Licensing Procedures for NPPs
and its Impact on Nuclear
Technology Transfer
- Korean Experience -
April 2007, Ho-Kee Kim
Page-0
Table of Contents
I.
Introduction
II. Regulatory Framework and Licensing
Procedures
III. Regulatory Development History
IV. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety and its
International Cooperation
V. Lessons Learned from History
VI. Conclusion
Page-1
I. Introduction
Page-2
 Nuclear safety

Risk level secured lower than social expectation, due to
nuclear utilization
 Safety regulation

Legal and government enforcement to reduce or maintain
the level of risk
 Characteristics of safety regulation



Technical knowledge based enforcement through the
process of licensing
- Responsible for the establishment of rules and
regulations, and authorization, review, inspection and
enforcement
International consensus on the role and mission
Regulatory leadership toward safety enhancement as a
worldwide topic
Page-3
 Licensing and nuclear technology transfer

Licensing expedites, inherently, to achieve technical
capability of applicant for safety and performance

Reactor technology of the existing designs is almost fully
developed and nuclear safety achievement is a global goal

International cooperation is an effective tool for regulatory
development
-
-
Various types of international cooperation are
implemented in the way of bilateral and multilateral
agreements, and through international organizations
Training and/or orientation, joint safety review,
design peer review, joint regulation development for
future reactors, etc.
 Regulation and its leading role are practically utilized
to secure nuclear technology in developing countries
Page-4
II. Regulatory Framework and
Licensing Procedures
Page-5
1. Framework of Nuclear Safety Regulation
 Regulatory body
MOST
 Regulatory enforcement
authority
NSC
 9 members and supported
by 5 sub-committees
 Decision-making on major
nuclear issues
KINS (Korea Institute of
Nuclear Safety)
 Quasi-government agency,
entirely dedicated to nuclear
safety regulation
President
Prime Minister
Ministry of Science & Technology
(MOST)
Atomic Energy Bureau
Nuclear Safety
Office
Resident
Inspectors
Office
Nuclear Safety
Commission
(NSC)
KINS
Page-6
 General working mechanism
NSC
MOST
Apply for
Permit or
License
Issue
Permit or
License
Submit
Technical
Evaluation
Results
Technical Discussion
& Inspection
Nuclear Industries
Request
Technical
Review
Correction of
Inspection Findings &
Improvement
KINS
Page-7
 Legal and regulatory policy system
Atomic
Energy Act
Legal
Enforcement
Decree of the Act
(Presidential Decree)
Enforcement Regulation of the
Act (Ministerial Ordinance)
Notice of the MOST
KINS Safety Review & Inspection
Guidelines over the entire safety regulation
Safety
Charter
Regulatory
Policy
Safety
Policy Statement
Comprehensive Program
for Safety Regulation
(5 year intervals)
Annual Policy Directives for
Safety Regulation
Implementation Plan of Annual
Policy Directives
Industrial Codes and Standards
(KEPIC, ASME, IEEE, ACI, etc.)
Page-8
2. Licensing procedure for NPPs
 Purpose of licensing

To ensure that all activities affecting safety of nuclear
power plant are planned and performed in accordance
with regulatory requirements

Covers design, manufacturing, construction, operation,
test, training, and emergency preparedness

Consequently, to protect employees, residents, and
surrounding environments against potential hazard
Page-9
 General sequence: review and inspection
Grant ESA
Early Site Review
Approval
(ESA)
Regulatory activities
Start foundation work
Applicant activities
Application
Construction
Permit (CP)
Issue CP
Review
Pre-Operational (PO) Inspection
Start construction
Application
Start-up test
Issue OL
Review
Operating
License (OL)
Application
PO Inspection
Load fuel
Commercial
Operation (CO)
Inspection in
18 M. intervals
Commence CO
Page-10
 Safety review for NPPs
Category
Construction
Construction
Permit
Licensing
review
Operation
Operating
License
Continued
operation after
design life
Approval of
standard design
Amendment of Permit or License
Approval of topical report
Other
safety
review
Implementation of Severe Accident Policy
Periodic Safety Review
Page-11
 Construction Permit (CP)



To ensure the adequacy of plant location and design, and
construction approaches in accordance with Rules and
Regulations, prior to the commencement of construction
Major application documents
 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), Quality
Assurance Program (QAP) for design and
construction, Environmental Report (ER), etc.
Early Site Approval (ESA)
- To allow the applicant to perform a limited civil
engineering work of site preparation and power
block excavation, before CP
 Application documents: Site Survey Report,
Detailed Geological Survey Report, etc.
Page-12
 Operating License (OL)

To confirm the final adequacy of plant design and
operational approaches

Performs safety review in the same manner as that for
CP, but with some additional reviews of the operating
capability and accident response ability of applicant

Major application documents


Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), QAP for
operation, Technical Specifications for Operation,
Radiological Emergency Plan, etc.
Nuclear fuel loading and commissioning tests upon the
issuance of OL
Page-13
 Continued operation after plant design life



Extension of plant operating period after the design life
Applied, as necessary, 2 to 5 years before the end of
design life for additional 10 years of operation
Periodic safety evaluation report, aging evaluation report
of major equipment, radiological environmental report, etc.
 Amendment of Permit or License


Modification of the contents of approved documents after
permit or license
Supplementary documents to verify the adequacy
 Approval of Standard Design


Prior authorization of a standard NPP design for the
repeated construction; effective for 10 years
Safety analysis report on the standard design, preparation
plan of emergency operating procedures
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 Approval of topical report


Avoidance of repetitive review on a specific technology
during licensing and enhancement of licensibility of the
technology
Detailed technical background on the application topic
 Implementation of Severe Accident Policy


Secure of severe accident prevention and/or mitigation
features, and enhancement of the capability to cope with
the severe accidents
Pre & final PSA results during CP & OL review periods,
respectively, and implementation of the Severe Accident
Management Program prior to the commercial operation
 Periodic Safety Review (PSR)


Comprehensive and systematic review for the safety of
each operating NPP in 10 year intervals after the OL
Physical conditions, safety analysis, equipment verification,
aged deterioration, safety performance, experience
feedback, operating procedures, etc.
Page-15
 Safety inspection for NPPs
Category
Construction
Operation
Type
Quality Assurance (QA) Inspection
Planned
Pre-operational
Inspection
Periodic
Inspection
Regular and
announced
Resident Inspection
Irregular and
unannounced
Reactive
Special Inspection
Page-16
 Quality Assurance inspection



To confirm the quality achievement of organizations involved
in the design, manufacturing, construction, and operation of
facilities
To verify the effectiveness of QA Program (QAP) and the
appropriateness of applicant’s QA activities
Performed in reference to the QAP approved by the
regulatory body, in a programmatic manner, annually
planned for each organization
 Pre-operational inspection


To confirm the adequacy of materials, components, systems
and structures, as well as construction related activities,
processes, procedures and personnel competence
Performed in compliance with safety assessment results
and Safety Analysis Reports, and in reference to the project
milestones
Page-17
 Periodic inspection

To ensure that the performance of reactor facility is
maintained in the state of the pre-operational inspection,
for re-criticality after plant overhaul

Performed during the plant outage period
 Resident inspection

To monitor daily construction and operation status, and
identify and respond to any activities adverse to nuclear
safety

Operate, both the MOST and KINS, resident inspection
office at each plant site
 Special inspection

Initiated in response to unexpected, unplanned or
unusual situation or event, as necessary
Page-18
III. Regulatory Development History
Page-19
1. History summary
1958
Initial
1980
- Formed basic regulation infrastructure
- Introduced the first 3 NPPs of proven technology per turnkey contract
- 1 step licensing by government per vendor country requirements
1989
Transitional
- Established current legal hierarchy and a subsidiary safety expert organization
- Constructed 6 more NPPs with non-turnkey project, and commenced NPP & fuel
localization
- Developed domestic regulatory requirements and cultivated regulatory staff
Present
Current
- Secured regulatory independence and competence with KINS & NSC,
- Achieved high level of safety and performance for 20 operating NPPs, including 8
OPR-1000 NPPs, and 6 NPPs (4 OPR-1000 & 2 APR-1400) are under construction
- KINS accumulated ample experience and commenced international contribution
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2. Changes of legal & organizational framework
 Initial stage from 1958 through 1980





Legislation of the Atomic Energy Act in 1958, and
establishment of the Office of Atomic Energy under the direct
control of the President in 1959
- To promote peaceful use and development of nuclear
energy
Incorporation into the Act the 1 step licensing and inspection
requirements for nuclear facilities in 1969
- Applied to Kori and Wolsong unit 1 plants
Adoption of the 2 step licensing processes and designation of
KAERI as the expert organization in 1978
TMI unit 2 accident in 1979
Formation of a basic regulatory infrastructure, and change of the
government direct regulation to the involvement of an expert
organization
Page-21
 Transitional stage from 1981 through 1989

Establishment of Nuclear Safety Center as the subsidiary
expert organization of KAERI in 1981, to be an independent
branch in 1987

Substantial amendment of the Rules & Regulations in 1982


Establishment of AEC, the current legal hierarchy of the
Act-Decrees-Regulations and licensing process for
nuclear facilities, and entrust of technical regulations to
the expert
Re-organization of the Rules and Regulations into the current legal
system, and establishment of a safety expert organization
Page-22
 Current stage from 1990 through present
 Foundation of Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) as
the regulatory agency by the special KINS Act in 1990
 Stipulation for the creation of comprehensive nuclear
promotion plan in 5 year intervals in 1994
 Establishment of Nuclear Safety Commission separating the
functions from the existing AEC, and nuclear R&D fund
utilizing levy on the NPP operator in 1996
 Adoption of the Periodic Safety Review in 10 year intervals
for operating plants, and the application of continued
operation after plant design life in 2001 and 2005,
respectively

Enhancement of regulatory independence, legislation of the
development of national nuclear utilization plan, and
strengthening of the safety for the operating NPPs
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3. Changes of nuclear safety regulations
 Initial stage from 1958 through 1980

Legal foundation of the fundamentals for the development
of nuclear energy and its safety control

Safety regulations together with promotion by the Office of
Atomic Energy of the government

Introduction of the first 3, Kori unit 1&2 PWR and Wolsong
unit 1 PHWR, NPPs

Safety achievement strategy of “the initial NPPs of the
proven technology” and turnkey projects
-

Vendors were responsible for schedule, inspection,
startup and performance of the plants
Safety evaluation by the Safety Review Committee with
the advisory support of the IAEA, in accordance with the
vendor countries’ regulatory requirements
Page-24
 Transitional stage from 1981 through 1989

Strengthening of legal foundation and establishment of a
regulatory expert organization, incorporating the enlarged
nuclear use and international movement emphasizing
safety after the TMI accident

Construction of six (6) more NPPs with non-turnkey
projects and multipurpose research reactor, and
commencement of NPP and fuel localization

NPP licensing by the government with the safety review
report by the expert

Launch forth developing domestic regulatory requirements
and guidelines, cultivating regulatory staff, dispatching
resident inspector, and establishing emergency
preparedness plan
Page-25
 Current stage from 1990 through present







Highly strengthening of independence and competence of
safety regulation with KINS and NSC establishments
Achievement of significant progress in developing
regulatory expertise and infrastructure, necessary in selfperformance of all the safety regulations
Construction of 17 additional NPPs
- 11 plants under operation and 6 plants under
construction
Accumulation of ample regulatory experience with 19 new
plants, including 2 KEDO plants for the DPRK in 2001
under the Agreement with KEDO
- 14 OPR-1000, 2 APR-1400, 3 PHWR plants
Achievement of high level of nuclear safety for a total of 20
operating NPPs
Commencement of international contributions, including
the orientation for 25 DPRK regulatory staff in 2002
Moving toward further deepening of regulatory capability
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III. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS)
and its International Cooperation
Page-27
1. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS)
 Established in February 1990


Quasi-government agency, independent and stand-alone,
by the special KINS Act
Mission of protecting the public health and environment
from potential radiation hazards
- Safety review and inspection, R&D for standards,
policy development, radiation protection, safety
information and licensing examination management
 Human resources


Approx. 400 staff members, and more than 80% has
Ph.D and Masters degree
Approx. 45 years old (average age), having ample
experience for nuclear safety regulation
 Regulatory agency having expertise and entirely
dedicated to nuclear safety regulation in Korea
Page-28
 Organization of KINS
President
Auditor
Policy
Development
Division
Planning
Division
Nuclear
Regulation
Division
Radioactive Waste
Safety Assessment
Division
Safety
Preparedness
Division
Regulatory
Research
Division
Radiation
Safety
Regulation
Division
Administration
Division
Technical Expert Pool
Page-29

Facilities of KINS
Headquarters
Emergency Center
R & D Center
Central Monitoring Station
Nuclear Safety School
Temporary Orphan
Source Storage
Page-30

Nuclear facilities subject to KINS regulation
Type
Facilities
Owner
Nuclear
power plants
20 units in operation and
6 units under construction
KHNP
Fuel fabrication facilities for NPPs
KNFC
Fuel cycle
facilities
Research
and training
reactors
Research facilities
for irradiated nuclear materials
Spent fuel processing facilities
for research
HANARO and related facilities
TRIGA Mark II, III (decommissioning)
AGN-201 for education
KyungHee Univ.
Facilities
using RIs
About 3,200 organizations
Medical, industrial
and academic fields
KAERI
Page-31
2. International cooperation and KINS
 International cooperation in safety regulation



Emphasized by international standards and society toward the
safety of facilities and activities
Expedited to establish bilateral or multilateral arrangements
with neighboring countries, others or intergovernmental
organizations
Utilized in fulfilling national obligations under international
conventions, information exchange, mutual assistance in
activities, staff training, and meetings
 New movements of cooperation

Expansion of the extent from unilateral technology transfer of
the past, to international policy making and joint works for
safety review and regulation development
- International Nuclear Regulators’ Association (INRA),
Western Europe Nuclear Regulators’ Association
(WENRA), Multilateral Design Evaluation Program
(MDEP) toward common standards for Gen. 4 reactor
Page-32
 KINS policy and implementation

Positive policy in mutual cooperation and contribution toward
global safety achievement

Cooperation with the IAEA and the OECD/NEA
- Participation in committees and meetings: IAEA CSS
and its subcommittees, OECD/NEA committees,
international conventions, SRMs, and MDEP

Cooperation with the regulatory organizations
- 15 Agreements or MOUs with organizations in 11
countries: CHINA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY,
INDONESIA, JAPAN, ROMANIA, SWEDEN, UK, US
and VIETNAM

Received 21 trainees from 7 countries and many visitors in
2006, and dispatched approx. 340 of 400 staff members to
participate in various international activities
Page-33
IV. Lessons Learned from the History
Page-34
 Nuclear development of Korea



Secured Korean OPR-1000 and its advanced APR-1400
NPP designs by stepwise approach of NPP construction
- Turnkey contract, non-turnkey project and design
localization

Nuclear development program of Korea was started at
the early stage of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in
the world

Consistent policy and implementation of the government
for development over a long period was essential

Currently, 4 OPR and 2 APR units are under construction,
and SMART, medium size reactor (660 Mwt), is under
development
Relatively short period of nuclear technology transfer for
developing countries is possible in consideration of technical
maturity of the existing designs and international competition
Government policy and public acceptance become major
factors, and favorable environment due to climate change and
instability of natural energy resources is created
Page-35
 Licensing development

Accumulated, gradually, regulatory capability in parallel to the
nuclear development program
-
From licensing of NPPs in reference to vendor country
requirements and practices, to the development of
inherent system and requirements

Secured, KINS, regulatory leadership in terms of safety
technology development and enlarges international contribution
toward global safety

Utilized, regulatory leadership, as the tool for nuclear technology
transfer for developing countries
-
International consensus toward nuclear safety, regulatory
cooperation environment and apparatus, and the nature of
nuclear licensing coupled with technology
Page-36
IV. Conclusion
Page-37
 Imperativeness of technical knowledge for licensing
of NPPs toward nuclear safety and plant performance,
for both applicant and regulator
 Positive function of regulatory leadership and
competence necessary for nuclear licensing, in
technology transfer
 Effectiveness and efficiency of the simultaneous and
parallel development of nuclear program and
regulation
 Utilization of international cooperation and its new
movements of regulatory policymaking and joint works
Page-38
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