Compare and Contrast Martin Heidegger`s concept of authenticity

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Compare and Contrast Martin Heidegger’s concept of authenticity and Being-towardsDeath with Erik Erikson’s Theory of Psycho-social Development and conclude who offers
the most positive view of later life.
This essay will focus on the work of the Existentialist Philosopher Martin Heidegger and the
developmental psychologist and psychoanalyst Erik Erikson, both of whom produced
influential works during the twentieth century. By comparing and contrasting their views
this essay will demonstrate how Martin Heidegger provides the most optimistic view of
adult later life. To answer the posed question this essay will begin by providing short
definitions of Heideggerian terms, which may expanded on as necessary, as Heidegger is
wont to use several words for the same concept. Then follows a summary of Erikson’s
theory and Heidegger’s main thoughts; this will describe, in detail, the notion of Dasein;
how it is constituted and what modes of existing are available to it. The essay will then
discuss which mode of existence is most appropriate for Dasein and how this is achieved;
this will emphasise the importance of Dasein accepting death to enable a fulfilling existence.
Subsequently, the essay will examine Erikson’s life Stages; focussing on specific life Stages,
particularly Stage 8 which include the notion of ego integrity versus despair. Following this
detailed examination of the two authors’ work, a discussion will highlight the areas where
the two conceptions converge and diverge. Discussion of other relevant theories will
provide support s and when necessary. In conclusion, it will be decided which, if either,
provide the clearest views on the human lifespan and the reasons why.
Within this essay, the term ‘Being’ is capitalised to denote existence the actual practise of
living. Heidegger uses the word ontic to denote specific entities and ontological to denote
its way of being. Dasein is the manner in which humans execute Being (Heidegger, 1996,
§53); Dahlstrom (2013, p146) explains that Dasein is concerned with its own being and as
such can be considered as having a onti-ontological perquisite as the first entity to be
investigated.
Furthermore, Dasein exists in a state of either thrown-ness, projection or fallen-ness (ibid, §
29, 31 & 38) and its everyday existence is also known as Being-in- the –World (Heidegger,
1996, §29). The main terms arising within Erikson’s concept are ‘Stages and crisis’, as each
Stage of development is completed a crisis occurs and the outcome equips the individual
with either positive or negative attributes, thus a crisis is a defining moment for the
individual (Shepherd, 2009, p98). ‘Ego integrity’ is not clearly defined by Erikson but is
understood to mean being certain of oneself and acceptance of the “inevitability of the
pattern of one's life” (Stevens, 2008, p54). In his later work Erikson (1998, p7) explains
integrity also includes having contact with the world and with people. Whilst in the process
of attaining ego integrity, there are two attributes available to the individual ‘wisdom’ and
‘despair’. Wisdom, according to Erikson, the knowledge of the actuality of one’s world, the
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knowledge one gains via the senses (Erikson & Erikson, 1998, p9). Conversely, ’despair’
describes the realisation that one had little time left and it is too late to start afresh and the
accompanying feelings of resentment, uselessness and anger (Erikson, 1995, pp 241- 247).
Whilst both Heidegger and Erikson focussed on human existence and how one’s life
develops, the initial stimulus was different for each. It is of value to consider if each writer’s
history and context had an effect on their views and outcomes. Heidegger, a student of
initially theology then philosophy, believed that incorrect thinking formed the basis of
Western Philosophy. He believed that whilst the subject matter of metaphysics was correct,
the methods used were not:
“Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of Being itself” (Heidegger, 2000, p 87)
Traditionally, metaphysics had primarily looked at the nature of reality; Heidegger believed
it should focus on the experience of Being. Erikson’s interest in the development of identity
and personality appears to stem from his own personal experience. Indeed, Bloland (2005,
p 62 & 64) cites Erikson’s own daughter who believed her father did not form his own
identity until he took a name of his making. Erikson’s childhood could be considered
unhappy as he was teased over his physical appearance (Hoare, 2001, pp 7-11) and his
academic life was not particularly successful. Uncertain of his future, Erikson spent time
travelling Europe, and continued to be concerned with questions over his father and
conflicting views over of ethnic, religious, and national identity (Bloland, op. cit). In his
twenties, Erikson began to work as an art tutor in Vienna and there, he encountered Anna
Freud, who, noting Erikson’s affinity with children, suggested he study psychoanalysis at the
Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute (Hoare, op. cit). Erikson, whilst agreed with the basics of
Freudian theory, believed it was incomplete. He saw that development was lifelong and
believed that the role of the outside word with pivotal in one’s development. Erikson later
served as a professor in major American Universities despite not holding a Bachelor’s
Degree and his work is thought to be of great influence (Haggbloom et al, 2002, p 139-152).
Whilst Heidegger’s views were based on extensive knowledge of philosophical thinking,
Erikson appears to have based his theory upon personal experience. This is one reason why
Heidegger could be thought to have more authority than Erikson; the former used a wide
range of knowledge to form his notions whilst the latter used subjective experience, from
his own life, to draw conclusions. Additionally, using Sigmund Freud’s work as a basis is not
without its difficulties as Freud’s clientele was exclusive, from the upper and upper-middle
classes (Ming Liu, 2013, p 488). It is difficult to assume that a limited pool of subjects
experience or one subjective experience can be theorised and applied universally. Millon,
Lerner & Weiner (2003, p148) discuss the usage of personal and clients experience, in
developing Freud’s theory and conclude that such methods may render theories as limited
and influenced by the theory’s initiator.
Heidegger’s work, Being and Time, focussed on the experience of being, the actual practise
of living. He introduced the concept of ‘Dasein’ to describe an individual entity and
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concluded that Dasein is unique in the sense that it is concerned with its own being
(Heidegger, 1996, §4). He described how Dasein in ‘thrown’ into its world; into concrete
situations and socio-historical contexts which are already constructed and contain a readily
prepared culture for Dasein to be immersed in and ultimately restricted by (Bunnin & Yu
2004, online). Heidegger believed that Dasein generally occupied the world as Being-in-theWorld, how one operates on a daily basis; this he also called ‘fallen-ness’, ‘averageness’ and
‘in-authenticity’ (Heidegger, 1996, §38). Dasein can choose to spend its time living out the
expectations of das man and is distracted with ease by the inane chatter of daily life
imbibing Dasein with a sense of vagueness and anonymity (King, 2001, p 133). In this mode
of existence Dasein becomes absolved from responsibility and is lulled into a state of calm;
Heidegger believed this state alienates Dasein from its own unique potential for Being (ibid).
Dasein, as Being-in-the-World, can choose its own possibilities and aim towards a more
authentic life. Alternatively, Dasein can believe it is unprepared, or ill equipped, to choose
for itself and fall back to the security of das man where it is Being will be less authentic.
When Dasein completely submits to das man, it is limited in its way of behaving. Encounters
are those permitted by das man and opportunities and values prescribed by das man. Even
death, the one completely sole possibility for everyone, is only encountered in passing and
as the death is not one’s own, Dasein can take the view that death is anonymous, someone
else’s death, but never Dasein’s own (Solomon, 1972 p 227). Heidegger also understood
Dasein to be projecting itself and continually moving forward towards possibilities but could
choose these to live authentically or in-authentically (Heidegger, 1996, §31). Authentic
Dasein takes responsibility and chooses its own possibilities from those available, whilst inauthentic Dasein prefers fallen-ness and to live according to the restrictions, rules and
limitations of faceless others or ‘das man’ (Rickey, 2002, p73). When faced with the
realisation that das man limits Dasein’s possibilities and potentialities resulting in a life that
is not unique, ‘anxiety’ occurs. Dasein can choose to fall back into das man where it has a
‘simple’ no responsibilities existence or it can choose to become self- regulating (Chandler &
Cunningham, 2007, p23).
Heidegger’s thoughts also include the importance of mood, that one perception of the
world is mood dependent (Heidegger, 1996, §134). Moods often have no trigger and can
strike at any moment (Haugeland, 2013, p 196). One specific mood discussed by Heidegger
is ‘anxiety’, this he calls an overwhelming sense that life has been completely meaningless,
may happen at any time the experience and allows Dasein to see clearly the truth and
untruth of its existence (Heidegger 1996, §260–274). During anxiety, the Dasein no longer
feels ‘at home’ in its world; nothing seems familiar, objects are no longer appropriate or
relevant, everything “collapses” (ibid, §186). Anxiety therefore pulls Dasein out of the
inauthentic grasp of das man. At this point, Dasein may choose to return to an existence
without personal choice and responsibility by falling back into das man or it can choose
‘freedom’ in the form of making its own choices towards authenticity. By embracing choice,
Dasein becomes self-responsible and accepts that death is a personal occurrence and it is
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impending (ibid, §250). However, because death is not experienced in a manner one can
reflect upon, it is the one act that is always a possibility. Heidegger explains that death is our
ultimate and unique possibility and by facing and accepting one’s death and becoming a
Being-towards-Death the individual can seize control from the limitations of das man to “act
of its own accord” (ibid, §308). Couzens Hoy adroitly summarises Heidegger’s thoughts as
being the act of facing and accepting one’s mortality, which provides the key to living a
more authentic life (Couzens Hoy, 2011, pp 280-287). Heidegger believed that to
comprehend Dasein, the notion of care must be understood, as it is an elemental
component of Dasein (Heidegger, 1996, §202).
Care enables a sense of continuity, when one compares oneself to other entities
encountered in our world. Heidegger did not believe in an underlying self because Dasein is
not present at-hand, which it is something that merely, occurs whether noticed or not for
example a rock or tree, (Polt, 1999, p95). Watts (2014, pp 78 -80) explains that care
directed outwards is solicitude, ‘concerned with’ and in its default form care is indifferent.
Furthermore, solicitude can be authentic, that is, directed towards helping another achieve
independence by encouraging them to choosing their own potentialities, or inauthentic,
when Dasein seeks to dominate fellow Dasein by choosing for it. Care, when analysed is
temporality, but not in the linear sense of past, present and future. Polt (1999, p96) clearly
explains Heidegger’s thoughts on Dasein’s temporality. The future is vital to Dasein, it
includes finitude and its requirement is choice, the choice of who Dasein wants to become,
as Heidegger writes Dasein can “….come toward itself” (Heidegger, 1996, § 325). The past,
our state of being thrown into the world, is based on our future. This may sound an odd
notion but its meaning is simple; future projects allow ones past to become re-defined in its
meaning to oneself (Polt, op. cit). Dasein is able to reach into its past and its future and
make choices in its present, as the present is the state in which other entities present
themselves to Dasein. Heidegger called temporality ‘ecstatical’ (Heidegger, 1996
§377&326) or ‘standing out’; this is unique to Dasein as it is the only entity who projects into
its future, is thrown out of its past and is situated in a present world where it can interact
and make differences to itself. Furthermore, care enables Dasein to take responsibility,
escaping the control of das man, and live a more authentic life (Martinez, 1989, 120). Care is
illustrated in the realisation that one’s life has been under the control of others, when
Dasein’s conscience speaks to it and anxiety occurs.
Heidegger states the call of conscience is silent, meaning that conscience quells the chatter
of das man and allows Dasein to focus back onto itself. Conscience brings the message of
guilt to Dasein, but this guilt is a sense of indebtedness to the self. Dasein realises that it is
able to choose its own future possibilities, as it exists in projection (ibid, §272-280).
Heidegger believes that authenticity is an ongoing process because the everydayness of das
man is always present and enticing:
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“existence can gain mastery over the ‘everyday’; but it can never extinguish it.” (Heidegger,
1996, §371-422).
Authenticity, when Dasein has accepted its mortality as a Being-towards-Death is, according
to Heidegger, when one can form an identity. This is achieved by the realisation that our
previous ‘self’ in das man was constructed to meet the expectations of ‘their’ wishes and
‘their’ opinions. This is clarified by Izenberg (2016, p77-8) who explains that whilst there is
identity in both authentic and inauthentic being. Authentic being allows an identity through
personal choice, whereas in inauthenticity an identity is foisted upon one. This being so,
Dasein can make choices from the myriad possibilities which it can actualise, accordingly
creating and defining its own identity and living a mostly authentic existence.
Erikson’s theory developed from his views on the manner in which life experiences influence
one’s behaviour and personality. Erikson theorised there were eight life Stages1 and as the
individual passed from one to another Stage a ‘crisis’ occurred. As explained by Rosenthal,
Gurney& Moore (1981, pp526) each Stage was representative of a struggle, and possible
crisis, resulting in an ego quality and this was due to the individual maturing and
encountering new areas social interactions. Each crisis has two outcomes; one either gains
a positive virtue, such as fidelity at Stage 5 or a maladaptation, an ‘improper’ action, such as
promiscuity at Stage 6 (Tandon, 2004, p 61 & 62). Erikson believed psycho-social
development was epigenic, meaning it followed a pre-set order of Stages (Murray Thomas,
2005, p 88). Erikson discussed the influence of both family, social institutions and culture
on the psychosocial development of the individual (Erikson, 1995, p 224, 233 & 240-1).
Additionally, Erikson discussed the value of care throughout the life Stages, showing a more
comprehensive attitude than Heidegger does. Erikson believed that a Mother was the
infant’s carer; however, primary carer is currently a more appropriate designation2 in Stage
1. Erikson called adult caring:
"the generational task of cultivating strength in the next generation" (Erikson, 1997, p67)
Within Stage 1, care is shown in the relationship between the infant and the primary carer.
Additionally, the primary carer is in a position to assist the infant in building a trusting
relationship. As the life journey continues, the individual passes through Stages. Implicit
within each Stage 1 is the influence of others, carers, friends, partners, possibly the parental
role and interaction within their community. Erikson discusses young adulthood, Stage 6, as
a time of forming relationships and being willing to “fuse his identity” (Erikson, 1995, p 237)
and Stage 7, adulthood, involved “guiding the next generation”, whether as a parent or
workplace mentor (Erikson, 1968, p 290). As previously illustrated, care is implicitly
embedded within the theory, from the care of an adult, for example: a primary carer or
teacher, towards a child during the first four Stages, to the care from peers during
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a copy of a table of the life Stages can be seen in Appendix 1 which follows the reference list
for example primary carer includes single, same sex or grand parent
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adolescence, partners and work colleagues during young adult and adulthood and extending
into maturity. By Stage 8, Erikson believed that if an individual has successfully moved
through all the previous Stages they were at a place where they could reminisce and review
their life. It appears that no specific age was set for Stage 8 and descriptions vary. Kalat
(2016, p 163) merely states “after retirement”, whilst Kincheloe & Horn (2007, p 79) propose
age “50s and beyond”; therefore this Stage is generally accepted as being between the ages
of fifty and sixty-five years. As the retirement age is currently increasing in the United
Kingdom, the lack of a given age confers a current appropriateness on Erikson’s theory
being primarily Stage not age based. Erikson clearly believed that following review, if one
were satisfied with life, one would both gain the state of ego integrity and hold the attribute
of wisdom. In later work (Erikson & Erikson, 1998, pp 7-8), wisdom is described as the
quality of perceiving the realness of one’s world, whilst despair is the realisation that one’s
life is ending and that it is too late to relive it to correct one’s mistakes (Erikson, 1995, p
242). Erikson & Erikson (1998, p9) call old age an “existential identity”, that is containing
past, present and future; one’s past either satisfies or disappoints one. This has an impact
on the present and looks forward into a pleasant or disagreeable future; this is particularly
realised during the review of one’s life, where the past is brought into the present and
influences one’s future mood and behaviour. It is clear that Erikson differs here from
Heidegger. For Erikson, temporality is linear; experiences are foundational and influence
one’s present and future behaviour (Cavanaugh & Blanchard-Fields, 2010, p328). This is a
different view of temporality from Heidegger who believed that the future allows one to
redefine the meaning of their past (Poult, opt cit.).
Heidegger’s philosophical thoughts on Being and Erikson’s theory of development will now
be discussed. Other relevant theories may be included to provide support to the discussion
as and when necessary. This will provide a basis to offer a conclusion that supports the
introductory statement: ‘Heidegger provides the most optimistic view of adult later life’.
Whilst Heidegger’s focus was on adulthood, he would have understood childhood from a
philosophical point of view. An Aristotelian view of children could be taken from his
discussion on causality (Aristotle, 2009, 194b17-195a4), the final cause of a human being is
one that occurs upon reaching maturity, when it functions ‘well’. The final cause for human
adults is, Aristotle concludes:
“Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action”, from a life
lived in virtuous activity (2009¹, Bk1:9 &13).
Additionally, Aristotle believed the formal cause of an entity was to mature and function
well, therefore, a child could be viewed as an immature adult with the potential to grow and
develop into a adequately functioning human adult (2009 194b17-195a4). The
Enlightenment thinker, John Locke (1959, Bk1, 2,1) posited that the human is born a ‘tabula
rasa’ a “white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas” He believed that one
developed through one’s experiences and one’s identity was freely defined and developed
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(Locke, 1959, Bk 1). Additionally, as a student of philosophy Heidegger would no doubt be
aware of Rousseau’s thoughts on childhood that it “...has its own ways…” (Rousseau, 2015,
Book 2, online) and felt that it was not applicable to his discussion on Being and
development, through childhood had, from a philosophical view, been sufficiently
discussed. However, Heidegger’s works allude to childhood, as one’s existence between
birth and death is the totality of Dasein (Heidegger, 1996, §373). He discusses thrown-ness
and the potentiality of Dasein and both of these can apply to child rearing. The thrown-ness
being the family, its belief and values, and the socio-economic setting of the family. As a
result of its childhood, in every venture each adult Dasein undertakes it carries within the
culture learned from its birth (ibid, §276). Furthermore, Heidegger (1982, p 123) states that
a child is Dasein, but he believed that the child’s world is unclear and a child is not yet able
to be independent (ibid, pp125-126). Heidegger expressed the belief that birth was a
traumatic experience and such things continued to shape a child’s demeanour (ibid, p125).
This idea is confirmed by facticity of Dasein, whose past has an effect on its present, “its
own being is constituted beforehand” (Heidegger, 1996, §374). Joensuua (2012, pp 417434) suggests that young children have a more authentic way of life as they have had little
influence from ‘das man’ and refers to the “genuineness’ of children”. However, as children
are influenced by carer’s expectations, the first form of das man, and the media from an
early age, Joensuua’s view is debatable (Rutherford, Bittman & Biron, 2010, p vi).
Conversely, Erikson’s focus was on childhood and adolescence. Nonetheless, he did
theorise on the whole lifespan and believed that individuals developed through social
interaction. These interactions culminated in the individual gaining positive or negative
attributes. By acquiring attributes, a personality and identity was developed (Tummala &
Hernandez, 2008, p 453). Erikson initially posited eight Stages of development,
posthumously published work suggests a ninth Stage, and the majority of which fall
between birth, adolescence showing where Erikson believed the most psycho-social
development took place, and the identity was formed. Harris and White (2014, online) offer
criticism on Erikson’s theory cautioning that Erikson accepted, without question, the culture
of his time, he failed to discuss identity changes in later life and that his focus on later life
was still child orientated, focussing on the parental role than the actual subjective life
experience.
Sokol (2009, Article 14) cites the work of Erikson (1968) during his discussion of identity
development. He raises inconsistencies in Erikson’s theory noting that Erikson (ibid) states
identity formation begins once a child stops identifying with carers, and the process of
identity formation is undertaken during adolescence. The prospect of career choice has a
major influence on identity as the adolescent needs to match their attributes to a suitable
sphere of employment (Erikson, 1995). Once this difficulty is settled Erikson believed
identity became “fixed at the end of adolescence” Erikson, 1968, (p. 16).However, Erikson
says little about adulthood, yet Sokol (ibid) cites many sources which claim identity
continues to evolve throughout the lifetime (Kotre & Hall, 1990, Lewkowicz, Libhaber, &
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Lachman, 1995). Sokol (op. cit.) notes there is a continued development of one’s identity
expressed in Erikson’s work, if one considers the crisis in Stage 8. The crisis facing an
individual results in either ego integrity or despair, both of which are outcomes following a
reflection on one’s life, which results from the realisation that death is impending (Erikson,
1963, p268). As previously stated, Erikson’s work was a development of Freudian theory;
Erikson believed in life-long development, Freud did not. However, can Erikson assert that
fixed identity occurs at adolescence yet additionally claim it is a life-long project? It would
appear that Erikson has two identities in mind, ego identity and personal identity. Erikson
(1995, p222) believed that ego identity begins early in life. Ego identity is based on the
infant’s trusting relationship with its carer, which expresses consistency of care, and is
developed over the first four life Stages, denoted by the phrase ‘I am…what I am give, what
I will, what I imagine and what I learn’ (Erikson, 1959, p 82). This leads into the Stage 5
adolescence identity crisis where one seeks to adopt an appropriate identity. In his 1950
work Erikson was using the term ‘identity’ to convey the sense of personal continuity, in
which the individuals sense of sameness matched ones enduring meaningfulness to others
(Erikson, 1950 p 228). By 1968, Erikson had redefined his meaning to include uniqueness,
the need for continuity and thirdly, conforming to social norms (Erikson, 1968, p 208).
Heidegger and Erikson agree the importance of one’s facticity, the existing background into
which one is born, for example the place, time and culture is of great influence. As an infant
has no choice in the family it is born into, this similar to Heidegger’s thrown-ness,
Additionally, the primary carer, being in a position of authority, would pass on their own
cultural beliefs and values (Erikson, 1995, p224); other family members would reinforce this
as the infant grows. Developing into pre-school, then school age, the expectations and
influence of teachers and peers again compare to das man’s influence. However, as Krogh
and Morehouse (2014, p 234) explain compliance with ‘authority’ figures, such as parents or
school teachers is usual behaviour for younger children. Whilst both Heidegger and Erikson
agree with the situation of one’s birth having an effect on the individual, their views on late
life are different.
Authenticity is a main theme in Heidegger’s work. He believed that authenticity occurs
when Dasein realises das man, the expectations, norms and values of the society one is in,
has restricted life choices, and future possibilities. Under the influence of das man, Dasein
has existed in a calm and desensitised manner, it has not needed to make any choices or
accept responsibility for its actions. Das man has even stipulated the likes and dislikes of
Dasein:
“….Dasein fails to hear its own self…” (Heidegger, 1996, § 271).
This type of existence shows how facticity and the norms and conventions of das man have
influenced and stupefied Dasein. This is not a positive experience for Dasein as it has chosen
to allow others to decide its Being and potentialities (Polt, 1999, p62). Once Dasein has
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acknowledged to itself that, it is free to make its own choices and endeavour to make
existence more authentic and shape its own identity through free choice.
Dasein is an entity and ‘I’, ‘myself’ and ‘am’ ” are owned by each individual Dasein, this is its
ontological constitution (Heidegger, 1996, § 115). However, in its everyday existence,
Dasein is submerged in das man and its self-image is mirrored back not as individual but as
part of the ‘they’, therefore, Dasein sees itself as a third person not an ‘I’ but one of the
‘they’ (King, 2001, p 133). As Dasein understands itself by the world it inhabits and its only
concern is to be anonymous and average, not individual and unique, it is quite happy to be
part of an anonymous many (ibid, §126-7). However, when in anxiety, Dasein’s conscious
speaks directly to itself by silencing the distracting chatter of the many. Dasein is
potentiality of being, it cannot escape death; it is the “possibility of the impossibility” (ibid,
§251). Acceptance throws Dasein back to its ‘own’ possibilities enabling it to become
subjective and self-aware due to the realisation that it is not dependant on anything else.
(Polt, 1999, p89.)
Whilst Heidegger believed that an existence shaped by others was an inauthentic existence,
Erikson’s theory suggests that whilst he agreed family and society’s values shape an
individual, it was a positive experience and that facticity influences our basic human drives
(Mitchell and Black, 1995, p 142-149). Furthermore, the crisis one faced at each Stage of
development shaped one’s identity. The adolescent crisis, Stage 5, focusses on identity.
Erikson called identity a “conscious sense of individual uniqueness” and an “unconscious
striving for a continuity of experience” (Erikson, 1968, p. 208). There is difficulty in this, if
facticity shapes identity then can it ever be truly unique, or is identity merely a culmination
of accepted influences? Erikson (op. cit, p 128) further stated “important need for trust in
oneself and in others”, this too is a difficult statement as it could be construed as meaning to
trust others in shaping one’s identity, if this interpretation is valid how can it be possible to
trust that others have our best intentions in mind? As previously discussed, there appears to
be contradictions in Erikson’s work, on the one hand, he states that identity is fixed in
adolescence on the other; it develops over the life span. It is not possible to produce a
definitive answer but it is plausible that Erikson could be implying one has a specific
‘personal’ identity but chooses to submerge it to comply with the norms and values of one’s
social context. Erikson’s work, whilst not overtly stated, does appear to illustrate what
Heidegger would call inauthenticity.
Does Erikson allude to the possibility of authentic Being, as defined by Heidegger? According
to Erikson, in late adulthood, Stage 8, an individual will look back and review their life. If
one finds that life has been good, and can accept the forthcoming end of life, it leads to ego
integrity, an acceptance of how predictable one’s life is (Stevens, op. cite.) Equally, one may
review their life and realise that there had been many wasted opportunities and feel feeling
remorse, regret or a sense of ‘unfinished business’, all of which make death unacceptable,
this Erikson believed leads to despair. He described despair as the realisation that one’s
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‘time has run out’; it is not possible to try afresh to find one’s integrity (Erikson et al, 1968,
p140). He further believed that despair often hides behind a demonstration of disgust or a
continuing contemptuousness for others and the self (Erikson, 1980, p 105). Later, Erikson
(1997, p63) added that despair can also include an element of “time forfeited”, that is to
realise one’s life had been futile or misused. This casts a gloomy shadow over later life,
Erikson seems to suggest that an older person just accepts that their life was wasted and
cannot, or will not, take action to ensure that what time is left is spent living in a unique and
authentic manner. Miller and Cook-Greuter (2000, p 86) note that Erikson’s view of later
life became more pessimistic as he grew older, and attribute this to declining health and
enforced retirement. His focus on late life then included death, rejection and mental
distress in the aged, again this gloomy view appears to be subjective in origin.
Whilst not specifically accredited to later life anxiety, as defined by Heidegger, it is
particularly likely to occur in later life when the prospect of retirement looms. Additionally,
Heidegger’s concept of Nothingness, and a feeling that there is no sense to one’s world, is
comparable to a negative, or anxious, view of retirement. One is facing a future of no
gainful employment, no work place status and possibly no social status; the latter especially
being dependent on whether the individual accepts society’s stereotypes of the retiree as
little more than a burden on society (Hudson & Moore, 2009, pp33-34). However, whilst
Heidegger posited that when one feels anxiety there are two choices to be made, one leads
to an more authentic way of life, the other mostly inauthentic, Erikson’s view appears to
lead only to inauthenticity whether one reaches ego integrity or falls into despair.
Heidegger’s anxiety has a positive attribute, insomuch as it can act as a stimulus to begin to
live life according to ones ‘own rulebook’. It is action following the realisation that life has
been lived according to the expectations of das man and as such has no uniqueness. Whilst
both Erikson and Heidegger cite an acceptance of one’s death for Erikson that is all it is,
plain acceptance; whilst for Heidegger impending death is the spur to personally choose and
seize all the possibilities open to one enabling an authentic later life experience.
As previously suggested, Heidegger’s anxiety could occur in later life when one is facing the
prospect of retirement. Newman (2003, p 29-30) discusses the anxiety felt, explaining it
may be due to a loss of one’s role in life or a loss of social status. She suggests that one
either embraces retirement as a chance to re-set life goals, which is comparable to
authentic living. Conversely, anxiety manifests itself as accepting a “downward slide towards
death” (ibid). The latter of the two options would seem to express Erikson’s despair, that is
it is simply too late so accept what fate has in store, and Heidegger’s inauthenticity,
accepting the outdated stereotypes of ageing. A study by Ardlet and Koenig (2006, pp184215) found that adults who believed their personal life goals had been met and they were
their ‘own person’ felt less death anxiety; this research would appear to support
Heidegger’s views on authentic living and confirms earlier work by Pollack (1979-80, pp 97112). Whilst providing evidence in support of Heidegger studies they also support Erikson’s
view of despair and fear of death for those who have lived a life of chosen inauthenticity.
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A more positive approach to later adulthood, and retirement is the Third Age or golden age.
Laslett (1989, p 79) believed the third age became part of British social structure in the
1980s and it occurs when longevity increases and society offers opportunities and freedom
for its older citizens (ibid, p 77). Barnes (2011, online) describes the third age in detail,
explaining the third age lies between retirement and declining health. It is a time of
adequate finance and less responsibility, a period which:
“offers rich possibilities for self-fulfilment, purposeful engagement, and completion”.
Herein lays a difficulty, if the individual subscribes to the notion of third age and indulges in
the products and services on offer from society are they actually being self-fulfilled in an
authentic manner or it is that they have chosen from what is available, from das man, and
life is still mostly inauthentic? An alternative view is held by Carr & Komp (2011, pp 249257) who believe that the third age is difficult to prove from empirical evidence. They
believe that society has imposed values upon the ‘younger’ retiree; that they are healthy,
affluent and need to give back to society, the latter they suggest could lead to exploitation.
Additionally, they discuss the image portrayed of young retirees spending time cruising or
golfing, which they believe to be the minority not the majority of people. Again, if the third
age is a social construction, whilst it may sound appealing it is yet another way to live mostly
inauthentic, as one is merely living the expectations of society, or das man. However, if one
chooses to indulge in the activities of one’s personal choice, whether they are the
traditional, stereotypical activities, or not, a more authentic existence is achievable. Wood
et al (2008, p386) discuss the link between authenticity and well-being and conclude that
authenticity is a basic aspect of well-being based citing multiple works to confirm their
conclusion (Horney, 1951, May, 1981, Rogers, 1961, Winnicott, 1965 and Yalom, 1980).
In conclusion, the statement Heidegger provides the most optimistic view of adult later life
has been demonstrated to be true. Heidegger does this by offering the individual, Dasein,
the opportunity to exercise choice. Choice enables one to determine one’s own future and
achieve one’s own unique possibilities. Erikson view of later life does not include any
opportunities to choose one’s future activities. The key moment of realisation that choice is
available and can be actioned is, for Heidegger, when one experiences anxiety. This allows
one to comprehend their life, so far, has been anonymous, dull and limited and there is the
opportunity to choose to be free of the influence of das man. One can then choose to live
one’s remaining time working towards authenticity by making one’s own choices on which
actions to take, form, hold one’s own opinions, and be a unique being. Alternatively, one
can choose to slide back allowing das man to exercise control and continue a mediocre and
undistinguished existence.
Conversely, Erikson’s offers two alternatives during later life and neither offer choice as a
catalyst for change. Following a period of reminiscing over one’s life, he believed that the
individual would either feel content and fulfilled and life would continue in the same
manner until death. On the other hand, one would realise that life, so far, had been full of
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12
regrets, missed opportunities and unrealised life goals. Exacerbating this dismal outlook is
the belief that there is no time left to start to live in a manner to ‘right these wrongs’.
Erikson did not include the opportunity for the individual to seize control and choose to
make the remainder of their life a time of positive, self-initiated action. Thus, his view of
later life is bleak and despondent. At a time when there may be the chance to choose from
many opportunities available to older people, and live a full life which is moving towards
authenticity and fulfilment, Erikson theory is outdated in only offer a contented or
despairing future. The two alternatives offered following reminiscence over one’s life is a
false dilemma3 as there is at least one alternative. At its bleakest, one’s third choice is
simply to take one’s life, which whilst sounding negative is a positive act if only that it puts
despair to an end. Additionally, Erikson believed that development followed predetermined
Stages under the influence of our culture and environment, which again appears no
opportunities to make choices. Heidegger, on the other hand, cites the call of conscience
where one faces the reality that life has been less fulfilling that it can be and offers the
choices to either continue in that manner or choose to be responsible for its own
potentialities and construct its own existence. Furthermore, Erikson had based his own
theory on the work of Sigmund Freud. Freud’s theories have been subject to criticism as he
worked with a select clientele; by doing this, Freud assumed that people from all social
classes were the same. Erikson has been similarly criticised as using his subjective, personal
experiences as a basis for his work. Again, by doing so he is potentially excluding vast
number of people as each individual’s life is composed of multitudes of varying experiences
and interactions which are unlikely to exactly compare to Erikson’s own life. This being so, it
is not feasible to support Erikson’s theory; at the least, it places his theory in jeopardy as
being influenced and interpreted by his experience.
Therefore, Heidegger’s philosophy has been shown to provide the superior and most
positive view of later life by allowing the opportunity to seize choice in one’s life and the
resultant autonomy. The ageing individual is able to live the remainder of their life span
engaging in opportunities that are self-chosen, fulfil their unique potentialities, and
maintain a sense of life satisfaction and emotional well-being.
6258 words excluding quotations
(total of 6393 words, 135 quoted words)
3
False Dilemma: Only a limited number of options (usually two) is given; in reality, there are more options. A
false dilemma is an illegitimate use of the "or" operator.
www.leo.lec.edu/ICS/icsfs/FallaciesOfMisdirection.rtf?target...4020.[accessed 21.04.16]
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