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Lest we forget: the effect of war commemorations on the perceived value of war
Hanne M Watkins
The University of Pennsylvania
Brock Bastian
The University of Melbourne
Author note: The authors wish to thank the attendees of the SPSSI-SASP small group meeting in
Melbourne, April 2017, for useful feedback on these studies. Correspondence should be addressed to
Hanne M Watkins, address: 3720 Walnut St, Philadelphia, PA 19104; email: [email protected].
Author biographies: Hanne M Watkins is a currently a postdoctoral research fellow at The University of
Pennsylvania, studying morality, environmental psychology, and war. Brock Bastian is an Associate
Professor at the University of Melbourne whose work focuses on pain, happiness, and morality.
Word count: 4991
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Abstract
Why do societies commemorate war? The persistence and ubiquity of war commemorations suggests that
they serve a function to society. We examine one possible function: commemorating past sacrifices
promotes a willingness among group members to endure future sacrifices on behalf of the group. Drawing
on one correlational “field” study (N = 500) and two experimental studies (N = 200, 600) with American
participants, we show that although war commemorations – reminders of costly sacrifices being
undertaken for U.S. society – induce regret for the country’s actions, they also elicit emotions such as
pride, admiration, and gratitude in response to the costly sacrifice of soldiers. This emotional response in
turn leads participants to endorse future costly pro-group behaviours; that is, to value and justify war. The
popular mantra claims that we remember wars to not repeat them; this research suggests the opposite
consequence may be just as likely.
Key words: war commemorations, cognitive dissonance, intergroup conflict, moral emotions
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“Being a great president has to do with a lot of things, but one of them is being a great
cheerleader for the country. (…) we’re going to show the people as we build up our
military, we’re going to display our military.”
-
President-Elect Donald Trump
reported in the Washington Post 18 January 2017
In setting up his military displays, Trump has plenty of examples to draw from. Military parades take
place all around the world; from France on Bastille Day to India on Republic Day, from China’s
celebration of Victory Day in 2015, to Iran commemorating its 1980 invasion of Iraq. Such displays of
military power are not only intended as shows of strength, aimed at deterring potential international
enemies, they are also designed to increase pride and alignment to a pro-group agenda. In contrast to
these celebrations of military strength, nations also commonly commemorate war. National days of
remembrance, such as Memorial Day and Remembrance Day in the US, and Anzac Day in Australia, also
place the military at the center of national attention. Yet, rather than celebrating military might, such
commemorative services focus on suffering, cost, and sacrifice. Their supposed aim is captured by Queen
Elizabeth II (2004): “In remembering the appalling suffering of war on both sides, we recognise how
precious is the peace we have built in Europe since 1945”. This common wisdom suggests that while
military displays might increase commitment to war, commemorations may lead us to regret it. We
examine whether this intuition is indeed true. Research indicates that making shared suffering salient is a
powerful motivator of group alignment (Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester, & Swann, 2014; Xygalatas,
Mitkidis, et al., 2013) and that this can be more potent than celebrating group success (Whitehouse, Jong,
et al., 2017). In the present study we test whether military commemorations highlighting the cost of war,
and sacrifices made during war, are more powerful predictors of future willingness to go to war, than are
displays of military strength.
The function of war commemorations
Wars are costly and horrific, raising the question of why societies spend immense resources to
commemorate them. This is particularly the case since it is often the costs – the sacrifices, the fallen
soldiers – rather than the benefits that are the focus of such rituals (Grant, 2005). One possible reason for
war commemorations is that they remind us that wars should be avoided; when we are made aware of
their cost we are more likely to regret past wars and less likely to engage in future wars (e.g. the received
wisdom of Queen Elizabeth II). And certainly, from the perspective of a rational cost-benefit analysis,
highlighting the costs of a possible action should theoretically reduce willingness to engage in it (Simon,
1955). This theoretical prediction is to some degree borne out by previous research: members of the U.S.
public who are connected to the military have been found to be more “casualty sensitive” (Gelpi, Feaver,
& Reifler, 2009) than those not connected to the military. In other words, for these civilians, support for
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war goes down, when costs (in particular casualties) rise. Similarly, political leaders who have seen
combat are less likely to initiate militarized policy, than are political leaders with military experience who
have not seen combat (Horowitz & Stam, 2014). Horowitz and Stam suggest that this may be because
combat experience leads to an “intimate knowledge of the horrors of modern warfare” (p. 534). This
perspective thus suggests that war commemorations serve a “preventative” function.
However, an alternative perspective exists, which leads to the intriguing suggestion that
commemorations may lead to a greater willingness to support war: Durkheim (1912/1995) argued that
painful and dysphoric experiences function to promote commitment and solidarity within groups, and that
this is one reason that costly group rituals have persisted across time (e.g., Whitehouse et al., 2014).
Research on such rituals furthermore shows that they have the capacity to increase pro-group behaviour.
For instance, Xygalatas et al. (2013) found that Kavadi ritual participants who had endured significant
levels of pain donated more money to a local temple compared to those who endured a less painful form
of the same ritual. Such effects also extended to the observers of these painful acts. Similarly, Bastian,
Jetten, and Ferris (2014) found that sharing a painful experience with novel group members increased
feelings of bonding to the group and enhanced cooperation.
Understood from this perspective, war commemorations may serve a very different function to
the one they are commonly believed to achieve: they may promote increased bonding to the group and
enhanced cooperation, and such feelings may in turn be associated increased, as opposed to reduced,
support for war. Furthermore, rather than directly exposing people to the visceral horrors of modern
warfare, thereby risking the chances or reducing rather than increasing support (e.g., Horowitz & Stam,
2014), commemorations highlight the sacrifices made by one’s countrymen, and their willingness to
endure hardship for the sake of the nation. This emphasis on shared sacrifice may serve an “inspirational”
function, rather than a preventative one.
How do war commemorations increase support for war?
Although the mechanisms by which dysphoric rituals may produce group commitment have been
theorized within evolutionary biology (Whitehouse et al., 2017) and argued to exist as a function of
episodic memory (Whitehouse, 1996), there is another more proximal explanation which is especially
likely to apply in the case of war commemorations: dissonance. In a classic study on hazing rituals,
Gerard and Mathewson (1966; see also Aronson & Mills, 1959) found that participants who had suffered
through pain in order to join a group, subsequently valued the group more. The researchers explain this
counter-intuitive dynamic, by drawing on a cognitive dissonance account which suggests that we value
things for which we suffer because valuing them justifies our choice to suffer. Suffering for a target that
matters little evokes dissonance due to the inconsistency between the high-cost behaviour (suffering) and
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low-cost target. People resolve this state of dissonance by increasing the value placed on the reason for
their suffering.
We suspect that a similar process is at play in the case of war commemorations. Where other
group members have made costly sacrifices for the sake of the group, we respond to those actions by
valuing both the acts themselves and the group for which they were performed. To do otherwise would
make the immense costs appear to be in vain – a dissonance provoking inconsistency. Critically, such
inconsistencies tend to be dissonance arousing to the extent that they matter to us (Festinger, 1962). Being
reminded of the costly sacrifices of outgroup members, even when they appear to be in vain, may arouse
less dissonance compared to when others in our ingroup have made sacrifices for ‘us’; for our shared
identity. In such cases, the motivation to make sense of such behaviour is stronger and can motivate
attitudes and actions which serve to resolve dissonance. This reasoning is consistent with the findings of
Xygalatas et al. (2013) who observed that it was not only the participants of extreme rituals, but also their
observers who engaged in more pro-group behaviour.
Overview of Studies
Across three studies we examined the effect of war commemorations on the perceived value of
war. We expected that being reminded of the costs of war – specifically the loss of soldier’s lives – would
make people regret their country’s involvement in war, yet we also predicted that people would
experience a concomitant increase in positive emotions regarding the sacrifices made by the soldiers
themselves. Feelings of gratitude, pride, and admiration are common responses to pro-social behaviour
(e.g, Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008) and are also indicators of value. We predicted that responding to the
costly sacrifice of fallen soldiers with these moral emotions would serve to reduce dissonance over their
loss of life – by increasing the perceived value, and in particular, moral value (Haidt, 2003), of their
actions. In line with this reasoning, we also expected that the costly sacrifice of soldiers would increase
the perceived value of war, and that this would be related to the experience of positive moral emotion.
Data and materials for this project are provided at https://osf.io/xxx.
Study 1
The aim of Study 1 was to investigate in a “naturalistic” setting the relationship between participating in
war commemorations, and positive moral emotions in response to sacrifice in war, as well as the
perceived value of war. We therefore recruited U.S. participants on Memorial Day (the last Monday in
May), a national holiday for commemorating all those who have fallen in war, and asked participants
which commemorative activities they had engaged in. We expected that greater participation in
commemorative activities would predict regret over America’s involvement in past wars, but also a
concomitant increase in positive moral emotions regarding the personal sacrifices made by the soldiers,
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and that this in turn would lead to increased valuing of war . Hypotheses and analyses were pre-registered
using www.aspredicted.org (see Supplemental Materials).
Method
Participants
Five-hundred U.S. participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), and
compensated for their participation, on Memorial Day (29th May, 2017). We did not perform an a priori
power analysis, however this sample size provides 99% power to detect an effect of ρ = .19 with an α of
5% (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).
Materials and Procedure
Participants were first shown a page that said “Today is Memorial Day in the U.S. Please indicate
below which activities you have participated in today.” Fifteen activities were listed (e.g., visited a
cemetery, thought about people who have died in war; see Supplemental Materials), in addition to an
“other” option (allowing free text response). Participants could select more than one activity. For each
activity selected, they were also asked whether they had engaged in the activity once, twice, or more than
twice.
Next, participants were asked how they felt about US involvement in past and (possible) future
wars (e.g. “I feel bad that the U.S. has been involved in wars in the past”, 1 = Strongly disagree,
7 = Strongly agree, α = .899). This served as a measure of regret over U.S. wars. Participants were then
asked “Thinking about the loss of life suffered by the U.S. during war, I feel…” We included 11 emotions
(anger, disgust, shame, guilt, anxiety, sadness, pride, admiration, gratitude, awe, happiness) and
participants responded on a 1-7 Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal). These emotions were
selected based on Haidt’s (2003) taxonomy of moral emotions and previous research on group-based guilt
and pride (e.g. Schori-Eyal, Tagar, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015). They were combined into separate positive
(pride, admiration, gratitude, awe; α = .869) and negative (anger, disgust, shame, guilt, anxiety; α = .836)
emotion sub-scales (see Supplemental Materials for subscale construction). This index of positive moral
emotions was our measure of how much people valued the sacrifices made by soldiers themselves.
Participants then indicated whether they endorsed war on behalf of their country (11 items,
α = .945, e.g. “Sometimes my country needs to go to war to make wrongs right” 1 = strongly disagree,
7 = strongly agree). These items were intended to tap directly into the value placed by participants on
war, and were our primary outcome measure. Finally, participants were asked to provide demographic
information, including age, gender, and political orientation (1 = extreme left, 9 = extreme right, 10 =
libertarian, 11 = don’t know/apolitical).
Results
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Although we had requested 500 participants from AMT, we somehow ended up with 6 additional
participants, thus the full sample included 248 women, 255 men, 3 indicated “other” as their gender. The
mean age was 36.56, SD = 11.50.
We first calculated a “commemoration score” for each participant by summing the number of
commemorative activities they had participated in, weighted by how many times they had participated
(Once: x1, Twice: x1.5, More than twice: x2). Scores ranged from 0 to 25 (out of a possible 32), M = 3.83
(SD = 3.87). As can be seen, in Table 1, this measure correlated positively both with the positive moral
emotions, and with the perceived value of war. However, we did not find any association between the
commemoration score and whether people regretted their country’s actions in past wars.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for Study 1
M (SD)
1
Gender
2
Age
3
Politicsa
4
Commemoration
score
Positive moral
emotions:
soldiers
5
6
Valuing war
7
Feel bad re war:
Country
Negative moral
emotions:
soldiers
8
F (2) = 248
M (1)= 255
2
.117**
3
4
5
6
7
8
-.066
.057
-.043
-.104*
.195**
.132**
.145**
.137**
.144**
.159***
.121**
-.065
.236***
.325***
.445***
-.223***
-.204***
.316***
.251***
.026
.035
.577***
-.124**
-.089*
-.260***
-.325***
.443***
-
Note: a For the continuous politics measure, anyone responding “libertarian” or “apolitical/don’t know” was filtered out. This
left an n of 452 for any analyses involving this measure. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Our prediction also concerned a mediational pathway from the commemorative score to the perceived
value of war through positive moral emotions. We therefore ran the analysis presented in Figure 1, using
Hayes (2012) PROCESS Macro for SPSS. The indirect effect of commemoration score on the value of
war (via positive moral emotions) was significant and positive: indirect effect = 0.063, 95%CI: 0.045,
0.086. The more commemorative activities a participant had engaged in, the more they valued war, and
this effect was partially mediated by the greater amount of positive moral emotions they experienced.
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This provided initial evidence in support of our claim that exposure to war commemorations can increase
the perceived value of war and that this occurs via the experience of positive moral emotions towards the
costly sacrifice of soldiers in war.
0.150***
(0.111, 0.190)
Commemoration
Score
Positive moral
emotions
0.028*
(0.0004, 0.055)
0.421***
(0.364, 0.479)
Valuing war
Figure 1: Summary of mediation model, Study 1. 95% bias corrected and accelerated
confidence intervals shown in brackets. The indirect effect was robust to including
demographic variables, political orientation, and negative responses to war as additional
predictors of positive moral emotions and valuing war, point estimate = 0.045, 95%CI: 0.029,
0.065. More details about these analyses provided in Supplemental Materials.
Study 2
In Study 2 we experimentally tested the possibility that although war commemorations lead to
regret over the country’s past actions, they also lead to a concomitant increase in positive moral emotions
in response to the sacrifice of soldiers themselves. We were again primarily interested in whether this
would in turn lead to an increase in support for future wars. Our experimental approach allowed us to
directly contrast the effect of commemorations (the commemoration condition) with displays of military
parades and technology (the military strength condition). The purpose of military displays is to build
support for war, yet based on our analyses, we predicted that the costly sacrifice of soldiers commonly
displayed in commemorations may be more likely to engender positive moral emotions and in turn to
increase support for future wars.
Method
Participants
Two-hundred U.S. participants were recruited using AMT. Sample size was determined based on
a desire for 80% power to detect an effect as small as d = 0.40, in a between-subjects t-test (Faul, et al.,
2009).
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Materials and Procedure
The materials were similar to in study 1, except instead of reporting their commemorative
activities, participants were shown either a typical Memorial Day video, commemorating fallen soldiers
(high cost condition; 4:12 minutes) or a control video which highlighted U.S. military power (low cost
condition; 3:55 minutes). Both videos can be viewed on YouTube (see Supplemental Materials). The
videos both contained military and patriotic imagery accompanied by stirring music, but only the ‘high
cost’ video drew attention to the cost of war in terms of human lives and suffering. To ensure that
participants watched the video, the ‘next’ button did not appear until 4 min. At the end of the study we
asked participants whether they had watched the video as requested, and filtered out any who had not (see
below).
After watching the video, participants completed a manipulation check (“Please give your
subjective estimate of how costly wars are for U.S. society, using the scale below”, 1 = not at all costly,
11 = extremely costly), and responded to the same measures as in study 1.1
Results and Discussion
After debriefing, 10 participants opted out of having their data included in the analyses, and 5
reported not having watched the video at all. This left a final sample size of 185; with 71 women, 113
men, 1 other, and with a mean age of 34.48 (SD = 9.88).
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for Study 2
M (SD)
1
Gender
2
Age
3
Politicsa
Positive moral
emotions: soldiers
Valuing war
Feel bad re war:
Country
Negative moral
emotions: soldiers
4
5
6
7
F (0) = 71
M (1)= 113
34.48 (9.88)
4.16 (2.23)
3.83 (1.81)
4.47 (1.41)
2
-.074
3
4
5
6
7
-.045
.003
-.007
-.022
-.186*
.187*
.113
.218**
-.009
-.061
.394***
.541***
-.333***
-.247**
.592***
-.122
-.152*
-.375***
-.390***
5.57 (1.40)
.470***
3.50 (1.75)
-
Note For the continuous politics measure, anyone responding “libertarian” or “apolitical/don’t know” was filtered out.
This left an n of 168 for any analyses involving this measure. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
:a
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Manipulation check
The effect of condition on the manipulation check was not significant, t(183) = 1.535, p = .127: in
both conditions, participants perceived the cost of war to be very high (high cost: M = 10.26, SD = 1.12;
low cost: M = 9.98, SD = 1.30; mean difference = 0.276, 95%CI: 0.079, 0.631). This may have been
because our question was too general; we did not specifically ask about the human cost of war (e.g.,
people may have been thinking of the cost of military equipment in the military strength condition). In the
next study we improve our manipulation check, but in the present study, we nonetheless analyse the two
conditions as planned.
Responses to war commemoration
As expected, participants reported greater positive moral emotions (α = .871) in the high-cost
versus low-cost condition, t(183) = 5.748, p < .001; high cost: M = 4.58, SD = 1.65; low cost: M = 3.17,
SD = 1.68; mean difference = 1.412, 95%CI: 0.928, 1.897. There was also a marginal effect of condition
on valuing war (α = .943), t(183) = 1.712, p = .089; high cost: M = 4.66, SD = 1.42; low cost: M = 4.31,
SD = 1.40; mean difference = 0.355, 95%CI: -0.054, 0.764. The effect of condition on negative emotions
(α = .888) in response to sacrifice was not significant, t(183) = -0.339, p = .735; high cost: M = 3.55, SD
= 1.75; low cost: M = 3.46, SD = 1.76; mean difference = -0.088, 95%CI: -0.599, 0.423, consistent with
the lack of a correlation between this measure and participants’ commemorative score in study 1.
However, participants reported greater regret for U.S. involvement in war (α = .898) in the high-cost than
the low-cost condition, t(183) = -2.841, p = .005; high cost: M = 5.88, SD = 1.30; low cost: M = 5.30,
SD = 1.44; mean difference = -0.575, 95%CI: -0.974, -0.176.
Mediation analysis
Although the manipulation produced only a marginal effect on the value of war, the value of war
was positively correlated with positive moral emotions (see Table 2), for which the effect of condition
was significant. Models of persuasion often posit a role for affect in attitude change and formation (e.g.
Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). We therefore reasoned that there may be an indirect effect of condition
via positive moral emotions on the value of war.2 Indeed, the mediation analysis presented in Figure 2
revealed an indirect effect of condition on the perceived value of war via positive moral emotions
(indirect effect = 0.710, 95%CI: 0.460, 0.996). Full results of the model are presented in the Supplemental
Materials.
These results provide further evidence that although commemorations highlighting the cost of
war increase regret over one’s own country’s involvement in war, they can also increase positive moral
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emotions in response to the costly sacrifice of soldiers, and in turn drive up the perceived value of future
wars. This also occurred independent of variables that are traditionally associated with valuing war (e.g.
conservatism).
Study 3
In the previous study we showed that a commemorative video increased participants’
endorsement of future efforts to protect the group (i.e. war) to the extent that the video increased their
positive moral emotional responses to the costly sacrifices made by soldiers. In study 3 we aimed to
replicate this effect with a larger sample, and included an improved manipulation check.
Method
The procedure and materials were the same as the previous study, but the manipulation check
item now referred specifically to the human cost of war: “Please give your subjective estimate of the
human cost of war in U.S. society” (1 = very low cost, 11 = very high cost).3 Six-hundred participants
were recruited via AMT, in two samples of 300 each.4
Table 3
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations for Study 3.
1
Gender
2
Age
3
Politicsa
M
(SD)
M (1) = 308
F(0) = 261
35.60 (10.97)
4.42 (2.24)
2
.061
3
4
5
6
7
-.042
-.037
-.047
.074
.058
.048
.204***
.167***
.086*
-.107*
.323***
.427***
-.250***
-.203***
4
Positive moral
4.00 (1.84)
.638***
-.205***
-.117**
emotions:
soldiers
5 Valuing war
4.62 (1.40)
-.363***
-.302***
6 Feel bad re war:
5.36 (1.46)
.389***
Country
7 Negative moral
3.42 (1.47)
emotions:
soldiers
Note: a For the politics measure, anyone responding “libertarian” or “apolitical/not sure” was filtered out. This left
an n of 499 for any analyses involving this measure. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Results and Discussion
Twenty-three participants opted out of having their data included in the analyses, and 4 reported
not having watched the video at all. This left a final sample size of 573; with 261 women, 308 men, 4
other, and with a mean age of 35.60 (SD = 10.97). Correlation among all measures are included in Table
3. This time the effect of the manipulation on the manipulation check item was significant, t(571) = 6.483,
p < .001: Participants perceived the human cost of war to be higher in the high cost (M = 9.88, SD = 1.47)
than the low cost conditions (M = 8.87, SD = 2.18; mean difference = 1.01, 95%CI: 0.70, 1.31).
Differences between the two conditions
As in Study 2, participants reported feeling greater positive moral emotions (α = .871) in the
high-cost versus low-cost condition, t(571) = 3.31, p < .001; high cost: M = 4.25, SD = 1.80; low cost: M
= 3.75, SD = 1.86; mean difference = 0.51, 95%CI: 0.21, 0.81. In this study the effect of condition on
valuing war (α = .947) was not significant, t(569) = 0.542, p = .588; high cost: M = 4.65, SD = 1.40; low
cost: M = 4.59, SD = 1.41; mean difference = 0.06, 95%CI: -0.17, 0.29.
Consistent with the previous study participants did not report feeling more negative emotions
focused on the loss of life (α = .788) in the high-cost compared to the low-cost condition, t(571) = -1.331,
p = .184; high cost: M = 3.34, SD = 1.44; low cost: M = 3.50, SD = 1.51; mean difference = -0.16,
95%CI: -0.08, 0.4, but they did report more regret about U.S. involvement in war in the high-cost than the
low-cost condition, t(571) = 3.999, p < .001; high cost: M = 5.60, SD = 1.36; low cost: M = 5.12,
SD = 1.52; mean difference = 0.48, 95%CI: 0.25, 0.72.
Mediation analyses
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We again ran the same mediation model as in the previous study, and found an indirect effect of
condition on valuing war via positive moral emotions, indirect effect = 0.249, 95%CI: 0.103, 0.406 (see
Figure 3 and Supplemental Materials for full details).
0.508**
(0.207, 0.809)
Condition
(Commemoration = 1;
Control = 0)
Positive moral
emotions
-0.186*
(-0.364, -0.007)
0.491***
(0.442, 0.539)
Valuing war
Figure 3: Summary of mediation model, Study 3. 95% bias corrected and accelerated
confidence intervals shown in brackets. The indirect effect was robust to including
demographic variables, political orientation, and negative responses to war as additional
predictors of positive moral emotions and valuing war, point estimate = 0.254, 95%CI:
0.141, 0.383.
General Discussion
In three studies, we have demonstrated that war commemorations, which focus on cost, sacrifice
and hardship, do indeed increase regret over one’s country’s involvement in past wars, but can
concomitantly promote emotional valuing of the costly sacrifices made by soldiers, and in turn increase
the perceived value of war. To our knowledge, no previous research has directly tested the effect of war
commemorations on the value of war; and these findings are particularly striking considering the
preventative function implied by the common mantra that we “remember history in order not to repeat it”.
However, in light of Durkheim’s (1912/1995) suggestion that painful experiences function to
promote cohesion and solidary within groups, these results are perhaps not so surprising. War
commemorations highlight the cost and suffering endured by members of our society during war. Such
sacrifices are valued by other group members, and this value therefore leads to a tendency to place value
on war itself and to justify the necessity of war. We suggest that cognitive dissonance can account for this
effect. People value costly behaviour, and in turn value the group-based goals of that behaviour, in order
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to reduce dissonance over the loss of life. Of course, people need not experience dissonance in order to
feel pride, gratitude, or admiration over past sacrifices, but to the extent that these positive moral
emotions are in turn associated with increased support for war and justification of its necessity, this
suggests that dissonance-based motivations are at play. In this way, our results indicate that
commemorations serve an inspirational function, promoting the value of future war even whilst
acknowledging regret over past wars.
Inconsistent results and future directions
There are some inconsistencies in our findings that are worth highlighting. In the correlational
study, we found no correlation between commemorative activities and regret over past wars. In the
experimental studies, on the other hand, participants regretted U.S. involvement in war in the
commemorative condition more than in the military power condition. The inconsistency of the effect
across studies can perhaps be explained by the correlational nature of the first study. Whereas we
randomly exposed people to a commemoration video in the experimental studies, self-selection in the
correlation study might have meant that people who participated in more commemorative activities were
more supportive of war in general.
Another inconsistency is the lack of a direct effect of commemoration on valuing war in the
experimental studies, although this effect was significant in the correlational study. In terms of the
difference across studies, this could again be related to self-selection in the correlational study, where
people who are in generally more supportive of war attend more commemorative events. In terms of the
lack of a direct effect in the experimental studies, it suggests that directly exposing people to the costs of
war is unlikely to directly increase their support for it. Rather, this occurs via a pathway of placing value
on the costly sacrifices of soldiers. Although we might have expected a direct effect, the obtained indirect
effect is very much aligned with our theoretical model. We predict that people respond to feelings of
dissonance over the costly sacrifice of soldiers by increasing the value they place on their actions. Our
measure of positive moral emotions was designed to capture this increase in perceived value. Yet, if
people do not respond by increasing the value placed on such actions, then they will not go on to also
increase the value placed on war. This suggests that our theoretical model does not explain all responses,
but captures the responses of those who feel pride, gratitude, and admiration for the sacrifices of soldiers
in past wars. It is worth noting that it is exactly this response that commemorations are designed to elicit,
and to the extent that they do our findings suggest they may achieve the opposite of what they set out to.
Conclusion
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Overall, the present research complements a growing body of research on rituals, moral emotions
and intergroup conflict, with a closer look at the impact of war commemorations on people’s endorsement
of future military efforts to protect their group. The present studies has demonstrated that the positive
moral emotions evoked by war commemorations in turn lead people to value war more; that is, they
appear to serve an inspirational function. This finding sheds light on why war commemorations persist,
even as wars – even for the victor – are costly and horrific.
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Footnotes
1. At the end of the survey participants also completed the 8-item fusions scale (e.g. “I am one with
my country”, 1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree, cite, α = .965). We included this measure to
explore whether our effects might extend to increased fusion with the group. This was not the
case (t(183) = -1.177, p = .241; high cost: M = 0.08, SD = 0.86; low cost: M = -0.07, SD = 0.92;
mean difference = -0.155, 95%CI: -0.416, 0.105), which is also consistent with the use of this
measure as an individual, as opposed to situational, variable a prior research (e.g., Gomez,
Brooks, Buhrmester, Vazquez, Jetten, & Swann, 2011) .
2. This analysis should be considered exploratory, as we conducted this study before the
correlational study 1. We report the studies out of chronological order because it makes more
sense (and is more conventional) to lead with correlational results.
3. We also included a 5-item patriotism scale instead of the fusion measure (e.g. “I find the sight of
the American flag very moving”, 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; α = .918; Federico,
Golec, & Dial, 2005). In sample 3a, this scale was positioned before the emotion items; in sample
3b, it was positioned at the end of the study, before the demographic questions; see footnote 4
below. Participants did not report greater patriotism in the high-cost versus low-cost conditions;
t(571) = -0.457, p = .648; high cost: M = 5.00, SD = 1.50; low cost: M = 5.06, SD = 1.54; mean
difference = -0.06, 95%CI: -0.31, 0.19.
4. This was done because in the first run of N = 300 (Sample 3a), with the patriotism measure
included before the emotion measures, there was no effect of the manipulation on any of our
outcome measures. This result was puzzling, as the only thing that had changed since Study 2 was
the inclusion of the patriotism measure. We therefore collected another sample (N = 300, Sample
3b), moving the patriotism scale to the end of the materials. In this latter sample, the results from
studies 1 and 2 did replicate, as expected. We therefore combined the two samples (N = 600), and
report the results of the combined sample here. Separate analyses of sample 3a and 3b are
provided in the Supplemental Materials, as well as the results of an analysis testing whether the
position of the patriotism scale did in fact statistically moderate our results.
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