Costly Signals and Moral Behavior Logan Hale and Jack Palmer

Does Magical Ideation Combined with Need for Cognition Facilitate Belief in Conspiracies?
Rick Stevens, PhD & Mary Medlin, M.S.
University of Louisiana at Monroe
Abstract
This study investigated the belief in conspiracy theories. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) describe the need for cognition as the “tendency to engage in and enjoy
thinking”. Cohen, et.al. (1955) referred the need for cognition as a need to understand the world. A third factor investigated by this study was the existence of
Magical Ideation, as defined by the Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Eckblad and Chapman defined magical ideation as “belief in forms of
causation that by conventional standards are invalid”.
It was found that Need for Cognition was positively correlated with belief in conspiracy theories. Another factor investigated by this study was the existence of
Magical Ideation. Magical ideation was positively correlated with the belief in conspiracies and with Need for Cognition.
Introduction
third factor investigated by this study was
the existence of Magical Ideation, as
defined by the Magical Ideation Scale
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Eckblad
and Chapman defined magical ideation as
“belief in forms of causation that by
conventional standards are invalid”.
Few people would doubt that
conspiracies exist. However, when using
the term “conspiracist ideation” there is
the implication that the person engaging
in beliefs about these conspiracies is
basing the belief on something other
than a logical evaluation of the available
Methods
and
Results
information. One implication might be
Need for cognition was found to be
that a person who engages in
positively
correlated
with
belief
in
conspiracist ideation keeps looking for
conspiracy
theories,
r(149)=.16,
p<.05.
explanations after finding that the
The correlation between magical
commonly accepted explanation for an
ideation and conspiracist thinking was
event is not emotionally satisfying.
significant, r(149)=.87, p<.05.
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) describe the
need for cognition as the “tendency to
A correlation was also found between
engage in and enjoy thinking”. Cohen,
the need for cognition and magical
et.al. (1955) referred to the need for
thinking (r(149)=.28, p<.05).
cognition as a need to understand the
Correlations (conspiracy, magical, need) Marked correlations are significant at p < .05000 N=151 (Casewise deletion of missing data)
world.
Means
Std.Dev.
Age
Ed-M
Ed-F
True-con
Need
Magical
Variable
If those who believe in conspiracies
which do not seem to be supported by
logic or accepted by the general
population have a greater need for
cognition, it seems reasonable that they
would spend time seeking explanations.
However, some of the explanations that
they arrive at seem puzzling due to their
apparent lack of logical consistency. A
Age
18.87417
1.62195
Ed-M
3.30464
1.05194
Ed-F
3.03311
1.18556
True-con
27.82119
14.38105
Need
55.31126
6.09173
Magical
21.70861
9.25245
1
-0.211824
-0.146897
0.025324
0.014111
0.021529
1
0.408811
-0.137394
-0.083558
-0.136029
1
-0.116564
-0.138054
-0.152268
1
0.161056
0.868588
1
0.283126
Table 1: Correlations between data from the scales in belief in
conspiracies, need for cognition, and magical thinking.
While a correlation of .16 is a bit weak,
it is significant in this case (N=151). The
correlations between all 3 scales would
1
suggest that those who believe in
conspiracies also engage in magical
thinking, pretty consistently. Further,
both of the conspiracy and magical
thinking scales correlate with need for
cognition, suggesting a motivation that
drives a belief in conspiracies and
perhaps an active imagination.
References
Conclusions
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Nothing Happens by Accident, or Does It? A Low Prior
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The combination of these three factors
suggests that those who are more likely
to believe in questionable conspiracies
engage in thinking processes that are not
logical, even when they are not thinking
about conspiracies. Also, they have a
tendency to seek explanations for things
that fit their unconventional worldviews.
The picture presented by the
combination of these three factors
suggests that a combination of thinking
processes which do not follow the
logical processes of cause-and-effect
(magical ideation) and a desire to seek
out explanations and make sense of the
world sometimes results in belief in
theories that the majority of people in
society view as illogical.
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