This is an author produced version of Public Values for Energy Futures : Framing,
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Butler, Catherine, Demski, Christina, Parkhill, Karen Anne orcid.org/0000-0002-9655-7414
et al. (2 more authors) (2015) Public Values for Energy Futures : Framing, Indeterminacy
and Policy Making. Energy policy. pp. 665-672. ISSN 0301-4215
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.01.035
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Public Values for Energy Futures: Framing, Indeterminacy and Policy Making
Authors: Butler, C.* Demski, C.^ Parkhill, K. Pidgeon, N.^ and Spence, A.x
Corresponding Author:
Dr Catherine Butler
University of Exeter
College of Life and Environmental Sciences,
Geography, Amory Building,
Rennes Drive,
Exeter, EX4 4RJ
Email: [email protected]
Author Affiliations
* University of Exeter, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, Geography, Amory
Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4RJ. Email: [email protected]
^Cardiff University, Understanding Risk Research Group, Tyndall Centre and Climate
Change Consortium of Wales, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, CF10 3AT,
UK. Email: [email protected]; [email protected]
University of York, Environment Department, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD. Email:
[email protected]
x
University of Nottingham, Horizon Digital Economy Research and School of Psychology,
Nottingham, England UK. Email: [email protected]
To be cited as: Butler, C. Demski, C. Parkhill, K. Spence, A. and Pidgeon, N. 2015. Public
Values for Energy Futures: Framing, Indeterminacy and Policy Making, Energy Policy,
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2015.01.035
1
Public Values for Energy Futures: Framing, Indeterminacy and Policy Making
Abstract
In the UK there are strong policy imperatives to transition toward low carbon energy systems
but how and in what ways such transitional processes might be realised remains highly
uncertain. One key area of uncertainty pertains to public attitudes and acceptability. Though
there is wide-ranging research relevant to public acceptability, very little work has unpacked
the multiple questions concerning how policy-makers can grapple with and mitigate related
uncertainties in efforts to enact energy systems change. In this paper, public acceptability is
identified as an indeterminate form of uncertainty that presents particular challenges for
policy making. We build on our existing research into public values for energy system
change to explore how the outcomes of the project can be applied in thinking through the
uncertainties associated with public acceptability. Notably, we illustrate how the public
values identified through our research bring into view alternative and quite different problem
and solution framings to those currently evident within UK policy. We argue that engagement
with a wide range of different framings can offer a basis for better understanding and
anticipating public responses to energy system change, ultimately aiding in managing the
complex set of uncertainties associated with public acceptability.
Key words: Public Acceptability, Uncertainty, Energy Policy, Energy transitions
1. Introduction
‘…the UK can move to a sustainable low carbon economy without sacrificing living
standards… However, it will require the public to accept new infrastructure and
2
changes to the way in which we heat homes, and to be prepared to invest in energy
efficiency…’ (Department of Energy and Climate Change, DECC, 2011: 12)
In current UK policy it is recognised that major energy system change is required to meet the
2050 80% climate change target and carbon budgets enshrined in the Climate Change Act
(2008). Transitions are identified as entailing multiple different forms of uncertainty with one
such set of uncertainties pertaining to public acceptability. Here, as the above quote indicates,
the uncertainties concern how publics are likely to respond to and engage with system
changes. In this paper, we build on our prior research into public values for energy system
change to explore how understanding these values is useful for thinking about uncertainties
associated with public acceptability in the context of transitions.
The previous research, on which this paper builds, developed a synthesis analysis combining
qualitative and quantitative datasets in order to reveal the core values that underlie public
perspectives on energy system transformation (see Parkhill et al., 2013). The broad premise
for this work was that the examination of public perspectives on complex socio-technical
issues requires understanding of what underpins people’s views; that is, it requires insight
into the more general positions that underlie particular concerns (e.g. Wynne, 1996;
Macnaghten, 2010). The term ‘values’ was used in the research to refer to these more general
concerns which underlay specific responses and denote them as representing salient cultural
resources (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) that people draw upon in forming their
preferences.
To illustrate by reference to this previous research, we found that a strong public preference
for solar energy was underpinned by a perception that it is ‘renewable’ ‘fair’, ‘just’ and
3
‘clean’. We argued that what is important in terms of public preferences, then, is why they
favour something, rather than what it is they favour, because were solar energy deployed in a
way inconsistent with these underlying beliefs, it would likely no longer be supported or
acceptable. In essence, we asserted that characterising and understanding the kinds of values
people draw on when evaluating a technology or aspect of energy transitions provides more
meaningful insight than simply knowing what public attitudes are at a given point in time.
These arguments around public values have been delineated in detail elsewhere (see Parkhill
et al., 2013; Demski et al. 2015).
In this article, we now take this further setting out subsequent analysis undertaken to explore
how the derived values set could be applied in managing uncertainties inherent to public
acceptability within energy policy decision-making. Specifically, we discuss the uncertainties
decision-makers face with regards to how publics will respond to energy system transitions
and illustrate how applying our understanding of public values can help with anticipating and
managing responses.
Through the paper, we will build on existing analyses of knowledge practices (e.g. Leach et
al. 2010) to argue that public acceptability represents a form of indeterminate uncertainty
where (necessarily) incomplete knowledge means that responses can never be predicted or
known fully in advance. In such contexts multiple authors have argued that conventional
expert-led approaches are limited and alternatives to understanding and decision-making are
required to anticipate outcomes and build resilience with regards to uncertainty (Jasanoff,
2003; Jasanoff and Kim 2013; Leach et al. 2007, 2010; Stirling et al. 2007). Central to
creating alternative approaches is an understanding of the ways that different people and
groups value different aspects of systems, goals or outcomes, and frame the issues in
4
fundamentally different ways (Leach et al. 2010; Jasanoff, 2003; see also Bickerstaff et al.
2008; Butler et al. 2013).
We apply the outcomes of our previous research to show that in the context of current UK
energy policy relatively narrow framings result in a narrower range of options being
considered, which do not reflect the complex and dynamic realities associated with public
acceptability. In this way, we illustrate how the public values derived from our research offer
a basis for an approach that can be used to interrogate different framings and contingencies,
build understanding of likely public responses, and ultimately, anticipate outcomes with
regards to public acceptability of energy system change.
In the following, we first discuss how we are conceptualising uncertainty with regards to
public acceptability setting out our arguments regarding the indeterminate nature of
uncertainties in this area. We then briefly outline the research methods and outcomes reported
elsewhere (Parkhill et al., 2013; Demski et al. 2015) as a basis for the subsequent analysis
and discussion. In the core analysis section, we first outline existing UK policy framings and
approaches to uncertainty with regards to energy system transitions, before moving to
illustrate the utility of the public values we have set out for engaging with uncertainties
associated with public acceptability. We propose that the values derived from our previous
research can be used to address uncertainty about public acceptability by reinterpreting
understandings of problems and solutions through a public lens. We conclude by critically
reflecting on current notions of public acceptability, and assumptions that appear to underlie
some existing approaches to public engagement within energy policy.
2. Conceptualising Uncertainty: Public acceptability and indeterminacy
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Uncertainty has been defined and conceptualised in a number of different ways ranging from
statistical and modelling based approaches, which generally focus on a quantification of
uncertainty, through to typologies and definitions that lend themselves more to qualitative
analysis (Adam and Groves, 2008; Pidgeon et al., 1992; Stirling, 2008). Given the nature of
this paper, we focus on approaches that aim to define uncertainty, offering typologies and
broader conceptual tools for thinking about uncertainty in complex policy contexts (Jasanoff,
2003; Jasanoff and Kim, 2013; Leach et al. 2007, 2010; Stirling et al. 2007; Wynne, 1992).
Several authors have defined uncertainty in comparison to other categories of knowledge (for
example, see Callon et al. 2009; Jasanoff, 2003; Knight, 1921; Leach et al. 2010; Smithson,
1989; Wynne 1992). Most of these authors in different ways have distinguished between risk
and uncertainty, as well as delineating further distinctions with regards to different forms of
uncertainty, for instance ignorance versus indeterminacy (Wynne, 1992), epistemic versus
aleatory uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Risk, in general, is defined as referring to a knowledge
context where relevant factors are well known and can be reliably quantified, as can the
chances of different outcomes. Uncertainty by contrast tends to be treated as more varied
within different categorisations. For some, uncertainty represents a distinct knowledge
category to be contrasted with ignorance or indeterminacy (e.g. see Leach et al. 2010;
Wynne, 1992). For others uncertainty takes on different forms and is differentiated according
to the extent to which it can be reduced or ameliorated (e.g. Knight, 1921; Callon et al. 2009).
These different approaches produce similar categorisations for interpreting uncertainty, with
most making distinctions between endemic forms of uncertainty and irreducible or
indeterminate uncertainties.
6
Endemic forms of uncertainty pertain to insufficiencies of models, necessities to set
boundaries thus exogenizing and making invisible certain possibilities, inaccuracy of
measurements, and other issues that systemically generate ignorance as a function of
constructing knowledge (Collingridge, 1980; Wynne, 1992; Hallegatte et al, 2012; Smithson,
1989). This form of uncertainty only becomes problematic when commitments to act are built
on the knowledge as if the endemic limitations (e.g. boundary setting) that result in ignorance
do not exist (Wynne, 1992).
Irreducible or indeterminate uncertainties refer to contexts where the causal chains and
networks are inherently open and as a consequence there is no scientific means of
establishing causality. Moreover, the factors and parameters salient to the emergent outcomes
are largely unknown and unpredictable; they do not merely lack definition in a cause and
effect system but are open-ended in the sense that outcomes depend on how a whole range
intermediate actors will behave (Wynne, 1992; see also Butler, 2008). Put another way, the
uncertainties associated are irreducible due to the nature of complex systems: they arise from
fundamentally complex or arbitrary behaviour (Hallegatte, 2012). This severely limits the
ability to generate probabilistic estimates of future(s) on which decisions can be based.
We argue here that public acceptability belongs to the category of indeterminacy or
irreducible uncertainty because the factors that influence public responses do not merely lack
definition within a cause-effect system but interact dynamically with multiple other
developments and occurrences. It will, in essence, never be possible to define all of the
factors affecting public responses in any given context because the social world is inherently
complex and not causally determined. Nor will it be possible to generate probabilistic
7
estimates of outcomes (in this case of public responses) because the multiple relevant factors
at play interact dynamically and are dependent on the particular social context.
This does not mean, however, that nothing can be known about public acceptability in any
given context but that the approach to engaging with uncertainty in this area must deliver a
basis for interrogation and exploration of multiple different contingencies. In this way a wider
sense of the dimensions of incomplete knowledge can be created helping avoid the dangers of
applying illusory, control-based approaches (e.g. probabilistic risk analysis) to complex
dynamic realities (Leach et al, 2010).
Leach et al. argue that central to creating an alternative approach to decision making under
conditions of indeterminate uncertainty is an understanding of the ways that different people
and groups value different aspects of systems and goals or outcomes, framing the issues in
fundamentally different ways. In contexts where only a narrow range of possible framings are
taken into account, analyses and responses are constrained from the outset - too narrow a
range of options are considered reducing the ability for pathways to be properly tailored to
inevitable changes and surprises that will emerge over time (see Leach et al. 2007; Stirling et
al. 2007). These arguments are echoed in other bodies of work such as science and
technologies studies (e.g. Jasanoff, 2003) and in the developing arena of responsible
innovation (Owen, Besssent, Heinz, 2013), which argue for the need to open up technical
assessments to wider social scrutiny and engagement. We are suggesting here that such
approaches for tackling uncertainty can have particular applications in policy engagement
with public acceptability.
8
We argue that our research into public values for energy system change is well placed to be
applied in elaborating the framings that publics bring to questions of transition and in
highlighting alternative pathways. By bringing into view such pathways and exploring the
ways in which they contrast with policy pathways, insight into public responses can be
garnered that can help to anticipate likely areas of contestation and opportunity. In the
following, we will unpack these arguments against the backdrop of current approaches to
managing uncertainty within UK energy policy. First, we briefly introduce the research and
findings (including the value-set derived from our research) as context for the analysis that
will be presented in this paper.
4. Research Background and Approach: Pubic Values for Energy System Change
The project involved three interlinked phases of empirical research. First, energy system
scenario and policy analysis along with stakeholder interviews, were undertaken to form an
understanding of policy and expert perspectives on energy system change. Second, in order to
develop insight into public values for energy system change, two major phases of research
were undertaken with members of the British public. Specifically, a series of in-depth
deliberative workshops held with publics in England, Scotland and Wales (participant n=68),
and a nationally representative online survey (Great Britain, participant n=2,441). Both of
these phases of research utilised an energy system scenario tool as a basis for engaging
members of the public with the notion of whole energy system change – namely the DECC
my2050 tool1. The my2050 tool represents a simplified version of the UK’s energy system
and interactively shows the impact of different system changes on carbon emissions targets
and energy security aims (see http://my2050.decc.gov.uk/).
1
The my2050 tool was developed by the digital democracy company Delib for the UK Department of Energy and Climate
Change and Sciencwise-ERC. The tool is publically available here: www.my2050.decc.gov.uk.
9
A synthesis analysis was undertaken for the deliberative workshops and survey data in order
to develop insights that best explained the data as a whole, and provided a coherent account
of public responses to energy system change. This was an iterative process involving
examining and re-examining, comparing and dissecting data via discussions amongst the
research team. The findings with regards to public values were the result of closely
examining both the similarities and differences within and between the datasets. Though the
research did reveal preferences and identify the key system elements more likely to provoke
public contestation (e.g. fossil fuels, Carbon Capture and Storage CCS), by setting out public
values for system change the project went beyond this to deliver insight into the deeper ideals
and concerns that underpin processes of preference formation. The public values pertaining to
energy system change identified from our datasets thus represent a set of general positions
that underlay the particular concerns that people held (see Butler et al. 2013b; Parkhill et al.
2013; Pidgeon et al., 2014).
Values that were identified as core to the formulation of public views about energy system
change can be summarised as follows: Efficiency and not wasting - in sum, being more
efficient (doing more with less) and minimising waste and overall energy usage is almost
universally seen as positive. Protection of environment and nature - in sum, being
environmentally conscious and respectful of nature through minimising intrusive and
destructive processes. Ensuring security and stability - in sum, making sure the energy
system is safe, reliable and accessible to citizens, both in terms of personal affordability and
national availability. Autonomy and power - in sum, being mindful of the importance of
autonomy and freedom both at national and personal levels. Social justice and fairness - in
sum, developing energy systems in ways that are open, transparent, fair, and attentive to the
effects on people’s abilities to lead healthy lives. Improvement and quality - in sum, thinking
10
in terms of long term trajectories, ensuring changes represent improvement and considering
their implications for quality of life (see Parkhill et al, 2013; Demski et al. 2015). These
represent the range of values that underpin people’s preferences and perceptions and give
insight to how publics think things should be with regards to energy system change in terms
of both processes and outcomes. They are, therefore, normative and pertain to desirable
system change, rather than beliefs about how the world is or ‘world views’ (see Parkhill et al.
2013; Demski et al. 2015).
Where the previous analysis identified what values publics bring to bear on thinking through
energy system change, here we introduce further original analysis undertaken to illustrate
how these values might be useful in guiding energy policy with regards to public
acceptability. Systematic and detailed review of current energy policy was undertaken to
discern policy pathways and identify key framings. In this, the concept of framing refers to
the particular contextual assumptions, as well as the forms of interpretation that different
groups bring to a problem, shaping how is bounded and understood. Framings thus constitute
storylines or narratives about the problem of energy system change; how it has arisen, why it
matters, and what to do about it (see Bickerstaff et al. 2008; Jasanoff, 2003; Leach et al.
2010). This was then qualitatively examined against the public values comparing and
contrasting in order to reveal where and how policy and publics framings meet and diverge.
In the following, we first provide a brief overview of current UK policy and approaches to
managing uncertainty relating to public acceptability. We then move to discuss the policy
framings in relation to the public values, focusing on differences and similarities in framings
across policy and publics. We show how the values can be used to highlight a much wider
11
range of framings that can provide a basis for stronger engagement with system dynamics and
uncertainties pertaining to public acceptability than is currently evident within policy.
Through the discussion we use some illustrative data points in the form of quotes and
statistics from the deliberative workshops and survey undertaken for the research. The full
empirical basis for the value-set found within the research is reported elsewhere (see Butler et
al. 2013b; Parkhill et al., 2013; Demski et al. 2013). Here, the intention is to illustrate the
application of the value-set as an outcome of the research for thinking about uncertainty
pertaining to public acceptability in whole energy system change.
5. Understanding Emergent Un/certainties: Framings in Public and Policy Energy
Futures
5.1 UK Energy Policy under Conditions of Uncertainty
Within the 2011 Carbon Plan the UK Government sets out its key policy scenario and
approach to delivering energy system transition, identifying the significance of public support
for the successful delivery of many core elements of change (DECC, 2011). We suggest that
current UK policy problematizes and frames the concept of energy system change in a clearly
defined and relatively narrow way. The key drivers for energy system transitions being
climate change and specifically the carbon targets as defined within the Climate Change Act
(2008), energy security characterised in terms of national security of supply, and cost
effectiveness which is to be attained through market mechanisms. The imperatives for
transitions are thus situated in these terms with implications for the proposed solutions. For
example, the importance of cost effectiveness means that a cost optimised scenario forms the
primary focus of policy despite the inclusion of other scenarios (not cost optimised) to
account for other aspects of uncertainty, such as in public acceptability (DECC, 2011).
12
Cost optimisation also sits at the heart of the government’s proposed approach to the process
of transition, which focuses on market competition and a commitment ‘to ensuring that the
low carbon technologies with the lowest costs will win the largest market share’ (DECC,
2011: 9). There is recognition that government intervention will be required in order to bring
low carbon technological options into competition with other energy sources, since the
current market will ultimately favour unabated fossil fuels as long as carbon is not taken into
account in an effective way. For this reason the government proposes intervening up to 2020
to bring Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs) and
nuclear energy into effective market competition. In this sense the government does not set
out any firm vision for change, such as 80% renewable energy by 2050 – as is the case within
the German Energiewende (Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2010) – because they believe that,
ultimately, the market will decide the share of any particular low carbon technological option.
The major tenets of the Carbon Plan are thus formulated as being nuclear, fossil fuels
(principally gas) with CCS, and RETs on the supply side, along with high reductions in
demand. The exact share of these different elements is, of course, extremely variable and
highly uncertain but in order to offer some indication of a cost-effective route to change
MARKAL modelling is employed to produce a plausible scenario to 2050.
The ‘core’ MARKAL run produced a cost optimised scenario that can meet the 2050 carbon
target, which in essence entails 33 Giga Watts (GW) of nuclear energy, 28 GW of fossil fuels
with CCS, and 45 GW of RETs including bioenergy. This supply side scenario is combined
with 50% reductions in demand on 2011 levels to be achieved through the development of
heat pumps and heat networks, energy efficiency (e.g. insulation), battery electric and fuel
13
cell vehicles, and reduced use of private vehicles. Though this is stated as representing only
one scenario for change it is translated into more concrete form through the carbon budgets,
which detail key abatement scenarios through particular time points (e.g. 2023 -2027). The
carbon budgets provide benchmarks towards the 2050 target in order to ensure that regular
progress is being made and provide a level of predictability for UK firms and households to
plan and invest for a low-carbon economy (Committee on Climate Change, CCC, 2014).
Currently the UK is in its second carbon budget period (2013-2017) but abatement scenarios
that follow through the lines of the Carbon Plan are in place up to the 4th carbon budget
(2023-2027).
From looking at both the Carbon Plan and carbon budgets we can see that high levels of
fossil fuels remain within the system in 2050. In terms of the timing of CCS deployment,
fossil fuels would remain unabated until 2025. CCS is envisaged to be retrofitted from 20252030 having been developed for commercial deployment within the current decade and early
2020s (CCC, 2013; DECC, 2012). Gas is expected to continue to dominate the market for
heating until 2030 as penetration of low carbon heat technologies develops (CCC, 2013;
DECC, 2012).
It is clear that significant public uptake of new transport and heating solutions are essential to
meeting the goals, as is public acceptance of the proposed low carbon supply solutions i.e.
RETS (including bioenergy and wind), nuclear, and fossil fuels with CCS. In general, the
Carbon Plan signals that questions remain around how publics are likely to respond to
proposed increases in nuclear energy facilities, whether electric cars and new forms of
heating systems will be acceptable, the extent to which increased use of biofuels will be
regarded un/favourably, how CCS is likely to be received, and, crucially, which combinations
14
of system changes are likely to garner the greatest or least support. It is possible, however, to
see multiple other inter-related areas of uncertainty that are less technologically focused such
as those regarding the public acceptability of different means for financing transitions,
governance arrangements, and questions around which approaches to the processes of change
are likely to generate support or increase the potential for contestation.
Within policy the extent to which members of the public are likely to accept and enact
various aspects of transitions is thus identified as an important area of uncertainty. A key way
of addressing this uncertainty is to run alternative scenario pathways to the core cost
optimised pathway (see also Eyre et al. 2011). These scenarios incorporate additional
assumptions with regard to costs, public responses, and technology development. For
example, the alternative scenario entitled “Higher nuclear, less energy efficiency” explores
the outcome of CCS not becoming commercially viable, offshore wind and solar showing no
significant cost reductions, and low public acceptability of energy efficiency measures. While
this represents an important means of engaging with some aspects of uncertainty, we would
argue that such an approach does not by itself provide a basis for grappling with the
indeterminate uncertainties endemic to public responses and acceptability.
Ultimately, in tackling uncertainties about public acceptability the government highlights the
importance of what it terms a coalition for change stating that ‘to make this transition,
industry, the Government and the public need to be pulling in the same direction’ (DECC,
2012). We argue that this process of establishing a coalition is likely to be particularly
difficult without engagement with the broader and more diverse set of framings that can be
found within public narratives. This policy background represents, then, the context for our
argument and forms an important precursor to the following discussion.
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5.2. Comparing Public and Policy Framings through Values
5.2.1. The Problem(s) of Energy System Change
As the above discussion indicates, in the UK policy framing there is a quite clearly defined
problematization (see Miller and Rose, 2008) which focuses on climate change, energy
security, and cost effectiveness formulated in specific ways (e.g. meeting the UKs 80%
reduction target for 2050). Through our comparative examination of these policy framings
and the values derived from our research, we found that publics incorporated a much wider
range of issues within their problem framings. These include concerns about climate change,
energy security and cost but also a whole range of other issues. In the following, we work
through the key tenets of current UK policy framings and pathways contrasting with public
framings that were elicited through our re-examination of the values. We begin with
underlying interpretations of the problem of energy system change or, to put it another way,
storylines about why is has arisen as a problem and why it matters.
A key area where public and policy framings diverge is related to the nature of the UK
energy market. Publics included in their consideration of why the energy system needed to
change issues they identified with the existing market system that underpins UK energy
production and distribution. In particular, they saw the market system as failing to operate
properly on its own terms because they recognised that there were severe limits to their
consumer power within current arrangements:
Participant 1: …part of the problem is that they have opened up the market place and
the market place now dictates what we pay whereas before it was centralised and
16
government-led and a fair price for all, now we swap and the next week they put their
prices up and you wish you stayed with that one
Participant 2: I think it does need to be uniform because at the minute we are playing
in a monopoly and we are losing because they are getting mega big bucks from the
profits.
This particular set of issues relates centrally to the values of Social Justice and Fairness and
Autonomy and Power. Here the problem of energy systems is one which incorporates concern
about the particular nature of the market-led system and its perceived under-regulation. It is
clear that though cost-effectiveness is central to the policy problem framing and though
political discourse, in general, does engage with some aspects of these values (e.g. through
strategies to address fuel poverty, or current energy market competition investigations), these
matters are not situated as central to that which should be addressed through energy system
transition. Within current Coalition policy, at least, the relatively narrowly defined terms for
energy system change do not problematize current market arrangements in the ways that
publics consistently did.
Publics further situate climate change as just one element within a much wider set of
concerns about environment and human/nature relations, as encapsulated in the value
Protection of Environment and Nature. This value encompasses the notion that the energy
system should contribute to (or at least not detract from) the general healthiness and
wellbeing of the environment – including society and the biosphere. As such, policy
imperatives principally focused on climate change, rather than wider environmental concerns
fail to bring into view important – to the public – additional environmental contexts and
issues. We argue that as a result, the narrower problem framings found in policy contexts
17
reduces the capacity for considering a fuller range of responses and for anticipating public
responses.
Energy security is also incorporated in public framings alongside cost (effectiveness), though
the focus in terms of these issues differs from policy once again in two key ways. First,
energy security is situated as part of a set of concerns about Security and Stability but in
contrast to policy which implicitly locates it at the national level and in terms of energy
supply, for the public, energy security is primarily located at the personal level. Specifically,
security and stability is connected to the ability to maintain system function – such as taking
children to school, eating, going to hospital – while undergoing change (see Leach, 2008). In
this regard, it further incorporates issues of cost and energy affordability, i.e. people place
emphasis on their ability to afford to use energy and gain access to energy services, rather
than only on securing national supplies (e.g. of fossil fuels).
Second, cost is of high concern for publics but this is not related solely to market price and
cost effectiveness, rather the issues are situated within the broader frame of affordability. In
situating concern about costs in terms of affordability, a wider and different range of
solutions to cost issues come into view, such as subsidies for low income households and
developments to ensure cost stability over and above lowest cost possible. It is worth adding
to this that energy is not currently viewed as particularly affordable, with current energy
prices and increasing unaffordability representing a key area of concern for publics (e.g. 73%
are (fairly or very) concerned about electricity and gas becoming unaffordable).
18
Participant: I generally worry about the price because the way things are going, is
like you know you wake up the following day and the energy company will just tell me
that there will be an increase in price, and there is nothing you can do about it.
There are a further set of differences between policy formulation and public framings that
emerge around the problem of demand reduction. Though there is congruence around the
need to reduce demand (81% of respondents wanted to reduce their energy use), there are
differences in terms of how this might be achieved. Specifically, in policy the problem is
formulated as one of consumer uptake relating to specific purchasing decisions (e.g. buying
electric vehicles), behavioural change and public acceptance of policy and expert prescribed
approaches. In public conceptions, by contrast, changes in demand were positioned as
requiring a wider sense of the issues and as needing to be situated within a longer-term vision
for change. This would provide a basis for locating the calls being made upon citizens to
“behave differently” within a broadly formulated narrative about change processes. To
illustrate, there was frustration around a lack of communication (both formal and informal)
regarding the potential for moves to electrification.
Participant: I think [refers to other participant] is right, people are being told
different things. I watch a lot of home improvement shows and they always say
upgrade the boiler to an energy efficient combi-boiler. If you are trying to encourage
people to go to electric shouldn’t they be telling them to do that rather than install
something which will cost 5-6 grand to have it installed when 20 years down the line
you might not have any gas to use it? It is mixed messages getting people to actually
understand why they should be doing something with the bigger picture. I doubt most
people will actually sit down and talk about it properly, they will just take what they
19
think are the facts like in the 70’s electric was more expensive but perhaps they don’t
know.
In this sense public formulations of the problem that necessitates energy system change do
converge with policy framings but only in a limited way. Centrally, examination of the values
highlights a much broader and subtly different set of concerns being brought to bear by
publics than those that are central to policy problem framings. This has important
implications for the solutions that are deemed suitable across policy and public perspectives
precisely because ‘the activity of problematizing is intrinsically linked to finding ways to
remedy it’ (Miller and Rose, 2008; 15).
5.2.2 Solutions and Pathways for Energy Futures
In terms of perspectives on responses and solutions, or ‘what to do about it’, public visions do
again converge with policy on some of the key areas, specifically reductions in fossil fuels,
increases in RETS (though publics are concerned about the socio-environmental
sustainability of biofuels), and the need for reductions in demand. There are also clear
differences between public and policy pathways. In terms of supply, publics favour greater
levels of RETs, and nuclear energy forms a much smaller part of public scenarios than the
main policy scenario – our evidence indicates that support is only likely to extend to
replacement rather than expansion. They also favour lower levels of fossil fuels and remain at
best ambivalent about the development and use of CCS.
These divergences are explicable when we look back at the problem framings. For example,
ambivalence about CCS can be understood when we consider that climate change forms only
one small part of public views on what requires changing.. That is to say, when the focus is
20
on climate change as a problem framing, CCS arguably represents a suitable solution.
However, when the problem framing situates climate change as just one element of wider
concerns about socio-environmental degradation, CCS no longer constitutes a solution as the
other forms of environmental degradation associated with fossils fuels continue to be an
issue.
In line with current policy discourse, publics are also favourable toward reductions in demand
and they highlight the need for support to achieve this. Where differences arise is the greater
emphasis in public visions on regulatory approaches to change, while the policy focus
remains on market mechanisms. Market mechanisms were widely held by those involved in
our research to be unlikely to achieve the scale of change required because of the high levels
of uptake necessary.
Participant: There are always going to be a lot of people who don’t care about this…
they want to get in their car, do what they want to do… it is about educating people,
but some people don’t want to be educated or don’t care, so sometimes you have to
force them… incentives and grants are a good idea [though] …
The nature of problem framings has important implications for the solutions that are
proposed. A further example arises with regards to the narrow framing of the problem in
terms of climate change, energy security and cost effectiveness. This excludes other issues
that were central to public framings, for example, relating to perceptions of the relationship
between private, state and civil spheres in the energy sector and responsibility for change. As
discussed previously, energy markets were perceived as not operating in the ways that they
should. This has implications for the acceptability of some responses in terms of financing
21
energy system transitions, such as through adding costs on to bills. Participants in the
research questioned the fundamental premise that energy system change – a societal good –
should be financed through a private mechanism i.e. customer bills. This core concern about
the mechanisms through which the energy system is operated and governed, gives rise to a
different set of problematizations that have implications for solutions and are also intimately
connected with other aspects of system change.
A final important area of divergence between public and policy pathways concerns the
process of change itself and how change is undertaken. This connects centrally with the
public value of Improvement and Quality – embedded within this is a focus on long-term
trajectories for change toward systems that are broadly commensurate with the values as an
interconnected whole. Public configurations of the challenge, in this regard, did not focus on
time points, such as 2050, but on the idea of setting the UK on a trajectory toward
fundamental change of the kind that is normatively desirable. This was tied to an underlying
set of understandings regarding what constituted a ‘transition’. Crucially, negative
perspectives with regards to CCS and biofuels were often predicated on a view that these
were non-transitions in the sense that they did not address the root causes of problems and
represented means for sustaining aspects of systems viewed as problematic (e.g. dependency
on fossil fuels; global trading of finite and limited resources).
Participant: We have been using oil and gas and coal for years and years and we all
know it creates smog and all the rest of it… It (CCS) is a cleaner version of that, but
the issue is , as far as I see it, we are still using materials that will disappear if we
carrying on the way we’re using them… it is a difficult one as we are still looking for
oil and we may find some big new oil fields that will keep us going for a hundred
22
years, but we are using the Earth’s resources which will run out, so although it’s
cleaner it feels like it is a short term option… maybe just cleaning up as opposed to
let’s look at this again and let’s look to the future longer term even beyond 2050. It
will take a long time to build this infrastructure and all these resources are being
eaten whereas there are other energy sources around us which feel a bit longer term,
like the sun.
This notion of a long-term vision is, however, also where the space emerges through which
we find latitude for compromise on current and short-medium term system configurations and
for addressing the values, which are inherently aspirational. There is significant room for
compromise on some of the more challenging aspects of divergence (such as nuclear and to a
lesser extent CCS) if these are proposed in the context of a longer term trajectory toward the
kind of change that is broadly commensurate with public values (see also Parkhill et al.,
2013). Establishing such a long-term vision around which diverse publics can coalesce
represents a particularly difficult challenge within the UK context. This is because current
UK policy is focused on a market led solution that, by its very nature, does not embed a long
term vision for change of a particular kind, rather end points and outcomes are left largely
open and for the market to decide.
6. Concluding Discussion and Policy Implications
Through the analysis discussed here, we have opened up understanding of how publics frame
energy system change and begun to illustrate how and why public and policy pathways both
converge and diverge, as well as highlighting some opportunities to develop constructive
compromises. In the discussion which follows we move to unpack what this means for policy
engagement with uncertainties relating to public acceptability of energy system transitions.
23
Overall our analysis is indicative of a far narrower set of framings within policy than those
that arise from public perspectives on energy system change. This highlights a closing down
within policy around particular framings, with corresponding commitments to particular
pathways. Here, we have argued that this is problematic for engaging with the uncertainties
associated with public acceptability because it obscures the wider range of framings that are
important for UK publics, creating blind spots in the way that the policy-public relationship is
understood and managed around energy system issues.
We have highlighted some of the key ways in which publics converge and, crucially, diverge
from policy framings, bringing into a view alternative interpretations of the problem and
pathways for change. The ‘opening up’ (Leach et al. 2010) that we have undertaken through
this analysis offers in its own right insight important for policy regarding the different ways
that publics engage with questions of energy system change. More broadly, however, such an
‘opening up’ offers a basis for a greater level of reflexivity about and inclusion of different
framings within policy. This brings at least two important possibilities for enhancing
capacities to engage with uncertainties associated with public acceptability.
First, insights into wider public framings offer possibilities for anticipating shocks and
uncertainties with regards to the evolution of public views, as things change and emerge in
any given context. We know that there is significant contingency around how developments
play out in particular contexts; for example, with regards to local contestation about
infrastructure development, like fracking, or the enactment of change in the area of energy
demand reduction. By understanding where public and policy pathways diverge, provides one
24
basis from which to interpret why contestation has arisen around any particular set of
developments, thus allowing for greater purchase on how to resolve conflicts.
Second, and, perhaps more importantly, the analysis provides possibilities for engaging with
uncertainties by offering insights important for developing a coalition for change between
government and publics (DECC, 2012). In contrast to simply anticipating shocks, informing
the development of such a coalition represents a more proactive form of applying the analysis
we have presented here. We argue that the creation of a coalition is likely to necessarily
involve broadening out from a narrow focus on climate change targets, security of energy
supplies, and cost effectiveness to include wider aspects of concern (such as the configuration
of energy markets), as well as re-interpreting and re-imagining already acknowledged issues
within policy (such as affordability and energy security). Building from a renewed basis in
terms of problem framing that accounts for more diverse public values and interpretations, is
likely to offer a far greater set of opportunities for convergence on possible solutions. Indeed,
constructing a long term notion of where change is heading requires agreement on what needs
to be changed in the first instance and on the imperatives driving change. If these broad
guiding visions can be put in place then it is likely that greater room for compromise can be
found. However, compromise is necessary on both sides – by both political elites and
publics. Central to this is a reconfiguration of how public acceptability itself is understood
within policy.
Within policy, the understandings of what public acceptability actually means are in
themselves extremely narrow, largely focusing on attaining public support for pre-defined
and overwhelmingly technological solutions. We argue here, however, rather than addressing
the issue of public acceptability as one of building acceptance of and investment in expert
25
and stakeholder defined pathways, there is a need to engage with public perspectives
regarding how the problem itself and the pathways are constituted. The processes associated
with understanding, managing and acting to reduce uncertainties with regards to public
acceptability, are thus ones that require a different formulation of what public acceptability
means; i.e. that it does not simply concern persuading people to accept or support pre-defined
problem framings and pathways.
Building from this basis, the task then becomes one of iteratively reformulating problem and
solution understandings so that public perspectives are incorporated at the outset and form
part of the thinking about pathways toward low carbon systems. This is not to diminish or
replace the role of expert understandings but to combine and expand the knowledge bases on
which decisions are predicated. Equally, this does not mean that there can be no role for
approaches which are less favourable from public perspectives (e.g. CCS) but that engaging
with public interpretations in open and inclusive ways that allow for the interrogation of
different approaches to change is likely to be of high importance for acceptability of these
more contentious options (also see discussion on responsible innovation e.g. Owen et al.,
2013).
In line with much previous work, we have argued that framings can not only construct a
particular definition of the problem but also, whether explicitly or implicitly, of the kind of
solutions that should be adopted. These processes may or may not be strategic, or even
intentional, but are fundamentally political in their consequences (see Bickerstaff et al. 2008;
Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Stirling et al. 2007). This has particular implications in the
context of energy system change because the nature of problem framing differs considerably
between policy and publics. We have highlighted how opening up framings within policy is
26
likely to be central to addressing the full implications of dynamics and incomplete knowledge
or indeterminacy with regards to public acceptability. Further, we have illustrated how the
values set out through our previous research offer a basis for such opening up and argued that
this is likely to be required to build a coalition for change which could, in turn, open up
possibilities for compromise within public responses. This is because less desirable aspects of
system change (such as some continuation of fossil fuels within the system) are likely to be
more acceptable in a context where there is a greater sense that the full range of responses
and concerns have been considered.
Problematically, at present the current governance context for energy system change does not
appear to provide a strong basis for the development of such reflexive and inclusive
reinventions. Public views are variously represented in media and political discourse about
energy systems as fickle, dogmatic, and irrational (e.g. see Guardian, 2014). This means that
engagement with public values and the broader framings that they imply can often be at best
very limited and at worst dismissive. Within technological research more broadly, there is
perhaps greater cause for optimism in the possibilities for more inclusive, open engagement
as the significance of responsible research and innovation, which encapsulates the need for
greater reflexivity and inclusivity as outlined above, moves up the agenda of key research
funders (see Owen, Besssent, Heinz, 2013). In concluding, we suggest that by engaging more
fully with public framings of energy system transitions the possibilities for developing a
coalition for change, and realising a more sustainable future energy system, could be
significantly enhanced.
7. Acknowledgements
27
This research formed part of the programme of the UK Energy Research Centre and was
supported by the UK Research Councils under the Natural Environment Research Council
award NE/G007748/1 (grant NE/I006753/1). Additional support was provided by the
Leverhulme Trust (F/00407/AG). The authors would like to thank *** for their contributions
to the research and comments on earlier drafts, two anonymous reviewers, and all of the
research participants.
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