Service delivery and citizen
security in Bogota (1995-2003).
Gerard Martin
Georgetown University
Colombia Program (USAID funded)
[email protected]
What made rapid and profound
change possible?
• Paul Bromberg: “When you
work hard, you will get
results”.
• Hard work can still lead to
policy failure; how did they
proceed to overcome
obstacles and implement
radical reforms?
On crisis and Sputniks
1) No Olympics (no Sputniks)
2) Post local governance crisis:
1958-73
1970 -82 1982-86
1986-91
1992-03
Since 2004
Av 3 yrs
Av 2 yrs
2 yrs
3 yrs
4 yrs
Av 1 yr
3) (Post)-violence crisis: city perceived by all as in urgent need
of change
4) Demo: 6% (1964-73) versus 2,5% (1995-2003)
5) Age: 15-29 yrs = 34% in early 1980s, versus 28% in 2000s
61
62
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70
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86
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98
99
00
01
02
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Colombia(S/B)
Bogotá
City Development plans
•
•
•
•
•
•
Coherent, integral (N)
Precise goals and objectives (N)
Ambitious – city wide (N)
Hammered down and mainstreamed (N)
Constant benchmark (N)
Institutional engineering: administrative and legal
reforms: Plan Maestro Seguridad, Codigo de Policia;
Sub-Sec Seguridad, POT etc. (N)
• New vocabulary
RESULT: leadership > credibility
Thematic areas and objectives of the three administrations (Bogotá, 1995-2003)
“FORMAR
CIUDAD”
(Mockus 1: 19951998)
Thematic Areas
Plan Objectives
(I) Citizen cultura
- Citizen
(values)
cultura
(II) Security and coexistence
“POR LA BOGOTÁ
QUE QUEREMOS”
(Peñalosa: 1998-2001)
“PARA VIVIR TODOS
DEL MISMO LADO”
(Mockus 2: 2001-2004)
- Egalitarian model of
the city
- Citizen culture (rules)
- Security and coexistence
(III) Public space
-Environment
-Public space
-City at a human scale
-“Demarginalization”
- Environment
(IV) Social progress
- Social progress
- Social interaction
-Social justice
-Education
-Family and children
(V) Urban planning
and productivity
- Urban productivity
-Urban planning and
services
-Mobility
(transportation)
- Productivity
(VI) Legitimacy
institutional
effectiveness
Institutional
legitimacy
-Institutional
efficiency
Admirable
management
and
public
Source: Gerard Martin y Miguel Ceballos, Bogota: Anotomia de una transformacion, 2004.
Institutional and management
reform to improve services
• Enlightened technocratic
elites.
• Professional
bureaucracy: redefining
functions +
responsabilities
• Example: Sub-Sec
Citizen Security; Consejo
de Seguridad; Consejo
ampliado de Seguridad;
Consejos locales de
seguridad
Transparent allocation of resources
•
•
•
•
Ley 80 taken seriously
E.g. Fondo de Seguridad y Vigilancia
General restructuring of contracting
Goals, rules, requirements and evaluation
methods widely published
RESULT: direct impact on quality of service; public
works prove that money is well spend: improved
credibility / no corruption charges
Citizenship and legitimacy
• Public officer as educator (M)
• Public space = citizenship (M) +
inclusion/equity (P)
• Norms, values, rules = producing civic
society + SC
RESULT: reformulation of social contract
Actors: NGO free model?
1) Strengthening of Centros IDIPRON
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
Habs Calle
1,000 1,500
1,300
1,500
1,838
Indigentes
600
1,400
1,200
1,278
1,527
500
1,933
1,700
3,468
300
300
373
Pandilleros
Madres jóv hab c
Ex callejeros
100
70
661
677
954
Proyecto Empleo
50
70
661
677
954
TOTAL
1,750 3,529
5,516
5,577
8,252
2) ZONAS SEGURAS PROGRAM of Chamber of Commerce
Demand driven quality services
• Less mini-police stations,
but better build, on more
strategic locations and
user friendly
• Additional in service
training for police officers
RESULT: credibility with
clients + agency
Community driven dimension
•
Frentes de Seguridad Local
Community controlled parks
Community Policing
Increased offer of services: increases
choice
RESULT: people know who is responsible.
Shorter routes + stronger oversight
E.g.: (i) introduction of Consejos Locales de
Seguridad + Local Security Plans +
Consejo Distrital Ampliado
• Easy to scale up
• Robust checks and balances
RESULT: voice + perception of voice
Continous M&E
Strengthening knowledge and
oversight:
• Crime Observatory -SUIVD
• Parks Observatory
• Other observatories:
integrated transportation
(movilidad)
RESULT: city administration
knows city > leadership;
shared knowledge >
credibility increased
Innovative forms of information
• City TV + Canal Bogota
• Communication
strategies
• M + P talking etc
• “Bogota como vamos” +
public accountability
• Publications
RESULT: voice / change in
political incentives
Ex-post
• Bogota model + language part of political
agendas
• Mayors for president
• Other cities are following
• Renewed belief in public institutions
• Improved image of public good + public
office
• Practical turn in academia
Can it be repeated?
Bogota:
- Mayor Garzon
Other cities:
- Manizales, Pereira, Monteria…
But:
- Superficial copy cat does not work
- Beyond charisma: professional bureaucracy,
deep leadership, integrated long and short
circuits of poor oriented service delivery