radical Political Theology: Religion
and Politics After Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 2011, New York.; Critchley Simon, The Faith of the Faithless:
Experiments in Political Theology, Verso Publications, 2012, London.; Losonczi, Peter, (ed.), From Political Theory to Political
Theology: Religious Challenge and the Prospects of Democracy, Continuum Books, 2010, New York.; De Vries, Hent, (ed.),
3
2 receive their inspiration from Carl Schmitt, who is considered to be the father of political theology,
and who famously argued that:
“All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological
concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were transferred
from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent god
became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because of their systematic structure, the
recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts. The
exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only by being aware of
this analogy can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas of the state
developed in the last centuries.”10
In short, according to the thesis of political theology, all political activities and institutions
necessarily depend on theological assumptions, or at least on assumptions that are functionally
equivalent to theology.11
In recent years the relation between religion and politics has come to the foreground of public and
academic attention, and the relations between the two (theology/metaphysics and politics) became
problematic mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, the increasing criticisms against secularization thesis,
and the so-called return of religion to the public sphere made this connection problematic. Efforts
to separate politics from institutionalized religion were developed in the late 18th century when new
regimes were founded in America and France, and these efforts were inspired by earlier political
theorists who had argued that religion must either be subordinated to the sovereign, or confined to a
private sphere. However, recently this separation has been called into question, “in part because of a
growing sentiment in some sections of the secular population that religious beliefs have no place in
political life; but also because ardent religious groups both inside and outside Western societies have
demanded that their religious views should play an important role in, or even dominate, political
life.”12 Secondly, the changing demographics of Western liberal democracies, increasing diversity of
these societies with respect to religion, which makes the issue of peaceful coexistence among
different religious and secular groups more pressing, can be considered as another factor.
The connection of these developments with theory can be made as follows: Firstly, although being
criticized from all corners of political theory, political liberalism is still the dominant political
ideology/theory in contemporary Western democracies. Secondly, Rawls suggests that the kind of
Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, Fordham University Press, 2006, New York.; Davis, Creston (ed.),
Theology and the Political: The New Debate, Duke University Press, London, 2005.; Philips, Elizabeth, Political Theology: A
Guide for the Perplexed, T&T Clark International, London, 2012.
10 Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, George D. Schwab, trans. (MIT Press,
University of Chicago Press, 1985).
11 Espejo, Paulina Ochoa, “On Political Theology and the Possibility of Superseding It”, Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy, 2010, 13:4, p. 477.
12 Michael Allen Gillespie & Lucas Perkins, “Political Anti-Theology”, Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and
Society, 2010, Vol. 22 No. 1, p. 66.
3 conception of justice, political liberal conception of justice, that is prevalent today in modern
democratic regimes has its origins in the Wars of Religion following the Reformation and the
subsequent development of the principle of toleration, and in the growth of constitutional
government and of large industrial market economies. This way, Rawls makes it clear that in his
understanding, there is a connection between the social, historical and cultural context and political
theory.13 This means that if this particular context goes through significant transformations, then it is
reasonable that Rawls would also expect a change on the political theory level. Thirdly, Rawls and
other liberals continue to argue that it is still possible to develop a theory that is solely political and
without any metaphysical/theological backgrounds or assumptions. These are two very important
points for Rawls’ theory, and if these two points have become problematic today due to the
criticisms regarding the separation of politics and religion and also due to the changing social and
cultural context in liberal democracies, then it can be said that Rawls’ theory became problematic as
well.
As Espejo also clearly shows:
“These debates all assume that there is or ought to be a neutral political background which
maintains a fundamental distance from religion within a state. For this reason, they can
frame religion as a form of political identity. However, we can only presuppose such a
neutral political background if the borders between the religious and the secular realms are
settled and stable. For without settled borders we cannot frame religion in terms of secular
politics. But what if these borders are unstable? The striking analogies between religious
arguments and secular legitimizations of the state suggest that they are less stable than these
debates assume, because the two kinds of arguments share features that overstep established
borders. So, unless we clarify the origin of the analogies we are not entitled to all the
assumptions of the main debates regarding religion and politics in political science.”14
How to Deal with This Problem? Avoiding, Reproducing or Superseding?
Today, one sees such debates both sociologically with respect to return of religion in the public
sphere and the blurring of the relations between politics and religion, and also theoretically with
respect to liberal political theorists’ unsatisfactory separation of the theological and the political.
However, when we look at how this problem is being dealt with in the literature, we see three
different approaches.
Firstly, we see the approach of political liberalism which is called as ‘the method of avoidance’ by
John Rawls. In trying to keep metaphysical background away from his conception of justice, Rawls
suggests that we should simply apply the principle of toleration to philosophy itself. In this way, he
Rawls, John, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring,
1987), p. 4.
14 Espejo, Paulina Ochoa, “On Political Theology and the Possibility of Superseding It”, Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy, 2010, 13:4, p. 476.
13
4 says, “we hope to avoid philosophy’s long-standing controversies, among them controversies about
the nature of truth and the status of values as expressed by realism and subjectivism.”15
However, whereas Rawls argues that his conception of justice is solely a political concept and
independent of metaphysical assumptions, many disagree with Rawls and argue that his theory is not
only political, but also metaphysical.16 In addition to such criticisms, there are also further difficulties
arising from following the method of avoidance. When we use the method of avoidance, then first
of all, we are giving up the idea of seriously dealing with the issue of the relations between theology
and politics. Instead of taking the question seriously and dealing with it in the same way, we decide
to ignore it. However, even if they are avoided, it does not mean that they disappear or lose their
significance. In his critique of Rawls, Habermas writes that:
“It belongs to the religious convictions of a good many religious people in our society that
they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental issues of justice on their religious
convictions. They do not view it as an option whether or not to do it. It is their conviction
that they ought to strive for wholeness, integrity, integration in their lives: that they ought to
allow the Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or
whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including, then, their social and political
existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than their social and
political existence’. Their religiously grounded concept of justice tells them what is politically
correct or incorrect, meaning that they are incapable of discerning ‘any ‘‘pull’’ from any
secular reasons’. If we accept this to my mind compelling objection, then the liberal state,
which expressly protects such forms of life in terms of a basic right, cannot at the same time
expect of all citizens that they also justify their political statements independently of their
religious convictions or world views.”17
Secondly, there is the first approach of political theology in which we see a tendency to try to
reproduce the theology and politics connection. Gillespie, for instance, argues that as opposed to
what Lilla says, political theology may not necessarily lead to apocalyptic politics, and that there can
be certain political theologies which can sustain a peaceful coexistence among different religious,
political, metaphysical truth claims.18 Furthermore, Gillespie argues that liberalism is also a kind of
political theology, and suggests that liberalism is much better served if it recognizes its roots in
theology. Finally, he claims that politics and religion have been so strongly and fundamentally
Rawls, John, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring,
1987), p. 13.
16
Adams, Ian, “The inevitability of Political Metaphysics”, Journal of Political Ideologies, 4:3, 1999, pp. 269-270.;
Naticchia, Chris, “Justice as Fairness: Epistemological, Not Political”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1999)
Vol. XXYVII, pp. 597-611.; Steinberger, Peter J., “The Impossibility of a Political Conception”, The Journal of
Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1, February 2000, pp. 147-165.; Neal, Patrick, “Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?”,
Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1990), pp. 24-50.
17 Habermas, Jurgen, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 14, No.1, 2006, p. 8.
18 Michael Allen Gillespie & Lucas Perkins, “Political Anti-Theology”, Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and
Society, 2010, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 65-84.
15
5 interwoven in the West, and therefore he says, if we were “to achieve the Great Separation that Lilla
longs for, we might find ourselves standing bewildered among countless loose strings on the cuttingroom floor.”19
Thirdly, Espejo’s suggestion can be mentioned. That is to say, instead of trying to avoid dealing with
political theology, or trying to reproduce it in newer forms, Espejo suggests that we can supersede
political theology. She writes: “According to Schmitt, all political activities and institutions
necessarily depend on theological assumptions, or at least on assumptions that are functionally
equivalent to theology. In contrast, this paper argues that in order to fully understand some political
concepts we need to remember their theological roots, but these theological assumptions are not a
necessary feature of politics. In a word, political theology can be superseded.”20
And how can this be done? Espejo accepts that there is a relation between theological arguments
and juridical/political arguments. However, she says, given that this relation “depends on an idea of
order among others, and not on essential features of politics, we can expect that it will change if the
dominant idea of order in the state changes. Currently, the dominant idea of order in the state relies
on the concept of sovereignty, so we can expect changes in the structural relation between theology
and the theory of the state if the influence of the concept of sovereignty wanes or changes.”21 That
is to say, if the idea of order in the state can be theorized without the concept of sovereignty, then
the links between theology and politics would be broken, Espejo argues, and thus political theology
would be superseded.
In a different article, Espejo pursues a similar approach and argues that, contrary to what Carl
Schmitt and some of his contemporary followers hold, political theology does not necessarily entail
decisionism, that is, a sovereign and uncontrolled political ruler in a similar way to omnipotent,
changeless and all-foreknowing God. She argues that the argument that “links political theology to
decisionism is invalid because it rests on a bad analogy between a particular conception of God, and
the source of authority in the modern secular state. Political theory may require a metaphysical
assumption to justify the state, but this assumption is not necessarily an omnipotent, changeless and
all-foreknowing God.”22 That is to say, omnipotent deciding sovereign is only one of many possible
metaphysical assumptions in theology, and if there can be a different perception of God, then there
could also be different kinds of sovereigns.
Although I agree with Espejo that political theology can be superseded, I disagree with her that a
change in the structural relation between theology and the theory of the state would take place, if the
Michael Allen Gillespie & Lucas Perkins, “Political Anti-Theology”, Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and
Society, 2010, Vol. 22 No. 1, p. 82.
20 Espejo, Paulina Ochoa, “On Political Theology and the Possibility of Superseding It”, Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy, 2010, 13:4, p. 476. 21 Espejo, Paulina Ochoa, “On Political Theology and the Possibility of Superseding It”, Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy, 2010, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 490.
22 Espejo, Paulina Ochoa, “Does Political Theology Entail Decisionism?”, Philosophy Social Criticism, 2012 Vol. 38,
No. 7, p. 727. 19
6 concept of sovereignty wanes or changes. As Lilla shows, there have been different views of the
divine, such as immanent, remote, or transcendent, through history that had been embraced by
diverse traditions of political theology.23 Although historically it might not be valid, theoretically it
would be possible to imagine a political theology without a sovereign as well. For instance, a political
society in which order is maintained without a sovereign, but through a kind of natural law/religion
that is found in the hearts of all citizens could be an example. And if this was possible, then it would
not be superseding political theology, but reproducing it in a different form.
So, then the condition we are in today can be described like this: if we today acknowledge that all
political theories are in one way or another linked to a certain metaphysics – thin, thick, weak or
comprehensive –, or structurally related with theology, then we should be looking for the possibility
of an agreement/consensus not only on the political level, but also on the metaphysical level. In my
view, political liberalism is presenting a strong response on the political level, but a weak one (or
none at all) on the metaphysical level. Whereas one strand in political theology simply tries to bring
theology back to the picture, others who try to supersede it may also fall into the trap of reproducing
it. My argument is that a strong response needs to be provided for the metaphysical level as well.
And this response should acknowledge the relations between theology/metaphysics and political
theory, but try to supersede it in a different way.
So, it has been argued that such metaphysical backgrounds exist and they influence, impact, “justify”
or prefigure (to use White’s term) political theories. However, I argue that not sufficient attention
has been given to the moral justificatory powers of these theological/metaphysical backgrounds
themselves. Therefore, I ask not whether metaphysics/theology is related with political theory or
not. Instead, I ask how these metaphysical/theological backgrounds are being perceived as morally
unacceptable by philosophers, and thus being questioned or transformed.But then how can this
superseding be achieved?
I argue that this superseding can be done in a different way. Instead of trying to break the links
between the two through epistemology, that is as a matter of truth, one can achieve this as a matter
of justice, as a moral agreement in the Rawlsian sense. That is to say, one does not need to try to
prove or disprove the relations between theology/metaphysics and political theory, but instead try to
show whether such backgrounds can morally be acceptable or not. In doing this, one does not only
analyze how metaphysics/theology is related with political theory, but also one asks whether or not
these metaphysical or theological premises or grounds can be seen as legitimate or just by
philosophers. In the end, when superseding is achieved, it does not mean that the
metaphysical/theological background disappears. But such backgrounds are shown very clearly and
strongly to be morally unacceptable, so that their power becomes very limited or none at all. In a
way, it becomes morally legitimate to deny the power of such metaphysical/theological backgrounds
on political theory because they are perceived us unjust.
23
Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West, Vintage Books, 2007, New York. 7 My argument is that metaphysical/theological backgrounds does not matter when/if taken in
isolation. All metaphysical backgrounds, this way or that way, justify a certain kind of political. And
all political conceptions of justice, or political theories are justified (even Nazism, fascism, socialism,
anarchism and political liberalism, etc.) by some metaphysical conceptions of justice. There is no
problem or mystery about that. The question then is that how does it become possible for one to
justifiably criticize his/her own metaphysical background, and how does it become morally
justifiable that he/she transforms this metaphysical background?
So, for me, justness/fairness is the criteria to judge/evaluate its legitimacy, and an attempt to
disconnect theology/metaphysics from political theory. In that respect, I am interested in the
question of how different philosophers problematize the legitimacy and justness of the existing or
traditional versions of their metaphysical backgrounds, and also the relationship of that metaphysics
with their traditional political theory (such as Iqbal in Islamic tradition, and Nietzsche in Western
tradition). I aim to analyze how Iqbal problematizes the legitimacy or justness of his
metaphysical/theological tradition. And in turn, how does he then problematize the legitimacy or
justness of the political theory of his tradition in the light of the justness or unjustness of his
traditional metaphysical background? And how he tries to deconstruct and reconstruct these again?
In doing this, I aim to shift the focus of the question from metaphysics/theology to morality
(justice), and ask such questions: What is the moral basis of questioning and challenging one’s
traditional/own metaphysical and political traditions? How can metaphysical/theological
backgrounds be legitimately or justifiably transformed? How can this transformation be morally
justified and supported – and that it does not become solely a matter of pragmatism, apologeticism,
or assimilation, or power struggle, or as a result of colonialism, oppression or suppression.
My argument is that this moral justification should be strong, not weak or based on avoidance. But
then, in which direction do I try to support this moral justification? Positive or negative? Or both?
Positive justification or negative justification? What do I mean by these? And how can this moral
justification be strong? And what do I mean by this? By this, I mean that the unjustness/unfairness
of these existing metaphysical backgrounds needs to be shown. This is, in my view, being interested
in metaphysics or theology, but in a negative way. And again this is, in my view, not an
epistemological or ontological justification or analysis – in which one tries to show how and in what
ways a certain metaphysical or theological background is related with a certain political theory by
grounding or justifying it – but a moral analysis and justification in which the moral legitimacy of
such backgrounds is being questioned. This is so because instead of taking the metaphysical
background granted or given, I try to analyze how they can be subject to moral criticism, challenge,
questioning and thus deconstruction, transformation and perhaps reconstruction. This way, I
believe, can be seen as an attempt to shift the focus of current studies from metaphysics to
morals/morality, etc.
8 How can this justification/grounding be provided? I suggest that this moral justification needs to be
provided on double grounds, that is, it needs to serve as a double justification. And from this, I
think follows two kinds of solutions: Positive Moral Justification and Negative Moral Justification.
In negative moral justification, you deny that justice exists, and therefore maintain that injustice is
the solid ground for everything. In that sense, the fact of injustice, the reality of injustice functions
as the solid ground upon which social life, politics, economics and everything can be built. This
negative moral argument need not/should not be in the sense that such connections do not exist
(like a matter of truth or whatever). It can argue that such connections exist or may exist, but they
are not necessarily just/fair/morally justifiable. This, I believe, can be found in Iqbal’s complaints
for injustices and unfairnesses he sees in the existing system (religion of Islam) he has. Here, one
might argue that my interpretation of Iqbal’s complaints to God is forced too much. Exoterically
read, the Shikwa (The Complaint) can be seen as a simple complaint against God for the social and
economical backwardness of the Muslims. However, in my view, Shikwa can also be seen as a sign
of a deeper dissatisfaction, a more profound disappointment with respect to God, to his promises
not only about social and economical welfare and such, but for deeper existential clarity, inner peace
and justice.
In the positive moral justification, you maintain that justice exists, but it is so difficult to maintain
this claim, and therefore you loosen the borders of your existing understanding of justice/fairness,
and try to include as many different peoples, values, ideas, etc., as possible. This is the solution that I
associate with Sufism, and in my view, Iqbal also finds a kind of relief in that ‘solution’.
In this way, you loosen or break the links between metaphysics/theology and political theory in a
relatively strong, decisive and compelling way because you provide a strong justification for the
political level by double grounding. This way, metaphysical/theological level of justice either
becomes a negative thing, that is, it effects nobody; or it becomes a positive thing, and in that
respect it effects everybody, and thus becomes ‘meaningless’ as a divisive criterion. In this way, one
feels more strongly convinced to shift his/her focus on the political level. If political theory is to be
‘secularized’, I think this could be a stronger, more compelling and a morally more acceptable way
than the method of avoidance.
Objections and Criticisms
There can be various objections and criticisms about this idea, but to begin with, one could argue
that by doing this, I would contribute to the already existing hegemony of political liberalism. For
instance, Kristin Deede Johnson argues that “Christians themselves have acquiesced to the
definitions and parameters provided to them by liberalism. By allowing themselves to be positioned
and trained by the language and practices of liberalism, they have lost the imaginative power to
picture other possibilities that are rooted in the language and practices of Christianity. What
9 theological resources might offer an alternative to the hegemonic control of “public” held by
political liberalism?”24
Here, I would definitely agree with Kristen Deede Johnson that other theologico-political
imaginations, such as those of Christians and others, were absorbed by the hegemonic language and
practices of political liberalism. But I do not agree that the way to escape the hegemony of political
liberalism is to try to develop other hegemonies. While I do not have a problem with Johnson or
others who are trying to find some inspiration from the old theological or secular resources to come
up with new alternatives to the hegemonic position of political liberalism, at the same time I believe
that we need to build something new and fresh – whether this is possible or not is a different
question. By simply borrowing certain theologico-political imaginations from the past, be it a secular
past, or a religious one, cannot help us establish a new and a common ground.
Furthermore, instead of contributing to the hegemony of political liberalism, this idea could even
weaken its foundations because in this way, political liberalism would also become a political theory
– or a version of political theology actually – with metaphysical premises. This in turn would end up
with political liberalism losing its privileged and so-called ‘neutral’ position among other political
theories. Once political liberalism also acknowledges that it has certain the theological/metaphysical
assumptions, then the same kind of moral justification criteria can be applied to the political
liberalism as well. That is to say, one could also discuss the moral legitimacy of political liberalism’s
metaphysical/theological assumptions. This in turn could make it possible for its metaphysical
premises to be openly discussed, challenged and criticized.
Secondly, such an approach could be criticized for being defensive and apologetic. That is to say, the
idea of criticizing one’s own metaphysical/theological sources and transforming them for the
possibility of a reaching a consensus or harmony between two things, such as religion and science,
Islam and democracy, revelation and reason, etc., can be seen as being apologetic. Although such
concerns are valid and important, I also think they hinder us from seeing certain deeper aspirations
behind such harmony or consensus-seeking attempts. That is to say, behind such harmony-seeking
projects, one could also find deeper concerns about finding more universal commonalities.
In addition, when examined in details, the issue of being apologetic becomes very problematic as
well. For instance, today an important political liberal, Andrew March, who is working in the field of
comparative political theory with a specific focus on Islamic political theory, is a strong critique of
being apologetic. He suggests that “comparative political theory does not need to be a purely
apologetic practice vis-à-vis non-Western traditions designed to demonstrate to fellow Westerners
that this or that non-Western tradition is more diverse and polyvalent than the crudest Western
polemics give us to understand.”25 He thinks that such discourses tend to “downplay the existence
24
25
Johnson, p. 257.
March, Andrew, "What is Comparative Political Theory?" The Review of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 4, Fall 2009, p. 558.
10 and seriousness of genuine moral disagreement and are ultimately no more sympathetic to nonWestern moral traditions if they involve the selective reading out of unsavory positions.”26
However, when we look at his book27 in which he tries to justify political liberalism to Muslims, it
would be possible to criticize him for being apologetic as well. What he tries to show in his book is
that political liberalism is a very unique political theory that can accommodate different religions,
specifically Islam and Muslims, and political theories in it – theories which have different
metaphysical backgrounds. He tries to show that people who have different comprehensive
doctrines (religious, metaphysical, philosophical or secular) might reach to an overlapping consensus
under the umbrella of political liberalism.
However, who’s to say that Andrew March or other liberals are not being apologetic today in the
light of changing conditions of religion? If we only reverse the question, and ask not whether Islam
is compatible with democracy or with liberalism, but if liberalism, political liberalism, or democracy
is compatible with Islam, then this time it is March or other liberals that become apologetic. Is
March not being apologetic when he tries to show that actually political liberalism is compatible with
Islam?
Furthermore, cannot the whole idea and goal of trying to find an overlapping consensus be seen as
an apologetic attempt/project? Why would anyone need, like the critics argue against March, to try
to find an overlapping consensus among peoples and groups who have different and perhaps
conflicting comprehensive doctrines? Is not Rawls taking a defensive strategy as well when he backs
from the comprehensive versions of liberalism due to increasing criticisms that those versions of
liberalism are still comprehensive doctrines with certain unsubstantiated metaphysical backgrounds?
Is Rawls not being apologetic and defensive when he backs up and tries to develop a thinner version
of liberalism to show that it can be compatible with democracy and the fact of pluralism – that is the
fact of plurality of metaphysical backgrounds in our contemporary democracies?
It could be argued that at certain points, one tries to find an overlapping consensus because one
wants to integrate/assimilate others into the political system. Then it means that he/she are
acknowledging the power dimension regarding being apologetic. So, Muslim thinkers were being
apologetic because their societies were relatively in a weaker situation in comparison to European
ones during the 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore with that psychological weakness, they were
being apologetic and defensive, and they were trying to prove that Islam was compatible democracy,
modern science, and sometimes liberalism. But if it is a matter of power, then one can argue that
what political liberals or Europe or the West is experiencing now is a threat from Islam – both
politically and philosophically. And being aware of the changes in the power equilibrium, or the
balance of power of the old era if you will, it can be argued that now they are taking a defensive and
apologetic stance and trying to show and prove that democracy and liberalism is compatible with
26
27
March, Andrew, "What is Comparative Political Theory?" The Review of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 4, Fall 2009, p. 558.
March, Andrew, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus, (Oxford University Press, 2009). 11 Islam. What Muslim thinkers were doing during the last two centuries is now being done by political
liberals and Europeans themselves.
Another thing which is important about being apologetic, I think, is who asks the question and how
the question is formulated. For instance, March asks in his book (his phd thesis actually) whether
political liberalism’s conception of citizenship is also compatible with Muslims or Islam, and this
does not become apologetic. And his main argument is that political liberalism’s conception of
citizenship is so ‘unique and superior’, and therefore it can incorporate Muslims and Islam into it as
well. However, if the question is formulated the other way around, such as whether Islam or
Muslims is compatible with political liberalism’s conception of citizenship, would that be apologetic
from Islam’s and Muslims’ point of view? However, in whichever way the question is formulated, it
is actually the same question, and therefore the very question itself brings the issue of being
apologetic.
Moreover, it is also important who asks the question. For instance, if a Western and political liberal
scholar, such as March, asks the question, does that make it not/less apologetic? What if a Muslim
scholar who is at the same time a devoted political liberal asks this question, that is, whether political
liberalism’s conception of citizenship is compatible with Islam and Muslims, then will that protect
him/her from being apologetic as well?
In short, the critiques about being defensive and apologetic seems to be a dead-end, if one does not
explicitly acknowledge the power struggle dimension inherent in it – and political liberals obviously
do not acknowledge that because they still think that such an agreement, an overlapping consensus
is possible despite the changes in the balance of power, that people would honor their agreements
even if they would become more powerful than the time the agreement were done. Actually, talking
about such power struggle issues which Rawls obviously does in his article, Overlapping Consensus,
shows that he also acknowledges the power struggle dimension in this process, but does it implicitly,
or thinks that it can be overcome. So, whatever the background is about being apologetic issue, it is
clear that it does not help anyone whoever uses it against the others. Therefore, I suggest that we
should try to go beyond that, and try to find other kinds of explanations when such reconciliation or
consensus-seeking attempts are being made by thinkers from different sides.
Last but not least, the authenticity issue can also be raised as an ethical question. It might be argued
that when you open the way for certain metaphysical/theological traditions to be criticized and
transformed, then you “destroy” that particular authentic metaphysical tradition. This would be one
ethical problem that needs to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, there is another
ethical problem which is, if you do not question the legitimacy/justness/fairness of those
metaphysical traditions, and just take them for granted or given, then one could also contribute to
the continuation of these injustices that are provided, maintained or supported by that metaphysical
tradition, such as environmental crisis, authoritarianism, economic underdevelopment, etc.
12 Iqbal’s God and Political Theory
What did Iqbal do when he deconstructed and reconstructed the onto-theological tradition he
received in Islam? He still spared some space for God, but in his new formulation, God became
both a more remote God. In a way, he was pushed to a certain space or level of existence, and was
deprived of his powers to intervene with earthly matters. And this creates implications on political
legitimacy as well, but then how does Iqbal deal with this problem? How does he try to provide a
new legitimacy for the political realm?
Analytical Part: In explaining this process in details, I argue that one needs to pay attention to the
tensions between onto-theology, epistemology and values (axiology). The interplay of these
determines the transformation of the metaphysical background, and thus the political theory of that
philosopher. I can make the analytical analysis of this change, of this transformation of the
metaphysical background as a process of interplay among knowledge, values and beings (God,
world, humans & Sovereign, realm, subjects) which are met in the process of comparison. So, that’s
what CPT is all about.
Normative Analysis: I can show how it becomes morally justifiable that such criticism and
transformation takes place through the concept of sense of justice and the connections I make
between sense of justice and theodicy. Do I also have a normative argument which claims that
grounding ought to be done in a double way?
In that sense, I argue that Iqbal’s criticism, deconstruction and reconstruction (transformation) of
his onto-theology (metaphysics) can better be explained as a morality matter rather than a purely
metaphysical (onto-theological and epistemological) one- What motivates Iqbal for such a
complaint, criticism and reconstruction, I argue, is the changes that take place in his sense of
justice.28 Why Iqbal retreats from an omnipotent God to a limited God residing in his own space, I
think, can be explained by the transformations in his sense of justice. Because an Omnipotent god,
together with the existence of evil and injustice, human with a free-will and responsibility, and god’s
right to judge this person and punish him/her if necessary do not fit neatly or successfully with each
other. This is the clear picture we could have if all these fitted with each other. So, what does Iqbal
do then? Firstly, God becomes a limited one. Secondly, good and evil becomes problematized, the
clear distinctions between them becomes blurred. God’s right to judge and punish become vague
whereas free-will of humans, with a right to commit sin and do wrong, is strengthened. By making
ijtihad accessible to individuals, Iqbal contributes to the relativization process of truth.
I read that Bourdieu has a concept of sociodicy which reminded me of theodicy. Maybe I should check that concept in
further details.
28
13 Picture A (The Old Picture)
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Omnipotent God
Deterministic/Fatalistic View of Life, History, Future, Time
A view of the World or Space (Nature)
The Subject, or Human with No Free-Will
Existence of Evil/Injustice and Clear Definition of Evil and Good
Theistic God?
Monarchy
Picture B (Iqbal’s Picture, The New Picture)
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Limited God
Non-Deterministic View of Life, History, Time
A Changed view of the World or Space (Nature)
The Subject, or Human with Free-Will
Blurred distinctions between Good and Evil
Panentheistic God
Republican/Democracy
14