The Evolution of Substantive and Descriptive Representation, 1974

The Evolution of Substantive
and Descriptive
Representation, 1974-2004
David Epstein
Sharyn O’Halloran
Columbia University
Georgia’s Gerrymander
Range
Baseline
Proposed
0-25
31
26
25-40
11
17
40-50
2
0
50-60
2
8
60+
10
5
Plan: Reallocate black voters to elect Democrats
Is This Retrogression?
The Perfect Storm


DC denied preclearance, saying state didn’t
prove non-retrogression in three districts
SC overruled in Georgia v. Ashcroft:



Retrogression should be assessed statewide, not
district-by-district
States could pursue substantive rather than
descriptive representation
Put much weight on testimony of black legislators
Consensus View

A conventional wisdom is forming about the
meaning and importance of Ashcroft:
1.
2.
3.
It abandoned a previous, “relatively mechanical”
retrogression test based on electability;
It did so in favor of an amorphous concept of
substantive representation that will be difficult to
administer; and
The crux of the debate revolves around whether
states should pursue substantive as opposed to
descriptive representation.
This Paper

We disagree with all three of these statements

The previous standard for retrogression was
crumbling anyway, due to political changes



The Court revised this, too, in the opinion, moving to
a statewide assessment of retrogression
Substantive representation is not difficult to
measure and administer
Real arguments aren’t over descriptive vs.
substantive representation, for the most part

Rather, the question is on how best to achieve secure
levels of substantive representation
0
.5
1
Electability: High Polarization
0
50 57.5
Percent Black Voting Age Population
100
Measuring Descriptive Representation
High
Polarization
P*
% BVAP
0
50
100
Measuring Descriptive Representation
High
Polarization
P*
% BVAP
0
50
No Minority Control
100
Minority Control
0
.5
1
Electability: Low Polarization
0
40
50
Percent Black Voting Age Population
100
Measuring Descriptive Representation
High
Polarization
P*
% BVAP
0
50
No Minority Control
Low
Polarization
100
Minority Control
P*
% BVAP
0
50
100
Measuring Descriptive Representation
High
Polarization
P*
% BVAP
0
50
No Minority Control
Low
Polarization
100
Minority Control
P*
% BVAP
0
50
Coalitional
100
Measuring Descriptive Representation
High
Polarization
P*
% BVAP
0
50
100
Minority Control
No Minority Control
Low
Polarization
PS
P*
% BVAP
0
50
Coalitional
Unsafe
Control
100
Measuring Descriptive Representation
High
Polarization
P*
% BVAP
0
50
100
Minority Control
No Minority Control
Low
Polarization
PS
P*
PP
% BVAP
0
50
Coalitional
Unsafe
Control
100
Safe
Control
Packing
Measuring Descriptive Representation
High
Polarization
P*
% BVAP
0
50
100
Minority Control
No Minority Control
Low
Polarization
PI
PS
P*
PP
% BVAP
0
No Minority Influence
Control
50
Coalitional
Unsafe
Control
100
Safe
Control
Packing
Measuring Descriptive Representation
High
Polarization
P*
% BVAP
0
50
100
Minority Control
No Minority Control
Low
Polarization
PI
PS
P*
PP
% BVAP
0
50
No Minority Influence
Control
Coalitional
Unsafe
Control
100
Safe
Control
Packing
How to make tradeoffs?
Retrogression in Electability

Forget categories; just use the probability of
electing a minority candidate in each district

Estimate this using “S-curves”
0
.5
1
Low Polarization
0
40
50
Percent Black Voting Age Population
100
Retrogression in Electability

Forget categories; just use the probability of
electing a minority candidate in each district


Then add up the probabilities to get the
expected number of minorities elected


Estimate this using “S-curves”
Can consider the variance of this distribution, too
For Georgia, the proposed plan had slightly
fewer expected minorities elected

Problem with overpopulated districts
Ashcroft & Substantive Representation
Descriptive
Pareto
Frontier
Substantive
Ashcroft & Substantive Representation
Descriptive
Pareto
Frontier
SQ
Substantive
Ashcroft & Substantive Representation
Descriptive
Pareto
Frontier
2
3
SQ
1
4
Substantive
Ashcroft & Substantive Representation
Descriptive
Pareto
Frontier
2
3
SQ
1
X
4
X
Substantive
Pre-Ashcroft
Ashcroft & Substantive Representation
Descriptive
Pareto
Frontier
2
3
SQ
1
X
4
Substantive
Post-Ashcroft
Ashcroft & Substantive Representation
Descriptive
Pareto
Frontier
2
3
SQ
1
X
4
P
Substantive
A move to P is now non-retrogressive
Measuring Substantive Representation

Great leaps have been made in the past two decades
in the analysis of voting behavior


Not because voting is the only important act


This is now commonly used as a measure of members’
policy preferences
But because it correlates with constituency service,
committee work, etc.
For substantive representation of black interests,
define a legislator’s Black Support Score:
BSS= % of votes cast with the black majority
1
White Dem.
.6
.8
Black Dem.
.4
South Carolina
State House
.2
Rep.
0
20
40
Black Voting Age Population
60
80
Overall Expected Representation

Can compare plans by calculating the expected
substantive representation


Combines prob. of election and support scores
For Georgia, this was:
Baseline
Proposed

Mean
62.3%
65.9%
Median
50.2%
69.2%
Real argument is over the distribution of these
scores, not over descriptive vs. substantive
representation
Trends, 1974-2004

Show changes in




Election probabilities
Substantive representation
Maximizing plans
Results:



Greater crossover in voting means point of equal
opportunity is under 50% BVAP
Southern Democrats become more liberal
A tradeoff emerges between substantive and
descriptive representation
98th Congress
.8
.8
94th Congress
White Dems
Black Dems
.2 Probability
.4
.6
.2 Probability
.4
.6
White Dems
Republicans
Black Dems
0
0
Republicans
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Black Voting Age Population
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Black Voting Age Population
1
106th Congress
1
102nd Congress
1
.8
Black Dems
Black Dems
Republicans
Probability
.2
.4 .6
Probability
.2
.4 .6
.8
White Dems
White Dems
0
0
Republicans
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Black Voting Age Population
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Black Voting Age Population
1
Substantive Representation, 1974-2000
0
.1
.2
.3
Black Voting Age Population
.8
.6
.4
.2
.2
.4
.6
.8
Black Support Score
1
1981 to 1986
1
1975 to 1980
.4
0
.6
.8
.6
.4
.2
.2
.4
.6
.8
Black Support Score
1
1992 to 2000
1
1987 to 1992
.2
.4
Black Voting Age Population
0
.2
.4
Black Voting Age Population
.6
0
.2
.4
.6
Black Voting Age Population
.8
1
Levels of BVAP Maximizing Descriptive and
Substantive Black Representation in Congress
.8
97
.6
102
.4
104
106
0
.2
105
0
.2
.4
.6
Descriptive Representation
east
south
.8
west
1
The Emerging Pareto Frontier
.5
102
101
100
103
.45
105
104
.4
98
99
97
96
.35
95
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1
Percent Black Democrats Among Southern Representatives
.12
Race of Representative Elected, 1975-2000
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
By District BVAP and HVAP, With 45 Degree Line
0
.2
.4
.6
Black Voting Age Population
White
Black
Hispanic
.8
1
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
BVAP & HVAP Combinations for PEO
.35
.36
.37
.38
Black Voting Age Population
1975-1980
1987-1992
.39
1981-1986
1993-2000
.4
Georgia State Senate, 1999-2002
.4
.6
.8
1
Black Support Scores by Type of Member
0
.2
.4
.6
Black Voting Age Population in District
Republicans
White Dems
Black Dems
.8
Descriptive Representation, 1974-2000
.5
0
0
.5
1
1981 to 1986
1
1975 to 1980
.4
.6
.8
1
0
.2
.4
.6
bvap
bvap
1987 to 1992
1993 to 2000
.8
1
.8
1
.5
0
0
.5
1
.2
1
0
0
.2
.4
.6
bvap
.8
1
0
.2
.4
.6
bvap
1
Black Dem.
.4
.6
.8
White Dem.
.2
Rep.
0
20
40
Black Voting Age Population
60
80