Land Tenure and Common Pool Resources in
Rural Ethiopia: A Study Based on Fifteen Sites
Bereket Kebede*
Abstract: The evolution of land tenure in Ethiopia during the
Imperial period directed towards private and individualized property
is discussed both in general terms and by examining conditions at
specific localities. This evolution was brought to an abrupt end by
the land reform of 1975 with nationalization. The same logic of
subsistence agriculture as in traditional tenures seems to be the basis
for the reform. With the abandonment of the socialist transformation
of agriculture no vision about future developments in land tenure
seems to exist. Privatization is suggested to improve the security of
land holding, to increase agricultural investment, to assist the
development of other markets as well as preserve common pool
resources.
Résumé: L’article étudie l’évolution du régime foncier éthiopien
sous l’empire, d’un point de vue général et examinant la situation
spécifique de certaines localités. Cette évolution, vers une propriété
privée et individualisée des terres, a été brutalement interrompue par
les nationalisations conduites dans le cadre de la réforme agraire de
1975. Celle-ci semble s’être appuyée sur la même logique d’agriculture de subsistance que celle qui sous-tendait les régimes fonciers
traditionnels. Aujourd’hui, la transformation socialiste de l’agriculture
ayant été abandonnée, il ne semble exister aucune vision pour
l’évolution future du régime foncier. Un programme de privatisation
est suggéré pour améliorer la sécurité du régime de possession des
* Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) and St Antony’s College, Oxford
University and Department of Economics, Addis Ababa University; email: [email protected]. This article draws on a report submitted to the Unit for Environmental
Economics, Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law at the
University of Gothenburg, Sweden. The financial support from Sida (Sweden) to administer
the survey on common pool resources in sites covered by the Ethiopian Rural Household
Survey is highly appreciated. I am deeply grateful to Professor Thomas Sterner for teaching
me environmental economics as well as his support during the write-up of the report. I would
also like to thank the survey supervisors who completed the questionnaires in the field. The
support of my friends Bezuneh Tsige and Tesfaye Sibhatu in providing me with a working
place during my stay in Addis Ababa in December 2000 is very much appreciated. Useful
comments from two anonymous referees have also helped improve the article. As usual all
interpretations and remaining mistakes are the responsibility of the author.
ß African Development Bank 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road,
Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
113
114
B. Kebede
terres, accroı̂tre l’investissement agricole, faciliter le développement
d’autres marchés et préserver les ressources communes.
1. Introduction
Settled agriculture became the dominant form of supporting livelihood
in the highlands of Ethiopia in ancient times and the country is still
predominantly agricultural. The dependence on the sector is more
pronounced here, even compared to most developing countries. In
addition to the overall dependence on agriculture, the basic
technology, the ox-plough, has remained almost the same over the
centuries. But the expansion of the ox-plough technology to areas that
were using less productive farming tools was important in shaping the
ecology of present-day rural Ethiopia. The spread of new crops and
strains has also played an important role.
A vital institutional dimension defining the modus operandi of
agriculture is the tenure system. This article traces out the main
features of the evolution in tenure during the Imperial period and
examines it in relation to the land reform programme of 1975 and
conditions thereafter. This will help us understand the similarities and
differences between the land tenure systems before and after 1975
enabling us to examine some long-standing and newly emerging
issues. This exercise also helps to look at prospects for the future.
In addition to describing the evolution of the land tenure system, this
article also focuses on common pool resources in rural areas. We use
the word ‘common pool resources’ as in Ostrom (1991) and Ostrom et
al. (1994). Common pool resources are similar to public goods because
barring unwanted users (exclusion) is difficult. But unlike public
goods, the use of a common pool resource by one person will subtract
the amount available to others (subtractibility). In the case of rural
Ethiopia, reflecting the low level of technological development, the
main common pool resources include: grazing areas, sources of water
(rivers, streams, springs, etc.) and fuel (forests, vegetation cover, etc.).
A study of common pool resources in rural Ethiopia is important
because of the following reasons. First, as the main sources of water,
fuel and cattle feed for the rural population they obviously influence
the livelihood of farmers. Secondly, the state of common pool
resources is an indication of the level of environmental degradation or
preservation. Thirdly, the management of common pool resources or
its absence is a reflection of the state of community level conditions; a
sustainable management of common pool resources is a symptom of a
stable community with strong social ties.
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Since the state of common pool resources depends on the land
tenure structure, most of this article is devoted to an examination of the
issues in land tenure. In addition to focusing on land tenure issues in
general, discussion of conditions in some localities is presented. The
microcosm of the sample villages is used to illustrate more general
land tenure and common pool resource issues.
The article is structured in the following way. Section 2 briefly
describes the data source and survey sites. Section 3 looks at land
tenure arrangements in the period before the land reform programme
of 1975. While section 4 summarizes conditions after the reform
programme, section 5 focuses on common pool resources. Section 6
presents some reflections that generalize and look at future prospects
in land tenure.
2. Data and Survey Villages
In 1989, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI),
based in Washington DC, conducted a household survey in seven rural
sites in Ethiopia covering around 600 households. The survey sites
were: peasant associations around Debre Berhan and Dinki in northern
Shewa, Korodegaga near the resort town of Sodere, Adele Keke near
the town of Alemaya in Hararghe, Gara Godo in Wolaita, Domaa in
Gamo and Beke Pond in Borana, Sidamo. In addition to examining
conditions in areas that are frequently affected by famine, the research
evaluated food-for-work and other relief-related projects (see Webb et
al., 1992). Corresponding to the objective of the project, almost all the
sites were located in famine vulnerable areas. In addition, the regional
coverage of the project was restricted due to the civil war raging in the
northern part of the country; no site was surveyed particularly from the
traditionally famine vulnerable areas of Tigrai and Wello in the north.
In 1994, the Department of Economics, Addis Ababa University and
the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), Oxford
University, launched the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS)
covering around 1500 households. Sida (Sweden) funded the survey.
Three different rounds, spaced in approximately four-month intervals to
capture seasonal variations, were conducted.1 With a parallel urban
household survey conducted in collaboration with the Unit for
Development Economics at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden,
the Department of Economics at Addis Ababa University was attempting
to build up a comprehensive rural and urban panel data set.
Instead of starting anew, revisiting the sites that were surveyed by
IFPRI in 1989 gave a chance to generate panel data on those
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B. Kebede
households. From the seven survey sites that were covered by IFPRI,
six were incorporated into the ERHS. Since most of the households in
the seventh site, Beke Pond in Borana, were dislocated due to ethnic
conflicts after 1989, that site was abandoned.
In contrast to the objectives of the 1989 survey, the ERHS aimed at
gathering information on the main farming systems of the country.
This necessitated increasing the number of sites by taking two aspects
into account. First, relatively richer rural areas of the country in
different farming systems must be represented. Secondly, sites in the
northern part of the country, particularly in regions traditionally
affected by famine, should be included. With the end of the civil war in
1991, the security problem in the north no longer existed. Nine
additional sites were added on the six IFPRI panel sites. In a sense, the
additional sites were selected by using the principle of stratified
sampling. After identifying regions that typically represent the main
farming systems of the country, particular villages were selected.2 In
the selection of the regions and particular survey villages, employees
of the Ministry of Agriculture with wide practical experience were
consulted.
Three northern peasant associations3 in the famine vulnerable
regions of Tigrai and Wello were selected; since famine cyclically
affects a large part of northern rural Ethiopia this inclusion was
necessary. The two sites in Tigrai are Geblen and Haresaw, the first
around the northern town of Adigrat and the second east of the town of
Wukro. In Wello, Shumsheha near the historic town of Lalibela was
selected. Yetmen in Gojam (in northern Ethiopia) and Sirbana Godeti
(around 60 km south-east of Addis Ababa in Adaa woreda4) were
selected as samples in rich teff5 (and wheat) producing areas. Teff is
one of the most important cereals consumed in Ethiopia commanding a
relatively high price and consequently being a vital source of cash
income for many farmers. Imdibir, a site in Gurage, was selected as a
typical village in an enset-farming system;6 a significant proportion of
the farmers in the south are dependent on enset as staple food. In some
regions of southern Ethiopia (particularly in Kembata and Wolaita),
household heads migrate for a significant part of the year to work in far
off plantations. One site, Aze Deboa in Kembata, was selected to
gather information on the nature of households participating in longdistance migration. In addition to the importance for the livelihood of
many rural households, that temporary long-distance migration is rare
in other parts of the country made the study of these households
relevant. As a sample for rich coffee growing areas, Adado near the
town of Dilla in Sidamo was selected; coffee is by far the most
important export of the country. The inclusion of a site heavily
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dependent on coffee will also give a chance to monitor the effects of
export related policy decisions on the welfare of households. Finally,
Terufe Kechema near the town of Shashemene was included as a rich
peasant association with a mixed cropping system (enset with cereals
and a variety of other crops). Table 1 provides a summary of the main
characteristics of the survey sites.
As a follow-up of the three survey rounds in 1994/95, two more
rounds were conducted in 1997 and 2000, both funded by USAID. While
the 1997 survey (done in collaboration with IFPRI) focused on intrahousehold issues, the latest emphasized innovations and adoptions.
In addition to gathering panel data from households found in the
main farming systems of the country, the ERHS has also collected
additional information on the community level. Information on local
prices, traditional measurement units, sociological profile of the
surveyed villages, wealth ranking and community level information on
infrastructure (like education, health, etc.) were gathered. These
supplementary surveys have generated information on the community
level that complement the data gathered from households.
In addition to the above-mentioned community level information, in
the 1997 fourth round of the ERHS, a questionnaire particularly
focusing on the issues related to common pool resources in each
village was administered. The questionnaire focused on identifying
main community level features related to land tenure and common
pool resources. Information on characteristics and evolution of land
tenure, common pool resources and governance structures before the
1975 land reform proclamation was solicited from village elders. In
addition, the changes brought about by the reform of 1975 in each
locality are recorded; changes in the distribution of land, governance
and management of common pool resources are included. The same
questionnaire was administered in all the fifteen survey sites.
In addition to the literature on land tenure, this article mainly uses
information gathered on the community level, particularly the
sociological village profiles and from the questionnaire on common
pool resources, to address issues in land tenure and common pool
resources. The article attempts to capture the main issues in land tenure
and common pool resources. This is done both by using general and
local level information as reflected in the fifteen survey sites. This
approach will enable us to look at the issues that cut across different
farming systems while at the same time considering local diversities.
To give background information on the survey sites, the table below
presents the main features of the survey sites covered by ERHS. The
next section outlines the evolution of land tenure before the 1975 land
reform proclamation.
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Site
Location
Main crops
Altitudea and rainfall
Geblen
Haresaw
Shumsheha
North, Tigrai
North, Tigrai
North, Wello
No school, health centre, market
2700; bi-modalb and erratic
2700–3000, bi-modal and erratic Primary school and health centre; no market
2000; bi-modal and erratic
Primary school; no health centre or market
Debre Berhand
Dinki
Yetmen
North, Shewa
North, Shewa
North, Gojam
Barley
Barley
Teff,c sorghum and
chickpeas
Barley and horse beans
Sorghum and teff
Teff and wheat
Imdibir
Gara Godo
Aze Deboa
Adado
Domaa
South,
South,
South,
South,
South,
Korodegaga
Ensete
Enset and maize
Enset, coffee and teff
Enset and coffee
Maize and sweet
potatoes
South, near Debre Zeit Teff and wheat
South, near
Wheat and barley
Shashemene
South, near Sodere
Maize and teff
Adele Keke
East, Harerghe
Sirbana Godeti
Terufe Kechema
Gurage
Welaita
Kembata
Gedeo
Gamo
1500–2300; uni-modal
1700; bi-modal
1700–3000; bi-modal
bi-modal
1000; bi-modal and erratic
1800–1900; uni-modal
2000; bi-modal
1000; uni-modal
2000; bi-modal
Facilities in village
Near town of Debre Berhan
No school, health centre, market
Junior secondary, health centre and main
market
Near Imdibir town
Primary school, clinic and market
Near town of Durame
Primary school; no clinic and market
Primary school; clinic and market in nearby
Wacha
Near towns of Debre Zeit and Mojo
Near town of Shashemene
Primary (4 grades) school; no clinic
and market
Primary school; nearby towns
a
Altitude is given in meters above sea level.
Many regions in Ethiopia have two rainy seasons. Even though there are some regional variations, the main rains generally come between June and September (meher) and
the small rains between March and May (belg). But there are other regions with only one rainfall season.
c
Teff (Eragrostis abyssinica) is a type of cereal used as a main staple food in many parts of the country (especially in the urban areas) and is indigenous to Ethiopia.
d
Includes four peasant associations around the town of Debre Berhan: Fagina Bokafia, Kormargefia, Karafino and Milki.
e
Enset is the root of the false banana tree and it is used as staple food in some parts of the country, particularly in the south.
f
Chat is a plant whose leaves are chewed as a mild stimulant.
b
B. Kebede
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Chat,f sorghum and
maize
2700; bi-modal
1400; bi-modal and erratic
2400; bi-modal
118
Table 1: Summary of the main characteristics of survey sites
Land Tenure and Common Pool Resources in Ethiopia
119
3. Pre-1975: Older Traditions
In September 1974 Emperor Haile Selassie, who claimed to be a
descendant of the biblical Solomonic dynasty that ruled the country for
thousands of years, was overthrown by a military coup. This led to an
establishment of a left-leaning military government (the Mengistu
regime)7 and the proclamation of the land reform programme of
February 1975. The proclamation nationalized all rural land abolishing
previous tenure arrangements in the country. As an important change
in the evolution of the land tenure system in the country, 1975 can be
taken as a logical dividing point. This is the reason for discussing
conditions before 1975 in this section while leaving the rest for later.
This section is divided into three sub-sections. Since important
variations in land tenure arrangements between northern and southern
parts of the country existed before 1975, the two will be discussed
separately in sub-sections 3.1 and 3.2.8 In both cases general
descriptions are followed by discussions of local conditions.
3.1 Northern Ethiopia: Rist and Other Tenures
The northern part of Ethiopia has experienced settled agriculture for
thousands of years. The characteristic features of this agricultural
system are the predominance of the cultivation of cereals and use of
the ox-plough. The ox-plough technology has remained dominant in
this part of the country starting from at least the first millennium BC
(McCann, 1995, p. 38).
In most of northern Ethiopia, the dominant tenure arrangement
before the land reform of 1975 was a ‘communal’ form called the rist
system. In four of the northern survey sites, except Debre Berhan and
Dinki both located in northern Shewa, the rist system was
predominant. Even though local variations existed, the main features
of rist were the same.
In the rist system, land is ‘communally’ owned by members of a
lineage that are supposed to be offsprings of the original settler of an
area.9 Any individual that can prove his/her descent from the original
settlers has rist right. Since the original settlers in many cases are dead
from one to two hundred years ago (Joireman, 2000, p. 105) the
number of people with rist rights generally is very large. The number
particularly is high because rights to rist land can be claimed through
any combination of male and female ancestors. That is, unlike most
traditional African systems of land tenure, the system is ambilineal
(cognatic descent) rather than unilineal. Both male and female children
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B. Kebede
can inherit land from their parents. Hence, the head of a household will
have the chance of claiming land from rist rights of his parents as well
as that of the parents of his wife.
The mere fact that rist is based on cognatic descent makes it
ambiguous and fluid (Hoben, 1973, p. 17). In the case of unilineal
descent, a population can be divided into mutually exclusive groups;
but that is not possible in the case of cognatic descent. The potential
rist right an individual has is very large. For instance, if we consider
only three generations back, a male individual has the right to claim
land that belonged to any ancestors of his eight great-grandparents. In
addition to this, he can also claim the rist land of the eight greatgrandparents of his wife. But in reality, pedigrees were from 8–12
generations deep (Hoben, 1973, p. 13) indicating the large amount of
rist rights individuals have.
The proliferation of rist rights is increased by exogamy; both in the
Amhara and Tigrai traditions, people are not supposed to marry if they
are related up to 6–7 generations back. Exogamy increases the rist
rights of an individual because the rights from his wife do not overlap
with the rights from his own ancestors; exogamy generally doubles rist
rights.
Even though rist rights were comparatively unrestricted, certain
practical considerations and in some instances formal rules constrained
the actual proliferation of rights. In some cases descent lines that
remained dormant for long periods were forgotten. The practical
impossibility of managing farms that are far from each other was
another reason. In some regions (for example in Tigrai and Eritrea)
claimants of land were formally obliged to live in the locality (Hoben,
1973, p. 20).
Theoretically any individual can claim land by using the multitude
of rist rights he/she has. But in practice, in addition to the abovementioned practical limitations, only those with political power, local
support and a higher capacity to litigate can activate most of, if not all
of, their rist rights. The pervasiveness of litigation in areas dominated
by the rist system is a reflection of this. As indicated by most of the
respondents in the northern sites by our survey, even though informal
conflict resolution mechanisms like elders’ councils were involved in
settling land disputes most cases were handled by formal courts.
Elders’ councils or other arrangements internal to the community
where the land dispute occurred generally favour a compromise to
avoid antagonizing a party to the dispute. This is against the interest of
the individual with a higher potential to win the case (with a better
connection and skill of litigation) and had the incentive to take the case
to formal courts.
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In spite of the ‘communal’10 character of rist, the above observations
indicate a competitive system. As indicated by Hoben (1973, p. 72), with
regard to property rights, the community was characterized by
competitiveness, suspicion and a strong sense of privacy. Joireman
(2000, p. 117) shows that men with titles (members of the elite) were
likely to win land disputes.11 In the absence of an active land market,
access to additional land in rist areas was essentially determined by the
political and social importance of individuals.
One of the most important secular12 powers in rural localities was
the gult (fief/overlord). A person appointed as a gult-holder (generally
selected from the elites) had the right to collect taxes (may also include
labour and other contributions), mobilized the populace in times of war
and was involved in judicial and administrative tasks. Gult positions
were not necessarily hereditary; for example, Hoben (1973, p. 188)
found that only in half of the cases did gult pass from father to son. In
addition to the political, administrative and economic tasks, the gultholder can also claim rist land by using his/her lineage; as a
consequence of his/her power and status it is comparatively easier to
activate most rist rights. Even though the power of the gult-holders
was weakened,13 particularly after the Italian occupation, they still
were important forces until the land reform programme of 1975.
All children in a family have the right to inherit land and they
establish their own independent households. As a result, households
generally break up after one generation (McCann, 1995, p. 72). Wealth
accumulated by households is not transferred intact from generation to
generation (say the eldest son taking over) implying that households
are not dynastic; there is little trans-generational continuity. In fact, if a
household head that was successful in accumulating a relatively large
amount of land by activating most of his/her rist rights dies, potential
claimants will use the opportunity to take hold of some of his/her land
by litigation. Holding on to all the rist land of their parents generally
will be difficult for the relatively inexperienced children.
Hoben (1973, p. 16) characterizes the Amhara14 descent group in the
following way:
‘‘First, the Amhara descent group is not a solidary or cohesive
group. Its members have no esprit de corps, no emblems, totems, or
honorific names to symbolize their unity . . . Second, the Amhara
descent group is not, except in a nominal sense, a kinship group they
are not expected to behave towards one another as kinsmen . . .
Third, the Amhara descent group is not a ritual group . . . They do
not perform any religious ceremonies together . . . Fourth, the
Amhara descent group is not a multipurpose group. It controls land
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B. Kebede
and the rotation of certain minor administrative offices among its
members; it has no other functions . . . Fifth, membership in Amhara
descent groups is not mutually exclusive, but overlapping.’’
As the brief description above indicates, the rist system cannot be
characterized as egalitarian. But it guaranteed access to land for most
farmers. Hoben (1973, p. 137) in the 1960s in Gojam found only a
small number of farmers totally dependent on tenancy. Before the
agrarian reform of 1975, in none of the peasant associations in Wello
and northern Shewa covered in the study by Admassie (2000, p. 103)
were tenants the majority. In three of the survey sites covered in our
study, Shumsheha, Yetmen and Haresaw, the respective estimates of
respondents for percentages of tenants before the land reform were 10
per cent, 13 per cent and less than 50 per cent respectively.15
In addition to the rist system that was dominant, other forms of
tenure also existed in the northern part of the country. Land tenure
systems in some regions of Eritrea and Tigrai did require residence to
get access to land. In Eritrea, rist existed side by side with diessa, a
tenure system where land is distributed only to farmers living in the
locality. Diessa was expanded at the expense of rist particularly during
the period of Italian colonial rule of Eritrea. Farmers were evicted from
significant portions of Eritrean highlands to clear the land for Italian
colonists. To give access to land to both evicted farmers as well as
migrants coming from Ethiopia, the Italians encouraged diessa since it
does not require farmers to be descendants of rist holders (see
Joireman, 2000 for extensive discussions). A tenure system based on
residence known as chiraf gwoses existed in less densely populated
areas of Tigrai. But in areas where population pressure is relatively
high, in addition to residence, descent (like in rist) was also required
(see Bruce, 1976 for a detailed analysis).
In addition to the above-mentioned ‘communal’ forms of land
tenure, private ownership of land (freehold) also existed in some areas
of the north. Admassie (2000) describes different types of traditional
tenures that slowly evolved into private property in parts of Wello and
northern Shewa; our two survey sites, Debre Berhan and Dinki, are
located in the latter region. For example, in Tegulet, northern Shewa,
land designated to provide for the Imperial courts was given as a
hereditary usufruct. After the Italian occupation (1936–41) land was
assessed for payment of monetary land tax. The receipts farmers get
after paying taxes were used as certificates of private ownership
(Admassie, 2000, p. 106).
The large number of court cases that dealt with disputes related to
land sales testifies to the existence of private ownership in northern
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Land Tenure and Common Pool Resources in Ethiopia
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parts of the country. Respondents in both Debre Berhan and Dinki
indicated that land sales were widespread before the land reform
programme of 1975. Even sale of rist land occurred; in certain cases,
the buyer must make sure that all people with rist rights for that land
have agreed to the sale (Joireman, 2000, p. 118). In three of the four
survey sites where rist was dominant, Geblen, Haresaw and
Shumsheha, respondents reported sales of land before 1975. In
Haresaw at some point elders prohibited the sale of land. But in both
Haresaw and Shumsheha, respondents indicate that the sale of land
increased around 1974 probably reflecting a long-run trend surfacing
up due to the weakening of the imperial government. The respondents
of only Yetmen reported that there were no land sales before 1975.
Compared to other land tenure systems in the country rist has
discouraged the development of an active land market. But as the
above evidence show, it probably has not totally escaped the erosion
from the development of land markets.
As indicated previously, the land tenure systems in northern and
southern Ethiopia before the land reform of 1975 were not uniform.
The next sub-section examines the nature of land tenure in the southern
parts of the country before 1975.
3.2 Southern Ethiopia: Free Holders and Tenants
Historically, the people of the southern part of the country had interacted
with the highland kingdoms for long. In addition to long-distance trade,
conquest of the south by stronger states of the highland north and
invasions of the north by southern armies had existed at different periods
of time. The massive migration and occupation of the north by the
Oromo people from the south in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was
an important development. But most of the southern parts of the country
were incorporated into the ‘modern’ Ethiopian state by the end of the
nineteenth century during Emperor Menelik’s regime.
Before the incorporation of the south into the Ethiopian Kingdom,
various state forms and tenure structures existed. Harar, in the eastern
part of present-day Ethiopia, had existed as an important economic and
Islamic centre for many centuries with its unique urban culture that is
rare for Ethiopia. There were well-organized Oromo kingdoms in the
Gibe river basin (McCann, 1995). Centralized kingdoms in Wolaita,
Jimma, Kembata and other places were flourishing from the control of
long-distance trade.
Similar to the diversity in the forms of state structure, the land
tenure system before the incorporation into the Ethiopian kingdom also
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B. Kebede
seems diverse. Nomads inhabited (and still inhabit) large parts of the
lowlands. Some of the centralized kingdoms probably were using slave
labour to clear the thick vegetation cover and run plantation-like
agriculture (McCann, 1995).16 In some regions (for example, in
northern Sidamo) land was collectively held by family units and
allocated by village elders on the basis of need and family size
(Joireman, 2000, p. 88).
Respondents in Aze Deboa reported that at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth centuries there was a centralized
administration in Kembata headed by a king. The king owned all the
land. To encourage nomadic people to settle down, land was
distributed with accompanying obligations; they had to pay taxes,
bring tributes to the king during holidays, had to fight in times of war
and contribute labour. Elders give the impression that centralized rules
and regulations from the king were used for the preservation of forest
and grazing areas (for example, each locality/village has to have a
certain size of forest and grazing areas). The king was the ultimate
owner of all land.
Respondents in Imdibir reported that traditional administration has a
hierarchy that goes up to the level where all Gurages (‘Seven House’
Gurage) are included known as yejoka kicha. It is a hierarchy of elders’
councils that also goes down to the village level (yejofera sera)
involved in administrative and regulatory activities. The traditional
system includes rules on criminal activities, village affairs, marriages,
contracts and land rights. Demarcating land owned by different
individuals and looking into land disputes is one of the tasks of this
traditional system. Respondents indicated that the traditional system
still exists but its power must be restricted as compared to previous
times. The relationship between the traditional system and formal
institutions (like the peasant association, formal courts) is not clear;
but the latter occupy a far more important position currently.
With the conquest of Emperor Menelik, the gult system was
extended to the south. The emperor gave gult (fief) rights either to
northern nobility or to southern landlords who have shown their
loyalty. Uncultivated land (or land used as common pool resource) was
formally taken over by the state. Before the Italian occupation of
1936–41 the elites were granted the power to collect taxes from the
farmers as well as receive payments in kind and in labour. The farmers
under their jurisdiction had use right over the land.17 The regional
lords used the taxes collected to strengthen their armies and power.
The political power of the state was essentially based on the power of
the regional overlords. Generally during this period, it is difficult to
characterize the land grants of the Emperor as private property of the
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overlords.18 In addition to the existence of the use right of the farmers
which limits the power of the overlords to evict them, the land grants
were made more for the fulfillment of government tasks (like the
collection of taxes, maintenance of local armies, etc.) than as personal
property. The overlords cannot sell their right to others and can be
replaced by the emperor just as replacing someone from office.
In the post-Italian period, a large amount of ‘state’ land was
distributed with more formal titling; this led to a significant movement
of people from northern to southern parts of the country and to
litigations on land. The privilege of the overlords to get payment in
kind and in labour was abolished. With the increase in the revenue
needs of the state, more taxes from the rural areas started to be
collected directly by government bureaucracy. Parallel to the
strengthening of the bureaucracy, the growth in the standing army
coupled with the relatively long period of peace diminished the
military importance of the overlords. In the mean time, urbanization
and commercialization increased. More and more of the landlords
became involved in urban interests changing into absentee landlords.
The importance of some cash crops (particularly coffee) also
increased.
In areas near relatively big urban centres some landlords began to
mechanize agricultural activities especially during the last years of the
Imperial period (first half of the 1970s). This resulted in the eviction of
tenants.19 From our fifteen surveyed sites, mechanization was
attempted only in three: in and around Sirbana Godeti, Korodegaga
and Terufe Kechema. Relative to Sirbana Godeti and Terufe Kechema,
Korodegaga is located in an area with more abundant land and the
mechanization there did not lead to evictions. The extent of
mechanization was limited in all three places. The fact that all
agricultural operations up to harvest were not mechanized underlined
the need for tenants’ labour and this was one of the factors that
discouraged further mechanization (McCann, 1995).
Even though the granting of land by the emperors and the evolution
thereof may have strengthened the landlord–tenant relationship in
many parts of southern Ethiopia, this does not mean that all farmers
were ultimately changed into tenants. There are regions that remained
with freehold farmers.20 For instance, respondents in Adado indicate
that the land tenure system did not change much after the incorporation
of the area into Menelik’s empire. The very small percentages of
tenants from the total number of farmers reported by respondents in
four of the southern sites indicate this fact. Respondents report that the
percentages of tenants in Imdibir, Adado, Aze Deboa and Adele Keke
were less than 35 per cent, 20 per cent, 10 per cent and 8 per cent
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B. Kebede
respectively just before the land reform proclamation. These figures
are very low in contrast to those of Korodegaga, Gara Godo, Sirbana
Godeti and Terufe Kechema; the respective percentages for these four
sites are 68 per cent, 75 per cent, 90 per cent and 95 per cent.21
The brief description of the tenure systems in the country before the
land reform programme of 1975 given in this section indicates that the
system was not homogenous. This may probably be an indication of
the evolution of the system rather than a haphazard collection of
tenures. In older times in the north when states expanded with the
annexation of new areas probably a similar tenure system as in the
south after Menelik’s conquest may have occurred. Rist probably had
evolved as people settled on those areas for long periods of time. But
an important difference is that as a result of the development of a
modern state and commercialization the land tenure in non-rist areas
developed towards private ownership. In addition, even in traditional
rist areas selling land was practised. This is an indication that the
traditional ‘communal’ systems were being eroded by the development
of markets. Population growth and the penetration of commercial
interests into subsistence production must have increased the implicit
relative price of land. The development of explicit private property in
most of the southern areas (especially with the increase in the
production of cash crops like coffee) and in some northern regions and
the weakening of traditional rist system probably are manifestations of
this relative price change.
Transaction costs and politics of the imperial period also help us
understand the overall logic of the tenure system. The growth of the
modern Ethiopian state under Haile Sellasie required a readily
available source of revenue. An easily extractable source of revenue
was tax collected from coffee (by far the most important single export
item). But coffee was produced by millions of smallholders scattered
in the southern part of the country without sufficient infrastructure.
The collection of coffee tax directly by the government would have
entailed huge transaction costs. According to Joireman, the overlords
in the south with land granted from the Emperor were essentially
acting as agents of the government (‘the principal’) to ensure the
production and assemblage of coffee for taxation and export. This
principal–agent relationship had also the added political advantage of
removing potential contenders to the Emperor from the centre and
creating an elite that can be easily controlled (see Joireman, 2000, pp.
92–102 for the political and transaction cost interpretation).
The evolution in the heterogeneous land tenure system was abruptly
brought to an end shortly after the revolution of 1974. The land reform
proclamation of 1975 abolished the various forms of tenure in the
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country and nationalized all rural land. The next part is devoted to
examining changes in tenure after the land reform.
4. Post-1975: ‘Land to the Tiller’
The overthrow of the Emperor in September 1974 by a military
government and the elimination of the highest-ranking officials of the
imperial regime soon after that heralded the downfall of a socioeconomic system many have characterized as ‘feudal’. But the powers
of landlords that extended to villages in rural areas were broken by the
land reform proclamation of February 1975, formally known as the
‘Public Ownership of Rural Lands Proclamation’ or ‘Proclamation
Number 31 of 1975’. This proclamation nationalized all rural land
prohibiting private ownership. Farming households were given use
rights and the size of land allocated to them must not exceed 10
hectares. The hiring of labour was prohibited and all mechanized farms
were confiscated without compensation. The setting-up of peasant
associations was an important aspect of the proclamation significantly
changing the administrative landscape of rural areas. Peasant
associations were established by a general assembly of farmers living
within a maximum area of 800 hectares.
Apart from administrative tasks, the peasant associations’ main task
was the distribution of land. This was a delicate task given the fact that
in most of the countryside due to relatively high population density it
is practically impossible to increase the total amount of land at the
disposal of a peasant association. In other words, the land fund of most
of the associations was effectively fixed (Rahmato, 1984), except in
cases where either land from plantations or grazing land and the like
were distributed among farmers. Compared to other areas, the
implementation of the land reform in formerly rist areas was slow.
The initial distribution of land after the proclamation varied across
regions. Despite the variations reflecting local conditions, peasant
associations themselves undertook most of the distribution autonomously without heavy interference from government officials.22 This
probably is the main reason for the absence of serious clashes among
farmers during the distribution.
The distribution of land implemented by peasant associations had
probably succeeded in levelling down differences in land holding as
compared to the condition before the reform. But in terms of size of
holdings, the reform did not change much. Obviously landlords have
lost due to distribution, but mostly not in terms of land they were
directly cultivating but in terms of the share of output they get from
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B. Kebede
tenants. Probably, landless households that received land have
benefited the most. Particularly, social groups that do not traditionally
own land have benefited. For example, in the survey site of
Shumsheha, Muslims and Felashas (‘black Jews’) have benefited
since they were not traditionally allowed to own land; Muslims were
predominantly traders and Felashas artisans. Tenants have benefited
not particularly by an increase in the size of land but because their
obligations to the landlords were abolished. In fact, if some tenants
were cultivating relatively large farms some of it was taken away.
Owner-cultivators with relatively large farms lost but those with small
farms generally have benefited. In addition, the distribution has not
changed the fragmented nature of households’ land holdings (see
Rahmato, 1984, for a detailed presentation of the initial effects of the
land reform).
Hence, in terms of abolishing the economic, political and
administrative power of the older regime the land reform programme
of 1975 can truly be characterized as a radical one. But in terms of
changes in the size and fragmentation of land holdings its impact
should not be exaggerated. For instance, respondents in the survey
sites of Adele Keke and Adado said that the land reform did not bring
any change in terms of land holdings. Even the general principle of the
land reform programme cannot be claimed to be entirely new. The
traditional land tenures of Tigrai and Eritrea (chiraf gwoses and diessa
mentioned in our previous discussions) are based on the same principle
of guaranteeing access to people living in the village. In fact, people
who were against the privatization of rist land in government
ministries during the imperial period were supporting these forms of
tenure based on residence (Bruce, 1976, p. 11).
With the land reform of 1975 both rural land and agricultural labour
markets were abolished. With the reform the sale, mortgage and lease
of land was prohibited. In addition, hiring of people for agricultural
activities was forbidden. But due to differences in the endowments of
labour (household size) and capital (particularly draught oxen) farmers
were forced to engage in transactions that either directly violated the
restrictions or went around them. Sharecropping was practised in
cereal producing areas implicitly affecting both accesses to land and
labour (see Kebede and Croppenstedt, 1995). Locally tailored laboursharing arrangements proliferated with outright employment of
agricultural workers in some cases.
Population growth creates a continuous pressure on land. The
additional population of the rural areas could not be absorbed by the
non-agricultural sectors due to lack of rapid growth. Hence, equitable
distribution, as a major objective of the reform programme, needed
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continual redistribution of land. In addition to the continuous transfer
of land in the form of inheritances and other means, there were major
redistributions of land at least in seven out of the fifteen survey sites
after the initial allocation subsequent to the proclamation.23 In many
instances, grazing or other communally used lands were distributed for
farming; for example, some grazing lands in Aze Deboa were
distributed to landless people.
Most of the rural areas in Ethiopia can be characterized as facing
scarcity of agricultural land. Hence, redistribution could not satisfy the
growing demand for land. Nothing was at work to slow down this
increase in the demand for agricultural land. An increase in the price of
land would have helped attain equilibrium. Or, a rapid growth in the
non-agricultural sector would have dampened the demand for
agricultural land. Since these or other equilibrium forces were not at
work the re-emergence of landlessness was inevitable. Habtu (1994)
found that 17.4 per cent of the households in his study area of northern
Shewa were landless.24 By 1994, respondents in our survey sites
pointed out the existence of a substantial number of landless people.
They estimated the following number of landless households in the
respective survey sites: 30 in Geblen, 40 in Korodegaga, 50 in Terufe
Kechema, 100 in Haresaw, 200 in Sirbana Godeti and 230 in Aze
Deboa. A significant number of these landless households are
demobilized soldiers, returnees from settlements established during
Mengistu’s regime and dislocated people. In some of the peasant
associations, like Haresaw, since there are periodic redistributions they
have to wait to the next round (in the case of Haresaw redistribution
occurs in four-year intervals).
The ‘mixed economic policy’ of the last year of Mengistu’s regime
in 1990 stopped redistribution of land. This helped increase the
security of tenure encouraging farmers to invest. The impact
particularly in terms of planting eucalyptus trees was immediate and
highly visible in some of the survey sites (for example, Sirbana
Godeti). In some coffee growing areas of the country in addition to
eucalyptus trees, farmers started to plant new coffee seedlings on their
holdings (Abegaz, 1994, p. 222).
With the overthrow of Mengistu, there were no major changes with
regards to ownership of rural land. The constitution of 1994 indicates
that all land in the country is state property. But the new constitution
gives the responsibility of promulgating laws concerning land to the
regional states. Using this devolved power, the Amhara regional state
(which includes the survey sites of Shumsheha, Yetmen, Debre Berhan
and Dinki) undertook a redistribution of land after the overthrow of
Mengistu.
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B. Kebede
The villagization programme launched by the Mengistu regime in
the latter half of the 1980s did significantly affect settlement patterns,
though in most cases only temporarily. The declared objective of the
government was to make the population live in nucleated villages to
facilitate the provision of services/infrastructure. But as many critics
have pointed out, the underlying objective seems to be creating a
settlement pattern that facilitates a more centralized control of the
population by the state (for tax collection, security, collectivization,
etc.). From the fifteen sites, eight were villagized. From the seven
remaining sites, Geblen, Haresaw and Shumsheha were not villagized
due to security reasons (either the areas were occupied by guerrillas or
they were not militarily secure). Adado, Aze Deboa and Imdibir25 are
highly dependent on enset as a staple food. Enset is planted near the
homestead and that probably is the main reason for escaping
villagization. The villagization of Gara Godo and other enset
dependent areas was a disaster for the same reasons (Sandford and
Sandford, 1994, p. 198).
The scale of the villagization programme was enormous. By 1987
around 5.7 million people were living in new villages and by 1988 the
figure had reached one-third of the rural population of Ethiopia, far
higher than the Ujamaa programme in Tanzania (McCann, 1995, p.
253).
In addition to the involuntary nature of villagization, a lot of
operational mistakes were done. Due to congestion and lack of sanitary
facilities in the new villages, diseases (both human and animal) spread;
for example, respondents in Adele Keke mentioned the break out of
epidemics when the peasant association was villagized. In some cases
the villages were constructed on fertile farmland. At other times, since
no study of the water drainage was done, the newly constructed
villages became muddy and almost impassable during the rainy
seasons. Facilities for the livestock were not available. Trees
(including enset) that are usually planted near homesteads were
destroyed. In many cases land allocated for gardening was not
sufficient. The labour and material costs of constructing the new
houses were high (sometimes competing with agricultural tasks) (see
Lirenso, 1990).
Starting with the mixed economic policy of the Mengistu regime
and then continuing under the new government, farmers slowly
trickled back to their previous localities. By now all the villages that
were created by the programme have disappeared in our sample sites.
As a means of transforming agriculture to a socialist enterprise, the
Mengistu regime also attempted collectivization. From the fifteen survey
sites covered in our study, producers’ cooperatives (collective farms)
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were established in ten. The five sites where producers’ cooperatives
were not set-up are Dinki, Imdibir, Domaa, Geblen and Haresaw, the last
two being located in areas where the civil war was raging. Generally the
establishment of producers’ cooperatives was not voluntary. They were
allocated the best land in the peasant association. They got government
subsidies in different forms. For instance, in Sirbana Godeti tractor and
thresher services were provided to the cooperative by the government.
Farmers who are not members of the cooperative are obliged to
contribute labour particularly in times when labour is in shortage due to
seasonal agricultural activities. In some cases members of the producers’
cooperatives became responsible for running the peasant associations
(instead of the executive committee of the latter). For example, this
happened in Sirbana Godeti.
With the mixed economic policy, all producers’ cooperatives were
disbanded.26 The land under the cooperatives was divided among its
members. This created problems in all the sites where there existed
producers’ cooperatives. First, most of the land allocated to the
cooperatives was more fertile than the average land in the peasant
association. Secondly, the size of land per member of a cooperative
was higher than the average land holding of others. In all the sites,
these issues were contentious leading to tensions among former
cooperative members and the rest. Even in 1994, some four years after
the disbanding of the cooperatives, this issue was still alive in many
peasant associations.
As indicated in a previous paragraph, the overthrow of the Mengistu
regime did not bring fundamental changes in the overall land tenure of
rural areas. The next section relates issues in land tenure with problems
in common pool resources in Ethiopia.
5. Land Tenure and Common Pool Resources
Reflecting the low level of agricultural development, the common pool
resources found in rural Ethiopia are relatively primitive. For instance,
irrigation systems based on large-scale permanent structures do not
exist except in modern plantations. But relatively simple irrigation
systems exist in some areas; for example, from the survey sites
Shumsheha, Dinki, Domaa and Yetmen have some plots of irrigated
land. The common pool resources that are commonly found in rural
areas are grazing land, sources of water (for both humans and animals)
and fuel.
Sources of water are various. Rivers, streams, lakes or springs are
used as common pool resources in almost all rural areas. In some areas,
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B. Kebede
for example in Yetmen and Adele Keke, there are water wells, while in
a small number of cases (for example in Terufe Kechema) tapped
water is used. Still in others mini-dams (Haresaw) supplement the
traditional sources of water.
The non-existence of a water management system based on largescale permanent structures probably is surprising given the very long
tradition of settled agriculture and vulnerability to draught. In addition,
that irrigation schemes were important in the past, at least in some
parts of the country, also makes this more surprising. Large-scale
irrigation schemes existed during the ancient kingdom of Axum
(McCann, 1995, p. 13).27 A diversified and rich agricultural system
thrived in the nineteenth century in northern Shewa where two of the
survey sites, Debre Berhan and Dinki, are located. The success of the
agricultural system in northern Shewa partially depended on widespread irrigation. In the highland areas, irrigation was used to produce
additional cereal crops during the dry season. In lowlands, it was
widely used to cultivate horticultural products for the market and the
palace. Only shadows of this achievement remain in the current
period.28
The only survey site with a centrally managed irrigation system is
Domaa, a resettlement village. The irrigation, constructed by UNICEF,
was part of the resettlement programme. It also serves neighbouring
peasant associations. The effect of the irrigation scheme is not as
initially anticipated partly because it was based on rudimentary
technology. No pipes are used and even the irrigation ditches were not
properly built, reducing the volume of water. In addition, respondents
reported ‘stealing’ of water and careless use of the scheme by some
farmers exacerbating the problem. Even though theoretically all
farmers have access to irrigation water this has not actually been
realized. The management of the irrigation scheme is in the hands of
intra- and inter-village committees. The lack of experience among the
farmers is one of the problems in the efficient utilization of the
irrigation system. The resettled farmers came from the highland areas
with little or no irrigation experience.
The evolution of common pool resources in different regions varied
significantly. In areas with relatively abundant resources and low
population densities most of the water, fuel and grazing resources were
totally open-access (for example, Domaa before 1975 with settlers who
subsequently moved away before the resettlement). In some areas,
even though individuals owned the resources privately, in many
aspects they had a common pool resource character. The local
populace in Sirbana Godeti was freely using water wells dug by
individuals. In the surrounding areas of Korodegaga and Adado,
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grazing lands and forests owned by landlords were used by farmers.
Local residents can freely collect dry leaves and twigs but they are not
allowed to cut down trees without the permission of the landlord. In
contrast, in Terufe Kechema grazing land owned by landlords was not
accessible for residents. This forced farmers to go to relatively distant
grazing areas resulting in clashes with other ethnic groups (particularly
the Sidama). Grazing areas owned by landlords around Debre Berhan
were used by residents during the dry season, but were protected
during the rains. In Kembata around the survey site of Aze Deboa
forested areas were distributed by the state in 1952 to increase the size
of agricultural land.
Currently, most of the common pool resources are in a state of either
exhaustion or stress. In Geblen, residents mostly depend on private
grazing; the common grazing land survived only because it is
uncultivable. In Haresaw, the common grazing land is depleted most
of the year and the peasant association is in conflict with neighbouring
areas on the use of some grazing land. In Shumsheha, nearby grazing
areas are used only for oxen, ruminants being sent to far off places. In
Geblen and Terufe Kechema farmers are forced to take their cattle to
relatively distant areas in search of grazing land. In Terufe Kechema
and Sirbana Godeti they mainly depend on agricultural residues; one of
the advantages of producing teff is its hay, a high-quality fodder for
cattle. In Terufe Kechema the common grazing land is available only
for 2–3 months a year. In Dinki, in addition to their dependence on hay
they also rotate the use of grazing land among households. The grazing
lands of Adele Keke and Gara Godo are small and depleted most of the
year. In Gara Godo in particular and Wolaita in general the shortage in
grazing land has forced farmers to tether their cattle near their house.
Even in regions with a relatively large grazing area, like Aze Deboa,
the stress is increasingly felt. For instance, the peasant association
allocated some of the grazing area to demobilized soldiers. In addition,
respondents in Geblen, Haresaw, Debre Berhan, Yetmen, Adele Keke
and Gara Godo reported that at some point common grazing lands
were distributed to farmers. The pressure on grazing land is felt in all
the survey sites, probably with the only exception of Domaa. Domaa is
located in a marginal area with low population density and is not much
dependent on cattle.
Corresponding to the pressure on grazing land the respondents in
almost all the survey sites reported a decline in cattle population. In
most cases cattle diseases and the lack of grazing land were mentioned
as the most important reasons for a decline in livestock numbers.
Conditions surrounding fuel sources also reflect similar situations.
An indication of the scarcity is whether or not households depend on
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B. Kebede
purchased wood fuel. In seven of our survey sites,29 respondents
reported that at least some households are either totally or partially
dependent on purchased fuel wood. In Haresaw households mainly use
purchased wood fuel. Respondents in Debre Berhan indicated that the
commercialization of wood fuel begun as far back as the occupation by
the Italians (in the late 1930s). In the case of Adele Keke, it dates back
only to the Mengistu regime. In Yetmen respondents guessed that
around one-third of the population of the peasant association is heavily
dependent on purchased wood fuel. In Adado the planting of coffee
trees instead of other species that are used as fuel has exacerbated the
fuel problem. In almost all the survey sites farmers also sell wood fuel
particularly to nearby urban centres. Six sites30 indicate that while
residents in the peasant associations depend on collected wood fuel,
some is sold to outsiders (mostly to urban areas).
The above information indicates the relative scarcity of wood fuel in
most rural areas of the country. Even in the not too distant past, most
rural areas mainly depended on self-collected fuel; but the condition
seems to have changed rapidly as a result of deforestation and
depletion of the vegetation cover. But the role of deforestation should
not be exaggerated as the agriculture of the highlands had developed in
an open environment for a very long period of time. Economic
historians indicate that most of the highland agriculture evolved in an
environment without heavy forests since at least the sixteenth century.
Forests in the highland have never been continuous (McCann, 1995, p.
37). But this does not mean that significant pockets of forest areas
(‘local forests’) have not been depleted in the recent past. And the
accounts of the respondents attest to this.
In almost all the survey sites, respondents indicate that forest areas
and other vegetation cover found on land directly not used by
households have significantly decreased. Particularly periods of
political instability and uncertainty have contributed to this. After
the proclamation of the land reform programme in 1975, forest areas
owned by landlords were effectively changed into open-access
resources with significant deforestation. In addition to the political
instability, the lack of a clear regulation in the proclamation about the
management and control of small forests had exacerbated the
condition. Many sites also reported the same problem at the overthrow
of the Mengistu regime. Conditions in Haresaw, an area affected by the
guerrilla war during the civil war, also illustrate the negative effect of
the civil war on nearby forests.
Respondents from the Yetmen peasant association indicated that all
the local forest area has been converted into farmland in the last 20–30
years. More forest areas are being reclaimed for cultivation even in
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areas with low population density such as Korodegaga and Domaa; but
these are still with better forest and vegetation cover compared to other
survey sites.
The above description of depletion in forest and vegetation cover is
not the whole story because there are also other developments going in
the reverse direction. For instance, the number of trees that are planted
by farmers on plots of land they individually use probably has
increased, particularly after the mixed economic policy of the
Mengistu regime which stopped the redistribution of land. In addition,
there were some community level afforestation programmes initiated
by the government that increased forest cover.31 For example, as
mentioned above, even though the local forest that initially existed in
Yetmen has completely disappeared, the producers’ cooperative had
planted trees that existed at the time of the survey. Respondents in
Gara Godo indicated continuous deforestation that was going on from
the beginning of the twentieth century but also emphasized that the
forest cover actually increased during Mengistu’s period. In addition to
these instances, afforestation programmes occurred in Debre Berhan,
Adele Keke and Imdibir at one time or another.
Another usually cited indicator of the depletion of forest and
vegetation cover is the use of cow dung as fuel rather than as fertilizer.
In all survey sites except Geblen, Haresaw, Domaa and Imdibir
respondents reported that cow dung is used mainly as fuel than as
fertilizer. Particularly in Debre Berhan, Yetmen and Sirbana Godeti,
cow dung is reported to be the most important fuel (more important
than wood). Only Geblen and Haresaw reported that cow dung is used
as fertilizer. The mere use of cow dung as fuel must not be taken as an
indication of recent depletion in vegetation cover. Cow dung has been
an important fuel in many areas of the highland for long periods of
time; in non-forested areas it may have been an important source of
fuel for at least 400 years (McCann, 1995, p. 37). But the recent
depletion of the vegetation cover seems to increase its importance
relative to the alternative fuels.
Generally, the management of the common pool resources focuses
on excluding outsiders, preventing inappropriate use and giving time
for regeneration. Before 1975, landlords serving as the local
administrators were mostly responsible for the management of
common pool resources. For instance, respondents in Dinki reported
that landlords would first give warning then punish by imposing cash
payments and finally even evict farmers that repeatedly violate the
rules in the use of common pool resources. Admassie (2000) indicates
that the experience of rural areas with indigenous management of
common pool resource before 1975 was very limited. From the eleven
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B. Kebede
peasant associations covered in his study in northern Shewa and Wello,
only five had community controlled common pool resources. The role
of churches in protecting common pool resources, particularly forests,
is clearly shown in the case study.
After the land reform, peasant associations in many cases with the
involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture took over the role of
managing the commons. Common pool resources located in or near a
peasant association as a rule are open only to members. For instance,
in Haresaw, access to the nearby forest area around the Afar
escarpment is reserved for members. In older times those with rist
rights and after 1975 peasant associations along and near the forest
area have effectively apportioned the forest into areas accessible to
their respective members. This has helped the preservation of the
forest. In Korodegaga and Terufe Kechema members should apply and
get permission from the peasant association in order to cut trees.
Employed guards in the latter ascertain that nobody cuts trees without
permission. In Geblen and Dinki, elected people from the peasant
association backed by the Ministry of Agriculture can arrest
transgressors.
In Korodegaga, the common grazing land is used to generate cash
income for the community. The common grazing area is completely
protected during the rainy season to allow regeneration of the grass. At
the end of the rainy season nomads from the surrounding areas bring
their cattle to graze and pay cash per head of livestock. The money is
used to run the office of the peasant association. Livestock owned by
local residents do not graze on the common land for the whole year
round.
In some areas, apparently there are no restrictions on the use of
certain resources (effectively open-access resources). For example, in
Adele Keke even though common grazing lands are exhausted during
part of the year, no one restricts its use to give a chance for
regeneration. People buy grass from nearby government land when the
grazing land is exhausted.
The dominant trend that emerges from our description of conditions
of common pool resources in the survey sites is that they are
increasingly being depleted. Given the mixed nature of agriculture in
most regions (farming with livestock rearing) the depletion of grazing
areas is particularly alarming. As indicated above, most respondents
gave the shortage of grazing area as an important reason for a decline
in livestock population. Unless major reversals in this trend help
regenerate grazing areas or alternative sources of fodder that are
accessible or affordable to the farmers are made available, this can
have more severe consequences not only on livestock numbers but also
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on agricultural productivity as oxen draught power is an important
farm input.
Our discussions above also indicate that peasant associations are
now the main community-level institutions managing common pool
resources. But the responsibility of peasant associations goes far
beyond that; in fact, management of common pool resource is a minor
part of their responsibility. One of the main reasons for the
establishment and existence of peasant associations was distribution
of land; they are responsible for allocating existing land to residents as
equitably as possible. This responsibility is still that of the peasant
associations. Given the relatively high population density and low per
household land size, this latter responsibility is in direct contradiction
to their role as managers of common pool resources. When young
adults establish their own households, or demobilized soldiers or
resettlers return to their localities the peasant associations effectively
are faced with two difficult choices. Either they have to take some land
from households whose land holding is already small or distribute
from the common pool resources; as we have seen from our survey
sites, most seem to have chosen the latter option (this may be due to
the fear of antagonizing farmers with some land). Hence, the
constitutional framework due to the current land tenure is not
conducive to preserve common pool resources.
In the next section we will discuss prospects in the land tenure
system.
6. Some Reflections
The preceding sections outline the evolution of land tenure and
common pool resources in Ethiopia. In this section, some general
patterns and possible future developments are identified. Since the
issues are very broad and difficult to be conclusively addressed in an
empirical fashion, our discussion here will be limited to general ideas.
The basic technology used for centuries by Ethiopian farmers, the
ox-plough, has played an important role in shaping the rural landscape.
The ox-plough has existed in the highland areas of the country for a
very long period of time (probably starting from the first millennium
BC, see McCann, 1995, p. 39). Compared to the hoe, the ox-plough is
highly productive, enabling farmers to cultivate much more area of
land. In addition, an important feature of the ox-plough is that it
requires open space, which is not necessarily true in the case of the hoe
that can also be used in areas with vegetation cover. The higher
productivity and the need for open space coupled with a rise in
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B. Kebede
population has led to the expansion of cultivated land at the expense of
forests (particularly in the south) and grazing land. The competitive
use of land for farming or for grazing is a perennial problem in
Ethiopian agriculture. With increases in population, more land
(including grazing land) has to be brought under the plough; but the
oxen pulling the plough will run out of feed as a consequence. This
process seems to continue even at the present period. Farmers in most
of our study sites reported that the decrease in cattle population was
mainly due to diseases and shortage in grazing land. Until other means
of providing fodder come forth this problem will continue.
The existence of an essentially subsistence agriculture in the country
for relatively long periods of time has shaped traditional land tenure
arrangements. The rist and other ‘communal’ forms of tenure that
existed before the introduction of private property were directed
towards guaranteeing subsistence; their logic was based on giving
access to land to the majority of the population even though some
outcast members of society may be prohibited from owning land.32 As
we have seen in our previous sections, they more or less succeeded in
doing that; landlessness before the land reform of 1975 was not
widespread. In spite of its radical consequences particularly in
abolishing the political power of the emperor and the overlords, the
1975 land reform programme was also based on the same logic of
subsistence economy; its main aim was guaranteeing farmers’ access
to land. In fact, government employees involved in land reform issues
took the traditional tenure system in Tigrai and Eritrea as a model.
With the socialist orientation of the Mengistu regime until the
declaration of the mixed economic policy in 1990, this state of affairs
was initially understood to be transient and to be superseded by a
collective form of agriculture. But with the failure and abandonment of
collectivization, a sense of direction indicating the next step in the
evolution of land tenure was totally lost. Even in the case where the
country started a comprehensive reform programme after the fall of the
Mengistu regime, nothing fundamentally changed in relation to rural
land tenure.
The status quo is clearly unsustainable. Due to relatively high
population density in most parts of the country, peasant associations do
not have a sufficient amount of land to allocate to all residents; nor
could they ‘colonize’ additional land. But peasant associations are still
understood to be responsible for allocating land for those who are
resident. In addition to young people coming of age, demobilized
soldiers and returning settlers also queue for allocation of land. This
has resulted in a significant number of landless people. Probably the
most important means through which the landless get access to land is
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sharecropping. As a short-term contract, sharecropping does not give
sufficient incentives for investment.
Generally, the increase in population decreases per capita land
holding. And given the stagnant technology this decreases the returns
to labour. If increased population density is to give rise to more
intensified agriculture, as predicted in Boserup’s framework, investment has to come forth; people have to start creating soil conservation
structures, water management systems, use better agricultural inputs
and technology. On the macro level, investment is crucial to arrest or
slow down the process of desertification (more and more previously
well-to-do areas are becoming vulnerable to famine). A necessary
condition for making long-run investments is security of land
ownership and this is clearly lacking in present-day Ethiopia.
The lack in security of rural land ownership is an endemic problem,
going back even to the period before the land reform of 1975. Since the
right of any descendant was assured in the rist system, farmers always
face a real possibility of giving up some or all of the land they
cultivate. If a farmer puts up a permanent structure on some plots of
land that was perceived by other members of the rist group as a
permanent claim on the land and usually leads to disputes and
litigation. After the incorporation of the southern areas into the
Ethiopian empire, all land effectively became that of the Emperor. If
overlords fell out of favour, the land they administer was given to
others. Only during the latter part of Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime
do we find private ownership of land. One consequence of the land
reform of 1975 is arresting this development towards a more secure
land ownership. The insecurity in land tenure both before and after
1975 has most likely undermined investment and led to deterioration in
land quality in many areas of the country.
The lack in security of tenure seems to play an important role in the
type of decisions farmers make. If we look at regions that have
improved their conditions recently most of the improvement comes
from shifting towards a more lucrative crop. The case of Adele Keke
and regions that have shifted towards the production of chat are cases
in point. Or the introduction of fertilizers in some areas has increased
yield. The absence of significant long-term investments (irrigation
systems, use of ground water and small-scale modern agricultural
equipments, etc.) is symptomatic of tenure insecurity. Since the impact
of variable inputs like fertilizer is maximized with complementary
inputs that require long-run investments (like irrigation), tenure
insecurity may have indirectly decreased the returns to the former.
In addition to undermining the security of land tenure, the
nationalization of rural land created a condition that enables active
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B. Kebede
intervention of the state on the micro level. Such policy measures like
collectivization and villagization would have been unthinkable with
private ownership of land. As long as land continues to be owned by
the state, the risk from interventionist measures from the state would
remain and increase the uncertainties faced by farmers.
Given the above problems in lack of tenure security and
uncertainties created by state ownership of land, the apparent solution
to the problem is moving towards privatization. Instead of full-fledged
privatization, some have argued for partial measures. For example,
Rahmato (1994) recommended ‘associative ownership’. In ‘associative
ownership’ land belongs to the community (basically members of the
peasant association) but individuals will have freehold right over it.
Individual farmers will have the right to rent, mortgage and sale only
to co-residents or peasants from neighbouring communities. This form
of tenure is targeted at preventing urban interests from acquiring land
for speculative purposes and large-scale agricultural projects. The
main problem with this alternative is that it will result in creating a
highly fragmented land ‘market’, in fact a ‘market’ administratively
controlled by peasant associations. If farmers are allowed to sell land
only to co-residents or members of neighbouring peasant associations,
the value of land will be low compared to unrestricted sell; this in a
sense is impoverishing farmers who have land by fragmenting
(creating inefficiency in) the land market. In addition, associative
ownership will prohibit the transfer of land to ‘outsiders’ who can
more efficiently use it. Farmers cannot use the land as collateral to
raise credits as long as the creditors are outside the community (and
generally we expect them to be outside). To minimize the risk of land
concentration for unproductive (speculative) purposes, it is better to
use taxation and other government instruments (for example, a high
land or another type of tax on those who are not productively using it
can be imposed).
Another alternative is to give very long-term leases to farmers. But
this alternative is also constraining because the farmers cannot sell the
land to raise money for non-agricultural or other activities nor can they
mortgage it to get access to credit.
Results from studies showing the absence of significant variation in
the productivity of differently held tenure arrangements (for example,
see Gavian and Ehui, 1999 for Ethiopia) are usually used to argue
against privatization. Some of these studies are comparing tenure
arrangements with different levels of security but do not include
private ownership. For example, Gavian and Ehui (1999) compare
productivity of rented, sharecropped and borrowed land with that of
land held by farmers with formal contract with the government. Since
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there is no private tenure in Ethiopia, they cannot do otherwise. But
even in cases where private tenure is included, productivity
differentials may not be observed in the short run if returns to
investment have long-term impacts. For example, Alemu (1999) found
that soil conservation investments have only long-run benefits; in fact
their benefits may even be negative in the short run. The main impact
of private property is strengthening security of tenure and consequently the uncertainty related to who gets the future returns from
investment will be minimized. Even when looking at current
differences in tenure, Teklu (1997) found that farmers with long-term
use rights invest more on the land than those with short-term use
rights. Since in both cases land is owned by the state, we logically
expect higher incentives for investment with private ownership.
In addition, the absence of land markets will have an impact on the
operation of other markets. For example, unless there is private
ownership of land, farmers cannot use land as a collateral; this will
have an effect on the credit market. With state ownership farmers
cannot sell land and set up non-agricultural activities; this arrests the
growth of the non-agricultural sector, a sector crucial for the
development of rural areas as well as the overall economy.
For most farmers land is the most important single asset within their
overall asset portfolio. The present state ownership of land effectively
constrains the use of this most important single asset to a small number
of alternatives (either cultivating it oneself or rent or sharecropping).
Expecting radical changes in the way farmers live while tying up most
of their potential wealth in only limited number of uses is unrealistic.
In addition to the above given reasons, with a vision for a marketoriented type of economic future, the natural next step in rural land
reform seems to be privatization.33 Privatization of rural land
obviously will be a socially, economically and politically radical and
demanding measure. Except in the latter years of the Haile Selassie
period in some parts of the country, land markets practically did not
exist in Ethiopia. Privatization of land amounts to creating land
markets almost from scratch. Cadastral surveys, registration and titling
of land generally are very costly. There is always the danger of using
land for unproductive (speculative) purposes and mechanisms for
discouraging that have to be designed and put into place (for example,
taxation). Given the current ethnic-based regional structure of
administration, a freely operating land market may increase political
tensions. If land concentration progresses at a very rapid pace,
landlessness and rural–urban migration may increase fast. These and
other risks should be taken into account and correspondingly the
modus operandi and pace of privatization should be shaped
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B. Kebede
accordingly. The relief and rehabilitation strategy may have to take
consideration of possible major social dislocations. But given the
overall market-oriented economic policy of the government, the need
to create a secure tenure to encourage farmers to invest in the land and
use it freely for whatever purposes they deem necessary, having a clear
vision of moving towards private property in rural land seems
necessary.
One useful experience from the land reform programme of 1975 was
that its implementation did not lead to as much social conflicts as
expected, essentially because the peasant associations worked in an
autonomous way taking local conditions into account (see Rahmato,
1984). Active and autonomous involvement of peasant associations in
privatization of rural land can help minimize costs as well as diffuse
possible social tensions.
From the farmers’ point of view, there is some evidence that a
significant number of them are willing to pay for privatization of land.
Using contingent valuation methods, Alemu (1999) found that 261 out
of the 524 sampled households (around 50 per cent) responded that
they are willing to pay money, either from their own pockets or by
borrowing, to buy land. Interestingly, 127 households were willing to
pay from their own pocket (i.e., without any borrowing). These are
indications that farmers are willing to pay for more security of tenure.
As demonstrated in the experience of other countries, privatization
of rural land is only a necessary, not sufficient, condition for rural
development. Privatization in many instances has not led to the
expected benefits due to lack or weakness of other markets. Credit
facilities, agricultural input markets are cases in point. Money raised
through the privatization of land can be used to cover costs (cost of
registration, titling and cadastral surveys) as well as strengthening
markets. For instance, micro-finance and similar institutions and
agricultural input supplies can be developed in a state-private
partnership.
So far we have focused our ideas on land cultivated by farmers
and ignored common pool resources. This is deliberately done
because the status of tenure on farmland essentially determines
conditions of common pool resources. A major problem in
preserving common pool resources at present is that peasant
associations are still considered to be responsible for providing land
to residents (even though they may not actually be capable of doing
so due to shortage of land). For example, in our sampled sites,
grazing land was distributed for returning soldiers and resettlers. In
addition to directly depleting common pool resources, the possibility
that they may be given out to individuals undermines the incentives
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to use them in a communally optimal way; since in the future the
common pool resource may be given out to individuals and may be
off limits to other residents, the time horizon for valuing the resource
will be shorter. Privatization with the protection of common pool
resources mitigates this problem.
Privatizing the commons can be suggested as a solution. At least
from present day conditions, this does not seem advisable. The main
forms of common pool resources in rural Ethiopia are grazing land,
sources of water (springs, rivers, streams, etc.) and fuel (vegetation
cover, forests, etc.). First, privatizing some of these resources is
impractical; for instance, water resources are migratory and private
property will be unenforceable. Secondly, until the time when
alternative means of satisfying needs covered by common pool
resources are available, privatizing them may create a monopoly. For
example, if farmers totally depend on common grazing land to feed
their cattle (i.e., there is no or little fodder from other sources),
privatizing grazing land may give monopoly power that can be
effectively used. Thirdly, some common resources can effectively be
used only on a large scale. For instance, if common grazing land is
apportioned among farmers, it most likely will not be as useful as one
large common grazing land.
The literature provides many examples of common pool resources
that have been successfully preserved for long periods of time (see the
examples given in Ostrom, 1991). The generations of people who have
managed them have stable social positions including secure tenure on
their individual farmland. Security of land holding through privatization probably creates the much-needed incentive to farmers to invest
on their land as well as establish more stable social relationships that
help to preserve common pool resources in Ethiopia. Hence, the
preservation of existing common pool resources in Ethiopia ‘paradoxically’ may depend on privatization of land.
Notes
1. IFPRI also participated in the first round of the survey covering
half of the sites.
2. A major area that is not covered by the ERHS is the nomadic
system.
3. In the Tigrai region, the local administrative division called tabia
generally corresponds with the peasant association in other parts of
the country. The different nomenclature in Tigrai apparently is a
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B. Kebede
result of the region being under the control of the TPLF (Tigrai
People’s Liberation Front) for a relatively long period of time
before the overthrow of the Mengistu regime by the coalition of
forces led by the TPLF itself.
4. Woreda is the lowest administrative sub-division in Ethiopia;
below the woreda are the local governments, the peasant and urban
dwellers’ associations.
5. Teff (Eragrostis abyssinica) is a type of cereal used as a main
staple food in many parts of the country (especially in the urban
areas) and is indigenous to Ethiopia.
6
Enset is the root of the false banana tree and it is used as staple
food in some parts of the country, particularly in the south.
7. Following the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, a military
council (the Derg) took power. After a bloody internal struggle,
Mengistu Haile Mariam emerged as the leader of the regime that
ruled until its overthrow by the TPLF in 1991. For the sake of
brevity, we will refer to the regime between 1974 and 1991 as the
Mengistu regime.
8. The division of our discussion about tenure into north and south is
not a neat classification; too much should not be read from this
classification.
9. The original settler of an area is known as wanna abbat (‘the main
father’) or aqgni abbat (‘the pioneer father’), the first for example
in Gojam and the second in Menz, northern Shewa.
10. The classification of rist as a ‘communal’ tenure is very misleading
as it covers up many competitive aspects of the tenure system.
11. Interestingly, while titles of litigants influence decisions of courts,
ethnicity was not statistically significant, contrary to accepted
opinions (Joireman, 2000, p. 117).
12. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church was also controlling large
amounts of land.
13. Generally the growth of the modern state was the reason that the
power of the gult was weakened. The expansion of a standing army
and maintenance of relative peace decreased their military
importance. Payment of taxes directly to the government replaced
payment-in-kind and services to gult-holders. Expansion of the
court system to lower administrative levels undermined their
judicial power (even though gult-holders retained much of their
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power by themselves becoming judges in many cases) (Hoben,
1973, p. 207).
14. Most of the characteristics also apply to Tigrian descent groups.
The Amhara and Tigrai ethnic groups constitute the majority of
people in northern Ethiopia.
15. The corresponding figures for Debre Berhan, Geblen and Dinki are
70 per cent, 75 per cent and 80 per cent. The very high figures
probably are due to confusions in nomenclature. The word gebbar
(‘someone who pays taxes/tributes’) can in some places (particularly in northern Shewa) be understood as self-cultivator but in
others as tenant. In a north Shewa locality, Admassie (2000, p.
106) found that 70.2 per cent of the farmers were owner-cultivators
before 1975. The percentages given in Rahmato (1984, p. 19) for
Gojam, Gondar and Tigrai, all in northern Ethiopia, are 13 per cent,
9 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. These figures strongly
reinforce our suspicion that the high percentages are results of
confusion due to names.
16. For a detailed description of the farming system that existed in
nineteenth century Gera, one of the centralized kingdoms in the
south, see McCann (1995, chapter 5).
17. Some authors argue that the condition of the farmers in the south
was very similar to European serfdom even though the farmers
were not legally tied to the land they work (Admassie, 2000;
Joireman, 2000).
18. There were some exceptions to this general picture. For instance, in
1907 holders of imperial land grants in the vicinity of Addis Ababa
were allowed to convert their land into freehold (Admassie, 2000,
p. 100).
19. In some cases, the eviction of tenants was not due to mechanization
but to give the land to other more efficient ox-plough farmers
(McCann, 1995, p. 229).
20. How much land tenure systems prior to Menelik’s occupation were
changed after the incorporation partly depends on particular
political developments. For instance, the western kingdom of
Jimma was left almost intact and autonomous even during the
period of Haile Sellasie by striking a deal with the government.
21. The figures for the latter four sites are relatively high and may
partially be a result of confusion due to nomenclature (see n. 15).
Gilkes estimated the percentage of farms in Ethiopia cultivated by
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B. Kebede
tenants at 42 per cent. Cohen and Weintraub assert that over half of
the peasants in the south were tenants. Southern farmers estimated
60 per cent (see Rahmato, 1984, p. 22). In particular, Rahmato
(1984, p. 23) found that only 20 per cent of the farmers in Boloso
Sore woreda, the woreda where Gara Godo is located, are tenants.
This is in sharp contrast to the 75 per cent we have here.
22. University and secondary school teachers and students were
dispatched to the rural areas just after the proclamation. But most
of the distribution was done after that.
23. The seven sites are Dinki, Domaa, Debre Berhan, Terufe Kechema,
Yetmen, Geblen and Haresaw. TPLF guerrilla forces had
administered the last two sites before the overthrow of the
Mengistu regime. There were periodic redistributions while the
sites were administered by the TPLF.
24. Given the institutional set-up of current Ethiopia, where land is
allocated to a household not to an individual, the definition of a
landless household is not immediately clear. Adult children living
with their parents that have land are cases in point. Habtu (1994, p. 60)
defined the landless ‘as comprising all married couples and single
adult males aged over twenty-four who had no direct access to land
and were residents in the study [peasant associations]’. As indicated in
the paper, the cut-off point of 24 is relatively high both in terms of the
life expectancy in Ethiopia as well as the age males start agricultural
activities or/and marry to establish their own households. This
indicates that the 17.4 per cent could be an under-estimate.
25. Traditional settlements in Imdibir in particular and in Gurage in
general are more or less in nucleated villages.
26. In addition to the abolition of producers’ cooperatives as a
consequence of the mixed economic policy of the Mengistu
regime, another major change brought about was abandonment of
compulsory grain delivery at low prices through a marketing board
(Agricultural Marketing Corporation).
27. The archaeologist J. Theodore Bent in 1895 wrote that ‘the remains
of irrigation works evident at Axum were comparable to ‘‘the hills
in Greece and Asia Minor’’ but now merely a ‘‘sad instance of
Abyssinian deterioration’’’ (from McCann, 1995, p. 13).
28. For an excellent description of the agricultural system in the
nineteenth century and a discussion of the reasons for its decline
see McCann (1995, part II section 4).
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29. These sites are Haresaw, Debre Berhan, Yetmen, Adele Keke,
Terufe Kechema, Adado and Aze Deboa.
30. These are Geblen, Shumsheha, Dinki, Korodegaga, Domaa and
Imdibir.
31. Admassie (2000, pp. 93, 117–18) reports very limited private tree
planting in rural areas before 1975. Community-based collective
labour for conservation was unknown. Most of the communitylevel tree plantings happened during Mengistu’s regime.
32. The Felashas (‘Black Jews’) in the north are a case in point. The
characterization of agriculture as subsistence economy is not to
deny important instances of organized forms of production
managed by the palaces of Emperors, kings and regional overloads
(for example, areas around Ankober in northern Shewa during
Menelik’s period, Gera in the south in the nineteenth century, see
McCann, 1995).
33. This suggestion does not necessarily mean privatizing all rural
land. For instance, existing common pool resources and large state
forests need not be privatized. In nomadic areas, privatization will
obviously be impractical as long as the current style of life
continues.
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