1
Dorothee Gelhard, FU-Berlin, Institute for General and Comparative Literature, Garystr. 55, D-14195 Berlin, [email protected]
(forthcoming in: Dostoevsky Journal - an Independent review, No. 1, 1999)
Meta-Dialogue and Identity or the recovery of the meaning
„Êàæäûé åäèíûé èç íàñ âèíîâåí
çà âñåõ è âñÿ íà çåìëå íåñîìíåííî,
íå òîëüêî ïî îáùåé ìèpîâîé âèíå,
à åäèíîëè÷íî êàæäûé çà âñåõ ëþäåé è
çà âñÿêîãî ÷åëîâåêà íà ñåé çåìëå.“
Dostoevskii, Brat’ia Karamazovy.
The idea of responsibility for the other plays a central role in the philosophy of Levinas.
Influenced among others by Dostoevsky1 he develops an ethical I-concept which is based on
encountering the other/Other.
„...la relation intersubjective est une relation non-symétrique. En ce sens, je suis responsable
d’autrui sans attendre la réciproque, dûtil m’en coûter la vie. La réciproque, c’est son affaire.
C’est précisément dans la mesure où entre autrui et moi la relation n’est pas réciproque, que
je suis sujétion à autrui; et je suis ‘sujet’ essentiellement en ce sens. C’est moi qui supporte
tout. Vous connaissez cette phrase de Dostoïevski: ‘Nous sommes tous coupables de tout et
de tous devant tous, et moi plus que les autres.’ Non pas à cause de telle ou telle culpabilité
effectivement mienne, à cause de fautes que j’aurais commises; mais parce que je suis
responsable d’une responsabilité totale, qui répond de tous les autres et de tout chez les
autres, même de leur responsabilité. Le moi a toujours une responsabilité de plus que tous les
autres.“2
The aim of the following is, by means of Levinas’ epistemes, to enable the subject in crisis to
find a way out of its postmodern atrophy and, at the same time, attempt the reconstruction of
meaning instead of the decay of meaning. The text is therefore divided into four parts. First,
the constitution of the ethical subject in Levinas and its linguistic expression will be dealt
with. This will be followed by a section about the anthropological aspect of his model of
subjectivity. Thirdly, the role and function of mnemonics in forming the identity of the ethical
subject will be examined, and fourthly, I will go into the textological consequences arising
Cf. „Malgré la fin de l’europocentrisme, disqualifié par tant d’horreurs, je crois à l’éminence du visage humain
exprimé dans les lettres grecques et dans nos lettres qui leur doivent tout. C’est grâce à elles que notre histoire
nous fait honte. Il y a participation à l’Ecriture sainte dans les littératures nationales, dans Homère, et Platon,
dans Racine et Victor Hugo, comme dans Pouchkine, Dostoïevski ou Goethe, comme, bien entendu, dans
Tolstoï ou dans Agnon. [...] Les Saintes Ecritures ne signifient pas par le dogmatique récit de leur origine
surnaturelle ou sacrée, mais par l’expression du visage de l’autre homme ...“ (my emphasis) LEVINAS, E.:Éthique
et Infini, Paris 1982, 126.
2
LEVINAS, E.:Éthique et Infini, Paris 1982, 105.
1
2
especially in literary theory from the before mentioned insofar as they are relevant for the
postmodern debate.
I. Speaking between saying and said
The genesis of the ethical subject includes, in Levinas’ thought, not only an anthropological
but also a linguistic model that I will call meta-dialogue in the following. This model tries, in
the context of the so often „lamented“ end of the individual in the modern age which at the
same time also includes the end of communication, to make interpersonal communication
possible again. In other words, the meta-dialogue asks the fundamental question about ability
and/or consensus of the subjects.3 Thus, the meta-dialogue, because it is based on the concept
of „person“, can enable the individual to get out of his „original“ indivisibility which implies
an „un-communicability“.
Both components of the meta-dialogue are, on the one hand, the informal form of address in
Jewish mysticism (TNA sch’ma [hear!]), what Levinas calls the genesis of the ego through
the Other, that is the „fact of being called“, the process of the active „moi-forming“ from the
passive „soi“, and the resulting movements in two directions: one forwards, active towards
the other (person)4, and one backwards, which is, however, not reflexive and which refers to
itself. The latter demands a mnemonic-practising ego that is subject to the command of
„RVTS“ (Zachor [Remember]). The meta-dialogue is therefore a double dialogue which
opposes nominalistic thought, which encourages the retreat of the individual and
consequently his renunciation of communication.
My thesis is that in the meta-dialogue, which consists of two aspects of subjectivity, in one of
which two directions are inherent, meaning can, at the moment of their encounter be reestablished, when we start from the Hebrew rcs (dåvår) instead of the occidental Greek
.
What do we gain by this assumption? It is known that the occidental philosophical thinking,
that had been predominant in the philosophy of the West for centuries and reached its limit in
the modern era, is based upon the fundamental connotation of  that includes many
About the correspondences between Bakhtin’s dialogue-concept and Levinas’ philosophy see also in details
GELHARD, D.: Metaphors of The Unspeakable - On the Concept of the Other in The Writnigs of Bakhtin, Lacan
and Levinas, in: New Zealand Slavonic Journal 1998, 177-188. and: GELHARD, D.: The semantics of time in
Bakhtin and Levinas, forthcoming 1999.
3
3
different meanings such as „word“, „sentence“, „speech“, „thought“ and also „calculation“.
Boman rightly refers to the root „-“ of „ = to collect, to order“ which is inherent in
the word.5 We must therefore start from a conception of the word which has nothing to do
with the speech function but with the sense which has to be well-ordered - and that means
here „rational“.  in its purest expression refers to divine (well-ordered) reason. This
word-concept is based upon the view of the Greeks that a discernible law is inherent in the
material objects of the word which alone makes possible the conception founded on the
.6 „The  as the basic fact of all life in the community is the decisive point of
Socratic or rather Platonic politics, the  expresses ‘being as it is’.“7 In Greece - and
therefore also in western philosophy - the finding of truth was carried out through the process
of „recognizing“, that is, „identifying“.
Levinas’ criticism of the Greek  does not at all refer to the ability to order and to
distinguish, which had meant in the Greek imagination enormous progress compared with the
previously common mythical thinking. It is rather wholly directed against this identityimposing order which represses the encountered Other because it is non-identical. For
Levinas, the Greek rationality which had initially aimed to free thought from mythical power,
is in fact captivated by this same power. In particular the subject itself is literally (sub-iacere)
submitted to it since it is substituted for its identifying (i.e. recognizing) knowledge. As long
as one starts from the Greek egological freedom of the subject, the circulus virtiosus cannot
be broken. It must consequently decentrate on its own resistance against the totalizing
identity.
Exactly this can be reached by starting from a completely different conception of the word,
namely the Hebrew rcs (dåvår) which implies „word“, „object“ as well as „action“, i.e. the
realization of the word which is missing in the Greek . „Word and action are therefore
not two different meanings of the rcs (dåvår) but action is the consequence of the basic
meaning of rcs (dåvår). [...] When rcs (dåvår) forms a unity of word and action, then action
is the highest thing in it according to our view.“8
4
Also in Buber this aspect is found. He calls it the I-Thou-relation. Cf. BUBER, M.: Ich und Du, Gerlingen
1994.
5
Cf. BOMAN, Th.: Das hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem griechischen, Göttingen 51968, 53 f.
6
Cf. de BOER, Th.: „...philosophy has to speak Greek. Greek is the language of reason.“ : Judaism and Hellenism
in Levinas and Heidegger, in: Archivio di Filosofia, vol. 53 (1985) 197-215, here: 199.
7
BOMAN 1968, 55.
8
BOMAN 1968, 52.
12
4
So even via the different semantics of „word“ the fundamental difference between Jewish and
Greek thinking becomes obvious: the highest harmony in Platonic thinking is stillness (the
highest existence is without change) whereas Jewish thought always starts from a movement.
The word of God is for example a dynamic „word of action.9 „To Jehovah an invariable, i.e.
eternal vhv (håyå) is attributed, and this vhv (håyå) is a dynamic, energetic, effective
personal existence ...[...] The being, i.e. the eternally effective Jehovah is the creator.“10 It is
remarkable that the Hebrew verb vhv (håyå) already implies the meanings of „to be“, „to
become“ and „to act“, in other words, „to become“ and „to be“ are considered as a unity and
not as a difference. Thus, „stillness“ means to the Jew the end of a movement or a latent
movement. Motionless rigid existence does not exist for him; only an existence that is
connected with something active and moving has a reality.11
The bipolarity of Levinas’ thinking consists in his oscillation and alteration between the What
and the How by putting the unique inner freedom and the relation to the other, the respect for
the Other side by side. The centred, self-focussed ego becomes in Levinas an ego that is
obligated to justice for the sake of the next one.12 This turning to the Other, which expresses
itself in language does, however, not mean a statement in space and time, but goes beyond the
said and its noematically delimited meanings as „saying“.13 The oscillation between meaninggiving consciousness and ethical directedness towards the Other interferes with the tension of
„said“ and „saying“ and is based upon a different understanding of time. Thus the uniformity
of the ego is decentred in Levinas in so far as his ethical subject is submitted to a directedness
and a movement between two determinations that are diametrically referring to each other:
the ethical saying and the ontological said.
Plato is himself aware of the insufficiency of his -concept, when he expresses among
other things in the Phaedrus-dialogue a certain scepticism of writing and inveighs against the
view that philosophy can be carried home in black and white. It was absolutely necessary, for
Plato, too, to distinguish between a „practised“ philosophy as a form of life, which is based
9
See in more detail BOMAN 1968, 45ff.
BOMAN 1968, 37.
11
Cf. BOMAN 1968, 21ff.
12
Here I see a clear parallel to the dialogical dialogue in Bakhtin. Cf. BACHTIN, M. M.: Problemy poetiki
Dostoevskogo, Moskva 1972.
13
Cf. also SANDHERR, S.: Die heimliche Geburt des Subjekts. Das Subjekt und sein Werden im Denken
Emmanuel Levinas’, Stuttgart 1998.
10
5
upon ontic experiences and which is not included in the -concept14, and a philosophy as
literature (or rhetoric), i.e. ontology.
A long time before Bakhtin coined the term of polyphony, Plato had already picked out as a
central theme this dilemma of a lived philosophy based on the premise of a book culture, as a
writing that is many-voiced, and at the same time, knows its own limit versus one that
standardizes.15
The ethical subject of the meta-dialogue takes up this philosophy as a form of life, as
postulated by Plato, or what was above called the aspects of the rcs (dåvår). His (esse) is
therefore interpreted by Levinas as inter-esse in which „inter“ has a literal meaning namely as
a process-like existence that develops „between“ the subjects.
He now looks for a way out of standardizing „-thought“16 and favours the „trace“ in
order to avoid thus the nominalistic-identity thought, which is constituted through
dissociation. I will try in the following to reduce these philosophical reflections of Levinas to
a linguistic „formula“.
By using the metaphor of trace in which ambiguity is inherent, Levinas succeeds in keeping
the binaristic structure open, since a trace cannot easily be „occupied“ in order to avoid a
„blurring“.
Thus Levinas introduces into the binaristic structure of the excluding thinking a variable „a“,
that admits variations between actually different concepts, which can be described with the
help of a pseudo-mathematical formula 0 (a) 1, in which „a“ is variable as distance or rather
space between 0 and 1. This operation can be compared to fuzzy-logic in mathematics which
refers to the name of a system where in contrast to classical logic certain components are only
indistinctly determined, i.e. are defined by fuzzy-quantities.17 Therefore Levinas is outside the
logic system since „0“ is in a not exactly definable relation „a“ (the Other) to „1“. In other
words, the probably most important line in logocentric thinking, the border line which
Cf. Greek „act“:  ,   oder  .
See also MAINBERGER, S.: Schriftskepsis. Von Philosophen, Mönchen, Buchhaltern, Kalligraphen, München
1995, 13.
16
Cf. BOER 1985, 198: „There is no philosophy in which the confrontation of Judaism and Hellenism is so
dominant a theme as in the thinking of Emmanuel Levinas.“
17
Whereas a classical (bivalent) set M of elements of a given basic sector I can be identified with its x from I by
1, if x ( M(M(x)=
0, if x ( M. defined characteristic function, a fuzzy-quantity is given over I in
analogous way by a characteristic function (M which assigns every x from I in a definite way a real number
(M(x) with 0 ( (M(x) ( 1. The value (M(x) assigned to an object x is interpreted as a degree of x belonging to M.
In the case of (M(x) =1 x belongs certainly to M, in the case of (M(x) =0 x does certainly not belong to M,
whereas in the remaining cases the value (M(x) can be interpreted eg. as a degree of certainty with which,
14
15
6
delimits one area from the other through being itself without expanse,18 becomes an area or a
surface in Levinas. This pattern of thought is based on the Hebrew word for „border“ klfd
gibul (which does not mean a mathematical border line but rather describes an area or a
surface. That way Levinas can make us aware of the fact that „the border line [...] is not given
in nature or in the material world. It is a pure product of our (European) mind, an auxiliary
line which we need in order to dominate the world in practice and in theory starting from our
conditions. With the help of border lines we form a picture of facial perceptions and order
them. With the help of abstract border lines we also form abstract ideas that we can therefore
define and compare to one another. Greek-Indo-European logical thought consists of such
acts.“19 In this respect it is not surprising that the „idea of infinity“ is so simple and at the
same time deeply rooted in Jewish thought. In my opinion it cannot be justified only
iconoclastically as Assmann20 tries to do. It must also be proved etymologically.
Levinas tries to disrupt this logical thinking by referring to those borders where identity is
formed thanks to the formation of difference - which means returning to several aspects of
Jewish patterns of thought.21 And so he calls, what I described variable „a“, the countenance
or the third person ille or illeité. Thus, „a“ is the Other, is the presence of the third person, but
it is also the other that encounters me as a face and is therefore in the end a variable for the
appellation constituting the meta-dialogue on the one hand and the mnemonic on the other
hand.
II. The anthropological aspect of the ethical subject
Levinas, as we can now say, posits that identity is formed through exteriority to the Other
(from the point of view of the subject). Meaning in the meta-dialogue does not develop selfreferentially, but each element, before it takes on a fixed meaning, bears in itself the trace of
because of existing experience, x belonging to M can be inferred resp. as the probability of x belonging to M.
Cf. KONDAKOW, N. I.: Wörterbuch der Logik, Leipzig 1983, 172.
18
See also CIGLIA, F. P.: Creazione di differenza ontologica nel pensiero di Emmanuel Levinas, in: Archivio di
Filosofia, vol. 53 (1985), 217-243. And cf. in detail BOMAN 1968, 136ff.
19
BOMAN 1968, 138.
20
Cf. ASSMANN, J.: Moses der Ägypter. Entzifferung einer Gedächtnisspur, Wien 1998.
21
In this respect Reiter’s distinction between religious and Hellenistic traces in Levinas’ thinking is
oversimplified. He ignores the Christian-Jewish differences as well as the two concepts of philosophy picked out
as a central theme in Plato (see above). Cf. REITER, J.: Differenz und Entsprechung. Überlegungen zum
Verhältnis von biblischem Anspruch und griechischer Denkform bei E. Levinas, in: Archivio di Filosofia, vol.
53, (1985), 245-263.
7
all other elements of the structure of signifiers. This means for the subject that here the
philosophical aspect of the person is added.
Existence is therefore understood as an „existence-as“ that in the respective encounter with
the other constitutes itself again and again anew and is thus subject to constant change.22 The
simple movement by which the Cartesian subject is completed and is directed towards the
aim, is in the model of a forming of identity through exteriority substituted for an infinite but definitely reciprocal (though asymmetrical) - movement in space.
„...est que la relation intersubjective est une relation non-symétrique. En ce sens, je suis
responsable d’autrui sans attendre la réciproque, dûtil m’en coûter la vie. La réciproque, c’est
son affaire. C’est présisément dans la mesure où entre autrui et moi la relation n’est pas
réciproque, que je suis sujétion à autrui; et je suis ‘sujet’ essentiellement en ce sens. C’est
moi qui supporte tout.“ 23
This subject concept based on the genesis of the person therefore starts always immanently
from a socio-ethical anthropological concept. Simplifying, one could say: I am already I, I
must still become a person or rather I will become this through the other, I will become this
through (ethical) action.
In contrast to the individual subject which, after having become aware of its being split, only
strives to compensate for this lack24, the ethical subject is to be called temporally holistic
which bears various aspects of an egostructure - where each aspect is definitely individual.
Identity through exteriority is therefore to be considered as a personal identity and definitely
includes the individual aspect. However, it does by no means entail a deconstruction of
individuality or mean revolving around the collective „we“, and consequently meta-dialogue
does not intend an emptying of content or a postmodern free choice, but rather the issue of the
subject’s ability to act is once again the concern of the meaning of the word which had been
denied in modern age by the individual atomistic concept of the subject.25
The meanings inherent in the Hebrew håyå = to be, to become, to act, and that means above all „to be a
person“, form also here the basis.
23
LEVINAS, E.: Éthique et infini, Paris 1982, 105. Cf. also: LEVINAS, E.: De L’Existence a l’existant, Paris 1990,
25ff. and see: „La muliplicité dans l’être qui se refuse à la totalisation, mais se dessine comme fraternité et
discours, se situe dans un ‘espace’ essentiellement asymétrique.“ LEVINAS, E.: Totalité et Infini. Essai sur
l’extériorité, La Haye 1961, 191.
24
Cf. Lacan. In particular the „mirrorstage“.
25
This ability to act becomes in Levinas an appeal to the responsibility of the individual. Cf.: Totalité et Infini.
Essai sur l’extériorité, La Haye 1961, inter alia 217ff.
22
8
„La métaphysique ou rapport avec l’Autre, s’accomplit comme service et comme hospitalité.
[...] Dans l’accueil d’Autrui, j’accueille le Très-Haut auquel ma liberté se subordonne, mais
cette subordination n’est pas une absence: elle s évertue dans toute l’oeuvre personnelle de
mon initiative morale (sans laquelle le vérité du jugement ne peut se produire), dans
l’attention à Autrui en tant qu’unicité et visage (que le visible du politique laisse invisible) et
qui ne peut se produire que dans l’unicité d’un moi. La subjectivité se trouve égoïsme se
refusant au système qui le blesse. Contre cette protestation égoïste de la subjecticité - contre
cette protestation à première personne - l’universalisme de la réalité hegelienne aura peutêtre raison. Mais comment opposer avec la même superbe les principes universels - c’est à
dire visibles - au visage de l’autre...“26
The ethical subject as ens morale is thus based on the concept of the person27 as it has
developed in the western philosophy of the modern era28 where person is referred to as a free
being who as such leads a moralistic existence. „The moralistic existence - this is the thesis of
this tradition - goes to make up the identity of the person. The moralistic identity, that of the
person, is an identity sui generis.“29
It is exactly that „moralistic identity“ which socially binds the human being to the
community.
Thus, we can now say that Levinas takes up with his construction of the „countenance“ that
variety of meaning of the Greek  which has the following etymological
connotations: besides „person“, „mask“ and „role“ also „face“ resp. „countenance“ as well as
generally „social, moralistic person“ and by that it combines the semantic shifting of the
concept of person described by Konersmann. The Greek   would then
correspond to Levinas’ construction of the encounter with the Other: rencontre face à face.
Understood this way, Levinas’ countenance-connotation implies those levels of meaning of
„person“ that in the Middle Ages were added to the ancient one that had only referred to the
exterior30, and person was among other things firstly referred to as the individual in its
relation to others31 and secondly as an indivisible substance of a sensible rational being. The
LEVINAS, E.: Totalité et Infini. Essai sur l’extériorité, La Haye 1961, 276f.
About the term „person“ cf. inter alia KOBUSCH, Th.: Die Entdeckung der Person. Metaphysik der Freiheit
und modernes Menschenbild, Darmstadt ²1997 and KONERSMANN, R.: Person. Ein bedeutungsgeschichtliches
Panorama, in: Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 1993, 2, 199-227. Both give a short review on the
chage the term „person“.underwent: the initial theatre metaphor of the mask, i.e. something that describes the
exterior, the covering, the changing, became in modern age the embodiment of the essential part for the human
being. KOBUSCH ²1997, 274.
28
Here the tradition in Christology of the 13th century is referred to.
29
KOBUSCH ²1997, 274.
30
Person was equated with mask or role.
31
Cf. Konersmann, who refers to the analogy to the grammatical definition, therefore the human being
„linguistically exists in three persons - speaking, spoken to, spoken about. [...] Person <means> here the
26
27
9
increase in value of the concept of person in the Middle Ages is closely linked with
Christianity: „The eye of God pays attention to merit and true values, not to property and only
show. [...] ‘Persona’ describes now the invisible, transcendent existence of the individual
...“32
However, more convincing is in my opinion to adopt here a Jewish pattern of thought, when
Levinas speaks of the „being called by the countenance“. This „background -imagery of the
seeing and the absolute look“, i.e. the believer’s conviction of being looked at by God, thus to
be „re-cognized“ is connected in Hebrew with the non-distinction between contents and form.
„It is characteristic of the Jews that they are so indifferent to contents that they have not made
a word for form and synonyms such as outline, contours (shape). They do have a lot of words
that we can translate with our word „shape“ but not one that describes the form of an object.
The Hebrews are only interested [...] in the contents of the shape.“33 In contrast to the Greeks
where the outward appearance plays a distinctive role in their concept of beauty, the Jewish
discourse on beauty does not refer to the outward appearance of the person but to his
characteristics. This is for example also expressed in the Hebrew word ihg „‘ayin“ for „eye“,
„sight“, but also „appearance and shape“. The lack of words for outline or contour is therefore
absolutely logical: when „characteristics“ or „impressions“ i.e. the „contents“ are the centre
of attention then the importance of the „form“ of the objects are pushed into the
background.34
To characterize a person it is necessary to say that they can lead their lives, and that means
that „their actions cannot „happen to them“ but are considered by them as their own
actions“35. They are therefore also capable to assess and to judge, can regard something as
good or bad, important or unimportant.
A person as an acting subject is therefore a processual subject that cannot renounce
diachrony36. Because: „Personal existence does not simply develop but sees itself always
characteristics (proprietates) and reciprocal relations (relationes) of the positions inside the trinity but not their
common substance.“ 1993, 213.
32
KONERSMANN 1993, 210.
33
BOMAN 1968, 135.
34
See in detail BOMAN 1968, 135ff. He also points out that geometry has by no means attained the same
importance for the Jews as for the Greeks.
35
KOBUSCH ²1997, 274.
36
LEVINAS himself points out: „Le temps phénoménologique - que Husserl distingue du temps objectif (bien que
cette distinction ne recouvre pas la distinction bergsonienne entre la durée pure et le temps spatialisé) n’est donc
pas la forme d’un courant de conscience qui serait comme un autre être en face de l’être du monde. Les
intentions et les sensations qui sont immanentes au courant de la conscience - ne sont pas une espèce de réalité
psychologique dont la phénoménologie fournirait la description; elles sont impliquées dans le sens de cette
10
anew looking at its own life-history and history in general. The ‘Becoming of personality’ [...]
is therefore not only being given by historical institutions but also by the connection with
one’s own past. The identity of the person is in this respect always also the continuity with the
past constructed by himself or by other persons.“37 Also William James has pointed out the
possibility of change for the individual if starting from a „personal identity“. In his extreme
philosophy of subjectivity he starts from the freedom of will; any restriction and any
determinism are therefore obsolete for the individual. James’ renunciation of „consciousness“
as a metaphysical entity anticipates in a certain way the postmodern relativity of identity
which therefore by no means implies an impoverishment of identity.38
subjectivité profonde dont on ne peut plus dire qu’elle est un être.“ LEVINAS, E.: En découvrant l’existence avec
Husserl et Heidegger, Paris 1949, 42.
37
KOBUSCH ²1997, 278.
38
Cf.also JAMES, W.: The Principles of Psychology, New York 1890, reprint: Cambridge, MA 1977, 647ff.
11
III. Mnemonics and the genesis of identity
In the meta-dialogue identification (of the subject) is constituted only through memory, and
that refers here to „collective memory“.39 A concept of identity thus understood starts from
another - a Jewish - understanding of time that clearly differs from the Greek-European
tradition and is of immense importance also in the philosophy of Henri Bergson and his
theory of memory. Bergson points out how spatial our (western) understanding of time is and
consequently he distinguishes between spatial understanding of time which he calls temps and
the „actual time“ the durée (duration).40 In contrast to the western understanding of time,
returning to the Greek one is not to be separated from spatial ideas and therefore is to be
understood as a linear-rational one because the individual „moments“ or „periods of time“
can be arranged on an imaginary straight line which makes a subdivision into past, present
and future possible, the Jewish one distinguishes instead between fulfilled or unfulfilled
actions. Present does therefore not imply a moment from which the straight line of time runs
in both directions but an idea of „simultaneous experiencing“ of the speaker. There are
different attempts to explain this understanding of time, the most plausible one comes from
Achtner, Kunz and Walter who point out that the ancient Hebrews were nomads what
required a maximum amount of physical flexibility and a quick adaptation to constantly
changing environmental conditions. „According to this the Hebrew nomad replaces the
constant elements of temporal orientation [...] with a line of unique events. By that the unique,
not repeatable event and the sequence of such events become the constitutive element of
temporary orientation. On the other hand, in the case of an unique event, the ability to
experience must be linked, if it is supposed to be useful for temporal orientation. Not only
this, it must be possible to make consciousness aware of the event again and again, i.e. it must
remember the event in order to be able to make use of it in the future if necessary. [...] Such
unique events, however, take place above all in a social context.“41
The consequence of this is that instead of linear and isolated periods of time, a rhythm, an
alternation of, for example, evening-morning-evening determines the subjective experience of
time of the human being who consequently no longer requires a „spatialization“. The
39
See inter alia BERGSON, H.: Materie und Gedächtnis, Hamburg 81991 and ASSMANN, J.: Moses der Ägypter.
Entzifferung einer Gedächtnisspur, Wien 1998.
40
Cf. BERGSON, Materie und Gedächtnis, loc. cit., 80ff.
41
ACHTNER, W.; KUNZ, ST.; WALTER, Th.: Dimensionen der Zeit. Die Zeitstrukturen Gottes, der Welt und des
Menschen, Darmstadt 1998, 60.
12
consequence of this understanding of time is that not the (measurable) distance of time to the
events plays a role but their experienced intensity and their presence.42 The understanding of
time depends on the identity of the consciousness that is able to store and record memories so
that events can dominate that are far back in the past and would possibly have faded away for
a long time in the linear understanding of time. In connection with this Boman notices that
the Hebrew perfect tense describes those actions, events or conditions that become noticeable
to the speaking person at any moment as continuous, in the process of being carried out or
newly occurring ones. In this respect it does not matter if one views their occurrence as being
certain or whether one only subjectively imagines or desires it and therefore views it as
merely possible.43
The loss of the connection between time and space that is also relevant for the meta-dialogue
results in the relativisation or subjectification of time itself: instead of a moment, line or
stretch of time each change of time is now determined by means of individual moments of
life (i.e. memory). Present time consequently becomes „subjective simultaneity“ so that from
the observer’s point of view the past crosses over into the present or [...] past events project
themselves in incomplete form onto the consciousness of the rememberer. The feeling of
simultaneity is not a statement about chronological time, i.e. time in our sense, but about
psychological time, i.e. time in the Jewish sense. 44 Strict simultaneity is therefore the same as
psychological identity by combining two contents in one.45
These components that both determine the subject, the mnemonic on the one hand and the
active turning to the other (human being) on the other hand, have also found their equivalent
in Jewish mysticism as Tikkun Olam. This refers on the one hand to the restoration of the out
of joint world through preserving memory and to „social activity“ on the other. The ego
situated in the Jewish mystical tradition has therefore a social obligation that arises from the
42
Cf. also KOELLE, L.: Paul Celans pneumatisches Judentum. Gott-Rede und menschliche Existenz nach der
Shoah, Mainz 1997, 118.
43
BOMAN 1968, 125. This particular form of the Hebrew use of the tenses is also reflected in Bergson’s memory
theory. Here also Proust’s examination of the time should be called to mind.
44
In this connection it is interesting to refer to the etymological meaning of the Hebrew „now“: pa’am (now)
actually means step, stride, mark and comes from p(‘am = to push. The idea behind this term is according to
Boman the following: When a joint action is to happen simultaneously, for instance a march, a walk, a dance,
this starts by the leader’s making the first move, firmly and resolutely, perhaps with a preceding call: Pa’am!
Step! [...] When now an action is to be carried out at a certain moment, one makes again a particular gesture with
the hand but does not direct it towards a certain point but beats in the air so as to give a starting signal and says
zà! Now! [...] The Hebrew term n o w therefore denotes the s u b j e c t i v e s i m u l t a n e i t y whereas
our term now expresses the present time.Cf. ibid, 126f.
13
memoria to the dead. „The Tikkun includes the dialectics of memory and redemption because
the memory, the remembrance as a moral act, i.e. orientated towards justice, means work on
the Tikkun. To collect the ‘dispersed things’, the ‘fragments’ so that nothing is lost is,
expressed theologically, regarded as a preparation for the coming of the Messiah who will
bring about redemption.“46
With his conception of time, Levinas returns obviously to the Jewish understanding of time
from the „present time as simultaneous experience“, therefore synchrony.
The „time of the Other“, also called „distance-closeness“47, therefore also denotes in his
works a relation rather than an objectifiable chronos.
It is the appeal from the Other to the passive soi which gets it out of the status of the
objectlike, the „mere accusative“ and turns it into moi, the subject through which the personal
existence is constituted. At a grammatical level, imagery even duplicates this: a reflexive
pronoun becomes a personal pronoun!
„La personne n’est pas identique avec le ‘je’ transcendantal qui est le source de tout acte.
L’activité pratique volontaire en constitue une spécification et soppose l’activité pure du moi
‘ Moi éveillé’ dans l’attention, il détermine aussi la passivité de le conscience non atentive,de
le pensée implicite. Elle se réfère au moi puisque cette passivité comporte une marque
positive - elle tient au fait que le moi s’est détourné de la pensée qui émane de lui. [...] Enfin
dans toute cette théorie du temps, il s’agit du temps de la pensée théorique, d’un temps
formel, qualifié uniquement par les contenus qui le remplissent et qui participent à son
rythme sans le créer. En cela encoree Husserl rest fidèle à ses intentions métaphysiques
fondamentales - l’esprit est l’intimité d’un sens à la pensée, la liberté de l’intellection. Le
temps accomplit cette liberté; il ne préexiste pas à l’esprit, ne l’engage pas dans une histoire
où il pourrait être débordé.“48
The „being-with-oneself“ turns therefore into a „becoming-for“. Just as before when it was
possible to reconstruct both aspects of the rcs (dåvår) that constitute the meta-dialogue, the
root of a Hebrew verb is found for this understanding of personal existence: vhv (håyå)
45
KOELLE 1997, 118f.
KOELLE 1997, 393.
47
Cf.: „Distance qui est aussi proximité - laquelle n’est pas une coïncidence ou une union manquée, mais
signifie - nous l’avons dit - tout le surplus ou tout le bien d’une socialité originelle. Que la dia-chronie soit plus
qu’un synchronisme, que la proximité soit plus précieuse que le fait d’être donné, que l’allégeance à l’inégalable
soit meilleure qu’une conscience de soi, n’est-ce pas là la difficulté et la hauteur de la religion? Toutes les
descriptions de cette ‘distance-proximeté’, ne sauraient d’ailleurs être qu’approximatives ou métaphoriques,
puisque la dia-chronie du temps en est et le sens non figuré, le sens propre, et le modèle.“ LEVINAS, E.: Le temps
et l’autre, Paris ³1989, 10f.
48
LEVINAS, E.: En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, Paris 1949, 40f.
46
14
which means „to be“ as well as „to become“ and „to act“. To become and to be are
consequently perceived as a unity in Jewish thought: „The vhv (håyå) denotes the existence.
Only that to which a vhv (håyå) can be attributed is real; but we have seen again and again
that the real expresses itself in reality; therefore existence is identical with reality, it is not
resting but dynamic. [...] As found out above, the unity of to become, to be and to act in vhv
(håyå) seems strange to us because our thinking is orientated starting from the visible things.
When the thinking is, however, psychologically orientated, the synthesis is well
comprehensible because the person, in an acting existence that is continually on the point of
becoming, still remains identical with himself.“49
The mnemonics-practising ego follows here its own rhythm of memory which always
includes infinite exegesis of the empty/teaching text and which means in the end „practised“
exegesis - therefore ethical action. In this respect one can say now that the two halves of the
meta-dialogue consist, so to speak, of a „theoretical“ part, the unconcludable reading and
exegesis of the empty/teaching text. It follows from this that its „realization“ or „fulfilment“
consists of ethical action. Both aspects are inherent in the Hebrew word rcs (dåvår).
But how can rcs (dåvår) be realized simultaneously as „act“ and „word“ without dominating
one or the other aspect?
IV. Textological consequences
Levinas’ ethical ego that constitutes itself exclusively in the meta-dialogue, which as shown
above includes the process of social activity, has therefore only a part in the complete works
„of redemption“ when it makes its own individual contribution to reconstruction. In other
words, it is (personal) responsibility that constitutes the subject and exactly here is the
subjectivity of the subject - i.e. it is here that the „irreplaceability“, the „noninterchangeability“ has its roots.50
49
BOMAN 1968, 36f.
Cf. also: OLIVETTI, M.: „Il rifiuto - per quanto concerne l’etica - del riconoscimento come modello
intersoggettivo simmetrico, ovvero l’affermazione che il ‘faccia-a-faccia’ non è riducibile all’attività sintetica
dell’ intelletto, ovvero la affermazione che il ‘plurismo’ non si produce come la molteplicità di una costellazione
esposta ad uno sguardo possibile [...] culmina nel rinvio dal detto al dire proposto da Autrement qu’ être [...]. Il
rinvio dal detto al dire è un rinvio metapragmatico, e non smentisce l’importanza etica della pragmatica
linguistica, ma la invera.“ : Intersoggettivià, Alterià, Etica, in: Archivio di Filosofia, vol. 53, (1985), 265-288,
here 279.
50
15
Levinas’ insisting on the responsibility of the individual which cannot be substituted and
which consists in the „being-as“ (namely to be in a relation) as well as the ability to act means with regard to the construction of the meta-dialogue the regaining of meaning. The
ethical subject of the meta-dialogue also takes up the „meaning“ disputed in
poststructuralism, a meaning, however, that is beyond the binaristic structure - exactly what I
had described with the help of „a“ between 0 and 1. The speech of the meta-dialogue does not
concern the recognition (of the Other) because this would mean the compulsive return to the
problem of unity, but the speech of the meta-dialogue means contact without going off into
the irrational.51
„...dans sa fonction d’expression, le langage maintient précisément l’autre à qui il s’adresse,
qu’il interpelle ou invoque. Certes, le langage ne consiste pas à l’invoquer comme être
représenté et pensé. Mais c’est pourquoi le langage instaure une relation irréductible à la
relation sujet-object: la révélation de l’Autre. C’est dans cette révélation que le langage,
comme système de signes, peut seulement se constituer. L’autre interpellé n’est pas un
représenté, n’est pas un donné, n’est pas un particulier, par un côté déjà offert à la
généralisation. Le langage, loin de supposer universalité et généralité, les rend seulement
possibles. Le langage suppose des interlocuteurs, une pluralité. Leur commerce n’est pas la
représentation de l’un par l’autre, ni une participation à l’universalité, au plan commun du
langage. Leur commerce, nous le dirons à l’instant, est éthique.“52
The regaining of sense occurs in the meta-dialogue via the process to reach a „finding of
truth“ by means of a polyphonic language which does not lead to anything whatever. Sense is
rather imagined as „revelation of existence“53. The overcoming of the self-made borders of
the occidental thinking means therefore also to leave linguistically the system of the bivalent
logic which excludes a tertium non datur.54 The postmodern discussion has sufficiently
picked out as a central theme the outmoded linear thinking that arose from the connection of
time and space and consequently follows completely the laws of classical physics without
really showing a new way. Levinas tries to realize the „spaceless“ thinking that is subject to
the laws of fuzzy-logic in language by constructing a relationship of suspense between the
Boer is right to comment here: „... Levinas does not agree with Pascal when he sets the God of Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob against the God of the philosopher. Such an antithesis presupposes that the subject of faith cannot be
expressed in the language of reason. [...] Ontology is also based an experience of concrete events.“ DE BOER,
1985, 199.
52
LEVINAS, E.: Totalité et Infini, La Haye 1961, 45.
53
Cf. LEVINAS, E.: Dieu, la mort et le temps, Paris 1993, 175.
54
For every statement of the bivalent logic two fundamental principles are valid, the principle of excluded
contradiction that implies: No statement is at the same time true or false, and the principle of the excluded third
party. Every statement is either true or false.
51
16
„saying“ (dire) as a vital and unique turning of the ego towards the Other on the one hand and
the „said“ (dit) as its unavoidable linguistic generalization on the other hand. The „saying“ is
here not only the complement of the said that „supplies the statement in space and time in
addition to the given contents but describes that language constituting moment of the turning
towards the Other which cannot be reached within the time of the statement.“55
It is no longer a matter of excluding a sign or determining it by making distinctions. In other
words: the reconstruction of meaning in the meta-dialogue has to start from an uninterrupted
question-impetus and not from „explanations“, therefore from a basically Talmudic text
comprehension that cannot be put down to sense but understands comprehension as a
relation, as a meaning constituted dynamically and plurally that cannot be grasped in the
forms of language (the „said“ [dit]) but can rather be suggested. Stemberger distinguishes
between two basic types of logic by the means of which the Talmudic (i.e. the Halachic) is to
be interpreted: 1. A search for a solution that is carried out through argument by analogy
(Gazera schawa) and 2. as he calls it „the logic of the rabbi“, which can be called in my
opinion more generally „metonymical“ since it tries to infer for example the difficult (more
important) from the easy (less important) and vice versa (Qal wa-chomer). Such text
comprehension is based on the conviction that every conclusion is subjective and that there
can never be only one (definite) solution but the validity of every law put in another context
has to be re-examined.56
In literary theory Levinas is consequently situated between the rationalistic concept of
itérabilité represented by Greimas which starts from the Platonic idea of repetition, i.e. the
idea of the same, the invariable original and Derrida’s iterativity which would be, as Deleuze
calls it, described as „Nietzschean repetition“57. The latter starts from a world of differences
and implies that each object is unique and always differs from every other one. The world of
appearances is in this theory not any more the one of copies but the one of the Simulacra58
differing from one another, that cannot be put down to an idea any more. This figure of
repetition leads in Derrida to a repetition of the non-similar, non-identical and therefore not
only to a shift of sense but to a gradual decay of sense since the returning meanings do not
contribute to an accumulation of the entire sense but rather particularize or pluralize the text
55
SANDHERR, S.: Die heimliche Geburt des Subjekts. Das Subjekt und sein Werden im Denken Emmanuel
Levinas’, Stuttgart; Berlin; Köln 1998, 25f.
56
Cf. STEMBERGER, G.: Der Talmud. Einführungen, Texte, Erläuterungen, München ³1994, 55ff.
57
Cf. DELEUZE, G.: Différence et répétition, Paris (1968), 71993, 82ff.
58
BAUDRILLARD goes into this phenomenon in detail. Cf., Simulacres et simulation, Paris 1981.
17
by the fact that ever new deviations of the first meanings are added. This idea of
particularizing is not shared by Levinas in so radical a form. Iterability as the return of a sign
within a - so called „memorial space“ - prevents the total atrophy of semantics because in
this respect it does not completely give up its referentiality.
Levinas’ Talmudic text concept can therefore rather be described in literary theory by the
term „contiguity-intertextuality“ coined by Lachmann who refers to a text-text-relation that is
based upon contact and participation in tradition. This means for the metonymical relation to
an unknown text, that the intertextual strategy is carried out as an act of participation, the
continuation of the culture chain and finally as an act of culture confirmation in contrast to
the culture-rejecting intertextual procedure of the metaphorical relation to the pre-text which
sees itself rather as a counter-writer or re-writer of tradition.59
It seems remarkable to me that basically from the beginning logocentric synthetic thinking
always existed besides the „other“ analytical one. As in quantum mechanics the traditional
wave-particle-concept was expanded to fulfil the necessity of a new understanding of reality,
so too both components of the meta-dialogue (appeal and mnemonic) are to be seen as
complementary aspects of the perception of reality in language.
Philosophy as a form of life once demanded by Plato could - this is Levinas’ answer - only be
carried out through the principle of responsibility on the one hand which on the other hand
includes the Zachor, the memory. Also the latter distinguishes Levinas from Derrida in whose
thinking this ethical aspect is completely left aside. Levinas directly takes up the fear as
expressed in the Phaedrus-dialogue, that writing involves the danger of leading to an atrophy
of memory because it prevents the memory from being used regularly60 - by basing his text
comprehension on the rcs (dåvår) in order to show that writing cannot only contribute to the
polysemy of the word and a recurring memory but definitely also to a preservation of the
‘cultural memory’.
59
Cf. LACHMANN, R.: Gedächtnis und Literatur, Frankfurt a. M. 1990.
Cf. Socrates’ legend about the invention of the characters in Egypt: „So hast auch du jetzt als Vater der
Buchstaben aus Liebe das Gegenteil dessen gesagt, was sie bewirken. Denn diese Erfindung wird der Lernenden
Seelen vielmehr Vergessenheit einflößen aus Vernachlässigung des Gedächtnisses, weil sie im Vertrauen auf die
Schrift sich nur von außen vermittels fremder Zeichen, nicht aber innerlich sich selbst und unmittelbar erinnern
werden. Nicht also für das Gedächtnis, sondern nur für die Erinnerung hast du ein Mittel erfunden. [...] Wer also
eine Kunst in Schriften hinterläßt und auch wer sie aufnimmt, in der Meinung, daß etwas Deutliches und
Sicheres durch die Buchstaben kommen könne, der ist einfältig genug [...]. Denn dieses Schlimme hat doch die
Schrift, Phaidros, und ist darin ganz eigentlich der Malerei ähnlich: Denn auch diese stellt ihre Ausgeburten hin
als lebend, wenn man sie aber etwas fragt, so schweigen sie gar ehrwürdig still. Ebenso auch die Schriften. Du
könntest glauben, sie sprächen, als verstünden sie etwas, fragst du sie aber lernbegierig über das Gesagte, so
60
18
enthalten sie doch nur ein und dasselbe stets.“ Platon, Phaidros (274d-275a; 275c-d), Werke vol. V, edited by
Gunther, E., translation by F. Schleiermacher, Darmstadt 1981, 177f.
19
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