Experiment Results
Dating Game
Presented by Doug Chung
Introduction
► Question addressed
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How fast
How strategic
Rational expectation / Nash
Absolute / Relative
Risk aversion
Introduction
► Motivation
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Group dating cases in Korea during the nineties
Analysis of strategic behavior
Signaling
► Matching problem
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Full information case
Different payoffs
Asymmetric Information case
Previous Literature
► Gale & Shapley (1962)
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Assigning applicants to colleges
► Mertens & Zamir (1971)
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Two-person zero sum games and asymmetric information
► Kelso & Crawford (1982)
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Labor market matching
► Ackerberg & Botticini (2002)
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Endogenous matching – principal & agent
► Sorensen (2003)
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Venture capital / firm matching
► Choo & Siow (2006)
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Marriage matches
Experimental Design
► Cohort
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4 person group that played each other
► Participants
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Undergraduate / Graduate students at Yale University – Ex2
Yale Korean Graduate Student Association – Ex1, Ex2, Ex3
Korean Military Acadamy Alumni Association at Texas A&M
Univeristy – Ex1, Ex2, Ex3
Total number of participants: 32
Experimental Design
► Experiment 1 (Perfect Information)
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Payoff matrix
Girl-High
Girl-Low
Boy-High
(4, 4)
(2, 4)
Boy-Low
(4, 2)
(2, 2)
Experimental Design
► Experiment 1 (Perfect Information)
Experimental Design
► Experiment 1 (Perfect Information) cont’
Experimental Design
► Experiment 2 (Uncertainty)
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Payoff matrix
Girl-High
Girl-Low
Boy-High
(4, 4)
(0, 4)
Boy-Low
(4, 0)
(0, 0)
Experimental Design
► Experiment 2 (Uncertainty)
Experimental Design
► Experiment 2 (Uncertainty) cont’
Experimental Design
► Experiment 3 (United we stand)
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Payoff matrix
Boy1
Girl-High
4
Boy2
Girl-Low
2
Boy1
Girl-High
0
Boy2
Girl-High
0
Boy1
Girl-Low
0
Boy2
Girl-Low
0
Experimental Design
► Experiment 3 (United we stand)
Experimental Design
► Experiment 3 (United we stand) cont’
Thank You