Weekly Lecture: Week 07 Chaps 13 –Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly CHAPTER ROADMAP What ’ sNe wi nt hi sEdi t i on? Chapter 13 has been slightly revised. Where We Are In this chapter, we examine two more market structures, monopolistic competition and oligopoly. The profit-maximizing quantity and price for monopolistic competition is discussed. The chapter shows why firms in monopolist competition decide to advertise, use brand names, and develop new products. Then the chapter moves to oligopoly. It expla i nst heol i g opol i s t s ’di l e mmaa ndt he nus e sga met he or yt oe xpl or e the behavior of oligopolists. Whe r eWe ’ veBe e n The previous chapters studied perfectly competitive firms and monopoly firms. The material dealing with monopoly is used in this chapter because monopolistic competition is similar in some regards to monopoly. Whe r eWe ’ r eGoi ng The next chapter starts to study macroeconomics. CHAPTER LECTURE 13.1 What is Monopolistic Competition? Monopolistic competition is a market structure in which A large number of firms compete. Each firm has a small market share and collusion is impossible. Each firm produces a differentiated product. Product differentiation means that each firm makes a product that is slightly different from the products of competing firms. Some people will pay more for one variety of a product, so t hede ma ndc ur vef ort hef i r m’ spr oduc ti sdownwa r ds l oping. Firms compete on product quality, price, and marketing. Firms are free to enter and exit the market. Identifying Monopolistic Competition There are two measures of market concentration used to help identify whether a market is competitive or dominated by a small number of firms: The four-firm concentration ratio is the percentage of the total revenue accounted for by the four largest firms in the industry. The four-firm 1 concentration ratio ranges between near 0 (extremely competitive) to 100 (not very competitive). The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is the square of the percentage market share of each firm summed over the largest 50 firms (or summed over all the firms if there are fewer than 50) in a market. The HHI ranges between near 0 (extremely competitive) to 10,000 (a monopoly). The U.S. Justice Department uses the HHI to classify markets: Markets with an HHI of less than 1,000 are regarded as highly competitive Markets with an HHI of between 1,000 and 1,800 are regarded as moderately competitive. Markets with an HHI above 1,800 are regarded as concentrated. TheFi r m’ sPr of i t -Maximizing Decisions In the short run, a monopolistically competitive firm makes its output and price decisions just like a monopoly firm. The figure shows a monopol i s t i c a l l yc ompe t i t i vef i r m’ s downward sloping demand curve and the downward sloping MR curve that lies below the demand curve. The firm maximizes its profit by producing the quantity where MR = MC and using the demand curve to set the highest price at which people will buy the quantity it produces. In the figure, the firm produces 20 pizzas per hour and sets a price of $16 per pizza. The firm in the figure makes an economic profit because P > ATC. The amount of the economic profit is equal to the area of the darkened rectangle. If P < ATC, the firm incurs an economic loss. The firm will shut down if P < AVC, so the maximum loss the firm will incur is equal to its fixed costs. 2 Long Run: Zero Economic Profit Unlike a monopoly, firms in monopolistic competition cannot make an economic profit in the long run. If the firms are making an economic profit, other firms enter the market. Entry continues as long as firms in the industry make an economic profit. As firms enter, each existing firm loses some of its market share. The demand for each f i r m’ spr oduct decreases and the f i r m’ sde ma ndc ur ves hi f t sl e f tward. Eventually the demand decreases enough so that the firms make zero economic profit, where P = ATC. Entry then stops. This outcome is illustrated in the figure, in which the firm produces 13 pizzas per hour (where MR=MC) and sets a price of $12 per pizza. Monopolistic Competition and Perfect Competition Because price exceeds marginal cost, monopolistic competition creates deadweight loss. Firms in monopolistic competition have higher costs than firms in perfect competition, but firms in monopolistic competition produce variety, which is valued by consumers. So compared to the alternative of complete uniformity, monopolistic competition is efficient. Unlike firms in perfect competition, firms in monopolistic competition have excess capacity: Excess Capacity: A firm has excess capacity if it produces less than the quantity at which average total cost is a minimum. The quantity at which average total cost is a minimum is the efficient scale. A firm in perfect competition produces at the efficient scale but, as the figure above shows, a firm in monopolistic competition produces less than the efficient scale of output. 13.2 Product Development and Marketing Innovation and Product Development Monopolistically competitive firms compete through product development and marketing. New product development allows a firm to gain a temporary competitive edge and economic profit before competitors imitate the 3 innovation. A firm decides upon the extent of innovation and product development by comparing the marginal cost of innovation or product development to its marginal revenue. Marketing Marketing and packaging allow a firm to differentiate its product. Firms in monopolistic competition incur heavy advertising expenditures which make up a large portion of the price it charges for the product. Selling costs, such as advertising, are fixed costs that increase the ATC at any given level of output but do not affect the MC. The ATC curve shifts upward but the MC curve does not shift. Advertising efforts are successful if they increase demand, which can lead to increased profit. But if all firms advertise, more firms might survive and so the demand for any one firm is less than otherwise. Advertising and marketing names are expensive. To the extent that they provide the consumer with valuable information, they are a benefit of monopolistic competition. But in some instances it seems as if the cost exceeds the benefit. So, ultimately the total efficiency of monopolistic competition is ambiguous. 13.3 Oligopoly Oligopoly is characterized by having a small number of firms competing and natural or legal barriers preventing the entry of new firms. Collusion Because there are a small number of firms, the firms are interdependent so that e a c hf i r m’ sa ctions influence the profits of the other firms. Because there are a small number of firms, the firms in an oligopoly might form a cartel. A cartel is a group of firms acting together to limit output, raise price, and increase economic profit. Cartels are illegal in the United States. A duopoly is a market with only two producers. Range of Possible Oligopoly Outcomes An oligopoly might operate like a monopoly, like perfect competition, or somewhere between these two alternatives: Competitive Outcome 4 A competitive outcome occurs when the firms produce the level of output determined by the intersection of the industry supply curve (the marginal cost curve) and the market demand curve. The price is the lowest and the joint total profit is the smallest with this outcome. Monopoly Outcome The firms form a cartel in order to reach the monopoly outcome. A monopoly outcome occurs when the firms produce the same level of output as a single-price monopoly at the intersection of the marginal cost and marginal revenue curves. The price is highest and the joint total profit is the largest with this outcome. TheDuopol i s t s ’Di l e mma If an oligopoly has formed a cartel that sets the monopoly price and quantity, then each firm has the incentive to cheat on the agreement by increasing its out puta ndc ut t i ngi t spr i c ebe c a us et hi sa c t i onboos t st hef i r m’ spr of i t .I fa l l the firms cheat, the cartel can break down and the outcome will be closer to, or the same as, the competitive outcome. 13.4 Game Theory Game theory is a tool for studying strategic behavior—behavior that takes into account the expected behavior of others and the recognition of mutual interdependence. Games have rules, strategies, payoffs, and outcomes. ThePr i s one r s ’Di l emma Art (A) and Bob (B) have been caught stealing cars. Both men are scheduled to be sentenced to two years in jail for this crime. Both are suspected of committing a more serious crime for which the prosecutor has insufficient evidence for a conviction. The two men are each interrogated for the more serious crime in separate cells. Each prisoner is told that if he confesses and his partner denies, he will serve 1 year in jail and his partner will serve 15 years, while if both confess, both serve 4 years. 5 Thega me ’ spayoff matrix is to the right. In it are the payoffs f r ome a c hma n’ sstrategies, which are to confess or deny involvement in the serious crime. In general, strategies are all the possible actions of each player. A’ ss t r at e gi e s Confess 2 years Confess B’ s strategies 2 years Deny 15 years 1 year 1 year 4 years Deny 15 years 4 years In the Nash equilibrium, player A takes the best possible action given the action of player B and player B takes the best possible action given the action of player A. The Nash equilibrium for the pr i s one r s ’di l e mmai sf orb ot hpl a y e r st oc onf e s s .Thi sout c omei sba df or them because both would be better off if each denied. The Duopolists’Di l e mma Fi r msi na nol i g opol yc a nf a c eapr i s one r s ’di l e mmaga me .Suppos et he r ea r e two firms, A and B. The firms could make a collusive (and illegal) agreement to jointly boost their price and A’ ss t r at e gi e s decrease their output. Once Comply Cheat the agreement is made, each $1 million $0 firm must select its strategy: Cheat cheat on the agreement or B’ s $0 $5 million comply with the agreement. strategies The payoff matrix is to the r i g ht .Ea c hf i r m’ spr of i t depends on its strategy and that of its competitor. $5 million $3 million Comply $1 million $3 million The Nash equilibrium for the game is for both firms to cheat on the agreement. The outcome is bad for them because both would be better off if each complied with the agreement. Collusion is profitable but is difficult to maintain. Advertising and Research Games in Oligopoly Fi r ms ’de c i s i onsa bouta dve r t i s i nga ndc onduc t i ngr e s e a r c ha ndde ve l opme nt can be studied using game theory. 6 In an advertising game, two firms can advertise or not advertise. Advertising is costly but if one firm advertises and the other does not, the one not advertising loses market share and profit while the one advertising gains market share and profit. Both firms would be better if neither advertised but the Nash equilibrium is that both firms advertise. In a research and development (R&D) game, two firms can conduct or not conduct R&D.Ea c hf i r m’ sstrategies are to conduct the R&D or not conduct the R&D. A firm that conducts the R&D must pay for the R&D. Both firms would be better if neither firm conducted research and development but the Nash equilibrium is that both firms conduct research and development. Repeated Games If a game is played repeatedly, it is possible for players of the game to cooperate and make and share the monopoly profit. Because the game is played repeatedly, a player can use a tit-for-tat strategy, in which the player cooperates in the current period if the other player cooperated in the previous period, but cheats in the current period if the other player cheated in the previous period. A tit-for-tat strategy used with the previous payoff matrix leads to a cooperative equilibrium. Is Oligopoly Efficient? If the oligopoly can restrict its output, it is inefficient. 7
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