CHAPTER FOUR
PERSPECTIVES FROM CONFLICT THEORY
4.1 Search for an Applicable Theory
In order to recognize and understand the coping strategies applied in center-periphery conflict,
we need an operative idea of conflict itself and of what typically makes up a conflict.
Although conflicts are natural and normal developments within organizations, they are not
everyday events – at least, Church center-periphery conflicts are not. Within the Catholic
Church, manifest conflict at the topmost level diverges from what is ordinarily a more placid
experience of leadership and decision making. The dynamics of conflict situations can be
distinguished, in their intensity and in the opportunities and dangers they bring to light, from
the pattern of day-to-day leadership situations. Thus far I have presented a picture of the
Church’s usual situation as a specific kind of organization pursuing its goals in the context of
modernity. In this chapter I will present a descriptive theory of social conflict that enables us
to see conflicts (as integrated wholes) in terms of the strategic activity that comprises them.
My search for a theory that would serve the purpose just specified has brought me into contact
with a wide variety of studies of social conflict. Especially helpful by way of their provision
of a composite overview of the field have been Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, Gangel and Canine
1992, Rahim 1992, Väyrynen 1991, Rahim 1990, Dahrendorf 1988, Shawchuck 1986b, Fraser
and Hipel 1984, Schellenberg 1982, Tjosvold and Johnson 1983, Himes 1980, Schelling
1980, Zartman 1978, Snyder and Diesing 1977, Filley 1975, Mack and Snyder 1973, Patchen
1969, Fink 1968, Gamson 1968, Iklé 1968, Simmel 1966, Coser 1964, Boulding 1962, and
The Journal of Conflict Resolution (1956-present). Consultation of these and other works has
shown that not all theoretical approaches to the handling of conflict suit the purposes at hand
equally well. Among the reasons for not choosing certain approaches: some rely on
mathematical models that are not easily transferable, e.g., Schelling 1980, Zwartman 1978,
Patchen 1969; some offer conflict models that are more static than dynamic, e.g., Rahim
1992; some are focused exclusively on nation states and not organizations, e.g., Iklé 1968 and
Snyder and Diesing 1977; some are grounded in problematic ideological standpoints, e.g.
Dahrendorf 1988; some are more prescriptive than descriptive, e.g. Shawchuck 1986b.
In particular, I have found myself in need of a descriptive perspective that not only specifies
how conflicts hold together (preferably employing terminology and models that are standard
enough to allow for cross comparisons within the field of conflict theory), but also gives
special attention to the concept of strategy and to the role (motivations, actions) of individual
participants in the conflict. Since I am attempting to identify coping strategies applied in
center-periphery conflict and to integrate these into a coherent account of the conflict as a
whole, I have sought a conflict theory that relates the picture of the entire conflict to the
choices of opposed decision makers who, in more or less intentional fashion, attempt to
achieve designated goals while taking into account the conditions of the decision making
environment, and especially the actions and reactions of other conflict participants. In the
work of Pruitt and Rubin (1986: Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement) I
have found such a perspective.
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4.2 Pruitt and Rubin on Conflict Handling
Pruitt and Rubin’s theory satisfies the needs identified above by providing an integrated
picture of conflict handling in general (it “transcends the various levels and arenas of society”
– p. 187) that is focused on the role of strategic choice. Their descriptive, social psychological
approach is built around a few basic observations. Actors act according to personal “interests”
(feelings about what is basically desirable), translating their interests into “aspirations”
(actions toward a goal). Those aspirations at times clash with the aspirations of others. The
handling of this clash (which strategies of conflict management are adopted) depends largely
on the relative levels of concern for one another’s outcomes and the perceived feasibility of
success in obtaining desired outcomes. And finally, conflicts tend to play out in stages of
escalation, stalemate and settlement.
For the purposes of our own study, Pruitt and Rubin’s perspective offers the following
advantages: 1) it focuses on individual behavior (which fits with my attention to the behavior
of individual bishops); 2) it foregrounds the concept of strategy (in a way compatible with my
own understanding, as articulated in section 3.5.3); 3) it identifies possible tactics that may
serve given strategies; 4) it helps us to associate strategies with distinct stages of conflict; 5) it
descriptively accounts for the whole of the conflict experience; and 6) it offers insight into the
role of third parties. In short, it supplies us with a necessary referential framework (based on
studies of how parties commonly behave in conflict), by means of which we can better grasp
our chosen case. Just as importantly, Pruitt and Rubin supply these advantages in a
straightforward and highly accessible presentation. Complexities are honored without being
allowed to overwhelm the interpretive process. Though all of the conflict writings mentioned
in the previous section offer valuable reflections (models, theories, insights, etc.) in their own
right -- with many employing terms and ideas that are functionally equivalent to (or viable
alternatives to) those offered by Pruitt and Rubin -- I have decided that more coherence can be
brought to my own work by concentrating on the single approach I have found to be most
advantageous. Given that Pruitt and Rubin’s theory is in fact well within the mainstream (like
countless others, for example, they draw heavily on Blake and Mouton’s (1964) “managerial
grid”), I trust that this decision will not lead me toward idiosyncratic conclusions.
Practically speaking, I will use their theory as follows. In this chapter I will summarize their
theory and highlight aspects that may prove especially relevant to our study of centerperiphery conflict. It is fair to say that this chapter continues the process of theoretical
sensitization carried out in chapters two and three, in that it supplies orientating concepts for
our confrontation of the empirical example. After having confronted the Rome-Hunthausen
case, I will revisit Pruitt and Rubin’s theory to see how the theory and the empirical example
shed light on one another.
But first, a general overview of Pruitt and Rubin’s approach.
4.2.1 Sources of Conflict
Conflict, according to Pruitt and Rubin, is found in almost every realm of human interaction,
but not all interaction necessarily involves conflict (p. 6). Thus there is no surprise that
conflict should arise in the context of decision making on behalf of the Church.
The results of conflict can be positive or negative. Among the positive functions of conflict
identified by Pruitt and Rubin are (1) its role in nourishing social change; (2) its ability to
(creatively) reconcile people’s legitimate interests; and, by virtue of the first two functions,
(3) its power to foster group unity. (The potential for conflict to serve the purposes of group
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unity is, of course, highly pertinent to our study of Church center-periphery conflict.) Along
this same line, Coser (1956, 31), following Simmel (1955), observes that conflict facilitates
socialization by helping to establish and maintain group boundaries, by allowing for the
ventilation of hostilities, and by establishing and maintaining the balance of power. Robbins
(1992, 182-183) notes that conflict can improve organizational performance (see also
Tjosvold & Johnson 1983, 8-9). And Janis (1982) asserts that it counteracts “groupthink” and
the too-ready acceptance of decisions based on weak assumptions. The negative functions of
conflict, however, are also familiar. Pruitt and Rubin point out that conflict is fully capable of
“wreaking havoc on society” (p. 7). Within organizations, Rahim (1992) has asserted that
conflict can damage communication, create distrust and suspicion, and diminish levels of
organizational loyalty and performance. In short, organizations, the Church included, have
strong reason to want to manage conflicts so that functional outcomes emerge to the exclusion
of dysfunctional outcomes.
Pruitt and Rubin understand conflict to be “perceived divergence of interest.” “Interests” are
“people’s feelings about what is basically desirable” and they “tend to be central to people’s
thinking and action, forming the core of many of their attitudes, goals and intentions” (p. 10).
Interests translate into “aspirations.” One aspires toward a particular “goal,” which is “the
more or less precise end toward which one is striving.” At the same time, knowing that not all
goals are fully achievable, one envisions a minimally acceptable level of achievement – a
“standard” in regard to the goal. Achievement below the standard is considered inadequate by
the aspiring party. Conflict arises when one party perceives that satisfaction of its aspirations
precludes satisfaction of the other party’s aspirations, and vice-versa.
For Pruitt and Rubin, three elements converge to produce conflict: “Party’s level of aspiration,
Party’s perception of Other’s level of aspiration, and the apparent lack of integrative
alternatives” (p. 13). All three elements must be present for conflict to arise.
Determinants of Party’s level of aspiration (based on realistic or idealistic considerations)
include: Party’s past achievements (raising aspirations); Party’s perception of own advantage
in strength (raising aspirations); normative justification (underwriting Party’s aspirations in
the face of incompatible aspirations by Other); invidious comparisons (leading to a rise in
aspirations); formation of struggle groups (bringing a rise in aspirations).
When Other’s aspirations are low or flexible they do not threaten Party, thus precluding
conflict. But Party may perceive that Other’s objectives are too high to be compatible with his
own, with conflict as a result. Among the circumstances that may invite Party to perceive that
Other’s aspirations are incompatibly high are hard experience with frustration at the hands of
Other and distrust of Other’s motives based on other knowledge.
Pruitt and Rubin call alternatives satisfying both parties’ aspirations “integrative solutions” (p.
18). The perception that such alternatives are not at hand is the third element that must be
present for conflict to develop. The perception that such integrative solutions are not available
may be rooted in a realistic assessment (mutually-desired resources may in fact be scarce), but
it may also be the product of a negative view of the other party which makes one reluctant to
investigate solutions creatively.
4.2.2 Strategic Choice
When faced with perceived divergence of interest, a party must decide how it will proceed.
Party has a high aspiration, so does Other, and the two appear to be incompatible. What now?
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Pruitt and Rubin, building on the work of Blake and Mouton (1964, 1979) and others (see p.
28) posit five strategic options:
1. Contending: Trying to prevail; pursuing one’s own aspirations without regard to
opposing party’s aspirations.
2. Problem solving: Trying to satisfy own and other party’s aspirations. Agreements
reached through problem solving may take the form of an integrative solution or a
compromise.
3. Yielding: Lowering one’s own aspirations as a form of concession.
4. Inaction: Doing nothing; temporarily withdrawing from the efforts to resolve the
controversy.
5. Withdrawal: Removing oneself permanently from the conflict handling process.
Pruitt and Rubin call the first three strategies “coping strategies” (p. 3) because they involve
“some relatively consistent, coherent effort to settle conflict.” These contrast with inaction
and withdrawal, which are not considered to be coping strategies because they are approaches
of pause or abandonment. Note that Pruitt and Rubin’s definition of “coping strategy” differs
from my own, stated earlier in section 3.5.3. By my definition, all five of the above-named
strategies have the possibility of being coping strategies, since each can serve as an
orchestrated attempt to manage conflict advantageously. From this point forward in the study,
I will not retain Pruitt and Rubin’s concept of coping strategy but will stay with my own.
One should also note that the five general strategies identified by Pruitt and Rubin function on
a lower conceptual level than the context-specific strategies I identified at the end of chapter
three. Whereas the five strategies listed above can account for activity in any social conflict,
my effort in this study is to identify coping strategies that are highly specific to Church
center-periphery conflict. Therefore, at a later point in this presentation (see section 5.4), I
will distinguish between the five general coping strategies and more specific kinds of coping
strategies that in some sense reflect the more general strategies.
Most conflict situations call forth a combination of the above-named strategies. The authors
propose two theoretical notions which help us to understand why a given strategy is adopted.
The first is summarized in a dual concern model (pp. 28-35). The second is conceptualized as
the perceived feasibility perspective (pp. 35-41). The two theoretical notions focus on distinct
and separate determinants of strategic choice. An explanation of each follows.
The dual concern model (see figure below) recognizes two types of concerns: concern about
one’s own outcome (abscissa) and concern about other’s outcome (ordinate). These concerns
range from indifference (the zero point of the coordinate) to very great concern.
The two concerns in this model are defined as follows: Concern about own outcomes
means placing importance on one’s own interests – one’s needs and values – in the
realm of the dispute. People with a strong concern about their own outcomes are highly
resistant to yielding; in other words, their aspirations tend to be rigid and high. Concern
about the other’s outcomes implies placing importance on the others’ interests – feeling
responsible for the quality of the other’s outcomes. This concern is sometimes genuine,
involving an intrinsic interest in the other’s welfare. However, it is more often
instrumental, being aimed at helping the other in order to advance one’s own interests.
(p. 28)
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The Dual Concern Model
(Pruitt and Rubin, 1986)
+
PROBLEM
SOLVING
YIELDING
CONCERN ABOUT
OTHER’S OUTCOMES
INACTION
CONTENDING
+
CONCERN ABOUT OWN OUTCOMES
FIGURE 4.1
The dual concern model holds that: problem solving is encouraged when there is a strong
concern about both own and other’s outcomes; yielding is encouraged by a strong concern
about only the other’s outcomes; contending is encouraged by a strong concern about only
one’s own outcomes; inaction is encouraged when concern about both parties’ outcomes is
weak. The model makes no prediction about when withdrawing is embraced as a strategy.
Pruitt and Rubin believe that compromising need not be seen as a separate strategy. They
understand it to be the product of less-than-robust problem solving or of simple yielding by
both sides. (Variants on the dual concern model have been applied to the study of Churchbased conflicts. See, e.g., Van der Ven 1996 and Gangel & Canine 1996.)
The strength of concern for one’s own outcome varies with the person and situation, but
certain determinants can be identified (pp. 29-31). These include: the importance of values
affected by the outcomes; the relative importance of other outcomes pursued at the same time;
one’s own fear(lessness) regarding conflict itself. Concern for the outcome for one’s group
(and not just for oneself) is also a significant determinant of the strength of one’s own
concern.
Determinants of concern for the other party’s outcomes include: existing interpersonal bonds,
kinship, group identity; and one’s having acted altruistically in the recent past. These
determinants tend to foster genuine concern. Instrumental concern for the other’s outcomes is
fostered by the perception that one is dependent on the other party (the other is seen as
capable of delivering rewards or punishments). The authors note that while personal bonds
and dependencies usually foster concern for the other’s outcome, they can also, under certain
conditions produce antagonisms that reduce this concern.
One’s decision about whether to problem solve, contend, yield, do nothing or withdraw in a
conflict situation is determined not only by the level of concern for oneself and the other
party. It is also determined by perceptions of cost and benefit related to the implementation of
a particular strategy. This is where the perceived feasibility perspective proves helpful.
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For a strategy to be adopted, it must be perceived as minimally feasible. (In regard to centerperiphery conflict, socially-conditioned organizational roles and perceptions about what the
Church and societal culture allow are likely to be important influences on feasibility
conceptions.) If a strategy appears to have no or little chance of success, another will likely be
chosen. Pruitt and Rubin focus on the perceived feasibility of three strategies in particular:
problem solving, contending and inaction.
Pruitt and Rubin (p. 36):
Problem solving seems more feasible the greater the perceived common ground (PCG). PCG is a party’s
assessment of the likelihood of finding an alternative that satisfies both parties’ aspirations. The more
likely it seems that such an alternative can be found, the more feasible problem solving appears to be.
PCG is greater (1) the lower Party’s own aspirations, (2) the lower Other’s aspirations as perceived by
Party, and the (3) the greater the perceived integrative potential (PIP) – that is, Party’s faith that
alternatives favorable to both parties exist or can be devised.
At a given point of negotiation, the existence of some strategic alternatives is known and the
availability of others is suspected. The perceived integrative potential is high when there are
known alternatives that provide high benefit to both parties. It is moderately high when the
prospect of developing such alternatives is likely. It is low when one sees little chance of
coming to mutually beneficial alternatives. As conditions contributing to PIP, the authors
identify: (1) faith in own problem-solving ability; (2) momentum – i.e., prior success at
reaching agreement in the current controversy; (3) availability of a mediator; (4) other’s
perceived readiness for problem solving – which is sometimes a function of trust.
Contending seems more feasible when the Other’s resistance to yielding appears low.
Contentious behavior is invited when the Other appears to be easy to dislodge. The feasibility
of contending also hinges on Party’s apparent capacity to employ contentious tactics and of
Other’s apparent capacity to resist (power versus counterpower). “In a stable long-term
relationship, each party’s capacity to employ contentious tactics tends to be matched by the
other’s level of resistance, so that there is relatively little advantage to either party in
employing contentious tactics” (p. 40).
Potential costs of contending – including the instigation of a conflict spiral and the alienation
of the other party – act as deterrents against the choice of contentious action.
Time pressure is the key to the feasibility of adopting the strategy of inaction. As time
pressure increases, the feasibility of inaction decreases. In the face of time pressure, yielding,
which is the fastest means to move to agreement, appears to be the most commonly adopted
strategy (p. 41; cf. Pruitt and Drews 1969.) Normally, contending and problem solving are
adopted in situations of time pressure only when there is heavy resistance to yielding.
Pruitt and Rubin concede that the dual concern model and perceived feasibility perspective do
not go far in explaining why people choose to withdraw from a conflict, but they do observe
that people, apparently, withdraw from conflict handling when the benefit they expect to
receive falls below their minimal aspiration.
4.2.3 Applications of Strategy
Pruitt and Rubin identify a variety of ways that parties carry out the strategies of contending
(pp. 44-61) and problem solving (pp. 139-164).
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Among the lighter tactics of contending are ingratiation, gamesmanship, persuasive
arguments and promises. (NB: Where Pruitt and Rubin speak of “tactics,” I prefer to speak of
specific coping strategies that can be distinguished from the more general classification of five
strategies presented above. I reserve the term tactic for micro-level techniques of social
interchange, as in elements of text construction, symbolic acts, nonverbal gestures, etc. See
sections 5.4 and 5.5.) Ingratiation involves the use of guile to soften up the opposing party for
later concessions. It may be carried out by means of flattery, opinion conformity, granting
favors, or self-presentation (showing one’s positive side). Gamesmanship seeks to “ruffle the
feathers” of the opposing party, thereby lowering the opponent’s resistance to yielding. The
authors offer the example of taking time when the opponent is in a hurry, and observe that the
key to the success of gamesmanship is not raising the suspicion of one’s own deviousness.
Persuasive arguments attempt to win cooperation by reasoning. One may, for example,
persuade the other party that one has a legitimate right to a favorable outcome. Promises offer
reward in return for compliance.
Heavier means of contention include threats and irrevocable commitments. Threats send a
message that one will punish noncompliance. Pruitt and Rubin cite studies (p. 53)
demonstrating that threats are more likely than promises to elicit compliance. Irrevocable
commitments are threats that assume the following form: “I have started doing something that
requires adjustment from you and will continue doing it despite your best efforts to stop me.”
As in the game of “Chicken,” one enters into a test of will with the other party, with the loser
being the first party to change course. If neither party gives in, both lose. One of the
interesting features of irrevocable commitments is the attempt to place the locus of control for
avoiding a negative outcome squarely on the shoulders of the other (as has been seen in
classic examples nonviolent resistance).
In contrast with the strategy of contention, which seeks one’s own advantage without regard
to the wishes of the other, problem solving seeks to address the concerns of both parties.
Getting started with problem solving may be difficult because showing one’s interest in this
strategy may telegraph weakness. At the heart of the strategy is the effort to identify and
discuss the true issues dividing the parties. Creatively envisioning alternatives may enable
parties to identify conflict solutions that bridge their opposing interests. Though problem
solving has the best chance of success when both parties apply the strategy, a single party may
apply the strategy individually, and it is also possible for a third party to do the problem
solving.
Since all of the above-named forms of contending and problem solving are common to the
handling of social conflict in general, we can expect that they may also turn up (in contextspecified ways) in Church center-periphery conflict. Though none of the strategies stand out
as being inevitably relevant to intrahierarchical conflict handling, one can imagine that the
strategy of ingratiation may in some ways play into bishops’ (presumed) orientation toward
courtesy, that persuasive argumentation is likely to fit well with the normative-rational aspect
of the Church organization, and that promises and threats relate to bishops’ powers of
remuneration and coercion.
The strategies of contending, problem solving and yielding may be practiced more or less
“vigorously” (p. 42). Contending is more vigorous as heavier actions are taken. Problem
solving is more vigorous as the investment of creativity rises. Yielding is more vigorous as
one drops one’s aspirations further and further. The vigorousness of strategic action has much
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to do with the level of concern for one’s own and the other party’s outcome. High concern for
both party’s outcomes makes problem solving more vigorous. High concern only for one’s
own outcome leads to vigorous contending. If concern for one’s own outcome is weak, higher
concern for the other party’s outcome leads to more vigorous yielding. Typically, parties who
have adopted a coping strategy begin by applying the strategy less vigorously. They gradually
apply the strategy with greater vigor if earlier efforts have not achieved agreement. This
“gradualism” ensures that a greater price than necessary will not be paid to reach designated
goals.
4.2.4 Conflict Stages: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement
Pruitt and Rubin invoke various metaphors to clarify the way social conflicts tend to hold
together in sequence (pp. 183-184). One metaphor is that of the three-act play. In the first act
(Escalation) conflict builds. In the second act (Stalemate) the conflict gets to the point where
it seems unwise to escalate further and a stage of transition is reached. In the third act
(Settlement) one finds the denouement, the resolution to the conflict. This metaphor, they
note, fits many conflicts but also tends to oversimplify. As an example, the symmetry of the
three-act play metaphor neglects the fact that it is much easier to move up the escalation
ladder than to move back down. This is because people are more prone to retaliate when
challenged than to reciprocate when they are treated well. Thus, conflict spirals are more
readily achieved than benevolent circles that relieve escalation.
It might be better, the authors propose, to employ the image of a valley or canyon to speak of
conflict. One descends into conflict (analogous to escalation), crosses to the other side
(stalemate), and makes the effort of climbing up the other side. This image allows for the fact
that it is often easier to get into conflict (gravity helps us to descend into the valley) than to
get out of it. This image works better for the visualization of conflict if one envisions a rather
expansive valley, with intermittent ascents and descents before emerging on the other side –
since conflicts tend to vary in their levels of intensity and contention over time, rarely
following a simple line of descent-ascent.
Another helpful image sees the conflict sequence as a tree of many branches. Here the
changes that occur in conflict – visualized in the progression from trunk to branch to sprig to
leaf – are accounted for in an image that captures something of the complexity of turns a
conflict can take.
I call forth these metaphors because they illuminate our own task of determining how centerperiphery conflicts hold together, but to do so in a way that does not overlook important
elements of the experience. I will now discuss what, according to Pruitt and Rubin, the stages
of escalation, stalemate and settlement look like and what sorts of coping strategies and tactics
we can expect to find applied in each stage.
During conflict escalation, certain incremental transformations take place which tend to be
mirrored by the two parties (pp. 64-65). As a result of these transformations, the conflict is
intensified in ways that persist and are often difficult to undo. Pruitt and Rubin identify five
types of transformation that typically occur during conflict escalation.
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Transformations That Occur During Escalation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
LightÆHeavy. Gentle tactics are supplanted by heavier counterparts.
SmallÆLarge. Issues proliferate and there is a tendency for parties to become more and more absorbed
in the struggle and to commit ever-increasing resources in order to prevail.
SpecificÆGeneral. Specific issues tend to give way to general issues and there is deterioration in the
relationship between the parties.
Doing wellÆWinningÆHurting the other. Interest in doing well is replaced by decidedly competitive
objective and, finally, after continued escalation, by the objective of hurting the other.
FewÆMany. Conflicts that begin with a small number of participants often grow, as collective efforts
arise at the prospect of one party’s failure.
A conflict can be said to escalate when any or all of these five transformations takes place.
(But NB: the transformations are often subtle and hard to notice.) Conflicts which have
escalated tend to stay escalated, at least for a time, because, as has been noted, it is harder to
de-escalate conflict than to escalate it.
It is possible to specify conditions that increase or reduce the likelihood of conflict escalation.
The likelihood of escalation is increased by high perceived power, low perceived
integrative potential, and high aspirations, particularly if these conditions exist on both
sides. The likelihood of escalation is reduced (and hence the situation tends toward
stability) in the presence of conflict-limiting norms and institutions, fear of escalation,
bonds between potential antagonists, and bonds to third and fourth parties who can be
expected to oppose the conflict. (p. 86)
Pruitt and Rubin draw our attention to three models (pp. 89-6) that clarify why conflicts
escalate. The aggressor-defender model distinguishes between an “aggressor” party who has
one or more goals that place it in conflict with a “defender” party. The aggressor ordinarily
starts with lighter tactics but moves to heavier tactics if these do not work. The defender
merely reacts, escalating his response in line with the aggressor’s escalation. Escalation
continues until the aggressor wins or gives up trying. The conflict spiral model holds that
escalation results from a vicious circle of action and reaction: one contentious act begets
another, in back-and-forth fashion. The structural change model holds that the use of conflict
tactics leads to changes (psychological changes, changes in groups and collectives) in the
parties and the communities that contain them. These changes invite the continuation and
escalation of the conflict.
Though not all conflicts escalate over an extended period of time, we can explain why some
conflicts do (pp. 111-125). One reason for this is that during intensifying conflict, the
relationship between the two parties may pass a psychological or collective threshold beyond
which return to the original state of relationship appears to be impossible. Moreover, negative
attitudes and perceptions toward opposing parties tend to endure, aided by processes of
selective perception (one sees only what fits a need or preconception), by self-fulfilling
prophecies (one’s expectation of the other party’s behavior invites that behavior) and by the
emergence of autistic hostility (one stops communicating or interacting with a disliked party).
Another reason for the perpetuation of conflicts is the vested interest that some may have in
continuing it. Participation in conflict provides social benefits (e.g., newfound status or a
sense of purpose) that some may be reluctant to relinquish. Finally, one may become
overcommitted to and entrapped in a given conflict. This occurs when parties invest more
resources in waging the conflict than seems reasonable by external standards. Being hesitant
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or unwilling to concede this overinvestment, one persists in the escalation with the hope of
still winning and thereby saving face.
Stalemate in conflict (pp. 126-138) comes when neither party can or will escalate the conflict
further (the point of maximum conflict intensity has been reached), nor will either party take
steps toward agreement. One may still see contentious activity during the period of stalemate,
but this does not contribute to escalation and it is less significant than the change in the
parties’ outlook that is at hand. Pruitt and Rubin recognize four major reasons for the
emergence of stalemate: the failure of contentious tactics, the exhaustion of necessary
resources, the loss of social support and unacceptable costs.
Since contention as a means of resolution is ruled out at the point of stalemate, the parties are
left with four ways out of the conflict. Inaction offers little promise because the parties are
already at an uncomfortable impasse and prefer to move beyond it. Yielding offers the
potential for a quick resolution, but one or both parties may not be in a position to yield
because they are entrapped by their commitment of resources and / or a need to save face.
(Pruitt and Rubin point out, p. 30, that representatives are usually more reluctant to yield than
are individuals bargaining on their own behalf, because representatives want to please their
constituents. This finding may be relevant the choices bishops’ make in center-periphery
conflict.) If both parties yield and come to agreement by this means, we call it a
“compromise.” Withdrawal entails a reversion to the status quo. Depending on whether the
status quo is advantageous or disadvantageous to a given party, such a solution may be
considered a form of victory or defeat in the conflict. Lastly, the strategy of problem solving
holds out the possibility of yet obtaining a resolution that is beneficial to both parties. Power
equality between the parties and the apparent chance of success are factors favoring the
adopting of problem solving methods at this point. The presence of an influential third party
may also encourage the decision to engage in problem solving. Trust in a third party mediator
can substitute for trust between the parties.
Settlement is the stage of actively taking steps toward resolution. It is characterized by the
use of problem solving and often involves third-party intervention (p. v). Three broad classes
of outcomes result from successful problem solving: compromise, agreement on a procedure
for deciding who will win (such as voting, or submitting to a judge or arbitrator’s decision)
and integrative solutions.
Types of integrative solutions include: expanding the pie (increasing the available resources);
non-specific compensation (Party gets what it wants, Other is repaid in an unrelated coin);
logrolling (each party concedes on issues that are of low priority to itself and high priority to
the other party); cost cutting (Party gets what it wants, Other’s costs are reduced or
eliminated); bridging (neither party achieves its initial demands, but a new option is devised
that satisfies the most important underlying interests of those demands). There are distinct
advantages to the achievement of integrative solutions. Specifically, integrative solutions lead
to more stable relationships between the parties in the long run and the broader communities
containing the conflictual parties are benefited as well by this stability.
The authors point out that parties do not always understand the nature of the interests
underlying their own preferences. Hence, the clarification of applicable interests is seen as an
important step in integrative problem solving.
Third parties (pp. 165-182) may be instrumental in the process of settling the conflict. A
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third party is “an individual or collective that is external to a dispute between two or more
others and that tries to help the disputants reach agreement.” Pruitt and Rubin note that the
mere presence of a third party is likely to change the relationship between the disputant
parties and, in many cases, to benefit that relationship by diverting energies otherwise given
over to escalation. At other times, however, a third party may disturb the progress toward
agreement. Thus third-party intervention is not a panacea in conflict resolution. Third parties
may take on formal or informal roles, individual or representative roles, invited or uninvited
roles, impartial or partial roles, advisory or directive roles, interpersonal or intergroup roles,
and content- or process-oriented roles. Effective third-party intervention can take the form of
modifying the physical and social structure of the dispute, altering the issue structure of the
dispute, and increasing the parties’ motivation to work energetically for resolution.
When assessing center-periphery conflict outcomes, we will want to look not only at type of
outcome and the consequences for the parties themselves – did both parties “win” in the form
of an integrative solution, did one party win at the expense of the other, did both yield to
reach a compromise, did both lose – but also, and more importantly, at the consequences for
the organization. Is the Church better or worse off for the way the conflict was handled? What
are the long-term effects of such an approach likely to be?
4.3 Use of the Conflict Theory to Illuminate the Case
This chapter has supplied us with an integrated way of thinking about social conflicts and
their management. My purpose in discussing the work of Pruitt and Rubin has been to
sensitize myself -- and the reader -- in preparation for the confrontation of the evidence from
the case, as presented in chapters six to eight.
Since I am in search of coping strategies that characterize the handling of center-periphery
conflict, I am indebted to Pruitt and Rubin for their provision of a way of thinking about the
role of strategic choice in conflict handling and their identification of a number of specific
strategies that may be employed. When we turn to consider the empirical example, we will
want to keep the concepts and strategies identified in this chapter in mind along with the
strategies and expectations summarized at the end of chapter three. In chapters six-eight I
draw specific connections between the case materials and the theoretical resources previously
provided, commenting on the “conflict functionality” of participants’ words and actions.
In chapter nine I will revisit Pruitt and Rubin’s theory in more cohesive fashion, using their
framework in support of my own understanding of how the conflict in its entirety holds
together.
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