Chapter14
Thepracticeoflearning
JeanLave
TheAmericananthropologistJeanLaveisProfessorattheUniversityofCalifornia,
Berkeley.Shehasstudiededucationandschoolinginpre-industrialsocietiesand,through
comparisonswiththecorrespondingAmericanconditions,shehasbecomeastrongadvocate
of“practicelearning.”Mostsignificantlythisapproachhasbeenformulatedinthefamous
bookSituatedLearning:LegitimatePeripheralParticipationwhichshepublishedtogether
withEtienneWengerin1991.ThefollowingchapterisanextractofLave’sintroductionto
theanthologyUnderstandingPractice:PerspectivesonActivityandContext,editedtogether
withSethChaiklinandpublishedin1993asakindofprogrammaticupdate,reformulation
andoverviewofthelearningapproachoftheRussiancultural-historicalandactivity
theoreticalschoolasdevelopedinthe1930sbyLevVygotskyandothers.
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Theproblemwith“context”
UnderstandingPracticegrewoutoftheworkofatwo-partconferenceinwhichthe
participantscametogethertoconsiderwhatweinitiallycalled“thecontextproblem.”Allof
uswereinvolvedinresearchonsociallysituatedactivity.Wewereconcernedabout
conventionallimitationsonvariousapproachestothestudyofactivity.Inparticular,we
wishedtoexplorequestionsaboutthe“sociallyconstitutedworld”–thecontextofsocially
situatedactivity–thatourworkoftenseemedmerelytotakeforgranted.
Ihadtriedinpreviousresearchtounderstandhowmathactivityingrocerystoresinvolved
being“in”the“store,”walkingupanddown“aisles,”lookingat“shelves”fullofcans,
bottles,packages,andjarsoffoodandothercommodities.Myanalyseswereaboutshoppers’
activities,sometimestogether,andabouttherelationsbetweentheseactivitiesandthe
distractinglymaterial,historicallyconstituted,subjectivelyselectivecharacterofspace–time
relationsandtheirmeaning.BothSethChaiklinandIknewthatotherpeopleconceivedofthe
probleminquitedifferentterms.Wedecidedtoholdacollectiveinquiryintotheseold,but
stillperplexingquestions.
Butwhywouldadiversegroupofstudentsofthehumanconditionparticipateover
months,andevenyears,totrytounderstandeachother’sperspective?SethChaiklinandI
initiallyproposedthefollowingrationale:Theoriesofsituatedeverydaypracticeinsistthat
personsactingandthesocialworldofactivitycannotbeseparated.Thiscreatesadilemma:
Researchoneverydaypracticetypicallyfocusesontheactivitiesofpersonsacting,although
thereisagreementthatsuchphenomenacannotbeanalyzedinisolationfromthesocially
materialworldofthatactivity.Butlessattentionhasbeengiventothedifficulttaskof
conceptualizingrelationsbetweenpersonsactingandthesocialworld.Norhastherebeen
sufficientattentiontorethinkingthe“socialworldofactivity”inrelationalterms.Together,
theseconstitutetheproblemofcontext.
Theparticipantsintheconferenceagreedtothissetofpriorities,withtheobviousproviso
thatrelationalconceptsofthesocialworldshouldnotbeexploredinisolationfrom
conceptionsofpersonsactingandinteractingandtheiractivities.Thatprovisograduallytook
onamorecentralmeaningand,asaresult,ourconceptionofthecommontaskcrystallized
intoadoublefocus–oncontextand,tooursurprise,learning.Afocusononeprovided
occasionsonwhichtoconsidertheother.Ifcontextisviewedasasocialworldconstitutedin
relationwithpersonsacting,bothcontextandactivityseeminescapablyflexibleand
changing.Andthuscharacterized,changingparticipationandunderstandinginpractice–the
problemoflearning–cannothelpbutbecomecentralaswell.
Itisdifficult,whenlookingcloselyateverydayactivity,toavoidtheconclusionthat
learningisubiquitousinongoingactivity,thoughoftenunrecognizedassuch.Situated
activityalwaysinvolveschangesinknowledgeandaction,and“changesinknowledgeand
action”arecentraltowhatwemeanby“learning.”Itisnotthecasethattheworldconsistsof
newcomerswhodropunaccompaniedintounpeopledproblemspaces.Peopleinactivityare
skillfulat,andaremoreoftenthannotengagedin,helpingeachothertoparticipatein
changingwaysinachangingworld.Soindescribingandanalyzingpeople’sinvolvementin
practicalactionintheworld,eventhoseauthorswhoseworkgenerallywouldbeleast
identifiedwitheducationalfoci(e.g.SuchmanandTrigg,1993;KellerandKeller,1993)are
ineffectanalyzingpeoples’engagementinlearning.Wehavecometotheconclusion,as
McDermott(1993)suggests,thatthereisnosuchthingas“learning”suigeneris,butonly
changingparticipationintheculturallydesignedsettingsofeverydaylife.Or,toputitthe
otherwayaround,participationineverydaylifemaybethoughtofasaprocessofchanging
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understandinginpractice,thatis,aslearning.
Learningbecameonefocusofourwork,evenwhereunintended,partlybecauseofour
concernwitheverydayactivityassocialandhistoricalprocessandwiththeimprovisational,
future-creatingcharacterofmundanepractice;partly,also,becausethoseofuswhose
researchhastouchedoneducationalquestionshavecometoinsistondenaturalizingthe
socialprocessesthatunfoldwithineducationalinstitutionsbyturningthemintoanalytic
objects.Sowhethertheresearchershaveapproachedtheproblemofcontextthroughits
temporaldimension,asactivity(orpractice),orwhethertheyhavelookedatinstitutionsof
learningascontexts,learninghasbecomeacentralissue.
Thediscussionofcontextsuggestsaproblem,however:Conventionaltheoriesoflearning
andschoolingappealtothedecontextualizedcharacterofsomeknowledgeandformsof
knowledgetransmission,whereasinatheoryofsituatedactivity,“decontextualizedlearning
activity”isacontradictioninterms.Thesetwoverydifferentwaysofconceivingoflearning
arehardlycompatible.Nonetheless,abeliefthattheworldisdividedintocontextualizedand
decontextualizedphenomenaisnotmerelyanacademicspeculationthatcanbediscarded
whenfoundtheoreticallyinadequateorincomplete.
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Craftworklearningandsocialproduction
Traditionally,learningresearchershavestudiedlearningasifitwereaprocesscontainedin
themindofthelearnerandhaveignoredthelived-inworld.Thisdisjuncture,whichratifiesa
dichotomyofmindandbody,sidetracksorderailsthequestionofhowtoconstructatheory
thatencompassesmindandlived-inworld.Itisnotenoughtosaythatsomedesignated
cognitivetheoryoflearningcouldbeamendedbyaddingatheoryof“situation,”forthis
raisescrucialquestionsaboutthecompatibilityofparticulartheories(cf.Soviet
psychologists’discussionofthe“match”betweenpsychologiesandsociologiesinthe1920s:
DavydovandRadzhikovskii,1985,p.49).Norisitsufficienttopursueaprincipledaccount
ofsituatedactivityarmedonlywithatheoryofcognitionandgoodintentions.Withouta
theoreticalconceptionofthesocialworldonecannotanalyzeactivityinsitu.Amore
promisingalternativeliesintreatingrelationsamongperson,activity,andsituation,asthey
aregiveninsocialpractice,itselfviewedasasingleencompassingtheoreticalentity.Itis
possibletodetectsuchatrendinmostifnotalloftheresearchtraditionsrepresentedin
UnderstandingPractice–thechaptersareworkingtowardamoreinclusive,intensive
developmentofthesociallysituatedcharacterofactivityintheoreticallyconsistentterms.
Theoriesofsituatedactivitydonotseparateaction,thought,feeling,andvalueandtheir
collective,cultural-historicalformsoflocated,interested,conflictual,meaningfulactivity.
Traditionalcognitivetheoryis“distancedfromexperience”anddividesthelearningmind
fromtheworld.This“release”fromthenarrowconfinesofbodyandimmediateexperienceis
rejectedonvariedgroundsinthechapterscollectedinUnderstandingPracticeinfavorof
morecomplexrelationsbetweenpersonandworld.Theideaoflearningascognitive
acquisition–whetheroffacts,knowledge,problem-solvingstrategies,ormetacognitiveskills
–seemstodissolvewhenlearningisconceivedofastheconstructionofpresentversionsof
pastexperienceforseveralpersonsactingtogether(e.g.Hutchins,1993).Andwhenscientific
practiceisviewedasjustanothereverydaypractice(e.g.Lave,1988),itisclearthattheories
of“situatedactivity”providedifferentperspectiveson“learning”andits“contexts.”
Participantsintheconferenceagreed,onthewhole,onfourpremisesconcerning
knowledgeandlearninginpractice:
1. Knowledgealwaysundergoesconstructionandtransformationinuse.
2. Learningisanintegralaspectofactivityinandwiththeworldatalltimes.That
learningoccursisnotproblematic.
3. Whatislearnedisalwayscomplexlyproblematic.
4. Acquisitionofknowledgeisnotasimplematteroftakinginknowledge;rather,
thingsassumedtobenaturalcategories,suchas“bodiesofknowledge,”“learners,”
and“culturaltransmission,”requirereconceptualizationascultural,socialproducts.
Itshouldbesaidthattheconceptionsofcraftworkinmostofthechaptersbearlittle
resemblancetothesmall-scaleproblem-solvingtaskstypicalofcognitivelearningresearch:
Forgingacookingutensilortakingpartintheworkofanationaluniversityexamination
committeearesubstantial,meaningfulformsofactivity.Inallcasestheworkdescribedtakes
onmeaningfromitsbroaderinterconnectionswith(in)otheractivitysystems.
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Relationswiththeorypast:Someparadoxesandsilencesof
cognitivetheory
Silencesandparadoxesaregeneratedinanytheoreticalproblematic:questionsthatcannot
beaskedandissuesforwhichnoprincipledresolutionispossible.Atleastfoursuchissues
troubletraditionalcognitivetheory.Theyconcerntheconventionaldivisionsbetween
learningandwhatisnot(supposedtobe)learning.Resolutionstothesedifficultieshavebeen
anticipatedinthefourpremisesconcerningknowledgeandlearninginpracticementioned
earlier.Theproblemsinclude,first,anassumeddivisionbetweenlearningandotherkindsof
activity.Second,boththeinventionandreinventionofknowledgearedifficultproblemsfor
cognitivetheoryiflearningisviewedasamatterofacquiringexistingknowledge.Third,
cognitivetheoryassumesuniversalprocessesoflearningandthehomogeneouscharacterof
knowledgeandoflearners(saveinquantityorcapacity).Thismakesitdifficulttoaccount
fortherichlyvariedparticipantsandprojectsinanysituationoflearning.Finally,thereisa
problemofreconceptualizingthemeaningoferroneous,mistakenunderstandingina
heterogeneousworld.
First,howis“learning”tobedistinguishedfromhumanactivityassuch?Withincognitive
theoriesithasbeenassumedthatlearninganddevelopmentaredistinctiveprocesses,notto
beconfusedwiththemoregeneralcategoryofhumanactivity.Thisinvolvestwotheoretical
claimsthatareinquestionhere:Oneisthatactors’relationswithknowledge-in-activityare
staticanddonotchangeexceptwhensubjecttospecialperiodsof“learning”or
“development.”Theotheristhatinstitutionalarrangementsforinculcatingknowledgearethe
necessary,specialcircumstancesforlearning,separatefromeverydaypractices.The
differencemaybeatheartaverydeepepistemologicalone,betweenaviewofknowledgeas
acollectionofrealentities,locatedinheads,andoflearningasaprocessofinternalizing
them,versusaviewofknowingandlearningasengagementinchangingprocessesofhuman
activity.Inthelattercase,“knowledge”becomesacomplexandproblematicconcept,
whereasintheformeritis“learning”thatisproblematic.
Asecond,relatedissueconcernsthenarrowfocusoflearningtheoriesonthetransmission
ofexistingknowledge,whileremainingsilentabouttheinventionofnewknowledgein
practice.Engeström(1987)arguesthatthisisacentrallacunaincontemporarylearning
theory.Certainly,anysimpleassumptionthattransmissionortransferorinternalizationare
aptdescriptorsforthecirculationofknowledgeinsocietyfacesthedifficultythattheyimply
uniformityofknowledge.Theydonotacknowledgethefundamentalimprintofinterested
parties,multipleactivities,anddifferentgoalsandcircumstancesonwhatconstitutes
“knowing”onagivenoccasionoracrossamultitudeofinterrelatedevents.Theseterms
implythathumansengagefirstandforemostinthereproductionofgivenknowledgerather
thanintheproductionofknowledgeabilityasaflexibleprocessofengagementwiththe
world.Engeström’sconceptualizationofhowpeoplelearntodothingsthathavenotbeen
donebeforeelaboratestheideathatzonesofproximaldevelopmentarecollective,ratherthan
individual,phenomenaandthat“thenew”isacollectiveinventioninthefaceoffelt
dilemmasandcontradictionsthatimpedeongoingactivityandimpelmovementandchange.
Further,partofwhatitmeanstoengageinlearningactivityisextendingwhatoneknows
beyondtheimmediatesituation,ratherthaninvolutingone’sunderstanding
“metacognitively”bythinkingaboutone’sowncognitiveprocesses.Criticalpsychologistsof
theBerlinschool(e.g.Dreier,1991;Holzkamp,1983)insistontheimportanceofa
distinctionbetweenexperiencingorknowingtheimmediatecircumstances(“interpretive
thinking,”“restrictedaction”)andprocessesofthinkingbeyondandabouttheimmediate
situationinmoregeneralterms(“comprehensivethinking,”“extended,generalizedaction”).
233
Together,inadialecticalprocessbywhicheachhelpstogeneratetheother,theyproducenew
understanding(seeWenger,1991).
Doingandknowingareinventiveinanothersense:Theyareopen-endedprocessesof
improvisationwiththesocial,material,andexperientialresourcesathand.Kellerand
Keller’sresearchillustratesthis:Theblacksmith’spracticesashecreatesaskimmingspoon
drawonrichresourcesofexperience,hisownandthatofotherpeople,presentandpast.But
hisunderstandingoftheskimmeralsoemergesintheforgingprocess.Hedoesnotknow
whatitwillbeuntilitisfinished.Atonepointhespreadsonesectionofthespoonhandlefor
thesecondtimebutgoestoofarand,inevaluatingthework,findsitnecessarytoreducethe
widthofthehandleagain.“Itisasthoughhehastocrossaboundaryinordertodiscoverthe
appropriatelimitsofthedesign”(KellerandKeller,1993).
Theworkofresearchersinartificialintelligenceappearstohavethesamecharacter:
SuchmanandTrigg(1993)describeitas“askilledimprovisation,organizedinorderlyways
thataredesignedtomaintainalivelyopennesstothepossibilitiesthatthematerialsathand
present.”And“analysesofsituatedaction…pointtothecontingenciesofpracticalactionon
whichlogicinuse,includingtheproductionanduseofscenariosandformalisms,inevitably
andineveryinstancerelies.”
Fuhrer(1993)emphasizesthevaryingemotionaleffectsoftheimprovisationalcharacterof
activity.Theseeffectsareperhapsmostintenselyfeltbynewcomers,butheequates
newcomers’predicamentswiththoseoflearnersingeneral.Heinsiststhatinadditionto
cognitiveandenvironmentaldimensions,thereisanemotionaldimensiontoalllearning.He
arguesthat:
tosomedegree,allindividualactionswithineverydaysettings,especiallythoseof
newcomers,aresomewhatdiscrepantfromwhatisexpected;thesettingschange
continuously.Mostemotionswithinsocialsituations,suchasembarrassment,audience
anxiety,shyness,orshame,followsuchdiscrepancies,justbecausethesediscrepancies
producevisceralarousal.Anditisthecombinationofthatarousalwithanongoing
evaluativecognitionthatproducesthesubjectiveexperienceofanemotion.
Giventheseconsiderations,Fuhrerraisesthequestionofhowpeoplemanageand
coordinate“thevariousactionsthatarisefromcognitive,social,andenvironmentaldemands
orgoals.”Old-timersaswellasnewcomerstrytocarryouttheusualactivitiesingiven
settings,buttheyarealsotryingtoaddressmanyothergoals,amongwhichareimpression
managementand“developinginterpersonalrelationstoothersettinginhabitants…Thusthe
newcomerssimultaneouslypursueseveralgoalsandthereforetheymaysimultaneously
performdifferentactions.”
Thethirdissue,theassumedhomogeneityofactors,goals,motives,andactivityitself,is
challengedinmanychapters,replacedwithquitedifferentassumptionsthatemphasizetheir
heterogeneity.Ibelievethisviewisnewtodiscussionsoflearning.Itderivesfromanintense
focusonthemultiplicityofactorsengagedinactivitytogetherandontheinterdependencies,
conflicts,andrelationsofpowersoproduced.TheseviewsareelaboratedinUnderstanding
Practicebyseveralauthors:KellerandKeller(1993)arguethat“thegoalofproductionisnot
monolithicbutmultifaceted…basedonconsiderationsaesthetic,stylistic,functional,
procedural,financial,andacademicaswellasconceptionsofselfandother,andmaterial
conditionsofwork.”Dreier(1993)proposesthat“differentparticipants’interpretationsare
basedondifferentcontextualsocialpositionswithinherentdifferencesinpossibilities,
interests,andperspectivesonconflictsarisingfromdifferentlocations.”SuchmanandTrigg
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(1993)describeartificialintelligenceresearchasasociallyorganizedprocessof
craftsmanshipconsistingof“thecraftingtogetherofacomplexmachinerymadeof
heterogeneousmaterials,mobilizedintheserviceofdevelopingatheoryofmind.”And
McDermott(1993)proposesthat“byinstitutionalarrangements,wemustconsidereverything
fromthemostlocalleveloftheclassroomtothemoreinclusivelevelofinequitiesthroughout
thepoliticaleconomy(preferablyfrombothendsofthecontinuumatthesametime).”These
statementsrefertoawidevarietyofrelations,buteachchallengesresearchonknowingand
learningthatdependsimplicitlyonahomogeneityofcommunity,culture,participants,their
motives,andthemeaningofevents.
Theheterogeneous,multifocalcharacterofsituatedactivityimpliesthatconflictisa
ubiquitousaspectofhumanexistence.Thisfollowsifweassumethatpeopleinthesame
situation,peoplewhoarehelpingtoconstitute“asituation”together,knowdifferentthings
andspeakwithdifferentinterestsandexperiencefromdifferentsociallocations.Suddenly
assumptionsconcerningtheuniformityofopinion,knowledge,andbeliefbecome,ontheone
hand,mattersofcommonhistoricaltraditionandcomplexlysharedrelationswithlarger
societalforces(whateverthesemightmean–nowanimportantquestion)and,ontheother
hand,mattersofimposedconformityandsymbolicviolence.Analysisfocusedonconflictual
practicesofchangingunderstandinginactivityisnotsolikelytoconcentrateonthetruthor
errorofsomeknowledgeclaim.Itismorelikelytoexploredisagreementsoverwhatis
relevant;whether,andhowmuch,somethingisworthknowinganddoing;whattomakeof
ambiguouscircumstances;whatisconvenientforwhom;whattodonextwhenonedoesnot
knowwhattoexpect;andwhocaresmostaboutwhat.Therearealwaysconflictsofpower,
somislearningcannotbeunderstoodindependentlyofsomeoneimposingherorhisview.
Thereis,ofcourse,andatthesametime,muchuniformityandagreementintheworld.The
perspectivesrepresentedheredifferaboutwhetherthisisalways,oronlymuchofthetime,a
matterofonepartyimposingassent,subtlyorotherwise,onothers.
Thefourthandfinalissueconcerns“failuretolearn.”Inmainstreamtheorizingabout
learning,thisiscommonlyassumedtoresultfromtheinabilityorrefusalonthepartofan
individualtoengageinsomethingcalled“learning.”Thealternativeviewexploredearlieris
thatnot-learningand“failure”identitiesareactivenormalsociallocationsandprocesses.The
lattergeneratesfurtherquestions,however:Iffailureisasociallyarrangedidentity,whatis
lefttobesaidaboutthemakingof“errors”?Giventhatseveraloftheauthorsprovidenovel
construalsoffailuretolearn,questionthemeaningof“consensus,”andcallattentiontothe
deficienciesofclaimsthatknowingunfoldswithoutconflictandwithoutengagingthe
interestsofinvolvedparticipants,doesthetermerrorstillhavemeaning?Theanswer
dependsonwhosesociallypositionedpointofviewisadopted,andonhistoricallyand
sociallysituatedconceptionsoferroneousactionandbelief.Severalofthechaptersin
UnderstandingPracticedeveloppowerfulwaysofconceptualizingsocially,historically
situatednonlearningormislearning.Theydiscussnonlearningactivitiesthatoccurwhen
embarrassmentistoogreatorthatresultfromanxiety,fromthesocialdelegitimationof
learningorthelearner,andfromtheretardingeffectsofdenyinglearnersaccessto
connectionsbetweenimmediateappearancesandbroader,deepersocialforces,ortoconcrete
interrelationswithinandacrosssituations(e.g.Fuhrer,1993;Levine,1993).Mehanexplores
thediscoordinationofvoicesininteractionsbetweenschoolpsychologist,teacher,andparent,
whospeakindifferent“languages”–psychological,sociological,andhistorical–and
betweenphysiciansandpatients.Engeström(1987)locatesunproductiveencountersbetween
patientsandphysiciansinthemismatchamonghistoricallyengendereddiscourses–thus,in
practice,amongthebiomedicalandpsychosocialregistersorvoicesthephysicianandpatient
useforcommunicatingaboutmedicalissues.
235
Hutchins’sanalysis(1993)raisesquestionsaboutthelocationoferror-makinginhistorical
systemsofactivityandinrelationsamongparticipants.Hedescribeswhatitispossiblefor
novicenavigatorstolearninpracticeintermsoftaskpartitioning,instruments,linesof
communication,andlimitationsandopennessofaccessforobservingothers,their
interactions,andtools.Hearguesthatthesedefinetheportionofthetaskenvironmentthatis
availableasalearningcontexttoeachtaskperformer–thisconstitutestheperformer’s
“horizonofobservability.”Thedensityoferrorcorrection(whichhelpstomakelearning
possible)dependsonthecontoursofthishorizon.
Insum,theassumptionsproposedhereamounttoapreliminaryaccountofwhatismeant
bysituatedlearning.Knowledgeabilityisroutinelyinastateofchangeratherthanstasis,in
themediumofsocially,culturally,andhistoricallyongoingsystemsofactivity,involving
peoplewhoarerelatedinmultipleandheterogeneousways,whosesociallocations,interests,
reasons,andsubjectivepossibilitiesaredifferent,andwhoimprovisestrugglesinsituated
wayswitheachotheroverthevalueofparticulardefinitionsofthesituation,inboth
immediateandcomprehensiveterms,andforwhomtheproductionoffailureisasmucha
partofroutinecollectiveactivityastheproductionofaverage,ordinaryknowledgeability.
236
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